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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCOM 0174.001 2002-2004 1 +tY OS ~L / BUILDING DIVISION -DPW ''h.~ N';,a COUNTY OF HAWAII - 101 Pauahi Street, Suite 7 -Hilo, Hawaii 96720 Hilo Office (808) 961-8331 Fax (808) 961-8410 Kona Office (808) 327-3520 Fax (808) 327-3509 April 1, 2003 Memorandum TO: CURTIS TYLER Councilman i FROM: BRIAN KAJIKAWA Acting Division Chie SUBJECT: HARDENING OF ESSENTIAL FACILITIES Please find enclosed the report done by Wiss, Janney, Elstner Assoc., Inc.. The report was done in June 1993. Selection of projects is based on Structural Scores and Modifiers results final score. The worst was Central Fire with (-)2.6; Kaumana and Waiakea both had (-)0.6; Kailua Fire is similar design to Kaumana and Waiakea. The lower the points the higher the risk. Should you have any questions please call me at 961-8331. Comm. No. I File No. n/4 Ref. To: _=LSi' Ref. Date APR 2APR 2~U~~~ ~ l /I') C POTENTIAL SEISMIC HAZARDS' AND . E1~IERGENCY RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS QF ESSEIVTIAL~ FIRE::: STATIONS ANIJ HOSPITALS -~INTHE - 'COUNTY OF HAWAII ~ i~t~trcd far the ` SYatc af:HawaFi ' . Dfe of civil Defense aad;thc T~Iaivu~ State ~arthgtakc Advisory $oazd f ` $y w,ss, Janney, Elstnex Associates, tncc tie Federal F.mcrgcncy Management Agency ~atlOaa[ ~art~lQU3kC Teelmtcal t~SSl3tanCe':~ClfltrdCt 'BMW 92=C 3852:::: IUne1993 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................3 SCOPE OF WORK ............................................6 Preliminary Screening 6 Selection and Assessment of Four Essential Facilities 7 On-Site Training/Briefings 8 HOSPITALS ................................................9 Introduction ............................................9 Structural Issues: Kona Hospital 10 Structutal Issues: Other Hospitals 13 NonstructuraUEquipment Issues 15 FIRE STATIONS 32 Introduction 32 Structural Issues: Hilo Central Fire Station 32 Structural Issues: Kaumana Fire Station 35 Structural Issues: Waimea Fire Station 36 Nonstructural/Equipment Issues 37 CONCLUSION .............................................45 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................45 TECHNICAL APPENDIX 7'he work that provides the basis jot this report was funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, OJjice oj6arrhquakes and Natural Hazards, under the National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract EMW-92-G 3852. The authors are solely responsible far the accuracy of the statements and interpretations contained in the i report. Such interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Government. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract ' ~ /NTRODUCT/ON This report addresses the emergency response preparedness of essential facilities in the County of Hawaii for a major earthquake. °i' MM•II~I,J~ ;,'o; It was prepared by Wiss, Janney, Elstner 9rSa/l1 Mwru W, Vil a.0 Associates, Inc. (WJE) on the basis of a pilot N, study performed by WJE and was initiated by .rz„a, Kllww. N. a.a the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board erz,rsl Ko,o. NI ,x (HSEAB). State Civil Defense sponsored 7AOlaa Nor HSEAB to further the State of Hawaii's KYprq NI °'6 earthquake preparedness program and to 987/99 KllauM. N. stimulate long-term earthquake hazard ansn9 Nut vm s.a mitigation plans in the County of Hawaii. This rwt0.rt project was funded by the Federal Emergency H,w;~' Management Agency (FEMA) under the ,i,29na N.r VII. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract (NETAC), EMW-92-C-3852. 11/1 a/a7 N•r Mrn• VIII a.a The HSEAB has recommended that seismic ~ assessment of essential facilities in the County ana~a9 K•I~ V9 s.: of Hawaii be a high priority mitigation task 7AelE 1 ~ sosMlcm 1N 7NE courm of NAVIA9 because the county is believed to be exposed to IFrwn FEMA f 90/Alry 19901 the highest seismic hazard in the state. In approximately the past 50 years the county has experienced at least 8 earthquakes with a Richter Magnitude of 6.0 or greater and the By definition, effective earthquake hazard geological structure of the island is believed to mitigation requues that essential facilities be capable of generating even larger remain operational following a major earthquakes. Furthermore, because the vast earthquake. This requirement dictates no[ only majority of the essential facilities in the county that the facilities maintain their structural were designed and constructed before adoption integrity, but also that the services they provide of the 1976 Uniform Building Code (UBC), continue without interruption. Yet, which is the earliest UBC edition whose seismic uninterrupted functionality is a seismic design requirements are similar to the 1991 performance criterion that is only obliquely UBC, many of these facilities most likely do not addressed, if at all, by modern seismic design conform to the minunum seismic design codes. requirements adopted by other high seismic risk regions of the United States. There is, This report summarizes the fmdings of our therefore, sufficient cause for concern for the performance evaluations of selected essential structural integrity and performance of the facilities in the County of Hawaii, and considers County's essential facilities during a major as much as possible within the defined scope of ~ earthquake. work both the structural and functional National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 1 prerequisites for emergency preparedness relative to seismic hazards. Given the findings of this pilot study, we conclude that in the County of Hawaii an earthquake-hazard mitigation program is not only to be encouraged, but is also necessary. Readers of this report are reminded that one of the primary goals of NETAC is to encourage and facilitate locally funded earthquake-hazard mitigation programs in regions of high seismic risk by providing technical assistance. Interested readers are advised that FEMA has sponsored the development of a significant library of publications which contain useful supplemental information relevant to seismic hazard mitigation and are available upon request. Recommended publications include FEMA 74/June 1985, "Reducing the Risky of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage.• A Practical Guide" and FEMA 150/May 1990, "Seismic Considerations: Health Care Facilities". National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 2 EXECUT/VE SUMMARY The County of Hawaii is exposed to the curbside survey of each building, WJE highest seismic hazard in the State and has personnel performed cursory reviews of all experienced at least 8 earthquakes with a available structural and architectural drawings Richter Magttitude of 6.0 or greater in and spent approximately 1 to 2 hours at each approximately the past 50 years. Significantly site surveying and documenting the construction larger earthquakes are possible. In recognition at each facility. In addition to observing of this hazard, the State Civil Defense (SCD) structural conditions, WJE identified and sponsored Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory catalogued non-structural hazards with the Board (HSEAB) initiated this pilot study to potential to severely disrupt the ability of the assess the seismic hazards at selected essential facility to provide emergency services. emergency response facilities as a prelude to Structural hazards varied greatly in type and evaluating the emergency response preparedness significance at each location, but the catalogue of the County in the event of a major of non-structural hazards tended to be repeated earthquake. Seismic hazards at essential at most of the fire station and hospitals emergency response facilities include both surveyed. structural conditions, which may compromise their structtual integrity, as well as other Typical fue station non-structural hazards hazards, which may result in operational include: garage doors that may bind if the disruption of emergency services. Funding for supporting structure experiences significant the study, which is intended to further the State permanent racking and may consequently of Hawaii's earthquake preparedness program prevent fue fighting and rescue equipment from and to stimulate long-term earthquake hazard responding to an emergency; poorly anchored mitigation plans, was provided by the Federal propane tanks that may roll over, rupture supply Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under lines, cause uncontrolled releases of propane, the National Earthquake Technical Assistance and start fires; and unsecured batteries for Contract (NETAC). emergency power generation which can fall, rupture, and cause a loss of power supply for In performance under this Contract, Wiss, emergency communication equipment. In Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc. (WJE) initially addition, desktop and console communications completed preliminary structural evaluations at equipment and computers housed in a 14 fire stations and 5 hospitals using a Rapid communications bunker at Hilo Central Fire Visual Screening (RVS) procedure similar to the Station were all unsecured and vulnerable to large inventory Rapid Visual Screening falling. Since this equipment functions as the Procedures (RSP) for non-essential facilities central dispatch and command center, this described in FEMA 154/July 1988, Rapid seismic hazard jeopardizes the fire fighting Visual Screening of Buildings for Pnterttial capability throughout the county. Seismic Hazards: A Handbook. The RVS procedure was performed as part of a pre- Non-structural hazards at all the hospitals screening technique to assist in selecting which visited were similarly severe. Poorly secured 4 of these facilities would later be more closely emergency power generators jeopardize all evaluated. In conjunction with the FEMA 154 hospital services. Unsecured hot water heaters, procedure which relies only upon an ex' ~rior boilers, and piping put sterilization, kitchen, and National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 3 laundry services at risk. Laboratory equipment, This code significantly revised the seismic ~ medical supply cabinets, pharmaceuticals, toxic design provisions for new construction contained chemicals, patient records, x-ray equipment, in previous editions of the UBC and contains hung ceilings, corridor lighting, sprinkler lines many of the provisions included in the current and propane tanks are also typically unsecured. 