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Case 1:05-cv-00325-JMS-BMK Document 35 Filed 01/25/2006 Page 10 of 24 <br /> Federal law determines when a cause of action based on a federal <br /> statute accrues. Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. <br /> 2000). "'[U]nder federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has <br /> reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action."' Id. (quoting <br /> Tworivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999)). "`The proper focus is <br /> upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the <br /> consequences of the acts became most painful."' Stanley v. Trustees of the Calif. <br /> State Univ., No. 04-15134, 2006 WL 51139, at *5 (9th Cir. January 11, 2006) <br /> (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979)). <br /> Section 1981, like many of the civil rights statutes, does not contain a <br /> statute of limitations. In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987), <br /> the Supreme Court held that courts must borrow the most "appropriate or <br /> analogous" statute of limitations from state law when deciding claims based on <br /> § 1981. Following this decision, lower courts, including the District of Hawaii, <br /> have applied the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims to § 1981 <br /> actions. See, e.g., Lesane v. Hawaiian Airlines, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1120 (D. <br /> Haw. 1999) ("The two-year limitations period governing personal injury actions is <br /> the most analogous state statute of limitations to govern § 1981 suits[.]"). <br /> 10 <br />