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Kaho'ohanohano v. State Page 18 of 46
<br /> Kemp v. State of Hawaii Child Support Enforcement Agency, 111 Hawaii 367, 385, 141 P.3d 1014, 1032 (2006)
<br /> (emphases added).
<br /> Because the State argues only that Trustees' claims for declaratory relief are moot, we address only that contention. It
<br /> has been noted that the dispositive question under HRS § 632-1 (1993), authorizing actions for declaratory
<br /> judgment, is "whether'the court is satisfied also that a declaratory judgment will serve to terminate the uncertainty or
<br /> controversy giving rise to the proceeding.' This is a question of law." Island Ins. Co. v. Perry, 94 Hawaii 498, 502, 17
<br /> P.3d 847, 851 (App. 2000) (quoting HRS § 632-1). Further, "[i]n determining whether parties still retain sufficient
<br /> interests and injury as to justify the award of declaratory relief, the question is whether the facts alleged, under all the
<br /> circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
<br /> immediacy and reality to warrant a declaratory judgment." United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646 v. Yogi, 101
<br /> Hawaii 46, 57, 62 P.3d 189, 200 (2002) (Acoba, J., concurring) (quoting Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S.
<br /> 115, 122 (1974) (other citation omitted)) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
<br /> As a matter of law, there manifestly remains a substantial controversy in this case and "'a declaratory judgment will
<br /> serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."' Perry, 94 Hawaii at 502, 17 P.3d at
<br /> 851 (quoting HRS § 632-1). As noted above, Trustees requested, inter alia, declarations that Act 100 violates article
<br /> XVI, section 2 and that future "skimming" will also be in violation of the constitution. Specifically, Trustees requested
<br /> a declaration that,
<br /> under[a]rticle XVI,section 2 of the Hawaii Constitution and applicable law,the State and its officers and agents are prohibited from
<br /> skimming the ERS'investment earnings and from taking any other or further action that(a)will diminish,impair,or otherwise obligate
<br /> the ERS'actuarial investment earnings;or(b)will reduce the [e]mployers'periodic contributions as determined by the [Trustees']
<br /> actuary in accordance with[c]hapter 88 and sound actuarial practice;or(c)otherwise will impair the contractual rights of the members
<br /> L]
<br /> (Emphasis added.) Trustees also alleged in their complaint that through the enactment of Act 100, the State had
<br /> unlawfully "diminished and impaired" the ERS funds:
<br /> In retroactively diverting the 1997 and 1998 investment earnings from the ERS to the [State and Counties],the State unlawfully
<br /> diminished and impaired the ERS funds;unlawfully denied the members the protection of the funds to which they are entitled as a
<br /> matter of law;and unlawfully interfered with and impaired the discretion of the [Trustees]in the investment and reinvestment of the
<br /> funds of the ERS.
<br /> Thus, the implementation of Act 100 does not preclude the injuries alleged in Trustees' claims from continuing to
<br /> occur.
<br /> XXVII.
<br /> Further, this case falls within the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine. As this court has stated,
<br /> "when the question involved affects the public interest and an authoritative determination is desirable for the guidance
<br /> of public officials, a case will not be considered moot." Slupecki v. Admin. Dir. of Courts, State of Hawaii, 110
<br /> Hawaii 407, 409 n.4, 133 P.3d 1199, 1201 n.4 (2006) (citations omitted). "Among the criteria . . . are [(1)] the public
<br /> or private nature of the question presented, [(2)] the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future
<br /> guidance of public officers, and [(3)] the likelihood of future recurrence of the question[.]" Yogi, 101 Hawaii at 58,
<br /> 62 P.3d at 201 (Acoba, J., concurring) (quoting Johnston v. Ing, 50 Haw. 379, 381, 441 P.2d 138, 140 (1968)).
<br /> As to the first prong, there is alleged a matter of public interest at stake. As Plaintiffs argue, Act 100 "increased the
<br /> [ERS'] unfunded liability, increasing the burden that is passed on to future generations of taxpayers and thus [made] it
<br /> more likely that, as the employer contributions become more onerous for State and county governments, there will be
<br /> further diversions or deferrals of contributions." Additionally, because all state and county employees obtain
<br /> membership in the system upon employment, this involves a significant number of people. Thus, there is a matter of
<br /> public interest sufficient to meet the first prong of the test. See id. (Acoba, J., concurring) (concluding that "[u]
<br /> doubtedly, the public interest [was] involved" where plaintiffs included four unions representing 48,000).
<br /> As to the second prong, it is obvious that determination of the matter would assist public officers in the future. Id. at
<br /> 58, 62 P.3d at 201 (Acoba, J., concurring). Plainly, a decision in this case will assist executive officers and legislators
<br /> http://www.state.hi.us/jud/opinions/sct/2007/26178.htm 8/12/2008
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