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COM 0982.000 2008-2010
William P. Kenoi Mayor William T. Takaba Managing Director October 14, 2010 avuxtfLl of C,Zanfuati CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY 920 Ululani Street • Hilo, Hawaii 96720-3958 (808)935-0031 • Fax(808)935-6460 J Yoshimoto, Council Chair and Members of the Hawai'i County Council Hawai'i County Council 25 Aupuni Street Hilo, Hawai'i 96720 Quince Mento Administrator C Re: 2010 County of Hawai'i Emergency Operations Plan and 2010 County of Hawai'i Hazard Mitigation Plan update. Pursuant to Chapter 7-3 of the Hawai'i County Code the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency, representing Mayor William P. Kenoi, Deputy Director of Civil Defense, is submitting to the Hawai'i County Council the 2010 revision of the County of Hawai'i Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) and the 2010 update of County of Hawai'i Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP). The EOP update modernizes the current County plan, last updated in 1989, and brings it more in line with State and Federal plans. The FEMA approved HMP update is required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and ensures Hawai'i County's continued eligibility for mitigation grant funding and Federal disaster relief. If there are any questions, please feel free to contact me at 808-935-0031 or gmento@co.hawaii.hi.us Sincerely, Quince Mento Civil Defense Administrator Note: The attached Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan and Emergency Operations Plan are not made a part of the duplicate copies, due to their size, but are available for viewing in the Office of the County Clerk, and at the Clerk -Council website: co.hawaii.hi.us. Hawai'i County is an equal opportunity provider and employer Cp Comm, No. 9 22- Ref. To# IDS G RbC Date County of Hawaii Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan August 16, 2010 Adopted by the County of Hawaii Prepared By Martin & Chock, Inc. 1132 Bishop Street, Suite 1550 Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Funding ivas made 1)os.�ible frons the Federal Emergency Management Agency Through the Hcnvaii ,State Civil Defense William P. Kenoi flavor County of Hawaii William T. Takaba Alanaging Director Walter KM. Lau Depii(vAlanaging Director Office of the Mayor 25 Aupuni Street, Suite 2603 • Hilo, HaNvai`i 96720 • (808) 961-8211 • Fax (808) 961-6553 KONA: 75-3722 Hanama Place, Suite 102 • Kail ua-Kona, HaNvai`i 96740 (808)327-3602 • Fax(808)326-5663 August 16, 2010 Re: County of Hawai'i Multi Hazard Mitigation Plan The County of Hawai'i, in recognition that the natural island beauty of the island comes with certain hazards and risks, is committed to disaster preparedness and to become a disaster -resilient community. The Hawai'i County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan represents Hawai'i County's commitment to reducing risks from natural hazards. In compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Public Law 106-390 this plan is hereby adopted for the County of Hawai'i on August 16, 2010. The Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency shall be the lead agency for maintenance and updates of the Plan. Aloha, William P. Kenoi MAYOR Count- of HaNvai`i is an Equal Opportunity- Provider and Employer. Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..................................................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................1-1 1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PLAN....................................................................................................... 1-1 1.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE PLAN.............................................................................................................. 1-6 1.3 OVERVIEW OF HAWAII COUNTY........................................................................................................... 1-7 1.3.1 Geography....................................................................................................................................1-7 CHAPTER 2 - MITIGATION PLANNING...................................................................................................... 2-1 2.1 PLANNING PROCESS.......................................................................................................................... 2-1 2.2 PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS............................................................................................................ 2-2 2.2.1 Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee Meetings....................................................................... 2-3 2.2.2 Public Involvement....................................................................................................................... 2-7 CHAPTER 3 - LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT............................................................................................3-1 3.1 POPULATION.................................................................................................................................. 3-1 3.2 ECONOMY......................................................................................................................................3-2 3.3 LAND USE...................................................................................................................................... 3-3 3.3.1 General Plan Projections.............................................................................................................. 3-4 3.4 ANALYSIS....................................................................................................................................... 3-5 3.5 CRITICAL FACILITIES.......................................................................................................................... 3-6 3.6 UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII................................................................................................................... 3-11 CHAPTER 4 - HIGH WIND STORMS...........................................................................................................4-1 4.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................... 4-1 4.1.1 Utilities......................................................................................................................................... 4-1 4.1.2 Trade Winds.................................................................................................................................. 4-1 4.1.3 Kona Storms................................................................................................................................. 4-4 4.1.4 Tropical cyclones: ......................................................................................................................... 4-4 4.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS......................................................................................................... 4-4 4.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE............................................................................................................. 4-5 4.4 RISK ASSESSMENT............................................................................................................................4-5 4.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................... 4-6 4.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................... 4-6 4.5.2 Future Plans.................................................................................................................................. 4-7 CHAPTER 5 - TROPICAL CYCLONES........................................................................................................... 5-1 5.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................... 5-1 5.1.1 Coastal Wave/Surge..................................................................................................................... 5-1 5.1.2 High Winds................................................................................................................................... 5-5 5.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS......................................................................................................... 5-6 5.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE............................................................................................................. 5-9 5.3.1 Probabilistic Hazard Analysis and Scenario Simulations.............................................................. 5-9 5.3.2 ASCE 7-10.................................................................................................................................... 5-10 5.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 5-12 5.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 5-13 5.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 5-13 5.5.2 Future Plans................................................................................................................................ 5-19 CHAPTER 6 - LANDSLIDES AND ROCK FALLS............................................................................................. 6-1 i Hawaii Cozsizty llitlti-Hazard llitigatiorz Plali 6.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................... 6-1 6.1.1 Hazard Areas................................................................................................................................ 6-1 6.2 SIGNIFICANT CATASTROPHIC EVENTS .....................................................................................................6-3 6.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE ............................................................................................................. 6-4 6.4 RISK ASSESSMENT............................................................................................................................ 6-7 6.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................... 6-8 6.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................... 6-8 6.5.2 Future Plans.................................................................................................................................. 6-9 CHAPTER 7 - EARTHQUAKES.................................................................................................................... 7-1 7.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................... 7-1 7.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS ............................................................................................................ 7-6 7.2.1 Kiholo Bay Earthquake................................................................................................................. 7-7 7.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE ........................................................................................................... 7-12 7.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 7-18 7.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 7-18 7.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 7-18 7.5.2 Future Plans................................................................................................................................ 7-23 CHAPTER 8 - LAVA FLOWS, VOLCANIC GAS, AND ASHFALL.......................................................................8-1 8.1 HAZARD DESCRIPTION....................................................................................................................... 8-1 8.1.1 Lava/Volcanoes............................................................................................................................ 8-1 8.1.2 VOG.............................................................................................................................................. 8-2 8.1.3 Ashfall...........................................................................................................................................8-9 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 9-11 8.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS ............................................................................................................ 8-9 8.2.1 Mauna Lou .................................................................................................................................... 8-9 8.2.2 Kilauea........................................................................................................................................8-10 9-16 8.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE ........................................................................................................... 8-11 8.3.1 Hazard Areas.............................................................................................................................. 8-11 8.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 8-14 8.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 8-14 8.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 8-14 8.5.2 Future Plans................................................................................................................................ 8-18 CHAPTER9 - TSUNAMIS...........................................................................................................................9-1 9.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................... 9-1 9.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS ............................................................................................................ 9-3 9.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE ............................................................................................................. 9-5 9.3.2 Hazard Areas................................................................................................................................ 9-6 9.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 9-11 9.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 9-14 9.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 9-14 9.5.2 Future Plans................................................................................................................................ 9-16 CHAPTER10 - FLOODS.............................................................................................................................10-1 10.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 10-1 10.1.1 Rainfall Flooding......................................................................................................................... 10-1 10.1.2 Dams...........................................................................................................................................10-3 10.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS ....................................................................................................... 10-4 10.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE ........................................................................................................... 10-7 10.3.1 Regional Hazards........................................................................................................................ 10-8 10.4 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................ 10-24 10.4.1 Previous/Current Efforts........................................................................................................... 10-24 ii Hawaii Coitiity AIitlti-Hazard.AIitigatiora Plena 10.4.2 Future Plans.............................................................................................................................. 10-37 CHAPTER 11 - DAM FAILURES.................................................................................................................. 11-1 11.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 11-1 11.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED........................................................................... 11-3 11.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 11-7 11.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 11-7 11.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 11-7 11.5.1 General.......................................................................................................................................11-7 11.5.2 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 11-9 11.5.3 Future Plans.............................................................................................................................. 11-14 CHAPTER 12 - HIGH SURF........................................................................................................................ 12-1 12.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 12-1 12.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS..........................................................................................................12-2 12.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 12-2 12.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 12-3 12.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 12-3 CHAPTER 13 - COASTAL EROSION............................................................................................................ 13-1 13.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 13-1 13.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS....................................................................................................... 13-2 13.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 13-2 13.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 13-3 13.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 13-3 13.5.1 Revise the Shoreline Setbacks..................................................................................................... 13-3 13.5.2 Utilize Inter -agency communication........................................................................................... 13-4 13.5.3 Increase Public Awareness......................................................................................................... 13-4 13.5.4 Promote Research Projects......................................................................................................... 13-4 CHAPTER 14 - DROUGHTS........................................................................................................................ 14-1 14.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 14-1 14.1.1 Defining and Measuring Drought............................................................................................... 14-1 14.1.2 Causes of Drought...................................................................................................................... 14-2 14.1.3 Impacts of Drought..................................................................................................................... 14-3 14.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS..........................................................................................................14-3 14.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 14-6 14.3.1 Hazard Areas.............................................................................................................................. 14-6 14.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 14-9 14.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................ 14-10 14.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts........................................................................................................... 14-10 14.5.2 Future Plans.............................................................................................................................. 14-11 CHAPTER 15 - WILDFIRES......................................................................................................................... 15-1 15.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 15-1 15.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS..........................................................................................................15-1 15.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 15-4 15.4 COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLANS......................................................................................... 15-4 15.4.1 Multiple -Agency Agreements.....................................................................................................15-6 15.4.2 Planning Process......................................................................................................................... 15-6 15.5 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 15-9 15.5.1 Purpose and Methods................................................................................................................. 15-9 15.5.2 Communities at Risk from Wildfires, Island of Hawaii................................................................ 15-9 iii Hawaii Coitiity AIitlti-Hazard.Alitigatiora Plena 15.6 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................15-11 15.6.1 Hazard Priorities....................................................................................................................... 15-11 15.6.2 Future Plans.............................................................................................................................. 15-14 CHAPTER 16 - HAZMAT............................................................................................................................ 16-1 16.1 HISTORY......................................................................................................................................16-1 16.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE ............................................. 16-1 16.3 ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE LAW...................................................................................................... 16-4 16.4 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW ACT..............................................................16-11 CHAPTER 17 - SHELTERS..........................................................................................................................17-1 17.1 PUBLIC EMERGENCY SHELTERS.......................................................................................................... 17-1 17.1.1 Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classification .................................... 17-6 17.2 PRIVATE HURRICANE SHELTERS........................................................................................................17-15 17.3 SAFE ROOMS...............................................................................................................................17-15 17.4 ENHANCED HURRICANE PROTECTION AREAS........................................................................................17-19 17.5 FUTURE MITIGATION PLANS............................................................................................................17-25 CHAPTER 18 - RISK ASSESSMENT............................................................................................................. 18-1 18.1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES AND CAPABILITIES.............................................................................. 18-1 18.1.1 Emergency Operations Center.................................................................................................... 18-1 18.1.2 Emergency Shelters.................................................................................................................... 18-3 18.1.3 Police Stations............................................................................................................................ 18-6 18.1.4 Fire and EMS Stations................................................................................................................. 18-7 18.1.5 Department of Public Works Baseyards................................................................................... 18-10 18.1.6 Hospitals...................................................................................................................................18-11 18.1.7 Hawaii County All Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities...................................................... 18-12 18.1.8 University of Hawaii Study........................................................................................................ 18-19 18.1.9 Warning Sirens and Evacuation System................................................................................... 18-20 18.1.10 Critical Lifeline Infrastructure Facilities.................................................................................... 18-23 18.1.11 Energy Systems......................................................................................................................... 18-31 18.1.12 Communication Systems.......................................................................................................... 18-33 18.1.13 Water Systems.......................................................................................................................... 18-36 18.1.14 Wastewater Systems................................................................................................................18-37 18.1.15 Recovery Facilities and Capabilities.......................................................................................... 18-39 18.1.16 Debris Management................................................................................................................. 18-39 18.1.17 Economic Assets....................................................................................................................... 18-45 18.2 SPECIAL AT RISK POPULATIONS AND AREAS.........................................................................................18-46 18.2.1 At Risk Populations................................................................................................................... 18-46 18.2.2 Buildings, Residences and Remote Off -Grid Settlement Areas ................................................. 18-47 18.2.3 Hotels and Resorts.................................................................................................................... 18-48 18.2.4 Schools, Day Care Centers, and Nursing Homes....................................................................... 18-48 18.2.5 Parks and Shopping Centers..................................................................................................... 18-48 18.2.6 Hazardous Materials Sites........................................................................................................ 18-49 18.3 RELATIONSHIP OF LAND USE GROWTH TRENDS TO HAZARD AREAS...........................................................18-49 18.3.1 Growth Trends.......................................................................................................................... 18-49 18.3.2 Land Use Tools.......................................................................................................................... 18-52 18.3.3 Loss Estimation and Hazard Ranking........................................................................................ 18-54 CHAPTER 19 - MITIGATION STRATEGY.....................................................................................................19-1 19.1 MITIGATION GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................. 19-1 19.2 MITIGATION ACTIONS BY HAZARD TYPE.............................................................................................. 19-2 19.2.1 Hurricanes and Wind Storms...................................................................................................... 19-3 iv Hawaii County-Multi-Hazard.11itigatiori Plan 19.2.2 Earthquakes................................................................................................................................19-4 Map showing all of the tsunamigenic earthquakes in the Pacific Ocean as colored circles.... 19.2.3 Tsunamis.....................................................................................................................................19-5 Figure 1-2. 19.2.4 Rainfall Flooding and High Waves.............................................................................................. 19-6 19.2.5 Lava Flows.................................................................................................................................. 19-7 19.2.6 Droughts and Wildfire................................................................................................................ 19-8 19.2.7 Landslides and Sea Cliff Erosion.................................................................................................. 19-8 19.3 PRIORITY CRITERIA......................................................................................................................... 19-9 19.4 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.................................................................................................................19-10 Figure 3-1. 19.5 DISCUSSION ON PAST IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS.................................................................................19-13 3-4 19.6 PRESENT IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS.................................................................................................19-16 Critical facilities map of Hawaii Island..................................................................................... CHAPTER 20 - PLAN UPDATE PROCEDURES.............................................................................................. 20-1 20.1 PLAN UPDATE PROCEDURES............................................................................................................. 20-1 CHAPTER 21 - REFERENCES...................................................................................................................... 21-1 CHAPTER22 - GLOSSARY......................................................................................................................... 22-1 CHAPTER 23 - LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK................................................................. 23-1 List of Fi6ures Figure 1-1. Map showing all of the tsunamigenic earthquakes in the Pacific Ocean as colored circles.... 1-8 Figure 1-2. Wind contour map for the Island of Hawaii. The complex topography of the island creates acceleration and decelerations of a 105 mph basic design event windspeed as shown........ 1-9 Figure 1-3. Map of Tropical Cyclones Formed Worldwide from 1985 to 2005 ....................................... 1-10 Figure 2-1. Hawaii resident survey on disaster preparedness................................................................. 2-10 Figure 3-1. Land use for Hawaii County..................................................................................................... 3-4 Figure 3-2. Critical facilities map of Hawaii Island..................................................................................... 3-7 Figure 3-3. Critical facilities map, Hilo area zoom...................................................................................... 3-8 Figure 3-4. Critical facilities map, Puna area zoom.................................................................................... 3-9 Figure 3-5. Critical facilities map, Kona area zoom.................................................................................. 3-10 Figure 3-6. Critical facilities map, Kohala area zoom............................................................................... 3-11 Figure3-7. UH Hilo Campus map............................................................................................................. 3-12 Figure 3-8. UH Hilo/Hawaii CC Manono Campus map............................................................................. 3-13 Figure 4-1. Typical diurnal wind patterns on Hawaii Island....................................................................... 4-2 Figure 4-2. Monthly wind roses for Hilo International Airport (shown for each quarter) ......................... 4-3 Figure 4-3. High Wind Events for Hawaii County by Month, January 1992 to October 2002 .................... 4-5 Figure 4-4. Wind hazard curves for the Hawaiian Islands for Tropical Cyclone and Non -Tropical Winds. 4-6 Figure 5-1. Extents of Hurricane storm surge inundation study................................................................ 5-3 Figure 5-2. Track of Hurricane Iwa and Iniki (Cheung, K.F. 2003).............................................................. 5-8 Figure 5-3. Historic Central Pacific hurricane tracks.................................................................................. 5-8 Figure 5-4. Central Pacific Hurricane Occurrences by month.................................................................... 5-9 Figure 5-5. Eastern and Central Pacific Hurricane frequency map. Contours show number of times a hurricane (intensity >64 knots) passes within 75 Nmi per 10 years ...................................... 5-10 Figure 5-6. Wind speed recurrence intervals for Hawaii (from ASCE 7-2010 Standard) ......................... 5-11 Figure 5-7. ASCE 7-10 relationship between Saffir/Simpson category and wind speed .......................... 5-11 Figure 5-8. Effective wind speed map (mph) for Hawaii Island (Chock, 2007) ........................................ 5-12 Figure 6-1. Massive coastal escarpment landslides into the ocean, Hamakua Coast ................................ 6-2 Figure 6-2. Examples of earthquake -induced rockfalls causing road hazard or closure ........................... 6-3 Figure 6-3. Slope hazards and soil types on Hawaii Island........................................................................ 6-5 Figure 6-4. Precipitation and groundwater condition on Hawaii Island .................................................... 6-6 Figure 6-5. Landslide susceptibility map of Hawaii Island......................................................................... 6-7 Figure 6-6. Map of historic landslide locations impacting major roads ..................................................... 6-8 V Hawaii Cozsizty llitlti-Hazard.Alitigatiorz Plan Figure 7-1. Cutaway Showing Earth's Layers............................................................................................. 7-1 Figure 7-2. Hawai'i Historical Earthquakes and Inferred Rupture Zones of the Larger Events .................. 7-2 Figure 7-3. Fundamental flexural models for plates under island loads ................................................... 7-3 Figure 7-4. Earthquake focal mechanisms in Hawaii................................................................................. 7-3 Figure 7-5. Effects of Earthquakes on Nonstructural Components........................................................... 7-5 Figure 7-6. Locations of damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater for Hawaii Island since 1868 7-6 Figure 7-7. Peak ground accelerations resulting from the Oct. 15, 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake ............. 7-8 Figure 8-1. Volcanic Gas Emissions at Kilauea Volcano's Summit Vent on May, 2009 .............................. 8-2 Figure 8-2. Aerial view of Hawai'i showing circulation of VOG under prevailing winds, May 13, 2009.... 8-3 Figure 8-3. Aerial view of Hawai'i showing circulation of VOG under prevailing winds, June 2, 2008...... 8-3 Figure 8-4. Concentrations of SO2 under prevailing winds in the Main Hawaiian Islands, April 30, 2009 8-4 Figure 8-5. Photograph of 1960 eruption taken 10:00 am January 14, 1960 .......................................... 8-11 Figure 8-6. Lava Flow Hazard Zone Map.................................................................................................. 8-13 Figure 8-7. Lava Flow Inundation Map.................................................................................................... 8-16 Figure 9-1. Travel Times for Distant Tsunamis........................................................................................... 9-2 Figure 9-2. Historic Tsunamis of Hawaii Island.......................................................................................... 9-3 Figure 9-3. Tsunami Height vs. Recurrence Probability for Hilo................................................................ 9-5 Figure 9-4. 1975 Halape Local Tsunami Wave Heights vs. Distant Tsunami .............................................. 9-6 Figure 9-5. Run-up height vs. time and distance, data from 1975 local tsunami ...................................... 9-6 Figure 9-6. Definition Sketch of Tsunami Inundation Terms..................................................................... 9-7 Figure 9-7. Tsunami evacuation zones....................................................................................................... 9-8 Figure 9-8. Tsunami evacuation zones, Kailua-Kona zoom........................................................................ 9-8 Figure 9-9. Historical and Hypothetical tsunamis for inundation mapping ............................................... 9-9 Figure 9-10. Updated tsunami evacuation zone map locations being developed ....................................... 9-9 Figure 9-11. Comparison of Historical Tsunami Inundation to FIRM VE Zone for Hilo .............................. 9-10 Figure 9-12. Tsunami prone communities in the County of Hawaii.......................................................... 9-12 Figure 9-13. Results of USGS tsunami vulnerability study......................................................................... 9-14 Figure 9-14. Locations of DART buoys....................................................................................................... 9-15 Figure 10-1. Kona Storms and Cold Fronts................................................................................................ 10-2 Figure 10-2. Map of dams on Hawaii Island............................................................................................... 10-4 Figure 10-3. Historical Stream Flooding Events for Hawaii Island............................................................. 10-5 Figure 10-4. Flood Insurance Rate Map Terminology................................................................................ 10-7 Figure 10-5. 100 -year return period 1 hour rainfall for Hawaii Island ....................................................... 10-9 Figure 10-6. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map, County View.................................................................... 10-20 Figure 10-7. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map, Hilo zoom........................................................................ 10-21 Figure 10-8. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map, Kona zoom...................................................................... 10-22 Figure10-9. FIRM Coverage..................................................................................................................... 10-31 Figure 10-10. Comparison of Paper vs. Preliminary Digitized FIRM Draft, showing alignment issue being resolved............................................................................................................................... 10-32 Figure 10-11. Extents of Hurricane storm surge inundation study............................................................ 10-33 Figure 11-1. Dam Inventory and Rating..................................................................................................... 11-2 Figure 11-2 Shaded Relief of Ka Loko Dam and Vicinity, Island of Kauai...................................................11-4 Figure 11-3 Ka Loko Dam Breach, Island of Kauai......................................................................................11-5 Figure 11-4 Ka Loko Dam Breach, Island of Kauai......................................................................................11-5 Figure 11-5 Houses Amid Debris from Ka Loko Dam Failure, Island of Kauai............................................11-6 Figure 11-6 Road Infrastructure Damage from Ka Loko Dam Failure, Island of Kauai...............................11-6 Figure 11-7 Comparison of One -Dimensional (MIKE 11) & Two -Dimensional (MIKE 21) Dam Failure Modeling...............................................................................................................................11-12 Figure 11-8 Serial Dam Failure Modeling using MIKE FLOOD..................................................................11-12 Figure 11-9 Example Map Using Reference Dam Inundation Maps to Develop Potential Dam Break EvacuationMaps..................................................................................................................11-13 Figure 12-1. Storm Wave Directions and Events for Hawaii Island........................................................... 12-1 Figure 13-1. The impacts of stabilization on shoreline retreat and beach loss ......................................... 13-1 vi Hairaii C'ozsizty AIitlti-Hazard.Alitigatiorz Playa Figure 13-2. Effects of beach stabilization................................................................................................. 13-2 Figure 14-1. Drought Vulnerability to the water supply sector in the County of Hawaii .......................... 14-7 Figure 14-2. Drought Vulnerability to the agriculture sector in the County of Hawaii .............................. 14-8 Figure 14-3. Federal Drought Monitoring Map......................................................................................... 14-9 Figure 15-1 2009-2010 Upland Fire in South Kona....................................................................................15-3 5-3 Figure 15-2 Smoke from 2009 Kealakekua Upland Fire Spread Throughout South Kona .........................15-3 5-6 Figure 15-3 Drought Vulnerability to the Environment, Public Health, and Safety Sector ........................ 15-4 Figure 15-4 Communities at Risk from Wildfires, Island of Hawaii..........................................................15-10 5-10 Figure 15-5 Local Firefighters Discuss Hazards and Fire History Patterns...............................................15-10 5-14 Figure 17-1. Map of shelter locations on Hawaii Island............................................................................. 17-6 Figure 18-1. Emergency Response Organization....................................................................................... 18-2 Figure 18-2. Map of shelter locations on Hawaii Island............................................................................. 18-5 Figure 18-3. Map of Police Stations, DPW Baseyards, and Hospitals........................................................ 18-7 Figure 18-4. Map of Fire Stations............................................................................................................... 18-9 Figure 18-5. University of Hawaii AAL losses per campus....................................................................... 18-19 Figure 18-6. Annual losses per hazard for UH Hilo and Hawaii CC .......................................................... 18-19 Figure 18-7. Pacific Tsunami Warning System......................................................................................... 18-21 Figure 18-8. Civil Defense Warning Sirens and Evacuation Routes......................................................... 18-22 Figure 18-9. Site locations for Cellular Run-up Detectors (CRD's), Satellite Run-up Detectors (SRD's), and Pacific Tsunami Warning Center sea level gauges............................................................... 18-23 Figure 18-10. Harbors and Airports........................................................................................................... 18-25 Figure 18-11. Roads and Bridges............................................................................................................... 18-28 Figure 18-12. Road damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake ................................................. 18-30 Figure 18-13. Bridge embankment Damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake ........................ 18-30 Figure 18-14. Electrical Substations........................................................................................................... 18-32 Figure 18-15. Communication Systems..................................................................................................... 18-34 Figure 18-16. Communications Network................................................................................................... 18-35 Figure 18-17. County Wastewater System................................................................................................ 18-38 Figure 18-18. Landfills, Transfer Stations, and TDSRs................................................................................ 18-40 Figure 18-19. Typical Material Process Concept for TDSR Site.................................................................. 18-42 Figure 18-20. TDSR Conceptual Site Plan................................................................................................... 18-43 Figure 18-21. County of Hawaii Land Use Planning System....................................................................... 18-53 List of Tables Table 1-1. Hawaii County Major Natural Hazard Events Since 1975 ........................................................ 1-2 Table 3-1. Hawaii County Demographic Profile........................................................................................ 3-1 Table 3-2. Employment statistics for Hawaii Island per the 2002 census ................................................ 3-2 Table 4-1. Design Wind Pressures per UBC/IBC Code Years..................................................................... 4-6 Table 5-1. Summary of Study Limits......................................................................................................... 5-3 Table 5-2. Saffir Simpson Scale and damage potential............................................................................ 5-6 Table 5-3. Significant Hurricanes Since 1950............................................................................................ 5-7 Table 5-4. Hurricane Windspeed vs. Recurrence Interval and Modern -Day ASCE Design Speeds......... 5-10 Table 5-5. Wood frame, double wall, residential construction statistics for Hawaii County ................. 5-14 Table 5-6. Wood frame, single wall, residential construction statistics for Hawaii County ................... 5-14 Table 7-1. Conversion of MMI to PGA Values Specific to Hawaii........................................................... 7-15 Table 7-2. Statistics for double wall construction, seismic design level in Hawaii County ..................... 7-19 Table 7-3. Statistics for single wall construction, seismic design level in Hawaii County ....................... 7-19 Table 7-4. Hawaii County comparison of W1 and MH SBT Enhanced Data model run with ShakeMap vs. publicly documented damage counts.................................................................................... 7-22 Table 8-1. Legend for Lava Flow Hazard Zone Map................................................................................ 8-13 Table 8-2. Lava inundation AAL.............................................................................................................. 8-14 Table 9-1. Tsunamis with Run-up of 2 meters or more: 1812 to present ................................................ 9-4 vii Hawaii Cortraty AIitlti-Hazard.Alitigatiora Plena Table 10-1. Repetitive loss property list and ranking............................................................................. 10-23 Table 10-2. County of Hawaii Flood Study list........................................................................................ 10-25 Table 10-3. List and Status of Levees...................................................................................................... 10-26 Table 10-4. Estimated Inundation Area and Number of Parcels Potentially Affected if Levees are not Certified............................................................................................................................... 10-30 Table 10-5. USACE October 1 MOA Compensation Allocation............................................................... 10-30 Table 12-1. FIRM Coastal flood zone classifications................................................................................. 12-2 Table 14-1. Drought Classification Based On SPI...................................................................................... 14-2 Table 14-2. Historic Drought in the Hawaiian Islands............................................................................... 14-6 Table 15-1. State of Hawaii annual wildfire summary report................................................................... 15-2 Table 15-2 Decision -Makers for the Community Wildfire Protection Plan..............................................15-7 Table 18-1. Resident Shelter Needs by District........................................................................................ 18-4 Table 18-2. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking, sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic earthquakeevent................................................................................................................ 18-15 Table 18-3. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking, sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic earthquakeevent................................................................................................................ 18-16 Table 18-4. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking, sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic hurricane event.................................................................................................................................... 18-17 Table 18-5. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking, sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic hurricane event.................................................................................................................................... 18-18 Table 18-6. Vulnerability ranking of UH Hilo and Hawaii CC facilities.................................................... 18-20 Table 18-7. Hilo and Kawaihae Port Facilities......................................................................................... 18-25 Table 18-8. Vulnerability Analysis of Residential Areas.......................................................................... 18-48 Table 18-9. State Land Use Districts Acreage (as of July 2007).............................................................. 18-50 Table 18-10. Relative Hazard Severity of Major Hazards Based on Average Annual Loss Estates........... 18-54 viii Hairaii Cortraty AIitlti-Hazard.AIitigatiora Plena Executive Summary EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Island and County of Hawaii has experienced 42 natural disaster events since 1977 and five tsunamis (1946, 1952, 1957, 1960, and 1964) since 1940. This island is uniquely exposed to all the major natural hazards due to its active volcanoes (lava flow and earthquake hazards), young geological age (sheetflow flooding due to undefined drainage -ways), vast land area larger than all the other islands combined (expansive areas vulnerable to wildfires), varied topography dominated by five mountains (complex hurricane wind acceleration patterns), and easternmost location in the Hawaiian islands chain (hurricane exposure). Of lesser concern is sandy beach erosion due to the geologically youthful age of this island resulting in few sandy beaches; instead, sea cliff erosion is of greater concern to control building too closely to the cliff edge. The purpose of this multi -hazard mitigation plan is to provide a strategy to reduce or eliminate loss of life or property caused by natural hazard events. A multi -hazard strategy addresses the relationship among various types of hazards, leverages resources to benefit multiple hazards, and allocates limited resources to areas susceptible to the most severe or frequent hazards. Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Hazard Analysis The state of knowledge and hazard mapping are summarized below • High Wind Storms. For high wind risks, the areas exposed to wind acceleration due to topography have been mapped. • Hurricanes. Similar to high winds, the areas exposed to wind acceleration due to to- pography have been mapped. For storm surge risks, the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (VE zone) will be updated based on hurricane surge modeling. • Landslides and Rock Falls. GIS mapping has been developed to identify areas susceptible to landslide or rock falls based upon the slope of the terrain, soil type, and ground moisture level. • Earthquake. The County should adopt the 2006 International Building Code as the official building code; this better classifies the probabilistic acceleration parameters of the Island than previous versions of the obsolete 1991 Uniform Building Code currently enforced by the County. Maps have also been developed to distinguish areas where ground motion could be significantly increased by softer soil conditions. • Lava Flows and Volcano Gases (VOG). Although mapping exists that zones the entire island into nine lava hazard zones, the Hawaii Volcano Observatory is presently working to replace this map with a probabilistic hazard map. UH Manoa Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes (CSAV) is developing a modeling system to predict direction and speed of flow for a given eruption. ix Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary • Tsunami. New mapping is being developed for tsunami inundation areas (delineation of historical and modeled run-up used to control development) and tsunami evacuation areas (more conservative delineation than inundation areas based on identifiable landmarks such as roads and used to facilitate field evacuation logistics). Historically in Hawaii Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) also accounted for the tsunami inundation risk areas and limits of historical inundations (VE zone). • Flooding. FEMA and the County are working on making the FIRMs available in digitized format, which will improve the GIS. The County is also working on improving the accuracy of the FIRMs based on updated topographic information. Additionally, the GIS includes revisions to the FIRM (called Letter of Map Revisions or LOMRs). Improvements are needed to the rainfall and stream -flow gauging system to improve forecasting and real-time monitoring. In December 2008 and February 2009, FEMA submitted to the the County Preliminary Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps (Pre-DFIRMs). The County is currently doing flood studies (map updates) in the following areas: Puna, Hilo, North and South Kona. There are several privately funded flood studies ongoing in the Kona, Hilo and Waimea. As part of FEMA's mapping process, the County is also pursuing, with the help of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, levee certifications for Alenaio, Paauau and Wailoa Flood Damage Reduction Control Projects. All of these studies will be completed within the next year to year and one half. • Dam Failures. Dam break studies have been conducted to map areas were flooding may result due to dam failure. • High Surf. The entire coastline of Hawaii Island is susceptible to the effects of high surf, areas were the potential for coastal flooding exists are defined as the VE zones on the current FIRM maps as described in the Hurricane and Flood chapters. • Coastal Erosion. No studies or GIS data exist to establish safe setback limits to address sea cliff erosion risks. Beach erosion in Hawaii County is not a significant enough problem to presently warrant detailed mapping. • Droughts and Wildfire. As part of the Hawaii Drought Plan areas where the water supply sector, agriculture and commerce, and/or environment, public health, and safety are vulnerable to the effects of drought were mapped in GIS. This mapping also identifies areas where historic wildfires have occurred and where this risk is present. • HAZMAT. The Department of Health Hawaii State Response Program List of Priority Sites identifies all Hawaii sites for potential or known non -emergency response actions managed by the NEER Office Site Discovery, Assessment, and Remediation Section Remedial Project Managers (RPMs). Sites are categorized as a potential hazard when sampling data indicate that contaminant concentrations exceed Hawaii Environmental Action Levels. The DOH Hawaii SRP Priority List of Sites shows 83 sites on the Big Island with potential or known hazardous substance or petroleum contamination. Three sites were determined to require No Further Action (NFA). HEER Office Remedial Project Managers (RPMs) continue active oversight on 70 assessment and response actions. X Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary Risk Assessment Risk can be defined as exposure to the chance of loss or injury. Critical Facilities and Special Populations/Areas This plan focused on mitigating hazards to critical facilities and special populations or areas. Critical facilities include those public and private facilities that need to be operational during and after a hazard event to meet public health and safety needs, or to speed economic recov- ery. These facilities include: • Emergency response facilities-- Civil Defense Emergency Operations Center, emergency shelters, fire and ambulance stations, hospitals, police stations, Department of Public Works base yards; • Infrastructure lifeline facilities-- transportation (harbors, airports, roads/bridges), energy (electrical, fuel, gas), communication (wired/cabled telecommunication, wireless), water, wastewater; • Recovery facilities-- debris clearing and disposal, car rentals, buses, financial institutions, survival and building supplies; • Secondary hazard facilities-- facilities that increase the hazard risk if damaged, including wastewater facilities and hazardous waste sites. A study of the critical facilities on the Big Island has been preformed to evaluate and rank the vulnerability of each building to the above hazards. Loss estimations have been developed and a benefit cost analysis of potential retrofits will be performed on facilities of highest priority. This study will be detailed in Chapter 16; this loss estimation information is used as one of several criteria to prioritize the allocation of limited resources to mitigate hazards. Estimates of historical and potential future losses for each of the above hazards can be further refined in future updates of the plan to rank the severity of the risk imposed by each hazard. Special populations identified with demographic data are those that are more vulnerable and may require special assistance to prepare, evacuate, or recover include: • Young and elderly; • Non-English speakers; • Persons with disabilities. Special areas that are more vulnerable and may require special assistance to prepare, evacuate, or recover include: • Schools, day care centers, and nursing homes; • Residences and buildings built before 1985 under building code additions prior to the adoption of the 1982 UBC and therefore more susceptible to hurricane and earthquake damage; • Residences and buildings in high hazard areas; • Remote residences that are distant from sirens or off -grid; • Hotels and resorts, due to their economic importance; Xi Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary The GIS system superimposed the hazard layers over the critical facilities and special populations/areas to identify those located in high hazard areas. Vulnerable critical facilities were assessed to determine whether the facility should be hardened. Vulnerable special populations and areas require a range of mitigation measures discussed in the plan. The following table summarizes the vulnerable critical facilities, special populations, and special areas based on the best available data. xii Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan > Y — U_ N L oCL m m L mom'-' C o E L �o . Q W' U > > L L N fn O n 2 C N O a) >..0 U L p o I' a) ._ m A _ 'Lnw �� m m,LmU Ow-z N O ° '° a o � m, Y w a Y -2 a w ° " T r v w� � W = L p — E m m -SR L m ` o a) 7 E p O U N ° o E cw :=J m O L C oC) � L U) .0 U w ma ma mU2r > .5Q L w `o E a m m w m._Ea)°U E 5 ENma Y L=> o p °° LaL L w YO a OwMa°'O LM'O - m —0 w U p Lm -Q 45 -E � �o i ">4'd C°w S�a_ ma) Qmp oL LU Ya mcm4 °C,O 2°mY - ° 0 LOm m m 0 0 CL z w U U E L o Y 6 lL > w Y° r a) m° w ca') > a) p ° m d p O r p > m Y L ° 0 a) fn L m 0� L 0 E> 2 w a) .F .0 L U) C U N m =� Y N N a� d N� a) L L Y T a'a m Ea �o �� ° m.4 > m E a)Y ° °'Qm � m') a E �.w `oa L } w �, mU m °m E E _gym w m m `m m m m o a) a a awe. mE��mmm. 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Goal: Continually strive to improve the state of the art for the identification of hazard areas, prediction capabilities, and warning systems. Objectives: 1.1. Prepare GIS maps for all hazards with the best available information and formulate a strategy to maintain/upgrade the data. 1.2. Improve applicability of modeling systems to Hawaii Island conditions for hazard mapping, mitigation planning, and scenario training purposes. 1.3. Improve flood prediction and field -monitoring systems. 1.4. Establish a warning system that is cognizant of warning siren gaps that require supplemental field warning, which strives to fill those gaps based on population, that is routinely tested and maintained, and that educates the public on proper response. 1.5. Establish a rigorous reporting system after each major event to document the extent and cause of damage, lessons learned, and actions required to improve hazard mitigation, preparedness, response, or recovery. 2. Goal: Control future development and retrofit existing structures within hazard areas to minimize losses. 2.1. Update the building code to cost-effectively resist earthquake, hurricane, and flood susceptibility. 2.2. Periodically review the effectiveness of current land -use -related plans, codes, and standards to control future development within hazard areas. 2.3. Develop incentives, such as tax deductions and insurance discounts, to encourage retrofitting of existing structures to resist earthquake, hurricane, and flood susceptibility. 3. Goal: Ensure that all emergency response critical facilities and communication systems remain operational during hazard events. 3.1. Harden all essential emergency facilities and communication systems to withstand earthquake and hurricane forces (Ensure road access to hospitals remains clear and that all hospitals have helicopter access, no emergency facilities should be located in the 100 -year flood -prone areas). 4. Goal: Ensure that all lifeline infrastructures are able to withstand hazard events or have contingency plans to quickly recover after a disaster. 4.1. Harden ports and airports to enable post -disaster operations. 4.2. Harden major highway segments that have no alternate bypass to withstand earthquake and 100 -year floods as well as rockfalls/landslide closure. 4.3. Harden fuel storage facilities and ensure distribution network to critical facilities. 4.4. Reduce vulnerability of electrical system to all hazards. 4.5. Develop water systems that resist damage to all hazards and contingency plans to truck water. xiv Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary 5. Goal: Provide adequate pre- and post -disaster emergency shelters to accommodate residents and visitors. 5.1. Identify and harden selected shelters to withstand hurricane. 5.2. Establish a standardized due diligence procedure for qualifying a building for private self -sheltering. 6. Goal: Develop a level of awareness among the general public and businesses, particularly the visitor industry, that results in calm and efficient evacuations, self- sufficient survival skills, and willingness to abide by preventive or property protection requirements. 6.1. Develop a broad-based public information program that utilizes a diversity of communication media. 6.2. Develop special public information programs targeted to vulnerable populations. 6.3. Develop a community-based network that double -functions as the Community Emergency Response Team and provides input into mitigation planning. 7. Goal: Minimize post -disaster recovery disruption by developing systems for efficient clean-up, documentation of damage and injury, and processing of appropriate aid to rebuild businesses and the economy. 7.1. Educate businesses on business interruption planning. 