2007-07-23_George_Kahoohanohano_et_al_v._State_of_Hawaii_et_al_-_Opinion_of_the_court_by_Justice_Acoba

Home

Kaho'ohanohano v. State Page 23 of 46 As to the constitutionality of Act 100, for the forthcoming reasons, we conclude that the framers of our constitution intended to emulate New York's pension provision and, as such, we hold that our constitutional non-impairment clause similarly protects not only system member accrued benefits, but also as a necessary implication, protects the sources for those benefits. See infra; see also Sgaglione v. Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 592, 594 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that "necessarily implied in this constitutional, albeit perhaps limited, protection of the underlying 'contract' providing for benefits is the protection of the sources of funds for those benefits, whether by way of continuing contributions by employees, employers, or the reserve funds required to be maintained under the retirement plan" (emphasis added)). Because of this implied protection, Act 100 violated article XVI, section 2 by impairing the sources used to fund the constitutionally protected "accrued benefits." XXXII. Trustees variously argue that(1) "[r]ecords from the 1950 Constitutional Convention show that [article XVI, section 2] . . . [was] introduced to ensure that the State and local governments would perform their statutory obligations to provide a sound retirement system for their employees," (2)the "[c]ourt erroneously granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment," because "Act 100 constitutes a plain, clear, and manifest violation of[a]rticle XVI, [s]ection 2, as evidenced by the text itself and scrutiny of the intent of the framers of the Hawaii Constitution, (3) "Act 100 impaired the structural integrity of the ERS," (4)the "[c]ourt erroneously concluded that Act 100 did not constitute a failure to fund the ERS," (5)the "[c]ourt incorrectly applied its definition of'accrued benefits,"' and (6) case law from jurisdictions interpreting similar constitutional provisions," support their position. The State responds that "Act 100 is constitutional and the . . . Trustees cannot establish that it is contrary to or violative of[a]rticle, XVI, section 2 of the Hawaii Constitution" because (1) "[t]he ERS is a'defined benefit' pension plan and members do not have a right to plan assets or a right to control the manner or method of funding their accrued benefits," (2) "[a]rticle XVI, section 2 of the Hawaii Constitution does not concern funding of retirement benefits" (citing to Hawaii constitutional debates and Illinois and Michigan case law), and (3) "[c]ases cited by the . . . Trustees from other jurisdictions have little persuasive value where they are founded on constitutional and statutory provisions that are different from ours." Trustees reply that "Illinois and Michigan law are not persuasive." Trustees request that this court reverse the court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the State and instruct the court to grant summary judgment in favor of Trustees. XXXIII. Certain preliminary propositions are relevant. "This court reviews questions of constitutional law de novo, under the 'right/wrong' standard, and, thus, exercises its own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case." In re Guardianship of Carlsmith, 113 Hawaii 236, 239, 151 P.3d 717, 720 (2007) (quoting State ex rel. Anzai v. City and County of Honolulu, 99 Hawaii 508, 515, 57 P.3d 433, 441 (2002) (other citation omitted)). "'We have long recognized that the Hawaii Constitution must be construed with due regard to the intent of the framers and the people adopting it, and the fundamental principle in interpreting a constitutional principle is to give effect to that intent."' Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City & County of Honolulu, 102 Hawaii 465, 474, 78 P.3d 1, 10 (2003) (quoting Convention Center Auth. v. Anzai, 78 Hawaii 157, 167, 890 P.2d 1197, 1207 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). "'The general rule is that, if the words used in a constitutional provision . . . are clear and unambiguous, they are to be construed as they are written."' Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Hawaii 205, 223-224, 140 P.3d 985, 1003-04 (2006) (quoting Taomae v. Lingle, 108 Hawaii 215, 251, 118 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2004) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, in interpreting a constitutional provision, "this court 'may look to the object sought to be established and the matters sought to be remedied along with the history of the times and state of being when the constitutional provision was adopted."' Id. at 225, 140 P.3d at 1005 (quoting City & County of Honolulu v. Ariyoshi, 67 Haw. 412, 419, 689 P.2d 757, 763 (1984) (citation omitted)). "[W]here it is alleged that the legislature has acted unconstitutionally, this court has consistently held that every enactment of the legislature is presumptively constitutional, and a party challenging the statute has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. The infraction should be plain, clear, manifest, and unmistakable." Watland v. Lingle, 104 Hawaii 128, 133, 85 P.3d 1079, 1084 (2004) (internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and citations omitted). http://www.state.hi.us/jud/opinions/sct/2007/26178.htm 8/12/2008