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2008-05-16_County_of_Hawaii_Answering_Brief_re_Robert_Nigel_Richards
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2008-05-16_County_of_Hawaii_Answering_Brief_re_Robert_Nigel_Richards
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B. Motion for Statutory Damages—De Novo <br /> Coupes contend that whether the denial of the Motion for Statutory Damages should be <br /> set aside turns on whether HRS § 101-27 applies under the circumstances and thus the standard <br /> of review is de novo. See, e.g., Lingle v. Hawai`i Gov't Employees Assn, AFSCME, Local 152, <br /> 107 Hawaii 178, 183, 111 P.3d 587, 592 (2005)("Questions of statutory interpretation are <br /> questions of law, which are reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard.") However, <br /> alternatively, because the Motion for Statutory Damages was deemed denied because no order <br /> was entered within 90 days, the trial court could have denied the motion on the grounds that the <br /> Coupes did not present a sufficient record to determine whether the requested amounts were <br /> reasonable. The applicable standard of review for the reasonableness of an allowance or award <br /> of attorney's fees and costs where authorized is abuse of discretion. Booker v. Midpac Lumber <br /> Co., Ltd., 65 Haw. 166, 171, 649 P.2d 376, 379-380 (1982). "In a legal sense discretion is abused <br /> whenever in the exercise of its discretion the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the <br /> circumstances before it being considered."Ariyoshi v. HPERB, 5 Haw.App. 533, 542, 704 P.2d <br /> 917, 925 (1985), citing Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 669, 169 P.2d 453, 456 (1946). <br /> C. Pretext for Public Use Claim—Clearly Erroneous <br /> Coupes argue that whether the trial court "should not have rejected allegations of <br /> pretextual taking or predominantly private purpose by looking only to the government's claims <br /> of public use" should be reviewed de novo on the grounds that these are questions of <br /> constitutional law. The County submits that this point of error turns on two issues. First, <br /> whether the Coupes have proven that the trial court in fact ignored the Coupes' pretextual <br /> allegations which should be reviewed by the clearly erroneous standard. Cf. Township, 172 N.J. <br /> at 578, 800 A.2d at 94 (Court stated that"we have never held that the standard is other than the <br /> manifest abuse of discretion test.") Second, whether the record lacks substantial evidence to <br /> support the finding that there was valid public purpose in Civil No. 05-1-15K, which also should <br /> be reviewed by the clearly erroneous standard. Leslie v. Estate of Tavares, 91 Hawaii 394, 399, <br /> 984 P.2d 1220, 1225 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting State v. <br /> Kotis, 91 Hawaii 319, 328, 984 P.2d 78, 87 (1999)) ("An FOF is also clearly erroneous when <br /> the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding. We have defined substantial <br /> evidence as credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a <br /> person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.") <br /> 15 <br />
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