8. Goal: Protect natural and cultural resources to the extent practicable that buffer hazards or have significant value. The following are the County priorities re2ardin2 hazard mitigation proiects: 1. Hardening and Retrofitting of Critical Facilities Conduct all hazard evaluations and develop cost-effective retrofits for priority facilities including: • hurricane shelters and schools, • hospitals, fire stations, and police stations, airports • Hilo and Kawaihae harbors and fuel storage facilities • key County bridges and plan alternative transportation routes, • power plants, water systems, communications sites, sewage treatment plants, and other facilities/buildings providing critical services 2. Upgrading of County Building Codes in accordance with Hawaii Revised Statues Chapter 107, State Building Code and Design Standards 3. Mapping/Assessments/Studies Analysis of high hazard areas and studies to develop mitigation measures: • perform screening evaluations of alternative facilities to augment public shelters to address shelter shortfall • investigate and document effectiveness of VOG mitigation techniques and incorporate in public awareness meetings xv Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary • update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate current bridge status and adapt HAZUS MH with enhanced building information data for hurricane loss estimation and identification of vulnerable structures Develop mapping of all major natural hazards: • flood map modernization with incorporation of both hurricane flood and tsunami inundation into DFIRM's • updated tsunami evacuation maps • earthquake ground failure hazard maps o probabilistic lava inundation maps o probabilistic tsunami inundation maps o dam inundation evacuation maps o landslide and slope stability hazard maps o LIDAR-based remapping of streams 4. Wildfire Prevention (firebreak establishment and fire mitigation resource inventory) 5. Drought Mitigation by improvements to irrigation aqueduct, reservoirs, and water management 6. Policy for Repetitive Flood Loss Properties 7. Develop natural hazard mitigation criteria policies for county facility site selection and design 8. Public Awareness/Education, with additional focus on implementation of Multi -Hazard Mitigation Techniques and VOG • Incentives for Homeowners and Business to retrofit vulnerable structures: To further support this type of outreach, the following actions are still needed: o an expedited permit process if the homeowner uses the standard recommended plans; o working with insurance companies to get homeowners insurance credits for implementing these retrofits; o need to expand the Expert System to add the hurricane mitigation techniques that were previously developed for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund's Loss Mitigation Grant Program. o Retrofit training, videos, displays, and demonstration/pilot retrofit projects • Multi -hazard public information website consolidating GIS mapping products for hazards & zoning 9. Mitigation of Erosion/Land/Rock Slides in residential areas and highways. (Highways have greater priority) xvi Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary Changes to Risk Exposure Due to Successful Mitigation Projects • Critical Facility Study. An all -hazard screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii has been conducted and a HAZUS MH risk assessment model created to evaluate the expected losses for each building. Two facility groups, that ranked high based on these analyses were evaluated in more detail such that recommended mitigation procedures were developed. A Benefit -Cost Analysis of the mitigation project construction funding was performed. This detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit a PDM grant applications for the retrofit project, and prioritize the most vulnerable critical facility buildings for future retrofits. • Shelter Studies Evaluations of 29 buildings throughout the Hawaiian Islands were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Accounting and General Services (DAGS), Division of Public Works, Scope of Services and Procedure for Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classification. The primary objective of these evaluations were to identify whether the structures substantially meets the wind load criteria for a Shelter rating of Type B or better. The evaluations also identify recommendations for any further incremental structural or nonstructural retrofits to achieve substantial compliance with Shelter Types B, A, and EHPA, where economically feasible. Four facilities on the Big Island were evaluated according to this procedure; the results of these studies are presented in Chapter 16. • Wind Map Improvements The building code now used in the County of Hawaii does not include any design requirements for amplified winds caused by topography. The International Building Code (IBC) 2006 Edition that will replace the code now used in the County introduces a new topographic factor and a wind directionality factor that in their default formulations would not give accurate results in Hawaii. This would lead to a high probability of incorrect design unless the State Building code amendments are adopted. The state of Hawaii amendments include several customized map products prepared for the building code in Hawaii County. Significant improvements in wind hazard mitigation can be accomplished through the use of wind speed-up mapping in local building codes and risk assessments. New wind maps incorporating this effect define a standard for a uniform level of protection for hurricane hazard throughout the County. Benefits include explicit quantification of wind -hazard and its mitigation through the identification of the severity of wind environments for planners and building designers that will significantly improve building performance. Determination of the wind hazard in topographically affected critical facility sites is essential for pre -disaster planning and emergency operations planning. Criteria for critical facility use and any necessary mitigation can then be objectively established. The overall effort will support goals of this plan to implement effective public safety planning and mitigation of coastal hazards. A 2008-2009 project sponsored by the State Office of Planning undertook the technical amendments necessary for the adoption of new wind speed design mapping provisions into the International Building Code 2006 and ASCE-7 standard by the County of Hawaii, which xvii Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary is located within a hurricane hazard region. Improvements in wind hazard mitigation can now be implemented through the use of these specialized "uniform -risk" wind speed maps for design use as a local code adoption to the State amendments to the International Building Code (IBC). A consistent level of protection for hurricane hazard would then be achieved in structural design on the island of Hawaii, thereby mitigating future hurricane losses in new construction. Implementation of the topographic and directionality in the County of Hawaii Building Code would fulfill recommendations made by structural engineers after Hurricanes Iwa (1982) and Iniki (1992). In addition, the enactment of the IBC 2006 with these wind provisions would be critical to maximizing federal disaster public assistance aid in future disasters. Section 406(e) of the Stafford Act requires that FEMA provides post -disaster public assistance aid funding only to the level of the code in place at the time of the disaster. When a county building code or any state building regulation is obsolete, any cost differential for repairing state buildings to modern standards currently becomes the responsibility of the State and County. Enacting a modern code would enhance the amount of federal aid available after a disaster to allow the State to rebuild in conformance to the latest disaster -resistant codes. Otherwise, post -disaster rebuilding and repairs may recreate vulnerabilities and weaknesses of antiquated codes that just happened to be in place at the time of the disaster. Thus, key benefits of this project are improved disaster -resistant construction immediately to reduce losses, and increased federal aid for post -disaster recovery of the State after the next disaster. • State Building Code Statute Act 82 (May 21, 2007) The State legislature found that the State has traditionally allowed the individual counties to establish their own building codes. In the past the counties adopted various portions of the Uniform Building Code, so the code differs from county to county. The status of fragmented building requirements in Hawaii is of serious concern to those involved in building ownership, design, construction, and insurance. Over forty states have adopted some form of a statewide building code. The adoption of a uniform set of statewide building codes applicable to one and two family dwellings, all other residential uses, and commercial and industrial buildings, and state buildings makes it possible for building owners, designers, contractors, and code enforcers within the State to apply consistent standards. The International Building Code is currently being considered for adoption by all counties. The health and safety considerations related to the codes are of statewide interest, especially relating to emergency disaster preparedness. Act 82 was implemented in Hawaii Revised Stature 107- Part H HRS 107 Part II created the authority of the State Building Code Council, any law to the contrary notwithstanding, to establish a comprehensive State Building Code. Under HRS §107-25, the State Building Code is required to include various codes and design standards that are listed specifically or generically in the statute. The State Building Code Council includes the State agencies and County jurisdictions with pre-existing regulations affected by a State Building Code. xviii Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary • The purpose of the law is to require the Department of Accounting and General Services to establish and implement a State Building Code • Creates a State Building Code Council with decision making authority • Preserves responsibilities for administration, permitting, enforcement and inspection as presently held by each county • Prohibits conflict with chapter 464, HRS, Professional Engineers, Architects, Surveyors and Landscape Architects • Requires adaption of the State Building Code by the local county government within 2 years • Permits county amendments without State Building Code Council approval • There is great importance of adopting the IBC as it relates to the County's ability to advance in FEMA's Community Rating System (CRS) program. If the IBC is not adopted, the County cannot advance past CRS Classification 8 or only a 10 -percent reduction in flood insurance premiums for all Hawaii County policy holders. • HAZUS MH Earthquake Modeling with updated building inventory database The Hawaii and Maui County general building stock data was enhanced by using residential and commercial property tax databases and several state government property databases. The project incorporated the unique Hawaii building types including the vulnerable post and pier single-wall construction type that statistically exhibited much higher damage levels than conventional wood -frame construction on slab -on -grade. • Post and Pier Retrofit Study A survey of 53 post and pier houses on the island of Hawaii was performed to determine the typical structural characteristics and variations in structural properties of these houses in the most vulnerable areas. The survey also investigated the extent of damage of these homes during the 2006 earthquakes along with any attempts to retrofit the houses at the time of survey. Based on this survey, a number of prototypical models of post and pier houses were analyzed for different levels of ground motion. A number of aspects of the houses were found to require retrofitting for even moderate levels of ground motion. From the analysis, three retrofit options were developed, with the applicability of each retrofit based on the location of the house and its structural properties. The retrofits are presented in a general format that can be applied to a wide range of houses without specific input from a structural engineer, except in special cases. Retrofit Option 1 is primarily a strengthening of connections using the existing post and pier foundation system, applicable in regions of low to moderate seismic hazard and for houses with moderate differential post heights. Retrofit Option 2 uses additional plywood shear walls between the ground and first floor of a house to provide additional lateral strength and stiffness to the foundation system. This retrofit is applicable in all regions with most combinations of differential post height and other structural properties. Retrofit Option 3 uses masonry shear walls to provide additional lateral strength and stiffness. This option is applicable for any post and pier house, although in some extreme cases a structural engineer would need to be consulted if the properties of the house fall outside the range of properties considered in the report. xix Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary • Soil NEHRP Classification Maps To be able to utilize the strong motion data recorded by the USGS Hawaiian strong motion network, knowledge of the subsurface site conditions beneath the USGS stations was required. The subsurface geology and, more important, the shear -wave velocity (Vs) structure beneath the USGS stations has been unknown to date. The information is invaluable to verify the appropriateness of the empirical ground motion attenuation models being used in the state hazard maps produced by USGS and in site-specific hazard analyses for engineering design. To obtain Vs information beneath the USGS strong motion sites, Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW) surveys were performed by the University of Texas, Austin, and URS Corporation in January 2008 (Wong et al. 2008). The SASW technique has been used to obtain Vs profiles at other USGS strong motion sites (e.g., Seattle, the Imperial Valley, and Los Angeles), and this technique has been well validated against other approaches, such as down -hole surveys (e.g., Wong and Silva 2006). The technique has been particularly useful in volcanic regimes where interbedded volcanic sequences can result in low-velocity zones (e.g., Yucca Mountain and Los Alamos). The SASW methodology is a non-destructive and non -intrusive seismic method. It utilizes the dispersive nature of Rayleigh -type surface waves propagating through a layered material to estimate the shear -wave velocity profile of the material (Stokoe et al. 1994; Joh 1996). In this context, dispersion arises when surface -wave velocity varies with wavelength or frequency. Dispersion in surface -wave velocity arises from the changing stiffness properties of the soil and rock layers with depth. Spectral analysis is used to separate the waves by frequency and wavelength to determine the experimental ("field") dispersion curve for the site. An analytical procedure is then used to theoretically match the field dispersion curve with a one-dimensional layered system of varying layer stiffness's and thicknesses. The one- dimensional Vs profile that generates a dispersion curve that matches the field dispersion curve is presented as the profile at the site. An active seismic source is required for the SASW surveys. In these surveys, one of the NSF's Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES) mobile vibrators, known as "Thumper," was used. Thumper has been designed to be a moderate- to high -frequency vibrator for use in seismic reflection and surface wave projects. The surveys took place from January 7 to 17, 2008 at 22 USGS strong motion. Several surveys were also performed at Kawaihae Harbor. The high PGA's recorded at the Waimea Station and the North Kohala Police Station are probably due to thin soil site amplification where a strong velocity contrast exists between the soil and underlying basalt. Based on the survey results, all of the 22 USGS strong motion sites are "soil" sites with Vs30 values ranging from 442 ft/sec at the USDA Laboratory in Hilo (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program [NEHRP] site class E) to 1,812 ft/sec at the South Kohala Fire Station (NEHRP C). Surprisingly, none of the strong motion sites had rock -like Vs30 values, even sites where basalt outcropped at the surface, such as at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. xx Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary As demonstrated in the 2006 earthquake, where some strong motion stations recorded peak horizontal accelerations close to Ig, site response effects can be significant on the Big Island. As part of FEMA -supported studies following the earthquake, a new 1:100,000 -scale map of site conditions on the Big Island of Hawaii was produced. The mapping makes use of about 25 new SASW measurements (Wong et al., 2008) and 1:100,000 -scale geologic mapping by Sherrod et al. (2007). An earlier 2006 site class map portrayed nearly all of the island as NEHRP site class B; however, based on about 20 SASW measurements in areas mapped as basalt, it is believed that most of the island should be mapped as NEHRP C or D. Vs30 estimates for these basalt sites ranged from 844 to 1,812 ft/sec, spanning NEHRP classes C and D. The median value for these Vs30 estimates is 1,304 ft/sec, with a log mean of 1,274 ft/sec and a standard deviation of 274 ft/sec. The sites cover a range of basaltic rock conditions as depicted on the geologic map, including lava flows, scoria cones, littoral deposits, spatter or tuff cones, cinder cones, and lava domes. Other geologic map unit groups for which only a few Vs30 estimates were made from SASW data include alluvium, ash/tephra, and artificial fill. These were assigned to map units NEHRP site class D, C to E, and C to E, respectively. Geologic deposits for which there is no quantitative velocity data and preliminary site class assignments have been made are sand dunes (D), landslide deposits (D), and glacial deposits (D). • Landslide Hazard Maps A conceptual level slope risk map was prepared for the Hawaii HAZUS Conversion Project, using an adaptation of the slope hazard methodology given in the FEMA 2007 HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual. The URS approach involved the interactions of three primary slope hazard input criteria simplified to low, medium and high hazard susceptibility The current HAZUS mapping for the Island of Hawaii is an initial pilot study allowing a scientific basis for incorporating slope hazards into island wide scenario loss estimates. This approach provides a simplified method where high resolution topography and rainfall data can be used with existing geologic maps in digital format to develop slope hazard criteria for rural, remote and developing areas where detailed slope hazard input data is not available. Plan Update and Maintenance Rather than just describe the need for plan maintenance and general tasks, this chapter was revised to provide specific actions and summary of specific ongoing hazard mitigation projects that will impact the next adoption of the mitigation plan. Thus, this provides a checklist of the resources expected for the plan maintenance taskings. This should ensure continuity and connectivity with ongoing and future work that should improve the next plan. This mitigation plan will be reviewed annually with input from an interagency Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee and an organized network of community groups in each district. The annual review will result in revised work -plans; budget requests to the County CIP, State Civil Defense, and other funding sources; suggested amendments to codes and plans; and proposed revisions to the text of this plan. xxi Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 1 1. Introduction Chapter 1: Introduction CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Plan Purpose of This Plan The purposes of this multi -hazard mitigation plan are twofold: 1) to protect people and structures from harm and destruction; and 2) to minimize the costs and disruption of disaster response and recovery. Hazard mitigation planning is the process that analyzes a community's risk from natural hazards, coordinates available resources, and implements actions to reduce risks. There are many benefits in developing a hazard mitigation plan: a well -thought-out blueprint provides more direct access to a wide range of technical and financial resources; the planning process promotes the development of a well- informed citizenry knowledgeable about hazards; mitigation strategies are more integrated with other community needs and goals; and the plan would improve the County's ability to recover after a disaster. A hazard mitigation plan is a pre -requisite to receive federal disaster assistance funding. In the past, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) placed primary emphasis on response and recovery. Recent changes in federal law marked a fundamental shift in policy to focus on mitigation as the foundation of emergency management.' For disasters declared after November 1, 2004, state and local governments must have a miti- gation plan approved by FEMA to receive pre- and post -disaster Hazard Mitigation Grants. This plan is the update and revision of the original "Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan: County of Hawaii," of May 2005. What is a Hazard? A hazard is a natural- or human -caused event that has the potential to cause significant injury, loss of life or property damage. "Disasters" are distinguished from "emergencies" by the degree of response required. An emergency is where local resources are adequate to respond. A disaster is when the marshaling of broader resources such as State and/or national resources is necessary to assist with recovery. Since 1977, Hawaii County has experienced six events (three floods, a lava flow, and two earthquakes) that have met criteria for Presidential declaration as a disaster area (see Table 1-1). 1 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-390), which amended the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 100-707) which in turn amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, P.L. 93-288. 2 "`Disaster' means any situation, usually catastrophic in nature, where numbers of persons are plunged into helplessness and suffering and as a result may be in the need of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or other necessities of life, and the governor of the State or the mayor of the County have declared a state of disaster or emergency." (Hawaii County Code section 7-6). 1-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction Table 1-1. Hawaii Countv Maior Natural Hazard Events Since 1975 Event Date Areas Affected Disaster Declaration Tsunamis November 29, 1975 Halape, Punaluu, Honuapo, Kaalualu Bay, Hilo, Kailua-Kona Unknown Floods Flooding February 2, 2008 Countywide Mayor Flooding, Severe Storms, High Surf, and Mudslides December 4-7, 2007 Countywide, Statewide Mayor, Governor, President Flooding October 25-26, 2004 Kona Mayor Flooding January 25, 2004 Kohala, Hilo, Puna, Kau Mayor Flooding November 1& 2, 2000 Ka'u, Pahala, Waiakea Uka, Komohana Mayor, Governor, President Flooding, high surf November 17, 1996 Countywide Governor Flooding September 19, 1994 Hilo, Puna, Ka'u Mayor Flooding August 12, 1994 Hilo, Hamakua, Puna, Ka'u Mayor, Governor, President Flooding, high winds April 7, 1989 N&S Kohala, Hamakua Mayor Flooding, high winds February 11, 1982 N&S Kona Mayor Flooding March 14-26, 1980 Puna, Ka'u, N&S Hilo, Hamakua, N&S Kohala Mayor, Governor Flooding, high surf, high winds January 8-14, 1980 Countywide Mayor, Governor Flooding November 15-17, 1979 Puna, Ka'u, N & S Hilo, Hamakua, N&S Kohala Mayor, Governor Flooding October 9, 1979 Ka'u Mayor Flooding February 17-22, 1979 Puna, Ka'u, N&SHilo Mayor, Governor Flooding, high winds January 12, 1979 Waipio Valley, N & S Hilo, Hamakua Mayor Lava Flow and `'OG Kilauea March 25, 31 and October 24,2008 Countywide Mayor Pu' u ' O' o March 3, 2008 Puna Mayor Kilauea eruption May 18, 1990 Puna Mayor, Governor, President Kilauea eruption April 23, 1990 Puna Mayor Kilauea eruption February 4, 1987 Puna Governor Kilauea eruption December 9, 1986 Puna Mayor Mauna Loa eruption March 29, 1984 E & SE portions of County Mayor Kilauea eruption September 30, 1977 Kalapana Mayor Earthquake October 15, 2006 Countywide Mayor, Governor, President 1-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction Event Date Areas Affected Disaster Declaration Earthquake November 16, 1983 Countywide Mayor, Governor, President Hurricane and High Winds High winds, high surf February 27, 2004 Countywide Mayor High winds, high surf January 14, 2004 Countywide Mayor Hurricane Jimena August 30, 2003 Countywide Mayor Hurricane Fernanda August 16, 1993 Countywide Mayor Hurricane Iniki September 28, 1992 Countywide Mayor High Winds February 16, 1986 Hamakua, N&S Hilo, Puna Mayor High Winds December 12, 1978 Waimea, Kawaihae, Waikoloa, Kiholo Mayor Hurricane Fico July 19, 1978 Kapoho, Kaimu, Honuapo Mayor Drought June 5, 2007 Kohala, Hamakua, Ka'u Mayor May 25, 2005 Countywide Mayor August 20, 2003 Statewide Governor July 1, 2003 Puna, Hilo, Hamakua, Countywide Mayor August 10, 2000 Ka'u, Kona, Kohala Mayor March 14, 2000 Hilo, Puna, Ka'u, Kona, Kohala, Hamakua Mayor July 22, 1999 Ka'u, N & S Kona, N & S Kohala, Hamakua Mayor January 30, 1998 Countywide Mayor November 8, 1996 N&S Kohala, Hamakua Mayor November 22, 1995 Hamakua, Hilo, Puna Mayor January 10, 1994, February 22, 1995 (amended), March 2, 1995 (amended) Initially N & S Kohala, Ka'u, Kona, amended to include all districts Mayor May 11, 1993 Kohala, Ka'u, Kona Mayor February 28, 1992 Countywide Mayor February 10, 1986 Countywide Mayor December 16, 1983 Countywide Mayor March 14, 1983 Countywide Governor February 15, 1983 Countywide Mayor July 15, 1981 S. Kohala, Hamakua Governor June 29, 1981 Countywide Mayor 1-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction Event Date Areas Affected Disaster Declaration January 30, 1981 Hamakua, S. Kohala Mayor January 5, 1981 Waiakea Uka, Puna Governor Wildfire July 1, 1987 S. Kohala Mayor Hold—Presidential Declaration Hawaii Island is uniquely at risk to several natural hazards. Compared to the other counties in this State, the relative risks are as follows: • High Wind Storms. Comparable risk to the other counties; wind speed-up patterns occur due to five dominant mountains; • Hurricanes. Higher risk relative to the other counties due to the easternmost location, but fortuitously low historic events; • Landslides and Rock Falls. Higher relative risk to other counties, due to higher level of seismic activity; • Earthquakes. Higher risk relative to the other counties; • Lava and VOG. Unique risk relative to other counties, as the only county with active volcanoes; • Tsunamis. Comparable risk to the other counties, but higher historic events; • Floods. Comparable risk of flash flooding to other counties due to small drainage basins with steep -walled amphitheater -shaped valleys; higher sheetflow flooding risk due to rela- tively youthful geological development of defined drainage ways, especially in the leeward areas; • Dam failures. Fewer dams than other islands however potential for failure maybe greater due to greater seismic activity; • High Surf. Lesser risk to other counties on Northwest facing shorelines due to shadowing effects of other islands, comparable risk on all other shorelines; • Coastal Erosion. Of lesser concern is sandy beach erosion due to the geologically youthful age of this island. Instead, sea cliff erosion is of greater concern to control building too closely to the cliff edge. • Droughts and Wildfires. Higher risk to droughts and wildfires relative to other counties due to more extensive rural settlements that rely on water catchments, a dominant agricultural industry that relies on rainfall, expansive open land area, and strong winds that make wildfires difficult to fight. • HAZMAT. The potential technological hazards of stored hazardous chemical materials are under the planning of the Local Emergency Preparedness Committee (LEPQ per Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 128D Environmental Response Law, and Chapter 128E Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act. In each chapter focusing on the above hazards will be profiled in terms of: • Description of the hazard; 1-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction • Significant Historical Events; • Probability of Occurrence; • Risk Assessment Methods; • Mitigation Strategies; Scope of this Multi -Hazard Plan This plan focuses on natural hazards, with a priority on disaster -potential hazards. Other plans focus on human -caused hazards such as terrorism and hazardous wastes. Rather than create separate plans for each type of natural hazard, this plan is a multi -hazard plan. A multi -hazard plan has several advantages: 1) certain hazards cause cascading hazard effects (e.g., earthquakes may cause landsliding, local tsunamis, or dam break flooding; hurricanes cause wind damage and flooding); 2) priorities can be established to allocate limited resources to areas susceptible to the most severe or frequent hazards; 3) areas identified as susceptible to multiple types of risks may require special attention; 4) common responses often apply to different hazards; 5) resources or mitigation measures can be leveraged where they could benefit multiple hazards; for example proposed changes to building design standards could consider both wind -loading (hurricane) and ground -shaking (earthquake). 1-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction The Value of Mitigation Emergency management includes preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. This plan will focus on mitigation-- i.e., strategies to reduce risks. For example, retrofitting bridges can keep them from washing out; installing hurricane clips can reduce personal and property losses thereby reducing the need for public assistance. The money spent today on preventive measures can significantly reduce the impact of disasters in the future. Reducing overall economic losses and social disruption will enable the community to recover to pre - disaster conditions as quickly and efficiently as possible, not to mention the costs saved. The goal is to become a "disaster -resilient" county where our lifeline systems of roads, utilities, infrastructure, and other support facilities are designed to continue operating in the midst of high winds, rising water, or shaking ground. Critical facilities such as hospitals, schools, and fire stations would be located in safe areas, rather than areas prone to high hazards. Resilient structures would be built or retrofitted to meet the safest building code standards available. Natural areas that provide buffers to flooding or other hazards would be conserved. Coordinated Approach Effective planning and response to hazard events involves local, State, and federal agencies. This plan has been coordinated and is consistent with the State of Hawaii Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan and guidelines of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)3. 1.2 Organization of the Plan The plan is organized into the following subject areas: • Mitigation Planning (Chapter 2). • Land Use, and Development (Chapter 3). Hazards Analysis (Chapters 4-15). All natural hazards that pose a potential threat to the County of Hawaii were analyzed to determine the degree of threat posed by each. The analysis provides a description of the hazard, significant historical events, probability of occurrence, risk assessment techniques, and mitigation strategies. ➢ High Wind Storms (Chapter 4) ➢ Hurricanes (Chapter 5) ➢ Landslides and Rock Falls (Chapter 6) ➢ Earthquakes (Chapter 7) ➢ Lava and VOG (Chapter 8) ➢ Tsunamis (Chapter 9) ➢ Floods (Chapter 10) 3 The federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-390) encouraged states and local governments to de- velop integrated natural hazard mitigation plans. States and local governments with plans in place would be eligible for faster funding and more effective risk reduction projects. Local Multi -Hazard Mitigation Guidance, FEMA July 1, 2008 1-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction ➢ Dam Failures (Chapter 11) ➢ High Surf (Chapter 12) ➢ Coastal Erosion (Chapter 13) ➢ Droughts (Chapter 14) ➢ HAZMAT (Chapter 15) • Shelters (Chapter 16). Facilities used for the purposes of sheltering residents in the event of a hazard are presented in this chapter. • Risk Assessment (Chapter 17). Those hazards determined to be of sufficient threat to the County of Hawaii were further examined to determine the degree to which the population, structures and land areas are vulnerable to the hazards. The analysis examined location of population concentrations, critical facilities, community resources, major transportation routes and infrastructure lines. • Mitigation Strategy (Chapter 18). By overlaying the hazard areas and community assets, problems and issues were identified. The strategy to address these problems and issues consisted of clarifying mitigation goals and objectives, identifying alternative mitigation actions, selecting and prioritizing the actions to be implemented, and developing an action plan. Mitigation actions include improving warning systems and evacuation plans; "hardening" critical facilities to withstand hurricane and earthquake forces; structural and land treatment measures that contain or redirect natural hazards; planning and regulatory measures to guide development away from hazards and establishing standards for managing exposure to hazards; and incentive and educational measures to encourage practices which are consistent with the disaster resistant community goals. • Planning process and update procedures (Chapter 19). The last chapter documents the extent of public participation and methodology used to develop the plan, as well as the methods and frequency to keep the plan updated. 1.3 Overview of Hawaii County 1.3.1 Geography The State of Hawaii consists of eight major islands (Kauai, Niihau, Oahu, Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Kahoolawe, Hawaii) and 124 small islands, reef, and shoals (referred to as the Northwest Hawaiian Islands). Located in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, it is one of the most isolated places on Earth-- 2,400 miles to the West Coast, 3,800 miles to Japan, 6 time zones separating Hawaii from the eastern United States. The Pacific Ocean is rimmed by active faults where tectonic earthquakes occur that can generate tsunamis (see Figure 1-1).4 4 Most of the tsunamis that have affected the Hawaiian Islands originated in the major earthquake belts, or ocean trenches, that surround the Pacific Ocean. These massive earthquakes along faults are called tectonic earthquakes. The devastating tsunamis of 1946 and 1960 were both generated by this type of tectonic earthquake, the former originating in the trench along the Aleutian Islands and the latter along a fault near Chile. 1-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction Figure 1-1. Map showing all of the tsunamigenic earthquakes in the Pacific Ocean as colored circles. Hawaii Island is the southeastern most island in the Hawaiian archipelago. The islands are divided into four counties-- Kauai, City & County of Honolulu (Oahu), Maui, and Hawaii. Hawaii County encompasses the entire island of Hawaii. Although the Hawaiian Islands were all formed by volcanic eruptions, only Hawaii Island still has active volcanoes. The size of Hawaii Island continues to grow as a result of the ongoing eruptions. Related to volcanic building of the land mass are earthquakes. At approximately 4,028 square miles, Hawaii Island, also known as the Big Island, is larger than all the other islands combined. Hawaii Island was formed from the coalescence of five volcanoes-- Kohala, Mauna Kea, Hualalai, Mauna Loa, and Kilauea. These five dominant mountains create wind acceleration zones on the island (see Figure 1-2). 1-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction Effective Wind Speed for the Island of Hawaii (For Components and Cladding with Mean Roof Height not geater than 100ft) District Boundary Land use — Major Road 6111 Agriculture Conservation - Rural Urban CONTOUR ------ 90 100 ...-....- 110 120 ---130 140 ------ 150 � r N A 10 20 Miles Figure 1-2. Wind contour map for the Island of Hawaii. The complex topography of the island creates acceleration and decelerations of a 105 mph basic design event windspeed as shown. As the geologically youngest island, Hawaii Island's landforms have not been weathered to the extent of the other islands. Thus rainfall runoff flows in narrow V-shaped stream valleys without broad floodplains or sheetflows in relatively undefined drainageways especially in the drier leeward areas. The relatively immature reef development and related lack of white sandy beaches is also characteristic of the youthful geologic age of this island. 1-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1: Introduction Located between 19 and 22 degrees north latitude at the northern edge of the tropical zone, Hawaii's mild salubrious climate is due in part to location within the tradewind zone. Hawaii's climate is notable for its low day-to-day and month-to-month variability. The annual variation in mean monthly temperatures is only about 9 degrees F for areas at sea level. While the climate is equable, the mountainous topography makes Hawaii Island one of the most spatially diverse anywhere. From 20 inches in leeward areas to 300 inches in the upper windward areas, this island experiences a range of moisture and temperature regimes exceeding that found across the breadth of a continent. The tropical conditions of the eastern Pacific are ideal for hurricane formation-- i.e., the warm ocean water near the equator (combined with the cyclonic spin) within 10-20 degrees north of the equator (see Figure 1-3). As the easternmost island in the State, Hawaii Island has a slightly higher probability of tropical cyclone landfall, but historically very few events have actually occurred. Figure 1-3. Map of Tropical Cyclones Formed Worldwide from 1985 to 2005' e 5 Image from Wikipedia Website, Retrieved October 5, 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File: Global _tropical _ cyclone_ tracks-edit2.jpg 6 The points in the map show the locations of the storms at six -hourly intervals. 1-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chalver 1: AppendixA Chapter 1 — Appendix A. Summary Digest Description of Changes from 2005 to 2010 in the County of Hawaii Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan — updated December 2010 Overall Reorganization and Reformatting of the 2010 Plan To accommodate greater detail on hazards and risk assessment, as well as to more clearly identify hazard mitigation activities and their specific impacts, the Hawaii County Multi - Hazard Mitigation Plan has been substantially reorganized, and now has separate chapters on each of the hazards. The number of hazards individually included in the plan has increased from 7 to 13, plus an additional chapter on emergency sheltering, which is a special consideration for island counties that cannot evacuate inland during hurricanes. The total number of chapters has increased from 5 to 21. In short, this plan is a near-total rewrite with the objective of greater clarity in addition to a major update of technical knowledge. The chapter on the Mitigation Planning process has been relocated to Chapter 2, providing better linkage to the Executive Summary and Introduction for background on the development of the plan for decision makers. The number of graphic and photographic exhibits has substantially increased, in order to provide better historical and technical exhibits for specific hazards, as well as illustrations documenting new and ongoing hazard mitigation projects and the results of risk and vulnerability analyses. Each hazard -specific chapter discusses previous/current mitigation efforts and future mitigation plan activities, so that specific recommendations are focused on each hazard. These recommendations are then compiled and prioritized in Chapter 19. It is anticipated that this new format will make the plan better enabled to accommodate future updates in knowledge and mitigation actions in the future, and allow for hazard - specific information to be exported to other planning efforts, such as community development plans, the Hawaii General Plan, and the State of Hawaii Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan. Chapter Description of Updates / Revisions in the draft 2010 Plan Executive Summary The 2005 plan discussed the primary The current 2010 plan developed a more concise executive hazards, critical facility and population summary, and also summarizes some of the more significant vulnerabilities, the mitigation strategy improvement in hazard identification and mitigation tools. The and priorities are given, and an updated mitigation strategy and project priorities are updated. exhaustive listing of various mitigation The most vulnerable facilities and populations are identified. The actions is provided. detailed mitigation action listing is given later in Chapter 19. 1. Introduction The 2005 plan provides an explanation of The 2010 plan updates the introduction with updates on hazards the intent of the hazard mitigation plan, and the scope of the plan, as well as updated exhibits. and a discussion of the geographic profile of Hawaii County from a hazards vs. community exposure perspective. Al -1 Hawaii C'ozirzty A-Itilti-Hazard AIitigatiotz Plan Chapter 1: AppendixA 2. Mitigation Planning In the 2005 plan, discussed in the The mitigation planning effort included a major effort toward chapter on the planning process at the greater public outreach meetings and community workshops, and end. included a public opinion survey on disaster preparedness dealing with both individual and governmental preparedness and mitigation priorities. 3. Land Use and Development The 2005 plan introduction provided an Demographics and critical facility information has been updated, overview of Hawaii County geography, as well as the discussion of land use and development projections population, economic profile, land use, per the Hawaii General Plan. and projected growth. 4. High Wind Storms In the 2005 plan, a high wind history in In order to differentiate the risks due to seasonal storms versus Hawaii County is given. tropical cyclones (tropical storms and hurricanes), this separate chapter now examines the high wind event history and windspeed probabilities associated with seasonal climatology. This helps to emphasize that seasonal winds have no direct relationship to the much greater wind risk posed by hurricanes. 5. Tropical Cyclones In the 2005 plan, historical events are This chapter reflects the substantial improvement in the state of discussed, structural benchmark knowledge of the tropical cyclone hazard probabilities and the vulnerability dates are given, and a effect of island topography in producing areas with amplified summary of 2000-2001 research on windspeeds, new flood maps incorporating a hurricane flood probabilistic hurricane hazard analysis is insurance study, indications of a pilot study of hurricane shelter discussed. The needs for further work vulnerabilities, and new wind -resistant design and construction on hurricane hazard and topographic provisions in the new State Building Code (2009). wind speed-up are identified. 6. Landslides and Rock Falls The 2005 plan included a brief discussion This chapter additionally includes a discussion of the substantial on the various generic mechanisms for rockfalls generated by the 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake, and landslides and rockfalls in Hawaii. examines a 2009 slope hazard map developed for use in earthquake loss modeling. Recommendations for improving the landslide susceptibility maps are given for a mitigation planning project that is starting in 2010 with the University of Hawaii. 7. Earthquakes The 2005 provided a basic description of This chapter explains the fundamental seismological mechanisms seismicity of the island of Hawaii and the for earthquakes in Hawaii, which is unlike continental seismology. seismic hazard analysis basis for the The M6.7 October 15, 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake is described, Uniform Building Code (now particularly its effects on the Kawaihae Harbor. The modern discountinued). seismic hazard analysis used for the basis for the International Building Code is explained. A new study to map soil conditions affecting seismic ground motion is included. Structural vulnerabilities of Hawaii island construction is addressed in several new analysis of residential and critical facilities. New Enhanced Hawaii Data for the HAZUS MH MR4 model for earthquake loss estimation and planning has been developed. A1-2 Hairaii C'ozirzty A-Itilti-Hazard AIitigatiotz Plan Chalver 1: AppendixA 8. Lava and VOG The 2005 plan included a discussion of This new chapter adds an entirely new section on VOG —Volcanic past eruptions and the basic lava hazard Gas Emissions, that was identified in public surveys as one the zones, along with recommended tools three major concerns (earthquake, hurricanes, and VOG for improved lava hazard mapping. mitigation). Additional information on past lava inundation events is included. The lava hazard zone map is used in GIS analysis to calculate the Average Annualized Loss (i.e., the county's economic risk) due to property damage by lava inundation. There is an update on lava and VOG mitigation activities, including several ongoing projects. 9. Tsunamis In the 2005 plan, the fundamentals of Further historical data on tsunamis during the past 100 years is tsunami generation, local history, presented. Additional information on tsunami detection and warning, and the historical development warning is provided. A new tsunami inundation study using state - of current tsunami evacuation maps are of -the -art modeling has developed updated inundation limits to explained. use as the basis for updating the tsunami evacuation maps. A risk assessment of tsunami -prone communities is presented. Further work is identified, to included addressing tsunami risk in coastal flood zoning and the upcoming development of new Performance - Based Tsunami Engineering provisions for future building codes. 10. Floods The 2005 plan included a description of The phenomena leading to flooding are described in greater coastal and stream flooding hazard detail. The locations of Hawaii Dams are given for background areas, and the basis for FIRM maps are information leading to Chapter 11. Historical damaging flood explained. Areas of seasonally higher events are described in detail. The modern-day rainfall intensity rainfall are generally identified. map is introduced. Areas of flooding are described by district. NFIP exposure for Hawaii County is summarized. An analysis of repetitive loss and severe repetitive loss properties is given and mapped. Floodplain management activities of the County of Hawaii are described in detail, and proposed county regulatory update objectives are summarized. Future work is identified. 11. Dam Failures Early research work on dam break This is an entirely new chapter dealing with the technological modeling is described and the need for failure hazard of dam break inundation. A major effort in dam further work on inundation modeling is condition surveys and hazard identification, and inundation identified, due to the presence of 11 modeling has occurred in the years since the March 16, 2006 earthern dams in Hawaii County. Kaloko Dam failure on Kauai. Regulatory requirements are described. Ongoing efforts of the USACoE, State, and County Civil Defense to create dam evacuation maps are discussed. 12. High Surf This is an entirely new chapter dealing with damaging high surf events and high waves due to hurricanes and tropical storms. 13. Coastal Erosion The 2005 plan was confined to discussion This entirely new chapter focuses on coastal erosion mechanisms of coastal escarpment erosion and and strategies. coastal landslides. A1-3 Hairaii C'ozirzty A-Itilti-Hazard AIitigatiotz Plan Chapter 1: AppendixA 14. Droughts Droughts and drought impacts are Drought measurement and susceptibility indices are described in described, and the need for further detail. Significant historical drought event losses are reported. updates to include the Hawaii Dought Drought hazard areas are mapped. Drought monitoring tools are Committee is identified. described. Drought mitigation initiatives from the Hawaii County Drought Committee are reported. 15. Wildfires Hawaii County wildfire suppression This entirely new chapter adds information on wildfire history and resources are identified. losses, probabilistic wildfire hazard maps, and project initiatives from the Hawaii County Drought Committee. 16. HAZMAT This is an entirely new chapter on the potential technological hazards of stored hazardous chemical materials, to summarize the planning of the Local Emergency Preparedness Committee (LEPC) per Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 128D Environmental Response Law, and Chapter 128E Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act. 17. Shelters This entirely new chapter identifies the presently available emergency public shelter facilities in the County, and maps these locations. A pilot study of structural and enclosure integrity of several shelter buildings is described, using a recently developed engineering assessment procedure of the Department of Accounting and General Services. New building regulations of the State Building Code for residential safe rooms and public building enhanced hurricane protection areas are described. Follow-up implementation recommendations for improving shelter safety are given. 18. Risk Assessment The 2005 plan Risk and Vulnerability This chapter adds a risk analysis of 80 critical facility buildings in Analysis chapter provided a very the County of Hawaii and expected losses for earthquakes and comprehensive overview of county hurricanes. Facility vulnerability rankings are given. A risk analysis critical facilities, and characteristics of of the University of Hawaii at Hilo campus buildings is given with the at -risk population. It indicated a high facility vulnerability rankings. Highway and bridge damage due to priority for hardening of critical facilities. the 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake are identified. Land Use data and Loss estimation was based on results population data are updated. Improvements to the HAZUS MH produced by Martin & Chock for the model capabilities are discussed, including the assembling of an State of Hawaii. The need for future Enhanced Data inventory of Hawaii County buildings. updates was indicated, stressing additional development of HAZUS capabilities and data improvements. 19. Mitigation Strategy The 2005 plan described the County's This chapter has been updated. The Mitigation Goals and mitigation goals and objectives, Objectives were updated, In that process, several items were mitigation actions by hazard, priorities, identified as emergency response activities rather than having any and project implementation actions. hazard mitigation effects, and these were removed. Mitigation Actions by hazard are identified. The priorities for hazard mitigation were updated. Implementation actions to address these priorities are organized in a clearer listing. A14 Hawaii C'ozirity A-Itilti-Hazard lIitigatiorz Plan Chapter 1: Appendix 20. Plan Maintenance The 2005 planning process was Rather than just describe the need for plan maintenance and described. general tasks, this chapter was revised to provide specific actions and summary of specific ongoing hazard mitigation projects that will impact the next adoption of the mitigation plan. Thus, this provides a checklist of the resources expected for the plan maintenance taskings. This should ensure continuity and connectivity with ongoing and future work that should improve the next plan. 21. References This chapter has been updated to reference new material. Appendix A FEMA LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK A1-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 LJ 2. Mitigation Planning Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning CHAPTER 2 - MITIGATION PLANNING 2.1 Planning Process The planning process engaged the many involved agencies and the public to increase aware- ness, facilitate input, and then to synthesize the information into a plan of action. The County Civil Defense Agency is the lead agency for all hazards planning in the County. For this initial effort, the Civil Defense enlisted the assistance of the Planning Department and Data Systems to coordinate the planning process. Although this plan is a culmination of the best efforts and the best available information at this time, the County recognizes that there are many areas for improvement and is committed to an ongoing process to update the plan with ever more public and agency participation. To compile the data for the initial plan, and this update, meetings were held with agencies whose functions related to hazards analysis (e.g., Hawaii Volcanoes Observatory) or critical facilities (e.g., HELCO, Fire, Police, Department of Public Works, Red Cross). The County's GIS system was the repository of the information. One of the goals of the planning process was to build the County's GIS capacity recognizing its importance not only for mitigation planning but also for emergency response. Public awareness and input was solicited that focused primarily on preparedness to respond to hazard events. Numerous public meetings were held throughout the County that provided a forum for discussion on hazard mitigation. Figure 2-1 A Typical Hazard Mitigation Planning Meeting 2-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning 2.2 Plan Development Process The plan development process consisted of the following steps 1. Mobilization and Scoping. From 2009, a FEMA PDM grant enabled the County to lay the groundwork for hazard mitigation planning by increasing agency and public awareness. In 2009, the Civil Defense Agency invited resource people from FEMA and the State and University of Hawaii to meet with several County agencies to discuss the approach and requirements for a hazard mitigation plan. This resulted in a schedule and strategy plan for performing the update. 2. Establishment of Working Committee. The Civil Defense Agency organized a working committee composed of representatives from its agency, Planning Department, Data Systems Department and two private consultants to prepare the Hawaii County Hazard Mitigation Plan. In lieu of relying on consultants to prepare the entire plan, the County deliberately chose to invest County personnel time to prepare the plan. Only by taking an active role in the overall preparation could County personnel become intimately educated in hazard mitigation, be committed to implementing the mitigation actions, and be able to update the plan. Beginning in the spring of 2009, the committee met to establish project parameters, develop a work plan, and determine the format for the plan. Early in the process, the committee also met with representatives from State Civil Defense to gain an understanding of how the various county plans were being developed, the kind of assistance that was available and what was expected from Hawaii County. These early sessions provided an opportunity to learn about the various hazard mitigation projects and activities that were already ongoing to incorporate into the plan. The committee met on a monthly basis to provide status updates and feedback on the work accomplished during the intervening time period. 3. Data Collection. In the process of preparing the plan, the County Plan utilizes a significant increase in GIS spatial analysis to compile, analyze, and illustrate available data in maps, developing needed additional data, and identifying the gaps to focus future efforts. The County recognizes GIS as a valuable tool for planning, response (E911 dispatch and Emergency Operating Center), and recovery. 4. Analysis. • Hazard Identification and Analysis. The working committee researched available documents and consulted with pertinent agencies and experts to synthesize the state of knowledge of the various natural hazards. Involvement by the Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee provided valuable input. The sources are referenced throughout the document in footnotes and listed in Chapter 21 - References. • Risk and Vulnerability Analysis. Critical facilities and infrastructure were mapped in the GIS. Hazard zones were then overlaid on the critical facilities/infrastructure maps to high- light the assets at risk. A engineering -based risk analysis utilized HAZUS MH was performed to accurately determine the facility structural characteristics, calcalate the risk, and identify the measures needed to mitigate the risk. • Mitigation Strategies. The mitigation actions were derived from the hazard analysis and the risk and vulnerability analysis. Implementation of these actions required assignment of 2-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning priorities, and details regarding who, when, and how much 5. Plan Development. The data collection and analysis was synthesized in this Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan. Key stakeholder groups that have been involved or will be involved in the continuous hazard mitigation planning include: 1) frontline agencies involved in emergency and disaster response and recovery; 2) regulatory and funding agencies responsible for certain mitigation actions; 3) key businesses that are involved with sheltering, evacuation, or recovery; and 4) the general public. 6. Public Input. The County's recent update of the General Plan adopted by the County Council in February 2005 included a major revision to the policies relating to natural hazards. The previous policies addressed only flooding hazards. The revision broadened the policies to address multi -hazards. An initial draft of this hazard mitigation plan has been available for public review and comment on the State's hazard mitigation website since January 5, 2010. 7. Verification, Refinement, and Public Outreach. With thoughts gathered together and organized in this Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan, the County will continue to hold interagency meetings and public workshops. For more grassroots involvement, the County has established a community outreach network to serve two functions: 1) to prepare communities to respond to emergencies and 2) to serve as a two- way communication conduit between the community and County officials.' This communication network would function during non -emergency periods as well as emergency periods. The County's Department of Research and Development, together with a steering committee of key interagency representatives (e.g., police, fire, civil defense, public works, American Red Cross), will oversee the program. 2.2.1 Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee Meetings Attendees: State Dawn Johnson State Civil Defense Larry Kanda State Civil Defense Ann Ogata-Deal Hawaii CZM Program, Office of Planning Coun Hunter Bishop Frecia Basilio Cheryl Chan Frank Demarco Ben Ishii Brian Kajikawa Christian Kay Quince Mento Lisa Nahoopii Noelani Whittington Office of the Mayor Research & Development Data Systems DPW (NFIP Coordinator) DPW - Engineering DPW- Building Division Planning HCDA Data Systems — GIS DPW 2-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning Coordinating Agencies/Organizations Darcy Bevens Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes George Curtis University of Hawaii at Hilo Don Thomas Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes, UH Hilo Gerald Fryer Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Peter Nicholson UH Manoa College of Engineering Cheryl Anderson UH Social Science Research Institute Gen Tamura FEMA Pacific Area Office Consultants Gary Chock Martin & Chock, Inc. Roy Takemoto PBR Hawaii Guest Speakers Kwok Fai Cheung UH Manoa School of Ocean Engineering Science and Technology Neal Fujii Hawaii State Drought Council Jim Kauahikaua Scientist -in -Charge, HVO Ian Robertson University of Hawaii at Manoa College of Engineering 2.2.1.1 February 11, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Planning Process Evaluation to Review Goals and Objectives Agenda Items: • Discuss and evaluate planning process section and the monitoring and evaluation • Establish a new planning process, monitoring, update and evaluation process • Hazard and Risk Analysis Overview • Outreach Strategy Discussion Preparations or following meeting: • Review submitted strategy and outreach suggestions 2.2.1.2 March S, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Discuss Public Participation and Community Education Process Agenda Items: • Discuss Public Outreach Related to the Plan Update Process Discuss Public Outreach as Part of Plan Implementation. and evaluate planning process section AND the monitoring and evaluation section Establish a new planning process, monitoring, update and evaluation process to implement now • Identify who is going to document and implement the changes Preparation for following meeting: • Review hazard identification and descriptions • Bring forward additional ongoing hazard studies 2-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning 2.2.1.3 April 2, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Hazard Identification and Profiling Agenda Items: • Develop final survey from review of an initial hardcopy beta distribution • Status Reports on Hazard Risk Identification and Mitigation Projects • Review and improve existing hazard descriptions • Identify who is providing new information and what the next steps should be Preparation for following meeting • review vulnerability section in preparation for next meeting • locate and bring additional related studies to the next meeting 2.2.1.4 May 7, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Vulnerability Assessment /Development Trends Agenda Items: • Review beta test of the public survey website Status Reports on Hazard Risk Identification and Mitigation Projects. Continuation from the April meeting on various studies recently completed, underway, or planned that advance the state of knowledge from the 2005 P1an.Review and improve existing vulnerability assessment Preparation for following meeting • each invitee should identify areas that strengthen the Island's mitigation efforts: regulations, personnel, funds, etc. 2.2.1.5 June 8, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Capability Assessment Agenda Items: • Discuss ongoing distribution of the public survey • Discuss distributed synopsis of suggested mitigation actions • The mitigation goals and objectives of the current plan was used as a framework to identify and discuss capability gaps. • Identify what the current plan says for hazard identification and mitigation and what remains to be done • identify who is responsible for documenting them Preparation forefollowing meeting: • review the entire strategy section and develop draft list of mitigation projects by hazard area per the discussion as well as any newly identified projects/objectives 2.2.1.6 August 17 and 20, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Review Risk Assessment of County Critical Facilities Agenda Items: • Discuss the HAZUS MH risk assessment that evalauted the expected losses for each building within an inventory of 80 critical county facilities, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and site visits. Facilities that rank high based on the HAZUS analysis are to be designated for more detailed evaluation and development of recommended mitigation procedures. • Select two groups of buildings from the list with the highest economic and functional vulnerabilities for detailed engineering study and Benefit Cost Analysis of retrofits. 2-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning 2.2.1.7 August 31, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Overview of Recommended Mitigation Actions Agenda Items: • review results of public survey • Mitigation Goals and Objectives. Summarize the discussions from the past meetings in terms of revisions to the 2005 goals/objectives/projects, as well as the candidate prod ects • brief group on prioritization methodology • FEMA PDM Project Applications for 2010 Preparation for following meeting: • review the mitigation project listing and prepare comments for prioritizing 2.2.1.8 October 12, 2009 Meeting Purpose: All -Department Mitigation Strategy and Action Prioritization Agenda Items: • review and modify action list of projects • brief group on prioritization methodology • prioritize actions through closed polling • Document discussion Preparation for following meeting: • review the plan maintenance section and prepare comments/ideas for discussion 2.2.1.9 December 4, 2009 Meeting Purpose: All Department Draft Plan Status and Plan Maintenance Agenda Items: • Report on prioritized list of mitigation actions • Update on Hazard Mapping Development • Scope of new hazard mitigation projects • Strategy for plan maintenance Figure 2-2 Tsunami Hazard Guest Speaker Dr. Kwok Fai Cheung 2-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning 2.2.2 Public Involvement 2.2.2.1 Public Meetings A series of public meetings across the county were conducted by Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency (HCDA), and additional focused workshops on hazards were conducted by the Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes, University of Hawaii at Hilo (CSAV). At these meetings and workshops, a survey form was distributed to gather feedback. a. HCDA and CSAV- Sponsored Meetings 2009-2010 • Community Meeting — Laupahoehoe High School — March 10, 2009 • After Dark in the Park — Kilauea Visitor's Center — March 17, 2009 • After Dark in the Park — Kilauea Visitor's Center — March 24, 2009 • Mauna Loa 25th Anniversary Presentation — UH Hilo Campus - March 28, 2009 • Mauna Loa 25th Anniversary Presentation — St. Jude's Church, Oceanview - March 28, 2009 • Mauna Loa 25th Anniversary Presentation — Konawaena Elementary School Cafeteria — April 4, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Keaau High School — April 8, 2009 • Red Cross Advisory Board Meeting — Kailua — Kona — April 09, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Konawaena Elementary School Cafeteria April 7, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Kona Town Pavilion April 14, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Oceanview Center - April 21, 2009 • South Kona Flood Study Meeting — Outrigger Keauhou Beach Resort — April 22, 2009 • Hilo Flood Study Meeting — Kress Building Hilo — April 23, 2009 • Earth and Ocean Fair — Keauhou Beach Resort — April 25, 2009 • North Kona Flood Study Meeting — Outrigger Keauhou Beach Resort — April 29, 2009 Community Meeting with the Mayor — Waikoloa Community Center — May 19° 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Waimea Elementary — September 23, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Laupahoehoe School — Oct 5, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Imin Center — Oct 13, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Naalehu Comm Center — November 24, 2009 • Kau Rural Heath Meeting — Pahala — November 30, 2009 • Post & Pier Retrofit Workshop - University of Hawaii Hilo December 5, 2009 b. Public Symposia and Teacher Training Workshops on Natural Hazards (2010) CSAV will host a series of four public symposia and teacher training workshops that will address the major natural hazards occurring in Hawaii (Volcanic Eruptions, Earthquakes, Tsunami, and Hurricanes). The format of each workshop and symposium will consist of a morning set of presentations that will address various 2-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning aspects of the hazard: the "science of the hazard"; the impacts of the hazard on individuals; the impact of the hazard on the community and critical infrastructure; mitigation measures that individuals can take to reduce the threat of the hazards; mitigation and assistance measures that the government has taken or can take to reduce the threat to the community. The symposia will be free and open to the public. School teachers on the island will be offered an opportunity to attend the symposia and participate in follow-on workshops for professional training credit that will contribute to their advancement in their profession. Enrolled teachers will be required to attend the morning Public Symposium session and, after a noon break, will reconvene for the first of the follow-on workshop sessions. In this meeting, the experts who provided presentations to the morning session will participate in discussion sessions with the teachers to: answer more technical questions, provide guidance on available curricular materials relevant to the hazard, and assist teachers to develop ideas and concepts for incorporating hazards awareness in their lesson plans. Discussions with the domain experts will be followed by a group activity under the guidance of a master teacher in the refinement of lesson plans that contribute to their students' ability to meet current curricular standards for their grade level. These activities will conclude the first workshop. About two weeks later, the teachers will be required to attend a second workshop to provide feedback and discussion on the results of their use of the hazards -related lesson plan in the classroom. The second workshop will also incorporate a field trip and visit to a facility relevant to the hazard (e.g. a visit to the Kilauea summit and the Hawaiian Volcano Observatory) with a domain expert who will be able to discuss the scientific background of the field visit and the relevance of the facility to the hazard. The Public Symposia and Teacher Training program will be conducted in Hilo and Honolulu to target teachers on the Big Island and on Oahu; if resources permit, additional symposia will be conducted in Kona and a series of Symposia and Workshops will be offered on Maui. 2.2.2.2 The "Are We Ready? "presentation This presentation provides communities with the following information: • Description of various hazards on the Island ranging from earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, and the possibility of pandemic • Stories of the history of specific hazards on the Island (i.e. the Great Ka'u Earthquake) • Information on the Civil Defense warning system • Information on the four phases of a disaster response and recovery • Actions that people can take to better prepare themselves, their families, and communities for a disaster (i.e. developing and exercising a family evacuation plan, putting together an evacuation home survival kit, planning for risk and vulnerable groups) • Disaster preparedness trainings 2-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning • The Kamehameha School students are producing a DVD by doing the editing, voiceovers and providing the actors. The draft should be finished by late 2010 and the DVD will be furnished 2.2.2.3 HCDA Text Messaging The Hawaii Community Development Authority introduced text messaging on natural hazard warnings pushed to voluntary subscribing cell phones. Subscribers register at the Civil Defense website, where they may obtain other hazard information. 2.2.2.4 Hawaii Resident Hazard Survey A survey was developed for the residence of Hawaii County to assess their understanding of the potential natural hazards which they face, and to determine what their greatest concerns are and what they feel should be accomplished by county hazard mitigation planning. A copy of the survey is shown in Figure 2-1. 2-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency " 920 Ululani St., Hilo, HI 96720 7:45 AM - 4:30 PM, Monday - Friday Phone [808] 935-0031 FAX NUMBER (808) 935-6460 Hawaii Resident Survey on Disaster Preparedness The County of Hawaii has experienced many severe natural disasters throughout history Theis land is uniquely exposed to all the major natural hazards due to its active volcanoes, young geological age , vast land area and varied topography dominated byfive mountains, and exposure to severe weather events. Some of these rarely occur but can be catastrophic; others seemingly happen almost every year to every decade. The County has a multi -hazard mitigation plan that has two main objectives: lj to protect people and structures from harm and destruction; and 2) to reduce or mitigate the losses and disruption of disaster response and recovery. Hazard mitigation planning is the process that analyzes a community's riskfrom natural hazards and implements actions to reduce risks. Besides consulting the best available scientific and engineering studies, Hawaii Civil Defense would like to find out more about your community's understanding of natural hazards and what you recommend we consider in preparing for disasters. We are seeking your input on this two-sided form that should take only a few minutes to complete. It can help us improve our planning and preparedness strategy against natural disasters, and help us seek federal funding for mitigation actionswith priority. We really appreciate yourthoughts and input! Which of the following natural hazards have adversely affected/damaged your present home or property in the past? ❑ flooding ❑ high winds / storm damage ❑ rockfallJlandslide ❑ coastal erosion ❑ earthquake ❑ high waves/storm surge ❑ lava ❑ tsunami ❑ wildfire ❑ drought ❑ vog damage ❑ highway/bridge outage Has your health been affected by vag? ❑ Not significantly or a tolerable annoyance ❑ Yes, but I have not required medical attention ❑ Yes, and I have sought medical attention ❑ Yes; I might have to move to another area Select the natural hazards that you think may affect you and yourfamily or property most adversely in the future? ❑ flooding ❑ high winds / storm damage ❑ rockfallJlandslide ❑ coastal erosion ❑ earthquake ❑ high waves/storm surge ❑ lava ❑ tsunami ❑ wildfire ❑ drought ❑ vog damage ❑ highway/bridge outage Was the risk of any of these hazards a factor when you selected the location of your home or place of employment? ❑ flooding ❑ high winds / storm damage ❑ rockfallJlandslide ❑ coastal erosion ❑ earthquake ❑ high waves/storm surge ❑ lava ❑ tsunami ❑ wildfire ❑ drought ❑ vog damage ❑ highway/bridge outage If none of the above hazards were a factor in your home or employment decisions, why not? ❑ I did not have enough information at the time, ❑ I was generally aware of the hazards, but they were just not but I would have probably considered it if I knew significant enough compared to other more immediate factors From what sources do you get information on natural hazards and the amount of risk? Are there any hazards that need to have more public information available? Do you have suggestions for other ways that the State or County could make hazard information more available to you? We need information to better understand your concerns: How many years have you lived on the Big Isle? Where do you live? Area: Zip Code: Do you: Li own your home LJ rent your home Is your residence a single —family house LJ apartment I Ljcondominium/townhouse (please fill out the reverse side of this pagel when done, return the form to Civil Defense) Figure 2-1. Hawaii resident survey on disaster preparedness 2-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency Hawaii Resident Survey on Disaster Preparedness (Page 2) On an importance scale of H (high), M (medium), or L (low), which of these hazards are the most important for your personal planning/preparation? flooding high winds / storm damage rockfall/landslide coastal erosion 4=tsunami —earthquake high waves/storm surge lava wildfire drought vog damage I _ highway/bridge outage In other volcanic areas outside the IDSA, some lava diversion has been done to protect communities. What is your opinion on whether lava dive rslon should be attempted to protect homes and property on the Big Island? It should be tried whenever private property is It should be tried when there is a definite threat of lava threatened inundation to a large community It depends on whether it will work effectively and what LJ Do not try to interfere with nature; that is just not right else will be damaged by diverting the lava; it's case by case still doubt there's any way to divert lava, so it's probably a waste of time and effort; I need to knew more about it What do you plan on doing that could most help you prepare or protect your family and home from the next disaster? Check if any of the following describe whether or not you will be able to strengthen your home for the next disaster: ❑ It costs too much ❑ The odds of being impacted are too remote to justify the cost ❑ I can't find a contractor to do the work ❑ I'm too busy; I°II just prepare if there's any warning ❑ I don't really know what to do or how to do it ❑ There isn't any way to stop the hazard and damage Let us know if you would like the State or County to assist you in any of the following ways: ❑ A workshop to learn how you can strengthen your home against earthquakes and hurricanes ❑ Public briefings in my area on the hazards that are the most important for us to know ❑ Have contractors trained on how to strengthen homes and post of list of the contractors willing to do the work ❑ Prepare videos and guidebooks on how to install earthquake retrofits and make them available to the public ❑ We need something else, like: What types of projects do you believe the government should try to fund in order to reduce the damage and disruption of natural hazards on the Big Island? (Rate these by an importance scale of H (high), M (medium), or L (low): Retrofit and strengthen essential facilities such as hospitals Retrofit the infrastructure, such as the harbors, airports, and highways and bridges, to make them more reliable Work on improving the reliability of power and communications/warnings, and supply of essential goods Improve safety in the schools and public shelters Improve the way government facilities are built or located to resist tsunamis and storms Improve on publically available maps and zonation that identifies the risk of (and odds of having) these hazards Improve the standards used in the construction of new buildings and homes and prevent or lessen damage Allow grants, tax credits and/or insurance discounts for strengthening my home or place of business _Provide more public information on how to reduce damage and our losses, and what insurance is available Work on the highways and county roadways to reduce the amount of rockfalls and landslide blockage _Work on flood control construction Work on dam and stream safety Check one of the following three if you agree with one of these other options: ❑ The County should look at doing something else, like: It's hard to know without costs. Just make sure the work is well-planned and cost-effective. Keep us informed. ❑ Do nothing more. It isn't worth spending more money on; you can't stop the hazard or reduce damage. Figure 2-1, cont.. Hawaii resident survey on disaster preparedness The results of this survey indicated: Impact/concern. The top concern is earthquake. Vog and hurricane were relatively tied for second. The vog response illustrates how a new concern can arise, something that would not have appeared two years ago. Hurricane concern indicates the awareness of this hazard among Big Island residents even if the Big Island has not been hit. 2-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning • Choice of residence or employment. Lava hazard is the only significant hazard that residents consider in choice of residence or employment; however, from this response it is surmised that residents would generally choose price over risk. • Where they get information on hazards. Responders use the internet (e.g., USGS site) to get info, indicating a high degree of sophistication. • Hazards requiring more information. Responders want more information on vog, particularly the long-term effects. Although no information available on the long-term effects, this indicates that the plan should include a section on VOG. • Retrofit. Although cost is the major factor determining willingness to retrofit, the high response for more information indicates that a public education program could convince more people on the worthiness to spend the money. • How government can assist. Responders suggested educational workshops, guidebooks on strengthening home. Suggestions included considering webinars rather than attending meetings which tend to be poorly attended. • What County should be doing? Responders recognized that the County should be taking care of its own facilities, e.g., retrofit essential facilities and critical infrastructure; improve safety in schools and shelters; provide grants or tax credits for voluntary retrofits. A graphical sampling of the results is included below: Which of the following natural hazards have adversely affectedtdamaged your present home or property in the past?(Can enter multiple selections) earthquake high winds j storm damage vog damage flooding drought highway,`hridge outage wildfire high waves,`storm surge coastal erosion lava tsunami rockfallflandslide 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 2-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 57.4 % (147] 41.4%(106) 41.0%(105) 23.4 % (60] 17.6-%1(4, 14.1 % {36] i 3.2 % (2T] 5,5%(14) I 2.7 % t7] I 2.7%(7) I 2.0 % (5) 1.2%(3) 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 2-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning Has your health been affected by vog? (Only select one answer) 5-.6 _ Not significantly ora tolerable annoyance _ Yes, but I have not required medical attention td.6 % Yes and I have sought medical attention _ Yes; I might have to move to another area 2.7% Select the natural hazards that you think may affect you and your family or property most adversely in the future?