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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCOM 0582.041 2004-2006 Page 1 of 1 Murashige, Laura From: James Weatherford [gardengreen@hawaiiantel.net] Sent: Monday, September 18, 2006 1:41 PM To: counciltestimony@co.hawaii.hi.us. Subject: Testimony for Environmental Management Committee September 29 ,2006 Attachments: Council Testimony, EMC September 19, 2006, Communication 582.38.doc James Weatherford, Ph.D. P.O. Box 2017 [15-1888 6th Avenue (Hialoa), Hawaiian Paradise Park] Kea'au, Hawaii 96749 808-982-5549 Comm. No. J p 2.41 Ref. To:Pte~ee Ref. Uate P-_.~~0_6 9/22/2006 Comm. 582.38: SOLID WASTE REDUCTION PROJECT PART ONE. Neither Technology nor Regulations can Assure no Harm to the Community The following are examples of cases that demonstrate why environmental regulations provide false assurance and technology safeguards cannot be relied on to avoid exposing the community to harm. CASE I. City of Perham, Minnesota sought $1,750,000 in disposal system revenue bonds in March 5, 2003. The Perham facility is awaste-to-energy facility located in an industrial park in the City. The Facility was constructed in 1985 and began operation in 1986. In July 1998, the Facility operations ceased under written directive from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency due to particulate emissions violations and failure of the operator to correct the violation within the time frame allowed under Minnesota law. The Facility had also not maintained auxiliary burners for start-up, shut-down and period of low furnace temperatures in accordance with the permit requirements. In August 1999, the City acquired the Facility in anticipation of its retrofitting and use. NOTE: Particulates are known to be harmful to human health. The problem caused by low furnace temperatures is that dioxin is formed at these low temperatures. Twelve years from inception of operations, the facility ceased operations due to operator negligence. Thirteen years from inception of operations, public expenditure was used to purchase the facility. Seventeen years from inception of operations, including five years of no operation, public debt was required to `retrofit'the facility. The environmental health risks that this community was exposed to were not about whether the technology being used was `modern.' It was about irresponsible operation. Neither technological capability nor regulatory controls prevented conditions that create dioxins and that resulted in emissions of particulates. Technological safeguards and regulatory assurances failed to protect this community. Source: Allison-Williams Company -Investment Bankers CASE II. This is about a Virginia State Air Pollution Control Board enforcement action issued to Covanta Alexandria /Arlington, Inc. of Alexandria, Virginia. On April 18, 2002 a Notice of Violation was issued to Covanta for violations of State Air Pollution Control Board Regulations and applicable permit conditions. Specifically, the violations were in regard to Covanta's failure to submit Excess Emissions Reports. On January 3, 2002 there was a malfunction that resulted in a 4-hour exceedance of the carbon monoxide limit set forth in the air permit. In 2003 a civil charge of $14,695.00 was imposed on Covanta. NOTE: Regulations against excessive emissions failed to prevent environmental degradation. Source: Virginia Department of Environmental Quality Comm. 582.38: SOLID WASTE REDUCTION PROJECT CASE III. This is drawn from information provided by the regarding violations of environmental regulations by Covanta. On February 20, 2001 three notices of violation were issued. 1) Failure to prevent the emission of air pollution, as defined in the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act. 2) Failure to take reasonable actions to prevent particulate matter from becoming airborne. 3) Failure to operate and maintain a source or control device in accordance with the specifications. NOTE: The violations all occurred because the facility was not operated properly. Neither antiquated technology nor lack of regulations was at fault -the operator (a vendor proposing a facility in Hawaii County) was negligent. Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection CASE IV. Wheelabrator Falls Inc committed numerous air emission and monitoring violations at its municipal waste incinerator in Falls Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Environmental Protection Regional Director Joseph A. Feola: "We found that Wheelabrator had violated at least one permit condition every quarter since April 1999, with some quarterly reports documenting as many as 15 separate violations." Violations noted in monitoring reports from April 1999 through September 2003: ? Ash residue not stored according to regulations, including prevention of dispersal. ? Solid waste not confined to unloading and approved storage areas. ? Surface or groundwater contact with waste not prevented or minimized. ? Refusal, hindrance, obstruction, delay, or threat against an agent of Commonwealth. ? Operation not in accordance with approved plans and permit. ? Violation for operating a source not identified in the application for the plan approval/operating permit. The ash residue from incinerators is known to very toxic. Failure to store ash properly and to allow its dispersal put this community, including the workers at the incinerator site, in harm's way. These violations demonstrate the inability or unwillingness of the incinerator to abide by contractual obligations and regulatory requirements. Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Comm. 582.38: SOLID WASTE REDUCTION PROJECT CASE V. Pinellas County, Florida has had incinerator plant operations under contract with Wheelabrator Pinellas, Inc. (WPI) since 1980. The County contracts with an independent engineering firm to conduct annual inspections of the plant. The following is taken from a 2005 audit by the County's Clerk of The Circuit Court: ? WPI does not timely implement recommendations noted during annual inspections of the County's independent engineering firms. ? It does not appear that WPI has exercised all reasonable efforts to reduce operating costs. These include use of lime reagents and natural gas. ? WPI noncompliance could have a significant impact on the Solid Waste costs and revenues. ? Repairs and maintenance (at WPI's expense) that are inadequate or untimely could result in accelerated aging of machinery and equipment, requiring major rebuilds or total replacements (at County expense). ? Plant management operating expenses have increased 46% since fiscal year 1998, and total operating expenses increased by 58%. Plant management expenses include fees and cost reimbursements paid to Wheelabrator Pinellas Inc. (WPI) for the management, operation, and maintenance of the County's solid waste facility. ? Tonnage processed has only increased 9%, revenues increased 27%, and the CPI increased 13% during this same five-year period. Source: Internal Audit Division, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Pinellas County, Florida. The incinerator operator neglected to fulfill its obligations regarding maintenance and repairs. SUMMARY. In all of the above cases, no amount of regulation or type of technology was sufficient to avoid exposing the communities to pollutants that are known to be life-threatening. It may or may not be true that the example facilities operated within regulatory limits on more days than not. It is true that regulations were enforced, if belatedly, with financial penalties and with an order to cease operations. Nevertheless, that enforcement did not protect the communities. There was exposure to life-threatening harm in all of the above cases. In Case V the negligence poses financial risks to the County government. In Case I, there was a prolonged period of no service and then a financial burden placed on the community involved. Comm. 582.38: SOLID WASTE REDUCTION PROJECT PART TWO. How to Maintain High Margins for `Waste-to-Energy' Incineration: Increase Prices, Pass Costs on to Customers, and Compete with Recycling Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. is one of three companies now in process of proposing so-called "waste-to-energy" incineration for Hilo. Wheelabrator is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Waste Management, Inc. According to a March 7, 2006 press release, Waste Management, Inc. considers the following as risks: 1. "Trends toward requiring recycling, waste reduction at the source, and prohibiting the disposal of certain types of wastes." These trends "could have negative effects on volumes of waste going to landfills and waste-to-energy facilities, which are higher margin businesses than recycling." 2. Inability to carry out "plans" for "pricing increases" and "passing on increased costs to customers" could "negatively affect revenues and margins." Increased recycling, waste reduction, and restrictions on what can be burned, are all viewed as being negative for'waste-to-energy' operations. Recycling competes with incineration. The "higher margins" for waste-to-energy operations, as compared to recycling, means that an incineration company makes better money burning resources than conserving resources. Making money is fine -wasting resources, price gouging, and poisoning the community to do so is not acceptable. The need to protect these high "margins" is also reflected in the intent to increase prices and pass costs on to customers. A policy of increasing prices to improve service delivery is not unheard of and is acceptable business practice. However, fora "waste-to-energy" business, the purpose of planned price increases is to keep garbage incineration at a high profit margin. For example, the preliminary contract in the Stage 2 RFP includes a "pass through" provision. This means the incinerator operator will not need to be innovative in the face of rising costs. The incinerator will pass increased costs to the customer (Hawaii County), while the operator's profit margin remains high. * Competition between recycling and incineration has been confirmed elsewhere. In Massachusetts, even as total tonnage of municipal solid waste disposed of statewide decreased by six percent due to aggressive recycling, a "put-or-pay requirement" in waste-to-energy service agreements served as a disincentive to recycling in communities with waste-to-energy projects. Source: "The North East Solid Waste Committee Project: Planning and Development of a Public Private Partnership" The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General (1998).