1991 UBC. Because the majority of the Together, they jeopardize nearly all essential essential facilities in the County were designed emergency services that hospitals will be prior to enactment of the 1976 UBC, it is highly expected to provide after an earthquake. unlikely that many of these facilities conform to the minimum seismic design requirements Structurally, many of the fue stations and adopted by other high seismic risk regions of hospitals pose some risk, though the degree of the United States. Prudence demands that those risk is more difficult to define. This difficulty structures not designed to the 1976 or later is due in large measure to the limited scope of edition of the UBC be subjected to a more work of this study, but is also due in part to the detailed structural evaluation to determine which great variability of structural types and years of of them are to be included in a long-term construction of these facilities. seismic hazard mitigation plan. A number of the essential buildings rated by Many of the essential structures which were the pre-screening procedure either failed the to have been designed to the 1976 or later FEMA 154 test or were borderline failures. edition of the UBC may also require detailed According to the FEMA 154 guidelines facilities structural evaluations. The stated intent of the that fail the test are defined as potentially UBC seismic design provisions for non-essential ~ hazardous and must be analyzed in more detail structures is to prevent structural collapse and by a structural engineer experienced in seismic thus limit loss of life in the event of a major design. In addition, information gathered by earthquake. Neither damage control nor post- WJE outside the scope of the FEMA 154 earthquake functionality is described as an procedure indicates that some of the buildings intended goat of the design provisions. that passed the FEMA 154 test may also be Although essential structures are required to be potentially hazardous. Although the FEMA 154 designed for greater seismic forces than non- procedure was not intended for evaluating either essential structures, the structural engineering the seismic adequacy of essential facilities or for profession recognizes that designing for greater evaluating the seismic hazards of a narrow class seismic forces does not necessarily produce a of structures or of any individual structure, better performing structure. The seismic force these results strongly suggest that there is a multiplier for the design of essential structures need for the County to develop and implement does not address damage control, nor does it a seismic hazard mitigation plan. Indeed, the provide reasonable assurance of unin'teti'upted several potential collapse hazards that were functionality. observed during the course of this study lend additional urgency to this need. Furthermore, relative to other high risk seismic regions, e. g. California, enforcement of Other data generated for this study also building code structural provisions in the justifies concern for the structural integrity and County of Hawaii is reportedly lax. We performance of the County's essential facilities understand that the County of Hawaii does not during a major earthquake. For example, the provide structural plan checking for new 1976 Uniform Building Code was adopted by construction [o confu'm compliance with the the County of Hawaii on December 11, 1978. governing building code,• nor does it require National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 4 ~ third party structural plan checks. Moreover, while building permits are officially required for new construction within the County, the penalty for building without a permit is only 5 dollazs. In other comparable high seismic regions, structural plan checking and third party peer reviews aze routine and are typically financed by building permit fees. Vigorous enforcement of the building permit system generally results in significantly improved designs. At a minimum, building permit enforcement needs to be improved to ensure that the design of new essential facilities satisfies the seismic provisions of the building code and the requirements of emergency response preparedness. Irt conclusion, this pilot study has found that the emergency response preparedness of the fire stations and hospitals in the County of Hawaii is poor. The essential facilities in the County are unprepared for effective disaster response following a major earthquake. A comprehensive earthquake-hazard mitigation program needs to be established and as one pan of this program the structural and non-structural hazards at all Caunry fire stations and hospitals need to be fully evaluated and abated. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 5 SCOPE OF WORK PREL/M/NARY SCREEN/NG ~Keaau - office/dormitory 14 fire stations and 5 hospitals undetwent -apparatus building preliminary screening using a Rapid Visual -hose tower Screening procedure similar to FEMA 154. For -multi-vehicle shelter the purposes of this project the scope of the FEMA 154 screening procedure was ~Pahoa substantially expanded. The pre-screening -main building procedure was tamed out with the goal of .North Kohala identifying structural and non-structural hazards as an aid toward selecting 4 of the facilities for -office/dormitory a more detailed evaluation. In addition, the -apparatus building available structural and architectural drawings were briefly reviewed prior to visiting each •Waimea facility to perform the screening. Generally, 1 -office/dormitory to 2 hours was spent at each facility surveying - appazatus building and documenting existing conditions. The pre- ~Honokaa screening procedure is described in greater -main buildin with multi-vehicle shelter detail in Technical Appendix A. g The fire stations visited included: °I-aPahoehoe - main building Hilo Central -apparatus building - main building - communications bunker ~~u - administration building -main building - warehouse -multi-vehicle shelter •Waiakea •Captain Cook - main building -main building - vehicle maintenance shop •Kailua-Kona - helicopter garage - multi-vehicle shelter -main building - multi-vehicle shelter •Kawailani - main building •South Kohala - multi-vehicle shelter -office/dormitory - apparatus building • Kaumana - main building National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 6 The hospitals visited included: SELECT/ON ANO .Hilo ASSESSMENT OF FOUR - abandoned buildings ESSENT/AL FAC/L/T/ES - new hospital building - mechanical building Four of the essential facilities visited were selected for more detailed evaluation. Selection •Honokaa was made on the basis of: - main building • importance of the facility; - dormitory buildings • vulnerability of the facility; - multi-vehicle shelter • location of the facility; and • typicality of the facility • Kohala - main building The four facilities selected for more detailed evaluation were: .Kau - main building • Hilo Central Fire Station • Kaumana Fire Station .Kona • Waimea Fire Station - original building • Kona Hospital - new building These facilities were evaluated in accordance ) Following the preliminary screening, WJE kith the analytical methodology described in prepared a presentation of the results of the Technical Appendix A. The methodology used screening for the HSEAB. The presentation incorporated features of FEMA 178/June 1992, included: "NEHRP Handbook for the Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings" as well as features of the • an introduction to earthquake loading and 1991 Uniform Building Code seismic design dynamic response of buildings; requirements for new essential buildings for Zone 4. However, because FEMA 178 is • discussion of established methods for seismic explicitly not intended for evaluation of essential evaluation of existing buildings; and facilities which must remain functional after an earthquake and because the 1991 UBC only • overview of fu•e stations and hospital addresses structural performance as it pertains structures; tanks and other structures to life-safety, these documents are by required for protection of essential facilities; themselves not sufficient for assessment of emergency vehicle shelters; structures and seismic hazards in fire stations and hospitals. equipment required for emergency response; The methodology used was tailored to evaluate standby power generating equipment; emergency response preparedness. emergency response and government communications. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 7 , ON-S/TE TRA/N/NG/BR/EF/NG Presentations for training and for disseminating the preliminary results of our pre- screening and detailed evaluations were given to groups of local officials, administrators, and engineers. The content of each presentation was guided by the level of expertise within each group. The groups and topics addressed included: • Staff engineers for the Department of Public Works, County of Hawaii --structural and non-structural hazards at fire stations, including on-site training at Hilo Central, Kaumana, and Waiakea fire stations. • Staff engineers for the State of Hawaii, Department of Accounting and General Services, County of Hawaii structural and non-structural hazards at hospitals. • Administrators for Hawaii Civil Defense Agency, County of Hawaii -structural and non-structural hazards at fue stations and hospitals, emergency response, and hazard mitigation. • Department Directors for Kona Hospital structural and non-structural hazards at Kona Hospital. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 8 F/RE STA T/ONS /NTRODUCT/ON STRUCTURAL /SSUES: H/L O CENTRAL F/RE Fue stations are critical to the emergency STA T/ON preparedness in the County of Hawaii. Fire _ fighting personnel and equipment may be called upon to put out fires, help with debris removal Hilo Central Fire Station consists of one and victim extrication, and provide emergency primary structure and several secondary medical care. If the fire station is not properly structures. 'The primary 2-story structure, a designed to resist seismic loading and is mixed steel frame and cast-in-place reinforced damaged during an earthquake, the personnel concrete, is the oldest fine station on the island. may be injured or the equipment damaged or The secondary structures include awood-framed trapped, rendering them unable to assist with administration building, a communication the emergency. bunker composed of concrete masonry units (CMil) and a light metal warehouse. Structural The fire stations in the County of Hawaii drawings were not available for any of the generally consist of several interconnected secondary structures, so these buildings were buildings and thus frequently have irregular not reviewed in detail. floor plans. These buildings typically include a ~ high-bay apparatus room to house the fire trucks Summary of Findinys and and equipment, an office and dormitory Recommendations building, and a hose tower for hanging and The following comments apply to the drying the hoses. These functions are primary structure: sometimes housed in separate buildings, but are • The hose tower exhibits significant cracking, usually in adjacent structures that share common reportedly caused by previous earthquakes, walls. These features can be problematic from and may be a collapse hazard during future the standpoint of seismic resistance. In earthquakes unless it is strengthened. addition, some fire stations have small detached • The main building appears to have both a out-buildings used for storage as well as multi- soft and a weak first story due to the large vehicle shelters. door openings and the open plan of the first floor, but the first floor walls have adequate The followhng sections contain specific capacity to resist the required lateral forces observations regarding the seismic resistance of due to earthquakes. the three fire stations we evaluated: Hilo Central Fire Station, Kaumana Fire Station, and The secondary buildings at Hilo Central Waimea Fire Station. An additional section were not subjected to detailed structural covers the nonstructural and equipment issues, evaluations. However, qualitative statements which are generalized for all of the fire stations about their expected performance can still be in the County of Hawaii. More detailed made. structural observations are included in the Technical Appendix. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 32 ti ~ ~r I~ ~ f r ` Yi ~ ~ 1 _i f Figure 29 Hi/o Centra/ Fire Station i ( i ~ ~4 t.Y+ fi 'n f J Figure 30 Hi/o Centra/ Fire Station Communication Bunker National Earthquake 'Cechnical Assisrinee Contrac[ Page 33 x" ~ _ v;, • The communications bunker is a small, ' ,5 " `c` ~ ~ squat, rewlar, windowless concrete masonry ' unit (CMLI) building with a light metal roof - which can be expected to perform well, ' suffering little or no structural damage. • The timber-framed administration building ~ ~ belongs to a class of structures with an ~ established history of acceptable seismic ,C ~ performance and which rarely suffers severe C structural damage during earthquakes. Some w . ~ ~ timber-framed construction however utilizes - G" cripple wall construction which is known to ' be vulnerable. If this building is an essential _ facility, its seismic adequacy should be - investigated further. • The light, metal warehouse building has rod- f ~ bracing in the roof diaphragm and in some j` f of the wall panels. This bracing is beneficial .