Laserfiche WebLink
Case 1:07-cv-00251-JMS-LEK Document 52 Filed 10/01/2008 Page 13 of 17 <br /> immunity for his "determination that the evidence was sufficiently strong to justify <br /> a probable-cause finding," Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 130 (1997), as well as <br /> his decision not to prosecute a particular case. Goldstein, 481 F.3d at 1173; see <br /> also Roe v. City & County of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 584 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that <br /> a "prosecutor's professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police is <br /> entitled to absolute immunity"). Absolute immunity attaches even if the decision <br /> to file charges results from an improper motive or is made without probable cause. <br /> See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5 ("The reason that we <br /> grant [absolute immunity] for the latter function (malicious prosecution) is that we <br /> have found a common-law tradition of immunity for a prosecutor's decision to <br /> bring an indictment, whether he has probable cause or not."). Malate's decision to <br /> file the criminal charge goes to the essence of Defendants' prosecutorial duties <br /> and thus, Defendants are plainly afforded absolute immunity from Plaintiff's <br /> allegation. <br /> Plaintiff's arguments for why Defendants' acts should be viewed as <br /> outside Defendants' roles as prosecutors lack merit. Plaintiff first argues that <br /> Defendants' acts were not intimately associated with the judicial phase of the <br /> criminal process because Defendants violated the County screening guidelines and <br /> various other state and federal laws. Pl.'s Opp'n 23-25. Plaintiff's argument <br /> 13 <br />