2005-04-01_Defendant-Appellant-Cross_Appellees_County_of_Hawaiis_Amended_Opening_Brief

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of third parties. Adair v. Hustace, 64 Haw. at 321, 640 P.2d at 300, citing W. McClintock, Equity § 28 at 72 (2d Ed. 1948). The doctrine of laches is not limited by the statute of limitations,but may preclude an equitable action brought within the applicable statutory period. Adair v. Hustace, 64 Haw. at 321-322, 640 P.2d at 300, Footnote 6. Plaintiffs never took an administrative appeal from any of the SMA or Use permits, subdivision approvals, or the Development Agreement(an"administrative action,"HRS § 46- 131),within the 30-day appeal period of HRS § 91-14(b)(1993) (the legislature clearly meant a very short appeal window for such entitlements). The complaints herein have never pled invalidation of subdivisions,County zoning, land use boundary or general plan amendments. There does not appear to be a specific limitation statute for zoning or Chapter 205 claims,but even properly pled zoning invalidation claims appear governed by the limitations applicable to the basis of the claim. See,Bremner v. City& County of Honolulu, 96 Hawaii 134, 145,28 P.d 350, 361 (App.2001)(Zoning challenge barred by 120-day limitation on underlying Chapter 343 claim.). The trial court's sua sponte invalidation of zoning, general plan or land use boundary amendments was barred by the underlying limitations on entitlements. 2. There Was Ample Public Notice of A Planned Substantial 1-Acre Subdivision In the State Land Use Agricultural District from September 1993 Onward. It is undisputed that Plaintiff-Appellee PKO's President, Jim Medeiros Sr., was employed on the Hokuli'a project from August 1999 to August 2000. He also knew of his ancestors' burials on the project site from the early 1990's. PKO and its principals plainly had actual notice of the significance of this property for years, and of the construction ongoing. Beyond this,none of the Plaintiff-Appellees have any interest in, or agricultural use claims on the subject property which would have entitled them to any personal, actual notice of any of the rezoning or permitting actions on which this project was based. It would be absurd to say that general public interest plaintiffs without any known ownership or agricultural interest in a particular property should be entitled to any ern sonal notice of proposed uses there. Moreover, This Court has held that even in cases of personal confidential relationship or fraud,there is no requirement of actual notice if facts and circumstances are sufficient to impute knowledge of a claim. Adair v. Hustace, 64 Haw. 314, 322; 640 P.2d 294, 300-301 (1982). 30