Laserfiche WebLink
Case 1:22-cv-00247-DKW-RT Document 85 Filed 12/21/23 Page 25 of 28 PagelD.3085 <br /> B. Scope of Injunctive Relief <br /> Having met each of the requirements for a permanent injunction, the Court <br /> turns to the only remaining question—that of scope. "A district court has broad <br /> latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary to remedy an established <br /> wrong." High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 641 (9th Cir. 2004) <br /> (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has <br /> instructed that "injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant <br /> than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs." Califano v. Yamasaki, <br /> 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). Such "tailoring [is] particularly important where, as <br /> here, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against a state or local government." <br /> Melendres v. Maricopa Cnty., 897 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 2018). <br /> Here, HILSTRA requests that the Court invalidate the entirety of Ordinance <br /> 22-7 as "its very core purpose [of prohibiting 30-89 day rentals] is frustrated upon <br /> striking its unlawful provisions." Dkt. No. 82 at 13-14; Dkt. No. 60 at 23. Such a <br /> remedy, however, is overbroad. For instance, HILSTRA acknowledges that the <br /> issue of whether "Ordinance 22-7 validly prohibits rentals of less than 90 days for <br /> properties that were not lawfully used prior to its enactment . . . is not before the <br /> Court, as Plaintiff's complaint was focused on the prior lawful uses." Dkt. No. 82 <br /> at 14 n.3. Moreover, Ordinance 22-7 contains an explicit severability clause, <br /> providing: <br /> - 25 - <br />