~Ts" ' ~ to the seismic performance of the building, - " although its adequacy was not determined. Figure 32 Hi/o Central Because this warehouse is the central supply Cracks at Hose Tower for the island's fire stations, a more detailed review of this building is recotrunended. ~~~11 ~ ~ 1 w..-"".~ t _ '}~+'r+~"'~f 'IF t~: -;mot r , ; ~ r. r:~~ . r C ' .~r:'..I~-t Figure 31 Hilo Cenfral Hose Tower Close-up View of Cracks National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 34 S7"R(IC'T(fRAL ~.SSUES: • A number of the bays in the perimeter ~ KAUMANA FIRE STAT/ON frames are partially infilled with CMIJ. resulting in undesirable short column conditions in each frame. The short The Kaumana Fire Station consists of one columns in the perimeter frames may crack building with a central hose tower. The due to the lack of ductile detailing, but loss buildine has anon-ductile concrete frame with of vertical support is unlikely due to the very reinforced concrete block masonry infill walls. low axial stresses in those columns and the The hose tower has a concrete roof slab, while displacement control provided by the interior the main roof consists of steel hip trusses and CMU walls. joists with a light gauge metal deck. • The corner columns provide the exterior support for the main roof hip trusses and The structural design of the Kaumana Fire will also behave as short columns during an Station is very similar to both the Waiakea and earthquake. These columns were all Kailua-Kona Fire Stations. Thus, findines observed to be cracking and/or spalling near presented in this section are relevant to these their top in the vicinity of the anchorage of three fire stations. the hip truss support. We did not perform a detailed investigation, but believe this Summary of Findin4s and cracking might be due to wind or Recommendations temperature loading on the roof trusses ~ The concrete frames, including the frames coupled with the lack of adequate transverse supporting the hose tower roof slab, lack the reinforcement at the anchorage. Because 1 transverse reinforcement required by modem these columns provide the primary support building codes for ductility. for the roof, we recommend further s The hose tower frame appears to be adequate investigation to determine the cause of the to support the roof slab under lateral cracking and to assess if corrosion of the loading, but due to the non-ductile detailing reinforcing steel in the vicinity of the cracks of these frames and the relative ease of is occurring. Repair and strengthening of bracing them, we recommend that bracing of these columns may be required. the hose tower be investigated. 1. -;i~ Y l ~ r _ Figure 33 Kaumana Fire Station National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract page 3~ Cracking was observed in the corner columns at • Since the high roof diaphragm is too flexible Kaumana, Waiakea, and Kailua-Kona fire to span between the CMU end walls, the stations. CMU pilasters located between the apparatus room doors must resist earthquake loading in STRUCTURAL /SSUES: the transverse direction. These pilasters are WA/MEA F/RE STA T/ON inadequate to resist the tributary loads and may be damaged, with the possibility of partial collapse. The stub pilasters at the Waimea Fire Station consists of one T- high roof area may suffer minor to moderate shaped building with 3 interconnecting parts: a damage. high roof apparams room that serves as [he • The stub columns at the low roof area Hazy garage for the fire trucks; a low roof area that suffer brittle shear failure and severe serves as the dormitory and living area of the cracking with the possibility of partial fire station; and a tall hose tower for drying the collapse. fire hoses. The building structure consists of • Damage to the pilasters in the apparatus reinforced concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls room may result in displacements that could and pilasters supporting timber roof trusses, cause the roll-up doors to bind or jam, skip-sheathing and wood shakes. The roof trapping the fire fighting equipment inside. structure is supported on short stub pilasters • We recommend additional investigation by a located at the top of the CMU perimeter walls. local stntctural engineer. Modifications are required to stiffen the roof diaphragms; Summary of Findings and modifications may be required to strengthen Recommendations the stub pilasters or to reduce the seismic • The skip-sheathed roof diaphragms are loading on these non-ductile elements; and to extremely flexible; non-ductile stub columns eliminate cross-grain bending on the timber have performed poorly in past earthquakes; roof supports. An investigation of the and the timber beams supporting the roof interaction between the three interconnected trusses are loaded in cross-grain bending. building areas should also be perforted. A11 of these features are undesirable for resisting seismic loads. - a .f 1 - Figure 34 Waimea Fire Station National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Paee 36 NONSTRUCTURAL/ Ro[[-uP oooRS FoR ~ EQU/PMENT /SSUES APPARATUS ROOM Nonstructural elements and pieces of ¦Fssential: TyptcaY equipment are also important for the continued ? Nonessenttal operations of the fire stations in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake. Unless they are properly secured, many of these items could be The central feature of a fire station is the vulnerable [o earthquake damage. In the apparatus room, which houses the fire fighting following discussion, these items will be equipment. This portion of the facility is categorized as either essential or nonessential equipped with large doors, approximately 12' for continued operations. As is the case with wide and 12' high, to accommodate the fire the hospital facilities, some of the items are not trucks. The fire stations we visited in the County of Hawaii generally had motorized roll- essential for continued operations, but their up steel doors. At the Waiakea Fire Station, the failure might impede the smooth operations which will help speed the post-disaster recovery helicopter hangar also is equipped with motorized roll-up doors. The doors are effort, generally hung from an overhead steel beam and The items discussed are typical of many of may have tracks or rails on either side. If the the fire stations in the County of Hawaii, and structural framing which supports these doors is are all marked "typical". not sufficiently rigid, the door openings may rack and the doors could either bind or jam, ~ trapping all of the fire fighting equipment inside the station. r J o ; - Figure 35 Rol%up Doors at Waimea Fire Station May Bind National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Paee 37 SAG ^ r!tJ.. W i rppp, % F; i~ - K ' +i A 1 ~ a i` ~ ~ i I~ _ ' ~f - r '!4 t C_ Figure 36 Ro/%up Doors at Waiakea He/icopter Hanger May Bind We recommend that the manufacturers of all overturning in an earthquake. Overturning of fire station motorized doors be contacted to the tanks can result in an uncontrolled release of determine acceptable limits for racking. In propane which may cause fires or explosions addition, motorized doors should all have a and disrupt the emergency power generation. manual override, and tools should be left near the doors which could be used to cut or pry the In order to provide adequate anchorage, doors open in an emergency. these tanks should be bolted to a continuous concrete pad wluch is massive enough to resist the seismic overturning forces. Most of the PROPANE TANKS tanks observed were attached to and supported by nominal concrete footings which are ¦ Essential ¦ Typical insufficient to prevent rollover of the tank. The L7 Nonessential gas supply line should have flexible hose connections where it is attached to the tank and where dte line enters the fire station. The area Propane tanks are frequently used for around [he tan}; should be clear ro ensure that cooking and heating in areas without an tall or heavy objects will not fall and rupture underground was distribution system, or for either the tank or the gas supply line. standby power in emergency situations. Many of [he fire stations in the County of Hawaii Nearly all of the propane tanks observed appeared to have propane tanks. These are during our site visits to fire stations in the typically horizontal steel tams that rest on four County of Hawaii appeared to be poorly short legs and are highly susceptible ro anchored mtd t1~us laighly vulnerable to damage in the event of an earthqu ke. National I a tthquake Technical Assistance Contract Pale ~4 - . i tµ r ti- ~ - . 7_ __.F - . ~ K'LL - .A ~i - NtJ ' ~ 1~ r- wi:l r~±~. Figure 37 /nadequate/y Anchored Propane Tank at the Kai/ua-Kona Fire Station - - ~.Sd~. L' _ ~ l~: " I; Figure 3S /nadequate/y Anchored Propane Tank at Pahoa Fire Station National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Pale 39 ~ EMERGENCY GENERAT/NG electrical hook-up should be connected with ~ EQU/PMENT flexible hose connections. ~,y~i ~ ~~'u ~ C\S~.N StS~# S 5~ ~C 4C ~`~F.ssenual <;; k V S"fyp?ca~~~`" t ~ ` COMMON/CAT/ONS EQU/PMENT ~lonessenltal ~ r~ < E i • C: - 4 ~ Essential : /rTypTCat ~ Vital functions at the fire station will cease b N4nessenttal ~z. 3~ ~ without a continuous power supply in an ~ emereenc}' situation. Lighting, automatic roll- up doors. and computer systems all depend on Communications equipment is vital to any power. post-disaster relief effort. Dispatchers need to contact off-duty fire fighters and respond to Emergency generating equipment generally incoming calls reporting foes or medical consists of the following components: emergencies. Command personnel need to • generator, communicate with police, other fire stations, • batteries and battery rack, and emergency response personnel in order to • diesel fuel or propane tank, and function effectively. • fuel line. The emergency communication system may The failure of any of these components could include: compromise the back-up power supply following • radio and short-wave radio an earthquake, compromising critical post- equipment, ~ • tele hone, cellular hone and fax a ui ment, disaster functions of the fire station. In order to P P 4 P protect this equipment, the generator and fuel • public address system, tanks should be securely anchored to a concrete • microwave receiver, and pad to prevent either sliding or overturning; the • computer networks. batteries should be strapped into a battery rack that is bolted down; and the piping and ' s trs. ~ F''.