(Can enter multiple selections) earthquake high winds storm damage vog damage flooding draught lava highwayJbridge outage wildfire tsunami high wavesfstorm surge rockfallilandslide coastal erasion 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan E 6 4 2 Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning On an importance scale of H (high), M (medium), or L (low), which of these hazards are the most important for your personal planninglpreparation? 2 ;r 2G 15 10 5 a 3' 3 3m m m m U m 0. m i O 0 m U W 9 a 3' 3 3m m m m U m 0. m - O 0 m U W �H M �L Was the risk of any of these hazards a factor when you selected the location of your home or place of employment?(Can enter multiple selections) 2-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2: Mitigation Planning If none of the above hazards were a factor in your home or employment decisions, why not? I did rvot have enough i nformation at the time, but I would trove pmba... was generally aware of the hazards, but they were I us[ not signirc... What types of projects do you believe the government should try to fund in order to reduce the damage and disruption of natural hazards on the Big Island? (Rate these by an importance scale of H (high), M (medium), or L (low): m n @!� 8 nS4 Ta ma0 ,msma mC— 3 pr3 oa -4.a 3 ff0 o`m44 am 31c 0 m a Q= �mm s 'a m, m m -:3 ,_,ap 0�0 mTm 0 ar3 4. Q:m a m'm' a �, a0 m �5 m �G 3 o -'aZ$ S¢ a03 a =am . m ?� CD 'm m a m 0 m a ry 2-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan MH MM ML Chapter" 2: Mitigation Planning Check if any of the following describe whether or not you will be able to strengthen your home for the next disaster: It costs tox I don't really kno to do or how There isn't any stopthe hazard and d The odds c impacted are too to justify tl II strengthening m I'm too hi just prr there's any v I can't find a cor to do tF 2-16 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan COUNTY OF HAWAII STATE OF HAWAII EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. CD -002 WHEREAS, the County of Hawai'i, in recognition of the fact that the natural island beauty of its volcanoes, beaches, forests and people come with certain issues and hazards, the County of Hawai'i is committed to disaster preparedness and to become a disaster resilient community; and WHEREAS, in pursuit of this commitment, the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency, Department of Planning, and Data Systems Department, have been and will continue to develop the County's Hazard Mitigation Plan in conjunction with the State Civil Defense on the State Hazard Mitigation Plan as required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (hereinafter "FEMA"); and WHEREAS, FEMA has required that a County Hazard Mitigation Plan be developed and adopted to qualify for federal disaster funding; and WHEREAS, it is anticipated that the process to develop the County's Hazard Mitigation Plan update completed in late 2010; and WHEREAS, pending adoption by the County Council, it is the purpose of this Executive Order to direct that the County of Hawai'i shall continue to pursue and develop a County Hazard Mitigation Plan. NOW THEREFORE, I, William P. Kenoi, by the authority vested in me as Mayor of the County of Hawai'i, pursuant to Hawai'i County Charter Section 4-1, in order to establish the County of Hawai'i as a disaster resilient community, hereby orders as follows: 1. That the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency shall be the lead agency, with the cooperation of the County of Hawaii Department of Planning, County of Hawai'i Department of Public Works and County of Hawaii Data Systems Department, to further develop and implement the County of Hawai'i Hazard Mitigation Plan. The Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency shall further ensure coordination of government and community input into the plan. 2. The County of Hawai'i Hazard Mitigation Plan shall include the following elements: • Identification of hazards • Risk and vulnerability analysis • Mitigation strategies • Planning processes and procedures • FEMA compliance ("crosswalk") checklist This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the County of Hawaii, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person. DATED: Hilo, Hawai'i, APR 0 5 2010 , 2010. APPROVED AS TO FORM AND LEGALITY: Depot orporation Counsel Couydv of Hawaii WILLIAM P. KENOI Mayor -2- CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 3. Land Use and Development Chapter 3: Land Use and Development CHAPTER 3 - LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT 3.1 Population Hawaii Island's resident population according to the 2008 census totaled approximately 175,784, supplemented with approximately 16,907 visitors for a de facto population of ap- proximately 192,691 persons. Among the four counties, Hawaii County's resident and de facto population is second to City & County of Honolulu. In terms of percent change from 1990, Hawaii County's resident and de facto population grew the most among the four counties. The change in the resident population represented the second highest net immigration among the four counties; the City & County of Honolulu had 68,803 residents who move in between 1990 and 2007, compared with 55,467 in Hawaii County. The age distribution in this County is comparable to the other counties, with minors (under 18 years) comprising approximately one-fourth of the resident population, the working age (18 to 64 years) comprising approximately 60%, and the elderly residents (65 years and older) comprising roughly 14%. Hawaii County's residents have the lowest per capita income among the four counties at $29,702 in 2007. A significant proportion of the residents over age 5 do not speak English "very well" (6%). More than 18% of the residents speak a second language at home. Table 3-1. Hawaii Countv DemoLyranhic Profile Characteristic Hawaii County State Rank Among Counties Resident populations 175,784 1,288,198 2 % change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 18.20/,o 6.3% 2 De facto population 192,691 1,388,605 3 % change, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 15.3% 3.8% 1 Resident population per sq mile, 20009 36.9 188.6 4 Residents <18 years old, %10 22.5 22.1 2 Residents 18 to 64 years old, % 63.7 63.1 3 Residents 65 years and older, % 13.8 14.8 2 Persons >5 years old who do not speak English "very well"11 10,840 143,505 Population per household, 1980/1990/ 200012 3.09/2.86/2.75 Net migration 13 55,467 179,969 1 Personal income per capita, 2007 29,702 39,242 4 8 Resident and de facto population from Hawaii County Data Book 2009, Table 1.4 9 Hawaii County Data Book 2009, Table 1.3 10 Age characteristics from Hawaii County Data Book 2009, Table 1.1la 11 Hawaii County Data Book 2009, Table 1.17 12 Hawaii County Data Book 2009, Table 1.18 13 Hawaii County Data Book 2009, Table 1.23 3-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3: Land Use and Development 3.2 Economy Sugarcane was the dominant industry of this island for more than 120 years. As late as 1969, plantations located in Hamakua, Kohala, and Ka'u Districts contributed more than 37% of the State's sugar production. The process of downsizing and closing plantations began in the 1970s and culminated in the abandonment of sugarcane production on the island in 1996. Throughout the years of sugar's decline, there has been growth in the island's tourism sector that is based largely in the Kona and South Kohala Districts. Diversified agriculture has experienced a generally upward trend as it strives to replace the abandoned sugarcane fields. In the County of Hawaii approximately 1,184,599 acres or 46% of the total land area is situated within the State Land Use Agricultural district. Included in the district are lands with a high capacity or potential for agricultural use as well as those with very low potential for productive agricultural activity. Approximately 27% of the total acreage of the County (686,000 acres) are presently being used for agriculture. The structure of commercial agriculture in Hawaii County is in a state of continuing transition. While commercial agriculture was once dominated by sugar and ranching, trends indicate that a larger number of small independent farmers producing a wide variety of diversified commodities will play an increasingly important role in the future. Diversified agriculture is dominated by macadamia nuts, papaya, flowers, tropical and temperate vegetables, and specialty coffee grown in the unique summer rainfall below on the middle slopes of the Kona District. Ranching cattle makes use of the extensive open areas. Employment statistics for the Island of Hawaii, according to the 2002 census, are given in Table 3-2. Table 3-2. Emnlovment statistics for Hawaii Island ner the 2002 census 2002 NAICS sector Number of establishments Sales, shipments, receipts, $1000 Annual payroll $1000 Number of employees Manufacturing 114 204,377 38,289 1,246 Wholesale trade 183 605,605 42,646 1,434 Retail trade 691 1,704,360 176,092 8,541 Information 65 N/A 25,646 712 Real estate & rental & leasing 239 278,016 55,840 1,766 Professional, scientific, & technical services 298 155,259 68,118 2,173 Administrative & support & waste management & remediation service 194 120,670 60,343 2,730 Educational services 29 6,178 1,913 120 Health care & social assistance 446 455,289 188,823 5,934 Arts, entertainment, & recreation 74 55,490 16,940 884 Accommodation & food services 350 747,901 210,356 10,595 Other services (except public administration) 266 103,296 28,745 1,387 3-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3: Land Use and Development 3.3 Land Use The passage of the Land Use Law in 1961 established the State Land Use Commission. It called for the classification of all lands in the State and authorized the adoption of rules of practice and procedures and regulations for land use within the various State land use districts. The four land use districts created by the State Land Use Commission provide the basic legal framework for land uses in the State of Hawaii. The Urban District is generally defined as lands in urban use with sufficient reserve to accommodate foreseeable growth. In the County of Hawaii this district is comprised of approximately 54,267 acres, or two per cent of the island's total land area. Rural Districts are defined as lands primarily comprised of small farms mixed with low density residential lots that have a minimum lot size of one-half acre under the State Land Use Law. Of the four districts, this is the smallest, with approximately 807 acres of the island's total land area. The Agricultural District includes lands with a high capacity for intensive cultivation as well as those with low capacity. The minimum lot size in this district under the State Land Use Law is one acre. The Agricultural District has the second greatest land area with approximately 1,184,599 acres or slightly over 46 per cent of the total land area of the island. Conservation Districts are primarily those lands in the existing forest and water reserve zones. This district has the largest land area with approximately 1,338,135 acres or 52 per cent of the total land area of the island. Land uses within the Urban Districts are administered exclusively by the counties. In the Ag- ricultural and Rural Districts, the State Land Use Commission establishes use regulations and the counties are responsible for their administration. The counties, however, may adopt more stringent controls than those imposed by the State within these two districts. Land use in the Conservation District is regulated by the State Board of Land and Natural Resources, except that the counties have concurrent permitting power within the Special Management Area near the coast. The counties have no land use control over Federal property, and the Hawaiian Homes Commission has the ultimate control over uses of the Hawaiian home lands leased to native Hawaiians. Within the County of Hawaii, the desirable future land use pattern is set forth by the General Plan Land Use Pattern Allocation Guide Map (LUPAG). The more detailed zoning must be consistent with the LUPAG. Lands designated Residential -Agriculture (RA) saw the largest percentage increase in acreage between the years 1989 and 2000 at 60 per cent, although the total acreage of RA zoned lands accounted for less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the total land area within the County. During the same period, Commercial zoned lands increased by 49 per cent, Multiple Family Residential zoned lands increased by 15 per cent and Industrial zoned lands increased by 14 per cent. Acreages of Open zoned lands fell by 0.6 per cent. Lands designated as Agricultural, excluding lands zoned Unplanned prior to the comprehen- sive revision to the Zoning Code in 1996, account for 77 per cent of all zoned lands within the County. 3-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Legend — Major Road Land Use Class - Breakwater J Conservation - Extensive Agriculture - High Density Urban - Important Ag, Lands Industrial - Low Density Urban - Medium Density Urban - Open Area - Orchards - Ponds Resort Node Resort - Rural Urban Expansion University Use 0 2.5 5 1 U 15 20 Miles T Chapter 3: Land Use and Development Figure 3-1. Land use for Hawaii County 3.3.1 General Plan Projections The following assumptions were the basis by which the County's General Plan was developed: • Agriculture Agricultural employment will increase significantly as former sugarcane lands are brought into production with import replacement, export and value added crops and products. Additional employment will be derived from expanding agrotourism enterprises. The expansion of the industry will be facilitated by the establishment of a new air cargo distribution center and post-harvest processing facilities that will allow for significant increases in the volume and types of products exported to the continental United States and foreign countries. Agricultural research and education will be enhanced. • Tourism The County will continue to pursue the development of a strong multi -market base for the visitor industry that includes direct oversea flights to Kona, growth of the cruise ship industry, strong resort -based employment centers and integrated product development for local products that can generate a healthy small business economic base. The County's visitor industry will continue to successfully grow and expand. Likewise, employment in the visitor industry and its related industries will continue to grow. 3-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3: Land Use and Development • Other Basic Industries There is tremendous potential for expansion in other industries such as aquaculture, astronomy, renewable energy, research and development, and special events such as cultural festivals and athletic events. Employment and population projections for the County of Hawaii were developed through the analysis of relationships between economic activity, employment, and population. The analytical approach used entails the forecasting of employment in basic industries and the relationship that changes in employment have upon population. Primary Income Generators are those industries that generate income from outside the County. They are assumed to be the foundation of the local economy and the key to the development of the island. Primary Income Generators include agriculture, tourism, the manufacturing of export products, and research and development. These Primary Income Generators, in turn, "drive" the secondary industries, or those enterprises that service the Primary Income Generators or the local popu- lation and include wholesaling, retailing and services. The Primary Income Generators de- termine the long -run pattern of population and income growth for the County. Population projections developed for the General Plan assume that the visitor industry will grow at an annual rate of 1% (Series A) to 3% (Series C), compared to a historical growth rate of 1.45% between the years 1977 and 1998. The resulting resident population projection for the year 2020 ranges from 213,000 to 237,000, compared to 148,700 residents according to the 2000 census, an increase of 43% to 59% over 20 years. 3.4 Analysis The planning committee concluded that development has largely been a continuation of an overarching trend over the past 10 years but, unlike Honolulu in the past 5 years, having no dramatic "boom" economy. No great shift in population centers or economic centers has occurred. However, agriculture in the post -plantation era has become increasingly specialized per the various micro -climates on the island. Thus, Hawaii County is mostly characterized by the vulnerabilities of rural and residential communities. Hawaii Island is uniquely at risk to several natural hazards. Compared to the other counties in this State, the relative risks are as follows: • High Winds / Tropical Cyclones. Higher risk relative to the other counties due to the easternmost location, but fortuitously low historic events; more complex wind speed- up patterns due to five dominant mountains; • Lava Flows. Unique risk relative to other counties, as the only county with active volcanoes; isolation of rural communities is a threat; • VOG. Volcanic gas emissions have had significant impact on Hawaii County's specialty floral agriculture; • Earthquakes. Higher risk relative to the other counties; past earthquake -induced landslides have also impacted agricultural water supplies; • Tsunamis. Lower risk compared to the other counties due to post mitigation after historic events. Concern for hazard awareness of tourist population addressed by 3-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3: Land Use and Development evacuation signage, Hawaii County is the only county in Hawaii that posts tsunami evacuation signage. Flooding. Comparable risk of flash flooding to other counties due to small drainage basins with steep -walled amphitheater -shaped valleys; high sheetflow flooding risk due to relatively youthful geological development of defined drainageways, especially in the leeward areas; comparable risk to other counties to storm waves. Reservoir Dam Failures pose heightened threats to the Waimea area. Coastal Erosion. Of lesser concern is sandy beach erosion due to the geologically youthful age of this island. Instead, sea cliff erosion is of greater concern to control building too closely to cliff edges. Droughts and Wildfires. Higher risk to droughts and wildfires relative to other counties due to more extensive rural settlements that rely on water catchments, dominant agricultural industry that relies on rainfall, and expansive open land area and strong winds that make wildfires difficult to fight. In this chapter, each of the above hazards will be profiled in terms of: • Description of the hazard; • Recurrence and severity; • Identification of hazard areas; • State of the art assessment such as capabilities to predict, adequacy of warning systems, accuracy of identifying vulnerable areas, data needs. 3.5 Critical Facilities Maps showing locations of all critical facilities throughout Hawaii Count are included in Figure 3-2 through Figure 3-6. 3-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3: Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County i^.•� / I HSN/ AAq .'j�'y/-yT{K]�`L A.NAIMKU f IAFAE- N1. MM MEA II.I, c i F �I�II -LA Pr1LICE S"TATK)N AIMEAFRE STAd!(N1 NkNAII GONM{JWTM HOSE 5iy>>>0HNOHAL GNIS - - WAIKOLOAEMS VAYm FIE KEALAiLUA I:I C6 K T'AKA "ON(—RA STATION APPARATUS ENILCING IPAHALA ( �HauAaoA Emergency Center KEAVHOLWMIM FIRE STATION • a STATION VEHCLE SFE(] * Police Station IN"ONCENTE CAPTAIN--' I�AUFIOUBIS %K CONIWNITVHG5PITALJ KONP.N+AEI Public School CENTER FIRES ?NONAUNAU r} k }/ F✓�GKENA Major Road Map(3) a 0 5 10 20 Miles N Map (4) W E S VPFHOEHOE VOLUNTEER FIRE STATION EIHOE POnCE STATION (NORTH HILO FOLICE STI'I Map 11) E INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT KAHA EMS W0.1 EA i(EAP.U: ETAS KEAAV POLYCE STATION VEHCLE 9 ER KEMU FIRE STATION VE11CLE ,'. MGVNfAIN VIS EERFIRFSTATKINAN i+•ON WATER KI PAHOAB. EMS' F AHIGNB I P APDUCE A Map (2) FIRE STAnG "ON(—RA STATION APPARATUS ENILCING IPAHALA ( FIRE STATION Emergency Center ATION • Fire Station STATION VEHCLE SFE(] * Police Station Care Facility j Public School Airport r} EMS Major Road Street Figure 3-2. Critical facilities map of Hawaii Island 3-7 Halraii Cotttaty-llttlti-Hazard llitigatioti Placa Chapter 3: Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County (1) OESI L=A KAUMANA FIRE STATION • Emergency Center • Fire Station :.% I EA FIRE STATION HELICOFEft Police Station © Care Facility T Airport + EMS Public School Major Road Street CENTRAL EMS R. CENTRAL FlRE STATIPN WPREHOVSE I CENTRAL FIRE STATION CENTRAL HIRE STATION DISPATCH OFFICE r � / KAROLANI JI PCISNC SAFETY R ILDING A JI PUNLIC SAFETY BUILDING R XFB45E EMERGENCY OPERATION5 CENTER HAWAII COW COLLEGE UHH AT HILO WAIAKEAHIGH WAMKEA INTER W -EA ELEM 2 Miles KAWAILANI FIRE STATION APPARATUS SHED KAWAILANI FIRE STATION q, 4KAWAILANI EMS WAIWEAWAENA Figure 3-3. Critical facilities map, Hilo area zoom 3-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan I EAUXAHA :.% I EA FIRE STATION HELICOFEft HANG 'rYAIAKEA FLARE STATION f44 HAWAII COW COLLEGE UHH AT HILO WAIAKEAHIGH WAMKEA INTER W -EA ELEM 2 Miles KAWAILANI FIRE STATION APPARATUS SHED KAWAILANI FIRE STATION q, 4KAWAILANI EMS WAIWEAWAENA Figure 3-3. Critical facilities map, Hilo area zoom 3-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3: Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County (2) Q Care Facility Airport • Emergency Center ♦ EMS �! ! Fire Station _ Public School ;;II �I# i Police Station Major Road Street MI N •, "U FIRE STATION AND POLICE STATION 1 I� I KEAAU FIRE STATION AND POLICE STATION '�V E NEAAU POLICE STATbON VEHICLE SHED KEAAU FIRE STATION VEHICLE SHED KEAAU �.KEAAU HIGH KIP— YNTER S KEAAU EMS 1 HAWAIIAN PARADISE PARK FIRE STATION HAWAIIAN PARADISE PARK FIRE STATION VEHICLE SHED HAWAIIAN ACRES VOLUNTEER FIRE STATION AND 24,000 GALLON WATER TANK MOUNTAIN VIEW KEONEPOKO PAHOA POLICE STATION PAHOA FIRE STATION PAHOA EMS PANDA HIGH .PAHOA ELEM 0 1,25 2.5 5 Miles Figure 3-4. Critical facilities map, Puna area zoom 3-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3: Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County (3) KONA INTERNATIONAL AIRMPT �! 0 1.25 2.5 5 Miles ��•LICE STATION GEfJER ATORBUILUING(KEA.LAKEHEPOLICE STATION) - A' •„!r•',+ ��. I =_LICE STATION (KEALAKEXE POLICE STPTlON) - - KEALAKEHEINTERKEAC4KEHE6.EM KEALAKEHE HIGH - r�- ��t.. , 3 KAILUAEMS.J,:I S KAILUA.KONANRE STATIONrr. -ILVA-K ONAEIRESTAMNEUAT$XED J . © Care Facility HowaLOA .,f KPHAKAI • Emergency Center • Fire Station * Police Station Airport ' EMS •KEAUHO U-KONA RRE 5T TION Public School BUILDING I AND 21KONACOMMUMTY HOSPITAL) - INFUSION CENTER (KONA COMMUNrtY HOSPITAL) PSYCHIATRIC FACILITY (KONACOMMUNITY HOSPITAL) Major Road RADIATION ONCOLOGY(KONACOMMUNITY HOSPITAL) " SPECIAL SERVICESBWLL,rw (KONACOMMUNITY HOSPITAL) Street I7Wj KONAWrAMIU.KONAWAENAHIGH - r KONAWAENA ELEM. KONAWAENAELIFFA. 'rla. FIRER POLICE STATION KONA'CIVIENTER FI RESTATION - NONACI4ICCCCENTER PRE STATION VEHICLE STORAGE SHED : 4,4= 1 COOK EMS ?, l HONAUNAU f H2OKErIP Figure 3-5. Critical facilities map, Kona area zoom 3-10 Hatraii Contaty-llttlti-Hazard llitigatiori Plan C� Chapter 3: Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County (4) M Care Facility r • Emergency Center is t N • Fire Station t� * Police Station W E T Airport � EMS , S i Public School �I Major (toad Street ir NORTH KOHAA FIRE STATION op NORTH KOHALA FIRE STAITONAPPARATUS POLICING KOHALA POLICE u'"rATIOH JKAPAAV POLICE STATION) KOHH1 KO ., 1 .'x. porrnw,AMIC�.��10ic�A� HA�LEHOOLAHAMAKUA-H%IAKCApOLICE HAMAKUA HEALTH CENTER Hf"r, AA FIRES R5 �, r 11 AUILO STATION CESTATIVNjKAMVELAFVL(CESTATIONI IMEA ELEMIINTER. NORTH HAWAII COMMUNITY H05FITAL 50UTH KOHALAFMS I -# WAIKOLOA . KOHALA'q$T FIRE$TATICN r - ,MAUNALAN) FIRE STATION) AND POLICE 57, A7[ON +wnrrcaLOA s J D 2.5 5:1- 10 Miles d i Figure 3-6. Critical facilities map, Kohala area zoom 3.6 University of Hawaii The University of Hawaii System consists of ten University and Community College campuses. Two of these campuses are located in Hawaii County, UH Hilo and Hawaii Community College. Maps of these campuses are shown in Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8. 3-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan aFi�tou 4LlTFN�Mee TEWAi CelalTe 0 �W?01 UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII HILL) Main Campus 200 W. Kawdi Street Hilo, 11196720-4091 Chapter 3: Land Use and Development I TO Pl Al—STREET I ° wnw�GTuu€ �rwu 1 H��ue tFS 4 I°T-R) 10. �OM �eruxrp� tRASL(`rti l4 � ,Fly P r Earn ` ■ GTu �d Figure 3-7. UH Hilo Campus map This arN nal la acah 3-12 Hawaii County Mult-Hazard Mit gat on Plan wn BUILDING ACRONYMS ADM Adminislradar Bldg.f Cnan 11bi'S Office ASB Auxiliary S --S Bldg. BO Business office CAB Collegeof Agriculture. Foreslry & Nature) Reso-e Management Bldg. (CAFNAM) CC Cam Ws Center CH College Hall K KanalWole Hall LIB Library LSLife Sciences M , Marione Campus MSB Marine Science Bldg. PB Zau. SSB Student Services Bldg. TA Theave UCB University Class—Bldg. WWeRN—lb Hall 324ANlei 5 345 B -ii—. Ed—N.. Bldg. Chapter 3: Land Use and Development I TO Pl Al—STREET I ° wnw�GTuu€ �rwu 1 H��ue tFS 4 I°T-R) 10. �OM �eruxrp� tRASL(`rti l4 � ,Fly P r Earn ` ■ GTu �d Figure 3-7. UH Hilo Campus map This arN nal la acah 3-12 Hawaii County Mult-Hazard Mit gat on Plan wn Chapter 3: Land Use and Development Figure 3-8. UH Hilo/Hawaii CC Manono Campus map 3-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 4. High Wind Storms Chapter 4: Hazard Analysis High Wind Storms CHAPTER 4 - HIGH WIND STORMS 4.1 Description of Hazard Wind is one of the most costly property perils, causing more damage nationwide than earthquakes, freezing, or other natural perils. (IIPLR, 1994) In wind storms and especially hurricanes, windborne debris can be a major factor in causing damage. Flying objects such as tree limbs, outdoor furniture, signs, roofs, gravel, and loose building components from progressively failing adjacent buildings can impact the building envelope, creating openings that allow internal pressure to build within. The internal pressures add to the external pressures producing more severe pressures on the building components of the structure. (IIPLR, 1994) The roof then is subjected to tremendous internal pressure building from inside, together with the negative wind pressures lifting the roof from outside. The resulting combined forces may cause roof system failure if the roof has not been adequately designed and constructed. If the roof is breached, high winds and rain destroy the inside of the building. Winds in Hawaii originate from three main sources: trade winds, Kona winds, and hurricanes or tropical storms. Northeast trade winds are dominant throughout most of the year and generally range in velocity between 10 and 20 mph. However, trade winds of 40-60 mph occasionally occur for several days at a time when the sub -tropical high- pressure cell located in the central North Pacific Ocean intensifies. During the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 winter seasons, for example, strong and gusty trade winds of 40 to 50 mph lasted several days and inflicted damage to roof tops, tree limbs, and telephone equipment. The east -facing coastlines, as a result, are the windward coasts and most impacted by trade wind energy. Kona winds are southerly winds and occur as light and variable winds during summer months when trade wind circulation breaks down, but in winter they can be very strong when storm systems moving across the central North Pacific draw air from the south toward their low pressure troughs. Damaging Kona winds from storms generally occur during the winter and spring seasons and have reached velocities of 50 mph for several days on end. 4.1.1 Utilities Power distribution lines are susceptible to strong winds due to the relatively low design standards for older portions of the grid which may also have preexisting damage in the wood poles due to decay and termite attack. One of the most common impacts of a wind storm is the loss of electrical service to some communities. [A comprehensive discussion of the historic design criteria for electrical transmission and distribution systems in Hawaii County, and recent updates, is provided in Chapter 5.] 4.1.2 Trade Winds Trade winds are by far the most common winds over Hawaiian waters and play a major role in defining the climatology of the region. (Kodama 1998) These persistent winds, which blow from a NE to ENE direction, became known as trade winds long ago when clipper ships 4-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4: Hazard Analysis High Wind Storms carrying cargo depended on the broad belt of Easterly winds encircling the globe in the subtropics for fast passage. High winds from trade winds, which blow 70% of the time (Kodama 1998), Kona winds (30% of the time), and rare winds from hurricanes and tropical storms passing through Hawaiian waters all affect the island of Hawaii. (Fletcher 2000) Tradewinds predominate from the northeast and generally range from 10 — 25 miles per hour, although occasional extreme events reach 40 - 50 miles per hour. North Pacific High pressure systems are responsible for the majority of the gusty trade wind episodes over Hawaiian waters, which commonly persist for several days before tapering off. Strong, gusty trade winds can cause problems for mariners. These strong trades blowing from the NE through East funnel through the major channels between the islands --Kauai, Kaiwi, Pailolo, Kalohi, and Alenuihaha Channels --at speeds 5-20 knots faster than the speeds over the open ocean. Mariners and beachgoers must exercise good judgment prior to entering the waters exposed to strong trades, especially in the major channels. 2:00 a.m. HST • r • %hala _ • sip Mauna Kea Huala • p!c �' auna Loa I 2:00 p.m. HST -4— -nd flow • ---a 0.5 MIS • • • i Qmis • Kohala \ �• 5,0 Mh- — t 11 • • •• Mauna Kea • • • • • • Mualal • • C Mauna Loa • • 1 • Kilaug, f • Kilauea Example • c'- • • 6.0 rrrururs/surund r _ The winds during the day on i 1,i+ u , Island vary in a consistent fashion. These examples show mean wind flows at 2:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M., based upon a 42 -day sample from 50 portable automated weather stations. The results comply with meteorological predictions for the behavior of air above a heated island in a trade wind flow. Figure 4-1. Typical diurnal wind patterns on Hawaii Island 4-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4: Hazard Analysis High Wind Storms NWw+1Q1Y41= w.oalKµL Sv.u9 q9p, XI �.ww 11e¢p99 119.+1 • 9.MN � �M• yv'�w+wY1.W •K. Figure 4-2. Monthly wind roses for Hilo International Airport (shown for each quarter) 4-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4: Hazard Analysis High Wind Storms 4.1.3 Kona Storms Kona winds occur as light and variable winds from the SW or SSW, most often during winter months when trade wind circulation diminishes, and as strong generally southerly winds when storm systems move across Hawaiian waters. Stormy Kona winds are most likely to occur when a low pressure center is located within 500 miles NW of the islands and has an unusually low central pressure, below 1000 millibars for the subtropics. Damaging Kona winds have reached velocities of 50 miles per hour for several days on end. The western or leeward sides of the islands, then, become windward in this case, as the predominant wind pattern is reversed. Kona storms generally form in the region bounded by 15° - 35° N and 175° E — 140° W and move erratically, though with a slow tendency toward the west. (Kodama 1998) These storms are persistent and can last up to two weeks. On land, effects of strong Kona winds can be very dramatic. It is not uncommon for trees to be uprooted, branches downed, and scores of roofs damaged. When reinforced by mountainous topography, downslope winds can increase and can be very destructive to land in low lying areas. During this time, considerable damage can be inflicted to boats caught in the open ocean or boats anchored in SW exposed anchorages. Coastal erosion can also result from the extended periods of heavy rain, strong surf and high winds. 4.1.4 Tropical cyclones: In the Central Pacific Ocean tropical cyclones are classified according to their strength as follows: • Hurricane: An intense tropical weather system with a well defined circulation and maximum sustained winds of 74 mph (64 knots) or higher. • Tropical Storm: An organized system of strong thunderstorms with a defined circulation and maximum sustained winds of 39 to 73 mph (34-63 knots). • Tropical Depression: An organized system of clouds and thunderstorms with defined circulation and maximum sustained winds of 38 mph (33 knots) or less. Historically, most tropical cyclones have passed the Hawaiian Islands to the south. Because they spin counter -clockwise in the Northern Hemisphere, east -facing coastlines in Hawaii receive the brunt of strong onshore winds as storms approach the islands, while the south and west coastlines feel onshore winds as the storms pass to the west. The highest wind speeds, however, may occur on the side opposite the storm approach, as downdrafts accelerate downslope as they descend over the mountainous terrain. Even so, coastlines facing the passing storms usually are adversely impacted by both wind and storm surge damage. History has shown that the islands do not have to take a direct landfall from a cyclone to sustain a high level of damage. Wind strength, storm radius of maximum winds, timing, and proximity, are important factors that control storm impact. 4.2 Significant Historical Events By far the most notable documented high wind event from a winter storm to affect Hawaii County was that of January 1980, which caused damages of $42 million. (Disaster 4-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4: Hazard Analysis High Wind Storms Declaration DR -613 -HI) The loss on Hawaii Island was $11.7 million. Agriculture — macadamia, coffee, foliage and flower farms — had major losses. Maui was also declared a disaster area (Haraguchi, 1980).14 Other winter storms have caused much less, but more localized effects, with flooding the main problem. The flood insurance maps are intended to reflect the stream flooding from these events as well as coastal effects. 4.3 Probability of Occurrence According to the National Weather Service (NWS) (Heffner, 2002), the monthly counts of high wind events impacting the populated lower slopes and elevations of Hawai'i County over a ten year period indicate the months of "winter" storms to be the most active. A high wind event by NWS definition includes sustained winds or frequent gusts of 40 mph or greater. For Hawaii County, 28 events were identified during the period January 1992 through Octo- ber 2002. The typical breakdown of events by month is: 0 w 6 LU W w 5 L °1 4 0 0 3 L w E 2 Z 1 0 High Wind Events in Hawaii County: Jan. 1992 - Oct. 2002 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Month Figure 4-3. High Wind Events for Hawaii County by Month, January 1992 to October 2002 Thus, the average is a little over 0.2 such events per month, but for the "season" of occurrences (December through April), it averages 0.4 per month, island -wide. 4.4 Risk Assessment The distinction between the tropical cyclone hazard and high wind hazard is illustrated by the hazard curves for the Hawaiian Islands shown in Figure 4-4. The figure shows that the relatively low wind speeds that occur more frequently are more likely to be from non -tropical cyclonic winds while the relatively high but less frequent wind speeds are more likely to be 14 Haraguchi, Paul, 1980, "Storm of January 8 - 10, 1980, State of Hawai i," DLNR, December 1980. 4-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4: Hazard Analysis High Wind Storms caused by tropical cyclones. The transition is for peak gusts around 68 mph and an average return period of around 30 years, therefore just below hurricane strength. 160 140 120 a 100 E 80 0 Y f0 _ a 60 40 20 0 Cyclone Events Non -Tropical 10 100 1000 Return Period, Years Figure 4-4. Wind hazard curves for the Hawaiian Islands for Tropical Cyclone and Non -Tropical Winds There is no objective model that is used solely for the purpose of evaluating economic losses due to high wind events without regard to tropical cyclone occurrences. The future risk of such events is projected to be roughly equivalent to the historic losses of past events. 4.5 Mitigation Strategies 4.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts Hawaii design wind pressures have changed over the years in the building code. The Uniform Building Code (UBC) design windspeed was based on an analysis of Honolulu weather station data by H.C.S. Thom in 1968 without consideration of hurricane history. The UBC wind loadings have historically lagged the ASCE 7 standard with respect to hurricane hazard because almost all the UBC constituent states were not in hurricane regions (except for Hawaii, which was only recently recognized after Hurricane Iwa and Iniki). Table 4-1. Design Wind Pressures ner iJRC/IRC Code Years Building Code Years Design Wind Pressure at IOM height* IBC 2003 26 psf UBC 1991 to 1997 30 psf UBC 1982 to 1988 26.5 psf UBC 1958 to 1979 15 psf 4-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4: Hazard Analysis High Wind Storms *Based on component and cladding wall pressures, for an enclosed building, near the coastline, not near a corner of the building. The critical benchmark year identifying structures previously designed to an inadequate wind pressure would be 1985, the date of Hawaii's adoption of the 1982 UBC edition. 4.5.2 Future Plans Future mitigation plans for high wind storms will be discussed in the proceeding chapter on Hurricanes, as Hurricanes pose a much greater threat to loss of property, infrastructure, and life. 4-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 1 5. Tropical Cyclones Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones CHAPTER 5 - TROPICAL CYCLONES 5.1 Description of Hazard Tropical cyclones are storms that originate over a warm tropical ocean. When such a storm develops sustained winds (one minute average) over 74 miles per hour, it is classified as a hurricane. 15 They are characterized by a large counterclockwise circulation of air and lower barometric pressure near the center. These actions produce the major hazards of hurricanes: high winds, high waves, storm surge, and heavy rain. These hazards cause flooding, salinization of water supplies, agricultural crop losses, erosion, loss of life, and damage to structures and infrastructure. The winds can affect all parts of an island and can be intensified by mountain ranges (orographic or topographic amplification). A good example was Hurricane Iwa in 1982; it was barely a Category I hurricane but winds in the Wahiawa area of Oahu equaled those in areas on Kaua i, which was closest to the path of the storm. Meteorologists consider the notion that Mauna Loa and Mauna Kea "protect" Hawaii Island from hurricanes to be unfounded. Waves and storm surges normally hit coasts ahead of high winds, as waves move faster than a hurricane advances. Locally intense rainfall may occur as the hurricane makes landfall. 16 Thus hurricanes, though rare in Hawaii, are complex hazards. 5.1.1 Coastal Wave/Surge Storm surge is the rise of water above sea level at the time of storm onset. The height of storm surge along the open coast depends on a number of factors, which include: (1) wind speed and associated barometric pressure, (2) depth of water or shoaling factor, (3) storm trajectory, and (4) speed of the storm. Coastal configuration in the form of estuaries or bays can cause a funneling or amplification effect. Coincidence with high tide will also increase surge height. Although the maximum surge usually affects only a relatively short length of coastline, combined storm surge and wave action may have damaging effects over the entire coastline facing a major storm center. Wind -driven waves on top of the storm surge pose a number of added problems. In Hawaii the wave run-up typically floods areas not reached by the surge itself. The scouring power of waves is considerable. The storm surge is the most dangerous part of a hurricane as pounding waves create very hazardous flood currents. About 90% of the deaths experienced in the past near the coast resulting from hurricanes are caused not by wind, but by storm surge. Stream flooding is also much worse inland during the storm surge because of backwater effects. 15 In the western Pacific, hurricanes are called "typhoons"; similar storms in the Indian Ocean are called "cy- clones". An organized system of clouds and thunderstorms with a defined circulation and maximum sus- tained winds of 38 mph or less is called a "tropical depression". An organized system of strong thunderstorms with a defined circulation and maximum sustained winds of 39 to 73 mph is called a "tropical storm". 16 Schroeder, Tom, 1993,"Hawai'i Hurricanes: Their History, Causes, and Future," Office of State Planning, December 1993. 5-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones The duration of storm surge is usually relatively short, being dependent upon the elevation of the tide, which rises and falls twice daily in most coastal places and the speed of a storm's onset. In Hawaii, the high velocities of hurricane winds often produce wave heights higher than the maximum level of the prevailing high tide or of the surge itself. In studying the aftermath of Hurricane Iniki it was discovered by researchers at the Army Corps of Engineers and the University of Hawaii (Fletcher and others, 1994) that the greatest threat related to hurricane overwash in the Hawaiian Islands is due to water -level rise from wave forces rather than wind forces. This differs from the mainland where the wind in a hurricane is known to drive water against the coast and cause flooding, called wind set-up. During Iniki, the strongest component of the overwash was the result of large waves, called wave set-up. Wind set-up appeared to be relatively less important. Other factors leading to coastal overwash are the low atmospheric pressure, the tide stage, coastal topography, and the location relative to the eye of the hurricane. Overwash mitigation must be enacted prior to the event. This would include adequate building setbacks so that development does not occur in high hazard areas of the coastal zone, elevation of existing structures to recommended levels, break -way ground floor walls that permit overwash flooding without compromising an entire structure, and other coastal construction techniques designed to reduce flood damage. FEMA has incorporated hurricane inundation from model scenarios into a flood insurance study for all islands including Hawaii, as discussed in the section below. 5.1.1.1 Hurricane Flood Insurance Study for the Hawaiian Islands The Hurricane Flood Insurance Study for the Hawaiian Islands was conducted under FEMA contract number EMW-2003-CO-0046, RMTC/URS Task Order 013. Under this contract, RMTC/URS, a joint venture consisting of R.M. Towill, URS, Dewberry, TerraPoint, Airborne 1, and Sea Engineering, was tasked to evaluate and map the magnitude and extent of coastal hazards due to hurricanes for six Hawaiian Islands, divided into four counties: Kauai (Kauai County), Oahu (City and County of Honolulu), Molokai, Maui, Lanai (Maui County), and Hawaii (Hawaii County). Although the effective (i.e., past) FIRMs for each county have accounted for tsunami hazards, the hurricane flood hazard had not been previously separately evaluated in a comprehensive study throughout the islands. In general, the hurricane coastal hazard analysis was limited to the southern coast of each island. This is due to several factors, including the predominance of tsunami hazards and limited low-lying areas susceptible to hurricane hazards along the north shore of the islands. Table 5-1 provides a summary of study limits. 5-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Tnhle 5-l. Sommnry of Stndv 1 imitc Island Western Limit Eastern Limit Reach Length (Miles) Hawaii Upolu Point Cape Kumukahi 193 Kauai Nohili Point Kuaehu Point 56 Lanai Kaumalapau Manele 16 Maui Honokahua Bay Koali 69 Molokai Ilio Point Cape Halaawa 54 Oahu Kaena Point Kawaihoa Point 60 Total: 448 dahu Molokai LanaiMaui '� Figure 5-1. Extents of Hurricane storm surge inundation study Transects were laid -out within the study limits and representative placement was evaluated during the field reconnaissance performed from July 24th through August 6th, 2007. The topographic base consisted of LiDAR collected under FEMA Task Orders 12 and 26. The LiDAR data were collected in the Fall of 2006, post -processed to bare earth and quality controlled to meet FEMA mapping standards. These data were assimilated together with the best available bathymetric datasets, including USACE hydrographic LiDAR, into high- resolution seamless digital elevation models. The hazard analysis considered the combination of storm surge and hurricane -induced wave hazards. This included independent analysis and/or modeling of storm surge, return frequency flood elevations, wave setup, overland wave hazards, and wave runup. The ADvanced CIRCulation model for coastal ocean hydrodynamics (ADCIRC) was selected to develop the stillwater elevations or storm surge for the study area. The Empirical Simulation 5-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Technique (EST), also developed by the USACE, was used to determine the stillwater frequency curves for the 10-, 2-, 1-, and 0.2 -percent annual chance stillwater elevations. Deepwater wave conditions were determined using the Shore Protection Manual (SPM) prediction technique and limited fetch analyses were performed in harbor and sheltered areas. Wave setup was differentiated and evaluated for areas with and without fronting reefs. Areas of primary frontal dune were identified, delineated, and eroded. Overland wave propagation hazards were evaluated using the WHAFIS model. Wave obstructions were verified at representative transect locations by field reconnaissance. Wave run-up was evaluated using the RUNUP 2.0 and TAW methodologies, depending of the presence of reefs and local steepness of the bathymetry. Wave hazard analyses were conducted at FIS transect locations, in addition to more tightly - spaced "mapping transects." These additional transects were facilitated by the application of an integrated GIS toolset that automates repetitive modeling tasks, and enables a more detailed analysis than typical coastal FIS studies. Wave setup values were assigned to these transects according to analysis at adjacent FIS transects. Otherwise, the mapping transects were treated with the same overland wave propagation and wave runup assessments as the FIS transects. The coastal hazards determined from the above analyses were synthesized in the form of the standard FEMA special flood hazard boundaries for the Zone VE, Zone AE, Zone AO, and Zone X hazard areas. These are presented in the TSDN as workmaps produced at a scale of 1':500". The workmaps also include stillwater stations, topographic elevation contours, FIS and mapping transect locations, and the shoreline. Wave analysis for the 0.2% annual chance event was not included in the scope of the study. The 0.2% return frequency stillwater elevation was exceeded by cumulative flood elevation from the 1% stillwater elevation and wave setup, therefore, the boundary of the 0.2% annual chance event was not delineated. In steeper areas where mapping scale limits the gutter placement, the SFHAs are only identified by the position of the 100 -yr flood boundary. Mapped Base Flood Elevations (BFEs) are considerably dependent to the topographic representation at each transect. As a result, localized variations in the topography at other locations may not be fully reflected in the mapped SFHAs and BFEs. A Technical Support Data Notebook (TSDN) was compiled for each county in the study area. Storm surge and return frequency elevation analyses were inclusive of all counties, and thus all materials pertaining to those analyses, including model input, output, and documentation are included in each county TSDN. The remainder of the data, including wave modeling, mapping, workmaps, topography, etc., are island and county specific. Therefore, these data are only presented in the appropriate countywide TSDN. Limitations of the study and need for evaluation prior to FIRM adoption: • There will need to be post-DFIRM modifications to the Flood Maps if tsunami inundation is to be any factor in zoning and construction requirements. 5-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones • Phase L The first step is to compare the differences between the existing and new FIRM maps to determine where historic or the recently modeled tsunami hazard is greater. • Phase IL UHM SOEST mapping (by Kwok Fai Cheung) can produce 100 -year and 500 -year probabilisitic tsunami hazard maps to provide future local modifications to the DFM Ms. 5.1.2 High Winds The hazard from hurricane winds is far more extensive than the water hazard. Both ex- perience and analyses indicate that certain locations will experience stronger winds. Hurricane winds, blowing from variable directions, will experience analogous variations. This orographic (or topographic) amplification is the reason a minimal hurricane such as Iwa can have significant wind effects. The NWS hurricane reports assume landfall at a flat Atlantic or Gulf coast state, and no amplification. Since wind forces increase proportionally to the wind speed squared, any amplification of the basic wind speed may significantly increase its effects. 5-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Table 5-2. Saffir Simpson Scale and damage potential 5.2 Significant Historical Events Little was recorded of hurricanes striking Hawaii before the last half of the 20th century. Since 1950, when adequate records began, eight hurricanes have affected the Hawaiian 5-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Central Pressure HurricaneMm Sustained Fastest Peak Gust Approximate Category g of Sea level Winds Mile Speed (overland) Storm Surge Damage potential (with tropical Pacific amendments) mercury at 0 Pressure mph h mph P i ft. ht He g ( ) degrees C (32 (inches) degrees F) Tropical < 40 mph < 2 ft Virtually None. Some small dead limbs, ripe coconuts, and dead Depression < 1008 < 29.77 (< 64 km/hr) (< 0.61m) palm fronds blown from trees. Some fragile and tender green leaves blown from trees such as papaya and fleshy broad leaf plants. 40-73 mph Some. Minor damage to buildings of light material. Moderate Tropical 979-1007 28.91-29.74 (64- 2-3 ft damage to banana trees, papaya trees, and most fleshy crops. Large Storm 117km/hr) (0.61-0.91m) dead limbs, ripe coconuts, many dead palm fronds, some green leaves, and small branches blown from trees. Significant. Corrugated metal and plywood stripped from poorly constructed or termite -infested structures and may become airborne. Some damage to wood roofs. Major damage to banana trees, papaya 74-95 mph 4-5 ft trees, and fleshy crops. Some palm fronds tom from the crowns of 1 980-992 28.94-29.30 (118-153 67-88 82-108(1.22-1.52m) most types of palm trees, many ripe coconuts blown from coconut km/hr) palms. Some damage to poorly constructed signs. Wooden power poles tilt, some rotten power poles break, termite -weakened poles begin to snap. Low-lying coastal roads inundated, minor pier damage, some small craft in exposed anchorage torn from moorings. Moderate. Considerable damage to structures made of light materials. Moderate damage to houses. Exposed banana trees and papaya trees totally destroyed, 10%-20% defoliation of trees and 96-110 mph 6-8 ft shrubbery. Many palm fronds crimped and bent through the crown 2 965-979 28.50-28.91 (178-209 88-110 108-130 (1.83-2.44 m) of coconut palms and several green fronds ripped from palm trees, km/hr) some trees blown down. Weakened power poles snap. Considerable damage to piers, marinas flooded. Small craft in unprotected anchorages torn from moorings. Evacuation from some shoreline residences and low-lying areas required. Extensive. Extensive damage to houses and small buildings; weakly constructed and termite -weakened house heavily damaged or destroyed, buildings made of light materials destroyed, extensive damage to wooden structures. Major damage to shrubbery and trees, 111-131 9-12 ft up to 50% of palm fronds bent or blown off, numerous ripe and many 3 945-964 1 7 91- mph 110-136 130-156 (2.74-3.66 green coconuts blown off coconut palms; crowns blown off of palm �S 47(178-209 m) trees; up to 10% of coconut palms blown down; 30%-50% km/hr) defoliation of many trees and shrubs. Large trees blown down. Many wooden power poles broken or blown down, many secondary power lines downed. Air is full of light projectiles and debris, poorly constructed signs blown down. Serious coastal flooding; larger structures near coast damaged by batteringwaves and floating debris. Extreme. Extreme structural damage, even well-built structures heavily damaged or destroyed, extensive damage to non -concrete failure of many roof structures, window frames and doors, especially unprotected, non -reinforced ones, well-built wooden and metal structures severely damaged or destroyed. Shrubs and trees 50%-90% defoliated, up to 75% of palm fronds bent, twisted, or blown off. 131-155 13-18 ft Many crowns stripped from palm trees; numerous green and virtually 4 920-944 27 .17- mph 136-169 156-191 296-5.49 all ripe coconuts blown from trees, severe damage to sugar cane, 27.88 (210-249 m) large trees blown down; bark stripped from trees; most standing trees km/hr) are void of all but the largest branches (severely pruned), with remaining branches stubby in appearance, trunks and branches are sandblasted. Most wood poles downed/snapped, secondary and primary power lines downed. Air is full of large projectiles and debris. All signs blown down. Major damage to lower floors of structures due to flooding and battering by waves and floating debris. Major erosion of beaches. Catastrophic. Building failures, extensive or total destruction to 155 mph non -concrete residences and industrial buildings; devastating damage '7 17 (> 250 > 18 ft to roofs of buildings; total failure of non -concrete reinforced roofs. km/hr) (> 5.49 m) Severe damage to virtually all wooden poles; all secondary power lines and most primary power lines downed. Small buildings overturned or blown away. 5.2 Significant Historical Events Little was recorded of hurricanes striking Hawaii before the last half of the 20th century. Since 1950, when adequate records began, eight hurricanes have affected the Hawaiian 5-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Islands and 12 others have posed a threat by their passage. 17 The only documented hurricane before 1950 was the "Kohala Cyclone" of 1871 which was believed to be a minimal hurricane that affected Maui and Hawai'i. The path of hurricanes can be quite variable and unpredictable as illustrated by Hurricane Iwa (see Figure 5-2). Table 5-3 below lists the significant hurricanes affecting the state of Hawaii since 1950 and Figure 5-3 shows the tracks of these hurricanes and tropical storms. Table 5-3. Significant Hurricanes Since 195015 Name Year Estimated Loss ($) Effects Hiki 1950 200,000 flooding on Kauai Della 1957 high surf, Kauai Nina 1957 100.000 high waves, Kauai Dot 1959 6.000.000 $150,000 on Oahu and Hawaii Fico 1978 180.000 East Hawai i Susan 1978 — Iwa 1982 312,000,000 Kauai and Oahu Iniki 1992 1,800,000,000 all islands 17 Haraguchi, Paul, 1984, "Hurricanes in Hawai' i", report for U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, March 1984. 18 Hurricanes Dot, Iwa, and Iniki were the only storms that exhibited hurricane -force winds in the Hawaiian Islands; the others were rated as hurricanes by measurement from aircraft, away from land stations. Wave action from these storms may still affect the islands. 5-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan P, 25 20 15 10 170 Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones 06:00 Sep 12 959 mh Buoy 1 p 06:00 Nov 24 23:51 Nov 23 Kauai 969 mb 10 00:00 Oahu Sep 12 *+ Maui 18:29 Nov 23 945 mb ** 968 mb Buoy3 18:00 Sep 11 Hawaii 938 mb ^ 12:00 Sep 11 940 mb Buoy 4 ^Buoy 2 06:00 Sep 11 23:30 Nov 22 947 mb 964 mb 00:00 Sep 11 f 94$ mb 12:00 Sep 10 960 mb 00:00 Sep 10 12:00 Sep 9 980 mb 992 mb J J UTC 00:00 Nov 20, 1982 1000 mb Ii UTC 00:00 Sep 9, 1992 Iniki 996 mb 165 160 155 150 Longitude(W) Figure 5-2. Track of Hurricane hwa and Iniki (Cheung, K.F. 2003) Figure 5-3. Historic Central Pacific hurricane tracks 5-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Central Pacific Hurricane Occurrence 17 All hurricanes Hurricanes � categWry 3 G °' I6k6,I I-,= �= 0 = 0 D n J JUL AW UF OUT MN [ JAN MWAh Figure 5-4. Central Pacific Hurricane Occurrences by month 5.3 Probability of Occurrence The Saffir-Simpson Scale classifies the potential severity of hurricanes. However, this scale may not fully address the risk for mountainous Pacific islands such as Hawaii. The Saffir- Simpson Scale was developed for flat coastal areas with a continental shelf where the winds over the land diminish relatively quickly accompanied by heavy rain. In Hawaii, the variable topography accelerates the winds in certain areas such that one area may be receiving wind speeds at a tropical storm level, while another area may be receiving hurricane -force winds. The number of tropical cyclones in the Central Pacific varies from none to ten annually, and few develop beyond the intensity of a tropical storm. The Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund (HHRF), originally established after Iniki induced insurance companies to drop coverage in Hawai'i, produced several studies on the probability of this hazard (including Applied Research Associates, 2001).19 (Other studies by Peterka & Chock have been concerned with estimating hurricane effects through Monte Carlo simulation models and analysis of topographic effects.) 5.3.1 Probabilistic Hazard Analysis and Scenario Simulations Studies sponsored by the NASA Office of Earth Science and the HIRF have developed new models for estimating the long-term probabilities of Pacific hurricanes. As of 2002, a much improved methodology was used by Peterka in Windspeed Mapping of Hawaii and Pacific 19 Applied Research Associates (ARA), 2001, "Hazard Mitigation Study for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund" (incorporates part of FEMA -sponsored Iniki Building Performance Report), December 2001. 5-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Insular States by Monte Carlo Simulation, to establish design hurricane windspeeds for individual islands reflecting their differential hazard. While Hawaii Island has not had a direct hit by a hurricane, the Peterka model sponsored by NASA indicates that Hawaii Island has a long-term hurricane hazard higher than the other islands (see Figure 5-5 and Table 5-4). However, the ASCE 7-2010 Standard accepts the ARA model which has approximately uniform wind hazard across all islands of the State (Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7). Topographic effects are reflected in the Hawaii State Building Code. The effective wind speed map of Figure 5-8 shows this effect of speed-up relative to a code design reference windspeed of 105 mph. 0 c 10 -170 -150 -150 -140 -130 -120 -110 -100 Figure 5-5. Eastern and Central Pacific Hurricane frequency map. Contours show number of times a hurricane (intensity >64 knots) passes within 75 Nmi per 10 years. (Peterka, 2002) Table 5-4. Hurricane Windsneed vs. Recurrence interval and Modern-Dav ASCE Design Sneeds Peak Gust 10 m Open Country Exposure in mph Peterka Lihue Peterka Oahu HHRF study Hawaii Average Peterka Hilo 50 -year 75 80 66 96 100 -year 90 95 87 114 500 -year 128 134 122 150 5.3.2 ASCE 7-10 The ASCE 7-10 standard will formally designate Hawaii as a Special Wind Region where the authorities having jurisdiction (State and Counties) shall establish the effects of topography on the basic wind speed. C6.5.4.1 Special Wind Regions. Although the wind speed map of Fig. 6-1 in ASCE 7 is valid for most regions of the country, there are special regions in which wind speed anomalies are known to exist. Winds blowing over mountain ranges or through gorges or 5-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones river valleys in these special regions can develop speeds that are substantially higher than the values indicated on the default map. The Hawaii State Building Code provides maps showing the net effect of such topography. 185 180 175 170 155 150 155 150 145 140 135 130 Peak Gust 120 Windspeed 115 (mph) 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 174 10 100 1000 10000 Figure 5-6. Wind speed recurrence intervals for Hawaii (from ASCE 7-2010 Standard) TABLE C6-2 APPROXIMATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WIND SPEEDS IN ASCE 710 AND SAFFIR/SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Sustained Wind Speed Over Water" Gust Wind Speed Over Water' Gust Wind Speed Over Land` Category Mph (m/s) mph (m/s) mph (m/s) 1 74-95 33-43 87-111 39-50 81-105 36-47 2 96-110 44-49 112-139 51-58 106-121 48-54 3 111-130 50-58 130-152 59-68 122-143 55-64 4 131-155 59 69 153-181 69-81 144-171 65-76 5 > 155 > 69 >181 >81.0 >171 >76 `1-mnnnte average wind speed at 33 It (IU in) above open water °3 -second gust wind speed at 33 ft (10 in) above open water '3 -second gust wind speed at 33 ft (10 nn) above open ground in Exposure Category C. This colmnn has the same basis (averaging tune, height, and exposure) as the basic wind speed from Fig. 6-1. Figure 5-7. ASCE 7-10 relationship between Saffir/Simpson category and wind speed 5-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Years OiaPter S: Hazard Analysis Tropical ())clones Effective Wind Speed for the Island of Hawaii (For Components and Cladding with Mean Roof Height not geater than 10011) District Boundary Land use CONTOUR Major Road 0 Agriculture ------ 90 conservation too - Rural --------- 110 0 urban 120 - - - 130 140 i _.._.. 150 - ,--- --'" •-,, 166 �. _ ... _ . 170 J 1 180 A 20 Miles Figure -5-8. Effective wind speed map (mph) for Hawaii Island (Chock, 2007) 5.4 Risk Assessment Average Annualized Loss (AAL) is an objective measure of future losses averaged on an annual basis. This information can be very useful in assessing the relative contributors to total natural hazard losses. Formula Expression: AAL = y Li Pi Li = Estimated Loss for Event i Pi = Amoral Probability of Event i 5-12 Halraii Coittaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiori Placa Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Description: Sum of the expected loss for each event (i.e., sum of the products of the estimated loss from each event and that event's rate of occurrence) A tool used to calculate AAL due to tropical cyclones is the HAZUS MH model. The wind speed recurrence intervals used by the HAZUS model are calculated based on the probability of tropical cyclone impacts, and high winds resulting from other effects (Kona Storms, high trade winds, etc.) are not specifically accounted for. Although the recurrence interval of these non -cyclonic wind storms is high, perhaps several storms per year, the magnitude of the winds and associated losses are generally small therefore it can be generally assumed that these storms will not contribute significantly to the AAL calculated for tropical cyclones. Based on a HAZUS AAL analysis incorporating Hawaii Construction Cost Data, tropical cyclone AAL is about $69 million in Hawaii County. The predominant contributor to loss is single-family residential construction. County Hawaii County Tropical Cyclone AAL $69 million per year The HAZUS model can also be used to determine probabilities of varying degrees of damage to site specific facilities. To determine AAL, HAZUS computes losses, Li, for seven earthquake scenario events with different return periods (1/ exceedance probability): 10 -year, 20 -year, 50 -year, 100 -year, 200 -year, 500 -year, and 1000 -year. The Probability versus Loss Curve is approximated through curve fitting, and the area under the fitted curve is integrated to obtain the AAL results. A risk assessment has been conducted for essential facilities in Hawaii County. From this analysis the facilities were ranked based on their expected losses and loss of functionality. 5.5 Mitigation Strategies 5.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts 5.5.1.1 Construction Standards As described in Chapter 4, the design vintage can be used as an indicator of a buildings susceptibility to wind damage. Design wind pressures, typical construction type (single or double wall), and use of hurricane uplift resistance can all be determined by the year built based on the corresponding version of the UBC or IBC in effect at the time. Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 provide statistics of the number of homes built under each version of the UBC and their probable uplift resistance. Most existing homes have no hurricane mitigation 5-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Tnble 5-5. Wond frnme_ dnnhle wall_ residential ennstrnctinn statistics fnr Hawaii Cnnntv Hawaii County (Double Wall Construction) Effective Date Year of UBC Hurricane Tie Requirement Number of Residences February 8, 1962 1961 None 648 41% Without Roof Strap April 17, 1968 1967 None 194 August 8, 1972 1970 1 None 1416 February 25, 1975 1973 None 1065 December 11, 1978 1976 None 2600 January 19, 1985 1982 None 5010 December, 1993 1991 1 UBC Appendix Load Path 12126 59% With Roof Strap July, 1999 1994 UBC Appendix Load Path 3759 Total = Total —1 26818 Table 5-6. Wood frame. single wall. residential construction statistics for Hawaii Countv Hawaii County (Single Wall Construction) Effective Date Year of UBC Hurricane Tie Requirement Number of Residences February 8, 1962 1961 None 8723 91% Without Roof Strap April 17, 1968 1967 None 2109 August 8, 1972 1970 None 2471 February 25, 1975 1973 None 931 December 11, 1978 1976 None 1088 January 19, 1985 1982 None 1378 December, 1993 1991 UBC Appendix Load Path 1271 9%With Roof Strap July, 1999 1994 UBC Appendix Load Path 293 Total = 18264 5.5.1.1.1 Windborne Debris Protection Hawaii is considered a windborne debris region per the ASCE 7 standard; this requires additional measures for basic windborne debris protection, and also special cases where even higher strength of enhanced glazing protection (such as health care and large assisted living facilities, public assembly, and essential and emergency response facilities) is further defined in the building code. In previous versions of ASCE 7 it was permitted, if the basic windborne debris protection was not provided, to design the building for the additional internal wind pressure resulting from window breakage. That internal pressure can raise the forces on structural and cladding components by as much as 100% higher (double). The current ASCE 7-05 does not allow for unprotected opening of buildings located within the windborne debris region, it simply states: 5-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Glazing in buildings located in wind-borne debris regions shall be protected with an impact resistant covering or be impact -resistant glazing according to the requirements specified in ASTM E1886 and ASTM E1996 or other approved test methods and performance criteria. The levels of impact resistance shall be a function of Missile Levels and Wind Zones specified in ASTM El 886 and ASTM El 996. EXCEPTIONS: 1. Glazing in Category II, IlI, or IV buildings located over 60 ft (18.3 m) above the ground and over 30 ft (9.2 m) above aggregate surface roofs located within 1,500 ft (458 m) of the building shall be permitted to be unprotected. 2. Glazing in Category I buildings shall be permitted to be unprotected. The Hawaii State Building code allows for the construction of a safe room in residential construction in lieu of the windborne debris protection requirements. This essentially reinstates the previous versions of the ASCE 7 where unprotected glazing is allowed in a windborne debris region although, it must be considered as an opening when determining the enclosure classification. 5.5.1.2 Utilities Damaged or destroyed utility lines and facilities — including electricity, computer and satellite links, gas sewer, and water services — can cripple a region after a disaster. Power lines are often badly damaged or destroyed resulting in the loss of power for days, weeks or even months as in the case of Hurricane Iniki. In addition to basic modern household appliances being affected, public water supplies, water treatment and sewage facilities can also be impacted. Electric pumps cannot pump drinking water into an area without power. Disaster victims who do get water may have to boil it to eliminate waterborne pathogens introduced to the supply in breached areas. Electrical transmission and distribution lines have been particularly susceptible to failure in previous hurricanes, with 30% of the wooden power distribution poles and 26% of transmission poles on Kauai failing during Hurricane Iniki. This has resulted in periodic updates to the design criteria for these poles. The most recent design criteria were adopted by the State Public Utility Commission as Hawaii Administrative Rules 6-13, and are based on the 2002 National Electrical Safety Code which references the ASCE 7 wind load criteria. While this would an improvement to the local design standards it does not incorporate the latest Hawaii specific wind design criteria. It is recommended that the future mitigation project should further update the transmission and distribution line design criteria to incorporate the Hawaii specific wind design criteria and utilize the effective wind speed maps that account for topographical, directionality and local exposure. Procedures should be implemented to assure the adoption of the new standards so that when a power pole fails and is replaced, the replacement should meet the current standards. 5-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones 5.5.1.3 Wind Speed -Up and Structure Type Vulnerabilities Structures are designed to withstand specified wind forces in accordance with the prevailing building code. Wind design pressures have changed over the years in the Uniform Building Code (UBC), increasing from 15 psf (1958-79) to 26.5 psf (1982-88) to 30 psf (1991-97).20 Hawaii County did not adopt the 1982 UBC until 1985, thus any structures built prior to 1985 are designed to an inadequate wind pressure. Subsequent to Iniki (1992), Hawaii County required hurricane ties for single-family construction with the adoption of the 1991 UBC in 1993. To identify vulnerable single-family housing stock, the suggested benchmark year would be thus 1993. The local Hawaii County building code is based on the 1991 UBC and does not take into account topographically induced local wind acceleration which could produce significant directional sensitivity at a given site. The wind speed-up effects are now reflected in the Hawaii State Building Code, which needs to be adopted by the County of Hawaii per Hawaii Revised Statute Chapter 107, Part II. 5.5.1.4 Critical Facilities Study An all -hazard screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii has been conducted and a HAZUS MH risk assessment model created to evaluate the expected losses for each building. Two facilities that rank high based on these analyses were evaluated in more detail such that recommended mitigation procedures were developed. A Benefit -Cost Analysis of the mitigation project construction funding was performed. This detailed evaluation will provide the information necessary to submit a PDM grant application for feasible retrofit project. 5.5.1.5 State Building Adoption /Requirements for Hurricane Resistance The 2006 International Building Code will soon be adopted by all Counties in the State of Hawaii through the recently developed State Building code, which each county must adopt by new state legislation after a grace period that is intended to allow development of any specific requirements a particular county may desire. The state building code is intended to ensure regular updates of the building codes and uniformity between the counties. One significant aspect of the adoption of the upcoming adoption of 2006 IBC statewide is the consideration of windborne debris protection for any glazing lower than 60 feet above the ground level in buildings located in a windborne debris region. Hawaii is considered a windborne debris region and consequently the IBC requires impact protection of the glazing. In lieu of glazing protection, the 2003 IBC allows any unprotected glazing in to be considered as openings and consequently the building must be designed for internal pressurization. This provision is omitted from the 2006 IBC for buildings in wind debris 20 "The 1982 to 1997 UBC values were predicated on an 80 mph basic fastest -mile windspeed, approximately equivalent to a 95 mph 3 -second peak gust. The 3 -second peak gust is the wind parameter now used in American Society of Civil Engineers 7 (ASCE-7), Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Struc- tures, which forms the basis for the International Building Code (IBC). The 3 -second gust windspeed standard now established in the IBC is 105 mph statewide, which is slightly greater than the UBC - equivalent 95 mph 3 -second gust. Hurricane Hazard Advisory from the Hawaii Multihazard Science Advisory Committee to the State Hazard Mitigation Forum, draft December 2002. 