Laserfiche WebLink
120 P.3d 217 Page 10 <br />108 Hawai'i 318, 120 P.3d 217 <br />(Cite as: 108 Hawai'i 318, 120 P.3d 217) <br />Calderon v. Los Angeles, 4 Cal.3d 251, 93 and districts that exactly correspond to the county's <br />Cal.Rptr. 361, 481 P.2d 489, 491 (1971).five towns “based on the long tradition of overlap- <br />ping functions and dual personnel” in the county <br />government and “on the fact that the plan ... [did] not <br />A[s]tate may legitimately desire to maintain the in- <br />contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular po- <br />tegrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as <br />litical interests or geographic areas”). <br />possible, and provide for compact districts of con- <br />tiguous territory in designating a legislative appor- <br />tionment scheme. Valid considerations may under-In view of these considerations, ... minor devia- <br />lie such aims. Indiscriminate districting, without tions from mathematical equality among state leg- <br />any regard for political subdivision or natural or islative districts are insufficient to make out a <br />historical boundary lines, may be little more than prima facie case of invidious discrimination under <br />an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering. Sin-the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justifi- <br />gle-member districts may be the rule in one [s]tate, cation by the State. [Supreme Court] decisions <br />while another [s]tate might desire to achieve some have established, as a general matter, that an ap- <br />flexibility by creating multimember or floterial dis-portionment plan with a maximum population de- <br />tricts.Whatever the means of accomplishment, the viation under 10% falls within this category of mi- <br />overriding objective must be substantial equality of nor deviations. A plan with larger disparities in <br />population among the various districts, so that the population, however, creates a prima facie case of <br />vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight discrimination and therefore must be justified by <br />to that of any other citizen in the [s]tate. the [s]tate. <br />....Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43, 103 <br />S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983) (internal quotation <br />marks and citations omitted). SeeKawamoto, 75 <br />So long as the divergences from a strict population <br />Haw. at 474, 868 P.2d at 1189. <br />standard are based on legitimate considerations in- <br />cident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, <br />some deviations from the equal-population princi-[10] At issue in Brown was a Wyoming reappor- <br />ple are constitutionally permissible with respect to tionment plan that allocated one of sixty-four seats in <br />the apportionment of seats in either or both of the the state's house of representatives to a county with a <br />two houses of a bicameral state legislature. deviation of 60% below the mean. Id. at 837, 843, <br />103 S.Ct. 2690. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court <br />upheld the plan on the following bases: (1) it was <br />**225 *326 <br />Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79, 84 S.Ct. <br />“undisputed” that Wyoming's policy of ensuring that <br />1362 (emphases added). SeeSwann v. Adams, 385 <br />each county had one representative was “free from <br />U.S. 440, 443-44, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501 <br />any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination”; (2) <br />(1967) (reversing a decision upholding a reappor- <br />“population equality [was] the sole other criterion <br />tionment plan where the state failed to present, and <br />used”; and (3) “there [was] no built-in bias tending to <br />the district court failed to articulate, “acceptable <br />favor particular political interests or geographic ar- <br />reasons for the variations” of 30% among senate <br />eas.”Id. at 843-44, 103 S.Ct. 2690. The Brown ma- <br />districts and 40% among house districts). <br />jority approved of the Wyoming plan as “an unusu- <br />ally strong example of an apportionment plan the <br />[8][9] The “general principle of population <br />population variations of which [were] entirely the <br />equality ... applies to state and local elections[.]” <br />result of the consistent and nondiscriminatory appli- <br />Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 29 <br />FN8 <br />cation of a legitimate state policy.” Id. at 844, 103 <br />L.Ed.2d 399 (1971). The Supreme Court has inti- <br />S.Ct. 2690. Thus, the “ultimate inquiry” is to deter- <br />mated that “slightly greater percentage deviations <br />mine “whether the legislature's plan may reasonably <br />may be tolerable for local government apportionment <br />be said to advance a rational state policy and, if so, <br />schemes” and that “particular circumstances and <br />whether the population disparities among the districts <br />needs of a local community as a whole may some- <br />that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed <br />times justify departures from strict equality.” Id. See <br />constitutional limits.”Id. at 843, 103 S.Ct. 2690 (in- <br />id. at 186-88, 91 S.Ct. 1904 (upholding a county re- <br />ternal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omit- <br />apportionment plan with a total deviation of 11.9% <br />© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. <br /> <br />