- - "r - ~ ' a - l - ' k - .art c +'cei°~ ~ ~F ' Figure 39 Hi/o Centra/ Dispatch Center Unanchored Communication Equipment National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page a0 All of the communications equipment in the OFFICE AND COMPUTER central dispatch center at Hilo Central Fire EQU/PMENT Station was inadequately anchored. This y Y- G<3 FS KS YS~ ¢f5 Q f. 1'{~ #:F. equipment requires anchoring to prevent ¦ ssettttal A teal earthquake damage. Desktop or countertop YP . ~1ttIIBSSCItkial~ F equipment should be located on a firm surface „.k 5 that cannot tip or slide and secured using brackets or velcro. Consoles should be braced A fire station may have many pieces of to the wall or floor. In addition, the anchorage office equipment. Computer equipment may of the main antenna at Hilo Central should be Include computers, monitors, laser printers or evaluated. high speed printers and tape drives. There may be copiers, fax and telephone equipment. WATER SUPPLY Some of this equipment may be an essential 5 1 x ~ s ci ; ~ SF ~ s~~ s~ part of the communication network. ~<Essentlrfl ~ Typrc~t ~ s Computerized systems may be used for to m 1~N~tiesse~nttat ' ~ 5 ~ calls, keeping track of engine locations and ...1. . ...o. . i.. O active foes, or storing data maps showing locations of pumping stations, reservoirs or Water is essential to maintain the hydrants. Information stored in computerized i functionality of a foe station. Dispatchers and data bases may be an important element of the personnel with a command or coordination stations ability to respond effectively during Y function may remain in the station following an emergency situations. All of the vital computer earthquake. Water for drinking, toilets, equipment should be properly secured to prevent showers, and cooking will be needed if the it from falling or being damaged in an station personnel are expected to do their jobs earthquake. Important equipment should also be effectively. protected from damage due to falling objects, overturned bookcases, etc. The water supply system in the fire station consists primarily of a gas or propane fired hot Even equipment that is not essential for water heater and the water pipes. Unanchored emergency operations should be secured or or poorly anchored water heaters were observed located so it will not slide or fall and disrupt the during our site visits. Unless the gas supply dispatch room or block exit ways. line to the heater has a flexible hose connection, the line could rupture and start a foe following an earthquake. These units should be properly anchored to a concrete pad to prevent sliding and overturning, and flexible connections are required to prevent rupture of the gas line. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 41 L/GHT/NG VEH/CLE SHEL TERS i r, Essential ~ Typical • ~ , 1~ 1? sentra! ' t 'I~ptca! • ©'.rlonessehttal ©Nonessendal Lighting in the fire station is critical for A number of vehicle shelters were observed continued operations. This includes suspended during our site visits. These are generally overhead lighting, fixed or track lighting, lighh+~eight flexible structures and are open at emergency lighting, and exit lights. All of this the front. They may be vulnerable to equipment should be secured to prevent earthquake damage. Although these shelters are ~ swinging, banging or falling during an not necessary for emergency operations, if they earthquake. Suspended lights should be braced collapse, extrication of the fire fighting to the roof or floor above. Florescent light equipment from under the ~allen roof sttucmre bulbs should be secured to the fixture to ensure will impede emergency response. These that the bulbs themselves do not fall out and shelters should be investigated, and braced or break, and grilles should be tied to prevent strengthened if necessary to guard against opening and falling. collapse. A variety of poorly braced shelters and poor support conditions were observed. - ii,: 1 ~io _ v , - j ~ f~ I ~1 i 1 _ a _ ,.4. ca ~ f a ~ Figure 40 Suspended Florescent Figure dl Detail of /mproperly Lights at Waia/yea Fire Supported Post for Station Vehicle Shelter at Kau Fire Station National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 42 ~ 4 _ _ Vii;` _~r:. ~r~ ~ - .,.r,.. L.Fih"' I I ~ M i' ~ x ' t ~ Y i Figure 42 Vehic% She/ter Without Knee-Bracing at Kau Fire Station FURN/TURF AND CONTENTS Q ssentra] ~¦.Typicai ¦ NbnesseduaI ~ This category includes a wide variety of i items that are not essential to the operation of - I ~ the fire station, but may cause damage or injury °ys ,--t. to staff, or block coaidors in the event of an earthquake. Some exanaples include: -'v • lockers for personal items; ' ~ ~ ' • storage racks and supply cabinets; • vending machines and refrigerators; • kitchen and laundry equipment; - • televisions and VCRs; • book shelves; • floor or table lamps; and • potted plants or indoor landscaping. ~ i Figure 43 Unbraced Lockers at the Pahoa Fire Station [~fational earthquake Techtucal Assistance Contract Page 43 These items could fall and cause serious injury. Care should be used in corridors and primary access routes through the station, to keep these areas free of items that could fall and block exits or impede the traffic flow. ' _ , Equipment or supplies that may be needed in an emergency should be stored so that these ',,I jl items will not fall to theround in an ' ;'.i'illl earthquake. Stoves and other gas appliances I - ~ ~ should have flexible hose connections to reduce ' - the possibility of fire. I ~ CE/L/NGS ~''RT^~} ==~"..•:r•~,i'I ~ ©Essenli3l L Typtcal ` ~ ¦ ~Nonessenpal c, ~f C. .'i z F t d Figure 44 Hi/o Central Fiie Station I Main Warehouse Containing Suspended ceiling systems are vulnerable to ~ Unanchored Storage Racks damage, particularly when the ceiling also supports the weigh[ of overhead lighting. I Suspended ceiling grids should be laterally braced using tie wires and compression struts to ~ ~ prevent the collapse of the ceiling system. ~ Florescent light fixtures supported by ceiling ~ systems require additional bracing and support r ~ ~ from [he floor above. e ~F c ~ _ 7_~~ ` . t~ .7~ - ' ~ ~ f f~ l~ - w i ~S r _ _~.d Figure 45 Supp/y Cabinet at the Kaumana Fire Station National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page d4 ~ CONCL US/ON B/BL/OGRAPHY The study has found that the emergency 1. Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural response preparedness of the fire stations and Earthgtallce Damage: A Practical Guide, hospitals in the County of Hawaii is poor. The FEMA-74, Federal Emergency Management essential facilities in the County are virtually Agency, .Tune 1985. unprepared for effective disaster respotse following a major earthquake. Both structural 2. Seismic Considerations - Health Care and nonstructural hazards are prevalent and Facilities, FEMA-150, Federal Emergency facilities experiencing a major earthquake are Management Agency, May 1990. likely to be unable to maintain post-earthquake operability. A comprehensive earthquake 3. Rapid 1rrual Screening of Building for hazard mitigation program needs to be Potential Seismic Hazards: A Handbook, established and, as one part cf this program, the FEMA-154, Federal Emergency structural and nonstructural hazards at all Management Agency, July 1988. County fire stations and hospitals needs to be evaluated and abated. 4. Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Potential Seismic Hazards.• Supporting Documentation, FEMA-155, Federal Emergency Management Agency, September 1988. l 5. NEHRP Handbook for the Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings, FEMA- 178, Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 1992. This Report has been prepared by 6. Uniform Building Code, International Wiss, Janney, Etsmer Associates, mc. Conference of Building Officials, 1991. for the 7. Hilo Hospital Structural Study for State of state of Hawaii Hawaii, Department of Accounting and office of Civil Defense, General Services, Wiss, Janney, Elstner The Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board Associates, Inc., November 1988. and the Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Earthquakes and Natural Hoards Authors: Terrence Paret Glenn Miyasato Cynthia Perry Eduardo Fiero Anatol Longinow National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract Page 45 / TECHNICAL APPENDIX 1 STRUCTURAL REVIEW A.1 ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF EVALUATION This section of the Appendix describes the analytical methodology used for evaluation of earthquake hazards at essential fire stations and hospitals in the County of Hawaii. Within fhe defined scope of work, the methodology used considered as much as possible risks to both life safety and loss of function as criteria for the evaluations, although these criteria are ofren assumed to govern independently for non-essential buildings and essential buildings, respectively. For this study, because of the age and structural diversity of the County's essential building stock and because of the historic lack of attention paid to earthquake resistance within the County, both criteria were assumed to require addressing. This assumption was later validated by the results of the study, which identified a blend of potential life safety and loss of function hazards at various facilities. The prediction of structural response to earthquake ground motion is, at best, approximate. Not only are the characteristics of future earthquakes in Hawaii ~ uncertain, but the behaviors of the complex building systems in evidence throughout the ~ inventory of surveyed fire stations and hospitals are difficult to define. Prediction of structural response is approximate, therefore, because engineers do not know enough and do not have adequate analytical tools to predict response with great accuracy. Nevertheless, relying heavily upon both quantitative and qualitative data, engineers can and do make predictions that appear to be reasonable, although these predictions have rarely heen field tested. There are many established methods for the evaluation of existing building structures, but without exception, these methods do not address the post-earthquake operability requirement of essential facilities. There is, in fact, little data available pertaining to prediction of loss of function due to less than adequate stnctural performance. In contrast to the relative straightforward tasks of defining potential risks to life safety and of describing the causes of structural collapse, catalysts for loss of function may be neither readily apparent nor predictable. Potential structural catalysts for loss of function are diverse: structural racking may prevent opening and/or closing of operating room doors, firehouse garage doors, etc.; moderate structural damage may precipitate unwarranted red-tagging by emergency inspection teams; non-structural cracking may produce the perception of an unsafe structure and create an unwillingness on the part of staff and the general public to enter the facility; and damaged or collapsed entrance canopies may prevent access. Wherever possible, we have attempted to identify obvious structural hazards to loss of function, but complete investigation of these hazards is beyond the scope of this report. National Earthquake Technical Assistance ContracC A-1 The evaluation procedures utilized in this study included both FEMA 178, "1VEHRP Handbook for the Seismic Evaluation of Ezrsting Buildings" and the 1991 Uniform Building Code design provisions for essential facilities iri Seismic Zone 4. Portions of both these procedures were incorporated into the evaluation methodology utilized, but because neither procedure explicitly addresses the post-earthquake functionality requirements of essential facilities, they were both modified and supplemented. The stated intern of the seismic design provisions of the 1991 Uniform Building Code (UBC) for non-essential buildings is to protect life safety in the event of a major earthquake. In a very oblique fashion, the UBC further provides a higher standard for essential facilities through the use of an importance factor, I, that results in design level forces 25% higher than for non-essential buildings. This higher force level, however, is neither intended to protect against loss of function nor necessarily provides better structural performance. Thus, structural evaluations using the 1991 UBC as a standard have limited relevance for essential facilities. Essential facilities that are determined to be in conformance with the 1991 UBC can be said to have been designed to a standard that was intended to protect life safety, but an essential building that does not collapse on its occupants during an earthquake is still not necessarily occupiable after an earthquake. Furthermore, for essential facilities that are determined to not be in conformance with the 1991 UBC, little can be concluded except that these facilities are not in conformance with the 1991 UBC. It is not