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120 P.3d 217 Page 10
<br />108 Hawai'i 318, 120 P.3d 217
<br />(Cite as: 108 Hawai'i 318, 120 P.3d 217)
<br />Calderon v. Los Angeles, 4 Cal.3d 251, 93 and districts that exactly correspond to the county's
<br />Cal.Rptr. 361, 481 P.2d 489, 491 (1971).five towns “based on the long tradition of overlap-
<br />ping functions and dual personnel” in the county
<br />government and “on the fact that the plan ... [did] not
<br />A[s]tate may legitimately desire to maintain the in-
<br />contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular po-
<br />tegrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as
<br />litical interests or geographic areas”).
<br />possible, and provide for compact districts of con-
<br />tiguous territory in designating a legislative appor-
<br />tionment scheme. Valid considerations may under-In view of these considerations, ... minor devia-
<br />lie such aims. Indiscriminate districting, without tions from mathematical equality among state leg-
<br />any regard for political subdivision or natural or islative districts are insufficient to make out a
<br />historical boundary lines, may be little more than prima facie case of invidious discrimination under
<br />an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering. Sin-the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justifi-
<br />gle-member districts may be the rule in one [s]tate, cation by the State. [Supreme Court] decisions
<br />while another [s]tate might desire to achieve some have established, as a general matter, that an ap-
<br />flexibility by creating multimember or floterial dis-portionment plan with a maximum population de-
<br />tricts.Whatever the means of accomplishment, the viation under 10% falls within this category of mi-
<br />overriding objective must be substantial equality of nor deviations. A plan with larger disparities in
<br />population among the various districts, so that the population, however, creates a prima facie case of
<br />vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight discrimination and therefore must be justified by
<br />to that of any other citizen in the [s]tate. the [s]tate.
<br />....Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43, 103
<br />S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983) (internal quotation
<br />marks and citations omitted). SeeKawamoto, 75
<br />So long as the divergences from a strict population
<br />Haw. at 474, 868 P.2d at 1189.
<br />standard are based on legitimate considerations in-
<br />cident to the effectuation of a rational state policy,
<br />some deviations from the equal-population princi-[10] At issue in Brown was a Wyoming reappor-
<br />ple are constitutionally permissible with respect to tionment plan that allocated one of sixty-four seats in
<br />the apportionment of seats in either or both of the the state's house of representatives to a county with a
<br />two houses of a bicameral state legislature. deviation of 60% below the mean. Id. at 837, 843,
<br />103 S.Ct. 2690. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
<br />upheld the plan on the following bases: (1) it was
<br />**225 *326
<br />Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79, 84 S.Ct.
<br />“undisputed” that Wyoming's policy of ensuring that
<br />1362 (emphases added). SeeSwann v. Adams, 385
<br />each county had one representative was “free from
<br />U.S. 440, 443-44, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501
<br />any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination”; (2)
<br />(1967) (reversing a decision upholding a reappor-
<br />“population equality [was] the sole other criterion
<br />tionment plan where the state failed to present, and
<br />used”; and (3) “there [was] no built-in bias tending to
<br />the district court failed to articulate, “acceptable
<br />favor particular political interests or geographic ar-
<br />reasons for the variations” of 30% among senate
<br />eas.”Id. at 843-44, 103 S.Ct. 2690. The Brown ma-
<br />districts and 40% among house districts).
<br />jority approved of the Wyoming plan as “an unusu-
<br />ally strong example of an apportionment plan the
<br />[8][9] The “general principle of population
<br />population variations of which [were] entirely the
<br />equality ... applies to state and local elections[.]”
<br />result of the consistent and nondiscriminatory appli-
<br />Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 29
<br />FN8
<br />cation of a legitimate state policy.” Id. at 844, 103
<br />L.Ed.2d 399 (1971). The Supreme Court has inti-
<br />S.Ct. 2690. Thus, the “ultimate inquiry” is to deter-
<br />mated that “slightly greater percentage deviations
<br />mine “whether the legislature's plan may reasonably
<br />may be tolerable for local government apportionment
<br />be said to advance a rational state policy and, if so,
<br />schemes” and that “particular circumstances and
<br />whether the population disparities among the districts
<br />needs of a local community as a whole may some-
<br />that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed
<br />times justify departures from strict equality.” Id. See
<br />constitutional limits.”Id. at 843, 103 S.Ct. 2690 (in-
<br />id. at 186-88, 91 S.Ct. 1904 (upholding a county re-
<br />ternal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omit-
<br />apportionment plan with a total deviation of 11.9%
<br />© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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