5-16 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones regions. However, risk analyses found that the benefits of providing windborne debris protection for all glazing did not exceed the costs for the relatively low hurricane hazard in Hawaii. Therefore, the state building code amendments to the 2006 IBC provide designers with flexibility in allowing Occupancy Category II buildings and some Occupancy Category III buildings (not healthcare or high occupancy facilities) to be designed with unprotected glazing provided they are designed for the internal pressurization. If a residential building is not provided with glazing protection then it must have a residential safe room installed which does have appropriate glazing protection and must satisfy other structural and non-structural criteria. Public hurricane shelters must also satisfy these criteria. Where used, debris protection for glazing may be in the form of a transparent protective film, on the exterior surface or between glazing layers in laminated glass. Alternatively, window shutters, precut removable plywood panels or another system may be used. Any protective film or other system must undergo testing based on ASTM E 1996 to verify the required level of protection. The University of Hawaii has recently started operation of a wind cannon capable of testing strengthened windows and other debris protective devices to the ASTM standard. This is intending to increase the local availability of products and ultimately reduce the cost of providing windborne debris protection to the glazed areas of a structure. Plywood Shutter Tests Because the HHRF plywood shutter design had not been tested against any of the three windborne debris standards discussed in Section 6.1.1, Applied Research Associates contracted with Dr. Timothy Reinhold of the Wind Load Test Facility at Clemson University to perform exploratory missile impact and pressure resistance tests on six HHRF storm panels. Although it was not feasible to conduct the cyclic loading tests specified in the ASTM standard, the tests did provide valuable information in the impact resistance and ultimate pressure resistance of the HHRF panels. The largest missile specified by ASTM, SBCCI, and the SFBC standards is a 9 -pound 2x4 piece of lumber. The missile is projected at the test object using an air canon and strikes the test object end on, perpendicular to the surface. For residential buildings, the missile impact speed specified for regions with the highest design wind speeds in the US is 50 feet per second (34 mph) in all three standards. In order for a product to pass the test, the SFBC impact standard allows no penetration of the protective system while the SBCCI and ASTM standards do allow penetration, provided the hole is small enough to prevent a 3 inch sphere from passing through the hole. The SBCCI and ASTM standards include smaller (lighter) missiles in regions with lower design wind speeds. For gust speeds between 110 and 130 mph, the ASTM standard requires that shutters resist a 4.5 -pound 2x4 at 40 feet per second (27 mph). Since Hawaii has a basic design wind speed of 105 mph (gust) in ASCE 7-98, the design speed falls just below the light missile standard. Consequently, impact protection systems for Hawaii would need at most according to current standards) to resist the impact of a 4.5 -pound 2x4 traveling at 40 feet per second (27 mph). This impact momentum corresponds to that of a 9 -pound 2x4 traveling at 20 feet per second (12 mph). All tests were conducted using a 9 -pound 2x4. In addition to the straight -on missile impact tests, tests were also conducted with missiles impacting at an oblique angle of 45 degrees. 5-17 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones The test standards also include testing of the panel system for 9000 cycles of pressure fluctuations, of various magnitudes up to the design pressure, after the panel has been subjected to the missile impacts. The tests performed at Clemson University primarily focused on the missile impact portion of the test procedure. Additional tests were conducted where the panels were subjected to uniform wind pressures using air bags or a vacuum chamber. The bulk of these tests were performed to determine the pressure at which the panel would break or be sucked off the wall system. In these tests, the pressures were monotonically increased until failure occurred in the fastening system or to one of the bracing members. Two additional tests were performed using the 6 -foot by 6 -foot 8 -inch sliding glass door protection system to determine the deflection as pressure was increased that pushed the panel against the opening. Two panels were tested for each thickness of plywood and for three sizes of openings (2 -foot by 4 -foot, 3 -foot by 5 -foot, and 6 -foot by 6 -foot 8 -inches). Generally, the missile impacts caused localized punching shear failures and it was possible to impact a single panel with multiple missiles. The overall observation is that the shutter systems are adequate to provide protection from the 8 -pound 2x4 missile traveling at 27 mph since the threshold for penetration is slightly higher than 24 mph with the 9 -pound 2x4 missile. At 24 mph, localized damage to the cross members and indentation of the panel was the rule. There were a couple of instances where a 9 -pound missile penetrated at 24 mph, however these were relatively rare. There was a marginal increase in resistance for the 5/8 -inch thick sheathing as opposed to the 1/2 -inch sheathing. The increase was generally on the order of 1 to 2 mph in missile speed for penetration. The 5/8 -inch sheathing did seem to perform better than the 1/2 -inch sheathing when subjected to the missile impacts at 45 degrees. The missile bounced off the 5/8 -inch sheathing more often than for the 1/2 -inch sheathing. In general, 9 -pound missiles penetrated the panels at speeds between 25 and 28 mph. The performance of the panels subjected to oblique angle impacts seemed to depend to some extent on whether the missile impacted with the long edge (3-1/2 inch) oriented vertically or horizontally. Local damage to the 1x3 lumber used at the laps between the plywood sheets was common if impact occurred on the 1x3 and fasteners withdrew or the 1x3 split when the impact occurred near the 1x3. The screws connecting the lx3s to the panels were fairly short and provided only minimal penetration into the plywood sheathing. In summary, the 1/2 -inch and 5/8 -inch shutters both clearly provide substantial protection from missile impacts associated with a 4.5 -pound 2x4 missile and essentially are very close to completely rejecting impacts of an 8 -pound 2x4 traveling at 40 feet per second (27 mph). Based on these test results, we conclude that the I-H -W protective panels should be an adequate level of protection against windborne debris provided that they are properly constructed and installed. Pressure cycling tests should be conducted to ensure that the anchor design meets the full ASTM standard. Each test specimen is required to receive two such impacts followed by cyclic pressure loading similar to that experience under hurricane conditions. The glazing was required to resist the pressure loading with no crack forming longer than five inches through which air could pass or with no opening forming which a three-inch diameter sphere could pass. 5-18 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones 5.5.2 Future Plans Recommended fixture hurricane hazard mitigation projects are listed below: Project Description Status Adopt IBC 2006 per HRS 107 Part II,• High Windspeed areas are now Not effective for new Identify high windspeed areas and mapped, and have been adopted in construction until county vulnerable structures the State Building Code (2009 adopts IBC 2006; canbe used to evaluate risk to existing buildings Adapt HAZUS MH or other hazard Incorporate Hawaii building Proposed Planning Project; modeling to Hawaii Island inventory and critical facilities into The HAZUS model now has the HAZUS MH wind risk model. a realistic building inventory Hurricanes will cause much higher for Hawaii and Maui, but it losses than earthquakes to residential needs to be converted to the buildings; vulnerable structures can building modeling scheme be identified with respect to high used for hurricane analysis. wind zones Emergency shelter evaluation; Harden Perform a 1 -year study to identify Proposed Project; public schools for emergency shelters. and rank Hawaii building types that Then follow-up with the more There is a shortage of shelter buildings in could be deemed safer for hurricane detailed DAGS-standardized Hawaii County. Of the 14 hurricane resistance without exhaustive site structural evaluation shelters on the island, only four shelters investigations. Use this screening procedure for those public have been evaluated for safety by DAGS: criteria to determine the number of shelter facilities that have • Holualoa E. S. low vulnerability buildings available higher vulnerability, taking • Waikoloa E. S. bldg D for refuge in the private sector. This into account the revised net • Waikoloa E. S. bldg E could result in a decrease in the shelter demand. • Konawaena E.S. number of persons that would report Perform a comprehensive screening to a public shelter. evaluation of public hurricane shelters and private sector buildings for possible use for refuge Hawaii County All -Hazard Assessment of The three to four facilities with the Proposed Project: Hurricane Shelters highest -ranked losses will be taken This detailed evaluation will This project will conduct onsite building to a detailed evaluation using Benefit be identifying priority construction as -built data collection for the Cost Analysis of potential mitigation buildings and providing the remaining 10 hurricane shelter buildings, measures. information necessary to using the more detailed DAGS- submit PDM grant standardized structural evaluation applications for three to four procedure that follows the criteria retrofit projects. established by the legislature Hardening of Waiakea High School Gym Waiakea High School Gym is a Last proposed for FY09 PDM Window, Door & Enclosure Retrofitting designated hurricane shelter, but has grant. Application requires Possible Roof & Framing connection glass doors and glass louvers further investigation to define retrofitting. When re -roofing a critical precise scope and cost, as facility, provide extra protection from well as developing the BCA water damage, check and refasten the roof sheathing. 5-19 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5: Hazard Analysis Tropical Cyclones Project Description Status Hawaii Residential Safe Room Requirements for room construction NOAA and DBEDT features are given in the State sponsored research project to Building Code; effective by 2011 for develop and test wall those homes that do not provide assemblies rated for safe glazing windborne debris protection. room use. Hurricane Storm Surge Study (2008) Funded by FEMA for updating the Completed flood zones in the DFIRM on south and west coast Provide higher -grade poles for electrical PUC and utility to adopt use of Proposed Project distribution Hawaii topographic windspeeds for use with the National Electric Safety Code. Develop a Hurricane Loss Estimation . Expected hurricane risk levels Proposed Project: The Model (HLEM) software available for (i.e., expected loss as a function of HLEM could provide Hawaii State and County planning return period) could be technically validated input on including state-of-the-art regionally- determined for a geocoded hurricane hazard and validated storm windfield modeling and building inventory database using vulnerability pertinent to tracking, topographic speedup modeling, the wind hazard analysis by State and County agencies. terrain category and building inventory Peterka combined with the Chock databases defined with detailed spatial topographic wind and building resolution, and regional building damage damage model. The Average and loss functions. State-of-the-art Annualized Losses due to could hurricane loss estimation requires be then calculated windstorms for regionally -validated storm windfield individual communities to modeling and tracking, topographic determine their risk relativity speedup modeling, terrain category and factors. This would allow an building inventory databases defined with objective ranking of hurricane risk detailed spatial resolution, and regional for regions or areas (such as building damage and loss functions. The census tract groupings), taking two NASA -sponsored projects have into account hurricane developed the core computational probabilities, site-specific wind components of what could be developed environment, and the building into Hurricane Loss Estimation Model inventory existent in each study (HLEM) software available for Hawaii region. State and County planning. Hurricane / MMS Upgrade for Hawaii Include the unique topographic wind USCOE-sponsored project for effects into the output of the model 2011 used as a tool for emergency response / evacuation decision- making, to allow identification of the topographically amplified wind speeds for any defined cyclone scenario. -20 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 6. Landslides and Rock Falls Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls CHAPTER 6 - LANDSLIDES AND ROCK FALLS 6.1 Description of Hazard Landslides are one of the natural processes of erosion resulting from mass transfer, the movement of material down the side of slopes under the influence of gravity. Mass transfer may also occur as falling, sliding or rolling of individual rocks or rock fragments, washing of loose materials by rain runoff and soil creep. Although gravity is the primary reason for landslides, other naturally occurring factors include: • Erosion by rivers or ocean waves creating over steepened slopes; • Rock and soil slopes that are weakened through saturation by heavy rain and runoff, • Stress created by earthquakes; • High winds uprooting trees along steep slopes. Human made causes of landslides may include grading, terrain cutting and filling and devel- opment on hillsides or excessive slopes. Landslides can occur on any sloping terrain given the right conditions of soil, moisture and the angle of slope. This ongoing process is generally slow and rarely noticeable. Occasionally landslides will occur in a spectacular rush or an abrupt collapse, often triggered by another natural hazard such as an earthquake or flooding. 6.1.1 Hazard Areas Areas that may be considered prone to landslides may include the following: • On existing old landslides • On or at the base of slopes • In or at the base of minor drainage hollows • At the base or top of an old fill slope • At the base or top of a steep cut slope • Developed hillsides where leach field septic systems are used .21 Roadcuts and other altered or excavated areas of slopes are particularly susceptible to debris flows and abrupt collapse. Several areas along the Hamakua Coast are chronic problem areas particularly during periods of heavy rainfall. In addition, the three major gulches Maulua, Laupahoehoe and Kaawalii, which are known for the "horseshoe" turns on State Highway 19, present rock fall problems. The rock fall problems arise during times of heavy rain as well as strong winds which sway the trees along the walls of the gulch back and forth and loosen the dirt and rocks underneath it. Homes that are built along the edge of the Hamakua coast cliffs are also susceptible to abrupt collapse particularly during times of heavy rainfall. These cliffs along the northeast coast of Mauna Kea range in height from 50 to 350 feet. The sea cliffs are eroded through a continu- ous process of wave action at the base of the cliff which cuts a notch and undermines the 21 USGS Fact Sheet FS -071-00 6-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls higher section of the cliff which eventually collapses and drops off. A photograph taken following a landslide caused by the Kiholo Bay earthquake is shown in Figure 6-1. Figure 6-1. Massive coastal escarpment landslides into the ocean, Hamakua Coast (Photograph courtesy of Hawaii Civil Defense Agency) 6-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls Figure 6-2. Examples of earthquake -induced rock falls causing road hazard or closure 6.2 Significant Catastrophic Events Giant catastrophic slides have occurred around the major Hawaiian Islands thousands of years ago. At least 15 giant landslides have been identified by United States Geological Survey (USGS) marine scientist with the most recent occurring approximately 100,000 years ago off the Kona coast. Each of these slides has resulted in huge land losses to the islands and resulted in large waves that have carried rocks and sediments as high as 1000 feet above sea level. Although these giant landslides have the potential for enormous loss of life, property and resources, these events are infrequent in human terms, occurring perhaps once every few tens of thousands of years. (USGS, Volcano Watch, 1997) The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) suggests that we should not be overly concerned about the giant landslides because they are so infrequent (once every few tens of thousands of years) and because "we can do virtually nothing to mitigate such gigantic slides and tsunami - except to follow evacuation routes predetermined by Civil Defense and hope that the tsunami is not too high." (USGS Volcano Watch, 1997) "Worrying realistically means directing our limited resources to the hazardous events most likely to occur -the ones whose effects we now have the ability to mitigate through education and foresight." (USGS Volcano Watch, 1997) A significant landslide mentioned in historical times is a mudflow triggered by the largest earthquake in recorded history in April, 1868. The mudflow killed 31 people in Wood Valley in the Ka'u district. No other landslide event has been mentioned as resulting in any loss of life. 6-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls 6.3 Probability of Occurrence Landslides and rock falls typically occur as a result of another hazard or force of nature, and due to the multitude of forces that may cause landslides and rock falls assigning or calculating the return period of events of a destructive magnitude would be extremely difficult. However, it is possible to determine areas that have a higher potential of risk for such events as was done in a study was conducted by URS. In this study a conceptual level slope risk map was prepared, using an adaptation of the slope hazard methodology given in the FEMA 2007 HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual. The approach involved the interactions of three primary slope hazard input criteria simplified to low, medium and high hazard susceptibility, described below: Topography: A high resolution slope map of the entire island is composed of recent aerial, lidar and satellite 10m DEM topographic survey data from USGS and FEMA sources. Slope criteria are categorized as: 1. <20degreees (low hazard susceptibility) 2. <20-40 degrees (medium hazard susceptibility) 3. >40 degrees (high hazard susceptibility) Geologic groups: Soil and rock categories assigned based upon strength and susceptibility to landslide was derived from existing UDSA NCRS surface maps and USGS geologic maps. Adapted geologic group assignments for the Island of Hawaii include: 1. shallow rock, fresh volcanics (low hazard susceptibility) 2. clay surficial soils, weathered rock (medium hazard susceptibility) 3. weak soft soils, ash deposits, mapped historic slide talus (high hazard susceptibility) In addition, URS interpreted historic Hawaii DOT landslide locations, as medium hazard for locations with preliminary FHWA Rockfall Hazard Rating System (RHRS) of less than 200 and high hazard for locations with preliminary RHRS values greater than 200. 6-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls s 4eF ..✓ � j Low MEDIUM HIGH SLOPEHAZARDS Mb Sh. ae Degree M. p SDRFICIAL GEOLOGY sn.,w. aozi �4'easM�retl Rod,Y sin po imlpnq }� HISTORIC HAZARDS supexazam -.... +.ews �n,a&iw nnz ®miles x HauN 9xpe Hauuz Map oisNaxaii WMaxs Ppp'MttrvWl ..n. e'sri er..�.., .. xu�s [xdeennke, lmp sTOWI w.xwuvnwarwwx.wsivro Figure 6-3. Slope hazards and soil types on Hawaii Island Soil moisture: The HAZUS MH4 slope hazard methodology considers soil moisture as either wet or dry, with wet soils posing increased slope hazard. Soil moisture assignments are derived from recent NOAA rainfall mapping of the island since regional groundwater and soil moisture data is unavailable island wide. Areas receiving greater than 2000 mm annual precipitation are considered wet soil, corresponding largely to the windward side of the island. In addition, coastal areas below elevation 200' are considered wet due to potential groundwater seepage gradients from higher elevations, except in the and Kona coast areas. 6-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls �e �y'" Pa ciflc Pe pro Gaa� ���`w 2 F8 Preeipltet on Contours (mm) J' w� raa, �oaa Pe c m c e oce n sou aronnawoeer cona�non ®nu.. — sacra phee..w cw�m..r.. wr. oN. P-. Figure 6-4. Precipitation and groundwater condition on Hawaii Island • HAZUS-MH MR4 provides susceptibility categories combining slope angle, soil type and soil moisture in ten categories (I to X), with an assigned yield acceleration to each category. The combined susceptibility categories when mapped thus represent zones of potential landslide triggering under different levels of ground shaking. • The ten HAZUS risk zones were converted to polygon shape files and mapped to census blocks/tracts, with an interface to Geodatabase (NAD83) so that HAZUS SHAKEMAP runs will then interpret triggering criteria and assign a triggered or non triggered assessment for a given earthquake scenario, and then incorporate loss estimates with other HAZUS estimate modules. 6-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls Figure 6-5. Landslide susceptibility map of Hawaii Island HAZUS assigned landslide sucscepibility categories for the Island of Hawaii. This figures is a conglomerate of spatially assigned topography, geology and soilo mostures relationships with superimposed mapped historical landslides 6.4 Risk Assessment The random nature of landslide and rock fall events presents a difficult challenge in assessing the risk in relation to other hazards that occur at more probabilistic intervals. As discussed in the previous section the HAZUS Earthquake model incorporates potential losses due to landslides into its economic loss predictions. Currently there is no way of quantifying the total risk of landslides and rock falls due to other hazards such as heavy rain and coastal erosion, other than history. 6-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls 6.5 Mitigation Strategies 6.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts The State Department of Transportation tries to address the landslide and rock fall problems through their maintenance budget. The more chronic problem areas will require additional CII' (Capital Improvement Project) funding that has not been provided to date; although landslide events are a concern for our roadways, utilities and structures, and data is available regarding the frequency and severity of these events. Discussions with State and County highway maintenance agencies have yielded only anecdotal information regarding landslide problem areas. Rockfall protection projects have been conducted along stretches of Hawaii Belt Road. Figure 6-6 illustrates locations where historic landslides have impacted major roadways in Hawaii County. Legend Slope Hazards SCUTH FOHLLA Historic Landslides HAMA K1A Other Roads Major Roads NORTH HILO KONA HAMAKUA -- KONA NORTHHILO.., r "� PUNA _i KONA kCA R � - Figure 6-6. Map of historic landslide locations impacting major roads Individual homeowners are attempting to address the problem of the collapse of the Hamakua Coast sea cliffs by reinforcing the cliff sides and anchoring their structures. Additional information is needed to assess these efforts and to determine adequate setbacks for future construction. 6-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6: Hazard Analysis Landslides and Rock Falls 6.5.2 Future Plans Improving the landslide susceptibility map: Project Description Status New UH study is to generate GIS maps are included, which To start in 2010, completion potential slope stability hazard could be used for prioritization of subsequent to this hazard maps which could be used to investigations as well as assessment mitigation plan update identify zones that may warrant tools for earthquake preparedness. further detailed evaluation during UH will take the URS' information project planning. from the landslide -potential map to develop 2nd generation maps that will identify priority criteria and critical areas for more detailed study (e.g., road cuts and lifelines). • Subdivide the island into subtracts for slope hazards to allow practical use of more slope susceptibility categories giving greater resolution. Digital file sizes limited the island wide mapping to 3 slope angle categories. Resolution of the final mapping varies from layer to layer due to disparate data sources. The scale of the 17" x 22" map is 1:333,732. • Refine key slope areas, colluvium, debris flows and poor soils intersect w/ boring data and shear strike measurements (field and from maps). • Refine soil wetness map with well and groundwater model data. • Incorporate final HDOT RHRS data. • Validate estimated generalized allowable slope angle relationship for local fractured/weathered basalts, soils, and ash with lab testing. • Incorporate more detailed offshore submarine slope modeling. • Incorporate more detailed USGS slope modeling with: • Simple rigid block deformation modeling (Newmark) using shallow friction behavior of basalts and andesites, ignoring soil strength. • Assigning spatial probability & susceptibility by event • Mapping of critical accelerations using Factor of Safety contours. • Consider inaccessible damages on very steep (>60degrees) high (>1000ft) cliffs at the North Kohala Ditch and general trends of landslide damage on leeward (west) slopes. 6-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 7. Earthquakes Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes CHAPTER 7 - EARTHQUAKES 7.1 Description of Hazard An earthquake is the sudden release of strain energy in the Earth's crust, resulting in waves of shaking that radiate outward from the earthquake source.22 The Earth's crust, which can be oceanic or continental, is the uppermost layer of the lithosphere 23. Figure 7-1 illustrates the layers that compose the Earth including the crust and the lithosphere. The oceanic crust is approximately 3 to 6 miles thick while the continental crust is approximately 20 to 30 miles thick .24 When stresses in the crust exceed the strength of the rock, it breaks along lines of weakness (either a pre-existing or new fault plane) and results in earthquakes. The point where an earthquake starts is termed the focus or hypocenter and may be many kilometers deep within the earth. The point at the surface of the crust directly above the focus is called the earthquake epicenter. The distance between the hypocenter and the epicenter is termed the focal depth. In the case of underwater earthquakes, the focal depth is measured from the hypocenter to the surface of the oceanic crust. The severity of earthquakes is dependent on the energy released from the fault or epicenter. Other factors influencing the severity of an earthquake include: magnitude, proximity to the epicenter, depth of the epicenter, duration, soil characteristics, and type of ground motion. The effects of an earthquake can be felt far from the epicenter. Figure 7-1. Cutaway Showing Earth's Layers 25 22 Pacific Disaster Center Website, Retrieved October 6, 2009 from hlW://ivww.pdc.org/iweb/caghLguakes.isp?subg=l 23 The lithosphere constitutes the rigid outer layer of the planet. It includes the crust and the upper mantle. 24 Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia Website, Retrieved October 7, 2009 from hlW://en.wikipedia.org/iviki/Crust_%28gcolo gy0/o29#cite_note-amonline-0 25 Image from Solar Computer House Website, Retrieved October 7, 2009 from hM2://www.solcomhouse.com/geothennal.htm 7-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes Historically, the largest earthquakes in Hawaii have occurred at shallower depths, beneath the flanks of Kilauea, Mauna Loa and Hualalai Volcanoes. The flanks of these volcanoes adjust to the intrusions of magma into their adjacent rift zones by storing compressive stresses and occasionally releasing it in crustal earthquakes. The active fault surfaces for these large earthquakes is associated with a near -horizontal basal d6collement separating the ancient oceanic crust from the emplaced volcanic pile, lying approximately 10 km beneath the Earth's surface. (A d6collement is a tectonic surface that acts as a plane of detachment between two masses.) Examples of such crustal or d6collement earthquakes occurred in 1975, the M7.2 (or greater) Kalapana earthquake beneath Kilauea's south flank, and in 1868, the largest earthquake in recorded Hawaiian history beneath the Ka`u district on Mauna Loa's southeast flank, estimated as a M7.9 earthquake. (Figure 7-2 by Klein, et al, 2001). HUALALAI Kmlua F M HAWAII HISTORICAL EARTHQUAKES CRUSTAL 10/1512006. h�• EARTHQUAKES M6.0 Z=16 /3�; `,,�r M 7.o -7s Pacific KOHACA"e1+1 '� v311335 0Ce(711 x M 6.1 3x30/1681'' M 6.5-6.9 M6,4: 1111&+41 M 6.0-6.4 10/15/2006 M61 MAUNAKEA a126173 A.; MANTLE EARTHQUAKES M6.7 Z=39 ® M6.2 Z-39 0 (z > 15) HUALALAI Kmlua F M 0 30 km 6 I i I Ocean Figure 7-2. Hawaii Historical Earthquakes and Inferred Rupture Zones of the Larger Events 7-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Rft Zone tea • ` MAUNA LOAN •� KILAUEA tl2one Ivo 1 , r CG 8114155 3/28/1868 M 6.1, 7.0 �a� M 6.0 1 129/75 5131!1877 M 7.2 41 s.3; 4!22!51 \4/2/1868 M62 M 7 99 Pi is Pacific 0 30 km 6 I i I Ocean Figure 7-2. Hawaii Historical Earthquakes and Inferred Rupture Zones of the Larger Events 7-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes Continuous 28M Fundamental flexure models �) Te=25 for plates under island loads Variable infill 2866 zsov ❑ ;, za6o T = 25 b) Broken plate 228°'0 Plate is broken, or so weakened or thinned C) ;"� '`=25 in the center, that it curves concave downward under the load. CO2 embrittlement Variable T 2500 enables deep seismicity. d) T =25 ��.'15- ,. (from A.B. Watts, Isostasy and ., flexure of the lithosphere, Cambridge Univ. press, 2001) Figure 7-3. Fundamental flexural models for plates under island loads earthquake focal mechanisms: Center of lithosphere bending radial P -axis (deep P -axis radiant point) O tangential P -axis "Hat, fault NW Mauna Kea Mauna Loa Kilauea SE 0 km volcanic edifice volcanic edifice M7.2 decollment 9-12 km O_M6_A (mixed P directions) (mixed P directions) neutrallane neutral plane — — _ _ 20-22 km (dee pth uncertain trete) "deep" Kilauea earthquake zone i M6 7approx. brokeno thin dplate-- elastic thickness 25-40 �"-- r� km approx. maximum brittle earthquake depth maximum bending sparse 20-55 km maximum bending and seismicity seismicity and seismicity Figure 7-4. Earthquake focal mechanisms in Hawaii The risks to property from earthquakes in the County of Hawaii are among the highest in the nation, with only San Francisco and San Jose, California having a greater annual loss per 7-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes million dollars of building value. Earthquake occurrence rates in the County of Hawaii are as high as that near the most hazardous fault areas on the mainland United States. The Island of Hawaii experiences thousands of earthquakes every year although only a few of them are strong enough to be felt or cause minor to moderate damage. Most of these earthquakes are directly related to volcanic activity caused by magma moving below the earth's surface and are concentrated beneath the island's two most active volcanoes, Mauna Loa and Kilauea. These volcanic -related earthquakes can occur before or during eruptions, or as molten rock travels underground. A few of the earthquakes are less directly related to volcanic activity and may occur in zones of structural weakness at the base of the volcanoes or deep within the earth under any part of the island .26 The point where an earthquake originates is termed the focus or hypocenter and may be many kilometers deep within the earth. The point at the surface directly above the focus is called the earthquake epicenter. Strong earthquakes, while infrequent, may endanger people and property by shaking structures, causing ground cracks, ground settling and landslides. Strong earthquakes in Hawaii's past have destroyed buildings, water tanks and bridges and damaged roadways, water, sewer and utility lines. Soil and topographic conditions may exacerbate potential earthquake hazards where steep slopes and water saturated soils may be susceptible to mudflows or landslides. Large earthquakes may also generate tsunamis which provide little or no time for advanced warning.27 Damage caused by earthquakes can be classified as structural or nonstructural. The structural components of buildings are those that carry stress loads, including columns, beams, braces, floor, roof, load-bearing walls, and foundations. Nonstructural components include every other part of the building and its contents. Common non-structural components include ceilings, windows, office equipment, file cabinets, HVAC equipment, electrical equipment, furnishings, and lights. Nonstructural damage may cause personal injury, property damage, or loss of function often resulting in more significant damage than structural damage. Examples of hazardous nonstructural damage that have occurred in past earthquakes include broken glass, overturned tall and heavy cabinets, falling ceilings or overhead light fixtures, and ruptured piping. Earthquake ground shaking has three effects on nonstructural components: inertial or shaking effects on the nonstructural elements themselves, distortions imposed on nonstructural components when the building structure sways back and forth, and separation or pounding across separation joints between adjacent structures (see Figure 7-5). Building codes primarily address structural components. 28 26 Heliker, 1990. 27 Ibid. 28 Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc., September 1994. Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide. FEMA 74 (3rd ed.). 7-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes Earthquakes are generally measured by magnitude and intensity: Magnitude. The Richter Scale measures magnitude by the relative size of the earthquake wave recorded on seismographs. Earthquakes below magnitude 3 are generally too shall to be felt. Magnitude 5 earthquakes may be damaging while earthquakes of magnitude 7 or greater can cause widespread damage when located near population centers. • Intensity. The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (MMI) measures the intensity of earth- quakes by the effects of what people feel and observe and what kinds of structural damage that occur. The earthquake intensity will vary as a function of distance from the epicenter. MMI ranges from I which is faintly registered by instruments to XII which is near total de- struction. OVERTURNING OF SLENDER OBJECTS .."""'..` .' SLIDING OF STOCKY OBJECTS UPLIFT SLIDING AND QVERTURNING ................. ....... ........ ... ....., .. .......... GLASS OR F .............. . PARi7TIONS .. IMPOSED DEFORMATION DEFORMED SHAPE BREAKAGE OF PIPING OR DUCTS MAY OCCUR AT OF BUILDING SEISMIC JOINTS DUE TO DIFFERENTIAL DISPLACEMENTS (SEPARATION AND POUNDING) DEFORMED SHAPE OF BUILDING BUILDING SEPARATION Figure 7-5. Effects of Earthquakes on Nonstructural Components. Source: Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc., September 1994. Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide. FEMA 74 (3rd ed.). 7-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes 7.2 Significant Historic Events The USGS has compiled two catalogs of earthquakes for the Hawaiian Islands: a "modern" catalog of earthquakes registered by the seismic network maintained by the USGS HVO dat- ing from the fourth quarter of 1959, and an historical catalog of earthquakes dating back to 1823 based on instrumental amplitudes from the Honolulu Magnetic Observatory and HVO combined with published felt reports from newspaper articles and other sources as well un- published felt reports sent to HVO (Klein and Wright, USGS Published Paper 1623). The Island of Hawai' i has experienced 13 damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater since 1868; several are shown in Figure 7-6. The largest of these occurred in 1868 in the Ka'u district on the southeast flank of Mauna Loa with an estimated magnitude of 7.5 to 8.0. Although the 1868 earthquake caused damage island -wide, the devastation was greatest in Ka'u where the earthquake triggered a mudflow killing 31 people and coastal subsidence generated a tsunami that destroyed several villages. Approximately 79 people were killed as a result of the earthquake of 1868 with most of the casualties resulting from the mudslide and the tsunami .29 Figure 7-6. Locations of damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater for Hawaii Island since 1868 (RMS, 2006) 29 Heliker, C. "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii", U.S. Geological Survey, 1990. 7-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan S I. M6.2' �I r � 1929/10/05 2006/10!15 1868103!?9eM:7. 2 Wr M7 Figure 7-6. Locations of damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater for Hawaii Island since 1868 (RMS, 2006) 29 Heliker, C. "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii", U.S. Geological Survey, 1990. 7-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan S I. M6.2' �I r � 1929/10/05 _ Figure 7-6. Locations of damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater for Hawaii Island since 1868 (RMS, 2006) 29 Heliker, C. "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii", U.S. Geological Survey, 1990. 7-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan S 1973.04126 M6.2' Figure 7-6. Locations of damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater for Hawaii Island since 1868 (RMS, 2006) 29 Heliker, C. "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii", U.S. Geological Survey, 1990. 7-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes The largest earthquake on the island during the 20th century occurred on the south flank of Kilauea in 1975. This earthquake had a magnitude of 7.2 and caused coastal subsidence at Kalapana, generated a tsunami that killed 2 people in the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park, destroyed houses in the Ka'u district, sank fishing boats in Keauhou Bay within the North Kona district, and damaged boats and piers in Hilo, within the South Hilo district.30 A large earthquake, unrelated to volcanic activity, was located 25 miles beneath Honomu in the South Hilo district in 1973. This earthquake had a magnitude of 6.2 and caused $5.6 mil- lion worth of damage and injured 11 people.31 7.2.1 Kiholo Bay Earthquake The most recent major earthquakes in the State of Hawaii were the Magnitude 6.7 Kiholo Bay and Magnitude 6.0 Mahukona earthquakes that occurred on October 15, 2006 at 7:07am and 7:14 am respectively (Robertson et al, 2006; EERI, 2006; EERI et al, 2006). Both earthquakes were centered near the Kona coastline of Hawaii. A map of ground shaking intensity for the island is shown in Figure 7-7 (Adapted from USGS Shakemap downloads). The maps show that largest ground shaking for this earthquake was at the northern end of the island, but did not directly coincide with the epicenter of the earthquake. The largest ground motions were recorded at the towns of Waimea and Hawi. These areas had amplified ground motion due to softer soil conditions at these locations. The most heavily damaged buildings were concentrated in the Waimea and Hawi areas with some damage also in the Honokaa and Kona areas. There was very little damage at the south end of the island. The main October 15 Kiholo Bay earthquake probably reflected the long-term accumulation and release of lithospheric flexural stresses. The long-term stresses consist in part of stresses generated in the crust and mantle by the weight of the volcanic rock that composes the islands. Such deeper mantle earthquakes at approximately 30 to 40 km depth result from flexural fracture of the underlying lithosphere in long-term geologic response to the load of the island mass. This is one of the seismotectonic mechanisms for damaging (but not the largest) earthquakes in the Hawaiian islands. Past examples of such "mantle" earthquakes include the 1973 M6.2 Honomu (on the northeast coast of the island), the 1938 M7 Maui, and the 1871 M7 Lana`i earthquakes. 30 Heliker, C. "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii", U.S. Geological Survey, 1990. 31 Ibid. 7-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes A Acceerornete•stauons PG'(%) Ma'oi roaGs 2 - 4 5-8 3-71 12 -15 - 16-19 * - 20-22 naksa, PoFice Station - 23-26 iJahvl(ona _ $� 1200&70115 1 - 27 - 29 - 30 - 33 - 0.38 - 34 - 37 tmpahoehae, ❑ 10 Say Mg. I70HS ;07:49.221 Hilo, Old Hospital Nilo, USDA Lab 0.24 Hilo, Univ of Hawaii ua-Kana, Fire Station ,., .06 27 ►LeaLakekua, !lona Hospital Pahaa, Fire Station 0.52 Honaumu, PU Ic WWI. k, HVO S c 0..2 s^ 0A6 N ,f-anala, Ka'u Hospital � 078 4{dl. Q 3 B 12 18 24 30 Miles Figure 7-7. Peak ground accelerations resulting from the Oct. 15, 2006 Kiholo Bad- Earthquake 7.2.1.1 Performance of the Kawaihae harbor One of the two major commercial ports on the island, the commercial port facility at Kawaihae Harbor consists of two pile -supported concrete piers, a 500 -foot long Pier 1 and the 1500 -foot long Pier 2, which is operationally divided into Piers 2, 2A, and 2B and a few warehouse and administrative buildings, and an asphalt paved shipping container yard. This facility was located less than 24 km (15 miles) from the epicenter of the Kiholo Bay Earthquake. 7-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes Figure 7-8. Aerial image of Kawaihae Harbor Kawaihae Harbor sustained major damage from liquefaction and lateral spreading. Sand boils were observed throughout the harbor area. Much of the fill material under the shipping container handling yard consists of dredged fill. As this material liquefied, the resulting lateral spreading caused significant vertical settlement of the asphalt pavement, and lateral displacement of the pile supported concrete piers. Large areas of the asphalt yard, had settled up to approximately 6 inches. A series of cracks with widths ranging from approximately 1/4 inch to several inches were observed roughly aligned parallel with the shoreline. Cumulatively, these cracks displayed lateral spreading of 6 inches or more. Pier 1 displaced as much as 6 to 12 inches laterally towards the harbor. This movement indicates that the piles were moved and/or distressed by the lateral spreading of the liquefied soil beneath and landward of the pier. Port Damages The most pronounced damage at Kawaihae was the failure of 1950's era Pier 1. The 1950's era Pier 1 which includes a concrete bulkhead wall, tie rods, anchor block and surrounding structures experienced a significant amount of damage. Primary damage and displacements greater than 15 inches occurred to Pier 1. Visible damage to the pier structure included: • Longitudinal cracks in the bulkhead cap, concrete sheetpile and rock revetments. • Yielding and necking of the tie rods, but no breakage with 4-6 inches lateral translation and 12-15 inches movement in the rip rap at the north end of the pier. • Significant settlement behind the anchor block and in pavements. 7-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes Other areas experience small deformations (less than 2 inches) and more minor damage. Piers 2, 2A and mooring dolphins which are 1960's and 1990's era structures experienced only minor cracking or spalling and remain in service. Terminal yard pavements experienced settlement and cracking damage. Terminal shipping warehouses, the harbor masters office and grain silage building also experienced racking, masonry cracking and minor cladding damage. The fuel tank farm and cement silo experienced only minor cracking. Several electrical and water utilities were broken. The cement and grouted rip rap storm drainage channel also experienced minor cracking displacements, but remained serviceable. Elevation (ft) ,30 za 10 M.LLW. 30 za 30 40 1,7-00 Dense Fill Loose to Dense Natural Coral Sand and Gravel Original Ground Pler 1(typ) Dredged Harbor Bottom Dense Natural Coral Sand & Gravel ` Variable Basalt Formation `_t — — — — — _ 10% Slope — — Hard (fresh) Basalt Figure 7-9. Interpreted subsurface profile of Pier 1 Site Response Study The subsurface geology of Kawaihae Harbor (i.e., loose coral deposits) is significantly different than geologies of the strong motion sites that recorded the Kiholo Bay earthquake, which are located on volcanic soil, ash, or rock. Estimate of surface ground motions at Kawaihae was between 0.3 and 0.6g, A site response analysis was performed based on an average shear wave velocity (Vs) profile. A total of nine Spectral -Analysis -of -Surface Waves (SASW) surveys lines were surveyed at Kawaihae Harbor. The results of the SASW surveys indicate fill and soil thickness of 40 to 90 ft over basalt. Low blow count SPT data in the coralline soils and observed liquefaction confirm that the upper 30 to 50 ft is code site class F. Liquefaction Studies Liquefaction is a soil behavior phenomenon where shear strength loss occurs due to the rapid build-up of excess pore -water pressure, which reduces effective stresses in the soil to zero. It is most commonly generated by strong earthquake ground shaking. In general, soils most susceptible to liquefaction are loose, saturated, uniformly graded sands containing little or no fines, such as dredged fills used to construct reclaimed landside areas of the harbor. Evidence of liquefaction was observed extensively at Kawaihae Harbor in the vicinity of Pier 1 and 2, in pavement areas at the pier structures, in the terminal yard area and within the waterfront storage warehouses. Sand boil emissions occurred through cracks in pavements, with associated settlements up to 7 inches, including shallow footings. Lateral displacements 7-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes up to 18" were observed at Pier 1, the seawall revetment area between Pier 1 and 2, and as localized displacement within the sloping fills abutting the piers. Harbor Building Mitigation Measures With the evolution of building codes, the evaluation of seismic risk in the Hawaiian Islands has gone through substantial change in recent years. Many older buildings would not meet current code requirements for seismic resistance. Harbor buildings that are deemed essential should undergo a thorough existing conditions evaluation to determine potential seismic design and/or construction deficiencies. Wharf and Pier Mitigation Measures Older wharf and pier structures are typically constructed using non -prestressed vertical and battered piles. These piles typically do not have the ductility reinforcing and detailing normally required to resist seismic loads. Four options were identified to improve the lateral resisting system of the existing wharf structures, including: • Install a new independent lateral resisting system with new piles carrying all the lateral loads under the existing deck, tied together. • Install additional vertical piles to share vertical and horizontal loads with existing serviceable piles, again tied together. • Increase the vertical and lateral capacity of existing vertical piles by wrapping piles in fiber -reinforced polymer (FRP) jackets, with doweled and grouted connections. • Add continuous anchor blocks behind the wall with tie rods located perpendicular to the length of the wharf and at opposing 45 degree angles (one in each direction) to resist both transverse and longitudinal seismic loads. Geotechnical Foundation Mitigation Measures Seismic hazards in soils, usually liquefaction or related seismic deformations, can be mitigated using one or a combination of the following soil treatment or ground improvement methods: densification, improvement of drainage characteristics, cementing of the soils, or use of structural elements to resist seismic loads. Structural foundation mitigation for liquefaction can also be used with or in lieu of ground improvements. Piles and micropiles have proven effective against liquefaction hazards by transferring the building loads into non -liquefiable soils, so long as the large horizontal forces can be adequately carried by the piles. Piles and micropiles are not effective when they do not sufficiently extend into non -liquefiable soils or where lateral spread is possible, causing excessively large bending moments in the piles. Planning For each port which may serve as a sole lifeline to its supporting communities, FEMA recommends the following: • Advocate as a highest planning priority to adopt more current standards or codes. • Determine site seismicity and surface ground motions for each critical structure including potential performance, effects of liquefaction and pavement settlements. 7-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes • Develop a seismic risk profile for the port infrastructure system inventory. • Allocate hazard mitigation program funding in compliance with eligibility requirements for FEMA assistance. 7.3 Probability of Occurrence Earthquake recurrence intervals have been estimated by Klein (1994) and Wyss Koyanagi (USGS Bulletin 2006, 1992) and range from 3 to 4.5 years for "large" earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 5.5; 29 to 44 years for "major" earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 7; and, 120 to 180 years for "great" earthquakes approaching a magnitude of 8. Figure 7-10 provides a visual distribution and magnitude of recent and historic earthquakes. 5L KAU,I Oahu `Jiil•a.i North Pacific Ocean EXPLANATION Hawaii 1989 ������jjjjjj 15 Oct 06 Earthquakes 1876 - 2615 • M €7 . 3.99 4-4.99 J� 1974 �i 5-5.99 Is`aut� L�9 rsrs 1'Y M3—U5 C so 100 Malekai �9aP 1-� W Lanai Maui Kahs561awe 700 TO 14v .. tiyasiSaaant 2—thw—k— Wry 7+ 4.5 yea mcm "Y T4ma L4, 4,?ng P -P 4ug 10619 0� 29 0015 19. -155.5 7.0 1666 04 43 4325 19. -155.5 7.!i 1011.. 02 a0 004Z 20=80 -157.00 15 7.0 1908 0"9 71 4631 1..9.40 -155.40 6.9 1PZ5 19 UG 0+91 19-7$ -156-00 4-"i 1938 01 83 4832 21.40 -156.40 66 13151 44 13 00 SZ 19-20 -155-60 6,.s 1951 08 21 1057' 19.48 -155.97 6.9 1954 03 30 1@41 19,35 -. S: 9, 9 6.S 14`75 11 24 1467 19.34 -155.00 9 7.a 1493 11 55 16111 19-.a3-155_dS 11 6_, Figure 7-10. History of Volcanic and Seismic Hazard Events 7-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Hawaii 1989 ������jjjjjj h'rr.na K�:� _ H In 7Y^r! J� 1974 �i Is`aut� L�9 rsrs 1851 11360 p*190U i HGa 700 TO 14v .. tiyasiSaaant 2—thw—k— Wry 7+ 4.5 yea mcm "Y T4ma L4, 4,?ng P -P 4ug 10619 0� 29 0015 19. -155.5 7.0 1666 04 43 4325 19. -155.5 7.!i 1011.. 02 a0 004Z 20=80 -157.00 15 7.0 1908 0"9 71 4631 1..9.40 -155.40 6.9 1PZ5 19 UG 0+91 19-7$ -156-00 4-"i 1938 01 83 4832 21.40 -156.40 66 13151 44 13 00 SZ 19-20 -155-60 6,.s 1951 08 21 1057' 19.48 -155.97 6.9 1954 03 30 1@41 19,35 -. S: 9, 9 6.S 14`75 11 24 1467 19.34 -155.00 9 7.a 1493 11 55 16111 19-.a3-155_dS 11 6_, Figure 7-10. History of Volcanic and Seismic Hazard Events 7-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes 7.3.1.1 Design Seismic Hazard The 2003 or 2006 International Building Code (IBC) defines seismic hazard using two series of maps indicating 0.2 second and 1.0 second spectral acceleration ordinates having a 2% probably of exceedance in 50 years with an implicit adjustment for a deterministic Maximum Considered Earthquake (MCE) within each seismic source zone. The applicable maps for the Hawaiian Islands are shown in Figure 7-11 for a rock site (Site Class B). The design spectral accelerations for a given site are 2/3rds of the MCE level shown in these maps. If required, the accelerations are modified, usually amplified, by the soil conditions underneath the site, if conditions other than rock exist. The IBC incorporates vastly improved seismic hazard mapping of Hawaii compared to previous standards, developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee. 7-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 01104 ¢ir inlvr—Ll , m g — 2OU —175 - -15D — 3r —125- -100- - 9C 125- -100- 9T1 —70— 21° -Go- -so- -40- -35 o—SD- 40-35 — a)" —30- -25- -20- -15- -5- Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes _ ule _+urticnsn da 1& regJad;'s?sced fL2 SEC SPEC I RAL RESPONSE AC01-ERA11ON (5% OF CRI IICAL DAMPIN4 , LGMMF =Tds, % — 150 —125 —100 - -9- - 75 - -6- -50- -40- -3D- -25- -20- -1S - - 10' - - 4 - - ❑ - 1611 16U' 758' "'a F.. '56. 155° lia` .a• V k 21` G r° 9° 21' ss° 1.0 SEC SPECTRAL RESPONSE ACCELERATION (5% OF CRITICAL DAMPING) Figure 7-11. Maximum considered earthquake ground motion for the State of Hawaii of 0.2 and 1.0 second spectral accelerations (5% damping, Site Class B) (ASCE, 2005) Table 7-1 correlates the peak ground acceleration rates to the Modified Mercalli scale. 7-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan T 'x 1 — _ ule _+urticnsn da 1& regJad;'s?sced fL2 SEC SPEC I RAL RESPONSE AC01-ERA11ON (5% OF CRI IICAL DAMPIN4 , LGMMF =Tds, % — 150 —125 —100 - -9- - 75 - -6- -50- -40- -3D- -25- -20- -1S - - 10' - - 4 - - ❑ - 1611 16U' 758' "'a F.. '56. 155° lia` .a• V k 21` G r° 9° 21' ss° 1.0 SEC SPECTRAL RESPONSE ACCELERATION (5% OF CRITICAL DAMPING) Figure 7-11. Maximum considered earthquake ground motion for the State of Hawaii of 0.2 and 1.0 second spectral accelerations (5% damping, Site Class B) (ASCE, 2005) Table 7-1 correlates the peak ground acceleration rates to the Modified Mercalli scale. 7-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes Tnh1P 7-1 _ Conversinn of MMI to PGA Vnlnes Snecifir to 4nwnii32 Perceived Shaking_ Not Felt Weak Light Moderate Strong Very Severe Violent Extreme Strong Potential Damage None None None Very Light Light Moderate Moder- Heavy Very ate/Heavy Heavy Peak Acceleration <3.2 3.2-8.1 8.1-13 13-20 20-32 32-51 51-80 80-128 >128 (%g) Peak Velocity (%g) 1.9 1.9-6.4 6.4-11 11-18 18-28 28-47 47-74 74-120 <120 Modified Mercalli I II-III IV V VI VII VIII IX X Intensity (MMI) Documentation for current hazard maps is given in Seismic Hazard in Hawaii: High Rate of Large Earthquakes and Probabilistic Ground Motion Maps, by Fred W. Klein, Arthur D. Frankel, Charles S. Mueller, Robert L. Wesson, and Paul G. Okubo, Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 479-498. June, 2001; USGS report 2724 published at http://pubs.usgs.gov/imap/2000/i-2724/. 7.3.1.2 Soil Conditions The seismic ground motion at a particular site can be significantly increased by weaker or "softer" soil conditions. Rock and soil conditions are categorized in the IBC by Site Classes A through F, sometimes referred to as Soil Types. Weaker soil indicates areas of greater potential hazard therefore Site Class should also be considered in individual building assessments. To be able to utilize the strong motion data recorded by the USGS Hawaiian strong motion network, knowledge of the subsurface site conditions beneath the USGS stations was required. The subsurface geology and, more important, the shear -wave velocity (Vs) structure beneath the USGS stations has been unknown to date. The information is invaluable to verify the appropriateness of the empirical ground motion attenuation models being used in the state hazard maps produced by USGS and in site-specific hazard analyses for engineering design. To obtain Vs information beneath the USGS strong motion sites, Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW) surveys were performed by the University of Texas, Austin, and URS Corporation in January 2008 (Wong et al. 2008). The SASW technique has been used to obtain Vs profiles at other USGS strong motion sites (e.g., Seattle, the Imperial Valley, and Los Angeles), and this technique has been well validated against other approaches, such as down -hole surveys (e.g., Wong and Silva 2006). The technique has been particularly useful in volcanic regimes where interbedded volcanic sequences can result in low-velocity zones (e.g., Yucca Mountain and Los Alamos). The SASW methodology is a non-destructive and non -intrusive seismic method. It utilizes the dispersive nature of Rayleigh -type surface waves propagating through a layered material to estimate the shear -wave velocity profile of the material (Stokoe et al. 1994; Joh 1996). In this context, dispersion arises when surface -wave velocity varies with wavelength or 32 Based on Wyss & Koyanagi 1992 7-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes frequency. Dispersion in surface -wave velocity arises from the changing stiffness properties of the soil and rock layers with depth. Spectral analysis is used to separate the waves by frequency and wavelength to determine the experimental ("field") dispersion curve for the site. An analytical procedure is then used to theoretically match the field dispersion curve with a one-dimensional layered system of varying layer stiffness's and thicknesses. The one- dimensional Vs profile that generates a dispersion curve that matches the field dispersion curve is presented as the profile at the site. An active seismic source is required for the SASW surveys. In these surveys, one of the NSF's Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES) mobile vibrators, known as "Thumper," was used. Thumper has been designed to be a moderate- to high -frequency vibrator for use in seismic reflection and surface wave projects. The surveys took place from January 7 to 17, 2008 at 22 USGS strong motion sites. Several surveys were also performed at Kawaihae Harbor. The high PGA's recorded at the Waimea Station and the North Kohala Police Station are probably due to thin soil site amplification where a strong velocity contrast exists between the soil and underlying basalt. Based on the survey results, all of the 22 USGS strong motion sites are "soil" sites with Vs30 values ranging from 442 ft/sec at the USDA Laboratory in Hilo (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program [NEHRP] site class E) to 1,812 ft/sec at the South Kohala Fire Station (NEHRP Q. Surprisingly, none of the strong motion sites had rock -like Vs30 values, even sites where basalt outcropped at the surface, such as at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. As demonstrated in the 2006 earthquake, where some strong motion stations recorded peak horizontal accelerations close to lg, site response effects can be significant on the Big Island. As part of FEMA -supported studies following the earthquake, a new 1:100,000 -scale map of site conditions on the Big Island of Hawaii was produced. The mapping makes use of about 25 new SASW measurements (Wong et al., 2008) and 1:100,000 -scale geologic mapping by Sherrod et al. (2007). An earlier 2006 site class map portrayed nearly all of the island as NEHRP site class B; however, based on about 20 SASW measurements in areas mapped as basalt, it is believed that most of the island should be mapped as NEHRP C or D. Vs30 estimates for these basalt sites ranged from 844 to 1,812 ft/sec, spanning NEHRP classes C and D. The median value for these Vs30 estimates is 1,304 ft/sec, with a log mean of 1,274 ft/sec and a standard deviation of 274 ft/sec. The sites cover a range of basaltic rock conditions as depicted on the geologic map, including lava flows, scoria cones, littoral deposits, spatter or tuff cones, cinder cones, and lava domes. Other geologic map unit groups for which only a few Vs30 estimates were made from SASW data include alluvium, ash/tephra, and artificial fill. These were assigned to map units NEHRP site class D, C to E, and C to E, respectively. Geologic deposits for which there is no quantitative velocity data and preliminary site class assignments have been made are sand dunes (D), landslide deposits (D), and glacial deposits (D). Other earthquake -induced ground failure hazards include liquefaction and landslide. Liquefaction occurs when loose granular soils below the water table temporarily lose strength due to excess pore water pressure build-up during prolonged strong earthquake ground shaking. Accordingly, higher potential would tend to occur at sites with these subsurface characteristics in regions of higher seismicity, since events of Richter magnitude 6 or greater with EPGA of greater than 0.1Og are generally necessary to begin to induce liquefaction. 7-16 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes RS r 1— PACIFIC OCEAN 71 1 s�P:e uP�>s P S 1P iS 2P N� P 6 12 16 26 Mks GPdP9k FlIdF'�(Jd0ffi KM t:1PP.P9F6CeIP YSdHIW.H�.. t06n Figure 7-12. URS soils classification 7-17 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Site Class r, Nor NG, sd A. Hard rock >5,000 ft/s NA NA B. Rock 2,500 to 5,000 ft NA NA C. Very dense soil and soft rock 1,200 to 2,500 ft's >50 >2,000 psf D. Stiff soil 600 to 1,200 ft/s 15 to 50 1,000 to 2,000 psf E. Soft clay soil X600 It s 15 <1,000 psf Any profile with more than 10 ft of soil having the following characteristics: -Plasticity index PI > 20, -Moisture content w > 40%, and - Undrained shear strength su < 500 psf F. Soils requiring site response analysis See Section 20.3.1 in accordance with Section 21.1 7-17 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes 7.3.1.3 Nonstructural Damage Assessment Surveys and possible incorporation into building codes must not be overlooked. 7.3.1.4 Susceptible Earthquake Induced Ground Failure Areas More detailed maps based on soils are needed to identify earthquake -induced ground failure hazards such as liquefaction, landslide, and surface rupture. Liquefaction occurs when loose granular soils below the water table temporarily lose strength due to excess pore water pressure build-up during prolonged strong earthquake ground shaking. Accordingly, higher potential would tend to occur at sites with these subsurface characteristics in regions of higher seismicity, since events of Richter magnitude 6 or greater with EPGA of more than 0.1Og are generally necessary to induce liquefaction. There is further work needed to better define areas susceptible to liquefaction and landslides. Localized ground surface rupture may be found in closer proximity to the seismic source zone, but should not be viewed as extensions of subsurface seismic faults. 7.4 Risk Assessment Average Annualized Loss (AAL) of earthquake events is also computed using the HAZUS model. HAZUS computes losses for eight earthquake scenario events with different return periods: 100 -year, 250 -year, 500 -year, 750 -year, 1000 -year, 1500 -year, 2000 -year, and 2500 - year. Based on a HAZUS AAL analysis incorporating soil site factor mapping and Hawaii Construction Cost Data, earthquake AAL is about $65.1 million in Hawaii County. The predominant contributor to loss is the single-family residential construction. County Hawaii Earthquake AAL $65.1 million per year 7.5 Mitigation Strategies 7.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts As described in previous sections of this report, the design vintage can be used as an indicator of a buildings susceptibility to seismic damage. Seismic zonation under which the structure was designed and typical construction type (single or double wall) can be determined by the year built based on the corresponding version of the UBC or IBC in effect at the time. Table 7-2 and Table 7-3 provide statistics of the number of homes built under each version of the UBC, their design seismic zonation, and probable code compliance. Most existing homes are code deficient for seismic resistance. 7-18 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes Table 7-2. Statistics for double wall construction. seismic design level in Hawaii Countv Hawaii County (Double Wall Construction) Effective Date Year of UBC Seismic Zonation Number of Buildings 8, 1962 February 8, 1962 1961 Pre Code 648 PF 3% No Seismic Design April 17, 1968 1967 Pre Code 194 August 8, 1972 1970 Zone 3 1416 83% Code Deficient February 25, 1975 1973 Zone 3 1065 December 11, 1978 1976 Zone 3 2600 January 19, 1985 1982 Zone 3 5010 December, 1993 1991 Zone 3 12126 July, 1999 1994 Zone 4 3759 14% Seismic Compliant Design Total = Total = 26818 Tnhle 7-3_ Statistics fnr sinule wall cnnstrnctinn_ seismic design level in Hawaii Cnnntv Hawaii County (Single Wall Construction) Effective Date Year of UBC Seismic Zonation Number otBuildin # sFebruary 8, 1962 1961 Pre Code 87 59% No Seismic Design April 17, 1968 1967 Pre Code 2109 August 8, 1972 1970 Zone 3 2471 39% Code Deficient February 25, 1975 1973 Zone 3 931 December 11, 1978 1976 Zone 3 1088 January 19, 1985 1982 Zone 3 1378 December, 1993 1991 Zone 3 1271 July, 1999 1994 Zone 4 293 2% Seismic Compliant Design Total = 18264 7.5.1.1 Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee The Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee (HSEAC) was founded in 1990 by the Hawaii State Civil Defense Agency (SCD) to bring together seismic expertise from the Hawaii scientific, engineering, and emergency management communities. HSEAC serves as a technical advisory committee to SCD for identifying and implementing seismic hazards mitigation programs. 7-19 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes HSEAC identified the need prepare for these earthquakes by developing an understanding and knowledge of potential losses - to humans, buildings, infrastructure, businesses - and potential needs - hospital beds, shelter, transportation and utilities, debris removal - in order to mitigate both short and long term losses. 7.5.1.2 Hawaii County Assessment of Critical Facilities The project engineering team consisting of the University of Hawaii, Martin & Chock, and Miyasato Kuniyoshi has conducted an all -hazard rapid visual screening (RVS) of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii. This included emergency command and control facilities, emergency first responders (fire stations, ambulance and police facilities), hospitals and clinics, and the two major airports (KOA and ITO). A HAZUS MH risk assessment model has been used to evaluate the expected losses for each building, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and the RVS site visits. The vulnerability of a building can be measured by economic loss or by loss of functionality related to the extent of damage. Both of these risk measures have been analyzed for earthquake and hurricane hazards at an equivalent level of probability, so that an "apples to apples" comparison of effects was made possible. From the 80 buildings, a shorter candidate list of 32 structures that ranked highest in risk was first identified, and then building design and construction feature vulnerabilities were weighed in order to develop a list for review. In accordance with this FEMA project scope, two facility groups that ranked high based on the RVS and HAZUS analysis were designated by Hawaii County Civil Defense for more detailed evaluation and development of recommended mitigation procedures. A Benefit -Cost Analysis of the mitigation project construction funding was performed. This detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit a PDM grant application for retrofit of Kau Hospital, and prioritizes critical facilities most in need of future retrofits. 7.5.1.3 Structural Seismic Retrofit for Residential Post and Pier Homes A survey of 53 post and pier houses on the island of Hawaii was performed to determine the typical structural characteristics and variations in structural properties of these houses in the most vulnerable areas. The survey also investigated the extent of damage of these homes during the 2006 earthquakes along with any attempts to retrofit the houses at the time of survey. Based on this survey, a number of prototypical models of post and pier houses were analyzed for different levels of ground motion. A number of aspects of the houses were found to require retrofitting for even moderate levels of ground motion. From the analysis, three retrofit options were developed, with the applicability of each retrofit based on the location of the house and its structural properties. The retrofits are presented in a general format that can be applied to a wide range of houses without specific input from a structural engineer, except in special cases. Retrofit Option 1 is primarily a strengthening of connections using the existing post and pier foundation system, applicable in regions of low to moderate seismic hazard and for houses with moderate differential post heights. Retrofit Option 2 uses additional plywood shear walls between the ground and first 7-20 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes floor of a house to provide additional lateral strength and stiffness to the foundation system. This retrofit is applicable in all regions with most combinations of differential post height and other structural properties. Retrofit Option 3 uses masonry shear walls to provide additional lateral strength and stiffness. This option is applicable for any post and pier house, although in some extreme cases a structural engineer would need to be consulted if the properties of the house fall outside the range of properties considered in the report. 7.5.1.4 Kiholo Bay HAZUS model validation and inventory update The 15 October 2006 moment magnitude (M) 6.7 earthquake beneath Kiholo Bay was among the largest to have occurred in Hawaii since written records have been maintained. For many, the Kiholo Bay earthquake served as an introduction to the fact that Hawaii is seismically active, and it reminds us that Hawaii is exposed to significant seismic hazard. Although no deaths or serious injuries were reported, damage estimates exceeded $200 million, resulting in the declaration of a major disaster by the U.S. government (FEMA - 1664 -DR -HI). Development of the HAZUS (Hazards U.S.) earthquake model began in 1992 and much of the methodology is based upon empirical observations from past damaging earthquake events. There is a critical national need to document the performance of loss estimation methodologies such as HAZUS and the 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake disaster provided a unique, but perishable opportunity to compare HAZUS-MH modeled results to those observed in the disaster. In addition, this was a relatively rare opportunity to test the model performance outside of California. The results of the validation study were also used to develop a recommended procedure for using HAZUS-MH in future events with the enhanced data to support FEMA and the State of Hawaii that addresses uncertainty and identifies the priority HAZUS-MH products. At the time of the 2006 earthquake, the State of Hawaii utilized HAZUS 99 runs with progressively more information during the first 10 hours of the quake. The runs included a 2000 -vintage building inventory aggregated by census tract, developed under previous FEMA contracts for Hawaii and Maui counties. However, HAZUS 99 damage and losses far exceeded ground truthed data. FEMA, working with the USGS, obtained a rapid ShakeMap product that included ground shaking information from felt reports, as well as 12 dial-up strong ground motion stations that greatly enhanced the results of the HAZUS-MH model. FEMA completed a run using the HAZUS level 1 data and version 12 of ShakeMap on 17 October where the losses dropped to about $200M total ($30M structural). Accordingly, in this study, data improvements are made with the goal of enabling operational use of HAZUS- MH with the present-day enhanced dataset and ShakeMap, and discontinuing use of HAZUS 99. This study further enhanced the Hawaii and Maui County building stock by using residential and commercial property tax databases and several state government property databases, and conducted loss estimation at the detailed census block level rather than at the geographically large census tracts that characterize the Big Island. The project incorporated the unique Hawaii building types including the vulnerable post and pier single-wall construction type that statistically exhibited much higher damage levels than conventional wood -frame construction on slab -on -grade. 7-21 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes Enhanced shear -wave velocity measurements on the Big Island are incorporated into the ShakeMap product used in the analysis. Comparisons of observed versus modeled results show good correlation, including casualties, structural and non-structural economic losses, highway bridge impacts, and damage by building counts. The detailed validation study includes comparisons of modeled results to observed damage data collected from FEMA's Individual and Public Assistance programs and the ATC -20 process. The HAZUS Advanced Engineering Building Module (AEBM) technique was used to evaluate the modeled loss results for selected public buildings against the observed loss details of the disaster assistance worksheets. Table 7-4. Hawaii County comparison of W1 and MH SBT Enhanced Data model run with ShakeMap vs. publicly documented damage counts HAZUS Damage LevelZ None Loss Ratio 070 595e 570-259'0 2570-50% 5095- 10070 HAZUS MH Enhanced 39465 2910 128 2 0 Data Model - Estimated Number of W1 Homes FEMA IA counts for 39253 2989 185 3 2 W1 ---------------------- ---------------------------__------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HAZUS MH Enhanced 11860 2613 293 3 u Data Model - Estimated Number of MH Homes FE MA IA counts for 13828 820 113 2 = MH HAZUS MH Enhanced 51325 5523 421 5 Data Madel W1 and MH FEMA IA 53081 3809 298 8 ATC Tags 55265 1705 (Green) 227 (Yellow) 77 (Red) (Limited Scope) ARC Survey I 54945 2409 280 40 7.5.1.5 Power Reliability Improvements Following the Kiholo Bay Earthquake, associated power system events led to island -wide blackouts for Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. (RECO) on Oahu and Maui Electric Company, Ltd. (MECO) on Maui, although there was little apparent seismic damage to the electric systems on either island. Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc. (HELCO) on the island of Hawaii maintained partial service with an isolated section, or "island" of generation and customer load in the Hilo area. Since this event, efforts have been made to improve the reliability of the power systems on all islands, with the primarily focus on the Island of Oahu where the effects of the blackout were greatest. 7-22 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7: Hazard Analysis Earthquakes 7.5.2 Future Plans Project Description Status Adapt HAZUS MH or other hazard New building inventory data for HAZUS MH new model for modeling to Hawaii Island; Hawaii County will make HAZUS disaster planning ise ready for use Develop scenario training and MH be capable of producing m2010 mitigation planning capabilities; earthquake damage maps and Implement operational use of reports at a much higher spatial HAZUS MH for use by the Pacific resolution, based on the best Disaster Center for immediate loss available building and soil data, and estimates during future it will perform analysis using earthquakes on Hawaii Island ShakeMap output from USGS. Update the HAZUS MH model to Compile detailed data on bridges in Proposed HSEAC Planning incorporate detailed data on State Hawaii County Project and County Bridges Update the HAZUS MH model and develop more accurate bridge Current loss models reflect default damage estimates for earthquake data that is incomplete and not up scenarios to date with present status Formulate priority rankings of higher vulnerability bridges not yet retrofitted Identify earthquake -induced round failure area Public Symposia and Teacher Training Workshops on Natural Hazards (Jan. — May 2010) CSAV hosts a series of four public symposia and teacher training workshops that address the major natural hazards occurring in Hawaii (Volcanic Eruptions, Earthquakes, Tsunami, and Hurricanes). Educational Outreach by USGS Hawaii Earthquake Fact Sheet Ongoing preparation Coastal Hazard Cards Ongoing distribution 7-23 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 8. Lava and VOG Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG CHAPTER 8 - LAVA FLOWS, VOLCANIC GAS, AND ASHFALL 8.1 Hazard Description 8.1.1 Lavallolcanoes The Island of Hawaii is composed of five volcanoes, two of which (Mauna Loa and Kilauea) have been very active in the past 100 years and pose the most immediate threat to life and property. A third volcano, Hualalai, last erupted in 1801 and has the potential to erupt again within our lifetime. Mauna Kea last erupted approximately 3,500 years ago. Kohala, considered extinct, is the oldest volcano on the island and last erupted approximately 60,000 years ago. Most of the eruptions of Hawaiian volcanoes are not explosive (therefore ash fall is not a ma- jor concern) and are characterized by relatively quiet outflow of very fluid lava. These erup- tions, however, can still be quite hazardous because they may be erupted in huge volumes, and on steeper slopes, the fluid lava can rapidly travel many miles from its source.33 Lava flows present potential threats to homes, infrastructure, natural and historic resources and entire communities. The areas exposed to the highest risk from lava flows are those situated downslope and in close proximity to the active rift zones of Mauna Loa and Kilauea. Steep slopes may allow lava flows to move quickly from the summit to the ocean in a matter of hours. Besides the direct threat of inundation, lava flows may also cut across a community's single roadway escape route limiting the amount of time available for evacuation. The following briefly profiles the volcanoes that pose potential hazards. • Mauna Loa, like most Hawaiian volcanoes, has a summit caldera and two radiating rift or fracture zones. Comprising approximately 50% of the island of Hawaii, Mauna Loa poses a lava hazard threat to the districts of South Hilo, Puna, Ka'u, South Kona, North Kona and South Kohala. Mauna Loa eruptions can occur at the summit, from vents on the southwest rift zone and the east rift zone and on the north and northwest flanks of the volcano. • Kilauea is one of the world's most active volcanoes and over 90% of its surface is covered by lava less than 1,100 years old. All of Kilauea's eruptions have occurred either at its summit, or along one of two rift zones that extend from the summit to the coastline on the east and southwest flanks of the volcanoes. Eruptions on the east flank of Kilauea are a threat to portions of the Puna district. Eruptions on the southwest flank of Kilauea are a threat to land within the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park and the district of Ka'u. • Hualalai is much older than Kilauea and Mauna Loa and has not erupted since 1800-1801. Eruption activity on Hualalai has been far less frequent with 25% of the volcano covered by flows less than 1,000 years old. Hualalai has erupted near its summit, along the northwest and south-southeast rift zones and from vents on the north flank of the volcano. Eruptions on Hualalai threaten land within the North Kona district. 33 USGS Fact Sheet 074-97. 8-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG 8.1.2 VOG "VOG," coined from "volcanic smog" but standing for "Volcanic Gas", is a term used by the public in Hawaii to describe hazy conditions caused by gaseous emissions from Kilauea volcano. Vog is created when Volcanic Gases (primarily oxides of sulfur, SO2) react with sunlight, oxygen and moisture. The result includes sulphuric acid and other sulfates. VOG is made up of a mixture of gases and aerosols which makes it hard to study and potentially more dangerous than either on their own. The SO2 gas in VOG is greater near the sources (Halema`uma`u and Pu`u `O`o vents). SO2 levels are lessened further away or upwind from the vents. Vog mostly affects the Kona coast on the west side of the Island of Hawaii, where the prevailing trade winds blow the vog to the southwest and southern winds then blow it north up the Kohala coast. The haze caused by vog may be heavy in West Hawaii, but the SO2 levels are typically lower due to the geographic distance from the sources. One cannot judge the amount of SO2 in the air or its danger to humans and plants by how heavy the vog appears, SO2 levels can be high with only light vog. Figure 8-1. Volcanic Gas Emissions at Kilauea Volcano's Summit Vent on May, 2009 8-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG Figure 8-2. Aerial view of Hawaii showing circulation of VOG under prevailing winds, May 13, 200934 Figure 8-3. Aerial view of Hawai'i showing circulation of VOG under prevailing winds, June 2, 20083' 34 Image taken from National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observatory Website, Retrieved on October 12, 2009 from http: //earthob sen,atory. nasa. gov/IOTD/view.php?id=3 8709&src=iotdrss 8-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG Hawcfii (birq island) ffur DlcWde Mass (metric tans) 15 3- Figure 8-#. Concentrations of SO2 under prevailing winds in the Main Hawaiian Islands, April 30, 200936 8.1.2.1 The Chemistry of, and Reactions Occurring in, Kilauea's Vog Plumes The vog plumes from Kilauea contain a variety of compounds, at varying concentrations, that could have adverse impacts on the downwind communities and environment. There are three primary sources of volcanic gases from Kilauea: Halema'uma'u, at the summit of Kilauea, the "TEB Vent", located on the upper Kilauea East Rift Zone (KERZ), and the ocean entry along the Puna shoreline. The compositions of each are generally different, and the compositions can vary depending on local and temporal conditions. 8.1.2.1.1 Halema'uma'u The Halema'uma'u discharge contains carbon dioxide (CO2), water vapor (H2O), sulfur dioxide (SO2), sulfur trioxide (S03) and smaller amounts of hydrogen sulfide (H2S), hydrochloric acid (HCl), and hydrofluoric acid (HF), as well as a number of trace gases. Although most of the gases discharged are the result of degassing of magma (within or below 35 Image taken from National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observatory Website, Retrieved on October 12, 2009 from http://earthobservatoiy.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=8800 36 Image taken from National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observatory Website, Retrieved on October 12, 2009 from http://earthobservatoiy.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=8706 8-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG the recently formed pit) there can also be contributions (of water vapor, hydrogen sulfide, and sulfur trioxide) from lower temperature hydrothermal systems that surround the magma conduit below and around Halema'uma'u. Soon after the gases discharge from the magma or the conduit surfaces, they begin to cool and undergo a variety of internal reactions and reactions with the atmosphere. While in the gas phase all the above compounds are transparent but, with cooling, sulfur trioxide will rapidly combine with water vapor (from the plume or the atmosphere) to form a sulfuric acid (H2SO4) aerosol. Under relatively dry conditions, the sulfuric acid aerosol can be distinguished by its bluish cast; when abundant water is present, a dense white plume is formed. HCl and HF will also condense onto solid particulates, if the latter are present, or form aerosol droplets by combining with condensing water vapor. Under dry atmospheric conditions, the plume will drift downwind and mix with the air column which will decrease the dew point in the discharge plume and the aerosol droplets will dehydrate and disperse. Under moist conditions, the plume will remain hydrated and the aerosols will remain much more visible. Mixing with air will also lead to reactions between atmospheric oxygen and the sulfur compounds sulfur dioxide and hydrogen sulfide. Sulfur dioxide is the more reactive of the two, with reported half-lives as short as a few tens of minutes to as long as several days depending on the chemical constituents in the air mass (e.g. urban air pollution, marine air), as well as the intensity of ultraviolet radiation. Given the absence of significant sulfur dioxide in the vog plume by the time it reaches Kona, it's likely that the half-life in the Hawaii air mass is no more than a few hours. The oxidation of any hydrogen sulfide present in the plume occurs at a much slower rate where the half-life of H2S in the atmosphere may be a day or more. The oxidation of sulfur dioxide will result in the formation of additional sulfur trioxide/sulfuric acid aerosol (because sulfur trioxide is extremely hygrosocopic, it will extract nearly any and all available water vapor from the atmosphere to form the acid aerosol) to contribute to the dry haze in the downwind plume. The oxidation process will continue until all of the sulfur dioxide is converted to sulfuric acid. Mixing of the plume with the atmosphere also brings the plume constituents into contact with ammonia that is derived from biogenic decay processes occurring in tropical soils. In the presence of water, ammonia (NH3) forms a weak base (NH40H) that will react very rapidly with the sulfuric acid aerosols to form ammonium sulfate [(NH4) 2SO41, and with the hydrochloric and hydrofluoric acids to form ammonium chloride (NH4C1) and ammonium fluoride (NH4F) respectively. Although these ammonia salts are not as hygroscopic as sulfur trioxide, they are sensitive to atmospheric moisture levels and the optical density of the plume will vary depending on the relative humidity in the ambient air. Whereas the non-reactive gas phase components of the plume (e.g. carbon dioxide) will gradually disperse, the aerosols are subject to both gravitational settling, through a process called dry deposition, as well as scrubbing from the atmosphere by rainfall. Although the aerosols can serve as a source of condensation nuclei for raindrop formation, some studies 8-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG have suggested that the plume may be providing an overabundance of nuclei that have inhibited drop growth resulting in a decline in rainfall rates in Ka'u and South Kona. The sulfur dioxide as well as the dry deposition of the plume aerosols can cause a variety of adverse impacts on the downwind environment and communities: 1) Sulfur dioxide and residual acid aerosols (that haven't reacted with ammonia) have been found to have broad detrimental impacts on non-native and agricultural crop biota. (There is some evidence that native plants have developed a degree of resistance to sulfur dioxide and/or the acid constituents in the plume.) The farming communities in Ka'u and HOVE have seen extensive defoliation and leaf damage to both edible crops as well as flowering and ornamental plants (tomatoes, lettuce, roses, protea, etc.). 2) The acid aerosols have been found to substantially lower the pH of rainfall. In locations with limited rainfall (e.g. HOVE) the combined effect of dry deposition of acid aerosols onto roofs, along with acid rainfall, substantially lowers the pH (becoming more acid) of domestic rainwater catchment systems. The likely consequences of the acidified domestic water are increased corrosion of the metallic constituents of both the roof and the plumbing equipment, as well as potential adverse health impacts from consuming the water (e.g. weakened dental enamel, poor uptake of dietary minerals). Increased acidity of the rainfall also has the potential to increase heavy metal exposure from leaching lead from paint (manufactured prior to 1978 when lead oxide was banned from paint) or plumbing systems that have used tin -lead alloys in their solder. The acid will likewise increase corrosion to any exposed metal along the path of the downwind plume including fencing, water lines, water tanks, farm equipment, etc. Even in relatively dry downwind areas, severe corrosion will generate significant economic losses. The most likely process driving the corrosion is dew formation rather than the infrequent rainfall: during the evening hours, as the dew point temperature is approached, the hygroscopic acid aerosols will form an extremely corrosive film, with pH as low as 1, on metallic surfaces. With daily replenishment of fresh acid from dry deposition, and nightly condensation of moisture it's reasonable to anticipate substantially more rapid deterioration of exposed metal surfaces than would occur in similar environments not exposed to the plume acids. A further effect of the increased loading of acid onto agricultural lands in the downwind areas will be accelerated leaching of minerals from the soil column. To date, this process has not been fully researched and, hence, it's difficult to offer an assessment of the long-term impacts of acidification of rainfall on the agriculture communities downwind of Kilauea. 3) The dry deposition of the acid aerosols and ammonia salts will increase the exposure of the downwind environment and communities to chloride, sulfate, and fluoride ions. Whereas moderate dietary intake of chloride and sulfate ion are relatively benign, fluoride ion is both an essential element, at low rates of intake, but can be extremely 8-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG toxic at excessive levels of consumption. Recent surveys of domestic catchment systems in the area of HOVE and Volcano have shown that plume constituents are contributing chloride, sulfate and fluoride ions to catchment waters. HOVE water samples showed the higher concentrations of these ions, by factors of four to ten above those of Volcano, and reflect a higher integrated exposure to plume deposition than did the Volcano community. (The higher rainfall rates and flow through the catchment systems in Volcano is also likely to contribute to the lower values there.) The median values of all ions for both communities were considerably lower than drinking water standards but some samples from both the HOVE and Volcano areas did show values that were substantially higher than the median values and were much closer to drinking water limits. Hence, significant changes in the plume discharge rates or in weather patterns could warrant further monitoring of the catchment systems. Of potentially greater concern is the deposition of fluoride salts onto forage crops. The scientific literature has documented a number of events where sheep, cattle, and horses have suffered significant losses as a result of both acute exposure as well as chronic exposure and accumulation of fluoride salts by grazing animals. Although there have been a few anecdotal reports of symptoms of fluorosis by some ranchers on the Big Island, further investigations will be necessary to determine whether the forage crops are accumulating sufficient fluoride to be of concern in the downwind communities. 8.1.2.1.2 TEB Vent and Pu 'u O 'o The TEB vent, located on the Kilauea East Rift Zone (KERZ), is discharging gases similar to those at Halema'uma'u, albeit at different relative concentrations. Due to the dynamics of gas release from magma, the relative amount of carbon dioxide to sulfur dioxide is lower at the TEB vent than at Halema'uma'u and the concentrations of HCl and HF are somewhat higher. This discharge is also likely to have lower amounts of sulfur trioxide and hydrogen sulfide than the summit discharge. The sulfur dioxide emission rates from TEB Vent have ranged as high as 2000 tonnes per day but currently are in the range of 1000 tonnes per day or somewhat less. The chemical processes occurring in the TEB plume, are in most respects, identical to those occurring in the Halema'uma'u plume but, because of the vent's location on the KERZ, the trajectory taken by the plume (during normal trade wind conditions) is substantially different from that of the former. Whereas the Halema'uma'u plume is often affected by the upslope winds generated by daytime heating of Mauna Loa's flanks, the TEB plume is far enough off -shore that it only rarely affects the south-east flank of Mauna Loa. However, the TEB plume has shown a history of becoming trapped in the eddy system on the southwest and western flank of Mauna Loa and has consistently affected air quality on the Kona side of the island since the initiation of the Pu'u O'o eruption in 1983. With the onset of the Halema'uma'u eruption, the addition of its plume to that of TEB has produced further deterioration in the Kona air quality. 8-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG Because the TEB plume has traversed a significantly longer trajectory on it's path to the Mauna Loa eddy system, nearly all the sulfur dioxide from the discharge has been oxidized to sulfate, and a higher proportion of the acid aerosols have been neutralized to ammonium salts, than has occurred in the Halema'uma'u plume during its trajectory across Ka'u and into the HOVE area. As a result, under trade wind conditions, the adverse effects of the TEB plume on the Kona community are likely to be more moderate than has been seen in Ka'u and HOVE. However, when southerly winds occur around the island, the TEB plume is carried across the upper Puna area and across into the Hilo area and surrounding communities. Under those conditions, the TEB plume carries abundant sulfur dioxide and acid aerosols. Due to the relative infrequency of these conditions, there's been little documented adverse affect beyond the nuisance effects of poor air quality. Under prolonged or frequent southerly winds, the more populous Hilo and Puna communities would likely experience similar, or even worse, impacts that have been documented in the Ka'u and HOVE communities. 8.1.2.1.3 Ocean Entry Plume The steam and gas plume generated when lava flows into the ocean has a substantially different composition from that of Halema'uma'u and TEB. Whereas in the latter, sulfur dioxide is a major contributor to the acid aerosols present in their plumes, the ocean entry plume contains only minor amounts of sulfur dioxide but much higher concentrations of hydrochloric acid. The latter is generated by the reactions occurring when seawater is boiled to near dryness by its interaction with the lava. The ocean entry plume is also rich in steam and aerosolized seawater, the hydrochloric acid tends to precipitate out more rapidly and, hence, poses a greater threat only in close proximity to the source and a much lesser threat further downwind. Further alleviating the potential for the ocean entry plume to adversely impact the community is that, under the more common trade wind conditions, the plume is driven offshore and over the ocean where most of the aerosols are precipitated out. Hence, the ocean entry plume is only of concern in the immediate vicinity of the shoreline and only during conditions that would bring the plume ashore. 8.1.2.2 Health Effects It appears that the levels of vog normally present do not produce acute symptoms although they may produce respiratory problems. Sulfur dioxide is irritating to the eyes, nose, throat and respiratory tract. Short-term exposure to elevated levels of SO2 may cause inflammation and irritation, resulting in burning of the eyes, coughing, difficulty in breathing and a feeling of chest tightness. "Sensitive groups" are children and those with pre-existing respiratory conditions such as asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, and chronic lung or heart disease. These people are especially sensitive to SO2 and may respond to very low levels in the air. Prolonged or repeated exposure to higher levels may increase the danger. Other common symptoms of vog exposure include the following: • Headaches • Breathing difficulties • Increased susceptibility to respiratory ailments • Watery eyes • Sore throat 8-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG 8.1.2.3 Effects on Plants Sulfur dioxide must enter leaf mesophyll tissue, through stomata (natural openings in leaf surfaces that regulate gas exchange), to cause plant injury. Once SO2 enters the moist mesophyll tissue, it combines with water and is converted to sulfuric acid which burns plant tissue. The general effects of SO2 exposure to plants may vary and depend upon plant species, age, and the SO2 dosage; these effects may include: • reduced seed germination • enhanced susceptibility to other diseases • foliar necrosis (spots, blight) • epicuticular wax erosion • rupture of epidermis, plasmolysis • reduced chlorophyll content • increased membrane permeability of plant leaves • decreased plant growth (root length, shoot length, leaf numbers) • plant organ or entire plant death 8.1.3 Ashfall Large amounts of ash were deposited both up- and down -wind from the large explosive events of 1790 and 1924. By contrast, the 2008 -ongoing Kilauea summit eruption has been persistently producing small amounts of ash punctuated by brief periods of increased production. HVO ash leachate analyses of samples collected near Halema uma'u after explosive events in March and April found high levels of fluoride and some metals (cadmium, copper, lead, and chromium for example). These levels were elevated but not high enough to warrant immediate concern because of the low ash emission rate measured, even during explosive events. Substances like fluoride could be of concern downwind of any eruption if substantial accumulation occurs, either by increased ash deposition or by a significantly prolonged eruption. 8.2 Significant Historic Events The recorded history of volcanic activity in Hawai'i begins with the arrival of the Christian missionaries in the early 1800's and those that are known from oral traditions of the Hawai- ians. Additional information on prehistoric eruptions is based on geologic mapping and dat- ing of old lava flows. 8.2.1 Mauna Loa Mauna Loa has had 33 historically recorded eruptions, most of which have occurred at the summit. Approximately 25% of the eruptions have started on the east-northeast rift zone and another 25% began in the southwest rift zone .37 During the period from 1832 to 1950, 37 Draft Lava Flow Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2002 8-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG Mauna Loa averaged one eruption every 3.6 years.38 Since 1950, eruption activity on Mauna Loa has slowed considerably. The two eruptions since 1950 include a 1 -day summit eruption in 1975 and a 3 -week eruption on the northeast rift zone which advanced to within 4 miles of Hilo. Six eruptions from Mauna Loa have reached the ocean since 1859. The 1859 eruption on the northwest flank of Mauna Loa lasted approximately 300 days and reached the ocean north of Kiholo Bay in the North Kona district. Between 1868 and 1950, 5 lava flows have reached the ocean from eruptions on the southwest rift zone of Mauna Loa. These flows traveled quickly with 4 out of the 5 reaching the ocean in 3 to 48 hours .39 These flows entered the ocean in the South Kona and Ka'u districts. The eruption of 1950 destroyed the Ho' okena- mauka village in South Kona with the swiftly flowing lava traveling 14 miles in only 3 hours. Although the lava flow also crossed the area's only highway in two places, the residents of the village escaped unharmed .40 8.2.2 Kilauea Kilauea was almost continuously erupting at its summit caldera from the beginning of historic records up until 1924. Since 1955, most of the activity has occurred along the east rift zone. The latest eruption of the east rift zone began in 1983 and is still ongoing as of the date of this report. The southwest rift zone has been less active with only 5 eruptions in the past 200 years; the latest was in 1974.41 April 1, 1955 (FEMA DR -32) Hawaii County experienced approximately $12.6 M in damages. About 1,580 hectares (3,900 acres) were covered by 108 million cubic meters (141 million cubic yards) of lava, mostly a a. Of the covered land, about 450 hectares (1,100 acres) were under cultivation in the Kama ili, Kehena, Ke' eke' e, Kau' eleau, and Kapoho areas. Approximately 10.1 km (6.3 miles) of public road were buried, as were many kilometers (miles) of cane -field roads. Iwasaki Camp, in Kama ili near the upper big bend in the road to ' Opihikao, was overrun, but fortunately some of the houses and all personal belongings had been removed. Tragically, surviving remnants of the camp were destroyed on the last day of the eruption, May 26. In all, 21 houses were overrun by ' a a during the eruption January 21, 1960 (" 1960 Kapoho Eruption of Kilauea Volcano Hawaii") (FEMA DR -96) The eruption of Kilauea ended on December 21, 1958; however the reservoir beneath the summit was filled with lava. Tine earthquakes were recorded near the summit of Kilauea and 38 Macdonald, G.A., A. T. Abbott, F.L. Peterson, Volcanoes in the Sea (2d ed.), University of Hawaii Press, 1983. 39 Heliker, 1990 40 USGS Fact Sheet 074-97 41 Heliker, 1990. 8-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG on January 12, 1960, more than 1000 earthquakes were recorded north of Kapoho. On January 13, 1960, the volcano erupted, destroying the villages of Koa' e and Kapoho. Volcanic gases were also a significant health issue during this eruption. Figure 8-5. Photograph of 1960 eruption taken 10:00 am January 14, 1960 May 18, 1990 (FEMA DR -864) Between 1983 and 1990, lava flow from the Kilauea volcano struck communities along its southern coast. This eruption is the volcanoes most destructive in the past 100 years. In 1990, it moved through the entire community of Kalapana.42 It has destroyed 210 homes, a visitor center at the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park, 8 miles of highways, and historical and archaeological sites. 8.3 Probability of Occurrence 8.3.1 Hazard Areas The U.S. Geological Survey has prepared maps showing volcanic hazard zones in Hawaii County. The "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii," 1990, authored by Christina Heliker and published by the U. S. Geological Survey, describes the lava flow haz- ard zone maps (see Figure 8-6) as follows: Maps showing volcanic hazard zones on the island of Hawaii were first prepared in 1974 by Donal Mullineaux and Donald Petersen of the U.S. Geological Survey and were revised in 1987. The current map divides the island into zones that are ranked from 1 through 9 based on the probability of coverage by lava flows. Other direct hazards from 42 USGS Fact Sheet 074-97 8-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG eruptions, such as tephra fallout and ground cracking and settling, are not specifically considered on this map; however, these hazards also tend to be greatest in the areas of highest hazard from lava flows. Hazard zones from lava flows are based chiefly on the location and frequency of both historic and prehistoric eruptions. The hazard zones also take into account the larger topographic features of the volcanoes that will affect the distribution of lava flows. Finally, any hazard assessment is based on the assumption that future eruptions will be similar to those in the past. Hazard zone boundaries are approximate. The change in the degree of hazard from one zone to the next is generally gradual rather than abrupt, and the change can occur over the distance of a mile or more. Within a single hazard zone, the severity of hazard may vary on a scale too fine to map. These variations may be the result of gradual changes that extend across the entire zone. For example, the hazard posed by lava flow decreases gradually as the distance from vents increases. There may be abrupt changes, however, in the relative hazard because of the local topography. For example, the hills behind Ninole stand high above the adjacent slopes of Mauna Loa and consequently are at a much lower risk from lava flows than the surrounding area, even though the entire area is included in a single zone. To determine the hazard differences within a single zone, more detailed studies are required. Table 8-1 provides the legend for the Lava Flow Hazard Zone Map. Zone 1 is the most haz- ardous area and includes the summits and the rift zones of Mauna Loa and Kilauea which have been the most active in historic time. Zone 2 includes those areas adjacent and down- slope of active rift zones. Zone 3 areas are gradually less hazardous than Zone 2 because of greater distance from the recently active vents and/or topographic conditions make it less likely to be covered by lava. Zone 4 includes all of Hualalai where the frequency of eruptions is lower than on Kilauea or Mauna Loa.43 It is anticipated that volcanic gases will also be a significant hazard during the next eruptions of Mauna Loa and Hualalai. 43 Heliker, 1990 8-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG Table 8-1. Le„ end for Lara Flow Hazard Zone Map Hazard Zones for Lava Flows Zone Percentage of area covered by lava since 1800 Percentage of area covered by lava in last 750 years Explanation Zone 1 >25% >65% Includes the summits and rift zones of Kilauea and Mauna Loa where vents have been repeatedly active in historic time. Zone 2 18-25% 25-75% Areas adjacent to and downslope of active rift zones. Zone 3 1-5% 15-75% Areas gradationally less hazardous than zone 2 because of greater distance from recently active vents and/or because the topography makes it less likely that flows will cover these areas. Zone 4 approx. 5% <15% Includes all of Hualalai, where the frequency of eruptions is lower than on Kilauea and Mauna Low. Flows typically cover large areas. Zone 5 none approx. 50% Areas currently protected from lava flows by the topography of the volcano. Zone 6 none very little Same as Zone 5. Zone 7 none none 20% of this area covered by lava 3,500-5,000 years ago. Zone 8 none none Only a few percent of this area covered in the past 10,000 years. Zone 9 none none No eruption in this area for the last 60,000 years. Volcanic Ha;,wxl %)ne - 2 14 E _ 5 fi 7 g 8 Figure 8-6. Lara Flow Hazard Zone Map 8-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG Future large eruptions of Mauna Loa's southwest rift zone and Hualalai in Kona may evolve quickly and produce lava flows that travel up to tens of kilometers in a few hours or less, generally faster than velocities expected for typical flows at Kilauea. Radial vent eruptions on Mauna Loa's north and west flank occur outside the rift zones (e.g., 1859 eruption and 1877 submarine eruption) and could represent a greater problem than rift zone eruptions because of their potential to begin closer to or within developed areas. 8.4 Risk Assessment Lava risk can be assessed fairly easily, at any property where lava inundation occurs a total loss is assumed. Therefore if the theoretical recurrence interval of lava inundation at an area is known the annual loss (AAL) can be computed by multiplying the total value of the exposed properties by the annual probability of lava inundation. The results of this analysis are included in Table 8-2. The projected AAL for lava inundation is about $24 Million/year. Table 8-2. Lava inundation AAL of Building Stock in Hazard Zone Tract District 1 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 Exposure Value (S) AAL ALLR by Tract 15001020100 PapaiR -Waflea 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% $ 520,302,382 $ 1,051 0.0002% 15001020200 Hilo: Upper Wankea Forest Reserve 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% $ 232,608,007 $ 470 0.0002% 15001020300 Hilo: Puueo-Downtown 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 758,039,632 $ 782,052 0.1032% 15001020400 Hilo: Villa Franca-Kailcdo 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 632,534,825 $ 652,572 0.1032% 15001020500 Hilo: Univers ty-Houselots 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,386,852,781 $ 1,430,784 0.1032% 15001020600 Hilo: Keaukaha-Partaewa 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,176,770,100 $ 1,214,046 0.1032% 15001020701 Hilo: Puaako 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 554,714,650 $ 572,286 0.1032% 15001020702 Hilo: Kawailaru 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 555,696,175 $ 573,299 0.1032% 15001020801 Hilo: Kukuau-Kaumarta 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 504,970,475 $ 520,966 0.1032% 15001020802 Hilo: Pnhonua-Kaumarta 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 717,253,225 $ 739,974 0.1032% 15001020900 Hilo: Hailtiri 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 568,778,950 $ 586,796 0.1032% 15001021001 Lo-Keaau 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,699,785,371 $ 1,753,629 0.1032% 15001021002 Keaau-Volcano 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,448,609,457 $ 1,494,497 0.1032% 15001021100 Pahoa-Kalap- 45% 45% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,082,017,600 $ 7,629,913 .7052% 0.70527T.- 15001021200 15001021200 Kau 0% 50% 25% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% $ 767,986,750 $ 778,265 0.1013% 15001021300 South Kora 0% 55% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 658,165,575 $ 709,210 0.1078% 15001021400 Kealakekua-Captain Cook 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 442,919,125 $ 456,949 0.1032% 15001021501 Kalaoa 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 2,535,736,450 $ 274,707 0.0108% 15001021502 Huslalai 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 609,567,725 $ 66,037 0.0108% 15001021503 KaumzLrmau-Kealakekua 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,422,217,132 $ 1,467,268 0.1032% 15001021601 Kam 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,615,167,275 $ 1,666,331 0.1032% 15001021602 Kahului-Kautnalumalu 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 1,369,362,350 $ 148,349 0.0108% 15001021701 Kawaih-Wailcoloa 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% $ 3,439,194,975 $ 372,582 0.0108% 15001021702 Warrnea-PmAnalau 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 10% $ 1,278,321,125 $ 135,013 0.0106% 15001021800 No2Kohala 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% $ 717,123,807 $ 5,976 0.0008% 15001021900 Honokaa-Kukuihaele 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% $ 431,633,500 $ 872 0.0002% 15001022000 Paahau-Paauilo 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% $ 259,500,950 $ 524 0.0002% 15001022100 North Hilo 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% $ 222,181,475 1 $ 449 1 0.0002% Total IS 27,608,011,843 1 S 24,034,868 1 0.0871% 8.5 Mitigation Strategies 8.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts The Hawaiian Volcano Observatory (HVO) is at the forefront in advancing our capabilities to address volcanic hazards. HVO was established in 1912 at the summit of Kilauea and has been operated continuously by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) since 1947. The HVO studies current geologic activity at Hawaii's volcanoes, past eruptions, earthquakes and other volcanic hazards. This information is utilized to provide timely warnings to local officials and the public, to assess long-term volcano hazards, and to make hazard -zone maps that help guide land -use planning decisions. Current eruptions are tracked by HVO scientists and the information provided on projected lava flow movements help public safety officials 8-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG determine the need for evacuation or other precautions.44 A current lava flow inundation map for Mauna Loa that identifies inundation areas is shown in Figure 8-7. In order to coordinate the efforts of HVO and other involved agencies, the "Lava Flow Hazard Mitigation Plan" (November 2002) identified several tools to improve planning and emergency response for lava flow hazards: • Probabilistic Hazard Maps. The HVO is continuing to work towards developing Probabilistic Lava Flow Hazard Maps for the Island of Hawai'i, which will replace the existing Island of Hawai'i Lava Hazard Zones 1-9. (See http://hvo.wr.usgs.gov/products/OF98794/OF987toc.html) Instead of boundaries designating whether lands are inside or outside a lava hazard zone, such maps would show gradational colors or patterns for increased or decreased hazard. The existing hazard zone maps have led to large jumps in insurance rates across narrow zone boundaries depending on what zone the property is in. With probabilities, insurance companies could, if they chose, apply a sliding scale of rates on the basis of probabilities, so that there would rarely be large rate differences across short distances. It is anticipated that the final product will be a single map showing generalized probabilities of lava flow inundation over a specific period of time. 44 USGS Fact Sheet 074-97 8-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: HazardAnalysisLava and T -OG Z USGS -17 SOUTH X ON A FOREST RESERVE f low prdN HAAPU A —1-1 XC>NA ,ipn 4M X 2 Vto A + + 4NING ar 3691 Map 7. NOVF Kap— NIN.11-1 —d.d.. Figure 8-7. Lava Flow Inundation Map 8-16 Hairaii (-'oittity-Altilti-Hazard-Alitigatioti Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG 8.5.1.1 Lava Directional Maps and near real time Modeling Capabilities Once an eruption is imminent, emergency managers would benefit from information forecasting possible lava flow direction as well as the size and speed of the flow. Combining predictive modeling results with GIS data and information, emergency managers will better be able to identify populations at risk and potential social and economic impacts. Towards this end, HVO is in the process of developing two related products: 'Lava shed Map,' which predicts the gravity -driven directional path using the hydrologic functions of GIS and a digital elevation model (DEM), and a 'Lava Flow Atlas,' which portrays the paths of known lava flows in the past. Together, the products will indicate the range of directions and possible paths that the lava from specified vents can be expected to take. Besides direction, a predictive model needs a range of size and speed of the flow. These estimates must be based on observations and measurements of past Hawaii lava flows and knowledge of the terrain, coupled with what is known of any precursory phenomena, such as earthquakes. HVO is currently compiling all available information on lava flow behavior during each post -1840 eruption in order to characterize these quantities. 8.5.1.2 Monitoring and Warning Capabilities Volcanic monitoring and surveillance are based on the movement of molten rock or magma and/or volcanic gas beneath a volcano that will precede any large eruption. HVO uses three primary techniques to detect magma and monitor its movements: 1. Monitoring of volcanic earthquakes. Any movement of magma requires it to push its way through the rocks of the earth's crust. This causes fracturing of rock, and movement along faults, resulting in earthquakes that can be detected at the earth's surface. Specific types of seismicity can be "mapped" to particular regions under the volcano allowing scientists to plot the passage of magma. 2. Monitoring of ground deformation. As the magma approaches the surface of the earth, and moves into the conduit below the vent of a volcano, the displacement of the surrounding rocks to make way for the magma causes the ground surface to move and the volcano to swell. This rising or swelling can then be used to assess the depth of the magma body and often give some idea of its volume. 3. Monitoring of the chemistry of volcanic gases. Magma deep in the earth contains gases dissolved in it. As the magma rises to shallow levels, these gases are released and, because they are mobile when compared to the sluggish liquid magma, they rise more rapidly to the surface and are discharged through gas vents. The composition and temperature of these gases give clues as to how close magma is to the surface. HVO aims to provide weeks to months warning guidance of potential eruptions at Mauna Loa and hours to days warning at Kilauea. Precursors before an eruption of Hualalai may last for hours to weeks, though this time period has not been tested because no eruption has occurred since monitoring was started on Hualalai. HVO has 65 seismic stations on the island of Hawaii to monitor volcanic earthquake activity. Moreover, HVO has scores of ground -movement monitoring stations, of which more than 20 are continuously reporting GPS systems, 11 are electronic borehole tilt -meters, and 4 are electronic deep borehole strain -meters. All field instruments radio signals to HVO in real time for evaluation and interpretation. 8-17 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG 8.5.2 Future Plans Project Description Status NOAA HYSPLIT Model tries to forecast SO2 Based on wind modeling of Being used in an evaluation hourly based on meteorological conditions and dispersion over the course trial at HCDA and USGS emission rates of the Halemaumau and Pu'u of each day. HVO. NOAA HYSPLIT O'o sources. modeling was initiated by John Rays of the National Park Service with Roland Draxier from NOAA. The current effort is a 2 -yr cooperative agreement between HVO and UHM (Steve Businger). Tere are two other parts to the current gas dispersion study: a) UHM will develop a pilot near real- time gas emission rate monitoring deployment and b) HVO will install a dense SO2 and meteorological monitoring network to better understand near -vent gas dispersion. Develop probabilistic lava flow maps and One of the technical issues Preliminary 100 -year % modeling: is in how to consider probability of inundation USGS is in the process of modernizing the lava overtopped prior flows that maps are being developed in inundation probabilistic maps. Based on become concealed by more 2009. Need to resolve under - average recurrence intervals with a Poisson recent flows. Otherwise, sampling of hazard before probabilistic model. the map probabilities may releasing. Could either use be too low. borings and/or simulation to refine. Enhanced Interactive Lava Flow Modeling The model does not Received FEMA funding and Program F1owGo II compute a rate of advance under development: The The study will provide updated information to of the terminus of the flow. most likely candidate for use identify at -risk areas as a lava flow progresses, Land cover, roughness, are of this model is the upslope and assist in locating highest hazard areas as factors that are not a part of part of Mauna Loa. flows approach. the present model formulation, but which Computation based on cooling of lava and would be needed to be increase in viscosity as it moves down the slope considered in the model to within a lavashed. It estimates where the initial estimate a rate of flow. The flow is likely to go. There is a random model does not include parameter term that allows the flow to follow a build-up of deposited lava non -deterministic path, enabling a Monte Carlo affecting the path of approach. subsequent flows. Evaluate economic impacts and critical To be based on probabilistic The existing lava hazard zone infrastructure and facility vulnerability from lava hazard mapping under maps have been used to lava inundation development by HVO deternrine expected losses to residential construction in each district Community testing of pH and metal content in Conducted by CSAV at water catchments stems conmiunity workshops 8-18 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Hazard Analysis Lava and VOG Conduct Public Meetings on VOG / SO2 and how to mitigate it's effects Conducted by CSAV at community workshops Study of vog mitigation effectiveness I. Removal technologies being tested IL Tests to be run A. Air conditioner A. Base case test: B. Dehumidifier 1) standard volume — 20' or 40' container — C. Particulate filters/Electrostatic sealable Precipitator 2) source of SO2; source of S03. Former would D. Fan with chemically treated fabric be simply a tank and regulator for sulfur filter dioxide; latter is a hot plate and pyrex glassware with concentrated sulfuric acid; fan for uniform The base case would give us most of the mixing, relative humidity instrument. information that we will need to make 3) sensor for SO2 (electrochemical sensor with recommendations. We will undoubtedly get data output would be adequate); nephelometer questions on the rates of removal and the most for aerosol sulfuric acid (sulfur trioxide); appropriate size of the unit that the homeowner humidifier may want to purchase so running the Base Case 4) Run baseline to determine what the natural rate +1 test with two or three different size units of decay is in the container volume: inject would help us provide answers to those known volume of SO2, or to a target SO2, questions. concentration, mix for uniformity (test run with electrochemical SO2 detector); track natural Base Case + 2 would only be useful for the decay rate of SO2. Run similar test with sulfur obsessives. It is quite likely that the largest trioxide while monitoring with nephelometer. effect of the fabric surface materials will be to 5) Under uniform conditions, inject S02/SO3 and accelerate the removal rate at high run: air conditioning unit; dehumidifier; a concentrations. But, as removal proceeds, the particle filter/electrostatic precipitator; fan and fabric surface materials will likely give up some bicarbonate fabric particulate filter; and track of the SO2 that was taken up by the fabrics. rate of decline of S02/5O3. For AC and (SO2 is kind of a sticky molecule and will dehumidifier will need to do additional runs attach itself to available surfaces — much like while operating a humidifier since the water vapor is taken up in fabrics.) The sulfur effectiveness of the method will depend on trioxide/sulfuric acid aerosols, once taken up on condensation of water on the chilling elements. the surfaces will probably not come back off at B. Base Case +1 a measurable rate. 1) Run 5) above using two or more levels of air flow in each device to detenmine what the relative increase in rate of removal can be effected with higher air capacity. C. Base Case +2 1) Run 4) & 5) above with "domestic materials" in the container volume. The nature of the surfaces in the test volume will likely affect the natural rate of decline of the gases/aerosols. Can probably use hanging fabrics and carpeting as surrogates for furniture and drapes. 8-19 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Appendix Where to Find Information about Vog, Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), Particulates, and Volcanic Ash Hawaii Volcano Helpline On August 1, 2008, the Hawaii Department of Health announced the introduction of a toll-free phone helpline where the public can obtain up-to-date information on Vog and volcanic emissions. The toll-free number is: (866) 767-5044. The helpline is staffed by trained professionals Monday - Friday from 5 AM to 5 PM, and on weekends from 9 AM to 5:30 PM. Recorded messages, updated daily, are accessible 7 days a week, 24 hours a day (including holidays) and include information on daily SO2 and particulate levels from monitoring stations on Hawaii Island. Hawaii County Civil Defense (HCCD) Emissions from Kilauea Volcano Brochure provides information on sulfur dioxide emissions, vog, ash fall, protective health measures, and relevant contacts. The brochure was developed through a partnership between County, State, and Federal agencies, and the American Lung Association of Hawaii. htta:Hco.hawaii.hi.us/cd/emissions brochure. -P Kilauea Eruption Update Website includes link to the "Emissions from Kilauea Volcano" brochure, but primarily provides information on Kilauea's current eruption and frequently asked questions about lava flows. httv://www.lavainfo.us/ United States Geological Survey (USGS) Sulfur Dioxide, Vog, and Volcanic Ash: Frequently Asked Questions about Air Quality in Hawar i Recent (2008) detailed FAQ document covering a wide range of issues on SO2, Vog, and Ash. Includes links to many other related websites and documents. http://hvo.wr.USgs.govdmards/FAO S02-Vog-Ash/main.html Webcam of Halema'uma'u vent at Kilauea Summit Live Panorama of Halema'uma'u vent in Hawai'i Volcanoes National Park. httt)://hvo.wr.usgs.gov/cam3/ Hawaiian Volcano Observatory Website includes recent Kilauea eruption update and summary, information on volcanic hazards, and weekly Volcano Watch articles. Search the Volcano Watch archive for information about vog and volcanic gases. httn://hvo.wr.usgs.gov/ A8-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Appendix Volcanic Air Pollution—A Hazard in Hawai i Fact Sheet 169-97 Information about volcanic air pollution (vog) in Hawai'I (revised June 2000) htt :// ubs.us s. ov/fs/fsl69-97/ Volcanic Ash ... What It Can Do and How to Prevent Damage Website about ash—what it is and how to prevent or reduce its damaging effects. http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/ash/ Volcanic Ash Fall --A "Hard Rain" of Abrasive Particles Fact Sheet 027-00 Information about ash and its potential health threats and hazards. htti).//i)ubs.usgs.gov/fs/fsO27-00/ Hawai'i_Volcanoes National Park (HAVO Current SO2 Conditions – Kilauea Summit National Park Service: Nature and Science – Explore Air Website Map showing location of the Halema'uma'u and Pu'u 'O'O gas plumes in HAVO and SO2 concentrations (ppm) at the Kilauea Visitor Center and Jaggar Museum. h ://www,nature.n s. ov/air/webcams/ arks/havoso2alert/havoalert.cfm Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Advisory Program National Park Service: Nature and Science – Explore Air Website Overview of sulfur dioxide monitoring in HAVO and advisory levels, plus links to more information about volcanic gases, volcanic pollutions, and air quality in Hawai'i. httv://www.nature.Eps.gov/air/webcams/arks/havoso2alert/havoadvisories.cfm#Advisor Level Criteria Air Quality Information National Park Service: Nature and Science --- Explore Air Website General information about air quality in HAVO. http://www.nature.nps.Lyov/air/Permits/ARIS/havo/ Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) Frequently Asked Questions and Answers on Vog and Volcanic Emissions from Kilauea A six-page Q&A covering common questions and answers about Vog, monitoring, health effects, protective measures, and water catchment issues. http://hawaii.gov/health/about/reports/voi4 ga. df Precautionary Measures for Elevated Sulfur Dioxide Levels on the Big Island Web page on sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from Kilauea Volcano, including links to Frequently Asked Questions about what SO2 is, how it affects health, and how exposure can be minimized and recommendations by the American Lung Association. http://hawaii.gov/healtblenviromnenial/air/cab/cab urecautions.html As -2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Appendix Online Air Quality Data Maps showing air quality conditions in the Hawaiian islands. Data collected by HDOH real-time air quality monitoring network. Click on link to "On-line Air Quality Data". Includes SO2, PM2.5, and H2S data on Hawai'i Island under link titled "Air Quality on Big Island", and just SO2 data under link titled "SO2 data on Big Island". Note that data is collected real time, but report on-line typically lags by about 2 hours. httn://hawaii.gov/health/environtnental/air/cab/cab onElinedata/cab onlinedata intro.html Clean Air Branch (CAB) Website includes link to "Public Notification: Air Pollutant Exceedence on Big Island." This is a list by HDOH air monitoring location, of dates and specific levels recorded when there have been exceedences of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). httv://Iiawaii.ggyLealth/enviromnental/air/cab/index.html Safe Drinking Water Branch (SDWB) Website includes information on a subsidized testing program for lead and copper in catchment systems that is available through the SDWB (lead or copper could be "leached" into catchments or related piping as a result of vog/acid rain impacts on roofs/gutters or piping that contain these metals). Website also includes link to other information on catchment testing and guidelines for safe construction and operation of catchments: htt ://hawaii. ov/health/environmental/water/sdwb/raincatch/raincatch.html American Lung Association of Hawaii (ALA -H) Website provides information about vog—what it is and what to do about it—and air quality in Hawai'i. Links to other relevant sites. http://www.ala-hawaii.or&Lairguality.asy U.S. Environment Protection Agencv Website EPA AIR NOW – Fine Particulates (2.5 micrometers and less) Air Quality Index for Hawaii. Indicates Good, Moderate, Unhealthy, etc. "color -code" for Department of Health monitoring site locations, including Kona, Pahala, Mt. View, and Hilo. Also see health guidance messages associated with the color codes. Data includes "forecasted" condition regarding fine particulates for the next day. htti)://www.aimow,gov/ At home page, select "Hawaii" from drop down menu under banner headed "Local Air Quality Conditions and Forecasts". See condition/color code for particulate levels at various island locations. Click onto specific location city to see detail for that particular location and health message associated with level/color code at that location. SO2 - How Sulfur Dioxide Affects the Way We Live & Breathe Web page about S02—what it is, where it comes from, causes for concern, health and environmental impacts, and EPA's effort to reduce it. htti)://www.eva.govYair/urbanair/so2/index.html As -3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8: Appendix International Volcanic Health Hazard Network IVH Website provides guidelines, databases, and publications on the health hazards of volcanic gas and ash. http://www.ivhhn.org/ Hawai'i Rainwater Catchment Systems (HRCS) Association Recommendations for Catchment Users Due to Increased Volcanic Activity Web page provides info on steps to take to minimize ash and debris in water catchment. htty://www.hawaiirain.ora/news/index.Rhn UH Hilo, Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes. Website contains information on Coping with Vog from Halema'uma'u and links to information on Coping with Vog from Pu'uO'o, as well as Coping with Vog on Catchment Tanks. httv://www.uhiLhawaii.edu/—nat haz/ Volcano School of Arts & Sciences Volcano Hawai' i This website includes real-time data from SO2 monitors at the charter school, as well as an S02 monitor located on 5th Street in a nearby Volcano neighborhood. This school is located approximately 4 miles NE of the Halema'uma'u vent at the Kilauea Summit. h=://volcano-school.orc/ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) GOES -WEST satellite: a geostationary NOAA satellite used most often for weather tracking. Images are typically acquired every 15 minutes. The loop is posted by the Washington DC Volcanic Ash Advisory Center for the purpose of tracking emissions from Hawai'i volcanoes. The imagery automatically switches from infrared at night to visual during the day. Recently, it has been useful for tracking volcanic gas emissions from Halema'uma'u, Pu'u 'O'o, and the Waikupanaha ocean entry during the day and hot lava flows at night. http://www.ssd.noaa.gov/VAAC/kilauea/sloop-vis.html National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) MODIS satellite: a NASA satellite pair, Aqua and Terra, which passes over Hawai'i twice a day. During daylight hours, the images are taken at about 11 am and 2 pm H.S..T. This imagery can be useful for tracking plumes, and can be viewed about 3-5 hours after acquisition at: httv://rwidfire.sci.asfc.nasa.gov/subsets/?subset=AERONET Mauna Loa Sept. 2008 As -4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 9. Tsunamis Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis CHAPTER 9 - TSUNAMIS 9.1 Description of Hazard A tsunami is a series of great waves most commonly caused by violent movement of the sea floor, usually a fault resulting in an earthquake, but also caused by nearshore or underwater landslides or volcanic eruptions. In contrast, regular ocean waves are generated from the wind. Tsunami are characterized by exceptional speed (up to 590 mph), long wave length (up to 120 miles), long period between successive crests (varying from 5 minutes to a few hours, generally 10 to 60 minutes), and low height in the open sea. Often the first wave of a tsunami may not be the largest. The danger from a tsunami can last for several hours after the arrival of the first wave. Sometimes a tsunami causes the water near the shore to recede, exposing the ocean floor. Tsunamis can be very large. At the shoreline, their height can be initially as great as 30 feet or more (100 feet in extreme cases), and they can move inland several hundred feet. Tsunamis can travel up rivers and streams that lead to the ocean. The speed of onset depends upon whether the tsunami is a distant tsunami or a local tsunami. Distant tsunamis result from earthquakes in Alaska, Japan, Chile, and other Pacific Rim loca- tions (see Figure 9-1). A warning is almost certain and ranges from three hours to 12 hours. Local tsunamis result from earthquakes or underwater landslides in the vicinity of the Hawai- ian Islands, most frequently near the south coast of this island with the probability much higher for the Ka'u-Puna districts than for South Kona. Adequate advance warning for local tsunamis is not presently technologically possible. Therefore, the public must be educated that the occurrence of strong ground shaking in a coastal area should be considered as a local tsunami "warning" and an immediate coastal evacuation should follow. 9-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis 14D• 184` #160` 60' All I 5 ollii l l 3 hr qD. ppi JAPAN Tokyo hr n Fran WW Angeles Thr 6 hr 5 hr .N�dw 7 1. *w {' , J/ f HAWAIIAN ISL AN05 I "wake I. • ` ��' r 11 Phollip "s '\ •Guam /, ! _-- /e. r + f 1 .A • : -tanning I. , ` 114 1 .Galopagal cam ti e 1 • ° r m,pp� o Solamaa ly �r� / ! I , Tahiti" *t2D r ! - anga I. Kermadec h J�Eosl�r /I IppOi, F 4 i / a f 40 DLI1L `rZ `+j 1A 40 - NEW ZEALAND r; a ` ILD r Map showing travel times (in hours) of tsunamis from the Pacific Ocean rim to Honolulu. The small stars indicate the approximate points of origin of some tsunamis that have affected Hawaii. The origins of the disastrous tsunamis of 1946 and 1960 are shown by the two larger stars. Figure 9-1. Travel Times for Distant Tsunamis. Source: Thomas, W. "The Variety of Physical Environments among Pacific Islands," in Man's Place in the Island Ecosystem (ed. by F.R. Fosberg), Bishop Museum Press, 1965. 9-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis 9.2 Significant Historic Events Tsunamis are infrequent events but can be extremely destructive. Since 1812, 25 tsunamis have adversely impacted the Big Island. Of these, 22 were distant tsunamis and 3 were local tsunamis (see Figure 9-2 for historical events and run-up heights). IFIO M4 1Mr Il lab ■s Ipre s6x 64 14M �pl H a■,�/ Y Y a 1 1 Polm 'No it% Largo bvYrrAs' (>Im, 3.3 MI -M reported yaw .4 lgpr 221 dMng■ in the H■waEllan Islands .R MFR Y_ a." A A. Wy14tls•• MOI TSI I 1n 1�mis 19M%O% tW 91A Walp19 I%7 IQn leto Apr 12 NCarr■1 U■e M.20 (ener lander ane LOekrldga, t No) - d 11W 3: It4s sr■ low Fib 90 94tlerm ChM M.4.0 �:, t %r 10■ 1M01R low M.? 3.0—Clia M-10 lid toot es 1■Y 140 NI�y1Iga f �..% ea .tre 1%7 IQR ltlr 'eR 1M1 aR loft ut,3ay IfirtldlaOR Y.20 18891 At, SE "%Ilei M.4.1 1ta4 7■ _ +9eQ 41 IM II RR Ie980 Aug 13 Wow Cage M.43 1w 4R `:. •� I%r i1R IM to sR 'sea. Olt Sa/l P4ey. I%04a 1e0pf4a 1969 ,kl 24 Sall Prlk sit 45■ ISM a1 1677 kuy 10 Nw—ch" M. 4.0 K6M4ei■ Hilo 1973 560 ttl11 l.ss lam J. 20 AY M lrl■■. Polm 1M4 tss %m eR 1896 J. Is Jaen M.40 ig91 Aug9 Tr11p KeNuo-Kor10 lana a1 ISS) M. 190M J-31 CekleaolEardor Y. 1.0 %1111 f9ry en Ism AuQIT Caarl Cela IM4 s11R _ told 5407 Kwft M.3B 1Mm 2■ IN' SR 1919 0.2 H—(H.1410 tatl e■ Ietl■ M IMS 1911 1971 loft It ISCttrlr Cli M." IIS. IMSM S. Sen l 121 1929 Feb3 Kard.11. 11.3.6 t9sm a■ IM7 11 14616 1933 Mr2 J1p■n M.&O teR I) ! M. �OR 1944 Apt wn Atl StY. dA CJrAWA. � I%'b 1Mr l.s 1992a Yr 17 Hwe6(H-IOM tars rill Intl 1111 19620 N.4 K...hft M." 1%7 Uwe Cor"AM.N. la 11.33 1900 Mtry 22 C+1■ M.4.5 •- rti ,46M ta4 +MS +1■ 1961 Mr 29 D1ldAlda M.4-5 It" uR tMr r■ t97d Abv 29 6ya,19,6f■rw9p4./7d7 � ,atl aaR tars 234 'PA1MW1gy231d4)1ty11W2rd1a*dd iR ISM Lakes &M Ia&& ,S F4As 118 IVRpaiRl {33 ■1, 4rM Ipw1■tldrrl■g■. 2000 0 - Mal IM 00'■ ;9ii 191 ay ISR "7lurrni 111■plwai•1■tlaYrdLyN.bprUrlwlaaby 2000-40001081 1%1101 +2R +9M a1 IMwditt—.(19M I*— H is M traid--V IWye 1%Q R eny8ela pl a awa t► -M M gMw4erg M99. 4000-1�0001ge1 6000 -WW Mat nnII N Dew uulrnla true aQ.AlISM NC1 So eW d Od 1991, 8000-10,000 Ioel - Hi91-ayc Ilnn4r. Oavllaaq MMhlr [<1 m11u4p, Yrpi4a111 12, 10.000 -OW Mat Sveams r� �—��toq� .vg,&Wo sa r4M0N L&Wr and Wdutly9119M. Ow owr 12.000low ® uman 81868 10 h Genet. Mbol eF FUND 901) 0 0 2MM Vele 141 ■010ad Pre. Figure 9-2. Historic Tsunamis of Hawaii Island Source: Fletcher, C, B. Richmond, E. Grossman, A. Gibbs, Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone, Prepared in cooperation with University of Hawaii, State of Hawaii Office of Planning, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series I-2761, 2002. The most devastating tsunamis to hit the Island of Hawaii in this century occurred in 1946 and 1960. In both cases, the worst damage was inflicted on the northeastern coast of the island. The tsunami of 1946 originated in the Aleutian Islands, struck Hawaii without warning, and killed over 170 people, mainly at Laupahoehoe and Hilo where the wave heights averaged 30 feet. The maximum wave height was 55 feet at Pololu Valley on the northern tip of the island. The 1960 tsunami originated in Chile and advanced upon the island from the southeast; again, its effects were greatest at Hilo. The arrival time of this tsunami was correctly predicted, but many people failed to heed the warnings, and authorities evacuated an insufficient area of Hilo. As a result, 61 lives were lost as waves up to 35 feet high crashed 9-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis through homes. Whole city blocks were swept clean of all buildings, and 580 acres were flooded. $23 Million in damages were reported. The tsunamis of 1868 and 1975 were locally generated by earthquakes beneath the southern coast of the island. The 1868 waves destroyed several coastal villages in the Ka'u and Puna districts, most of which were never rebuilt. The 1975 tsunami claimed two lives and caused widespread damage along the Kalapana coast. Table 9-1. Tsunamis with Run-up of 2 meters or more: 1812 to present 1.' Eartiest tstmuni for which defuutt ioferrnationemsts. L' Probable source. ce. sows : George Paras&-Carayacmis.CWae 0.g q1 Tgmamis in he HRwawm Isrands (U. S. Coast and'Geo&—tic Smmey, hlay 1969): Harald G. Loomis,Tiro Tmmami off"Aavembar 2 ,, 1975 in Emwui (1-hwaii Institute of%e�ysies, December 1975), pp. 1 and 10; D.C. Cor; aid J. hfotgagLoca?T.sunanris and PbsmNe LocatTsunawis irr Haivaa (HAwaii Institute of Gcepinrsics, lRrpQrt HIG ?7-14; Nm, mber 1977); Doak C. ComTsamami Casuntres an VorttzfityInH wan 0Jniversity ofHanaii, Ens^irotmnent CkMtef, .Tune 1987), p. 391- James F. Laaderaad Pairscia A_ Lockridge:Un rea Sterns Tsimamis (Incizxiit:,g U'Wfed.Srares Posszsiaras)1690-1988 Publication 41-2_ Naticnat GeophygicalData Center, :august 1989, pp. 17-77-1 iJ_5_ Geologicai Suney, Hawaiian Volcano Obsenatory, records: Pacific Tsurtanri Warrting Center, recaids 9-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Maximum height in Hawaii Deaths, In Datta Place of observation Source Meters Feet Hawaii Damage in Hawaii 1812: Dec 21 11 Hookena, Hawaii Califarniai 25 8 - Hut flooded 1819: April 12 W. Hawaii Chile ao 7 - Houses destroyed 1837: Nov. 7 Hilo, Hawaii Chile 6.0 20 16 100 houses destroyed 1841: May 17 H110,11awall Kamchatka 4.6 15 - lJnknuwn 1860: Dec. 1 Maliko Bay, F,?1aui N_ Pacific 2r 3.6 12 - Houses, wharr destroyed 1868: April Keauhou Lancing, Hawaii Ka"u 13.7 45 47 Severe in Puna and Kdu 1868, Aug. 13 Hilo, Hawaii Chile 4.6 15 - Houses, bridges destroyed 1869: Aug. 24 S.E. Puna S. Pacific 2J 8.2 27 - Houses destroyed, roads washed out 1877: May 10 Hilo, Hawaii Chile 4.8 16 5 Severe in Hilo 1878: Jan. 10 Mallko Say, Maui N_ Molokal 21 3.6 12 - Scattered flooding, N_ Maul, N. Ganu 1896: June 15 Keauhou, Hawaii Japan 5.5 18 - Houses, wharfs, stores destroyed 1903: Nav 29 Pelekunu.Mnlokai N. Molokai 45 15 - Hnuses destroyed on hlaui, railroad washed alit on Oahu 1906: Aug. 17 Maalaea, Maui Chile 3.6 12 - Piers damaged 1919: Oct -2 Hcupuloa, Hawaii S. Kana 4.3 14 - Wharf damaged, car swept ava-ay 1922: NQv. 11 Hila, Hawaii Chile 21 7 - Fishing brats swept away 1923: Feb. 3 Hilo, Hawaii Kamchatka 6.1 20 1 51,500,000 1933- March 2 Keauhau, Hawaii Japan 32 10 - Boathouses, walls dest Wed in Kona 1946: April 1 Waikolu valley. Molokai Aleulian Islands 1&4 54 159 526.000,000 1952: NDV. 4 Kaena, Oahu Kamchatka 9.1 30 - 81,000,000 1957: marcn 9 Haena,Kaual Aleullan Islanas 16.1 53 - $5,000,0130 1960: May 22 Hilo, Hawaii Chile 10.5 34 61 523.000,300 1964: March 27 Waimea Bay, Oahu Alaska 4.9 16 - 568.000 1975: Nav 29 Keauhou Lancing, Hawaii S. Puma 14.3 47 2 51,500,0170 1.' Eartiest tstmuni for which defuutt ioferrnationemsts. L' Probable source. ce. sows : George Paras&-Carayacmis.CWae 0.g q1 Tgmamis in he HRwawm Isrands (U. S. Coast and'Geo&—tic Smmey, hlay 1969): Harald G. Loomis,Tiro Tmmami off"Aavembar 2 ,, 1975 in Emwui (1-hwaii Institute of%e�ysies, December 1975), pp. 1 and 10; D.C. Cor; aid J. hfotgagLoca?T.sunanris and PbsmNe LocatTsunawis irr Haivaa (HAwaii Institute of Gcepinrsics, lRrpQrt HIG ?7-14; Nm, mber 1977); Doak C. ComTsamami Casuntres an VorttzfityInH wan 0Jniversity ofHanaii, Ens^irotmnent CkMtef, .Tune 1987), p. 391- James F. Laaderaad Pairscia A_ Lockridge:Un rea Sterns Tsimamis (Incizxiit:,g U'Wfed.Srares Posszsiaras)1690-1988 Publication 41-2_ Naticnat GeophygicalData Center, :august 1989, pp. 17-77-1 iJ_5_ Geologicai Suney, Hawaiian Volcano Obsenatory, records: Pacific Tsurtanri Warrting Center, recaids 9-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis 9.3 Probability of Occurrence 9.3.1.1 Distant Tsunamis Distant tsunami events occur with a roughly 7% probability in a year. Events with smaller waves have a higher probability than large waves (see Figure 9-3). Waves can strike all coasts and persist up to several hours. FiEK3Ffr VS RECURF4 NM PROBJIBiLITIr, HILO TSUNAMIS SINCE 1832, COX, CURTIS 30 ;o a F i } O f I 4 '! p 10 F $ LL § a i ra tn0 PROBASU Y, YEARS, HEIGHT GREATER THAN Fl- S VED hEk�riTS Figure 9-3. Tsunami Height vs. Recurrence Probability for Hilo 9.3.1.2 Local Tsunami Local tsunami events occur with a roughly 2% probability in a year. A local tsunami will be of limited extent and duration. Near the seismic source, the waves may be 40 feet high but have a short period and diminish rapidly, as demonstrated by the 1975 Halape tsunami (Figure 9-4 shows the wave heights from the 1975 Halape tsunami as they traveled around the coast to North Kona). 9-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunanzis TSUNAMI WAVE HEIGHTS, (Max. Wave) South DISTANT � North Combined historical distant tsunamis 0 W �� LL � CAPT COOK LL M 1975 LOCAL Southeast coast 45 50 55 60 65 COAST MILE 50 45 Figure 9-4. 1975 Halape Local Tsunami WaN-e Heights N -s. Distant Tsunami 40 '@ RUNUP 35 FEET 30 25 20 15� 10 5 0 80 60 40 20 5 0 2 20 40 60 80 DISTANCE FROM ORIGIN, MILES Figure 9-5. Run-up height i -s. time and distance, data from 197-5 local tsunami DATA FROM 1975 LOCAL TSUNAMI Runup Height and Time vs Distance N./ 25 20 15 TIME, MINUTES 10 5 0 9.3.2 Hazard Areas Two types of tsunami maps need to be distinguished: tsunami inundation and tsunami evacu- ation maps. Tsunami inundation maps show the historical or calculated limits of inundation in terms of the limits of inland inundation and the run-up height (for definition of terms, see 9-6 Hawaii Corttaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiotz Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis Figure 9-6).45 These inundation zones have been incorporated into the FIRM maps (V and VE zones) and guide land use and construction standards. The tsunami evacuation zones are derived from tsunami inundation maps, but are more conservative than the inundation maps in that they encompass a broader area that are potentially at risk that should be evacuated and refer to readily identifiable physical landmarks such as roads where possible (see Figure 9-8). On the one hand, these evacuation zones should not be so broad as to jam evacuation capabil- ities; on the other hand, they should not be too narrow to risk injury or death. NOTE: R MAY BE GREATER OR LESS THAN h ; DO NOT CONFUSE, PRESENT WATER LEVEL/LINE MAY BE USED IN LIEU OF MSL, IF STATED. MAX WATER LEVEL h T HEIGHT OF � %A1A%t7' nr cunoci inic MAX INTRUSION Figure 9-6. Definition Sketch of Tsunami Inundation Terms T The evacuation zone map applies to distant tsunamis, assuming worst case wave action from any probable source area. For local tsunamis, the arrival times are very short (typically min- utes), and the felt earthquake is likely to be the only warning that many residents will receive in advance of the first tsunami wave. Mitigation, therefore, depends primarily on public edu- cation for a swift and appropriate response from within the coastal communities. A new sys- tem is in place to alert police of a local tsunami generated from the southern coast of the island. This system senses sea level rise at six locations on this southern shoreline .46 It alerts the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center which immediately confirms the event by correlating it to an earthquake signal and advises the County Civil Defense (or the police after working hours). This system supplements the slower and less definitive earthquake -only local system currently in service. 45 Historical data on tsunamis is primarily scattered run-up values. Hilo is unique in having well-documented historical inundation lines for several tsunamis. Inundation for areas other than Hilo is the calculated "maxi- mum expectable inundation". 46 Walker, Daniel, "Local Tsunami Real-time Warning System," Science of Tsunami Hazards, v. 20, n. 1, 2002. 9-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis SOUTH KO / HAMAKUA.