necessarily true for these buildings that there are consequent risks to life safety and to functionality. Supplementary evaluation is, therefore, requisite for all essential facilities. FEMA 178 provides a much more complete methodology for seismic evaluation of buildings than does the UBC. It is a seismic evaluation handbook, rather than a design code and describes in detail most of the issues that must be considered during an evaluation. however, FEMA 178 explicitly excludes post-earthquake operability and performance of essential facilities from its scope, and limits itself instead to evaluation of potential life safety hazards. Nevertheless, this document is a valuable source book for orienting structural engineers whose primary experience is in building design toward building evaluation. Structural evaluation for the study commenced with apre-screening procedure similar to FEMA 154, a brief review of the structural drawings and a one to two hour site survey of each building. This portion of the evaluation facilitated our undecstanding of the construction and configuration at each site and provided invaluable information about connection details between various structural elements and structural wings, interaction between structural and non-structural elements, and conditions not represented in the drawings. FEMA 154 scorecards for all structures surveyed are provided in Part C of this Appendix. For the 4 facilities chosen for subsequent evaluation, more detailed reviews of the available structural and architectural drawings were performed. The review was loosely based upon the guidelines set forth in FEMA 178. The system was identified, National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-2 building and element strengths and masses were computed, and approximate hand calculations were performed to assess overall building performance and the performance of obvious weak links, and to evaluate likely failure modes. The approximate analyses were generated assuming the standard UBC 5 % critical response spectrum for Zone 4 on an SZ site and demand to capacity ratios were computed for critical elements. Estimates of damage potential, life safety hazards, and possible risks to post~arthquake operability were based upon the data generated by the site survey, the drawing review, and the computed demand to capacity ratios. B.1 PROPERTY: Kona Hospital Building 1 Kona Hospital consists of two structurally independent buildings: Building 1 is the original building including minor structural modifications for the expansion of the emergency room. Building 2 is a major 3-story addition. This section of the appendix summarizes the review of Building 1. B.1.1 BUILDING DATA ADDRESS: P.O. Box 69, Kealekekua, HI 96750. CLIENT CONTACT: Ms. Jenny Wung, Administrator. Phone (808) 322-9311. ~ REVIEWED BY: Terrence Parer, Senior Engineer; Glenn Miyasato, Project Engineer; and Eduardo Fierro, Senior Engineer. DATE OF SITE VISIT: 2/5/93 B.1.2 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS: Original architectural and structural drawings by James K. Tsugawa & Associates, Architects, May 1972. OTHER DRAWINGS: Expansion of the emergency room architecmral and structural drawings by James K. Tsugawa & Associates, Architects, April 15, 1980. GEOTECHNICAL REPORT: Soil boring log on sheet A-1 of original drawings. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-3 ~ / 1: the building is safe to occupy. Aside from the cracking in the exterior architectural finishes and spalling of the ductile frames, we believe that the structural design of this building is sufficient to permit continued occupancy after a major earthquake, 6. The proximity of Building 2 to Building 1 is likely to result in pounding of the two structures. Pounding of buildings during earthquakes can have severe structural and non-structural consequences, but the structural consequences of pounding are very difficult to predict with certainty. In some cases, pounding may actually improve building performance. Because the floor elevations of the two buildings in Kona Hospital are identical, pounding is not likely to be a major concern for the structures, but it will likely exacerbate non-structural damage by introducing impulsive high frequency accelerations. In addition, the anticipated differential displacement across the expansionjoint between the two buildings will likely promote damage to non-structural systems crossing the joint, including medical gas delivery system, electrical conduit and piping, and requires additional investigation. The potential for disruption to these systems should be investigated and, if necessary, mitigated. B.3 PROPERTY: Hilo Central Fire Station Hilo Central Fire Station consists of one primary structure and several secondary structures. The primary 2-story structure, a mixed steel frame and cast-in-place reinforced concrete bui]ding, is the oldest fire station on the island. The secondary structures include awood-framed administration building, a communication bunker composed of concrete masonry units (CMU) and a light metal warehouse. Structural drawings were not available for any of the secondary structures. This section of the appendix summarizes the review of the primary structure. B.3.1 BUILDING DATA ~ ADDRESS: 466 Kinoole St., Hilo, HI 96743-2983. i CLIENT CONTACT: None available. REVIEWED BY: Terrence Paret, Senior Engineer; Glenn Miyasato, Project Engineer; and Anatol Longinow, Consultant. DATE OF SITE VISIT: 2/3/93 B.3.2 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS: Original architectural and structural drawings by Frank F. Arakawa, 1938. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-10 1 OTHER DRAWINGS: None available GEOTECHNICAL REPORT: None available B.3.3 PROPERTY DESCRII'TION BUILDING TYPE: Two-story steel frame with reinforced concrete shear walls and a reinforced concrete hose tower. AREA (approx.): 8,800 Square feet. NUMBER OF STORIES: Two stories. STORY HEIGHT: Approx. 15 feet-0 inches DESIGN/ CONSTRUCTION DATE: Original design 1938. I CURRENT USE: Fire station. SITE DESCRIPTION: Building is located adjacent to an intermittent stream bed which has been diverted underground through the property. SOIL CHARACTERISTICS: None available. B.3.4 STRUCTURAL SYSTEM VERTICAL: Roof The roof is a 4-inch thick reinforced concrete slab supported on 15-inch deep steel beams supported by steel girders and reinforced concrete walls. The steel girders are also supported by four steel columns at the interior. Second Floor The second floor is a 4.75-inch reinforced concrete slab supported on 15-inch deep steel beams supported by steel girders and reinforced concrete walls. The steel girders are also supported by four steel columns a[ the interior. The configuration is very similar to the roof. Hose Tower The hose tower is a 17 feet x 17 feet reinforced concrete structure with a 4-inch thick reinforced concrete roof slab. The tower extends approximately 22 feet above the parapet level. I Foundation The foundation consists of wall and column footings. z National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-11 r ,1 LATERAL: The lateral loads in the building are transmitted from the roof fff and slab to reinforced concrete shear walls. The thickness of the walls ranges from 8 inches to 20 inches. The Hose tower lateral load resisting system consists of four L-shaped 36 inch x 36 inch x 8 inch shear walls at the comers of the structure, interconnected by spandrels at two levels. B.3.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The hose tower was observed to exhibit significant cracking which we were told was caused by previous earthquakes. The cracking appears to be flexural in origin and is consistent with frame action of the L-shaped wall segments and spandrels. Flexural yield of the hose tower was computed to occur at about .13g acceleration of the hose tower roof. This is inadequate to protect the hose tower from severe damage and possible collapse during a major earthquake. We recotnmend that the lateral load resisting system of the hose tower be upgraded. The upgrade could be accomplished by providing a new braced steel frame to support the tower. Caze should be taken to verify the quality of the existing concrete and the adequacy of the connections to the main building. 2. Two of the hose tower L-shaped walls are discontinuous and are supported by ~ steel framing at the roof level. These supports are believed to be adequate to support the hose tower for [he lateral forces associated with flexural yield of the L-shaped wall segments, but may have to be strengthened if the lateral strength of the hose tower is upgraded. 3. The main building has substantially more lateral stiffness in the second story than in the first story due to the open plan of the apparatus room. Although this configuration results in a soft-story effect, the fu•st floor walls appear to have adequate strength and stiffness. Little if any damage is expected to occur at the first floor of this structure. Minor damage to the second floor slab and to the concrete headets over the doors on the second floor may result from the discontinuity of the second floor walls. Due to the great strength and stiffness of the walls in the first story, we believe that this fire station is less prone to suffering permanent racking displacement than any other fire station on the island. There is, therefore, a low probability of building distortion great enough to bind the apparatus room doors. 4. The secondary buildings at Hilo Central were not subjected to detailed structural evaluations. However, qualitative statements about their expected performance still should be made. As a small, squat, regular, windowless CMU building with a light metal roof, the communications bunker can be expected to perform well, suffering little or no structural damage. The timber-framed administration ` building belongs to a class of structures with an established history of acceptable seismic performance. Small timber-framed buildings rarely suffer severe National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-12 structural damage during earthquakes, although construction with cripple walls ' is known to be vulnerable. A determination should be made regazding the criticality of this building for emergency response and then, if necessary, the adequacy of the building should be investigated: The light, metal warehouse building also belongs to a class of building that tend to perform well in earthquakes. This building was observed to have rod bracing in the roof diaphragm as well as in some of the wall panels, which is beneficial from the standpoint of performance. Because the warehouse is a supply facility for many fire stations in the County, the adequacy of this building should be investigated. B.4 PROPERTY: Kaumana Fire Station Kaumana Fire Station consists of one building with a central hose tower. This section of the appendix summarizes the review of this building. B.4.1 BUILDING DATA ADDRESS: c/o 466 Kinoole St., Hilo, HI 96720-2983. CLIENT CONTACT: None available. REVIEWED BY: Terrence Parer, Senior Engineer; Glenn Miyasato, Project Engineer. DATE OF SITE VISIT: 2/3/93 B.4.2 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS: Original architectural and structural drawings by ODA / McCARTY, Architects. OTHER DRAWINGS: None available GEOTECHNICAL REPORT: None available B.4.3 PROPERTY DESCRIP'T'ION BUILDING TYPE: Non-ductile concrete frame with reinforced concrete block masonry iniill walls. The roof consists of steel hip trusses and joists with a light metal deck. AREA (approx.): 4,900 Square feet. NUMBER OF STORIES: One-story with a hose tower. National Earthquake Tectutical Assistance Contract A-13 STORY HEIGHT: 12 feet-0 inches, roof slopes 18 feet to the base f of the hose tower which rises an additional 14 feet above the peak of the roof. w DESIGN/ = CONSTRUCTION DATE: 1968. CURRENT USE: Fire station. SITE DESCRIPTION: Building is located on a gently sloping hill. SOIL CHARACTERIS'T'ICS: None available. B.4.4 STRUCTURAL SYSTEM VERTICAL: Roof The roof framing consists of light metal deck supported by steel joists and trusses supported by reinforced concrete columns and beams. The roof of the hose tower consists of a 4-inch reinforced concrete slab supported by spandrels and four 12 inch x 12 inch reinforced concrete colutttns. Foundation The foundation consists of 16-inch wide continuous wall footings at the walls, with 3 foot x 3 foot spread footings at the column. LATERAL: The lateral loads in the building are carried by frame action of the concrete columns and beams, as well as by the many intzrior and exterior 8-inch thick CMU walls. B.4.