2024-04-02 PL-CCI-2024-000003 Bill 121 Claudia Rohr Testimony

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Case 1:22-cv-00247-DKW-RT Document 85 Filed 12/21/23 Page 18 of 28 PagelD.3078 Stated plainly and unambiguously, this statute prohibits counties from passing zoning ordinances which discontinue any previously lawful uses.15 See Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 919 P.2d 263, 269 (Haw. 1996) ("[w]here the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, [the Court's] only duty is to give effect to the statute's plain and obvious meaning."). Further, there is only one exception: [A] zoning ordinance may provide for elimination of nonconforming uses as the uses are discontinued, or for the amortization or phasing out of nonconforming uses or signs over a reasonable period of time in commercial, industrial, resort, and apartment zoned areas only. In no event shall such amortization or phasing out of nonconforming uses apply to any existing building or premises used for residential (single-family or duplex) or agricultural uses. In other words, although HRS § 464(a) permits a county to phase out nonconforming uses "over a reasonable period of time," this exception is clearly limited to only four zoning districts: commercial, industrial, resort, and apartment. Conversely, the counties are explicitly prohibited from phasing out non- conforming uses in "any existing building or premises used for residential (single- family or duplex) . . . uses." HRS § 464(a) (emphasis added). 15Indeed, Hawaii courts have confirmed this facially obvious reading of HRS § 46-4(a). See, e.g., Waikiki Marketplace, 949 P.2d at 193 (explaining that to comply with HRS § 464(a), new LUOs must include provisions grandfathering in nonconforming uses);Ferris Trust, 378 P.3d at 1028 ("[t]he statutory protection of lawfully existing uses and structures prior to the effective date of a zoning restriction is grounded in constitutional law." (quotation marks and citation omitted)). - 18 -