� SOUTH HILO w NORTH KONA SOUTH f INORTMHILO Y Kailua SOUTH KONA 1 KAU a' SOUTH HIL' HIL Hilo PUNA Legend - Tsunami Evacuation Zones Major Road Other Roads 0 3 6 12 18 24 Miles Figure 9-7. Tsunami evacuation zones Figure 9-8. Tsunami evacuation zones, Kailua-Kona zoom 9-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis 9.3.2.1 Tsunami Inundation Zones Figure 9-9. Historical and Hypothetical tsunamis for inundation mapping Figure 9-10. Updated tsunami evacuation zone map locations being developed 9-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis Coastal floodplain boundaries shown on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) for the County of Hawaii are based on the 100 -year Tsunami: wave elevation; runup elevations; known topographic characteristics; and, a depth of flooding by the incoming Tsunami wave of 4.0 feet. The 100 -year Tsunami inundation boundaries were delineated using methods outlined in "Tsunami Inundation Prediction," by C. L. Brentschneider and P. G. Wybro, which was presented at the 15th International Conference on Coastal Engineering, Honolulu, HI, in July 1976. Since Hilo has one of the most complete historical inundation mappings, this data was compared with the Preliminary DFIRMs to verify whether the VE zone encompassed the furthest inland inundation limits. Surprisingly, the VE underzoned the historical inundation (see Figure 9-11). FEMA and the County are currently working to improve the Preliminary DFIRMS for the County of Hawaii, which will include a careful evaluation of the coastal high hazard areas in terms of combining the most protective inundation area from FEMA's 2008 Hurricane Flood Study for Hawaii County (refer to Section 10.4.1.3) and the current effective FIRMs' coastal high hazard areas. Historical Inundation vs Evacuation Zone vs FIRM Legend Study Area: HiloHistorical Inontlation Zone Streets ® FIRM 100 Year Entire area in Tsunami Evacuation Zone Figure 9-11. Comparison of Historical Tsunami Inundation to FIRM VE Zone for Hilo 9-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis 9.3.2.2 Evacuation Zone Maps Hawaii was the first state to develop tsunami evacuation maps. The tsunami evacuation maps were created in 1989-91 using one-dimensional numerical model S.47 This approach used historical inundation records to infer the nearshore tsunami heights, which in turn provide the inundation limits through repeated calculations at transects perpendicular to the adjacent coastlines. However, the original inundation maps for Hawaii data on which these were based are no longer available. Technical advances enable a more rigorous approach using a two-dimensional model. The results of the 2-D model indicate that the existing evacuation lines may need to be moved further inland in certain areas. Additionally, the 2-D model could better define inland waterway embankment inundation which was not addressed by the 1-D model. However, because of the extensive cost to remap the entire evacuation zone, remapping is prioritized to recent coastal developments and densely populated areas. A new generation of tsunami evacuation zone maps is being prepared in 2009-2010, based on 2-D inundation modeling by the University of Hawaii, School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology (UH SOSET). The analysis uses 2-dimensional modeling with updated bathymetry and topographical data utilizing recent LIDAR topographical surveys, which provide a higher resolution of the shallow reef forms below sea level and shoreline above sea -level than previously available. The National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program requires 2D numerical modeling and credible worse -case scenarios when mapping tsunamis affecting Alaska, California, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii. The tsunami inundation and runup analysis performed by UH SOSET uses scenarios from tsunami -genic source regions along the Pacific Rim, see Figure 9-9. The methodology to meet this standard essentially uses the same 5 historical events (4 from Aleutian and one from Chile) used by the original tsunami map, but uses 2D methodology; also added hypothetical events assumed to be 2X the Great Sumatra Tsunami (beyond credible magnitudes), from other directions (west, e.g., Japan, and south Pacific, e.g., Marianas, and East Pacific, e.g., Cascadia), to test the model results. The hypothetical events do not appear to generate greater inundation than the historical suite of events due to directionality effects in the wave propagation. The 2-D modeling has been validated as producing good results when hindcasting historical inundation and runup data. The analysis has provided updated inundation zones around the island at locations indicated in Figure 9-10. Evacuation maps are soon to be updated in 2010 based on the results of this analysis. The inundation and run-up analysis is based on scenarios not on statistical probabilistic methods. An improved analysis would develop "Maximum credible inundation" maps based on probabilistic estimation. At some point, building code maps will need to incorporate tsunami inundation. Building designers need the tsunami inundation data to properly site and design structures against tsunami forces. 9.4 Risk Assessment Similar to the coastal flooding hazard an annualized loss can be estimated based on the exposure and the probabilistic tsunami inundation. 47 Curtis, George, D., Hawaii Inundation/Evacuation Map Project, Final Report, Joint Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research, University of Hawaii, April 1991. 9-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis To describe tsunami -prone landscapes and community vulnerability to tsunamis on the Hawaiian coast, (USGS Scientific Investigations Report 2007-5208) used geographic - information -system (GIS) tools and publicly available geospatial data to create spatial overlays of hazard and socioeconomic data. Details on each of the socioeconomic datasets used in this analysis follow an overview of our analytical approach and the study area. Vulnerability calculations and comparisons are limited to the exposure and sensitivity of the urban footprint and certain assets, including developed land, populations (residential, employee, and tourists), economic assets and critical facilities. Exposure is defined as the amount of an asset (for example, the number of residents of a town) within a tsunami evacuation zone. Based on a spatial overlay of CDP (Census Designated Places) and tsunami -evacuation -zone data, there are 65 CDPs (hereafter called communities) in the State of Hawai'i that contain tsunami -prone land. 13 of these are located in Hawaii County, these are shown in Figure 9-12. Countvof Hawai-i f >•uia Kukuihoclo Laupahoohoo Puak5 f F{n]aoa Hilo I3iiwFrii3n I{dilua — H a 'i'4' it t h i Paradi� P. irk 1laluaJoa Haaeiidn Boachn } ahaJu'u-Keauhou t Capt3i n Cook H&nnunEiu-N!po'op'o i r fi :North. o to km W Pacific Ocean Figure 9-12. Tsunami prone communities in the County of Hawaii To determine the number and type of residents in the tsunami -evacuation zones, USGS used block -level population counts and demographic data from the 2000 U.S. Census (U.S. Bureau of Census, 2001). Tax base is represented by current parcel values and is considered an attribute of community vulnerability because communities rely on property taxes for local services. Results of the GIS -based analysis are summarized by tsunami -evacuation zone and by CDP -based community. Figures summarizing these results are included below. 9-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis — Tsunamis AmDuatof *O.B-7.3 Pem2amgeof 75.100% Dv-elop?d Land 0 0A-0.79 DeLvto* Land 0.50-74% in Tiuow- 0 0.1-0.39 in Touflarjii- 0 25-49% Etiucua&Dn o 0.0L- 0.03 Evacuaticti 0 1-24% 70119 (krif-) * 0 Zone . 0% cry. xeo- Nuffbecof 0 695-9725 Falp"am is 0 209-692 Thummi- L-2% W --ti— 7, n. 4 C, HITIVi Nualbefof 9 ?74-5,146 Residents in 0 242-773 Tsmami- 0 45 -:2.41 Evwua&nn 0 1-44 7000 . 0 cry. xeo- Nuffbecof 0 695-9725 Falp"am is 0 209-692 Thummi- L-2% W --ti— 7, n. 4 C, HITIVi rW El. R.P. liiA N umber of 0 5219 -10.5 Hotel AD -V in 0 L-526 Tsuna=- 0 Evocutitioa Zone 0 1-'4^. rW El. R.P. liiA 9-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan pefonbg* of 75 -1 W16 Residents in %-74% Tmaum- 0 0 -;'''a Esucua.kon 0 1-'4^. 2OW * )q 9-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Percentage of 75 -1 W16 Empbyreea in %-74% 7sivawt- iD 25-4996 Evecantim 0 1-24% Zone 0% 9-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan PeTceatzse of 75- LOOM I-Iotat A.DV is SO- 74% Tumirni- 0 25-49q E+ucujtbn 0 1- 2AA Zane . 0�, 9-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis TatnLrlafo LYalue S516M-468 S L96M - 516M irainLts�'aarnptiaas? � 531M-1�5M in TSL300011- # dl-d34K EtiacuibonZooe t 0 Pe"n4aoff 8 7-5-[(@)T- UtaL Parcel Value o 50 -'#''i- Wr a oDPWbons) in Tsu�orai-Grv,cuatio-n '� I _9»&• Zone C% Uim H'.. .ru i xyur - - [yv.mt r Bran J'_ i1i, Figure 9-13. Results of USGS tsunami vulnerability study 9.5 Mitigation Strategies 9.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts 9.5.1.1 Deep -ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) When a tsunami event occurs, the first information available about the source of the tsunami is based only on the available seismic information for the earthquake event. As the tsunami wave propagates across the ocean and successively reaches the DART systems, these systems report sea level information measurements back to the Tsunami Warning Centers, where the information is processed to produce a new and more refined estimate of the tsunami source. The result is an increasingly accurate forecast of the tsunami that can be used to issue watches, warnings or evacuations. Over the past 20 years, NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory (PMEL) has identified the requirements of the tsunami measurement system through evolution in both technology and knowledge of deep ocean tsunami dynamics. The tsunami forecasting technology developed at PMEL is based on the integration of realtime measurements and modeling technologies, a well -tested approach used in most hazard forecast systems. Developed by PMEL and deployed operationally by NOAA's National Data Buoy Center (NDBC), DART is essential to fulfilling NOAA's national responsibility for tsunami hazard mitigation and warnings. Design: The first -generation DART design featured an automatic detection and reporting algorithm triggered by a threshold wave -height value. The DART 11 design incorporated two- way communications that enables tsunami data transmission on demand, independently of the automatic algorithm; this capability ensures the measurement and reporting of tsunamis with amplitude below the auto -reporting threshold. 9-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis 40 E 80 E 80 E 90_OE 120E 140E 980 E Figure 9-14. Locations of DART buoys 9.5.1.2 Tsunami Inundation Run-up Mapping 20 E A tsunami inundation and run-up analysis of the islands of Oahu and Hawaii was performed though the University of Hawaii, school of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology using scenarios from tsunami -genic source regions along the Pacific Rim. The analysis uses 2- dimensional modeling with updated topographical data utilizing recent LIDAR topographical surveys that provide a higher resolution of the shallow reef forms below sea level and shoreline above sea -level than previously available. The 2-D modeling has been validated as producing good results. The analysis has provided updated inundation zones around the island. Evacuation maps are soon to be updated based on the results of this analysis. The inundation and run-up analysis is based on scenarios not on statistical probabilistic methods. An improved analysis would develop "Maximum credible inundation" maps based on probabilistic data, although there is currently not sufficient historical tsunami data to develop such maps. 9.5.1.3 Performance Based Tsunami Engineering An experimental program by the University of Hawaii, Oregon State University and Princeton University is close to being concluded, having investigated tsunami bore formation, impact on structures, inundation and scouring. Design provisions for the structures located in inundation zones are currently being developed using the results of these studies. It is anticipated that there will be two design methodologies: a prescriptive methodology with a predefined water height and water velocity to characterize the tsunami hazard; and a site specific analysis method using calibrated analysis tools to determine the local tsunami inundation characteristics. 9-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9: Hazard Analysis Tsunamis 9.5.2 Future Plans Project Description Status Update tsunami evacuation maps: The 2-D model is based on good Ongoing project: Any necessary Tsunami Inundation and Runup topographic data along the coastline evacuation zone changes would be Mapping: Analysis of the island of (e.g., LIDAR). "Maximum credible done by Quince Mento of HCDA Hawaii based on scenarios from inundation" used to develop evacuation based on updated information from tsunami -genic source regions along maps UH SOEST the Pacific Rim. Big Island mapping focuses on 12 populated areas around the island. It was originally thought that the 2-D The present maps have historical tsunami Proposed Planning Project: There will modeled tsunami inundation maps inundation embedded, but the new need to be DFIRM modifications to would be incorporated into the FIRM DFIRMs do not. FEMA is addressing the Flood Maps if tsunami inundation maps as the VE zone. However, this issue in 2010 with a supplemental is to be any factor in zoning and FEMA originally determined the study to compare the differences construction requirements. Tsunami based coastal floodplain between the existing and new DFIRM Phase L The DFIRM will be based on boundaries for the nation using a 1-D maps, and to produce maps using the the most protective of FEMA's 2008 model. Conceivably, FEMA will greater effect along the south and west hurricane study boundaries and the determine future changes to the coasts. current FIRM's coastal floodplain Tsunami based coastal floodplain boundary. The northeast coastline will boundaries using a 2-D model. The continue to reflect the current FIRM's DFIRM will include the most coastal floodplain boundary, which is protective of FEMA's 2008 hurricane based on Tsunami indundation. study boundaries (refer to Section Phase 11: UHM SOEST mapping (by 10.4.1.3) and the current FIRM Kwok Fai Cheung) can produce 100 - coastal flood boundary. year and 500 -year probabilistic tsunami hazard maps to provide future local modifications to the DFIRMs. Tsunami design guidelines for Update of the design provisions for Under development by University of buildings Sept 2010 guidelines for tsunami bore impact and Hawaii at Manoa, Princeton, OSU, new and for evaluating existing inundation/scouring and Martin & Chock, for future buildings. adoption 9-16 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 10. Floods Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods CHAPTER 10 - FLOODS 10.1 Description of Hazard Floods are temporary inundation of land from excessive rainfall or wave action. Because flooding causes millions of dollars of damage each year, the federal government created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to assist those who suffer from flood disasters. Under the NFIP, each county has mapped flood hazard areas and established a permit system to regulate development within these flood hazard areas. The Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) include areas prone to rainfall flooding (A zones) and high waves (V zones). In this County, the permit system is set forth in Hawaii County Code Chapter 27. The NFIP man- dates federal insured banks to require purchasing of flood insurance as a condition for financ- ing the construction of buildings in flood plain areas, thereby shifting the primary burden for flood disaster relief to those who choose to live or conduct business in flood hazard areas .48 Although the NFIP has significantly mitigated flood damages, major flood problems exist in older areas developed prior to flood control regulations and building standards, in areas that are subject to flooding but not identified on the FIRMs, and areas with flood control improvements that are inadequate to contain or control larger floods by present standards. Direct economic losses from flooding result from soaking, dislocation and destruction of property as well as erosion and scouring from the velocity of the flow, and deposition of sediment and debris transported by the water. Dams can exacerbate flooding should they fail; hence, a dam safety program is also an integral part of flood control. In the past, flood control meant engineered structural solutions such as dams, levees, stream channelization, diversion channels, and other costly improvements. In spite of these improvements, flood damage continued to escalate. A broader approach to flood management that attempts to work with nature instead of trying to control the awesome forces of nature has evolved. The federal government's flood management program embraces these non-structural measures by encouraging regulatory measures that direct development away from flood prone areas (e.g., zoning and subdivision codes), requiring flood -proofing building standards where structures are located in flood prone areas (e.g., flood control and building codes), allowing federal disaster assistance funds to be used to buyout and restrict future development in flood -prone areas where such acquisition is more cost-effective than heightened structural flood control improvements, and allowing upgrades to damaged structural flood control improvements (e.g., bridges) to resize inadequate structures rather than strict "in kind" replacements. 10.1.1 Rainfall Flooding Four types of storms produce heavy rainfall: • Frontal storms. Frontal storms usually occur during the period from December through 48 For an overview of the National Flood Insurance Program in Hawaii, see State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, National Flood Insurance Program in Hawaii, Circular C90, 1994. 10-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods March. They originate over the Pacific Ocean as a result of the intersection between polar and tropical Pacific air masses and move eastward over the islands. These storms reflect orographic influences and are accompanied by widespread precipitation (see Figure 10-1). Subtropical Cyclonic Storm R✓ CL Q1 j02 020 1010 1012.1005 1000 1075' KONA STORM - Nawai f. ]012.5 1070 7010 Mid -latitude Cyclonic Storm 7015 r� 1012.5 Cr �' 1B4' 1SlP 4'•f��g:' Ig6' 16V 1270 12V' Yl" . Kona storms are low-pressure areas (cyclones) of subrrop- between October and April, marl: the lCadiug edgeS of iral origin that usually develop northwest of Hawaii in cold air masses associated with low-pressure systems winter and move .slowly eastward, accompanied by south- moving north of the Islands in the prevailing westerlies. erly winds, from whose direction the storm derives its They bring widespread Clouds, heavy rain, and occasional name, and by the clouds and rain that have made these thunderstorms. Vigorous fronts may be preceded by strong storms synonymous with dad weather in Hawaii. Kona southwest winds and followed by gusty northerly winds. storms vary in number from year to year. Some winters Kauai experiences as many as 20 cold fronts per year, but have had none, others five or more. Cold fronts, common generally only about half of them reach Hawai' i Island. Figure 10-1. Kona Storms and Cold Fronts • Upper troughs. Upper troughs are low pressure storms over wide areas that cause heavy rain and strong winds. • Convective -type storms. Convective -type thunderstorms can occur at any time of the year. They are most common during periods of relatively high humidity and unstable air conditions. These storms cover comparatively small areas and result in high-intensity rainfall of short duration. • Hurricanes or tropical storms. Hurricanes and tropical storms cause heavy rains, strong winds, and high surf. Heavy rainfall creates three types of flooding: 1) channel overflow, 2) overland sheet flow, and 3) ponding of standing water in poorly drained low-lying areas. Channel overflow occurs when the carrying capacity of the channel is exceeded, which can be exacerbated by develop- ment changes within the drainage basin or clogging by debris or overgrown streambed vegetation. Overland sheet flow occurs primarily in areas with undefined drainage ways, such as Puna and the leeward side of the island (e.g., Kona, Waikoloa, and Kawaihae). Poorly drained low-lying areas are a problem when flooding occurs even when rainfall is not heavy. Intense rainfall may trigger "flash -floods" which provide little warning (less than six hours) before the affected area experiences flood conditions. Prolonged rainfall may result in an accumulation of water creating flooding conditions that last several days, or even weeks. Factors influencing flooding conditions include rainfall intensity and duration, topography, soil type, antecedent soil moisture, and ground cover. 10-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Flash floods are characterized by rapid rise in water level, high velocity, large amounts of de- bris, and concentration in stream beds that are often normally small or even dry. The major factors are the intensity and duration of rainfall, rain shed area, and steepness of the streambed. They can also be caused by a dam break. Flash floods typically carry large amounts of debris which increase the damage they do, and are very capable of undermining bridges and carrying away vehicles. There is a major public safety hazard from these events, as the National Weather Service (NWS) estimates that over 50% of the flash flood deaths in Hawaii involve vehicles. The records provided by Mr. Tom Heffner of NWS show that since 1959, when their records began, 30 deaths from flashfloods have occurred. They do not have the data by county, but assuming that this County had one fourth of the deaths, that averages one every six years. 10.1.2 Dams A dam is a barrier constructed across a watercourse for the purpose of detention (control), storage, or diversion of water. Detention dams retard and minimize the effects of flood runoff by storing the flood flow and releasing it at a rate that does not exceed the carrying capacity of the downstream channel. Storage dams impound water during periods of surplus supply for use during drought periods. Diversion dams provide hydraulic head for diverting water into ditches, canals, or other means of conveyance. These various types of dams are constructed for one or a combination of the following reasons: flood control; water source for domestic or irrigation use; recreation; and/or hydroelectric energy production. The volume of water impounded is measured in acre-feet referring to the number of acres of land that would be covered to a depth of one foot. A list of all dams on Hawaii County is provided below and mapped in Figure 10-2: 1. HA00026 Lalakea Reservoir 2. HA00051 Hawi No. 5 Reservoir 3. HA00027 E-13 Reservoir 4. HA00052 Kehena Reservoir 5. HA00040 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 6. HA00122 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 2 7. HA00042 Puukapu Reservoir 8. HA00123 Puu Pulehu Reservoir 9. HA00043 Puukapu Watershed Retarding Dam R-1 10. HAO0131 Paauilo Reservoir 11. HA00049 Keaiwa Reservoir 12. HAO0136 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 3 13. HA00050 Hawi No. 3 Reservoir 10-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods HAM NOS RESERVOIR [RIAWI NO. 3 RESERVOIR F11 KEHENA REStRVOIR -E"KEA RESERVOIR 10 E-13 RESERVOIR WAIMEA 60 MG A"gKVOIR WAIKOLOA 50 MG RESERVOIR PUUKAPU RESERVOIR A q(%SC MG RESERVOIR 3 WAIKOLOA 50 MG RESERVOIR i ❑0 D p Dam Locations Legend a Dams 1` ❑KEAWJVOIIC Major Road 0 7,757,5 15 22.5 70 r-r-� �Mles Figure 10-2. Map of dams on Hawaii Island See Chapter 11 for dam break inundation hazards. 10.2 Significant Historical Events The Historical Stream Flooding Map shown in Figure 10-3 provides a list of flooding events on the Big Island, by location and dates, since 1890. 10-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Hawaii Stream flooding 1818hdiY1tle 8tftAM n®ealflf because 01 hent' rmine i=,6,0 Juga x H.Tx Fm 6 20 I d.N ,b,6 d *C 6 FbO&p 1086 W. ,^S Ep=NPmdrp 6!1 1 2.27418 '1 lbM-g 10M 021-22 �Oa r.'. IYSM1 Pbod 109+ Qu 24.25 KM. swim. IMM1086 Apr 5 FMdrO 1068 M, PO,, FI.&,d 1067 ai 91.28 F -Ek -0 1057 W 1-0 Fi sa? 1656 KI.I{ 15 9-1, ariw0 l§56 k,V 6 NF rt' ,.56 Fw i 5 .2 ,856 4a I FwJ�a 1b� .J 1!'r0'&w ♦1.110 ra 1686 SW 20 CH11- iM 2aR 1 Q,his, b dra imIAcv26 MdTpraed al{tlry 1119 aL 21.2ET9 dm.F0{tlra Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Lahey a d ICSC11 im 11're Fib i~8 F1reM1 H0od11p C & a4o^a 0-2000 tee1 1'e2:7 11 Fwn 115Me.*a nr.I,+- i9%t,n222.1,, h.ud.WndFl- 200D) 1000 MIR 1*7 mn6 Wd.-,d WW, GeelanL 4CI03 BUW (CRC NooO-10•00o r'A 90,610-12,000 15e1 0rw40 12.0 410 Urpan area' ra W In-.rn>ii (i-hac) Hi�l,liayx 150rt'k dx M.>, rlrs-kdia harga(fNF--j S1malru !111 M. hr>i0M d Handing (Imrj S,anaLs P.1nan anneal rai,hall (ii-haq ale V' U NYiE Fa11I F . 4x1� 9p-9ry! FY.IIIx I. Fwk F-_rLc1{_ld n lY:Jlx iwd-e FY.. x J.rr}1 FYw IN Hieb GRUB oma*t 1a86 PPC?-:eir11la0r r xl.ry.,aa Ibrawa Ifi[@ Ma�fi-leen llz,dy Ck H9rcy.,a 1fifiB hq 1{, 9hro:lbm, 1582 Jy-irriT Fb,M1lpp1-gd r;,n,N,P TC.:.Yst. {PJ1lbatl rq . . . -E.b'M1 �,ra Ib0 rq t HMPbb P 1h Ji 110.5 1h T .:M1 L .N O .•ate 199? v: ti rbsM1lm+..�- 158r PNP. YE mx .lbs iaai 9 v 1.-n1n e, x. ,ad { n 597 t'b -'8 bxl g 0'r 588 rq e/s4 Fln :'A 6 r+trow's :i88 &U}i6-21 R). lbin 1003, 1580 ¢sc1�2; Fb:41q 15BI lug b-7 FLpmN 15w lyr'.1-E Fba11s. nlrbldo•. f iB Fben lbatl Fh+r-antl naY fF F$`N,i 1:Yrd rq ' Tfi cm. bl ..-lwdngavrch 6.Mnh Port 186,11aa 2fi rT FeP,un Lw,rr p 4nP41rw 1878 Fab id -@3 Nfab1.1 d h1.b. 22.8 NMiI Hila 0 Run. rar'1 rb 1.11 b1hI LM''n PdM1 rar. 112 I- I Nctl n� R Ilk Ifs rer. prncr Nu1lrmn sam Yu 1.1 I Nctl r.1 rat Y Kx,np.I- ma Y - a.a rue 1t'. n l N. -Mont 1'161:+. 3] �bMINw1r� fFI6'1P1- Iaie 1-11 l IrM 5-v.lr a I Y 1a n IaIJ S}r1 Ienuv, In-la'+1r eau ko{1 ter. 1r.:sr 11«n.y n11N ISS nrti1:1J] I la+cn3, .lff rnn earl 6�a-1 11rM 5ztl 1•-.I .1�by ears 's.n a Ica! Figure 10-3. Historical Stream Flooding Events for Hawaii Island. Source: Fletcher, C, B. Richmond, E. Grossman, A. Gibbs, Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone, Pre- pared in cooperation with University of Hawaii, State of Hawaii Office of Planning, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series I-2761, 2002. FEMA DR -1398 -HI November 2000 A severe flooding event occurred in November 1-2, 2000 from prolonged intense rainfall concentrated in two distinct areas, Waiakea and Kapapala (over 30 inches), with lesser rainfall in most of East Hawaii (5 to 25 inches). The resulting flood damage to homes, roads, bridges, businesses, and farms totaled in excess of $70 million, among the highest totals associated with flooding in the State's history. Four meteorological and topographic conditions simultaneously converged to cause the extreme nature of the storm: 1) the upslope topography of eastern Hawaii, 2) the location of a large upper level trough, 3) the pattern of southeasterly trade winds, and 4) the location of the remnants from tropical storm Paul. Although maximum 1 -hour rainfall totals were not extreme (recurrence interval of 1 to 2 years, except for Kapapala Ranch and Hilo Airport gages at 5 to 10 years recurrence interval), the severity was in the prolonged nature of the storm with a recurrence interval for a 24-hour period equal to or in excess of 100 years at several rain gages. The recurrence interval for peak stream discharges determined from stream gage data ranged from 50 to 100 years for streams south of Wailuku River in the Waiakea area; the majority of remaining 10-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods streams in East Hawaii had recurrence intervals between 5 and 30 years .49 Governor Cayetano declared the island of Hawaii a disaster area and President Clinton declared Hawaii County a federal disaster area, which authorized federal assistance (FEMA DR -1398 -HI). More than 1,131 Big Island flood victims registered for assistance through FEMA's toll-free tele -registration number.so FEMA DR -1743 -HI December 2007 A complex storm system developed in the northwest Pacific Ocean and moved southeast toward Hawaii on December 3, 2007. As the system moved southeast, the associated cold front intensified and approached the island chain from the west. Strong southwest winds ahead of the cold front were reported across Kauai and Oahu on the fourth and fifth. Lingering atmospheric instability behind a previous frontal system combined with warm, moist conditions ahead of the cold front lead to extremely heavy rains across the state with Maui and the Big Island receiving the heaviest rains between the sixth and the eighth of December. The storm weakened and drifted northeast toward the end of the period, but a surface trough remained across the state keeping conditions unsettled until roughly December 11. Widespread property damage was reported all across the state during this weather event. The approach of the front and the strong southwest flow prompted forecasters to issue high wind warnings for parts of Kauai and Oahu. As the front moved down the island chain, additional warnings were issued. Although winds were generally strong across the state, downslope zones of northeast Kauai, central Oahu, windward Oahu, and Molokai saw the highest gusts, in the 60-70 mph range. Very strong winds were also reported at the summits of Haleakala on Maui and the summits of Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa on the Big Island of approximately 70-80 mph. Maui and the Big Island experienced the heaviest rainfall during the event. Widespread flooding was common across portions of central and upcountry Maui. Flash flooding in the Waiohuli area of Maui swept a house from its foundation. Two day totals for the period ending at 8:00 am HST Thursday, December 6, 2007 were between ten and twelve inches at the Kapapala Ranch and Hawaii Volcanoes National Park Headquarters gauges. Up to two feet of water covered portions of Highway 11 in the Kau district of the Big Island. State wide totals for the same period ranged from one to six inches. Conditions on the summits of Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa deteriorated rapidly during the approach of the front on the fifth of December. High winds and snow showers created white- out conditions on the summits. Snow levels dropped down to around eleven thousand feet. Seven foot snow drifts and icing forced park rangers to shut down the Mauna Kea access road on the fifth. Conditions did not allow for the road to be reopened until the end of the storm period. 49 Data on the November 2000 flood cited in this paragraph are from Fontaine, R. and B. Hill, Streamflow and Erosion Response to Prolonged Intense Rainfall of November 1-2, 2000, Island of Hawaii, Hawaii, U.S. Geological Survey, Water -Resources Investigations Report 02-4117, 2002. 50 Hawaii Hazard Mitigation Forum website, higp://Nvww.motheniature-haNvaii.com. 10-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Extensive property damage resulted from the event. Roofs were blown off of houses in downslope areas and downed power lines created widespread power outages. Estimates compiled from local authorities placed the damage cost for the event in the area of $3.4 million. 10.3 Probability of Occurrence The recurrence interval of a flood, or flood frequency, is the average time interval within which a flood of a given magnitude will be equaled or exceeded. Flood frequencies can be determined by plotting a graph of the size of all known floods for an area and determining how often floods of a particular size may occur, or gathering hydrologic and hydraulic data from streams and calculating probabilities through models. The FIRM maps identify a flood hazard area as the area that would be inundated by a 100 -year flood, or a flood with a 1% chance of occurring annually. The 100 -year flood, also referred to as the base flood, is a national standard adopted by the NFIP that represents a compromise between minor floods and the greatest flood likely to occur in a given area (see Figure 10-4). The FIRM maps delineate the 100 -year flood zones for rainfall flooding, coastal flooding, shallow flooding, and distinguish areas where detailed studies have been conducted to determine base flood elevations. Special Flood Hazard Area is the area that has a 1 % chance of being flooded in any given year (140-yearfloodplain). The 100 -year flood is also referred to as the base flood. Floodway is the stream channel and that portion of the adjacent flood plain that must remain open to permit passage of the base flood with- out raising the water surface elevation by more than one foot. Flood Fringe is the area within the 100 -year floodplain other than the floodway. Base Flood Elevation (BFE) is the elevation of the water surface resulting from a 100 -year flood in reference to a defined datum. Figure 10-4. Flood Insurance Rate Map Terminology Data compiled over the last 50 years indicate that, on average, a damaging flood event occurs on the Big Island with a annual probability of 0.5%. 10-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods 10.3.1 Regional Hazards Annual rainfall on the island of Hawaii ranges between 300 inches on the slopes of Mauna Kea above Hilo, to below 10 and 20 inches in the and regions around Kawaihae and South Point. As expected, flooding is rather common on the wet, windward side of the island where high annual rainfall is the norm. Most of the flooding that has caused damage has been flash flooding during extreme rainfall events that bring about sheet flow between stream channels. In addition, the soils along the Hamakua Coast readily absorb precipitation - thereby facilitating mudslides and landslides. The Hilo and Puna areas are probably the most frequently flooded and hardest hit by flash floods on the Big Island and perhaps in the State.si Perhaps more surprising is the degree of flooding experienced by the more and regions of the Big Island. The Kohala and Kona districts have a long and active history of flooding largely due to flash flooding and intense storms. More recently, the South Kohala and Waikoloa areas have experienced intense flash flooding that has caused considerable damage.sa 51 Fletcher, C, B. Richmond, E. Grossman, A. Gibbs, Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone, Prepared in cooperation with University of Hawaii, State of Hawaii Office of Planning, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series I-2761, 2002. 52 Ibid. 10-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods HAWAII ]Q .1.11 1.502.01-220[]301-3MMM1-G.DOFJ .41-M i 1�1-1.4D�2.21-216[]351-&ME- 1-5.5D A■1A1-i.6D 2A1-256❑4D1-4M®r,51-7AG ■1-Ri-1.SD 2.61-286.4.51-5-M❑7.01-7.5D M1-81-2AGC-] 2.61-3J*M SDI -SW[] 751-8.66 Figure 10-5. 100 -year return period 1 hour rainfall for Hawaii Island No district on the island is immune from rainfall flooding hazards. In some of the districts flood hazard areas are difficult to delineate due to the lack of defined drainage ways. The fol- lowing provides a summary profile for each district:53 • Puna. The climate of the Puna District varies considerably from the rocky shoreline to the rain forest areas in the upper elevation. Rainfall amounts are generally heavy and most of the district receives over 100 inches per year. The district is subject to heavy rainfall and there is record of severe flooding. Historically, flooding along the Belt Highway and the highway from Keaau to Pahoa had been the most prominent problems of the district. However, highway improvements have done much to alleviate the flooding on the roadways. Currently, the lack of development and the extremely permeable soils have helped to minimize major flooding and damage to life and property. However, as the amount of development increases within the district, flood problems will also increase. Furthermore, the conversion of land historically planted in 53 Hawaii County General Plan, 2005. 10-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods sugar to other crops may increase runoff. In this regard, Soil and Water Conservation District conservation programs can help lessen the potential problem. Some of the flood hazard areas for the Puna district are difficult to delineate due to the lack of defined drainage ways. Recorded flood damage has mainly been caused by surface sheet flows that are likely to occur anywhere when heavy storms strike. Examples of this are found in Fern Forest, Eden Rock, Fern Acres, Orchidland, and Hawaiian Paradise Park. In addition to these subdivisions, flooding occurs in certain areas of Pahoa. Other areas, such as Hawaiian Acres, may be more defined. The flooding below Mt. View may be the result of diversion of the Mt. View watershed into some of the substandard subdivisions. Systems that incorporate diversion channels to intercept sheet flows and main channels to transport the flows away or through the area have been proposed for the communities of Keaau and Pahoa. Along the Keaau-Pahoa Road, the State Department of Transportation (DOT) has installed culverts to facilitate the movement of water and minimize overtopping of the road in certain sections. In addition, the DOT plans to replace those culverts that are ineffective or inadequate. Drainage systems incorporating the use of diversion channels to collect and transport surface flows safely through the area are also proposed for Mt. View. A portion of this system has been constructed. South Hilo. The South Hilo District is divided into two watershed study areas divided by the Wailuku River. North of the river, the coastline has abrupt cliffs 30 to 80 feet high that are broken by deep stream channels. Flooding problems in this area are primarily caused by runoff from former sugar cane fields situated above the communities situated closer to the coast. South of the Wailuku River is a relatively flat plain that extends towards High- way 11 with slopes gradually increasing in southerly and westerly directions. Development in the upper section of the Waiakea Stream Watershed has been susceptible to flooding. Two recent studies by NRCS examine the problem areas of the Waiakea and Wailuku- Alenaio watersheds.54 With the Wailuku River as a dividing line, the South Hilo district can be separated into two watershed study areas. To the north of the river, the coastline has abrupt cliffs 30 to 80 feet high that are broken by deep stream channels. Usable land areas have a ground slope of six to twelve per cent. Above the 4,000 foot elevation, the stream channels diminish in number and depth and have all but disappeared above the 7,000 foot elevation. Flooding problems in this area are primarily caused by local water runoff from former sugar cane fields situated above the communities. South of the Wailuku River is a relatively flat plain of less than one per cent slope that extends towards Highway 11. Above Highway 11, the slope steepens to approximately six to twelve per cent. Stream channels are poorly defined and disappear at elevations above 2,500 feet. 54 Natural Resources Conservation Service, The Waiakea Stream Preliminary Investigation report, November, 1999, NRCS, The Wailuku-Alenaio Watershed Reinvestigation report, December, 1999 (identified a new flood diversion alternative that could provide 100 -year flood protection to development on the south side of Kaumana Drive in the vicinity of Akolea Road and Chong Street). 10-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Waiakea Until recently, the existing drainage system was the result of uncoordinated development. Lacking a comprehensive plan, property owners have constructed and installed drainage facilities to protect their own interests. In many instances, these facilities have seriously concentrated flows and aggravated situations downstream. Many proposals of the "Hilo Drainage and Flood Control Report" have been completed in the Waiakea area reducing the flooding problems. Many culverts in upper Waiakea are inadequate. Roadside ditches, though small in cross- sectional area, are aided by the highly porous ground and are fairly effective even during heavy storms. One of the most serious problems faced by County maintenance crews is the frequent washout of cinder -gravel shoulders along road pavements. Another problem is the accumulation of vegetation growth and debris in waterways, which causes overflow. The Waiakea Stream Preliminary Investigation report prepared by Natural Resources Conservation Service in November, 1999 identified the channel constrictions at the Hoaka, Kupulau, and Kawailani bridges as a major factor in the flooding of the Waiakea Stream Watershed. Several recommendations in the report suggests an increase in the level of maintenance for the Waiakea stream channel, reconstruction of the three bridges to handle the 100 -year flood, installation of a flood levee above the properties along Kupulau Road, and Stream channel improvements to manage the volume of a 100 -year flood. In the lower Waiakea area, storm damage is minimal due to the effectiveness of the Wailoa and Waiakea-Uka Flood Control Projects. The Waiakea coastal area is subject to tsunami and hurricane storm surge inundation and has suffered considerable loss to life and property from tsunami activity. Kaumana-Ainako-Wailuku River Kaumana's drainage system consists of roadside ditches, culverts, and narrow channels. Except for the Ainako Avenue area, all of upper Kaumana's storm water runoff is discharged either through the Waipahoehoe or the Alenaio Streams. The Chong Street Diversion No. 3 and the Wailuku-Alenaio Diversion No. 4 along Akolea Road serves to reduce flooding in the lower areas and the Ainako Avenue sections. The Wailuku-Alenaio Watershed Reinvestigation report prepared by Natural Resources Conservation Service in December, 1999 identified a new flood diversion alternative for the watershed. The alternative will control stormwater in Waipahoehoe and Kaluiiki Streams and could provide 100 -year flood protection to communities on the south side of Kaumana Drive in the vicinity of Akolea Road and Chong Street. The County has requested the Natural Resources Conservation Service's assistance to further plan and implement the new alternative. The drainage system in the Ainako-Wailuku River area is comprised of box culverts that pass the discharge of the Ainako River across Kokea, Koula, and Kapaa Streets. The residential areas bordering the Wailuku River have a system of collection ditches. Except during very intense storms, there are few problems in the area. Hilo Urban Area Between tsunamis and runoff from higher elevations, the commercial district has displayed amazing recuperative abilities. Prior to the completion of the Waiolama Canal in 1924 and 10-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods the Ponahawai Storm Drain System in 1926, this area was a virtual "sea" during heavy rain. The construction of the canal and the storm drain system has since provided some degree of protection for the area. The Alenaio Stream Flood Control Project, completed in 1998, begins just below Kapiolani Street and ends below Kilauea Avenue with an earthen levee leading into the Waiolama Canal. The project consists of three flood walls, a 1,790 -foot rectangular concrete -lined channel, a 200 -foot concrete entrance transition, and an 830 -foot earthen levee. The project also included the reconstruction of four bridges located at Kapiolani, Ululani, Kinoole Streets, and Kilauea Avenue. The Alenaio Flood Control project mitigated much of the flooding that occurred in the Alenaio flood plain. Except for the northern section of the business district, all of downtown Hilo falls within the Wailoa River basin and within the area tributary to the Alenaio Stream. The State Department of Transportation (DOT) has indicated that there are periodic shifts of beach material along the Hilo bay front shoreline. In addition, occasional storm events will close the roads at bay front due to storm surge. A study detailing the level of storm surge and the periodic shifts of beach material is needed before a solution can be developed. The shoreline areas south of the Wailuku River are subject to damage from tsunami and hurricane storm surge inundation. Paukaa, Papaikou, Pepeekeo, Honomu, Hakalau; these communities have no serious flood problems although Honomu and Papaikou have experienced minor flooding. These result from runoff from the areas above the communities. • North Hilo. The district is characterized by an average ground slope of approximately 10 per cent with scores of deep intermittent and perennial streams. Other than runoff from former cane lands, there is little record of flooding in urban areas. Each community is in close proximity to one or more gulches that carry flows from the upper watershed areas. The key to flood control within the district is to collect and divert surface runoff to the gulches. In addition, soil conservation practices are highly recommended. The flood hazard areas are extremely difficult to delineate. High intensity storms can produce localized flooding in almost any area. The only definite flood hazard area is Laupahoehoe School. The community of Ookala has not experienced heavy flooding although there are minor problems due to surface waters from the former cane fields above the town. There is no record of any flooding within the community of Ninole. The existing flood control system provided by the plantation is adequate. The community of Laupahoehoe has not experienced any extreme flood flows. However, there will be a need to supply flood protection for the community since Laupahoehoe School, which is located just to the south of the urban center, has experienced some flooding. Water flows from the former cane fields, when the natural vegetation does not form a complete cover. 10-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods The community of Papaaloa has not experienced any serious flooding problems. With the projected expansion of the community, there will be a need to provide flood protection for the area. • Hamakua. The Hamakua District can be divided into two major watershed areas. The northern watershed, which affects the Waipio Valley area, extends upward into the Kohala Mountains. The second watershed extends to the peak of Mauna Kea and affects the communities of Kukuihaele, Honokaa, Paauhau, Paauilo, and Kukaiau. The majority of the flood damage in this area is felt by the State or the County through damage to improvements within former cane fields, roads, ditches, and bridges. Streams originating above and flowing through Honokaa have caused flooding in the town. The existing culverts within the town also do not have adequate capacity to handle volume flows. The communities of Paauhau and Kukaiau have not been subject to any high flood flows in the past and the only recommended flood prevention measures would be the construction of diversion channels above the communities to divert water from former sugar cane fields and into the surrounding gulches. Occasional flooding along the Hawaii Belt Road between Ahualoa and Waimea occurs when rainwater comes down from the pastures and overtops the road. Although there are no mitigation measures planned at this time, road improvements have alleviated some of the flooding and improved sheet flow. Localized drainage problems exist within the limits of Paauilo. These problems are caused by allowing surface waters to collect from large areas within the town and flow down narrow roadways. The problems could be eliminated if this water was intercepted and transported to the gulches for disposal. • North Kohala. The North Kohala district is subject to occasional heavy rainfall that creates heavy runoff. Streams collect water from the upper watershed and convey most flows safely through the urban centers. Although the gulches are generally smaller than those on the Hamakua coast, they have adequate capacity to handle storm flows. Other than damage to highway culverts, there is no record of any flood damage to structures. There are areas, however, which are subject to flooding problems. These include the town of Hawi which has experienced surface sheet flows concentrating along the highway within the town, the highway and road culverts at Lipoa Gulch, and Halelua and Pueka gulches. The community of Kapaau has problems similar to those of Hawi. The existing highway culverts are inadequate to handle peak flood flows and have caused minor flooding problems in the past. On each side of the highway, the Makapala area is relatively flat and is susceptible to flooding by the Niulii and Waikani Streams. The solution to the flood control and drainage problems of this district lies in the practice of proper soil conservation in agricultural lands and forest areas to help reduce and retard 10-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods surface water and sediment runoff. In addition, there are the improvements to natural channels to increase their capacity. The North Kohala district has recorded runup from tsunami and hurricane storm surge activity. Areas subject to inundation include Pololu Valley, Upolu Point Airport, and the Mahukona Harbor areas. • South Kohala. The South Kohala district can be divided into two separate watershed areas. The Waimea Village watershed extends into the Kohala Mountains. Heavy rainfall occurs in these mountains and several intermittent streams flow through the Waimea area. Upon reaching the Waimea plains, these streams turn to the west and flow toward Kawaihae across the extremely permeable lava flows of Mauna Kea. The Waikoloa stream has caused flooding within the town of Waimea during high intensity storms when waters overflow due to sharp stream bends and generally inadequate flow -carrying capacities. In addition, there is some flooding concern around the area abutting the Kawaihae road. The second watershed area above the Kawaihae to Anaehoomalu shoreline extends from the coast to the peaks of Mauna Kea to Mauna Loa. The area is semi -arid with few well- defined channels and infrequent stream flows. High intensity storms have caused flooding along the Queen Kaahumanu Highway from Kawaihae to Puako, and at Puako. These storms are very infrequent and tend to create flash floods. High flows have been experienced in the Hapuna Beach and Spencer Beach Park areas due to the flash floods. The Puako Beach lots have also been subject to flooding. During the evening of September 8, 1996, heavy rains generated a flash flood along Auwaiakeakua Stream. The floodwaters overtopped the existing drainage ways causing damage to private properties, particularly the Fairway Terrace Condominium at Waikoloa Village, County roads and drainage facilities. In 1997, construction was completed on the Parker Ranch drainage improvements. The improvements diverted the Kamuela and Lanimaumau Streams toward open pasture lands. Flooding has done substantial damage to the residential subdivision at the Mauna Kea Beach Resort. To mitigate the flooding, the developer has constructed flood control measures off site and the State Department of Transportation intends to install three sets of new culverts on site. The State Department of Transportation also intends to realign and replace Waiaka Road. An added threat to the coastal areas results from fire that leaves the upper slope areas with limited ground cover and thus more susceptible to flooding. • North Kona. The North Kona district can be divided into two watershed areas. The area north of Keahole Point and the summit of Hualalai have very low rainfall and runoff. Rainfall for this area reaches a maximum average of 40 inches per year, but most of the area receives less than 20 inches per year. The soils in the area are extremely permeable and there is no record of hazardous flooding in this area. The southern area, extending southward from Keahole Point, contains most of the urban development and is subject to increasing hazards from floodwater damages as land is more intensively utilized. The area is characterized by dry vegetative growth along the coastal 10-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods areas and thick tropical vegetation in the upper forest reserves. The ground slope is steep, averaging approximately 15 per cent. The steep slopes, shallow soils, frequent high intensity rains, and the lack of well-defined drainageways make many areas in the North Kona district susceptible to flooding and overland flows. Flash floods, primarily from overflows of the Keopu/Hienaloli, Waiaha, Kaumalumalu and the Holualoa/Horseshoe Bend drainage ways, have been identified by the Natural Resources Conservation Service's "North Kona Flood Plain Management Study." Flood water and sediment damage occurs along the entire coffee belt with the Kainaliu, Holualoa and Kailua village areas experiencing the heaviest damage. • South Kona. Being geographically young, there are few well-defined drainage ways in the district. Overland and stream flows are rare and can only be detected when the rainfall intensity exceeds the rate of infiltration. The district is subject to sudden high intensity rainstorms that can strike anywhere and cause localized flooding. Flood prone areas have been identified by the Natural Resources Conservation Service's "South Kona Flood Hazard Analyses." Coffee and other agricultural lands are subject to erosional damage and roads and culverts are sometimes damaged by high flows and sediment deposition. The Sunset Coffee Mill Flood Prevention Project has provided substantial relief in the Napoopoo area. There are also records of minor flooding from Kiilae, South Keokea, Honaunau and Wailapa Streams. In general, an area within 150 feet of the stream channels can be considered subject to flooding. Other areas with records of minor flooding include the areas along the Belt Highway in the area of the 1950 lava flows and at Hookena Road. • Ka'u. The Ka'u district can be divided into three separate regions. The northeastern region is dominated by the Ka'u desert. The average annual rainfall here is approximately 20 inches. There are few defined stream channels, none of which are perennial. The soils are very shallow, covering rough lava flows that are extremely permeable. The southwestern region that extends westerly from the South Point Road is characterized by moderate slopes, extremely permeable soils, and relatively young lava flows. The median annual rainfall varies from less than 20 inches at South Point to 75 inches at the 5,000 -foot elevation. There is little evidence of stream flow within this region and no record of damage from flood flows other than the flooding of roads within the Hawaiian Ocean View Estates subdivision. The central region contains the communities of Pahala, Naalehu, and Waiohinu. There are several streams within the region, none of which are perennial. Flood flows occur when the soils are saturated and rainfall intensity exceeds the rate of infiltration. Storm runoff descends steep slopes behind the communities and causes flooding and deposition of sediment and debris in the communities. 10-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods There are three existing flood control measures in this district. A flood water channel and debris basin in Naalehu was completed in 1965 with additional improvements and modifications completed in 1969 and 1982. The second project is within the town of Pahala and consists of diversion channels in the former sugar cane fields above the town and the improvement of Paauau Stream. The third project is within the town of Waiohinu. It is designed to collect flows from the watershed areas and transport them around Waiohinu for disposal in the rock land area. This project has been implemented, but needs additional improvements. Although major flooding within the communities has been addressed, flash flooding along the Hawaii Belt Road still occurs. The Piikea, Keaiwa, Paauau, Punaluu, Hilea, Kawaa, and Honuapo streams often exceed the capacity of the existing bridges and culverts and flood the roadway. This temporarily closes the road and effectively cuts off this district from the Puna, Hilo and Kona districts. However, in the Piikea ford area, the State DOT completed the construction of a new Piikea bridge in 1998. In addition to the bridge, improvements to the Piikea ford are proposed with the construction of three large box culverts. At the Paauau stream, there are plans for the construction of a new bridge. There are also plans for the replacement of the Ninole bridge located just past Punaluu. A new culvert is proposed in the Kawaa flats region. 10.3.1.1 NFIP Flood Insurance Profile for Hawaii County Insurance Overview As of 0313112009 Community: HAWAII COUNTY' State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY GID: 155166 Overview Occuly T—Zone Pre/Post FIRM Total by Community Group Flood Insurance Total Number of Policies: 4,277 Total Number of Policies: U Total Premiums: $2fi46,895 Total Premiums: $U Insurance in Force: $820,215,840 Insurance in Force: $0 Total Number of Closed Paid Losses: 407 Total Number of Closed Paid Losses: 0 $ of Closed Paid Losses $!,033,832 S of closed Paid Losses: $U Post Firm Minus Rated Policies Manufactured Homes Total Number of Minus Rated Policies 9 Total Number of Policies: 0 A Zone Minus Rated Policies: 5 Total Number of Closed Paid Losses: 0 V Zone Minus Rated Policies: 4 5 of Closed Paid Losses: $0 ICC 1316 Total Number of ICC Closed Paid Losses: CI Number of Properties by Community: 0 $ of ICC Cl Paid Losses: SU Substantial Damage Losses Number of Substant al Damage Closed Paid Losses: 17 10-16 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan ClaaPter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Insurance Zane As of 0313112009 Community: HAWAII COUNTY * State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY CID: 155166 Overview I Occupancy I Zone I PrelPost FIRM i Policies in B. C & X Zone Insurance in Premium Force $569,380 $196,299,300 $176,265 $24,782,300 $10,469 $3,408,60D $9,771 $3,250,400 $0 $0 $0 $0 $969,880 $116,243,000 $0 $0 $14,533 $2,525,D00 Standard 1,521 $677,783 $279,44'1,200 Preferred 628 $218,814 $194,266,900 Total 4,277 $2,646,895 $820,215,800 Number of Closed Paid $ of Closed Adjustment Losses Paid Losses Expense 59 $1,096,794.85 $37,306.31 37 S522,776.88 127,855.42 7 S216,D01.57 $5,779.00 3 S31,90126 $1,650.00 0 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00 $0.00 134 $2,335,540.21 $88,079.86 —0 $0.00 $0.00 10 523,466.11 $2,000.00 50 $1,559,849.31 $41,51851 _17 $348,848.01 $20,42664 317 $6,135,275.00 $224,613.001 Insurance Occupancy As of 0313112009 Community: HAWAII COUNTY * State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY CID: 155166 Overview Occupancy I Zone I PrelPost FIRM Force A01-30 & AE Zones 1,243 A Zones 119 AO Zones 14 AH Zones 14 AR Zones 0 A99 Zones 0 V01-30& VE Zones 727 V Zones 0 D Zones 11 B. C & X Zone Insurance in Premium Force $569,380 $196,299,300 $176,265 $24,782,300 $10,469 $3,408,60D $9,771 $3,250,400 $0 $0 $0 $0 $969,880 $116,243,000 $0 $0 $14,533 $2,525,D00 Standard 1,521 $677,783 $279,44'1,200 Preferred 628 $218,814 $194,266,900 Total 4,277 $2,646,895 $820,215,800 Number of Closed Paid $ of Closed Adjustment Losses Paid Losses Expense 59 $1,096,794.85 $37,306.31 37 S522,776.88 127,855.42 7 S216,D01.57 $5,779.00 3 S31,90126 $1,650.00 0 $0.00 $0.00 0 $0.00 $0.00 134 $2,335,540.21 $88,079.86 —0 $0.00 $0.00 10 523,466.11 $2,000.00 50 $1,559,849.31 $41,51851 _17 $348,848.01 $20,42664 317 $6,135,275.00 $224,613.001 Insurance Occupancy As of 0313112009 Community: HAWAII COUNTY * State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY CID: 155166 Overview Occupancy I Zone I PrelPost FIRM 10-17 Hairaii Coittaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiori Plan Policies in Number of Force Single Family 1,225 2-4 Family 250 All Other Residential 2,604 Non Residential 198 Total 4,277 Policies in 209 S4;021,381.69 Force Premium Condo 2,880 $1,054,102 Non Condo 1,397 $1,592,793 Total 4,277 $2,646,895 10-17 Hairaii Coittaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiori Plan Number of Insurance in Closed Paid $ of Closed Adjustment Premium Force Losses Paid Losses Expense $1,053,784 $321,043,600 209 S4;021,381.69 $127,021.65 $182,991 $56,046,900 40 $609,306.34 _$30;710.00 $857,178 $364,100,400 95 S1;202,837.97 $41;328.36 $552,942 $79,024,900 63 51;200,305.71 $54,325.73 $2,646,895 $820,215,800 , 407 S7,033,829.00 $253,384.00 Insurance in Number of Closed $ of Closed Paid Adjustment Force Paid Losses Losses Expense $426,516,300 91 51;451,04521 _$56,813.36 $393,699,500 3'16 S5;5B2,786.50 $_196,572.38 $820;215,800 407 57,033,831.00 $253,385.00 10-17 Hairaii Coittaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiori Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Insurance Pre/Past FIRM As of X31311201©9 Community: HAWAII COUNTY " State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY CID: 155166 Overview I Occupancy I Zone I PrelPost FIRM Post -FIRM Pre -FIRM Number of Policies in Number of Insurance in Closed Paid $ of Closed Policies in Insurance in Closed Paid $ of Closed Adjustment Paid Losses Force Premium Force Losses Paid Losses Expense A01.30 & AE Zones 1,055 5506,882 $144,966,700 49 S933.95050 S32,541 31 A Zones 82 $108;669 $16,124;DDD 33 S454,390.17 S15,780.42 AO Zones 4 $5,692 $830,100 7 $216,001.57 $5,779.00 AH Zones 3 $4,479 $733,200 $733,200 2 $16,715.09 $1,05000 AR Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 A99 Zones 0 $01— $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 V01-30 & VE Zones 698 $858;617 $107,986,200 128 $2,129,686.94 $84,504.86 V Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 DZones 4 $5,783 $1,011,000 9 $23,085.10 S1,910.00 B. C & X Zone 1,386 $488,204 $250,249,600 441 $1,179,005.64 533,339.12 Standard 1,176 $416230 $189,954,600 40 $1,094,521.57 S29;347.64 Preferred 210 $71,974 $60,295,DD0 4 $84,404.07 53;991.48 Grand Total 3,232 $1,978,326 $521,900,8DD 272 $4,952,842.00 S174,9©3.00 10.3.1.2 Repetitive Loss Properties Per FEMA, counties are encouraged to develop plans that address the mitigation of target repetitive loss properties, as insured properties may be eligible for Flood Mitigation Assistance and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HGMP) Funds, in order to reduce the number of repetitive claims against the NFIP. Refer to Figures 10-6 through 10-8. 10-18 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Post -FIRM Number of Policies in Insurance in Closed Paid $ of Closed Adjustment Force Premium Force Losses Paid Losses Expense A81.30 & AE Zones 188 $62;498 $51332,60D 10 $162,834.35 54,765.00 A Zones 37 $67,596 $8,658,300 4 $68,386.71 $12,075.00 AO Zones 10 $4,777 $2,578,50 0 $000 _ $000 AH Zones 11 $5;292 $2,517,20D 1 $15,186.17 $600.00 AR Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 A99 Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 V01.30 & VE Zones 29 $111,253 $8,256,80D 6 $205,953.27 $3,575.00 V Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 50.00 D Zones 7 $8,750 $1,514,000 0 $0.00 $0.00 B. C & X Zone 763 $408393 $223,457,600 23 $729,691.68 S28;6D6.03 Standard 345 $261,553 $89,486,60D 10 _$465,327.74 $12,170.87 Preferred 418 $146,849 $133,971,000 13 $264,363.94 $16,435.16 Grand Total 1,045 $668,569 $298,315,000 44 $1,182,050.00 $49,621.00 10.3.1.2 Repetitive Loss Properties Per FEMA, counties are encouraged to develop plans that address the mitigation of target repetitive loss properties, as insured properties may be eligible for Flood Mitigation Assistance and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HGMP) Funds, in order to reduce the number of repetitive claims against the NFIP. Refer to Figures 10-6 through 10-8. 10-18 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods First, a check was made of whether all structures on the NFIP Claims list would still be considered repetitive losses, i.e., having 2 or more losses of more than $1,000 within a ten- year period. All properties on the list met these criteria. Refer to Table 10-1. Second, a check was made of whether any of the properties would fall under the ICC (Increased Cost of Compliance) coverage funding criteria, i.e., two or more substantial damage losses in the past ten years, with each loss being 25% or more of the market value of the structure per occurrence. None of the losses would have qualified for this additional coverage. Third, FEMA's national Severe Repetitive Loss Strategy criteria was used to identify structures with higher priority for mitigation, i.e., insured structures with four or more losses, and structures with 2 or more losses where cumulative payments have exceeded the property value. Nineteen of the 50 properties met the criteria to be classified as target repetitive loss structures. It may be recommendable to determine whether there are any insured properties adjacent to these 19 target repetitive loss structures that should be considered in any specifically proposed mitigation action. The list includes the cumulative property values of these 19 structures (about $52.4M). Then, the NFIP Claims list was sorted using the above criteria and whether they are currently insured and by descending total cumulative claim amount, and given a ranking ordinal from 1 to 50. Nearly all the repetitive loss structures are located at coastal sites. All but one of the target 19 properties is pre -FIRM. All repetitive loss properties have been mapped with specific identification of those residential properties falling within the FEMA target criteria. Eight properties (ordinals 12 to 19), have made claims in the past meeting the target criteria, but are not currently insured. Five properties (ordinals 7 to 11) are currently insured under Special Direct Facility (SDF). With regards to mitigation, then acting administrator Robert Shea of FEMA's Federal Insurance Mitigation Administration testified to Congress as follows in 2001: "A factor to be considered in offering assistance to the owners of these target properties — whether they choose to move out of the flood plain or to improve their properties — is how to treat those who refuse such an offer. Most people living in these high-risk areas are looking for help to alleviate their plight. However, there will be those who, for various reasons, are reluctant to move. This approach to addressing repetitive loss properties will receive public acceptance only if it is voluntary, and it will be important to provide an insurance consequence to the decision not to accept an offer of assistance. Alternatives proposed have included denying further insurance coverage, requiring that full actuarial rates be paid for future coverage, and substantially increasing deductibles to have those who refuse to move shoulder a greater portion of their cost of recovery. It is our belief that shifting more of the financial burden to the property owner is a more effective incentive than the denial of insurance." Accordingly, it appears that uninsured properties with higher losses (those in the gray portion of the list, ordinals 12 to 19) would not be targeted for mitigation, as there would be no insurance consequence to the decision not to accept an offer of insurance. There may be good reason to examine these cases to determine why they are not continuing under 10-19 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods coverage, as part of an annual repetitive loss area outreach project. (Flood insurance could have lapsed after repayment of a disaster assistance loan.) In addition, examination of the NFIP repetitive loss data indicates that there are numerous typographical corrections, mostly relating to Hawaii location addressing, which should be reported to the Corrections Clearing House at ISO. Repetitive Loss Properties • CRS* Target for Mitigation Criteria Other Roads Major Roads Flood Zone 100 Year - 500 Year X SOUTH KOHALA * Number indicates mitigation rank, see table Total Losses Paid $ 3,86®,982 HAMAKUA SOUTH NORTH KONA { NORTH HILO PUNA OUTH KONA Figure 10-6. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map, County View 10-20 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods A.14 9 10 SOUTH H2Lo 41 48 25 14 5 Repetitive Loss Properties • CRS y Target for Mitigation Criteria sw W- OtherRoads Major Roads 24 Flood Zone 100 Year - 500 Year X Figure 10-7. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map, Hilo zoom 10-21 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods 409 987 39 Repetitive Loss Properties • CRS Target for Mitigation Criteria Other Roads Major Roads Flood Zone 100 Year - 500 Year - X ti 18 8 %22 6 2 �, 1523 29 1q-14 �NORTH KONA } t 1 Figure 10-8. 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Chapter 27 was adopted on May 5, 1982 and was last updated on November 30, 2007. Implementation and enforcement of HCC Chapter 27 typically occurs during: review of subdivision proposals (HCC Chapter 23), building permits (HCC Chapter 8), grading/grubbing permits (HCC Chapter 10); and/or, public or private complaints. HCC Chapter 27 includes variance process from Chapter 27's requirements, which includes very specific criteria for reviewing, recording, reporting and appealing a variance. HCC Chapter 27's enforcement provisions include: right of entry; notice of violation and/or administrative order process; injunctive relief through the circuit court of the third district, State of Hawaii, or United States District Court, State of Hawaii; criminal enforcement, where violations constitute a misdemeanor and are subject to a fine of $1,000/day for each day of none compliance and/or one year imprisonment; and, removal of floodplain encroachment/obstruction notices, and/or removal of encroachment/obstruction by County at the violator's expense. See the appendix at the end of this chapter. Description of community assistance and monitoring activities: Assistance includes, in part, the following activities: participating in the NFIP so the community has access to flood insurance, and Federal disaster relief/low interest loans; maintaining and providing information/assistance on FEMA's Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM), Flood Insurance Studies and letter of map changes; requiring, reviewing and maintaining FEMA's Elevation Certificates for structures built within FEMA's Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA); providing review of subdivision proposals and related construction plans, building permits, grading/grubbing permits, which all relate to improvements proposed within FEMA's SFHA; providing FEMA flood zone determinations to the public, governmental agencies, lending institutions and realtors; Participating in FEMA's Community Rating System, which is a program to reduce flood insurance rates based on the County doing certain floodplain management activities; updating FEMA's FIRMs through detailed flood studies; receiving and as appropriate, responding to complaints related to activities with floodplains; providing review of variances and appeals, as provided in HCC Chapter 27; and, providing educational literature, presentations, website information and sponsoring training. Monitoring compliance with HCC Chapter 27 is accomplished, in part, by: requiring FEMA Elevation Certificates (pre and post construction submittals), which help assures buildings within SFHA are constructed in compliance with HCC Chapter 27; reviewing applications for subdivisions and related construction plans, building permits and grading/grubbing permits for compliance with HCC Chapter 27; responding to complaints and taking appropriate actions to correct noncompliance. Reviewing, approving, preparing, submitting to FEMA and maintaining Letter of Map Changes, which are used to update FEMA's FIRMs. 10-24 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods 10.4.1.1 County of Hawaii Flood Studies The County is currently doing flood studies (map updates) in the following areas: Puna, Hilo, North and South Kona. There are several privately funded flood studies ongoing in the Kona, Hilo and Waimea. See the County of Hawaii Flood Studies in Table 10-2. Table 10-2. County of Hawaii Flood Study list County of Hawaii Flood Studies Prepared on October 12, 2009 County of Hawaii's flood control levees certification project: Levees that are not properly constructed and regularly maintained, inspected and certified have the potential to create significant community disruption and considerable cost in flood insurance, repairing and replacing flood damaged structures. Consequently, on November 2, 2007, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) notified the County of Hawaii that the County's levees (refer to Table 2) require certification in accordance with Code of Federal Regulation Title 44 Section 65.10 (44 CFR 65.10). FEMA's April 2007 "Fact Sheet — Meeting the Criteria for Accrediting Levees on Flood Maps" is a good resource on FEMA's levee certification process. 10-25 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Estimated FEMA Case FEMA Panel Completion Identifier TMK No. Flooding Source No. Engineer Start Date Status / Remarks Date DHHL Lalamilo Housing, Phase 6-6-001:077 09-09-2407R Keanuimano & 0164 D Anson Murayama, 7/17/09 9/3/09, Withdrew CLOMR Jan -10 2 Waikoloa Streams Community due to possible change in Q Planning & Engr value based on CLOMR Inc Case No. 95-09-154R. Waiakea Trib Area 3A Various 09-09-2120P Waiakea Trib 3A 0870 C, 0880 C Cary Kondo, Belt 1/26/09 Formerly Case No, 09-09- Dec -09 & 0890 C Collins 0862P. 9/11/09 FEMA requests information. Kailua Gardens Subdivision 7-5-010: 088 and 09-09-1818R Hienaloli 0713 D Mr. Geoffery 5/19/09 6/19/09 FEMA requested Dec -09 089 Drainageway Casburn, with more information. CMF Engineering, Inc. Waipahoehoe Trib 2-5-006152 09-09-1789P Waipahoehoe Stream 0859D Paul Nash, Atlas 5/18/09 6/17/09 FEMA requested Feb -10 Trib Engr more information. Greenwell Family Flood Study 8-1-004: 001, 045, 09-09-1820P South Kona 0939 C and Mr. Ty Dempsey, 5/19/09 7/6/09 FEMA requested Jan -10 052, 053, 054, Watercourse #1 and 0943 C with Lyon Assoc. information. 055, 070, 074, Watercourse #2 075 Kawailani Street Bridge 09-09-1608P Waiakea Stream and 0880 C, 0890 C Wesley R. 12/20/07 LOMR Issued & Effective Done Replacement Waiakea Tributary Segawa & Assoc. 