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The Kaumana Fire Station structural design is very similar to the Waiakea Fire Station and to Kailua-Kona. Findings presented in this section are relevant to all three fue stations. 2. All concrete frames, including the frames supporting the hose tower roof slab, lack the transverse reinforcement required for ductility by modem building codes. 3. The strength of the hose tower frames appears to be adequate to support the roof slab under lateral loading, Nevertheless, because of the non-ductile detailing of these frames and the relative ease of bracing them, we recommend that bracing of the hose tower be investigated. 4. A number of the bays in the perimeter frames are partially irtfilled with CMU. The infill typically results in multiple short column conditions in each frame. I National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-14 5. The loads paths for lateral forces between the roof and the foundation are circuitous and are dependent upon the relative rigidities of various components of the structure. The short columns in the perimeter frames further complicate the load path, and it is difficult to quantify how much load they will attract. Cracking of these short columns is quite possible, but despite the lack of ductile detailing, loss of vertical support is unlikely due to the very low axial stress in those columns and the displacement control provided by the interior CMU walls. 6. The corner columns provide the exterior support for the main roof hip trusses and will also behave as short columns during an earthquake. These columns were all observed to be cracking and/or spalling near the top in the vicinity of the anchorage of the hip truss support. Investigation was not performed to determine the cause of this cracking, but we believe that it might be due to resistance of the concrete frames to distortion of the hip trusses caused by wind or temperature change coupled with [he lack of adequate transverse reinforcement a[ the anchorage. Because of the relative importance of these columns for support of [he roof and because of the possibility of corrosion of the reinforcing steel in the vicinity of the cracks, investigation, repair, and possibly strengthening of these columns should be undertaken. B.5 PROPERTY: Waimea Fire Station j Waimea Fire Station consists of one T-shaped building with 3 interconnecting parts: a high roof area that serves as the garage for the fire trucks; a low roof area that serves as the dormitory and office; and a tall hose tower for drying the fue hoses. B.5.1 BUILDING DATA ADDRESS: P.O. Box 731, Kamuela, HI 96743. CLIENT CONTACT: None available. REVIEWED BY: Terrence Parer, Senior Engineer; Glenn Miyasato, Project Engineer; and Eduardo Fierro, Senior Engineer. DATE OF SITE VISIT: 2/4/93 B.5.2 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS: Original architectural and structural drawings by M. Matsushita & Associates, Architects, Dec 1976. OTHER DRAWINGS: None available National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-15 GEOTECHNICAL REPORT: None available ~ H B.5.3 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION t BUILDING TYPE: Reinforced concrete block masonry shear walls and pilasters with skip-timber sheathing and shake roofs. AREA (approx.): 9,266 Square feet. NUMBER OF STORIES: One story. STORY HEIGHT: Garage, 16 feet-8 inches; dormitory, 10 fee[-6 inches; and hose tower, 32 feet-0 inches. DESIGN/ CONSTRUCTION DATE: Original design December 1976. CURRENT USE: Fire station. SITE DESCRIPTION: Building is located on level ground. `l SOIL CHARACTERISTICS: None available. B.5.4 STRUCTURAL SYSTEM VERTICAL: Roof The roof framing consists of skip-sheathing supported by wooden trusses supported by 8-inch x 14-inch wooden beams supported by reinforced concrete block masonry pilasters or walls. Foundation The foundation consists of 2-foot wide continuous wall footings at the walls, with 4-foot x 8-foot spread footings under the pilasters. LATERAL: The lateral loads in the building are transmitted from the roof system to small 8-inch x 8-inch stub pilasters located beneath the roof framing, to larger pilasters located at the building perimeter in the garage, and to walls located inside the dormitory. Typical perimeter walls are 8 inches thick. Typical pilasters are. 16 inches x 24 inches and 16 inches x 16 inches. A11 pilasters lack ductile reinforcing details. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-16 B.S.S SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS ~ 1. The main roof diaphragms consist of skip-sheathing and shakes, which is a very flexible system. The non-ductile stub colutttns which support the roof are known to perform poorly in earthquakes. Furthermore, the 8 inch x 14 inch timber beams supporting the roof trusses participate in the lateral system through cross- grain bending. This configuration is very undesirable for resisting forces due to earthquakes. 2. Garaee: For earthquake loading on the gazage in the transverse direction the roof diaphragm cannot effectively span between the transverse CMU walls, and the tall CMU pilasters will be required to carry tributary portions of the roof loads. These pilasters were computed to have a D/C ratio of 2.1 in bending and may experience moderate to severe damage, with the possibility of partial collapse. The stub pilasters have a D/C ratio of 1.25 and may experience minor to moderate damage. 3. Dormitory/Office: The stub pilasters have a D/C of 1.7 in shear which may result in severe cracking, brittle failure, and the possibility of partial collapse. 4. The damage anticipated to the pilasters is likely to be associated with displacement that may bind the roll-up doors. 1 5. The lateral load resisting system requires additional investigation by a structural engineer and appears to require strengthening. In the garage, possible strengthening measures include stiffening the roof diaphragm either by replacing the roof sheathing with plywood or by installing a plywood diaphragm at the truss bottom chords. Modifications of the load path to avoid delivering significant earthquake forces to the stub pilasters are also appropriate. Modification of the anchorage detail of the timber garage door headers to avoid cross-grain bending should also be considered. Investigation of the interaction between the 3 interconnected building areas should be performed. C.1 FEMA 154 SCORECARDS This section of the Technical Appendix contains the FEMA 154 scorecards for the primary structure at the facilities surveyed. These scorecards are provided for reference only and should not be used to prioritize detailed evaluations of the surveyed facilities. As explained in the body of this report, the FEMA 154 methodology is not intended to provide the basis for drawing conclusions pertaining to a particular building. Use of these scorecards foc that purpose will result in misidentification of some facilities as not requiring detailed evaluations when they do require it, and of some facilities as requiring detailed evaluations when they do not. National Earthquake Technical Assistance Contract A-17 :~,~tyl'1%k~ ~ ~ A TG-G I i u . „ Udo s. o-, F6ttl) ~uoas _ ~r ~ RapO Visual Scraertaq of Se~vrrcaly Hazardous l3.ddinOs t~ - Other IderNhors _ _ _ . No, Stories ~ Year~t 1438 I'ts0eclor ,lJ Y1 Date a-3-9~ 7ota1 Fbor Aree (sq. ft) l~ialnq Nama~f/LO GEnIt2At. FIRE" t-r"n'>"JoN Use 1Pw~n IacNl r ?e. . t _ j, 1 i ~!y } ~ S~ 4 1 a ~ ~l 't z.. a' I . Is ~ ~ - - r •t s~ - p ~ 1 i- I ~C~ r ° : i I ti'. ~..r ~ ' I p~~ OCCLPANCY STRUCTURAL SCORES AND MODIFIERS Residential iNO. PerHarte 9.LLMX3 TYPE w s1 SZ 93 54 Ct C2 03185 FCt PC2 RM IAIA Conmerclal cMtl X80 M1M ~SICS\VI (~1 tsvrl Mt+rFl frU _ _ 0-10 Babe Scorn 4.b 4.5 3.0 5.5 3.5 2.0 ~ 1.b 2.0 1.5 3.0 1.0 Office 11-100 F)dOStflal wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -1.0 -t .O -0.5 wA -0.5 -1.0 -0.5 100+ Poor Catltlrn -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 Pitt. A85em. Vert. Frapiarfj -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -I.O 6 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0 6 School ~ son story -t.o -z.s -z.o -t.o -z.o -z.o _z.o -1.0 -1.0 -z.o -z.o -1.0 Govt- ~ i roroia, -to -z.o -f.o -t.o -t.o -l.o -1.0 -l.o -t.a -t.o _t.o SArv Plan t*a'O11ar1<Y -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ~a~^q wA -0.5 -0.5 wA -0.5 -0.5 wA wA wA -O.5 wA wA HlStonc l.arpa l4aVy C1MSS1O WA -2.O WA WA WA -t.O WA WA WA -1 O WA WA ~ Short Cokmn WA WA WA WA WA - J , O 1 .O 1 .O 1 .O WA WA WA . Non Structtral ? PoatOxctmark Year .2.0 .2.0 .z.o .2.0 .2.0 -z.o WA--,z-o .z.o .z.o WA Falfnq Hazard - DATA CONFI7ENCE S~ -0.9 -0'3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 ~).3 -0-3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 SL3 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0. 8 -0.5 -0.8 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0. a Entineied S~4w. 31,3 8 8 to 20 atorbaa wA -0.8 -0.5 WA -0.8 a -0. B wA -0.8 -0.8 -0. a ar lkreialL Oats Oti(. Do tJOt Know FNAL _ oZ. COI,R.AQJTS ~ ~H~.l~Vrna~~ ~--i~1JiPr{~ tlo-C Detailed A,JCI~rl~9 Oo~.,)~ Evaluation Required' m•~ YFS NO Figure Bic ,trc-zl-r Appendix B 1?3 ATC-21/ crr~tw rtaa,nroae ~.ar ,~~r,~ ;1s.,~s - - . Rapid Visual Screetvp of Se~srrticaty Hazardous Buidr70a ~ ~tttef Iderttrfier9 _ _ _ _ tb. Stones I } Year Btit = 196A Inspector ~ Hr-1 Date ~ -5-93 _ Total Floor Area (sq, tt) Buioinq Neme_kA~1HP~+A PutE S7RTt~ ~ _ Use lrw~n leDaq - _ it • . . i _ .:.ti'.f ~ R~•-+^~ ~ OCCUPANCY STRlICT11RAL SCORES AND MODtFERS Residential 'No. Persona ~~'p TYPE w s1 52 g3 S4 c1 C2 C3iS5 PC1 PC2 fA1 lFA1 _ tMF1 ea ILAtI me sm P.t~1 ram M1+eA l'~l mn Corrmerdal 10 Beak Scores 4.6 4.6 3.0 5.5 3.5 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 3.0 7.0 Office ~ 11-100 I-Ighlilee wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 wA -0.S -1.0 -0.5 Y1d15triel I 100+ Par Cardarn -0.S -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.6 -0.S -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.5 Ptlb. Assam. j Vert. tiapJat[y -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -7.0 -7.0 -0.6 -0.6 School Soft glary -1.0 -2.5 -2.0 -7.0 -2.0 0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -7.0 Tordon -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 Sefv F4n tra0Jar[y -7.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.S -1.0 -7.0 -7.0 -1.0 ra„dno WA -0.S -0.S wA -0.S -0.S WA WA WA -0.S WA WA F4SIOnc - L.arpa Heavy llaOdYp WA -2.O WA WA WA WA WA WA _7.D WA WA ghortComr WA WA WA WA WA 7,O -7.O -1.O WA -1.0~ WA WA NOn Structtral ~ rout earctanaric Yar .z.0 •2.0 .z.0 .2.0 •2.0 .0 .2.0 "'A •2.0 •2.0 .2.0 wA Falfrtp Hazard 9L.