2005-04-01_Defendant-Appellant-Cross_Appellees_County_of_Hawaiis_Amended_Opening_Brief

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themselves by allegedly wrongful acts or omissions,the answer would always be"yes,"and laches would never apply. Instead, the Circuit Court should have focused on whether Plaintiffs had slept on known claims unreasonably, to the unfair prejudice of Defendants. Clearly Plaintiffs did sleep, Defendants now suffer huge prejudice, and laches should apply. Moreover,there is no general duty personally owed to developers or individuals for county zoning interpretation or enforcement. Biser v. Deibel, 128 Md.App. 670, 739 A.2d 948 (1999) cert. Den. 357 Md. 482, 745 A.2d 436 (Md. 2000)(Planning Director and Zoning Administrator had no negligent misrepresentation duty for construction of office buildings in residential area);Konicki v. Village of Hinsdale, 100 Ill. App.3d 560,427 N.E.2d 325 (1981)(Village had no duty regarding negligent zoning advice to owner);Pigott v. City of Wilmington, 50 N.C.App. 401, 273 S.E.2d 752 (1981)(Chief Building inspector had no negligence duty regarding building code interpretation on permitted uses). If the County has no negligence duty to persons regarding interpretation or enforcement of zoning laws, it should certainly not be held to "cause"the damages resulting from Plaintiffs' delay in bringing known HRS Chapter 205 claims. The Count IV order does not present any laches authority which would excuse delay in seeking enforcement because of a lack of enforcement. Laches should apply here. c. The Development Agreement Poses No County Enforcement Conflict or Collaboration With Developer Barring Equitable Laches Relief. Plaintiff-Appellees may argue that the Court's excuse of delay here is based on the "unclean hands"conclusion that the"County of Hawaii and Oceanside deliberately collaborated to avoid LUC involvement in exchange for the conditions imposed in the Development Agreement." R, Count IV Order, COL No. 24,R at 66: 21413A256. This argument fails for several reasons. First,the Development Agreement does not avoid HRS Chapter 205,but expressly requires compliance with it. The Circuit Court itself correctly held: "Oceanside's April 20, 1998 Development Agreement with the County was explicitly conditioned on compliance with HRS Chapter 205. . ." Count IV Order, COL No. 50,p. 25, R at 66:21413A261. (Bold Italics added). See, Appendix"C", Paragraphs 20, 23. Strangely, the Circuit Court seemed to infer something nefarious from the very existence of the Development Agreement, thinking that it"placed the County in a position of conflict 34