2024-03-06 PL-SMA-2023-000046 Claudia Rohr Opposition Testimony (2)

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3/6/24, 12:06 PM Unite Here!Local 5 v.City and Cty.of Honolulu,231 P.3d 423-Haw: Supreme Court 2010-Google Scholar 443 Id.at 468,209 P.3d at 1282(Nakamura,J.,dissenting).The dissent considered the overriding purpose of HEPA—i.e.,"to ensure*443 that an agency is provided with relevant information about the environmental impacts of a proposed project so that the agency can make informed decisions about the project,"id.at 471,209 P.3d at 1285(citing HRS §343-1(1993))—and concluded that"[a]proposed project can become'an essentially different action'in terms of its environmental impacts due to changed circumstances surrounding the project or the discovery of new information,even if the project's design has not changed."Id.The dissent additionally reasoned,as discussed infra,that "absurd results"would stem from the majority's interpretation of HEPA and HAR§§11-200-26 and 11-200-27.Id.at 472,209 P.3d at 1286.Thus,the dissent concluded that," [b]ecause of its erroneous view of the law,the DPP failed to consider appropriate factors and follow correct procedures in deciding not to require a[]SEIS."Id.at 474,209 P.3d at 1288. The ICA filed its judgment on appeal on June 12,2009.The plaintiffs filed a timely application for a writ of certiorari on September 8,2009.114]Thereafter,this court accepted the plaintiffs'application on October 13,2009 and heard oral argument on December 17,2009.0 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Summary Judgment An appellate court"review[s]an award of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the circuit court."Yoneda v.Tom.110 Hawaii 367,371,133 P.3d 796,800 (2006)(citation omitted).Thus,this court reviews the circuit court's grant or denial of summary judgment de nova.Sierra Club v.Dept of Transp.,115 Hawaii 299,312,167 P.3d 292 305(2007).Moreover, [s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,depositions,answers to interrogatories,and admissions on file,together with the affidavits,if any,show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.In other words,we must view all of the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id.at 313,167 P.3d at 306(citations omitted). B. Statutory Interpretation This court has established the following principles for interpreting a statute: First,the fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself.Second,where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous,our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.Third,implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature,which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.Fourth,when there is doubt,doubleness of meaning,or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute,an ambiguity exists.And fifth,in construing an ambiguous 444 statute,the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining*444 the context,with which the ambiguous words,phrases,and sentences may be compared,in order to ascertain their true meaning. Awakuni v Awana,115 Hawaii 126,133,165 P.3d 1027,1034(2007)(citation omitted).This court has also instructed that statutory language must be read"in the context of the entire statute and construe[d]in a manner consistent with its purpose."Hous..Fin..&.Dev.Corp..v..Castle,79 Hawai'i 64,77,898 P.2d 576,589(1.995)(citation omitted). ......... ......... ......... — The same general principles that apply to statutory interpretation also apply to interpretation of administrative rules.Allstate Ins.Co.v Ponce,105 Hawaii 445,454,99 P.3d 96,105(2004),(citation omitted). C. Conclusions of Law "A COL is not binding on an appellate court and is freely reviewable for correctness.Thus,the court reviews COL de novo,under the right/wrong standard."Kapuwai v City& County of Honolulu 121 Hawaii 33,39,211 P.3d 750,756(2009).(citation omitted).Statutory interpretation is"a question of law reviewable de novo."Awakuni,115 Hawaii at 132,165 P.3d at 1033. D. Agency Decisions The issue of what standard to apply when reviewing an agency's decision whether a SEIS is required presents a question of first impression in this jurisdiction.This court, however,has reviewed an agency's determination whether an EIS satisfies the applicable statutory requirements under the"rule of reason"standard.See Price v Obayashi Hawaii Corp.,81 Hawai'i 171,182,914 P.2d 1364,1375(1996).As applied to consideration of the adequacy of an EIS,this court has stated: In making such a determination[,a]court is guided by the"rule of reason,"under which an EIS need not be exhaustive to the point of discussing all possible details bearing on the proposed action but will be upheld as adequate if it has been compiled in good faith and sets forth sufficient information to enable the decision-maker to consider fully the environmental factors involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the environment against the benefits to be derived from the proposed action,as well as to make a reasoned choice between alternatives. Id.(quoting Life of the Land v.Ariyoshi,59 Haw.156,164-65,577 P.2d 111 6,1121(1978)(citation omitted))(footnote omitted). Moreover,this court has recognized that"[a]court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its action.Rather,the court must ensure that the agency has taken a hard look'at environmental factors,"and,"[i]f the agency has followed the proper procedures,its action will only be set aside if the court finds the action to be arbitrary and capricious,'given the known environmental consequences."Id.at 182 n.12,914 P.2d at 1375 n.12(relying on federal case law). III. DISCUSSION The plaintiffs primarily contend before this court that the ICA majority erred in interpreting HEPA and HAR§§11-200-26 and 11-200-27"to mean that an agency may order a supplemental review only when there has been a substantive change in the design of a project"and essentially argue that a SEIS is warranted when the project has changed "substantively in size,scope,intensity,use,location,or timing."HAR§11-200-26.In response,Kuilima raises two threshold issues that must be addressed prior to reaching https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4308700817237546533&q=unite+here+local+5&hl=en&as_sdt=2006 10/17