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 DATA COt~FDENCE gi3 -0.e -0.e -0.e -0.a -0.e (-0.81 -0.e -0.e -0.e -0.a -0.e -0.a *-Eatine2edsibiectFva sWaem20ata4sa wA -0.a -0.s WA -0.a ~-o.s -0.a WA -o.s -o.a -0.s ar llrreleLM Data Cf•K - Do Nat Know - O, 6 i COMv1ENTS CRACKS Irk CoRrjF2 ColVt1n15 Detsiled Evaluation Requiredt 0.., Q- NO Figure 83c i ATC17-1 Appendix B 123 ATC-2 7 / (NE~f?P MaP Aroea 5.6,7 hiptt) Adctosa Rapid Visual SCreemO of Seisrncaly Fiazerootls Btidnps ~ i Otfter Iderttrfiot s ' _ . _ No . Stories I + . Year limit 19-11 hspector r".tFe~l Date Total Floor Ares (sq. nl . _ - Buidit0 Name_ W a~ r~ l~t'P, F i nt S TAT av Use IPSa4oR IeCaq ~i _ ',r~~ _ _ _ ~ ~ i i , ~ ~ ~.z , x r~ state. r ~ -4""~'`~ ..r OCCIPANCY STAt1CTLgAL SCORES MD MOD~IERS ~ - - Residential No. Peraorta rv~ w st s2 s3 sa ct c2 c3is5 Pct Pct FaA LR1A Carmerdal ~ t ~1 ~ nao me sm n.AFl rsm nAra ~ (?ul Office ~ i ~O~ 4.6 4.5 9.0 S.5 3.5 0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 3.0 t.0 hdll5tiel wA -2.0 -7.0 wA -1.0 ~-7.0 -0.5 wA -0.6 -1,0 -0.6 t00+ Poor Oa>mfon -0.S -0.6 -0.S -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 Pttt. ASSem. Vert. trapLrty -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -t.0 -0.6 -0.6 Scholl SoR Story -7.0 -2.6 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -t.0 -t.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 Taradon -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 Set ~ pFlp,,a,,n~~,,a~tr~~~~pJarty -t.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.5 -t.0 -1.0 -t.0 -1.0 "^"'~Y WA -0.S -0.S WA -0.S -0.S WA WA WA -0 S ~ WA WA H1StOf)C tXOa 1'faaVY C1pOd}'Q WA -2.l) WA WA WA - WA WA WA -1 Q WA WA NOn ~ $110rt CaAmr ----WA WA WA WA WA 1.O -1.O -1.O WA -t.O WA WA .JU ul.lll p~ g~~k Yyr •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 ...0 .2.0 "rA •2.0 .2.0 •2.0 wA Falfr7gHazard DATA CONF~ENC:E 9t1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0. J -0.3 -0~~1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 9L3 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 (-0.8) -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 ' EairtWay SiCje[Cvs. °l_S 6 e l0 20 etaW wA -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 wA -0.8 -0.8 -0. 8 or lkrefaoy Oats ~ IXJC - Co Not Know F?iAl. SCOT -U.b COr.T4alTS Detailed ~ Grcacu..S 1rJ cAflll lilt Col,vt-ASS Evaluation i Required? , •m NO Figure Bic ,arc-zl-1 i Appendis B 1?3 _ ATC-21/ (~1-fW flap Areea 5.6.7 Nigh) ~arosa Raga Visual Soreertrtq of Seismcaly Hazardous Bul~rtQs ~ ~tit®f IdBfltlflBf9 - _ _ No. Stories I YearBuit 19Sa- . hspecior ~NM Date 1-3-R3 Total Fbor Area (sq. ft1 i( Buid'npName_ I<fa~.1A1~A~t~ FtnE s-nx>,~.\ ~ Use . (i s~-on leb.0 _ f- ~ . Yv- y ~ w OCCIPAMCY STRUCT1JFiAL SCORES AND h1OD~lERS RBSiderrtial jNO. Persona ~~'p TYFE w 9t S? S3 S4 ct c2 03/95 PC7 Pct Fad LFUd Corrmerdal ~ 0-t - ~l ~ iuq tFtcsvn fF~l t"mtua+rrl fttA _ Office I ~ ~O~ 4.6 4.5 3.0 6.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.3 3.0 1.0 17-100 1-{~FF~ wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -i.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 wA -0.5 -0.5 ~ Yldtstf181 100« Fbar Condlm -0.5 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.5 -0.6 -0.S -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 Rb. Assem. Vvt. hpWrty -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -1.0 -0.5 -0-6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 ~ $~}t00) SoR Story -t.0 -2,5 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 II ~ Torehn -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 Se<v fin ~Y -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.5 -t.0 -t.0 1.0 -t.0 ~ilt WA -0.S -0.5 WA -0.S -0.S WA WA WA -0 5 A WA HiStOrK: Bldg. l~rp~FWvy CtedOb wA -2.0 wA wA wA -1.0 wA wA wA _t.p~ wA wA 9tlflt CCkmtiJ WA WA WA WA WA _t,O -1.O -t.O WA _t ,d WA WA ~n~'~~+~ ~ r~eencr.r~elkreer .z.o .z.o .z.o .2.0 .z.o .z.o .2.o wA_.z.o .z.o .z.o WA Fa1Gtp Hazard - - - - - DATA COrFDEiJC'E 9~2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -4.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 3 -0.3 91.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0. B -0. B -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0. B r_ Fstineted 9iDiective. 3l_3 8 8 to 20 eionw wA -0.8 -0.8 "~A -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 wA -0.8 B -0. 8 a UrcalatL De4 1' CfiC ~ Da Nat Know ~.1 COA?v1ETJT$ Detailed Evaluetlon Required? 0„ YES NO Figure Bic ATC-21-I Appendix !1 123 ATC-2 1 / (f~E}-RP t.4ap Areea 5.6,7 FiQh) ^Oa esa _ ~ Rapd Visual Sueem0 of SeisrrrAty Hazardous Other Iderttifiera - - No. Stones I YearE*<dt 1964 Inspector C~Hr-+ Date a-3-9-~ ~ Total Ffocr Area (sq. h) _ _ BuidnO Name_ KEFra~~ rtf1E ST~1oN t}Se . (Peei-oft kDM) _ - ' t ~ C - . ..._.:.;.........3 ~t 1 SCele: . _ i OCCLPANCY STAUCTLRAL SCORES At~D~MODIFIERS Residential No. Peraorta rYPE w st sz sa sa ct c2 c3iss xt x2 aM ~ CCrtmerCial - 'A!F~ Brtt M1NI fRC Sw1 f~l 15tin Na! rF1 mn Bade Seams 4.6 4.5 3.0 5.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 3. 1.0 Office t1dO5tllal ? Htri~ wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -1.0 -1 .0 -0.5 wA -0.5 - -0.6 100+ Poor CaidNm -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 PLIb. Asaem. Vert. FipJarty -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -7,0 -t .0 -0.6 son st«y -t.o -z.s -z.o -t.d -z.o -2.0 -z.o -t.o -t.o -z.o - -t.o roam -t.o -z.o -to -t.o -t.o -t.o -t.o -t.o -t.o -t.o -t o -t.a Serv Ren trapJarty -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1.0 -t.0 -1.0 -1.0 Potrr~q wA -0.5 -0.5 wA -0.5 -0.5 wA wA wA -0.5 wA WA H1SSOrIC Ltrti~FiMVY CleditV WA -2.O WA WA WA -t,O WA WA wA -1.O WA WA NOn StrlKt~?~ $110ft QOLIRM WA WA WA WA WA -t,d -t.0 -1.D WA -t ,d WA WA P'cst 8encfinark Year •2.0 .2.0 .2.0 .2.0 •2.0 .2.0 .2.0 wA .2.0 •2.0 •2.0 wA FalGtq Hazard - - ~2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 DATACCt`FDENCE 9L3 -0.s -0.e -0.e -0.e -0.5 -08 -0.e -0.5 -0.6 -0.e ~-0.a F.sliruteC aiDlrtetiw. SLJ 8 E to 20 alo`4sa wA -0.8 -0.8 wA -0.8 -0. B -0.8 -0.8 wA -0.8 -21-'S -0. e « Urereas Data DNt . oa r+a R„m.~ ~ ~'O~ 1. Y COAT.¢NT'S ` )ftnEf~~ (p PO ppr~H / Detailed f-b.~130v~1b ~~`,~P`t' Evaluation r~DThCC'rC- [~J1~,Dlf`I6S. Required? i m..~ - G(tAcV,,a~ A'C L~acn.E'c~ l,~nl'r ~l_ ~ NO Figure Bic :1TC-21-1 appendix B 123 f'l ~~I;;N~MwJM1i-S ~°.se-` f\ I C;-L 1 / Ili}-r6' r.ui0 ivees o.o.r r~n~ ••uosu _ ~l r - Rapd Visual Screerut0 of Se~,mcaty HazarOOUS ®dddert0o "0------ Other Iderrtifiers - - - No. Stones I Year~7t 1964 Inspector ~;Hrt Date T -3-4J _ Tots! Fbor Area Isq. h) i _ 63iditp Name_ PAHOa ~~nc ScrArt~eJ ~ Use last-on lec.q - 'F l l 1 t ) 1 SCai~ . li OCCIPANCY STRUCTURAL SCORES MD MODIFIFAS Residential ;No. Persona rYae w si s2 53 sa ct c2 c3iss aci ace ta,~ uat Commcrdal ~ ~ (M+-7 811 hMl CRC Sm n.safl tsm M1iw rf1 RU - t 8a tk Sear 4.6 l.5 5.0 5.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 3.0 t.0 Office 11-100 hd>Stl'181 wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 -0.5 wA -0.6 -t.0 -0.5 /00~ doorCadlon -0.5 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 Ptb. ASSam. Vrt, hnpiartly ~ -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -i.0 -0.6 -0.6 -7.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 SChool Sort Story 0 -2.6 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -7.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -t.0 Tornbn -1 .0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 ~-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -t.D -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 Pten treptlnrty -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.5 -t.0 -1.0 -7.0 -t.0 aa<~{1 WA -0.S -0.S WA -0.S -0.S WA WA WA ,-0 S WA WA H15toric~. LerpsFMavyCt~oR>Q wA -2.0 wA wA wA .1.0 wA wA '?A -t.0. WA wA $71Clt CCMfifl~ WA WA WA WA WA ~-i.O -t.O -t.O WA -t.0 WA WA NOn Structtrel ~ Put 8ac7mnrlc Yssr .2.0 .2.0 .2.0 .2.0 .2.0 -2.0 .2.0 'r'A -2.0 .2.0 .2.0 wA Falrrtq Hazard - - 91..2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 DATA COf~DENCE 9t3 ~ -0.a -0.e -0.e -0.e -o a -0.e -0.a -0.a -0.a -0.e -O.6 Eytmrtlnl S~pCfiw. 313 8 8 to 20 rlorgn -0. a -0. a '+~A -0. B -O. 8 -0.8 -0. B wA -0.8 -0.8 -0. B a lYrelaob Ono Drx - oo trot ~ Fr'^i scope 3,4 co+,~rrs Detailed Evaluation Required? .@ YES NO Figure 83c ATC-? I -1 Appendis B 723 ~Vr,, ATC-G ~ / 1~}-FS' Mao Areea o.0.7 ~--~i~ •,,x.r ~:,s Y Lp Rapia Visual Screerrq of Seisrncaly Hazardous Otltar Identirters - - No. Stories I Year (~.it 14ffO C7 hsoector ~~HM Date a-H-93 Total Fbar Area (sq. tt) ~f _ c~idrK7Neme_ rJortrt ko~-W~n Fine SeH'~~a 9 Use - (r~abn lec.il 6~~ _ ~ r - , , .7 . - _ _ _ ~y _ _ ~ ~ _ - - Scale: ; . . . _ OCCLPANCY STRUCTURAL SCORES AND MODIFIERS . Residerttiel No. Persona TvPE w st s2 s3 sa ct c2 C3r55 Fat c~cz aM u-ba (>~l 9r1 fLAO 1RC 5v/t f~'I tsvn Mw rFl rnn _ _ _ Corrmerdal 0-10 g~~ 4.6 4.5 3.0 5.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 3.0 1.0 - Of(1CB I 1 -100 Fiyt Poe wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 wA -0.5 -1.0 -0.5 ' hd<tstfiel 1pD~ floor Cardltm -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 FUb. Aasem, ~ Vert, hplvty -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 ~t10O) SoR Story -1.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -7.0 ~ Torabn -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 Flan FrspJorEy -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.5 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ~ . Serv . Fairir~p wA -0.5 -0. S wA -0. S -0. S wA wA wA -0, 6 wA wA Hi5(OfIC ty~, LX~! FWVy CLdCi'y WA -2.O WA WA WA -1.O WA WA WA _t Q WA WA $I1prt COIURI! WA WA WA WA WA -1.0 -t.e -1.0 WA -t.0 WA WA NonStruchral ~ aatetr,a,,,,.eva.r 2.0 .z,o .z.o .z.o •z.o •z.o •2.o wA •2.0 •2.0 .2.o wA FaIGtgHazard ^,i2 -0 3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 DATA CCt`FCQJCE SL3 -0.a -0.e -0.a -0.e -0.e -0 e -0.e -0 a -0.e -0.a -0.a -0 a Eslinnted Sabjscp,n. 8L3 8 8 to 20 etorba -0.8 -0. a '~A -0.8 -0. B -0.8 -0.8 wA -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 or lt'rolaub Data CrJC ~ Do rk,c Kraw FTUL SCOFF .S 9 COI~TAETtT3 Detailed ~ Evnluatian Required? m YES- NO ~ Figure 83c :1TC-':-1 .tppendii li 13J :,1~:,„us,,~ ,i,.. ATC-2 7 / (t~E}-~P Mao Areas 5.6.7 ligh) I A07esa _ _ I Rapd Visual Sueennq or SeisrncaYy Hazardous i3uio5rtgs Other bxrtirters - - No. Stories _ I Year d.dt 14-ib w hspector~~Hr1 Dated-y-yZ Total Floor Area Isq. h) I _ _ ~AloSrtg Narno__ ~sJPiMFA FtnE GrPsTca Use . IPSa1•oR lawn I _ Y s ~ .e- - / ~ .iwJKy~ J -t- a ~ I . ~r a p. _ L. - - . _ ~....,v. . ' +j.. - scale: . OCCUPANCY STRUCTLgAL SCORES AAD MODF~RS Residential No. Persona a.~DNClrrpe w st s2 s3 s< ct c2 DygS Pct pct qA ~ I Comnerdal 0- t 0 ~l ~ a~Al rRC svn n~ tsvn Brag rF1 ([vr Otfica Bade Score 4.5 4.5 3.0 5.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 Ea.u7 7.0 ti-~~ wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 wA -0.5 T"if X7.5 ktdJSiT781 100. Poor Caidl4n -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -O.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 Fib. Aasem. Vrt. hpUarty -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 ~-0.5 Sc}ppt SoR Story -1.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -~2.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -2.0 0 -t.0 Ci0 7ordoR -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 Plan treOJarty -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0. S -0.6 -0.5 -1 .0 -t .0 -1 .0 -1 .0 Sefv - ~+~'t0 wA -0.6 -0.6 wA -0.5 -0.6 -O.5 WA WA WA WA HIStOnc Bldg. LJf Q~FWVY OISddfq WA -Z.O WA WA WA -1.O WA WA WA -t,0 WA WA ~ St10rt Cokmt, WA WA WA WA WA -1.O -t.O -t.O WA -t.O WA WA ' tJonStrucnral ? PodBer>Lttwxrear .z.o .z.o .z.o .z.o •z.o •z.o .z.d WA .z.o .z.o •z.o wA FalGtg Hezard - - DATA CQ`FD~dC!_ ~ -0.3 -4~3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0 3 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 Sl9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0 8 -0.8 -0.B -0-8 -0.8 -0.8 i _ Eatinefed, a,~~ y,~, 9L.3 d B to 20 slortea wA -0.8 -0. B -0. B -0. B -0. 8 -0. B wA -0. B ~B -0 8 or lXrafa[>r Oats Cfi(- lb Not I(tnw FTll+L SCOT O,q COMVIF1~175 - SHoltC- PI~AS'«ri-5 S~ f'FbfCC (2~~~ Detailed - p~ Po~ao~~ Evaluation 13.~11t~,r1E SE-L-~S Required? YfS NO Figure Bic .tTC-ZI-I 4ppendis B !?3 - i;r~. ATC-21/ (NE}f3P plan Araee o.6,71iph) r rar©sa Rapid Visual Saeertrp of Seivrx',a?y Hazaroxis i~tddngs Otfior fdet7dfiers `'p----.