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3/6/24, 12:06 PM Unite Here!Local 5 v.City and Cty.of Honolulu,231 P.3d 423-Haw: Supreme Court 2010-Google Scholar <br /> [a]public administrative agency possesses only such rule-making authority as is delegated to it by the state legislature and may only exercise this power within <br /> the framework of the statute under which it is conferred.Administrative rules and regulations which exceed the scope of the statutory enactment they were <br /> devised to implement are invalid and must be struck down. <br /> Haole v.State,111 Hawaii 144,152,140 P.3d 377,385(2006).(citations omitted)(brackets in original).In other words, <br /> an administrative agency can only wield powers expressly or implicitly granted to it by statute.However,it is well established that an administrative agency's <br /> authority includes those implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted.The reason for implied powers is that,as a <br /> practical matter,the legislature cannot foresee all the problems incidental to carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the agency. <br /> Id.(emphasis in original)(citation omitted).Here,the rule-making authority expressly grants to the Environmental Council the power to promulgate rules regarding EISs. <br /> However,to further the purpose and intent of HEPA,the Council,as discussed supra,clearly contemplated the possibility of changes to the original project that may dictate the <br /> need for a further environmental impact assessment,i.e.,a SEIS.Thus,the rules promulgated to address SEISs,including HAIR§§11-200-26 and 11-200-27,are clearly <br /> within the"implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted." <br /> Moreover,the SEIS process established by the Environmental Council is consistent with HEPA and its objectives—i.e.,"environmental consciousness is enhanced, <br /> cooperation and coordination are encouraged,and public participation during the review process benefits all parties involved and society as a whole,"HRS§343-1—and <br /> furthers environmental review.Consequently,we hold that the Environmental Council did not exceed its authority in promulgating rules to guide the SEIS process,including <br /> HAIR§§11-200-26 and 11-200-27. <br /> C. Requirement that Kuilima Complete a SEIS <br /> With respect to the plaintiffs'arguments regarding the timing of the project,the ICA stated that: <br /> Plaintiffs'only allegation in the circuit court of a"change"in the[p]roject was an alleged change in"timing."Plaintiffs argue that increased traffic,other planned <br /> developments near the[p]roject,and the existence of endangered or threatened species constitute"new circumstances or evidence."However,these are not <br /> substantive changes in the[p]roject. <br /> 450 When asked what information they had about changes in the[p]roject,each of[p]laintiffs'deposition witnesses admitted'450 they had no personal knowledge or <br /> evidence of changes in the[p]roject,with the exception of their claim regarding timing. <br /> Unite Here_,120 Hawaii at 466,209 P.3d at 1280(emphasis added).The ICA went on to determine that"[t]he[1985]EIS detailed only an approximate phasing of the <br /> development for the resort[,]"'and that"[n]either the[1985]EIS nor the governmental entities imposed a timing condition"and ultimately concluded that"[t]he record in this <br /> case demonstrates there was no substantial change in the[p]roject,"including a change with respect to timing.Id. <br /> The plaintiffs argue before this court that,because:(1)"[t]he EIS's impact analysis relied on basic assumptions about the project's timing by incorporating construction <br /> projections in three phases"and(2)twenty-four years have passed since the 1985 EIS was approved,there has been a change in the project's timing such that there is"an <br /> essentially different action...under consideration."HAR§11-200-26.In its response,Kuilima contends that a different action is not under consideration because"the[p]roject <br /> ...was not qualified by timing"inasmuch as"[t]he phasing plan for the[p]roject contemplated only a general and approximate plan for development"and"the[u]nilateral <br /> [a]greement...contemplated a reasonable and flexible schedule."Further,Kuilima argues that,"[e]ven if this[c]ourt concludes that[plaintiffs]have shown a change in the <br /> timing of the[p]roject,'the[plaintiffs]have failed to connect any new or different significant effect resulting from'that alleged change that was not originally disclosed or <br /> previously dealt with"in the 1985 EIS. <br /> HAIR§11-200-26 states that: <br /> A statement that is accepted with respect to a particular action is usually qualified by the size,scope,location,intensity,use,and timing of the action,among other <br /> things.A statement that is accepted with respect to a particular action shall satisfy the requirements of this chapter and no other statement for that proposed <br /> action shall be required,to the extent that the action has not changed substantively in size,scope,intensity,use,location,or timing,among other things.If there is <br /> any change in any of these characteristics which may have a significant effect,the original statement that was changed shall no longer be valid because an <br /> essentially different action would be under consideration and a supplemental statement shall be prepared and reviewed as provided by this chapter.As long as <br /> there is not change in a proposed action resulting in individual or cumulative impacts not originally disclosed,the statement associated with that action shall be <br /> deemed to comply with this chapter. <br /> (Emphases added).This court has stated that'[t]he fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself....[W]here the statutory language <br /> is plain and unambiguous,[the courts]sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning."Awakuni,115 Hawaii at 133,165 P.3d at 1034.The same general <br /> principles that apply to statutory interpretation also apply to interpretation of administrative rules.Allstate Ins.Co.,105 Hawaii at 454,99 P.3d at 105. <br /> Based on the plain language of subsection 26,every EIS is inherently"qualified,"or limited,by,inter alia,"the timing of the action,"i.e.,some sort of time frame.As the <br /> plaintiffs recognized,failing to consider the timing of a project,among other things, <br /> guts environmental review because certainly no one would argue that...we don't know how big this project is going to be,we don't know how much density <br /> there's going to be on this project,we don't know exactly where on the property this project is going to be located.All of those things need to be set out[i]n an <br /> EIS. <br /> We agree.For an EIS to meet its intended purpose,it must assess a particular project at a given location based on an explicit or implicit time frame. <br /> Here,the 1985 EIS explicitly described the scope of the project and centered its analysis on the size,location,intensity,and use of Kuilima's expansion.The 1985 EIS also <br /> 451 specifically referenced the"phasing and timing of the action,"stating that the"Phase I designation generally indicates a 1986 start*451 of construction date,Phase II, <br /> commencement between 1988 to 1989,and Phase III,[c]ommencement between 1993 to 1996."Although the phasing projections were"flexible,"such projections indicate <br /> that the 1985 EIS was subject to an implied timing condition or time frame,especially in light of the plain language of HAIR§11-200-26 identifying timing as a consideration. <br /> The record in the instant case indicates that the EIS was based on and limited to data available in 1985 and projected through 2000.As a result,the 1985 EIS addressed only <br /> the environmental impacts of the project within that time frame.For example,the evidence in the record indicates that:(1)traffic studies analyzed traffic impact projections <br /> through 2000;(2)visitor units,hotel demand,and population growth were also projected and analyzed only through 2000;and(3)monk seal populations were nearly non- <br /> existent in the project area at the time and,thus,were not even considered in the 1985 EIS. <br /> Inasmuch as:(1)over twenty years have passed since the approval of the 1985 EIS;(2)the evidence demonstrates that environmental impacts were examined only through <br /> 2000;and(3)the project is not yet completed,we conclude that the project,although unchanged in terms of size,scope,location,intensity,and use,is—due to the change in <br /> https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4308700817237546533&q=unite+here+local+5&hl=en&as_sdt=2006 13/17 <br />