2006-11-22_Answering_Brief_re_Calvert

Home

the Board that the action taken was late. ROA 00442. Therefore, the only question before the court is the effect of the lateness. Appellant argues that HRS Section 91-13.5 does not apply because it provides that "unless otherwise provided','.means that the Subdivision Code and Planning Department Rule provision which provides for automatic denial would prevail over the statutory provision. The County Code needs to.comply with the general laws of the state. Under HRS Section 46-1.5 General powers and limitations of the counties the county is granted certain powers however they are"[s]ubject to general law." In this case the state has enacted a general law establishing a requirement for agencies to act within a specific timeframe. The law should not be read in a way to render it ineffectual to the County. Accepting the argument provided by Appellant would mean that the County could exempt itself from the operation of this law by making code provisions which contradict the statute. It is clear from the language of the statute that the legislature intended the law to apply to county issued permits. In defining the permits to which the law applies,the legislature includes "any state or county applications." The only specific exemption for counties is "state administered permit programs, delegated, authorized or approved under federal law." Legislative enactment should be interpreted in such a manner as to give them effect. Wright v. Home Depot U.S.A. Inc., 111 Hawaii 401, 142 P.3d 265 (2006). The Planning Department is an executive agency bound by the provisions of HRS Section 91-1 for the purposes of the chapter defines an agency as "each state or county board, commission, department or office authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate cases, except those in the legislature or judicial branches." The Planning Department did in fact adopt rules relating to subdivision applications and time limits for actions. 11