__ - - - No. Stories I `!ear 3.d[ ~ 1960 _ Inspector 6 H h Date _ 2- K -43 Total Floor Area (sQ. n) _ ftiidrp Name F:o..loko.ra c rt>: s~-n~N Use (Peron leGvlt _ i ~j_ / _ / - , _ _ _I I ~J I i :2. -~--.t~ _ . c. 1 Scale: OCCIPANCY STRUCTLRAL SCORES AND tdODiFIERS Residential No. Peraot7s ~-~-~7YPE w 97 52 s3 sa ct c2 cy95 aC7 s'ct qe ~ Comrrtercial ~ 0- 7 0 O.tRFl eq ruts R+c sv0 n~7 rsvn rti:a rFl (ttA - - - Office 5eorr. 4.6 4,5 3.0 5.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 7.5 2.0 1.5 3.0 1.0 )<1d1791rt81 wA -2.0 -7.0 wA -1.0 -1.0 -7 0 -0.5 wA -0.5 -7.0 -0.5 I 700+ Poor Caidtlon -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 Pt>b. Assam. ~I Vntt. FrapJar[y -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -t.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 Scholl 9oR SEOry -1.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2,0 -t.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -7.0 Torobn -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 SefV i Flan trapJarRy -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 Pancirq WA -0.S -0.S WA -0.S -0.S WA WA WA .-0.5 WA WA W$ WIC lJtpn Fienvy~ WA -2.O WA WA WA -t.O WA WA WA _t ~ .WA WA Short Co4+fn0 WA WA WA WA WA -),Q -t.~ _t p WA _t.p WA WA nro^~~~ ~ PoatBmcrmmtcYear .2.0 .z.o .z.o FelfrtpHazard _"_."'.______-'.'___.'.__"`."___-'?:0 .2.0 .2.0 .2.0 we .2.0 .2.0 .2.0 wA DATA CONFDETJCE ~~-0~-0~~ -0.3 -0.3 -0 3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0 3 -0.3 913 lIDC -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.B -0.8 -0.8 -0 8 -0.B -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 * - Estiruted 9tbpcNva. 913 d 8 to 20 rtornn liter -0.8 -0, B ^~A -0.8 -0. B -0. 8 -0. 8 wA -0. B -0.8 -0. 8 a lk'/eieLln Ono Drat . oo rwt ~,m. ~+u. scot€ 3.g co+vt,.l~rrs Detailed Evaluation Required? .mw. YFS N Figure 83c 4TC-21-1 :t ppendis U 133 -~~~ip YfixlaN~ ~I r~ ~ ~.-c li 1fu i-W Map ~,rons c.; r vqi ~~~1 - Ragd Visual Screem0 of Seivncafy Fiazsrdous f3~dirgs oy,~ Iderttifiera _ tJo. Stones I Year ~t Z hspector ~~Nr-, oats ~-~-9'S i total Fbor Aree tsa. n) . dnp Name- I_AvralrF NaE Use iae.Fbn InC~q Y,,.y.- s a - ~r v , . , i - .Y 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ _ ~ et r_ • ~ - l ~ - _a . - - ,k , . ~ ~S'~ _ _ A' rI - - I u - ~ i ° _ / y. it r~ / ~ _ - I' ~ . r n ^ 1 ~~R~ . Scale- !r _ - t- OCCLPANCY STRUCTL4iAL SCORES AND MOD~~AS Residential 'tJo. Persona rYae w st s2 s3 sa ct c2 c3rss Fct Pct raA wM Commerdal ~ c*~1 ~ nan ~c swt n.gFl rs~ M1AA! rFl r?tn - - - 1D Basic Seor~ ~.6 4.5 3.0 5-5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 3.0 t.D Otltce 11-100 I-yt pMa wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -t.0 -t .0 -0.6 wA -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 tldl$tn81 100 Poor Cardfon -0.S -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 Rb. Aesem. Vwt. hpLriy -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 School SoM1 Story -1.0 -2.6 -2.0 -1,0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -7.0 ~ Taralon -t.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -t.0 -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 SBr-~ Plan hspWr[y -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 Pa+~W WA -0.S -0.S WA -0.S -0.S WA WA WA -0.6 WA WA I'{I$0r1C WaF4NYY CLO~10 WA -2.O WA WA WA -t.O WA WA WA -1,O WA WA Start C.CtIfM WA WA WA WA WA _t_Q _t,p _t,0 WA -t,O WA WA NOn ? Poa 0enctmeix Yet •2.0 •2.0 .z.0 •2.0 .2.0 •2.0 .2,0 1°A •2.0 •2.0 .2.0 wA Falfnq Hazard - DATA COf~FDENCE 9l2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 SL3 ©-0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.B -0.6 ' t. EatiiateC °.abjxE,n, 9L3 d B to 20 MorLa wA -0.8 -0.8 wA -0.8 -0. B -0.8 -0.8 wA -0.8 -0. B -0.8 a tkrelatY De4 COM,~NTS Detailed ~ Evaluation Required? Y FS Figure 83c ,trc-zr-1 Appertdis Q 123 Y. ~ , ATC-2 7 / - Mao Areas s.s.7 F;at,) I Address ~ - Rapd Visual Screem0 or Seivrticaly Hazardous Buidtgs Other Identifiers _ _ No. Stories 1 "ear tun z Ftspeclor ~ NM Date ~ -5-93 _ Total door Area (sq. ft) _ _ Baiting Name kAU F1ne ~-'a~orJ _ _ _ Use (Peel-oH IeCM) 1 i i t.-~ S i ~ i -ti ~ r i .a. 1 \ ,~i..~ i - OCCUPANCY STAUCTI~AL SCORES AAD MODIFIERS Residential No. Persona ~Dr1O TYFE w st s2 s3 s4 ct c2 03/35 act Pct wA trot Cormterdal 0-t IROFl se n_AO ~ttcswt t"sFl tswtM1mtrFt rttn ~ _ Office 4.6 4.5 0,0 5.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 7.5 ~3~ 1.0 -100 Fiyt PJerr WA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -1.0 -t .0 -0.5 wA -0.e -1-0 -0.5 F1dl15tTial i f00t Poor Coedlfatt -0.5 -0.6 -0.S -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.S -0.5 Pt>b. AaSettt. Vrrrt. trglu[y -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -7.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 . ~ttOOl Sort Story -7.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -7.0 -7.0 -2.0 -2.0 -7.0 ~ Tardon -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 Pten trepJarty -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.5 -0.S -0.S -0.5 -1 0 -7.0 -7.0 -1.0 Serv Poun6q WA -0.S -0.S WA -0.5 -0.S WA WA WA -0,5 WA WA Sts Wp~Fbavy C +e WA -2.O WA WA WA -1.O WA WA WA _t:~ WA WA $tY7t C:nLlrflf WA WA WA WA WA -1.0 -1.0 -1 .O WA -t.d WA WA tJOn~ tvel ~ Pott 8achnrk Yer .2.0 •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 .2.0 "~A •2.0 •2.0_ .2.0 "~A fl and 9L.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.' -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 DATACOt~FOFFNCE gt,g -0.e -0.e -0.a -0.a -0.e -0.e -0.e -0.a -0.a -0.a -0.e +.P~t;rweastcie~ew. suaewzo~t«w WA -0.a -0.e WA -0.a -0.a -0.a -0.a W. -0.a ~-0 a or lkreleb4 De4 FNAL SCOt~ DtK . Do Not Km. COMMENTS Detailed Evaluation Required? YFS NO Figure 83c i aTC-21-I appendix B 123 ,.:max t.E}-~{p Map Areee 5.6,7 FSgh) M. Addesa ATC-21 / ( Rapd Visual Soreennq or SeisrncaYy Hazaroau ~9s ether Identifiers No. Stones I Yearl3uit 1965 hspector OHM Date ~-5-93 Total Floor Area (sq. rt) Buidnp Name l- aPrFAirJ r~a~ c,c-E ST,~ctcrJ _ - Use - iaw-on iec.n I , - . _ _ - _ _ '-Y~ i. - - SC8I9: ........i OCCUPANCY SIAUCTIJFiAL SCORES AND MODFIFAS Re5ldentlBl NO. Persona 9.1fN'A3 TYPE W S7 S2 57 S4 C7 C2 C3/S6 PCl PCZ RM I.FaA (MFl Bq M1.Ap Its SW1 (mil (SW) M1NM tV-l (7UI _ _ _ Commerdal ~ 0-10 gam mph 4.5 4.5 3.0 5.5 9.5 2. D 9.0 1.5 2.0 1 .5 3.0 t .0 Office 1 100 1-fy~Rb WA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -7.0 -7.0 -0.5 wA -0.6 -1.0 -0.5 frlduSVjal I t00+ poor Cardllon -0 S -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.6 Pub. Assem. I Vrt. Frp.LRY -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -1 .0 -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 g~ I son story - ~ -z.s -z.o -~.o -z.o -z.o -z.o -1.0 -~.o -z.o -z.o -i.o . Govt. ® roralo^ 1.0 -z.o -t.o -1.0 -1.0 -t.o -1.0 -1.0 -i.o -1.0 -t.o -1.0 d0~ I Aen~H ~ -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.5 -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 SerV I Poundrp A -0.S -0.S WA -0.S -0.S WA WA WA ~j,6 WA WA His OIK: lirW FWVY C4Odtq wA -2.0 wA wA wA -1.0 wA wA wA _t,p wA wA - ~ ~.Q<nty WA WA WA WA WA -t,p -1.O -I.O WA -1 ,0 WA WA NOn Structtral ~ Pwt Berctrrurk Yeo •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 .2.0 wA •2.0 •2.0 •2.0 wA FelfngHezard 9l2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 DATA C0t~DE1JCE 3u3 ~ -0.a -0.e -0.e -0.e -0.e -0.e -0.a -0.e -0.a -0.e -0.a `ml~ wA -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 wA -0.8 -0.B -0.8 * ~ Eatinet~ y~y,~ SL.3 d a to 20 etorW -0.8 -0.8 or UrrelaW Oa4 SCOFE Cti(- Do Not Know off.`{ COMMQJTS PRC-cA ST c-c.-~CltETE. FRACIES SJP['cli~' Rc~G Detailed EvAluetion Required? ' YES NO Figure Bic ATC-?1-1 Apperrdir B 123 ATC-2 7 / Ir~>>RP Men Arena 5.6.7 i-iat,) I AdCrese Rapd Visual Screervtp or Seivr~icaly Hazardous f3~drxJs Iderrtitiers _ _ _ _ tJo. Stories I near f3u1t = 9'7o's _ _ hspector ~ N n Date ~ - t. - 9-t Total Fbar Area Isq. K) - Buidin0 NemB _ lCA1L~1A- L'orlc• G 2£ STATIOnI U39 (PS,4or1 MMq V,~ - _ y~,,y~ w< aln' k'~AAk` .`•ti ~ t.3y_4" _ .nX_: . .SJr':c;.. j ~r°r ~ / _ ~ ~ _ ~ _i .F'~r+- Scale: - -r..~ ~ r- s.;, ~ a- - 000IFANCY . STRUCTI~RAI. SCORES MD MOD~IERS --~=-•.X - - Residential No. Persona T~ w st s2 s3 sa ct ci c3is5 a;2 wa t~ Cormterdal i 10 s`!Fl aq nan etc syn ~ tsyn Mni rrq rnn _ _ _ Office ~ Bad ~On 4.S 4.5 3.0 5.5 0.5 2.0 0.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 3.0 1.0 k1d1Sti181 ~ f~ wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 ~ -1 .0 -0.5 wA -0.5 -1.0 -0.5 I 100+ Poor CandBm -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 Ftb. Aesem. I Vwt, trraplar~y -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 ~1~ -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 Scholl Soil Story -1.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 GOVt. p~• Ttrdon -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 _ ~ ~V Flan YrrpJarty -t.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.S -0.5 -~.0 -1 .0 -1.0 -1.0 SRI WA -0.S -0.S WA -0.5 -0.S WA WA WA -0.5 WA WA HlSterlC Bldg • i W7~ FMavy C~~O WA 2.0 WA WA WA WA WA WA _ ~ ; D WA WA P~On " CoU+n~ wA wA wA wA wA 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 wA -1 .0 wA wA F81fnq Hazard ~ ~ 0°~k Yer .2.0 .2.0 .z.0 .2.0 •2.D .-:___.2.0 '~A .2.0 •2.0 •2.o wA DATA CODFDEN(~ 9L2 -0.3 -0.3 -0,s -0.3 -0.3 -0 -0.s -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 8L3 -0.a -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 88 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 Eafinnted 9uDjectiw. 81.3 d a l0 20 slorfq wA -0. a -0.8 "~A -0.8 --0'H -0. B -0. B wA -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 I ar Urraleel~ OaL Cf1C. Oo Nat Know -R6 COMAQJTS GR/•~CKS la C~a.r1~ tAt,~µrjs Detailed Evaluation Required? YES NO I Figure Bic ATC-21 • I Appendix B 123 ATC-21/ (Nt~f~P Map Areea 5.6.7 Hi0h) AUdrese _ , Rapd Visual Screerct0 of Seismcaily Hazardous ~ Other tderttific>rrs ~ ' _ _ No. Stories I Year twit _ 19Y6 hspector 6NM Dete ~-6-gg ;1 Tote) Hoar Aree Isq. ttl _ ~ - _ BOitftO Name 4n.,n-1 Kr,Nn~A F nF Crnr _ _ Use . Ipe.HOn kDN) _ ~K ~wf~R _ : IC = t~~~ ~iV ,yy Mi~ _ . . n > , . , ~ y 1 ~---1 I OCCIPANCY STRUCTI~RAL SCORES AND MODIFIERS Residential No. Persona T'~ w st sz s3 sd ct cz c3iss Pct Pcz w.t tFat Comttterdal 0^t nsFl an non me sure tA~t tam narw rr~ rry _ Bade Score 4,b 4.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 9.0 7.0 i ~ wA -2.0 -1.0 wA -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 wA -0.6 t. -0.5 100+ Doer Corxitlat -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 ~0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0 5 -0.5 Rb. Aasem. ; Vrt. tr~pJar[y -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -7.0 -0.6 -0.6 -7.0 -1.0 ~-0.6 Scholl i Sort 3tary -t.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 -7.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1,0 Torsion -7.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -~1.0 -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 -7.0 -1.0 -7.0 ~ Plen FrepJrty -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 _1.0 -t .0 -1.0 -t 0 ~+i6^0 wA -0.5 -0.5 wA -0.5 -O.5 wA wA wA -0.5 wA WA HIStOfIC ~ tYa FIMVY ~1O WA -Z.O WA W4 WA - 1 D WA WA WA -1 . D WA WA SMrt Col+tro WA WA WA WA WA _j.O -1.O -1.O WA -j,0 WA WA NOn Structtrel ? pat Bercl.rrrh Yer .2.0 .2.0 .2.0 .z.D •2.0 ~2.0 .2.0 WA .2.0 •2.0 .2.0 FelFitq Hazard - DATA CGNFiJENCE 9t.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -J.3 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0 3 -0.3 37.9 -0.8 -0.e -0.8 -0.6 -0.a -J 8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.B (~-0.8 @stirn~ed S~biectiw. 91~ 8 a to 20 etorW wA -0. a -0.8 WA -0.8 -7. 8 -0.8 -0. B wA -0.8 -0 8 a lkre7ae4 Oeta txx . oo Not Know rr+w ~O~ { .9 COAL-NTS Detailed Evatue lion Required' ' YFS NO Figure Bic ' ,tTC-ZI-1 Appendix Q 123