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Case 1:22-cv-00247-DKW-RT Document 85 Filed 12/21/23 Page 13 of 28 PagelD.3073 <br /> § 46-4(a)." Dkt. No. 72 at 6. The lack of a state court ruling on these precise <br /> matters is not determinative. Rather, a court should abstain under the third prong <br /> of Pullman where "a federal court cannot predict with any confidence how the <br /> state's highest court would decide an issue of state law." Pearl Inv. Co. v. City & <br /> Cnty. of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). <br /> Here, there is little indication that determining whether Ordinance 22-7 <br /> qualifies as a land use ordinance or rental regulation is an uncertain or unclear <br /> matter of state law. Rather, in making this determination, the Court is easily aided <br /> by ordinary tools of statutory interpretation and context. See, e.g., Reprod. Health <br /> Servs. v. Strange, 204 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1331-32 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (applying state <br /> rules of statutory construction to determine whether a statute is ambiguous for the <br /> purposes of Pullman); see also infra at 15-17. Accordingly, the Court lacks the <br /> discretion to exercise Pullman abstention in this case. See Harman v. Forssenius, <br /> 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965) ("The doctrine...contemplates that deference to state <br /> court adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain." <br /> (emphasis added)). <br /> B. Preemption <br /> HILSTRA contends that Ordinance 22-7 is conflict-preempted by HRS § 46- <br /> 4(a), which prohibits counties from enacting zoning ordinances which discontinue <br /> previously lawful residential property uses. Dkt. No. 60 at 15. Under Hawaii law, <br /> - 13 - <br />