2024-04-02 PL-CCI-2024-000003 Bill 121 Claudia Rohr Testimony

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Case 1:22-cv-00247-DKW-RT Document 85 Filed 12/21/23 Page 15 of 28 PagelD.3075 As an initial matter, it is first necessary to determine the precise nature of the alleged conflict. Relying on Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), the City asserts that the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between "land use (i.e., residential living activities)" and "the economic relationship between the landlord and tenant (i.e., the rental agreement)." Dkt. No. 72 at 9-10. The City argues that rental duration and advertising constitute the latter, such that Ordinance 22-7 is not a zoning ordinance at all, but rather a rental regulation authorized pursuant to HRS § 46-1.5(20)." Id. at 6-13. This is consequential as "restrictions on amortizing nonconforming uses created by HRS § 46-4(a) do not apply to rental regulations authorized by HRS § 46-1.5(20)." Id. at 6. The City's attempt to reframe the issue first presented during preliminary injunction proceedings more than a year ago is unavailing. In Yee, the Supreme Court explained that the ordinance at issue "regulate[d] petitioners' use of their land by regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant." Yee, 503 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added). It did not create the land use versus landlord-tenant distinction that the City now imagines. Further, HRS § 464(a) grants the counties wide latitude to enact zoning regulations, including, inter alia, through ordinances which specify "the areas in "HRS § 46-1.5(20) authorizes counties to"regulate the renting, subletting, and rental conditions of property for places of abode by ordinance." - 15 -