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agreement with the Coupes and they eventually reached an impasse in 2000. Exh.s J-294; J-437;
<br /> J-142; J-143; J-313; Test. Takase (7/16/07pm,p. 21) (Supplemental R.O.A., filed 5/l/08,
<br /> ("S.R.O.A."), 00-1-181K, V.43/T0008 and 05-1-15K, V.30/T0008); Frye Depo. p. 318 ((R.O.A.,
<br /> 00-1-181K,V.39/D011, and 05-1-15K,V.26/D011).
<br /> On May 23, 2000, Oceanside asked the County to commence condemnation proceedings
<br /> relating to the Coupes' lands. 1stAmd.FOF 161 (R.O.A., 00-1-181K, V.41/00507 and 05-1-15K,
<br /> V.27/01031).
<br /> On July 26,2000, the County Council adopted Resolution No. 266-00 that authorized the
<br /> County to initiate eminent domain proceedings,pursuant to the Development Agreement, for the
<br /> condemnation of the Coupes' property to be used for the Bypass. Exh. J-231.
<br /> On October 9, 2000, the County filed a condemnation complaint against the Coupes in
<br /> Civil No. 00-1-181K. Exh. J-232. (R.O.A., 00-1-181K, V.1/00001.) Resolution No. 266-00 and
<br /> the October 2000 Complaint attached a survey that identified the specific parcel to be obtained
<br /> comprising an area of 2.9 acres. The trial court determined in 2007 that the County Council
<br /> passed Resolution No. 266-00 in order to comply with the Development Agreement,pursuant to
<br /> which Oceanside gave the County a directive to commence such condemnation proceedings.
<br /> The trial court determined that compliance by the County with an existing contractual
<br /> commitment to condemn was not a proper public purpose for a condemnation, and thus
<br /> dismissed the condemnation action commenced pursuant to Resolution 266-00. 1 stAmd.FOF
<br /> ¶62, 75-84 (R.O.A., 00-1-181K, V.41/00507 and 05-1-15K, V.27/01031); 1stAmd.Judg. TLA
<br /> (R.O.A., 00-1-181K, V.41/00508 and 05-1-15K, V.27/01032).4
<br /> 4 Although the County did not appeal this finding, the County and Oceanside vigorously argued
<br /> at trial that the County Council made the final decision in Resolution 266-00 on whether and if
<br /> so what property to condemn in part because the definition of"County"in the Development
<br /> Agreement(§2h) excluded the County Council and thus promises made by the County did not
<br /> affect the Council's ultimate power of condemnation consistent with the holding in
<br /> Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Hawaii 46, 58, 868 P.2d 1193, 1205 (1994).
<br /> (S.R.O.A., 00-1-181K, V.43/T0011 (at pp. 22, 32-34, 48-51, 53-60) and T0021 (at pp. 18-21,
<br /> 49-50), and 05-1-15K, V.30/T0011 (at pp. 22, 32-34, 48-51, 53-60) and T0021 (at pp. 18-21, 49-
<br /> 50) In addition, Township of West Orange v. 769 Associates, L.L.C., 172 N.J. 564, 575-76, 800
<br /> A.2d 86, 92-93 (2002) correctly held that a county agreement with a developer to condemn does
<br /> not constitute an improper delegation of condemnation powers where government made the
<br /> initial decision to condemn for public use. See Oceanside Trial Memorandum at pp. 5-12.
<br /> (R.O.A., 00-1-181K, V.39/00480 and 05-1-15K, V.27/01003.)
<br /> 4
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