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<br /> ('1A LL14aY OL na aV bVU <br /> order to protect thew investments. Therefore, the likeh'hood of litigation is high should the <br /> (;ounty pass the Draft General Plan in its present form and seek to enforce its provisions. <br /> A. The reYtthttion of lead wheeh deprives a Isadowaer o[ all ecotaonaicat>y <br /> lS.°.S~~iwl ti4°e eia an uuTA^u~u~~u0vSl tru~ib~ ref W <br /> upcrty i <br /> i~isut iiuup2ufiauua <br /> contrary to the Flesh Amendmwt of the US CoaaHta6on. <br /> To the extent that any Hawaii landowners would be restricted to virtually no economically <br /> beneficial or viable use under the Draft General Plan, they would suffer an unconstitutional <br /> regulatory taking of their property under the Fifth Amettdztteut to the US Constitution. Under <br /> concur U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, a landowner must be able to make such economically <br /> beneficial use of laud or the regulating govemmentaJ agcy must pay compensation as if the <br /> ]and wen takes by eminent domain ("...nor shall private property be taken for public use, <br /> without just compenaation.'~. While arguably drafted principally to protect private landowners <br /> from physical takings without compensation, since at least l 922 and Ore decision of the U.S. <br /> Supreme Couri is Pennsvlvaoia Coal Co v Mahon. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) a regulation of land <br /> which goes "too far" is also a taking for which government must pay compensation. It is this <br /> "regulatory taking" issue which the Dnfl General Plan raises. The lend may have value. <br /> Indeed, it may evtn have some limited, "salvage" uses such as for walking or picnicking. But if <br /> it has no economically beneficial use, then the govemmmt moat pay for the land as if it had <br /> condemned it, or lift the offending regulation and potentially pay for the time during which the <br /> unconstitutional regulation affected the use of the relevant land. Thus, in Lucca v. South <br /> C2F'ClL*ia rCa4tEl CC^.tlC.l. U.S. 1003 (1992) S state c:,as"~ <br /> lw^ne y":3tec`ivn SutL't@ picJcrited <br /> David Lucas from constructing two beacbfront houses on two separate lots. The statute <br /> prevented dewekrparent forward (makar7 of a beach line in order to protect coastal habitat, plan; <br /> animal and marine species, the natural ~virornnent and tourism. Remaining legal uses included <br /> walking; limited camping and picnicking. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the strpttxne court <br /> of South Carolina, holding that a regulation which removes all productive or economically <br /> beneficial use from a parcel of land is a regulatory taking requiring compensation under the Fifth <br /> Amendment. The court impoacd m limitations on this per se, categorical rule except for two <br /> exceptions -nuisance and background principles of a state's law of property (public trust and <br /> customary rights, neither of which eppcara to be applicable here). Observing that too often ]and <br /> use regulations having as their principal purpose the preservation of the enviromncnt have forced <br /> a single landowner to bear the burden of such public befits, the Court said: <br /> Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically <br /> beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent <br /> inquiry into the nature of the owrter's estate shows that the proscribed <br /> use interests were not part of his title to begin with. <br /> Lucas, 505 U.S. at ]027. Closely following this reasoning in Lucas, a Maryland court held that <br /> an open space zoning category effectively foreclosed all economically viable use when applied <br /> to private property, resulting in a total taking. Steel v. C~a a Corporation 111 Md App. 1 <br /> (1996): <br /> 5 <br /> <br />