2/16/10 No. 2 Hilo Medical Center Parking Lot 2-3-032001 09-09-1400P Unnamed Trib to 0880C Alex Kalawe, 4/2/09 Recently combined with Jan -10 Wailuku River Engineering Case No. 09-09-1398P Partners, Inc. Ainako Stream Flood Zone Various 09-09-1398P Ainako Stream 0880C Cary Kondo, Belt 4/6/09 5/13/09 FEMA requested Jan -10 Drainage Basin Collins information. Kona Coffe and Tea Company 7-5-017:031 & 09-09-0036R Waiaha Drainageway 0713D Ty Dempsey, 7/08 CLOMR - 3/24/09 letter Flood Channel 045 Lyon Assoc. from FEMA requesting data within 90 -da s. North Kona Flood Study 7-5, 7-6 & 7-7 None Waiaha, Horseshoe 713D, 714C, Berry Mu ran aka,mple 12/11/2008 Coting topographic May -10 Bend, Holualoa, 926 E & 927D Metcalf & mapping within 30 -days. Kaumalumalu Eddy/AECOM watercourses. South Kona Flood Study Phase 1 8-4 None Watercourses 13-20 1166C & 1167C Michael Wong, 6/24/2008 Completed preliminary flood Nov -09 Army Corps of study. Readyto submit to Engineers County. South Kona Flood Study Phase 11 8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, None Watercourses 1-12 939C, 943C, Michael Wong, 6242008 Working on developing Jul -10 8-5,8-6 and 21-23 944C, 1156C, Army Corps of topographic maps 1157C, 1158C, Engineers 1159C, 1169C & 1407C Puna Flood Study 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9 None To be determined None printed Jay Stone, 12/192006 Completed hydrology and May -10 Oceanit Hydraulic anal is. Keopu-Hienaloli Flood Study 7-5 None Keopu and Hienaloli 0712C, 713D & Derrick Elfalan, 11/202007 Preliminary flood study May -10 Watercourses 714C Oceanit completed. Continuing to refine flood boundaries (hydraulics study). County of Hawaii's flood control levees certification project: Levees that are not properly constructed and regularly maintained, inspected and certified have the potential to create significant community disruption and considerable cost in flood insurance, repairing and replacing flood damaged structures. Consequently, on November 2, 2007, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) notified the County of Hawaii that the County's levees (refer to Table 2) require certification in accordance with Code of Federal Regulation Title 44 Section 65.10 (44 CFR 65.10). FEMA's April 2007 "Fact Sheet — Meeting the Criteria for Accrediting Levees on Flood Maps" is a good resource on FEMA's levee certification process. 10-25 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods The County needs to certify the four levees listed in Table 10-3, which includes Waiakea Stream Levee 11 (refer to Figure 1), Alenaio Stream Levees 12 and 20 (refer to Figure 2) and Paauau Stream Levee (refer to Figure 3). Table 10-3. List and Status of Levees FEMA Levee ID USACE Levee? PAL Status Flood Source Levee Owner -Object 1 No A Kamuela Stream Parker Ranch 2 No A Lammaumau Stream Parker Ranch 9 Yes B Keo a Draina ewav Countv of Hawaii 11 Yes B Waiakea Stream Countv of Hawaii 12 Yes B Alenaio Stream County of Hawaii 20 Yes A Alenaio Stream Counly of Hawaii 21 Yes B Keao a Draina ewav Countv of Hawaii (1) Yes B Paauau Stream I County of Hawaii USACE - United State Ann Corps of Engineers PAL - Previously Accredited Levee B - Received a USACE acceptable maintenance level rating in a recent inspection review. A - Levees not in the USAGE program with no approved maintenance review for FEMA. 0 - Levees subject to this CDBG funding request (1) - Levee not originally listed in FEMA November 2, 2007, letter. Given the time needed to comply with 44 CFR 65.10, FEMA issued its March 16, 2007, Procedure Memorandum No. 43 (PM No. 43), which establishes a process that gives communities additional time to acquire and assemble the necessary levee certification documentation. In accordance with PM No. 43, the County of Hawaii entered into a PAL Agreement with FEMA on January 29, 2008. 10-26 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Claalver 10: Hazard Analysis Floods I Site Location I Levees not certified 100 -Yr Flood (1%) Inundation Area I Levee No. 20 1 2009 Community Development Grant County of Hawaii Department of Public Works Engineering Division Figure 1 - Alenaio Stream (Levees 12 & 20) Note: Inundation areas are estimates only. 10-27 Hairaii Corttaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiotz Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Levees not certified 100 -Yr (1 %) Flood Inundation Area I Levees I I Site Location I -\� 2009 Community Development Grant County of Hawaii Department of Public Works Engineering Division Figure 3 — Paauau Stream (Levee) c_ L Note: Inundation areas are estimates only. 10-29 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan ■ Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Currently, the areas landward of County's levees are mapped as "X Zones" on FEMA's Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM). Areas designated as "X Zones" are not considered by FEMA as being subject to 100 -year (1%) flood inundation. Mortgaged structures located within "X Zones" are not required to have flood insurance under National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), or the flood insurance premium is greatly reduced. If the levees are not certified in accordance with the PAL Agreement and 44 CFR 65. 10, the area landward of the levees will be remapped on the FIRM as "A Zone" Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA). Areas designated as "A Zone" SFHA are considered by FEMA as being subject to 100 -year (1%) flood inundation. Any mortgaged structure located within an "A Zone" SFHA is required to have NFIP flood insurance. The annual premium for NFIP flood insurance can be in the thousands of dollars. If the County's levees are not certified, Table 10-4 presents an estimate of the acres of inundation (64 aces) and number of parcels (175 parcels) potentially affected (Refer to Figures 1, 2 and 3 for: the location of the levees; flood sources; estimated 100 -year (1%) flood inundation areas landward of the levees; and, potentially affected parcels). Table 10-4. Estimated Inundation Area and Number of Parcels Potentially Affected if Levees are not Certified FEMA Levee Inundation Area, Object ID Flood Source acres(' No. of Parcel(') 11 Waiakea Stream 12 10 12 & 20 Alenaio Stream 43 133 - - - Paauau Stream 9 32 Total 64 acres 175 parcels (1) Based on the inundation areas shown on Figures 1, 2 and 3. The USACE has the expertise to prepare the certification documentation requested by FEMA. As part of the USACE Interagency and International Support Authority, the County entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the USACE, on October 1, 2008. Under the October 1 MOA, the USACE will assist the County in acquiring, assembling and submitting the necessary levee certification documentation to FEMA for Alenaio Stream (PAL Levee Nos. 12 & 20), Waiakea Stream (PAL Levee No. 11) and Paauau Stream (no PAL no. assigned). See Table 10-5. 10.4.1.2 Accuracy and Completeness of Flood Zone Mapping Many known flood -prone areas have minimal FIRM coverage (e.g., upper Puna). Some FIRM maps do not completely include all flood areas, as evidenced by the November 2000 flooding (e.g., FIRM maps for Hilo). FEMA and the County are working to digitize the FIRMs, which should be completed by late 2010 or early 2011. Figure 10-9 shows those 10-30 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Table 10-5. USACE October 1 MOA Com ensation Allocation FEMA Levee Object ID Flood Source HUD Funds 10% County Funds 90% Total Funds 11 Waiakea Stream $ 27,500 $ 247,500 $ 275,000 12 & 20 Alenaio Stream 14,500 130,500 $ 145,000 - - - Paauau Stream 14,500 130,500 $ 145,000 Total $ 56,500 $ 508,500 $ 565,000 10.4.1.2 Accuracy and Completeness of Flood Zone Mapping Many known flood -prone areas have minimal FIRM coverage (e.g., upper Puna). Some FIRM maps do not completely include all flood areas, as evidenced by the November 2000 flooding (e.g., FIRM maps for Hilo). FEMA and the County are working to digitize the FIRMs, which should be completed by late 2010 or early 2011. Figure 10-9 shows those 10-30 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods areas that have not been mapped, the mapped areas that have been digitized by FEMA, the mapped areas that FEMA did not digitize but which the County has recently digitized. Figure 10-10 compares the information on a digitized preliminary DFIRM to the paper FIRM maps, illustrating that alignment checking and correction are a part of that process. Legend FIRM not printed, minimal tsunami inundation zone (per FEMA) FIRM not printed, area all in Zone X FIRM Printed LOMR (Letter of Map Revision) pending on a portion of panel Figure 10-9. FIRM Coverage. 10-31 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods i Blo�l1E Reel KAMO% M207', KCOkeB POi at 3� �\j_I\/ MACHIOA �pKE fO � pP v LIHIKAI STREET A' - E1 e Puhi B -Y KE... \ZONE AE ACCESS o 1 [I oFo _ hioxaR.,l. % ZONE VE rix' ani L, rpy G' a _M206. - oPo M205 SPkEt RJ NSE 5. 55 i ' PGWk 9 JE 9 gANOREWS � Z E o� r v� P✓kN v4 VENUE ZONE VE _ _ AE'P o�s�' 9 9 w a � ET xv Pa e E VN aJ IEy JE Paper Map FIRM showing base flood elevations l ZONE AE- Digitized firm w/out BFE, but showing relationship to parcels and topographic features. Figure 10-10. Comparison of Paper vs. Preliminary Digitized FIRM Draft, showing alignment issue being resolved. 10.4.1.3 Hurricane Flood Insurance Study for the Hawaiian Islands The Hurricane Flood Insurance Study for the Hawaiian Islands was conducted under FEMA contract number EMW-2003-CO-0046, RMTC/URS Task Order 013. Under this contract, RMTC/URS, a joint venture consisting of R.M. Towill, URS, Dewberry, TerraPoint, Airborne 1, and Sea Engineering, was tasked to evaluate and map the magnitude and extent of coastal hazards due to hurricanes for six Hawaiian Islands, divided into four counties: Kauai (Kauai County), Oahu (City and County of Honolulu), Molokai, Maui, Lanai (Maui 10-32 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods County), and Hawaii (Hawaii County). Although the effective (i.e., past) FIRMS for each county have accounted for tsunami hazards, the hurricane flood hazard had not been previously separately evaluated in a comprehensive study throughout the islands. In general, the hurricane coastal hazard analysis was limited to the southern coast of each island. This is due to several factors, including the predominance of tsunami hazards and limited low-lying areas susceptible to hurricane hazards along the north shore of the islands. Table 5-1 provides a summary of study limits. Table 10-6. Summary of Studv Limits Island western Limit Eastern Limit Reach Length (Miles) Hawaii Upolu Point Cape Kumukahi 193 Kauai Nohili Point Kuaehu Point 56 Lanai Kaumalapau Manele 16 Maui Honokahua Bay Koali 69 Molokai Ilio Point Cape Halaawa 54 Oahu Kaena Point Kawaihoa Point 60 Total: 448 ,'� Kauai Oahu Sr LanaiMa LU Figure 10-11. Extents of Hurricane storm surge inundation study Transects were laid -out within the study limits and representative placement was evaluated during the field reconnaissance performed from July 24th through August 6th, 2007. The topographic base consisted of LiDAR collected under FEMA Task Orders 12 and 26. The LiDAR data were collected in the Fall of 2006, post -processed to bare earth and quality 10-33 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods controlled to meet FEMA mapping standards. These data were assimilated together with the best available bathymetric datasets, including USACE hydrographic LiDAR, into high- resolution seamless digital elevation models. The hazard analysis considered the combination of storm surge and hurricane -induced wave hazards. This included independent analysis and/or modeling of storm surge, return frequency flood elevations, wave setup, overland wave hazards, and wave runup. The ADvanced CIRCulation model for coastal ocean hydrodynamics (ADCIRC) was selected to develop the stillwater elevations or storm surge for the study area. The Empirical Simulation Technique (EST), also developed by the USACE, was used to determine the stillwater frequency curves for the 10-, 2-, 1-, and 0.2 -percent annual chance stillwater elevations. Deepwater wave conditions were determined using the Shore Protection Manual (SPM) prediction technique and limited fetch analyses were performed in harbor and sheltered areas. Wave setup was differentiated and evaluated for areas with and without fronting reefs. Areas of primary frontal dune were identified, delineated, and eroded. Overland wave propagation hazards were evaluated using the WHAFIS model. Wave obstructions were verified at representative transect locations by field reconnaissance. Wave run-up was evaluated using the RUNUP 2.0 and TAW methodologies, depending of the presence of reefs and local steepness of the bathymetry. Wave hazard analyses were conducted at FIS transect locations, in addition to more tightly - spaced "mapping transects." These additional transects were facilitated by the application of an integrated GIS toolset that automates repetitive modeling tasks, and enables a more detailed analysis than typical coastal FIS studies. Wave setup values were assigned to these transects according to analysis at adjacent FIS transects. Otherwise, the mapping transects were treated with the same overland wave propagation and wave runup assessments as the FIS transects. The coastal hazards determined from the above analyses were synthesized in the form of the standard FEMA special flood hazard boundaries for the Zone VE, Zone AE, Zone AO, and Zone X hazard areas. These are presented in the TSDN as workmaps produced at a scale of 1':500". The workmaps also include stillwater stations, topographic elevation contours, FIS and mapping transect locations, and the shoreline. Wave analysis for the 0.2% annual chance event was not included in the scope of the study. The 0.2% return frequency stillwater elevation was exceeded by cumulative flood elevation from the 1% stillwater elevation and wave setup, therefore, the boundary of the 0.2% annual chance event was not delineated. In steeper areas where mapping scale limits the gutter placement, the SFHAs are only identified by the position of the 100 -yr flood boundary. Mapped Base Flood Elevations (BFEs) are considerably dependent to the topographic representation at each transect. As a result, localized variations in the topography at other locations may not be fully reflected in the mapped SFHAs and BFEs. A Technical Support Data Notebook (TSDN) was compiled for each county in the study area. Storm surge and return frequency elevation analyses were inclusive of all counties, and thus all materials pertaining to those analyses, including model input, output, and documentation are included in each county TSDN. The remainder of the data, including wave modeling, mapping, workmaps, topography, etc., are island and county specific. Therefore, these data are only presented in the appropriate countywide TSDN. 10-34 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Limitations of the study being addressed prior to FIRM adoption: • Modifications to the Flood Maps to include tsunami inundation as a factor in zoning and construction requirements. o Phase L The first step presently underway is comparing the differences between the existing and new FIRM maps to determine where historic or the recently modeled tsunami hazard is greater. o Phase 11: UHM SOEST mapping (by the Kwok Fai Cheung Group) could produce 100 -year and 500 -year probabilistic tsunami hazard maps to provide future local modifications to the DFIRMs. 10.4.1.4 Adequacy ofManaging Existing Flood Problems and New Development with Watershed Planning and Drainage Standards The current comprehensive drainage plan for the County is the "Drainage Master Plan for the County of Hawaii" prepared over 30 years ago in 1971. This plan needs to be updated to incorporate new studies and to provide a watershed perspective in managing floods using both structural and non-structural methods. This plan would be the basis to prioritize CIP projects and to initiate regulatory changes. FEMA has funded an Area Development Plan for Existing and Future Development project to investigate: County regulations and policies for new development to provide community outreach in regards to protection/precaution measures. Floodplain management and land use regulatory integration scope of work includes examining regulatory integration of grading ordinance (HCC chapter 10), flood control code (chapter 27), subdivision code (chapter 23), and zoning code (chapter 25): Reduction of flood hazards through regulary measures (recommended revisions to hcc chapters 10, 23, 25 & 27) DESCRIPTION: This project will recommend new regulatory measures to the Hawaii County Code that would reduce flood hazards, including hazards caused by dams and levees within the County of Hawaii. Proposed regulatory measures will focus on Chapter 10, Erosion & Sedimentation, Chapter 27, Flood Plain Management, Chapter 23. Subdivisions and Chapter 25, Zoning. Recommendations to other Chapters of the Hawaii County Code may be made as may be appropriate. We are focusing on the four chapters for the following: Chapter 10, Erosion & Sedimentation Control: Any land disturbance activity has the potential of causing flood hazards or aggravating existing flood hazards to surrounding properties and the environment. There is a need to improve enforcement as well as to increase the use of mitigating measures and/or best management practices that would minimize erosion, sedimentation impacts during land disturbance activities that would create flood hazards. Major recommendations are anticipated as this Chapter has not had any major changes since its adoption in November 1975. 10-35 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods Chapter 27, Flood Plain Management: This Chapter focuses on establishing building code and infrastructure requirements that would minimize flood damages based on hazards identified by the FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps. Recommendations may also address uncertainties inherent with the FEMA maps and measures to reduce flood hazards for non- compliant structures in special flood hazard areas. Because substantial changes to this Chapter were made in November 2007, major revisions are not anticipated. Chapter 23, Subdivisions: This chapter needs to be revised to reflect current requirements for subdivisions that are within special flood hazard areas. Upgrading of current drainage improvement requirements will also be considered. Chapter 25, Zoning: Like Chapter 23, upgrading of drainage improvement requirements will be a consideration. However, its applicability to the various types of zoning within Hawaii County and/or development restrictions within special flood hazard areas, watersheds, forests and other similar areas will a major issue of consideration. Because it is the responsibility of the implementing agency to develop legislative proposals, identification of pros and cons of each recommendation including any economic impacts, implementation measures and/or any legal issues or constraints is an essential part of this proj ect. 10.4.1.5 Flood Forecasting In recent years, the NWS has installed more telemetered rain gauges to aid in flood prediction. Two Doppler radars on this island provide rainfall intensity in quantitative graphic form. A corps of human observers is also maintained to report significant events. Warnings for specific areas are broadcast via normal and special radio/TV forecasts and by special County Civil Defense announcements as well as over the NOAA Weather Radio. Thus, short-term mitigation is being addressed. The problem of vehicles being driven across flooding streams must be met by road hazard signs and public education for hunters and others using remote roads. 10.4.1.6 Pacific Services Center Flood Response Tool The Hawai'i Flood Response Tool is an ongoing project to develop a geographic information system (GIS) -based application to provide enhanced flood response in Hawai'i. The application will centralize access to diverse weather and stream now data from various locations and sources to allow for timely analysis and response. This software, which is being developed for local emergency managers, will provide an improved operational picture for flood response activities by automatically logging disparate real-time and near real-time observation data and text products via the Internet. The information will be displayed along with historical and baseline data in an -easy to -interpret format utilizing GIS. This rapid access to new data streams should provide a more realistic picture of on -the -ground conditions and reduce data compilation time. More information on the Hawai'i Flood Response Tool is available at nos. csc.psc2noaa.gov. 10-36 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods 10.4.2 Future Plans Project Description Status Modernize FIRM maps with local amendments See http://gis.hawaiinfip.org/that On Dec. 12, 2008 and Feb. 26, 2009, FEMA Also included a re-evaluation of FEMA has revised the DFIRM's and Flood issued Preliminary Digital Flood Insurance Insurance Study based on hurricane flooding the Puukapu Watershed of the Rate Maps (91 panels) for Hawaii County hazard. Waimea area (Pre-DIRMs). On April 21, 2009, FEMA These FIS maps do not include historic tsunami held its Pre-DIRMs flood hazard mapping inundation data. The next step is to compare the community coordination meeting with the differences between the existing and new FIRM County. On April 22, in Kona, and April 23, maps to determine where historic or the recently in Hilo, FEMA and the County held public modeled tsunami inundation hazard is greater. meetings on the Pre-DIRMs. On June 30, 2009, the County sent a letter to FEMA indicating, until the Pre-DFIRMs are revised to acceptable standards, the County will continue using the County's current floodplain management records to make land use and building permit issuance decisions. On July 7, 2009, FEMA acknowledge the County's June 30 letter and accepted the County's support in preparing improved digital presentations of the riverine flood zones. On Sept. 28, 2009, FEMA approved a $71,300 Cooperative Technical Partners grant to assist in improving the riverine flood zones on the DFIRMs. FEMA will continue to improve the DFIRMs coastal high hazard areas by combining the more protective inundation areas from either FEMA's 2008 hurricane flood study for the County of Hawaii (refer to Section 10.4.1.3) and the current effective FIRMs' coastal high hazard areas. Participate in the Community Rating System Results in reduction in flood Project requires documentation effort and insurance premiums analysis of repetitive loss properties Precipitation -Frequency Atlas of the US Hawaiian http://hdsc.new.noas.gov/hdsc/pfds NOAA release May 2009 Islands Includes: precipitation frequency estimates for durations from 5 -minutes through 60 days, for return periods of 1 -year through 1000 years. Develop policies for repetitive loss structures Policy may or may not make This depends on an analysis of repetitive loss economic sense from a Benefit properties Cost Analysis Area Development Plan for Existing and Future Floodplain management and land Ongoing project scope: Recommend Development use regulatory integration scope of revisions to the Department of Public Works This project proposes to refine regulations and work includes examining for Chapters 10 and 27; and recommend policies for new development and provide regulatory integration of grading revisions to the Planning Department for community outreach in regards to ordinance (HCC chap 10), flood Chapters 23 and 25 and develop new protection/precaution measures. Context Sensitive control code (chap 27), regulatory measures to reduce flood hazards Solutions methodology will be used to identify a subdivision code (chap 23), and within the County of Hawaii and to earn comprehensive programmatic approach to mitigate zoning code (chap 25) FEMA Community Rating System (CRS) the risks to existing and future developments. The points for the County of Hawai'i. study also proposes to identify and prioritize floodplain mapping, develop policies for unprotected subdivisions, and coordinate disaster preparedness planning for floods. Develop rainfall and streamflow gauging system Internet accessible tool to view NOAA PSC developing prototype suitable to flood monitoring real-time rainfall and streamflow application for emergency managers data 10-37 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10: Hazard Analysis Floods 10.4.2.1 Community Rating System The National Flood Insurance Program's (NFIP) Community Rating System (CRS) is a voluntary incentive program that recognizes and encourages community floodplain management activities that exceed the minimum NFIP requirements. As a result, flood insurance premium rates are discounted to reflect the reduced flood risk resulting from the community actions meeting the three goals of the CRS: 1. Reduce flood losses; 2. Facilitate accurate insurance rating; and 3. Promote the awareness of flood insurance. For CRS participating communities, flood insurance premium rates are discounted in increments of 5%; i.e., a Class 1 community would receive a 45% premium discount, while a Class 9 community would receive a 5% discount (a Class 10 is not participating in the CRS and receives no discount). The CRS classes for local communities are based on 18 creditable activities, organized under four categories: 1. Public Information, 2. Mapping and Regulations, 3. Flood Damage Reduction, and 4. Flood Preparedness. The table below shows the credit points earned, classification awarded, and premium reductions given for communities in the NFIP CRS. Credit Points Class Premium Reduction Premium Reduction SFHA* Non-SFHA** 4,500+ 45% 10% 4,000 — 4,499 r 40% 10% 3,500 — 3,999 r 35% 10% 3,000 — 3,499 r 30% 10% 2,500 — 2,999 r 25% 10% 2,000 — 2,499 6 20% 10% 1,500 — 1,999 15% IF 5% 1,000 — 1,499 r 10% IF 5% 500-999 5% 5% 0-499 10 0 0 *Special Flood Hazard Area **Preferred Risk Policies are available only in B, C, and X Zones for properties that are shown to have a minimal risk of flood damage. The Preferred Risk Policy does not receive premium rate credits under the CRS because it already has a lower premium than other policies. The CRS credit for AR and A99 Zones are based on non -Special Flood Hazard Areas (non-SFHAs) (B, C, and X Zones). Credits are: classes 1-6, 10% and classes 7-9, 5%. Premium reductions are subject to change. 10-38 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix Chapter 27 FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT Article 1. Authorization. Section 27-1. Statutory authority. Section 27-2. Findings offact. Section 27-3. Purpose. Section 27-4. Scope and methods. Article 2. General Provisions. Section 27-5. Applicability. Section 27-5. Basis. Section 27-7. Compliance. Section 27-8. Other laws and regulations. Section 27-9. Interpretation. Section 27-10. Warning and disclaimer ofliahility. Section 27-11. Severability. Section 27-12, M-finitions. Section 27-1.3. Nonconforming structures. Article 3. Adm inkiration. Section 27-14. Director of public works approval. Section 27-15. 17csignalion of the floodplain administrator. Section 27-15. Duties and responsibilities of the floodplain administrator Article 4. Standards. Section 27-17. Certification standards. Section 27-18. Standards for construction. Section 27-19. Standards far utilities. Section 27-20. Standards for subdivisions and other developments. Section 27-21. Standards for manufactured homes. Section 27-22_ Standards fir fl(x)d,.vays. Section 27-23. Standards for coastal high ha2ard areas. Section 27-24. Standards for general floodplain. Section 27-25. Standards for improvements adjacent to drainage facilities. Section 27-24. Storm drainage standards. Article 5. Variances and Appeals. Section 27-27. Criteria for variances. Section 27-2$. Application for variance. Section 27-24. Pievl ew of van ancc appl lcations Section 27-30. Recording and reporting of variances. Section 27-31. Appeals. SUPP.5 (1-2048) 10A-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 10A-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Article 6. Enforcement. Section 27-32. Right to enter_ Section 27-33. Notice of violation. Section 27-34. Administrative order. Section 27-35. Injunctive relief. Section 27-36_ Criminal enforcement. Section 27-37. Removal of encroachment and/or obstruction notices. Section 27-38. Removal by County; costs. 10A-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-1 Chapter 27 I+LOODPLAIN MANAGFMFPIT Article 1. Authorization. Section 27-1. Statutory authority. This chapter is enacted pursuant to the U.S. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (Public Laws 90-418 and 91-152), as amended, and the U.S. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-234), As amended. In addition, the Legislature of the State of Ilawai`i has in Ilawai`i Revised Statutes 46-1.5(5), 46-1,5(14), 46-11, 46-11.5, and 46-12 conferred upon the various counties the authority to adopt regulations designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfarc of ils citizenry (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 3.) Section 27-2. Findings of fact. (a) The flood hazard areas of the County of Hawaii are subject to periodic inundation which results in loss of lifc and property, health and safety hazards, disruption of commerce and governmental services, extraordinary public expenditures for flood protection and relief, and impairment of the tax base, all of which adversely affect the public health, safety and general welfare. (b) These flood losses are caused by the cumulative effect of- obstructions in areas of special flood hazards which increase flood heights and velocities and, when inadequatcly anchored, cause damage to uses in other areas. Uses that are inadequately lltiodproofcd, elevated, or otherwise protected from flood damage also contribute to the flood loss. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) Section 27-3. Purpose. It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare, and to minimize public and private losses due to flood conditions in specific areas by provisions designed: (a) To protect human life and health; (b) To minimize expenditure of public money for Costly flood control projects; (c) To minimize the need for rescue and relief efforts associated with flooding and generally undertaken at the expense of the general public; (d) To minimize prolonged business interruptions; (e) To minimize damage to public facilities and utilities such as water and gas mains, electric, telephone and sewer lines, streets and bridges located in areas of special flood hazard; (f) To help maintain a stable tax base by providing for the sound use and development of areas of special flood hazard so as to minimixc fixture flood blight areas; (g) To assist in notifying potential buyers that property is in an area of special flood hazard; and (h) To ensure that those who occupy areas of special flood hazard assume responsibility for their actions. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) Section 27-4. Scope and methods. In order to accomplish its purposes, this chapter includes methods and provisions for: (a) Restricting or prohibiting uses which are dangerous to health, safety, and property due to water or erosion Wards, or which result in damaging increases in erosion or flood heights or velocities; (b) Requiring that uses vulnerable to floods, including facilities which serve such uses, be protected against flood damage at the time of -initial construction; 27-1 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 27-4 I'IAWAI`I COUNTY CODE (c) Controlling the alteration of natural floodplains, stream channels, and natural protective batriers, which help accommodate or channel llcmd waIurs, (d) Controlling fill, grading, dredging, and other dcvelopmcnt which may increase flood damage; and (e) Preventing or regulating the construction of flood barricrs which will unnaturally divert flood waters or which may increase flood hazards in other areas. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) Article 2. General Provisions. Section 27-5. Applicability. (a) This chapter shall apply to all areas of special flood hazards identified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in a scientific and engineering report entitled "Flood Insurance Study," dated April 2, 2004, with accompanying Flood Insurance Rate Maps and all future changes, revisions and amendments to these documents, and shall apply to all areas bordering identified special flood hazard areas, and all other areas outside the identified special flood hazard area% cnoompassing and adjacent to a river, dream, stormwater channel, oulfall area, or other inland water or drainage facility determined by the director of public works to be subject to flood hazards. The special flood hazard areas are as follows.- (1) ollows:(1) 1loodway fringe - Zones AL, AIT, and AC). (2) Floodway. (3) Coastal high hazard (tsunami) - Zones V and VF_ (4) General floodplain - "Lone A. (5) Land adjacent to drainage facilities, and Zone A99. (b) This chapter shall not apply to: (1) Any building permit lawfully issued prior to Nfay 5, 1982 or building permit application property filed and accepted for review prior to May 5, 1982, provided that approval was obtained without any significant changes in plans or specifications made after May 5, 1982. (2) Roadway and site improvements for subdivisions litr which lcntative approval had boon granted prior to May 5, 1982 and where roadway and site improvement construction and grading plans had received all necessary agency approvals by May 5, 1982. (3) Carnivals, ]n`aus, fairs, and camping tents of a temporary nature which are not in a floodway. (4) Nonfenccd, at grade outdoor swimming pools. (5) Signs which arc not in a floodway. (6) Demolition. (1993, Ord, No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Chd. No. 01-108, sec. 1; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 4.) Section 27-6. Basis. The areas of special flood hazard identified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the Flood Insurance Study dated April 2, 2004, along with all subsequent revisions and amendments, and the Flood Insurance Rate Maps, dated April 2, 2004, May 16, 1994, July 16, 1990, and September 16, 1988, and all future changes, revisions, and amendments to these documents, are hereby adopted and declared to be a part of this chapter. 'the blood Insurance Study and flood Insurance Date Maps, and all future changes, revisions, and amendments to these documents, are on file at the Aupuni Center, Department of Public Works, 101 Pauahi Street, Suitc 7, Rio, Hawaii 96720- (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, see, 3; Am. 1994, Ord. No. 94-74, sec. 3; Am. 1995, Ord. No, 95-86, see. 3; Am. 2007, Card. No_ 07-169, sec. 5_) SUPP.5 (1-2006) 27-2 10A-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-7 Section 27-7. Compliance. No structure or land shall hereafter be constructed, located, extended, converted, or altered without full compliance with the terms of this chapter and other applicable regulations. The terms of this chapter shall he enforced by the standards set forth in article 6. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, see. 3.) Section 27-8. Other laws and regulations. All construction and improvements subject to this chapter shall comply with other applicable laws and regulations including, but not limited to, the zoning, building, electricity, plumbing, subdivision, erosion and sedimentation control chapters of the Hawaii County Code, and the storm drainage standards, October 1970 edition, or later revisions, of the County of Hawaii. This chapter, designed to reduce flood losses, shall take precedence over any less restrictive, conflicting laws, ordinances; and regulations. this chapter is not intended to repeal, abrogate, or impair any existing casements, covenants, or deed restrictions. However, where this chapter and another chapter, casement, covenant, or deed restriction conflict or overlap, whichcvcr imposes the more stringent restrictions shall prevail. In the event of a conflict between this chapter and the National Flood Lnsurance program and Related Regulations (NFIY), as amended, the more restrictive provision will govern. (1993, Ord. No_ 93-78, see. 3; ,Am. 2007, Ord, No. 07-169, sec. 6_) Section 27-9. Interpretation. In the interpretation and application of this chapter, all provisions shall be: (a) Considered as minimum requirements; (b) Liberally consorted in favor of the Counh, ofHawai`i; and (c) Deemed neither to limit nor repeal any other powers granted to the County of Hawaii under Stale o1' Hawaii statutes. (1993, Ord. No. 93-79, see. 3.) Section 27-10. Warning and disclaimer of liability. The degree of flood protection required by this chapter is considered reasonable for regulatory purposes and is based on scientific and engineering considerations. Larger floods can and will occur on rare occasions. Flood heights may be increased by man-made or natural causes. This chapter does not imply that land outside the areas of special flood hazards and areas of flood -related erosion hazards, or uses permiticd within such areas will be free from flooding or flood damages. `This chapter shall not create liability on the part of the County of Hawaii, any officer or employee thereof, or the Federal Insurance Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, for any flood damages that result from reliance on this chapter or any administrative decision lawfully made thereunder. (1993. Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) Section 27-11. Severability. 11tis chapter and the various parts thereof are hereby declared to be severable. Should any section of this chapter he declared by the courts to be unconstitutional or invalid, such decision shall not all -cut the validity of the chapter as a whole, or any portion thereof other than the section so declared to be unconstitutional or invalid. (1993, Card. No. 93-7$, sec. 3) 27-3 SURP.5 (1-2008) 10A-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 27-12 I'IAWAI`I COUNTY CODE Section 27-12. Definitions. Unless spccifically defined below, words or phrases used in this chapter shall be interpreted so as to give them the meaning they have in common usage and to give this chapter its most reasonable application. "Accessory use" means a use which is incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the parcel ofland on which it is located. "Appeal" means a request for a review of the floodplain administrator's interpretation of any provision of this chapter or denial of a request for a variance. "Area of shallow flooding" means a designated AU or Al I zone on the Flood Insurance state Map (FIRM). llle base flood depths range from one to three feet; a clearly defined channel does not exist; the path of flooding is unpredictable and indeterminate; and velocity flow may be evident. Such flooding is characterized by ponding or sheet flaw. "Backfill" means the placement offill material within a specified depression, hole or excavation pit below the surrounding adjacent ground level as a means of improving floodwater conveyance or to restore the land to the natural contours existing prior to excavation. "Base flood" means the flood having a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year (also called the "onc-hundred-year flood"). "Base flood elevation" means the water surface elevation of the base flood. "Basement" means any area of the building having its floor subgradc (below ground lcvcl) on all sides. "Breakaway walls" are any type of walls, whether solid or lattice, and whether constructed of concrete, masonry, wood, metal, plastic or any other suitable building material which is not part of the structural support of the building and which is designed to break away under abnormally high tides or wave action without causing any damage to the structural integrity of the building on which they are used or any buildings to which they might be carried by floodwaters. A breakaway wall shall have a safe design loading resistance of not less than ten and no more than twenty pounds per square foot. Use of breakaway walls must be cerlified by a licensed structural cnginccr or archileci and shall meet the following, conditions: (1) Breakaway wall collapse shall result from a water load less than that which would occur during the base flood; and (2) "lite elevated portion of the building shall not incur any structural damage due to the effects of wind and water loads acting simultaneousty in the event of the base flood. "Buffer zones" are areas bordering and within 50 feet of special flood hazard areas with base flood elevations, depth numbers specified in feet on the FTR1v1 or other areas that have been studied and identified with base flood elevations or depth numbers. "Coastal high hazard area" - See "Gone V" and "Lone VE." "Development" means any man-made change to improved or unimproved real estate, including but not limited to buildings or other structures, mining, dredging, filling, grading, paving, excavation or dulling operations or storage of equipment or materials. "Drainage facility" - See "Watercourse." "Encroachment" means the advance or infringement of uses, plant growth, fill, excavation, buildings, permanent structures or development into a floodplain which may impede or alter the flow capacity of a floodplain. "Existing manufactured home park or subdivision" means a manufactured home park or subdivision for which the construction of facilities for servicing the lots on which the manufactured homes arc to be affixed (including, at a minimum, the installation of utilities, the construction ofstrcels, and either final site grading or the pouring ofeonercte pads) is completed before May 5, 1482. SUPP.5 (1-2006) 27-4 10A-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-12 "Fill" is the placement of fill material at a specified location to bring the ground surface up to a desired elevation. "Fill material" can be natural sand, dirt, soil or rock. Far the purposes of floodplain management, fill material may include concrete, cement, soil cement, brick, or similar material as approved on a case-by-case basis. "Flood elevation determination" means a determination by the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the water surface elevations of the base flood, that is, the flood level that has a one percent or greater chance of occurrence in any given year. "Flood elevation study" or "flood study" means an examination, evaluation, and determination of flood hazards and, if appropriate, corresponding water surface elevations, or an examination, evaluation, and determination of flood -related erosion hazards. "Flood, flooding, or floodwater" means: (1) A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of normally dr_y land areas from: (A) The overflow ofinland or tidal waters; (I3) Uie unusual and rapid accumulation of runoff or surface waters from any source which are approximately caused by flooding as defined in paragraph (A)(ii) of this definition and are akin to a river of water on the surfaces of normally dry land areas, as when earth is carried by a current of water and deposited along the path of the current; and (2) The collapse or subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or other body of water as a result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding anticipated cyclical levels or suddenly caused by an unusually high water level in a natural body of water, accompanied by a severe storm, or by an unanticipated force of nature, such as flash flood or an abnormal tidal surge, or by some similarly unusual and unforeseeable event which results in flooding as defined in paragraph (1)(A) of this definition_ "Flood Insurance Rate Map (FLRM)` means the official map on which the Federal Emergency Management Agency has delineated both the areas of special flood hazards and the risk premium zones applicable to the community. "flood Insurance Study" means the official report provided by the federal Emergency Management Agency that includes flood profiles, the Flood Insurance Rate Map, and the water surface elevation of the base flood. "Flood protection system" means those physical structural works for which funds have been authorized, appropriated, and expended and which have been constructed specifically to modify flooding in order to reduce the extent of the area within a community subject to a "special flood hazard" and the extent of the depths of associated flooding. Such a system typically includes hurricane tidal barriers, dams, reservoirs, levees, or dikes. Thesc specialized flood modifying works are those constructed to conform with sound engineering standards. "Floodplain administrator" is the individual appointed to administer and enforce the floodplain management regulations. this person shall be the director of public works of the C ounty of Ilawai `i or the director's duly authorized representative who shall be a currcntly licensed professional cnginccr in the State of Hawaii. "floodplain management" means the operation of an overall program of connective and preventive measures for reducing flood damage, including but not limited to emergency preparedness plans, flood control works and floodplain management regulations. 27-5 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 27-12 I'IAWAI`I COUNTY CODE "Floodplain management regulations" means zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, building codes, health regulations, and special purpose ordinances (such as a floodplain ordinance ur an erosion and sedimentation control ordinance) and other applications ofpolicc power. The term describes such stale or local regulations, in any combination thereof, which provide standards for the purpose of flood damage prevention and reduction. "Floodplain or flood -prone area" means any land area susceptible to being inundated by water from any source (see definition of "flooding"). "Ploodproofing" means any combination of structural and nonstructural additions, changes, or adjustments to structures which reduce or eliminate flood damage to real estate or improved real property, water and sanitary facilities, structures, and their contents. "floodway fringe" is the areas of a floodplain on either side of the designated floodway where encroachment may be permitted. "Moodway" or "regulatory floodway" means the channel of a river or other watercourse and the adjacent land areas that must be reserved in order to discharge the base flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface elevation. "Fraud and victimization" related to article 5, variances, of this chapter means that the variance granted must not cause fraud on or victimization of the public_ In examining this requirement, the director of public works will consider the fact that every newly constructed structure adds to government responsibilities and remains a part of the community for fifty to one hundred years. Structures that are permitted to be constructed below the base flood elevation are subject during all those years to increased risk of damage from floods, wrote future owners of the structure(s) and the community as a whole are subject to all the costs, inconvenience, danger, and suffering that those increased flood damages bring. In addition, future owners may purchase the structure(s), unaware that it is subject to potential flood damage, and the structure(s) can be insured only at very high flood insuranec rates. "freeboard" means a factor of safety usually expressed in feet above a flood level for purposes of floodplain management- "Freeboard" tends to compensate for the many unknown factors that could contribute to flood heights greater than the height calculated for a selected size flood and floodway conditions, such as wave action, bridge openings, and the hydrological effect of urbanization of the watershed. "Functionally dependent use" means a use which cannot perform its intended purpose unless it is located or carried out in close proximity to water. The term includes only docking facilities, port facilities that arc necessary for the loading and unloading of cargo or passengers, and ship building and ship repair facilities, but does not include long-term storage or related manufacturing facilities. "general floodplain" - See "Zone A." "Ilardship" as related to article 5, variances, of this chapter means the hardship that would result from a failure to grant the requested variance. The director of public works requires that the variance be exceptional, unusual, and peculiar to the properly involved. Mcrc economic or financial hardship alone is not exceptional. Inconvenience, aesthetic considerations, physical disabilities, personal preferences, or the disapproval of one's neighbors likewise cannot, as a rule, qualify as exceptional hardships. All of these problems can be resolved through other means, without granting a variance. '17 is is so even if the alternative means arc more expensive or complicated than building with a variance, or if they require the property owner to put the parcel to a different use than originally intended, or to build elsewhere. "Ifighest adjacent grade" means the highest natural elevation of the ground surface prior to construction next to the proposed walls of a structure. "Historic structure" means any structure that is: (1) Listed individually in the National Register of I listoric Places (a listing maintained by the Department of Interior) or preliminarily determined by the Secretary of the Interior as meeting the requirements for individual listing on the National Register; SUPP. 5 (1-2006) 27-6 10A-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-12 (2) Certified or preliminarily determined by the Secretaty of the Interior as contributing to the historical significance of a registered historic district or a district preliminarily determined by the Secretary of -the Interior to qualify as a registered historic district; (3) Individually listed on a State of Ilawai`i inventory of historic places where the hisloric preservation program has been approved by the Secretary of the Interior; or (4) Individually listed an a local inventory of historic places in communities with historic preservation programs that have been certified either: (A) By an approved State program as determined by the Secretary ofthe Interior, or (I3) Directly by the Secretary ofthe Interior in states without approved programs. "Levice" mean% a man-made structure, usually an earthen embankment, designed and constructed in accordance with sound engineering practices to contain, control, or divert the flow of water so as to provide protection from temporary flooding. "Levee system" means a flood protection system which consists of a levee, or levees, and associated structures, such as closure and drainage devices, which are constructed and operated in accord with sound engineering practices. "Lowest floor" means the lowest floor of the lowest enclosed area (including basement). An unfinished or Hand resistant enclosure, usable solely for parking ofvchicles, building access, or storage in an area other [ban a basemenl area is not considered a building's lowest floor provided that such enclosure is not built so as to render the structure in violation of the applicable nonclevation design requirements of this chapter. "Manufactured home" means a structure, transportable in one or more sections, which is built on a permanent chassis and is designed for use with or without a permanent foundation when attached to the required utilities. The term "manufactured home" includes a "mobile home" but does not include a "recreational vehicle." "Manufactured home park or subdivision" means a parcel (or contiguous parcels) of land divided into 1"o or more manufactured home lots for rent or sale. "Market value." For the purposes of determining substantial improvement, market value perlaim only to the structure in question. It does not pertain to the land, landscaping, or detached accessory structures on the property. For determining substantial improvement, the value ofthe land must always he subtracted. Acceptable estimates ofmarket value can he obtained from the following sources: (1) Independent appraisals by a professional appraiser licensed by the State. (2) Property appraisals used for tax assessment purposes by the County department of finance, real property lax office. (3) The value of buildings taken from National Flood Insurance Program claims data_ This value shall be used as a screening tool to identify those structures where the substantial improvement ratio is less than forty percent or greater than sixty percent. "Mean sea level" means, for purposes of the National Flood Insurance Program, the National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929 or other datum, to which base flood elevations shown on a community's flood Insurance Rate Map are referenced. "Minimum necessary" related to article 5, variances, of this chapter means the minimum necessary to afford relief to the applicant of a variance with a minimum deviation from the requirements of this chapter. In the case of variances to an elevation requirement, this means the director of public works need not grant permission for the applicant to build at grade, for example, or even to whatever elevation the applicant proposes, but only that level that the director of public works believes will both provide relief and preserve the integrity of this chapter. "New construction" for floodplain management purposes, means structures for which the "start of construction" commenced on or after May 5, 1982, and includes any subsequent improvements to such structures. 27-7 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 27-12 I'IAWAI`I COUNTY CODE "New manufactured home park or subdivision" means a manufactured home park or subdivision for which the construction of facititics for scrvicing the Tuts on which the manufactured homes are to be afliec:d (including at a minimum, the installation of ofiIilios, the construction ofstrccIs, and either Ii nal site grading or the pouring of concrete pads) is completed on or after May 5, 1982. "Obstruction" includes but is not limited to any dam, wall, wharf; embankment, levee, dike, pile, abutment, protection, excavation, channelization, bridge, conduit, culvert, building, wire, fence, rock, gravel, refuse, fill, structure, vegetation, or other material in, along, across, or projecting into any watercourse which may alter, impede, retard, or change the direction andlor velocity of the flow of water, or due to its location, its propensity to snare or collect debris carried by the flow of water or its likelihood ofbcing carried downstream. "One -hundred year flood" means a flood which has a one percent annual probability of being equaled or exceeded. Il is identical to the "base flood." "One -hundred -year floodplain" means any area of land susceptible to being inundated by water from any source generated by the one -hundred -year flood - "Primary frontal dune" means a continuous or nearly continuous mound or ridge of sand with relatively steep seaward and landward slopes immediately landward and adjacent to the beach and subject to erosion and overtopping from high tides and waves during major coastal storms. The inland limit of the primary frontal dune occurs at the point where there is a distinct change from a relatively mild slope. "Principal structure" means a structure used for the principal use of the property as distinguished from an accessory use. "Rcorcational vehicle" means a vehicle which is= (1) Built on a single chassis; (2) lour hundred square feet or less when measured at the largest horizontal projection; (3) Msigncd to be self propetlul orr permancntly towable by alight duly truck; and (4) Designed primarily not for use as a permanent dwelling but as temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, travel, or seasonal use. "Regulatory floodway" means the channel of a river or other watercourse and the adjacent land areas that must be reserved in order to discharge the base flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface elevation. "Repetitive loss structure" means home or business that was damaged by flood two times in the past ten years, when the cost of fully repairing the flood damage to the building, on the average, equaled or oxcccdcd twenty-five percent of -its market value: at the time of each flood. "Riverine" means relating to, formed by, or resembling a river (including tributaries), stream., brook, etc. "Sand dunes" means naturally occurring accumulations of sand in ridges or mounds landward of the beach. "Sheet flow area" - See "area of shallow flooding." "Special flood hazard area" means an area having special flood or flood -related erosion hazards, and shown on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps as Zones A, AO, AF, A99, All, VF, or V. "Start of construction" includes substantial improvement and other proposed new development and moans the dale the building permit was issued, provided the actual start of construction, repair, reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, placement, or other improvement was within one hundred - eighty days from the date of the permit. '.the actual start means either the first placement of permanent construction of a structure on a site, such as the pouring of slab or footings, the installation of piles, the construction of columns, or any work beyond the stage of excavation; or the placement of a SUPP.5 (1-2008) 27-8 10A-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-12 manufactured home on a foundation. Permanent construction does not include land preparation, such as cicaring, grading and filling, nor does it include the installation of structs and/or walkways; nor docs it include excavation for a basement, footings, piers, or foundations or the erection of temporary farms; nor floes it include the installation on the property of accessory buildings, such as garages or sheds not occupied as dwelling units or not part of the main structure. For a substantial improvement, the actual start of construction means the first alteration of any wall, ceiling, floor, or other structural part of a building, whether or not that alteration affects the external dimensions of the building. "State" means the State of Ilaw ai`i. "Structure" means a walled and roofed building, including a gas or liquid storage tank, that is principally above ground, as well as a manufactured home. "Substantial damage" means damage of any origin sustained by a structure whereby the cost of restoring the struclure to its before damaged condition would equal or exceed fray percent of the market value of the structure before the damage occurred. "Substantial improvement." For the purposes of this chapter, the determination of whether any improvements constitute substantial improvements is applicable only to structures built prior to May 5, 1982 or buildings constructed after May 5, 1982 which were not within a special flood hazard area at the time of issuing the building permit. "Substantial improvement" means any repair, reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, or other proposed new development of a slruclure, the cost of which equals or exceeds filly percent of the: market value of- the structure before the "start of construction" of- the improvement which shall be the sum of all costs of all such work performed in the previous ten years including the cost of the current work being considered. The value of the structure including previous tcn Year improvements, shall be certified by a contractor, engineer, or architect licensed by the State and the property owner as may be required on a form provided by the County. This term includes structures which have incurred "substantial damage," regardless of the actual repair work performed. The term does not, however, include either: (1) Any project for improvement of a structure to correct existing violations of state or local health, sanitary, or safety code specifications which have been identified by the local code enforcement official and which are the minimum necessary to assure safe living conditions; or (2) Any alteration of a "historic structure; provided that the alteration will not preclude the tructure's continued designation as a "historic structure." "Variance" means a grant of relief from the requirements of this chapter which permits construction in a manner that would otherwise be prohibited by this chapter. "Violation" means the failure of a slruclurc or other development to be fully compliant with the community's floodplain management regulations. A structure or other development without the elevalion certificate, other certifications, or outer evidence of compliance with this chapter is presumed to be in violation until such time as that documentation is provided. "Water surface elevation" means the height, in relation to the National Geodetic Vertical ]datum of 1929, (or other datum, where specified) of floods of various magnitudes and frequencies in the floodplains of coastal or riverine areas. "Watercourse" means a lake, river, creek, stream, wash, arroyo, channel, or other topographic feature on or over which waters flow at least periodically. Watercourse includes speci&cafly designated areas in which substantial damage may occur. "'Lone A" is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the one hundred -year floodplains that are determined in the Flood Insurance Study by approximate methods. Because detailed hydraulic analyses arc not performed for such areas, base flood elevations or depths have not been determined within this zone. "'Gone A99" is the special flood hazard area where enough progress has been made on a protective system, such as dikes, dams, and levees, to consider it complete far insurance rating purposes. Base flood elevations have not been determined for areas designated as Zone A99. "Tone AE" is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the one hundred -year floodplains that are determined in the Flood Insurance Study by detailed methods. Whole -foot base flood elevations 27-9 SUPla.5 (1-2008) 10A-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 27-12 I'IAWAI`I COUNTY CODE derived from the detailed hydraulic analyses have been determined at selected intervals within this zone. "Zone AFF is the special flood hazard area that eorrcsponds to the areas of one -hundred -year shallow flooding (usually areas of ponding) where average depths are between one and three feet. Alhole-foot base flood elevations derived from the detailed hydraulic analyses have been determined at selected intervals within this 7onc. "Zone AO" is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the areas of one -hundred -year shallow flooding (usually sheet flow on sloping terrain) where average deptlis are between one and three feet, Average whole -foot depths derived from the detailed hydraulic analyses have been determined within this 7onc. "Zone ll" corresponds to unstudied areas where flood hazards are undetermined; but possible. "Gone V" is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the one hundred -year coastal floodplains extending from offshore to the inland limit of a primary frontal dune along an open coast and any other arca subject to high velocity wave action from storms or seismic sources. It is an arca subject to high velocity waters, including coastal and tidal inundation or tsunamis. Base flood elevations have not been determined for areas designated as Lone V. "Zone VF." is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the one hundred -year coastal lloodplains extending from onshore to the inland Broil of a primary fronlal dune along an open coast and any other arca subject to high velocity wave action from storms or seismic sources. It is an area subject to high velocity waters, including coastal and tidal inundation or tsunamis. VVhcic400t base flood elevations derived from the detailed hydraulic analyses have been determined at selected intervals within this Crane. "Lome X (shaded)" are areas of moderate flood hazard corresponding to areas of the five -hundred - year floodplain, areas of one -hundred -year flooding where average depths are less than one foot, areas of one -hundred -year flooding where the contributing drainage area is less than one square mile, and areas protected from the one -hundred -year flood by levees. "Zone X (unshaded)" arc areas of minimal flood hazard corresponding to areas outside of the live - hundred -year floodplain. Base flood elevations or depths have not been determined for Zone X. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, see. 3; Am. 1997, Ord. No. 97-116, see 1; Am. 2001, Ord. No. €11-108, secs. 1 and 9; Am_ 2007, Card. No. 07-169, sec_ 7.) Section 27-13. Nonconforming structures. Any nonconforming structure existing on May 5, 1982 or made nonconforming by a change in the special flood hazard area may continue, subject to the following conditi ons: (a) Any repair, reconstruction, improvement, or addition to a nonconforming structure, if it is considered to be substantial improvement, shall comply with the applicable standards of this chapter. (b) All relocated structures shall comply with the applicable standards of this chapter. (c) Substantial improvement of a damaged, destroyed, or demolished structure located in a lloodway shall not be allowed unless a variance from the flood requirements is obtained. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Arra. 1997, Ord. No. 97-116, sec. 2.) Article 3. Administration. Section 27-14. Director of public works approval. No building permit, certificate of occupancy, or fading permit shall he issued, nu structure shall he occupied, and no development or subdivision shall be approved without the approval of the director of public works with respect to compliance with the provisions of this chapter. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec, 8.) SUPP.5 (1-2006) 27-10 10A-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-15 Section 27-15. Designation of the floodplain administrator. The director of public works of- the County of Hawaii is hereby appointed icy administer, implement, and enforce this chaptcr in ace ord with the provisions of this chapter. (1993. Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1.) Section 27-16. Duties and responsibilities of the floodplain administrator. The floodplain administrator, with the cooperation and assistance of other County departments, shall administer this chapter. The duties and responsibilities of the floodplain administrator shall include, but not be limited to: (a) Permit review. (1) All building permits, certificates of occupancy, grading permits, and development or subdivision proposals shall be reviewed to determine whether the requirements of this chapter have been satisfied; (2) All other development permits referred by other governmental departments and agencies shall he reviewed for consistency with the requirements ol'this chapter; (3) All permits and proposals shall be reviewed to determine that the proposed building site is reasonably safe from flooding; (4) For proposed building sites in flood -prone areas where special flood hazard areas have not been defined, water surface elevations have not boon provided, and [hero is insufficient data to idcnlify the floodway or coastal high hazard areas but the flood plain administrator has determined that there are verifiable physical indications that such hazards are present, all new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures and substantial improvements (including the placement of manufactured homes) shall be: (A) Designed and adequately anchored to prevent flotation, collapse, or lateral movement; (H) Constructed of flood -resistant materials; (C) Constructed by methods and practices that minimize flood damage; and (D) Constructed with electrical, heating, ventilation, plumbing, and air conditioning equipment and other service facilities that are designed andlor located so as to prevent water from entering or accumulating within the components during conditions of flooding; (F) Be reviewed to assure that all necessary permits have been received from those governmental agencies from which approval is required by Federal or State law, including section 404 of the Federal boater Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 1334; (I') New and replacement utilities shall comply with the requirements of section 27-19; and (5) All permits shall be reviewed to determine that the proposed development when combined with all other existing and anticipated development will not increase the water surface elevation of the base flood at any point. (b) Information to be maintained. (1) The Flood Insurance Study and Flood Insurance Rate Maps for the County ofHawai`i; (2) The cerlilicalion of lowest Iloor elevation; (3) The cerlification of floodproofmg for spaces below the base flood elevation; (4) 'The certification of final pad elevation where a site is filled above the base Ilood elevation; (5) The certification that an encroachment in the floodway will not result in any increase in flood levels during base flood discharge; and (5) The certification of elevation and structural support for structures in the coastal high hazard area. (c) Intcrprctatian of maps. The director of public works shall make interpretations where needed, as to the exact location of the boundaries of the areas of special flood hazards (for example, where [here appears to be a conflict between a mapped boundary and actual field conditions). A person contesting the location of the boundary° shall be given a reasonable opportunity to appeal the interpretation as provided in article 5. 27-11 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1O Appendix § 27-16 I'IAWAI`I COUNTY CODE (d) Change in base flood elevations. Whenever base flood elevations increase or decrease or result in a mappable alteration of the boundaries of any special flood hazard arca, as a result of physical changes affecting flooding conditions, as soon as practical, but no later than six months after the date such information becomes available, the floodplain administrator shall notify the federal Emergency Management Agency of the changes by submitting technical or scientific data through the Letter of Map Revision process. Such a submission is necessary so that upon confirmation of those physical Changes affecting; flooding conditions, risk premium rates and floodplain management requirements will be based upon current data. (e) Use of other base flood data. When base flood elevation data has not been provided in accordance with section 27-6, the floodplain administrator shall obtain, review, and reasonably utilize any base flood elevation and floodway data available from a Federal or State agency, or other source, in order to administer article 4. Any such inkn malion shall be submitted to the County ofIlawai`i for adoption. (f) Whenever a watercourse is to be altered or relocated: (1) Require that the flood carrying capacity of the ancrod or rclocalcd portion of said watercourse is maintained: (2) For riverine situations, notify the State of Ilawai`i department of land and natural resources (Commission an water resource management) and all adjacent property owners, prior to such alteration or relocation of a watercourse, and submit evidence of such notification to the Federal Fmergency Management Agency. (3) Whenever a proposed alteration or relocation occurs that would significantly change the base flood elevation or result in a mappable alteration of the boundaries of any special flood hazard area, technical and scientific data through the Conditional Letter of Map Revision (CLOMR) shall be submitted to and approved by the federal Emergency Management Agency. Such a submission is necessary so that upon completion of those physical changes affecting flooding conditions, risk premium rates and floodplain management rcquircincuts will be based upon current data. Work to be performed under an approved Conditional Letter of Map Revision (CLUIfR) shall be subject to the following: (A) Work shall not begin any on-site development affecting or impacting the floodplain until an approved Conditional Fetter of Map Revision is received from the Federal Emergency Management Agency; (B) Within sixty days of receiving final approval from director of public works for the completion of the alteration or relocation of a watercourse, the request for a Letter of Map Revision (LOW), and at other informafion acquired by the Letter of Map Revision (I DMR) process shall be suhmitted to the flood plain administrator. (g) Take action to remedy violations of this chapter as specified in article 6. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, turd. No. 01-109, sec. 1; Am 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 9.) Article 4. Standards. Section 27-17. Certification standards. Pro -construction and post -constriction certification of elevation and floodproofing of new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, development, and substantial improvements within areas of special flood hazards and huller zones shall he submitted to the director of public works and shall be maintained as a matter of public record. (a) Fir -construction certification. Requirements for approval of the building permit shall include the following items, as applicable, and any additional items as required by the director of public works to promote public welfare and satcty: (1) Certification of building plans. Each set of building plans shall be certified by a structural engineer or architect, currently licensed in the State of Hawai `i, to be in compliance with the requirements of this chapter. SUPP.5 (1-2008) 2712 10A-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1O Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-17 (2) Flevation certification on building plans. The elevation of the lowest floor shall be certified on each set of the building plans by a civil cnginccr or land sunvcyor currently licensed in the State of Haw ai `i. (3) Special flood hazards area certification. 