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Application of Hawaii Elec. Light Co., Inc.,60 Haw.625 (1979)
<br /> 594 P.2d 612
<br /> While we have said that the courts have great respect for the findings made by specialized agencies,those findings are subject
<br /> to judicial review.In order to facilitate that review,HRS s 91-12(1976)provides that:
<br /> Every decision and order adverse to a party to the proceeding, rendered by an agency in a contested
<br /> case, shall be in writing or stated in the record and shall be accompanied by separate findings of fact and
<br /> conclusions of law. If any party to the proceeding has filed proposed findings of fact, the agency shall
<br /> incorporate in its decision a ruling upon each proposed finding so presented.
<br /> The requirement that the Commission set out findings of fact and conclusions of law is no mere technical or perfunctory matter.
<br /> In re Application of Kauai Electric Division,supra,60 Haw.at--,590 P.2d at 537.The purpose of the statutory requirement
<br /> that the agency set forth separately its *642 findings of fact and conclusions of law is to assure reasoned decision making by
<br /> the agency and enable judicial review of agency decisions. See Pin Re Application of Terminal Transportation,Inc.,54 Haw.
<br /> 134, 504 P.2d 1214(1972); Cooper, Supra,at 465-468;Davis, Supra,at s 16.03.
<br /> In order that we might be informed of the factual basis upon which the Commission relies,the Commission's findings of Ultimate
<br /> facts 10 must be supported by findings of Basic facts which in turn are required to be supported by the evidence in the record.
<br /> FaIn re Application of Kauai Electric Division, supra, 60 Haw. at--, 590 P.2d at 537; Boise Water Corp. v. Idaho Public
<br /> Utilities Commission,supra,97 Idaho at 840,555 P.2d at 171; Cooper, Supra,at 466;Davis, Supra,at s 16.04. See PMitchell
<br /> v.BWK Joint Venture,57 Haw.535,560 P.2d 1292(1977);International Minerals and Chemical Corp.v.Mayo,336 So.2d 548
<br /> (Fla.1976).In the instant case,the Commission has failed to support its ultimate finding that the residential rate structure is just
<br /> and reasonable with sufficiently specific findings of fact to enable this court to intelligently review its decision. As the court
<br /> said in American Can Co.v.Davis,28 Or.App. 207,216, 559 P.2d 898, 905 (1977);
<br /> (T)he findings ought to set forth sufficient facts so that the reviewing court can prudently discharge its duty and not experience
<br /> a sense of frustration through inability to get at the facts.The circumstance that the evidence is in the transcript **624 and that
<br /> the court,by weighing it, can determine for itself'the facts'does not suffice. The agency is the fact finder, and the undigested
<br /> transcript is not a substitute for a set of findings of fact. . . .Nor should a court be put in a position wherein it is forced to ferret
<br /> out the facts or seek them through engaging in mathematical calculations of a kind for which special training is required.
<br /> *643 We cannot fill the voids in the Commission's orders for we are not the fact finding body. See Camelot Utilities,Inc.v.
<br /> Illinois Commerce Commission,51 Ill.App.3d 5,8 Ill.Dec.74,365 N.E.2d 312(1977);New England Telephone and Telegraph
<br /> Co.v. Public Utilities Commission,R.I.,376 A.2d 1041 (1977); City of Milford v. Illinois Commerce Commission, supra,45
<br /> Ill.App.3d at 737, 4 Ill.Dec. at 194, 359 N.E.2d at 1146; American Can Co. v. Davis, supra, 28 Or.App. at 216, 559 P.2d at
<br /> 905;Bristol County Water Co.v. Public Utilities Commission, 117 R.I. 89,363 A.2d 444 (1976). To hold otherwise would be
<br /> inconsistent with the presumed validity of the Commission's orders.
<br /> B. Whether the Commission's conclusion that the residential rate structure is not unreasonably discriminatory is justified by
<br /> reliable,probative and substantial evidence.
<br /> Once a utility's revenue requirement has been determined, the final question is the rate structure or the set of rates that will
<br /> produce the additional revenues that are needed to earn the permitted rate of return. St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce
<br /> v. Minnesota Public Service Commission, 312 Minn. 250, 251 N.W.2d 350 (1977); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. Davis, 28
<br /> Or.App. 621, 560 P.2d 301 (1977).
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