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• <br /> FINANCIER: Case Study <br /> it took many more weeks to assemble annual spending to the long-term ser- <br /> • the two teams, each comprised of more vice objectives and the need to develop <br /> than 40 volunteers; two full-time pro- • , a stronger commercial- and industrial <br /> fessionals and one paid consultant with tax revenue base for.planned expan- <br /> : public service management experi- : sion. We found that communities had -. , <br /> ence. The work itself took over another no means forfinancial planning to <br /> 1 eight months. - ' , meet changes in the economic base and <br /> ' The.pilot cities were Montebello, a , in the mix and level of services they - .. <br /> largely blue-collar, ethnically-mixed, ` needed. . <br /> industrial community in Southern Cal- <br /> , ifornia, and Saratoga, a bedroom corn- Sensitivity and Understanding <br /> munity just outside of San Jose. It is all too easy, and convenient, to ' <br /> describe an effort such as this in sim- , - <br /> Focus On Three Areas plistic terms of problem definition and - <br /> The urban task force 'expertise was then•steps.one, 'two and three toward <br /> initially focused on three areas: Finan- , the solution. The importance of this ' <br /> cial . management, effective planning , program, and the efforts of the public <br /> . practice and work productivity' im- and private , sector people involved, <br /> provement. The major stages of the would- be unfairly diminished if this <br /> program were research to identify the 'effort were reduced to terms of a simple <br /> problems and opportunities, develop- -business task. Let no one be deluded <br /> _ ment of near and long-term solutions, into thinking that the bringing to- <br /> - and preparation of extensivespecific gether of public and private sector ex- <br /> ' • programs'in which the city executives " pertise is simply a matter of physically <br /> weretold just what needed to be done, - planting business experts in the city <br /> and work productivity programs were administrative offices. These programs • <br /> set up for city employees on all levels, require sensitivity and understanding <br /> teaching them how to.identifyineffi from people in both sectors. <br /> ciencies and correct them. - . The private sector teams let it be - <br /> In ,1978, based on our :success_in known explicitly that they were not ' <br /> Montebello and Saratoga, the program- some all-knowing auditing power corn- <br /> was repeated in Montclair in Southern ing in to open the closet door in search <br /> California and Union .City 'in the of skeletons. Atthe same time, the <br /> - North: The difference in 1978, how- teams asserted their independence <br /> ever, was that we did not have to seek from any constraints in coming up <br /> out candidates — -as 'the word spread,_ with what they thought-were-the best - . <br /> cities throughout the state began ask- solutions to city problems. <br /> ing to join in. That erased any linger- There was no evidence that any of - <br /> ing doubt in my mind about commu- the people with whom the urban teams <br /> nity response to private-sector worked felt threatened' by their pres- <br /> involvement. , ' ence. This'was due in part to the quail- <br /> ' 'At year-end '1978, we completed im- ty of the urban team members-as well <br /> plementation..of the 'Montclair and • as to the quality and self confidence of <br /> 'Union City programs. • the. city executives and staff. The ur- <br /> Although each of the four cities'had ban teams went in with'an attitude of <br /> distinct needs, the teams- uncovered trust in the capabilities of the public - <br /> common threads: Difficulties in tying sector workers who, in fact, showed a <br /> • <br /> FINANCIER February 1979 39 <br /> • r <br />