2007-07-23_George_Kahoohanohano_et_al_v._State_of_Hawaii_et_al_-_Opinion_of_the_court_by_Justice_Acoba

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Kaho'ohanohano v. State Page 13 of 46 they could withdraw their accumulated contributions to the pension system and the mortality tables in effect would have no bearing. However,the security offered by membership in the retirement system is generally regarded as an inducement to employment in state service or in the public schools. The value of retirement benefits and prospective rate of payment,especially in the face of continued inflation,is of vital concern to the plaintiffs and might well be the determining factor in their decision to continue in the teaching profession or seek more lucrative employment. Id. (emphasis added). Birnbaum further stated that "[b]y the constitutional amendment the people determined to confer contractual protections upon the benefits of pension and retirement systems of the State and of the civil divisions thereof, and to prohibit their diminution or impairment prior to retirement." Id. at 244-45. Assuming, arguendo, that Birnbaum supports conferring standing on Plaintiffs because of the "contractual relationship" clause in our own pension provision, we need not accept Birnbaum as persuasive in this case because we employ our own "injury in fact test" in determining standing. The Birnbaum court's standing analysis appears to be limited to affirming the lower court's conclusion that the pension system served as an inducement to employment and did not include an analysis that in any way resembled the Akinaka test that we employ. See supra. XVII. In regard to Plaintiffs' argument(3), Plaintiffs focus on Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia, 245 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1968). They argue that in that case, where a city employee, who would not be eligible for retirement for another six years, sued to compel the city to make necessary appropriations to the retirement system, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that the employee's "vested right to his retirement benefits, and his contractual relationship to the city and its retirement system are interests he does not share with the general public and which he holds independent of the public."-("3 Id. at 244. Dombrowski involved an "action in mandamus." The mandamus statute in that case stated that a writ "shall issue on the application of any person beneficially interested." Id. at 242 (emphasis added). The case law interpreting that statute declared that "the relevant [standing] inquiry [was] whether the private plaintiff possesses an interest which is not shared by the public at large." Id. Thus the standing standard did not resemble the Akinaka test and did not require any showing of injury but only that the person be "beneficially interested" or possess "an interest which is not shared by the public at large." Id. Thus, Dombrowski is not persuasive in an analysis of Plaintiffs' standing. XVIII. Doubtless, Plaintiffs performed a service for the retirement system and future retirees by filing a suit that the Trustees may have been obligated to bring in the first place. However, as indicated herein, Plaintffs lack legal standing to bring the suit. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs do not meet the "actual or threatened injury" requirement to show standing in this case. Thus, analysis of the other two prongs of the Akinaka test are not necessary. Plaintiffs do not provide any argument that would indicate that the second and third prongs of the Akinaka test have been satisfied. XIX. As to the Trustees' standing and State's argument(1), it should be noted that this issue is raised for the first time by the State on appeal, and was thus not addressed by the court. Nonetheless, "[b]ecause standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be addressed at any stage of a case, an appellate court has jurisdiction to resolve questions regarding standing, even if that determination ultimately precludes jurisdiction over the merits." Keahole Def. Coal., Inc. v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 110 Hawaii 419, 427-28, 134 P.3d 585, 593-94 (2006) (citing United Pub. Workers, Local 646 v. Brown, 80 Hawaii 376, 379, 910 P.2d 147, 150 (App. 1996)). XX. As to the first prong of the three-part Akinaka test, Akinaka, 91 Hawaii at 55, 979 P.2d at 1081, it is preliminarily observed that, to reiterate, the ERS has "the powers and privileges of a corporation[.]" HRS § 88-22. The ERS "may sue or be sued, transact all of its business, invest all of its funds, and hold all of its cash and securities and other property" in its own name. Id. Trustees are charged with "[t]he general administration and the responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system and for making effective the provisions of this part and part VIII of this http://www.state.hi.us/jud/opinions/sct/2007/26178.htm 8/12/2008