COM 0910.003 1996-1998 - Laserfiche WebLink

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Mr. Albert Lono [ an Page 3 September 21, 1987 time move his purchasers from one campsite to another--so he now argues to us--the evidence supports the Superior Court's finaing that in reality a purchaser acquires an indefinite interest in a particular campsite. The purchaser chooses his campsite at the time of purchase and pays a price for it that varies by as much as $10,000 depending on the campsite's location. Further, although the stipulation of facts says only that the purchaser receives the right to exclusive use of the 'facilities' at his campsite (a term that, as used in the stipulation, apparently refers only to the campsite hookups for water, sewage, and electricity), it is plain that the purchaser receives exclusive use of a broader area surrounding the facilities as well. This is evident from the fact that he may erect a tent pad, tireplace, and other minor installations. As a matter or conunon sense, one does more while camping than simply use the facilities. Although Wilkinson attempted to avoid a direct answer on this point, he eventually aumitted that a purchaser of one campsite would not be permitted to pitch a tent on a campsite alreauy purchased by someone else. Clearly, each purchaser receives an indefinite tee interest in a unique and identifiable parcel of iana, although the boundaries of the parcel are not well defined. We therefore conclude that there has been a division of the campground into lots so as to bring the Birch Point Colony Club within the scope of 30 M.R.S.A. $ 4956." 444 A.2d pp. 42-430 Another case is People, eetta__ v. Grund City National Bank, 422 N.E.2d 648 (1981). In this case the defendants p annex convert a mobile home park to a conoominium by selling cubicles of air over pads. These would be the units which were independently owned. Then each owner would own an undivided share of the common elements consisting of the remaining grounds and facilities of the trailer park. The County brought an action claiming the plan was not allowable under the Condominium Property Act. The court found that the mobile home park was not convertible to condominium form of ownership of property. it found that "jt)he type of conversion which defendants envision is essentially nothing more than a subdivision of the existing park. If defendants' argument were accepted, a developer who owned land which he divided into lots,