'the County of Rawai`i "Special Hood Ilazard Area Certification" form, as amended, shall be completed and certified by a structural engineer or architect currently licensed in the State of Hawaii. The completed "Special Flood Hazard Certification" shall be submitted for approval with the building plans. (4) ldoodproofing certification. For all new nonresidential construction and substantial improvement with enclosed areas below the base flood elevation,. the Federal Emergency Management Agency "Floodproofing Certificate" form, as. amended, shall be completed and certified by an Login= m architect currently licensed in the State of Ilawai `i and shall be submitted for approval with the building plans. The director of public works may require additional information regarding the floodproofing design from the permit applicant and the applicant shall provide it. 'The information required may include the design data and calculations used in the floodprooting design, a detailed flood elevation study, a drainage report, and other information as determined necessary by the director of public works to establish compliance with the provisions of this chapter and to promote public welfare and safety. (b) Posl-construction certification. Requirements for approval of the certificate of occupancy shall include the following; items, as applicable, and any additional items as required by the director of public works to promote public welfare and safety: (1) Elevation certification, The Federal Emergency Management Agency "Elevation Certificate," as amended, shall be completed and certified by a land surveyor, civil engineer, or architect currently licensed in the State of IIawai`i and submilled for approval with the application for the certificate of occupancy. The information certified within the "Elevation Certificate" shall be based on actual construction. (2) Compliance with other requirements of this chapter. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1; Am_ 2007, Ord. Na. 07-169, scc. 10.) Section 27-18. Standards for construction. Standards for construction within areas of special flood hazards and buffer zones are established as follows: (a) Anchoring. (1) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements shall be adequately anchored to resist flotation, collapse or lateral movement of the structure resulting from hydrodynamic and hydrostatic loads, including the effects ofbuoyancy. (2) All manufactured homes, including mobile homes, shall meet all standards for structures. (b) Construction materials and methods. (1) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall be constructed with materials and utility equipment resistant to flood damage. (2) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall be constructed using methods and practices that minimize flood damage. (3) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall be designed and constructed with electrical, heating, ventilation, plumbing, air-conditioning equipment, and other service facilities including, but not limited to, furnaces, heat pumps, water heaters, washers, dryers, elevator lits equipment, electrical junction boxes, circuit breaker boxes, and food freezers located above the base 11ood elevation plus any required ficeboard_ (4) Within 7cmcs V and XT, new construction, improvements to repetitive loss slructures, and substantial improvements shall comply with the standards of section 27-23. 27-13 S1IPP.5 (1-2008) 10A-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 27-18 11AWAI`I COUNTY CODE (5) Recreational vehicles placed on sites within '.ones AH and AF, on the FIRM shall be elevated and anchored or be on the situ for less than time hundred eighty consecutive days or be fully licensed and highway ready - (e) Encroachments. (1) Within a floodway, encroachments (including fill), new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, substantial improvements, and other developments, shall be prohibited unless certified by a professional civil engineer licensed in the State of Hawaii, with supporting data, that the encroachment will not cause any increase in base flood elevations during the occurrence of the base flood dlschargc. (2) Require, until a regulatory floodway" is designated, that no new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, substantial improvements, or other development (including fill), shall be permitted within "Lanes AE on the 1TR1VI, unless demonstrated that the cumulative eilecl of the proposed development, when combined with all other existing and anticipated development, will not increase the water surface elevation of the base flood at any point_ (3) Within all zones ofspecial flood hazards, but not including floodways, filling which would result in the blockage or impediment of flow and/or induce or aggravate flooding shall be prohibited unless certified by a professional civil engineer licensed in the State of-Hawai`i, with supporting data, that the encroachment will not cause any increase in base flood elevations during the occurrence of the base flood discharge_ (4) Within floodway firinge areas, filling to elevate the lowest floor of a nonresidential structure may only be permitted where the structure: (A) Is floodprocrfed so that below the base flood elevation plus any required fTcclxrard the structure is watertight with walls substantially impermeable to the passage of water, and (13) Ilas structural components capable of resisting hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads and the cf ecIs of-buoyancy- (5)In Zones V and t h. filling shall be prohibited. (d) Elevation and floodprcxffing. (1) Within Zones Ali and All: (A) For residential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements, the lowest floor shall be elevated to or above the base flood cicvafion plus a fi-eeboard of at least one foot. (13) For nonresidential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvemcnls, the lowest floor shall be elevated or floodproofcd to or above the base flood elevation plus a freeboard of at least one foot. Ifthe lowest floor is below the base flood elevation plus the required fieebaard, then the structure together with attendant utility and sanitary facilities shall be designed, constructed, and certified by a currently licensed professional engineer or architect in the State ofHawai`i such that: (i) The structure is watertight below the base flood elevation plus the required freeboard. (ii) The walls are substantially impermeable to the passage ofwater. (iii) The structural components arc capable of resisting hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads and the effects of buoyancy. (C) Within Zone AH, now construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall be required to provide adequate drainage paths around structures on slopes to guide floodwaters around and away from proposed structures. (D) Fully enclosed areas below the lowest floor that are uscable solely for parking of vehicles, building access, or storage in an area other than a basement and which are subject to flooding, shall be designed to automatically equalize hydrostatic flood forces on exterior walls by SUPP.5 (1-2006) 2714 10A-16 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-18 allowing for the entry and exit of floodwatcts. Designs for meeting this requirement must either be ccrtiticd by a currently liccnscd professional engineer or architect or meet or exceed the fallowing criteria= A minimum of two openings having a total net area of nol less than one square inch for every square foot of enclosed area subject to flooding shall be provided. Each opening trust be on different sides of the enclosed area. The bottom of all openings shall be no higher than one foot above grade. Openings may be equipped with screens, louvers, valves, or other coverings or devices provided that they permit the automatic entry and exit of floodwaters. (2) Within Zone AO: (A) For residential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and suhsiantial improvements, the lowest floor shall be elevated above the highest adjacent grade at least ono - too t nefoot above the depth number specified in feet on the FIRNL or at least three feel if no depth number is specified. (F3) For nonresidential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements, the lowest floor shall be elevated or completely floodproofed above the highest adjacent grade at least one foot above the depth number specified in feet on the 171117M, or at least three feet if no depth number is specified. If the lowest floor is to be completely floodproofed, then a currently licensed professional engineer or architect in the Slate of Hawaii shall develop and/or review structural design, spcei It cations and plans far construction and shall certify that the design and methods of construction are in accordance with accepted standards of practice for the structure together with attendant utility and sanitary facilities such that: (i) 'the structure is watertight below the referenced flood elevation. (ii) The walls are substantially impermeable to the passage of water. (iii) The structural components arc capable of resisting hydrostatic and hydrodynamic load% and the eflews of buoyancy. (C) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall be required to provide adequate drainage paths around structures on slopes to guide floodwaters around and away from proposed structures. (3) Within Zones V and VE_ New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall comply with the standards of section 27-23. (4) Witftin Zone A: New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall comply with the standards of-scetion 27-24- (5) Buffer zones: Areas bordering and within fifty feet of a special flood hazard areas with base flood elevations, depth numbers specified in feel on the FIRM or other areas that have been studied and identified with base flood elevations or depth numbers. (A) For residential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial impravcments, the lowest floor shall be elevated to the bordering base flood elevation ar depth number plus a freeboard of at least one foot. (8) For nonresidential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements, the lowest floor shall be elevated or floodproofed to the bordering base flood elevation or depth number plus a freeboard of at [cast one fool. If the lowest floor is below the bordering base flood elevation or depth number plus the required freeboard, then a currently licensed professional engineer or architect in the State of I-lawaN shall develop and/or review structural design, specifications and plans for construction and shall Certify that the design and methods of cons true lion are in accordance with accepted standards of practice for the structure together with attendant utility and sanitary facilities such that: (i) The structure is watertight below the bordering base flood elevation or depth number plus the required freeboard. 27-15 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-17 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1O Appendix 27-18 1'1AWAI`I COUNTY CODE (ii) The walls arc substantially impermeable to the passage of watcr. (iii) The structural components arc capahle of resisting hydrostatic and hydrodynamic heads and the cllcets of buoyancy. (C) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements, shall be required to provide a drainage path around and away from proposed structures. (D) When topographical or ground elevation data, submitted by a civil engineer or land surveyor currently licensed in the State of Hawaii, shows that the proposed building site is higher than the elevation requirements of paragraph 27-18(d)(5)(A) and 27-18td,1(5)(B), the flood plain regulations of this chapter shall not be applicable. (e) Certification requirements. All new construction, impmvc mcnis to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement within areas of special flood hazard and buffer Zones shall be certified as required by the standards of section 27-17. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 1997, Ord. No. 97-116, sec. 3; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 11.) Section 27-19. Standards for utilities. (a) New and replacement water supply and sanitary sewage systems shall be designed to minimize or eliminate infiltration of flood waters into the system and discharge from systems into flood waters. (b) On-site cesspools and septic systems shall be located to avoid impairment to them or contamination from them during flooding. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) Section 27-20. Standards for subdivisions and other developments. (a) All subdivisions and other developments within areas of -special flood hazards and flood prone areas where special flood hazard areas have not been dcFttncd, water surface elevations have riot been provided, and there is insufficient data to identify the floodway or coastal high hazard areas but there are verifiable physical indications that such hazards are present as determined by the flood plain administrator, shall. (1) Be consistent with the need to minimize flood damage; (2) Have public utilities and facilities, such as sewer, gas, electrical, and water systems, located and constructed to minimize flood damage; and (3) Have adequate drainage provided to reduce exposure to flood damage. (b) All subdivision and other devclopmcnt applications shall identify the areas of special flood hazards and base flood elevations on the proposed site. If such information is not provided by the Flood Insurance Rate Maps, the director of public works may request and the applicant shall provide such information. (c) Finally approved subdivision plats for subdivisions within areas of special flood hazards shall provide base flood elevations within the lots. (d) All new subdivision proposals and other proposed developments within areas designated as Gone A or a flood prone area where special flood hazard areas have not been defined, water surface elevations have not been provided, and there is insufficient data to identify the floodway or coastal high hazard areas but the flood plain administrator has determined that there are verifiable physical indications that such hazards arc present shall comply with the following: (1) Be reviewed to assure that all necessary permits have been received from those governmental agencies from which approval is required by Federal or State law, including section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 fl.S.t:. 1334; (2) For all proposed developments and/or subdivisions greater than either fifty lots or five acres, the developer and/or subdivider shall include base flood elevation data within their proposal. (3) Comply with the requirements ofsection 27-24. SUPP.5 (1-2008) 27-16 10A-18 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-20 (e) All developments requiring a site drainage plan under section 25-2-72(3) shall submit such a plan for review and approval by the director of public works. The site drainage plan shall comply with sections 27-20(a) and (b) and section 27-24, and shall include a storm water disposal system to contain run-off caused by the proposed development, within the site boundaries, up to the expected one-hour, ten year storm event, as shown in the department of public works "Storm Drainage Standards," dated October 1970, or any approved revision, unless those standards specify a greater recurrence interval. The amount of expected runoff shall be calculated according to the department of public works "Storm Drainage Standards," dated October 1970, or any approved revision, or by any nationally -recognized method meeting with the approval oftbe director of public works. Runoff calculations shall include the cflects of all improvements. (f) Storm water shall be disposed into drywells, infiltration basins, or other approved infiltration methods. The development shall not alter the general drainage pattern above or below the development. (1993, Ord. No. 93-79, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 12.) Section 27-21. Standards for manufactured homes. Manufactured homes that are placed or substantially improved on sites outside of a manufactured home park or subdivision, in a new manufactured home part: or subdivision, in an expansion to an existing manufactured home park or subdivision, or in an existing manufactured home park or subdivision on which a manufactured home has incurred "substantial damage" as the result of a flood shall: (a) Within Zones AL' or All, be elevated so that either: (1) 'llre lowest floor of the manufactured home is at or above the base flood elevation, or (2) The manufactured home chassis is supported by reinforced piers or other foundation elements of at least equivalent strength that are no less than thirty-six inches in height above grade and be securely anchored to an adequately anchored foundation system to resist flotation, collapse, and lateral movement. (b) Within Zone AO, be elevated such that the lowest floor of the manufactured home is elevated at least as high as the depth number spccificd in feet on the FIRM_ or at least two feet if no depth number is specified and be securely anchored to an adequately anchored foundation system to resist flotation, collapse, and lateral movement. (c) Within Zone A, comply with the standards of section 27-24. (d) Within 'Zones V or VE, comply with the standards of section 27-23. (1993, Card. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) Section 27-22. Standards for ftoodways. The floodway identified on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps and located within areas of special flood hazard is the watercourse reserved to discharge the base flood. Since the floodway is an extremely hazardous area due to the velocity of floodwaters which carry debris, potential projectiles, and erosion potential, the following provisions apply: (a) Encroachments, including fill, new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, substantial improvement, and other new development shall be prohibited unless certification and supportinf data is provided by a licensed professional engineer or architect demonstrating that the encroachment will not cause any increase in base flood elevations during the occurrence of the base flood discharge. (b) If an encroachment within a floodway is allowed under the conditions of paragraph 27-22(a), all new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, substantial improvement and other proposed new development shall comply with all applicable flood hazard reduction provisions established in Iles chapter. 27-17 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-19 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 27-22 I'IAWAI`I COUNTY CODE (c) The following uses, not involving fill, shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to establish that the use docs not cause any incrcasc in base flood elevations: (1) Public and private outdoornonstruclural recreational facilities, lawn, garden, and play areas; (2) Agricultural uses, including farm, grazing, pasture, and outdoor plant nurseries; and (3) Drainage improvements, such as channels and stream crossings. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, see. 3; Am� 2007, Card. No. 07-169, sec. 13) Section 27-23. Standards for coastal high hazard areas. Coastal high hazard areas, more commonly known as tsunami inundation areas, are identified as Zone V or "Lone VE on the Mood Insurance hate Maps. Within coastal high hazard areas, the following standards shall apply: (a) All new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements in a coastal high hazard area shall be constructed with materials and utility equipment resistant to flood damage and using methods and practices that minimize flood damage. (b) Now construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall be elevated on adequately anchored pilings or columns and securely anchored to such pilings or columns so that the lowest horizontal portion of the structural members of the lowest floor, excluding the pilings and columns, is elevated to or above the base flood level. 17te pile or column foundation and structure attached then to shall be anchored to resist flotation, collapse, and lateral movement duo to the clfects of wind and water loads acting simultaneously on all building components. The wind and water loading values shall each have a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. (e) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and other development shall be located nn the landward side of the reach of mean high tide. (d) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall have the enclosed space, if any, below the lowest floor free of obstructions and constructed with breakaway walIs as defined in section 27-12. Such enclosed space shall not be used for human habitation and will be useable solely for parking of vehicles, building access, or storage. Machinery and equipment which service the building, such as furnaces, air conditioners, heat ptrrnps, hot water heaters. washers, dryers, elevator lift equipment, electrical junction and circuit boxes, and food freezers are not permitted in such enclosed spaces_ The enclosed space must only be achieved with breakaway walls, open wood latticework, or insect screening intended to collapse under wind and water loads without causing collapse, displacement, or other structural damage to the elevated portion of the Building or supporting foundation system. A breakaway wall shall have a design safe loading resistance of not less than ten and no more than twenty pounds per square foot. Use of breakaway walls which exceed a design safe loading resistance of twenty pounds per square foot may be permitted only if a licensed professional structural engineer certifies that the design proposed meets the following conditions: (1) Breakaway wall collapse shall result from a water load less than that which would occur during the base flood; and (2) The elevated portion of the building and supporting foundation system shall not be subject to collapse, displacement, or other structural damage due to the effects of wind and water loads acting simultaneously on all building components (structural and nonstructural). Maximum wind and water loading values to he used in this determination shall each have a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year (one -hundred -year mean recurrence interval). (e) Fill shall not be used. (f) Man-made alteration of sand dunes which would increase potential flood damage is prohibited. (g) All new construction, improvements In repetitive loss structures, development, and substantial improvement within coastal high hazard areas shall be certified as rcquired by scetion 27-17. SUPP.5 (1-2008) 2718 10A-20 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-23 (h) Recreational vehicles placed on sites within Zones V and VF, on the FIRM shall he elevated and anchored or be on the site for less than one hundred eighty consccutivc days or be fully licensed and highway ready. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 14.) Section 27-24. Standards for general floodplain. The general floodplain, identified as Zone A on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps, arc: areas of special flood hazards for which detailed engineering studies are not performed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to determine the base flood elevations and to identify the floodways. (a) To determine base flood elevations and the locations of floodways within the general floodplain, the director of public works may obtain, review, and reasonably utilize any base flood elevation and floodway data available from a Federal, State, or other source, including information requested of a permit applicant. (b) Development or subdivision proposals shall conform with the requirements of section 27-20- (c) The following; information shall be provided by a permit applicant to the director of public works to evaluate the proposed construction or improvement site within a general floodplain area: (1) Project location and site plan showing dimensions. (2) Relationship to floodway and floodway fringes as determined by flood elevation study. (3) Contour map showing the topography of existing ground bated on elevation rclerence marks on flood maps. The scale and contours are to be appropriate to the work in question. (4) Existing and proposed base flood elevations. (5) Existing and proposed floodproofing and flood control measures. The director of public works may waive informational requirements if the director of public, works has sufficient information to make an evaluation and determination regarding flood elevation or may request further information, including a detailed flood elevation study and a drainage report, to evaluate flood risks and determine the applicability of flood construction and development standards. (d) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements within the general floodplain shall satisfy the requirements set forth for 'Zones AL, All, ACI, or VE as is determined to be applicable by the director of public works based on base flood information and floodway data obtained through subsections 27-24(a) and 27-24(b). (e) All new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, development, and substantial improvement within the general floodplain shall be certified as required by section 27-17. (f) All manufactured homes shall be elevated and anchored to resist flotation, collapse, Or lateral movement. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1; Am, 2007, Ord.. No. 07-169, sec. 15.) Section 27-25. Standards for improvements adjacent to drainage racilities. New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements proposed adjacent to drainage facilities outside of the special flood hazard areas identified on the hood Insurance Rate Maps shall he subject to review and approval ofthe director of public works. (a) Upon request by the director of public works, further information concerning base flood elevation, floodways, surface water runoff, existing and proposed drainage pattems, and other information, including a detailed flood elevation study, drainage report. and findings and opinions by a licensed professional civil engineer, shall be provided to evaluate potential Bonding_ (b) The director of public works shall determine the applicability of the various development and construction standards provided in this chapter based upon information available from a Federal, State, or other source, including information provided by the permit applicant. (c) A drainage facility shall not be modifrcd, constructed, lined, or altered in any way to accommodate the improvement without the approval of the director ol'public works. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 16.) 27-19 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-21 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1O Appendix § 27-26 11AWAI`I COUNTY CODE Section 27-26. Storm drainage standards. Thu dcpartmunt of public works, County of Hawai`i's "Storm Drainage Standard," October 1970 edition, or latest revision, is incorporated into and made a part of this chapter. These standards have been prepared to guide County engineers and personnel, engineers for subdivision and other developers, consultants employed by the department of public works, and other interested parries in the general features required for the design of storm drainage Facilities, preparation of flood hazard studies, and other related work in the County of Hawai `i. (1993, (fid. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 17.) Article 5. Variances and Appeals. Section 27-27. Criteria for variances. A variance from this chapter may be issued by the director of public works only upon the applicant meeting the variance criteria of this section. The variance criterion set forth in this section are based on the general principle of zoning law that variances periain to a piece of' property and are not personal in nature. A properly issued variance is granted for a parcel of properly with physical characteristics so unusual that complying with the requirements of this chapter would create an "ceptional hardship to the applicant or the surrounding property owners. 'the characteristics must be unique to the property and not be shared by adjacent parcels. The unique characteristic must pertain to the land itself, not to the structure, its inhabitants, or the property owners. It is the duty of the County of Hawaii to help protect its citizens from flooding. 11sis need is so compelling and the implications of the cost of insuring a structure built below flood level are so scrious that variances from the flood elevation or from other requirements of- this chapter arc quite rare. The variance guidelines arc dclailed and contain multiple provisions that must be met before a variance can be properly granted. The following criterion are designed to screen out those situations in which alternatives other than a variance are more appropriate: (a) Generally, variances may be issued for new construction, improvements to repetitive loss slructtacs, substantial improvement, and other proposed new development to be erected on a lot of one-half acre or less in size contiguous to and surrounded by lots with existing structures constructed below the base flood level, providing that the procedures efarticles 3 and 4 of this chapter have bccn fully considered. As the lot size increases beyond one-half acre, the technical justifteation requircd for issuing the variance increases. (b) Variances shall not be issued within any designated floodway if any increase in flood levels during the base flood discharge would result. (c) Variances shall only be issued upon: (1) A showing of good and sufficient cause. Under this criterion, the applicant must demonstrate that the variance request is for land which has physical characteristics so unusual that complying to flood requirements will create exceptional hardship to the applicant or surrounding landowners. The unique characteristic must pertain to the land itself" and not the structure, its inhabitants, or the properly owner. Under this criterion, only exceptional instances should arise where the physical characteristics of properties ercate a hardship sufficient to justify granting a variance. Even in a fairly common situation where an undeveloped lot is surrounded by properties with structures built at grade and/or below flood levels, a variance cannot be justified since an applicant can erect the concerned structure on pilings, (2) A determination that failure to grant the variance would result in exceptional "hardship" (as defined in section 27-12) to the applicant. Under this criterion, the hardship that would result Isom failure to grant a requested variance must be exceptional, unusual, and peculiar to the property involved. Economic or financial hardship alone is not exceptional. Inconvenience, aesthetic considerations, physical disabilities, personal prefercnc+:s, or the disapproval of one's neighbors cannot, generally, quality as exceptional hardship. Tindcr this criterion, [or example, SUPP.5 (1-2008) 27-20 10A-22 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-27 a member of a household has a physical disability and wants a variance to build the dwelling at grade or at a tower level for access purposes- A vanancc should not be issued because the owner can construct a ramp or elevator to meet flood rcquircmcnts. Elevation will allow the infirm or persons with disabilities to be evacuated in the early stage of flooding, and, if there is insufficient warning or help in evacuating that person, then, in all likelihood, he can survive the flood by simple remaining in the home safely above the levels of floodwaters; (3) A determination that the variance is the "minimum necessary" (as defined in section 27-12), considering the flood hazard, to afford relief. Under this criterion, the variance that is granted should be for the minimum deviation from the flood requirements that will still alleviate the hardship. In the case of variance to an cicvalion requirement, this docs not mean approval to build at grade level or to whatever elevation an applicant proposes, but rather to a level that the director of public works detemrines will provide relief and preserve the integrity of the flood ordinance; and (4) A determination that the granting of a variance will not result in increased flood heights, additional threats to public safety, extraordinary public expense, create nuisances, cause "fi-aud or victimization" (as defined in section 27-12) of the public, or conflict with existing local laws or ordinances. Under this criterion, an applicant must demonstrate that flood levels will not be raised above the base flood elevations. (d) Variances may be issued for new construction, improvements to rcpetifive loss structures, substantial improvement, and other proposed new development necessary for the conduct of a "functionally dependent use" (as defined in section 27-12) provided that the provisions of paragraphs 27-27(a) through 27-27(c) are satisfied and that the structure or other development is protected by methods Ihat minimize flood damages during the base flood and create no additional threats to public safety. (e) Variances may be issued for the repair or rehabilitation of historic structures upon a determination that the proposed repair or rehabilitation will not preclude the structure's continued designation as a historic structure and the variance is the minimum necessary to preserve the historic character and design of the structure. (f) Variances may be issued for improvement of a structure to correct existing violations of State or local health, sanitary, or safety code specifications which have been identified by the local code enforcement official and which are the minimum necessary to assure safe living conditions. (g) Variances may be approved with conditions. Such conditions may include: (1) Modification of the construction or substantial improvement, including the sewer and water facilities_ (2) Limitations on periods ofuse and operation. (3) Imposition of operational controls, sureties, and deed restrictions. (4) Requirements for construction of channels, dikes, ditches, swalcs, levees, and other flood - protective measures. (5) Hoodproofing measures designed consistent with the regulatory flood elevation; flood velocities, hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces, and other factors associated with the base flood, (6) Other conditions as may be required by the director of public works to promote public welfare and safety. (1993, Ord. No, 93-78, see. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 18.) Section 27-28. Application for variance. An application for a variance shall he submitted to the director of public works, signed and stamped by a licensed professional engineer or architect, and shall include three sets of documents with the following information as may be applicable: 27-21 SURP.5 (1-2008) 10A-23 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix § 27-28 I'IAWAI`I COUNTY CODE (a) Plans and specifications showing the site and location; dimensions of all property lines and topographic elevation of the lot; existing and proposed structures and improvements, fill, storage: arca; locations and elevations of-cxisting and proposed streets and utilities; floodproofiing measures; relationship of the site to the location of the flood boundary; floodway; and the existing and proposed flood control measures and improvements. (b) Cross-sections and profile of the area and the regulatory flood elevations and profile based on elevation reference marks on flood maps. (c) Mood study and drainage report in areas where a study and report have not been reviewed and accepted by the County of Hawai `i. (d) Description of surrounding propoTtics and existing structures and uses and the effect of the regulatory flood on them caused by the variance. (e) Evaluation and supporting information for the variance with respect to the factors to be considered by the director of public works as listed in paragraphs 27-27(a) through 27-27(f). (1) An agrcemcnt that a covenant will be inserted in the deed and other conveyance documents of the property and recorded with the bureau of conveyances of the State of Ilawai`i, stating that the property is located in a flood hazard area subject to flooding and flood damage; that a flood hazard variance to construct a structure below the base flood elevation will result in increased flood insurance rates and increases flood risks to life and properly; that the property owners will not file any lawsuit or action against [be County of Hawaii for costs or damages or any claim; that the property owners wilI indcmnily and hold harmless the County of Ilawai`i from liability when such loss, damage, injury, or death results due to any flood hazard variance and flooding of the property; and that upon approval of the variance, the covenants shall he fully executed and proof of recording with the bureau of conveyances shall be submitted to the director of public works prior to the issuance of a building permit. (g) Such other information as maybe relevant and requested by the director of public works. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am- 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, see. 1; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, sec. 19) Section 27-29. Review of variance applications. The director of public works shall review variance applications and shall consider all technical evaluations, relevant factors, standards specified in other sections of this chapter, and: (a) The danger that materials may be swept onto other lands to the injury of others; (b) The danger of life and property due to flooding or erosion damage; (c) The susceptibility of the proposed facility and its contents to flood damage and the effect of such damage on the existing individual owner and future owners of the property; (d) The importance of the services provided by the proposed facility to the community; (c) The necessity to the Facility of a waterfront location, where applicable; (f) the availability of alternative locations for the proposed use which are not subject to flooding or erosion damage; (g) The compatibility of the proposed use with existing and anticipated development; (h) The relationship of the proposed use to the comprehensive plan and floodplain management program, if any, for that area; (i) The safety= of access to the property in time of flood for ordinary and emergency vehicles; (j) The expected heights, velocity, duration, rate of rise, and sediment transport of the flood waters expected at the site; and (k) The costs of providing governmental services during and after flood conditions, including maintenance and repair of public utilities and tacilitics such as sewer, gas, electrical, and water system, and streets and bridges. (1) Upon consideration of the factors of paragraphs 27-29(a) through 27-29(k) and the purposes of this chapter, the director of public works may attach such conditions to the granting of variances as it deems necessary to further the purposes of this chapter. (1993, Ord. No_ 93-78, see.. 3; Am. 2601, Ord. No. 01-148, sec. 1_) SUPP.5 (1-2008) 27-22 10A-24 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-30 Section 27-30. Recording and reporting of variances. (a) Any applicant to whom a variance is granted shall be given written notice over the signature of the director of public works that: (1) "fhe issuance of a variance to construct a structure at elevations below the base flood level will result in increased premium rates for flood insurance up to amounts as high as $25 for $100 of insurance coverage; (2) Such construction below the base flood level increases risks to life and property; and (3) A copy of the notice shall be recorded with the State of Ifawai`i bureau of conveyances and shall be recorded in a manner so that it appears in the chain of title ofthc affected parcel of land. (b) A record of alk variance actions, including justifications for issuance of any variance and written no ti cc s, shall be maintained by the director of public works. A report of the variances issued shall be included in the biennial report submitted to the federal Emergency Management Agency. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1; Am. 2007, (rd. No. 07-169, sec. 20.) Section 27-31. Appeals. 11te circuit court of the third circuit, County of llawai`i, State of flawai`i shall hear and decide appeals when it is alleged that there is an error in any requirement, decision, or determination made by the floodplain administrator in the administration or enforcement ofthis chapter. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) .article 6. Enforcement. Section 27-32. Right to enter. Authorized representatives of the County of Hawaii are empowered to enter and inspect properties, both public and private, for the purposes of investigating compliance with the provisions of this chapter. The representatives shall, upon request, provide groper identification and state the purpose of the investigation. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, see. 3.) Section 27-33. Notice of violation. Whenever any person, firm, or corporation violates any provision of Ihis chapter, the director of public works shall serve, either through certified mail or by hand delivery, a notice of violation to the parties responsible for the violation. (a) The notice of vinlats'on shall identify the violation and require: the responsible party to correct the violation and comply with applicable requirements of this chapter. (b) The notice ofviolation shall include at least the following information: (1) lite date of the notice; (2) The name and address of the pennon served with the nolicc; (3) the tax key number of the property where the violation has been identified; (4) 'the section number of the chapter or other law which has been violated; (5) The nature of the violation; (6) The corrective measures required to comply with this chapter; (7) T7te deadline date for compliance with the notice. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Ord. No. 01-108, sec. 1.) Section 27-34. Administrative order. (a) In lieu of or in addition to section 27-33, if the director of public works determines that any person, firm, or corporation is not complying with the requirements of this chapter or a notice of violation for a violation of this chapter, the director of public works may have the party responsible for the violation served, by certified mail or delivery, with an order pursuant to this section. 27-23 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-25 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 27-34 11AWAI`I COUNTY CODE (b) The order may require the party responsible for the violation to do any or all ofthc following: (1) Correct the violation within the lime specified in the order, (2) Pay a civil fine of not less than $500 and not more than $t,000 in the manner, at the place, and before the date specified in the order; (3) Pay a civil fine of not less than $500 per day and not more than 51,000 per day for each day that the violation persists, in the manner and at the time and place specified in the order. (c) The order shall become final thirty days from the dale of service unless the party served requests a hearing under chapter 91, Hawaii Revised Statutes. If a hearing is requested, no fine shall be imposed except upon completion of the hearing. In determining the amount of the fine, the director of public works shall consider the seriousness of the violations, any history of such violations, any good -faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the fine on the violator, and such other considerations that have a bearing on the amount of the fine. (d) The director of public works may institute a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the enforccment of any order issued pursuant to this section. Where the civil action has been instituted to enforce the civil fine imposed by said order, the director of public works need only show that the notice of violation and order were served, that a civil fine was imposed, the amount of the civil fine imposed, and that the fine has not been paid, (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3; Am. 2001, Or(. No. 01-108, we. 1; Am. 2007, Ord. No, 07-169, sec. 21.) Section 2735. Injunctive relief. Whenever a person, firm, or corporation has violated or continues to violate the provisions of this chapter, notice of violation, or administrative order issued relevant to this article, the County of Hawaii may petition the circuit court of the third district, State of Hawaii, or the United Slates District Court, Stale of Hawaii, through the County of flawai`i's corporation counsel, for the issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction, as appropriate, which restrains or compels the specific performance of the provisions of this chapter, notice of violation, or administrative order. Such other action as appropriate for legal and/or equitable relief may also be sought by the County of Hawaii A petition for injunctive, relief need not be filed as a prerequisite to taking any other action against a user. (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) Section 2736. Criminal enforcement. A violation of the rcquircmcnls of this chapter shall constitute a misdemeanor. Any person violating the provisions of this chapter shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of $1,000 or by imprisonment not. exceeding one year, or both, except that in cases where such offense shall continue after due notice, each day's continuance ofthe same shall constitute a separate offense, (1993, Ord. No. 93-78, sec. 3.) Section 2737. Removal of encroachment and/or obstruction notices. In addition to any other section, if any encroaclunent and/or obstruction exists, under, over or through any portion of a drainagcway, floodway, levee system or watercourse within the County and the encroachment and/or obstruction is observed, or a complaint made to the department of public works of the County of Ilawai`i, then the department of public works shall investigate and forthwith, give notice to the owner to remove the encroachment and/or obstruction in the manner provided in this article. (1997, Ord. 97-128, sec. 1; Am. 2007, Ord. No. 07-169, see. 22.) SUPP.5 (1-2006) 27-24 10A-26 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT § 27-38 Section 27-38. Removal by County; costs. If the encroachment andlor obstruction is not removed or its removal is not commenced and diligently prosecuted prior to the expiration of thirty days alter mailing; of notice, the department of public works may proceed to remove the encroachment and/or obstruction by itself or contract for its removal. All costs incurred in the course of removing the encroachment and/or obstruction shall he paid by owner and the County may institute an action to recover costs and expenses for removal of the cncroachmcnt an(For obstruction. The County may also place a lien against the encroaching andlor obstructing parcel for any uncollected costs. (1997, Ord. 97-128, sec. 1.) 27-25 Si1PP.5 (1-2008) 10A-27 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 wi WAMOVANOWA w.' r.rr� 11. Dam Failures Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures CHAPTER 11 - DAM FAILURES 11.1 Description of Hazard The severity of flooding caused by dam breaks has been analyzed by modeling by the Pacific Disaster Center and the US Army Corps of Engineers. Although no known dam break events have occurred on Hawaii Island, the potential damage is significant enough to merit prevention and disaster preparation. Dam failure can result from: prolonged periods of rainfall; inadequate spillway capacity; internal erosion resulting in structural failure; improper maintenance; improper design; negligent operation; failure of upstream dams on the same watercourse; landslides into reservoirs which may cause surges resulting in overtopping; high winds which can cause significant wave action resulting in substantial erosion; and earthquakes, which cause longitudinal cracks and weaken the entire structure. Hawaii County has 13 dams, all of which are earth dams.ss Most dams in Hawaii are old earthen berm reservoirs built during the plantation era originally for irrigation purposes. Of these dams, DLNR has rated two on this island to be "high" hazard based on the extent of potential downstream losses to residential/ commercial structures or agricultural crops (see Figure 11-1). A NASA -funded study applied a model to estimate flood losses.56 The report classified the inundated area into three risk zones: the zone of severe flooding corresponds to the region where flood depths are sufficient to cause severe structural damage or loss of life; the zone of probable damage corresponding to the region that is expected to be flooded to a depth of at least one foot; and the maximum possible flood extent. Because of the short duration of such flooding events from a dam break, coupled with the unknown reliability of the model, it would not seem practical to use the model for real time response. The value of the modeling is to assess priority for preventive monitoring and maintenance rather than to incorporate the results into the FIRM's where it would be used for permitting and insurance purposes. 55 Goosby, S., Chatman, A., Michaud, J., Kerper, D., Dam Break Inundation Study for the State of Hawaii, Prepared for the State of Hawaii's Department of Land and Natural Resources, ASCE 2008 56 Johnson, C. and J. Michaud. Dam Failure Inundation Mapping Project, NASA Contract No. NASW-99044, January 15, 2003. 11-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures M Critical Dams ® Dams Figure 11-1. Dam Inventory and Rating Following the 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake some damage occurred to dams and irrigation ditches in the Waimea-Kamuela area where recorded peak ground acceleration exceeded 1.Og (soil depths are greater in that region than along the rocky coast nearest the epicenter). At least two dams experienced cracks along their crests, while at least two others showed clear evidence of incipient slope failure on their embankments. The Pacific Disaster Center performed dam break simulations for Hawaii County Civil Defense. Two dams located above Waimea were drained after excessive seepage and "water boils" were observed five days following the earthquakes. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources had in place post -earthquake dam inspection procedures. The Hawaii Dam Safety Guidelines: Seismic Analysis & Post -Earthquake Inspections (Brandes, 2004) call for inspections of dams within 75 miles of the source of an earthquake of magnitude between 6 and 7. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers undertook these comprehensive inspections. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provided Hawaii State Civil Defense (HSCD) with completed documentation concerning the Statewide Dam Visual Conditions Survey in response to the Kiholo Bay Earthquake on October 15, 2006. Documentation includes electronic field inspection reports with corresponding photographs for 86 dams inspected by USACE between October 30 and November 8, 2006. HSCD asked Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) to develop a map viewer application to allow authorized users to view the documentation provided by USACE. PDC created (and will maintain) a password -protected map viewer that hosts and displays USACE data for persons authorized by HSCD to access 11-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures it. This map viewer is based on PDC's Hawaii Hazards and Vulnerabilities Atlas, which was also used as the foundation for the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Map Viewer and other PDC -developed applications. In addition to the existing functionality contained within these viewers, the Dam Status Map Viewer includes "hot links" to "State of Hawaii DLNR Dam Safety Inspection Sheets" for each dam as well as to site graphics as available. A list of all dams on the Island of Hawaii is included below. 1. HA00026 Lalakea Reservoir 2. HA00051 Hawi No. 5 Reservoir 3. HA00027 E-13 Reservoir 4. HA00052 Kehena Reservoir 5. HA00040 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 6. HA00122 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 2 7. HA00042 Puukapu Reservoir 8. HA00123 Puu Pulehu Reservoir 9. HA00043 Puukapu Watershed Retarding Dam R-1 10. HAO0131 Paauilo Reservoir 11. HA00049 Keaiwa Reservoir 12. HAO0136 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 3 13. HA00050 Hawi No. 3 Reservoir 11.2 Significant Historic Events and Lessons Learned There is no record of any major dam failures on the Island of Hawaii resulting in significant loss of property or life. However, as discussed previously several dams showed signs of damage following the Oct. 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake. On March 14, 2006, just before dawn, Ka Loko Dam on the island of Kauai breached sending nearly 400 million gallons of water (weighing 1.6 million tons) from the Ka Loko Reservoir into Kilauea Bay, taking trees, cars, buildings, and seven human lives with it. According to Godbey's independent civil investigation of the Ka Loko Dam failure, the breach of the dam can be attributed several possible conditions and practices. Among these conditions and practices are inadequate inspection of the dams by the State of Hawaii, non - permitted grading operations at the dam site by the owner, inadequate maintenance of the dam by the owner, and non -enforcement of regulations by the County of Kaua`i.s' 57 Godbey, Robert, Report of the Independent Civil Investigation of the March 14, 2006 Breach of Ka Loko Dam, 1, January 2007 11-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures B6ach Ke'itu Pt. _ = State Highway 56__.,r MORITA .' mro V%l, AKALUA RESERVOIR Q RESERVOIR RUU KAELE RESERVOIR y , Highway 56 Road 0 Reservoir '*+ Stream ----- Ditches R r .�` - KA LOKo} 0 vo�op RESERVOIR i `r r Mlles �! r 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1 �. ' M -a- 1 inch equals 0.50 miles�:� S6URC ES: NOAq E; NEGSTATE❑FHAWAII; HITECH URBAN EDWTIONS,INC.� S 'PREPARED EYHI;TECH URBAN EDW TIONSINC., 12- Figure 11-2 Shaded Relief of Ka Loko Dam and Vicinity, Island of Kaua`i58 ss Godbey, Robert, Report of the Independent Civil Investigation of the March 14, 2006 Breach of Ka Loko Dam, 1, January 2007 11-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures Figure 11-3 Ka Loko Dam Breach, Island of Kaua'is9 Figure 11-4 Ka Loko Dam Breach, Island of Kaua`PO 59 Godbey, Robert, Report of the Independent Civil Investigation of the March 14, 2006 Breach of Ka Loko Dam, 1, January 2007 11-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures Figure 11-5 Houses Amid Debris from Ka Loko Dam Failure, Island of Kaua°i61 Figure 11-6 Road Infrastructure Damage from Ka Loko Dam Failure, Island of Kaua`i6z 60 Image Retrieved Wikipedia Website October 26, 2009 from http:Hen.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kaloko_breach. jig 61 Image courtesy of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR), Star Bulleting Website, Retrieved October 26, 2009 from hlW://arcliives.starbulletin.com/2006/03/15/news/ston,01.httnl 11-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures 11.3 Probability of Occurrence Given the increased monitoring procedures enacted following the breach of the Ka Loko Dam on Kauai, the probability of a dam failure anywhere in the state of Hawaii has been significantly reduced. A major dam failure is a very rare event for which there is no defined recurrence interval. However, the potential does exist during an extreme rainfall event, or major earthquake at any unmaintained or under maintained location. 11.4 Risk Assessment After the failure of the Kaloko Dam, the DNLR Dam Safety Division initiated a project to study the potential inundation areas downstream of all 135 registered dams in Hawaii. The failure scenarios considered were: • Sunny day failure with dry downstream conditions • Failure occurs when dam is at maximum capacity • Failure occurs by piping failure halfway up the dam face • Spillways and dam outlet works are inoperable at the time of the breach The water flow from the dam failure scenarios was modeled to determine maps of the inundation area, maximum water depth, maximum flow velocity and time of inundation at each dam. The various impacts of the dam break were considered for each dam, including: • Impact to the population by the number of people potentially impacted downstream • Impact to transportation including water depth and speed at bridges and road crossings • Impact to buildings based on replacement cost value • Impact to critical facilities including schools, hospitals, fire and police stations, government buildings, airports/seaports, shelters The results of this study could be used to infer some type of expected annual loss based on a probability of a particular dam's failure, however, these probabilities very small and ideally zero if proper monitoring and maintenance is provided. The intention of this study was prioritize critical areas, and to provide a reasonable assessment of risk, not to determine annual expected losses for comparison with other hazards. 11.5 Mitigation Strategies 11.5.1 General 11.5.1.1 National Dam Inspection Act The National Dam inspection Act (NDIA) of 1972 as expressed in Public Law 92-367 authorized for the first time the federal regulation of privately own dams. Per the NDIA, the United Sates Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) were authorized to inventory and inspect privately owned dams in the United States. The NDIA provided funding for the Honolulu 62 Image courtesy of Casey and Cyndi Riemer from Jack Harter Helicopters, Retrieved from Star Bulleting Website on October 26, 2009 from http:Harcliives.starbulletin.com/2006/03/15/news/stoiyOLhtml 11-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures Army Corps of Engineers and the State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) to complete an inventory of dams in the State of Hawaii and perform inspections of 53 high -hazard private dams between 1977 and 1981.63 11.5.1.2 National Dam Safety Program Act The purpose of the National Dam Safety Program Act (NDSPA) of 2000, as expressed in Section 215(a) of Public Law 104-303, is to "reduce the risks to life and property from dam failure in the United States through the establishment and maintenance of an effective national dam safety program to bring together the expertise and resources of the federal and non-federal communities in achieving national dam safety hazard reduction." The State assistance program is intended to help States bring the necessary resources to bear on inspection, classification, and emergency planning for dam safety. Public Law 104-303 provides for the assistance program described below. For a State to be eligible for primary assistance under the National Dam Safety Program, the state dam safety program must be working toward meeting the following criteria, as listed in Public Law 104-303: • The authority to review and approve plans and specifications to construct, enlarge, modify, remove, and abandon dams; • The authority to perform periodic inspections during dam construction to ensure compliance with approved plans and specifications; • A requirement that state approval be given on completion of dam construction and before operation of the dam; • The authority to require or perform the inspection at least once every 5 years of all dams and reservoirs that would pose a significant threat to human life and property in case of failure to determine the continued safety of the dams and reservoirs, and a procedure for more detailed and frequent safety inspections; • A requirement that all inspections be performed under the supervision of a state - registered professional engineer with experience in dam design and construction; • The authority to issue notices, when appropriate, to require owners of dams to perform necessary maintenance or remedial work, revise operating procedures, or take other actions, including breaching dams when necessary; • Regulations for carrying out the legislation of the state; 63 Office of History, United Sates Army Corps of Engineers, The Federal Role in Water Resources Management„ Washington, D.C., 1896,12p 11-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures • The provision for funds to ensure timely repairs or other changes to or removal of a dam to protect human life and property, and if the owner of the dam does not take the action described above, to take appropriate action as expeditiously as possible; • A system of emergency procedures to be used if a dam fails or if the failure of a dam is imminent; and • An identification of each dam whose failure could be reasonably expected to endanger human life, the maximum area that could be flooded if the dam failed, and public facilities that would be affected by the flooding. 11.5.1.3 State of Hawai `i Dam Safety Act The State of Hawaii Dam Safety Act was started in 1987 where the rules, statues, and Hawaii Administrative Rules were set up by the Department of Land and Natural Resources (HAR, Title 13, Subtitle 7, Chapter 190, Dams and Reservoirs). A majority of existing dams were built by private plantation owners in the early 1900's for irrigation and not flood control; there were no standards at that time. According to the Hawaii National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Certified Floodplain manager (CFM), during that historical period, when the embankments were built, workers had carts filled with rocks that were pulled by horse or mule, which then ran back and forth over the embankment to provide some compaction. The Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) Engineering Branch administers the Hawaii Dam Safety Act The DLNR reviews and approves plans and specifications for the construction of new dams or for the enlargement, alteration, repair, or removal of existing dams. Any individual or entity seeking to construct, alter, or remove an existing dam must fill out the "Application For Approval Of Plans And Specifications For Construction, Enlargement, Repair, Alteration, Or Removal Of Dam" with the DLNR Engineering Branch, Dam Safety Section. 11.5.2 Previous/Current Efforts 11.5.2.1 United States Army Corps of Engineers Statewide Dam Visual Conditions Survey Following the 2006 failure of the Ka Loko dam in the island of Kauai, the State of Hawaii DLNR in coordination with the Corps conducted emergency visual inspections of dams on the islands of Kauai, Oahu, Molokai, Maui, and Hawaii. The purpose of the inspections was to assess whether there existed any imminent danger to life and property based on the dam and/or reservoir conditions at the time of the inspection. DLNR determined that this broad-based visual inspections were sufficient basis for the State of Hawaii to contact dam owners for follow-up investigations and potential remedial and/or mitigatory actions. All statewide inspections pertaining to this initiative are consolidated into a report titled "Statewide Dam Visual Conditions Survey for the islands of Maui, Oahu, Hawaii, and Molokai and re -inspections on the island of Kauai" dated June 23, 2006. 11-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures The dam inspections consisted of the visual only examination or condition survey of the regulated dam structures, including abutments, spillways, outlet facilities, and reservoir. The visual assessments yielded conditions ratings that ranged according to the following: • Satisfactory: Dam is expected to fulfill its intended function. • Fair: Dam is expected to fulfill its intended function but maintenance is recommended. • Poor: Dam may not fulfill its intended function and maintenance/repairs are necessary. • Unsatisfactory: Dam is not expected to fulfill its intended function and repair, replacement, of modification is necessary. • Unknown: Dam is not visible, not accessible, not inspected, or unable to determine the condition rating based on the observation taken. Besides the rating, the report includes recommendations for each facility if any. Typical recommendations vary from the removal of vegetation to facilitate future inspections to the requirement of owners to make immediate repair actions to restore the integrity of the facility. A total of thirteen dams were inspected in the County of Hawaii. Full summary reports of these inspections can be found at http://www6.hawaii.gov/dlnr/reports/dam-inspections/. IL 5.2.2 Pacific Disaster Center Dam Failure Inundation Map Project In 2009, the State of Hawaii DLNR and the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) engaged in an effort to generate Dam Failure Inundation Maps for all one -hundred -thirty-five (135) registered dams in the State of Hawaii. Besides the inundation maps, the project aims at providing basic damage assessment and social -economical vulnerability assessment. The inundation maps for this project were produced using MIKE software — one of the industry standards for simulating flow and water level, water quality and sediment transport in rivers, floodplains, irrigation canals, reservoirs, and other inland bodies of water. All three available modules of the MIKE Modeling Suite were used to substantiate the results of the analyses: MIKE 11 for one-dimensional dynamic modeling of river, channel, and reservoir hydraulics; MIKE 21 for two-dimensional free surface flow models; and MIKE FLOOD for the integration of a series of dams within one single model. For illustration purposes, inundation maps for the same dam based on the two- and three-dimensional modeling capabilities of MIKE 11 and MIKE 21 are shown in Figure 11-7. Similarly, Figure 11 - illustrates a single model of a series of dams using MIKE FLOOD. The following failure scenarios and assumptions were use to assure conservatism in the preparation of the maps: 11-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures • Failure occurs during a sunny day with dry downstream conditions • Failure occurs when dam is at its maximum capacity • Failure occurs by piping failure halfway up the face of the dam • Spillways and dam outlets are inoperable at the time of the breach In addition to the dam failure inundation maps, the study will provide individual dam assessment reports with the following information: • Total maximum water depth • Time of maximum water depth • Time to first inundation • Depth at first inundation • Water velocity. • Impact to population including number of people potentially impacted downstream • Impact to transportation including water depth and velocity at bridges and road crossings • Impact to building infrastructure and replacement cost value • Impact to critical facilities (schools, hospitals, fire and police stations, government buildings, airports/seaports, and shelters) As of the third trimester of 2009, PDC has completed the dam failure inundation maps and individual assessment reports for all one -hundred -thirty-five (135) dams. In 2010, DLNR evaluated and approved these maps and reports for release to County of Hawaii Civil Defense, for official use only. The Hawaii County Police Department, responsible for evacuation procedures, utilized the reference dam inundation maps to develop potential dam break evacuation maps. An example map for the Waimea area (and downstream) is shown in Figure 11-9. It is expected that the documents will be released to the public in early 2011. 11-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures Figure 11-7. Comparison of One -Dimensional (MIKE 11) & Two -Dimensional (MIKE 21) Dam Failure Modeling64 Ar , MAEPORESERVOiR AEPOALUA RESERVOIR AEPOKOLU RESERVOIR - ' im 'AEPOEHA RE3ERVOiR n Figure 11-8. Serial Dam Failure Modeling using MIKE FLOOD 65 64 Goosby, Stanley, Chatman, Andrea, Michaud, Jene, and Kerper, Dale, Dam Break Inundation Study for the State of Hawaii, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Conference Proceedings, 2008, 312, 40p 65 Goosby, Stanley, Chatman, Andrea, Michaud, Jene, and Kerper, Dale, Dam Break Inundation Study for the State of Hawaii, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Conference Proceedings, 2008, 312, 40p 11-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Z fl] O iO CD c O C� _M O _Q 2 co N� L.L f13 O Y 3t O a) LL m .Q A J+ C 7 as LLaz V�V a® a Chapter I1: Hazard Analysis Dam Failures 11.5.3 Future Plans Project Description Status Dam & Reservoir Safety DLNR Evaluation; DWS repair of Kiholo Drafting of Dam Safety Guidelines USCOE dam break inundation study Bay earthquake damage Permitting requirements for new dam of Il dams statewide completed; at Waikoloa construction PDC study of "sunny day" dam DLNR Engineering Certification of compliance that owners break inundation for 138 dams Division is completing meet Phase I operation and maintenance statewide completed; dam break Phase I Detailed Visual recommendations and have an emergency evacuation maps being finalized in Inspections, and action plan. December 2010 by Hawaii County updating the state dam Civil Defense Agency inventory C-122. 11-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 12. High Surf Chapter 12: Hazard Analysis High Surf CHAPTER 12 - HIGH SURF 12.1 Description of Hazard High waves that inundate coastal areas are generated by strong winds or seismic events. The seismic -type wave is called a tsunami and covered in Chapter 9, on page 9-1. Damaging wind -generated waves occur from distant storms in the Northern and Southern Hemisphere, tropical storms, hurricanes, and localized Kona storms (see Figure 12-1). North -facing shores receive annual North Pacific swells in winter ranging from 10 to 20 feet. Usually damage - causing events from north swells are over 20 feet. Larger northeast trade waves are typically 2 to 4 feet; however, well-developed trade swells produce high waves of 6 to 8 feet that have caused damage. South -facing shores are exposed to Kona storms and southern swells, which have caused damage at heights of only 4 to 6 feet. Tropical storms and hurricanes affect any and all shorelines especially during summer and fall with damaging high waves of 10 to 30 feet. Hawaii Damaging high waves* and high waves due to hurricanes Islandwtde high waves 1979 �2$-29 HlgRwwee 1117. Mar Za-$4 lkpn 9l¢I 19]5 Nov2121 High seas 1976 FA7 nigh End v978 Har FS H1gR Wrt 19]3 Jul11_1 9311 aW I erg Jen1_" HIA115985 ltla5 Malt-tl a low e1.d 6892 g 61Yd i1 H F996 upf5-1R H FpweL 4 20mi I I 0 29km ,ake8 and resemo fs. 0-2900 feet 2000-4000feel 4000-&lOO feel 8MM -sow feel 8000.10.000 loot 10,000-12.000 feet ver, 12,000 feet Urban Areas - Highways S1leans Canals H HI111fCArla TS Tropical Sic - 10 It torm101t HOIghl of suer (feel] Upolu Point Kohala 9967 Jen 6 -FO Hloh surl point POlKpoi --. ---, �- fli 19( 14u°26 "10 — South Puna Coast South P High sod et 196a Jan 20 1110h eud a1 Kew8v1199'P" O 1987 M1u018 Hrc}h wn9ae ,W Feb 15-18 High aura—q coon Keilua--" ,M84 Fab20 Hlgh— Kona 1990 Mara High surfathhrMou ea, 5971 Jerk HlOh sort Magic ten A¢O 9-29 309 Sands 1976 3-6-7 nreh u1,19 ¢s1 Beach 5975 Nov 2134 M✓Jh Hol hleglG SarA„eenpa 49®2 Ag14-18 "i" sun 1902 Sop 11 H 1986 Pb B High ..d long -11 r2�, 1998 Feb 22 WO WA along ¢o¢at 1901 Jen9-to MOau. 'M Jut,R-M High surf 1992 Sep l l H MNc.lwirs.+l 1995 Jun25-3o'1oh9 'E$8°� ICBM Sev t1�9niksl 1994 7 Ills a2 -t a n Ke SWe1'.,0-12i[ k •noes not include high waves due to tsunamis Figure 12-1. st! Nl10 03 01No ,956 Apr Y Jen 3-a High sees NanaareCh 1947 ev 1989 Foo 111@9 Jan ail N 1990 Fob e-9 Hou 1B93 Fob 9-9 25=30 II 'M A.9$3-18 HFemen. tggg Feb i8-179-12 ft NNE P.O. W. A In Hm !1196 Nw02011Nsere.ci a& 6109 H,Ye b°oaltvr¢ler 1990 Jam 23-31 20-1 H ¢w¢11 ~` Hilo Onekahakaha y Beach r P fa Kap Oplhika Beach 12-15 0 Storm Wave Directions and Events for Hawaii Island ¢h4 KO1 Large wind -generated waves can also cause storm surges (or overwash). A storm surge is a rise in the water level caused by wind forces driving water against the coast (wind set-up) or 12-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan South Puna Coast South P High sod et 1987 M1u018 Hrc}h wn9ae +� 4u 15,2e1 H1gR Kau 198$ Ju 1 Mo awl 1 1970 Aug 17-2651W 259 1=10-13b 14%8 JW 19 2oftwrl 1005 Ju11 tall WA 1860 J'u122�-23 Moa 7908 Ut;4-8 H' 1965 J.1 25 10-153 suit l88$ oec 33-31 d 1905 Seo s-8 High earl 1902 Sop 11 H 1908 JA 22-23 Nigh wA r2�, 1900 AM -8 r4hW 19109 Jena -11 HO_"v 'M Jut,R-M High surf ICBM Sev t1�9niksl 1994 7 Ills a2 -t a n 12-15 0 Storm Wave Directions and Events for Hawaii Island ¢h4 KO1 Large wind -generated waves can also cause storm surges (or overwash). A storm surge is a rise in the water level caused by wind forces driving water against the coast (wind set-up) or 12-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 12: Hazard Analysis High Surf by wave forces (wave set-up). If the surge occurs at high tide, water height is even greater. The water rise enables the storm waves to reach further inland with the associated scouring and erosion caused by the wave forces. In studying the aftermath of Hurricane Iniki, the Corps of Engineers determined that wave set-up was the stronger component than wind set- up, unlike the mainland coastal areas.66 12.2 Significant Historic Events Hurricane Estelle illustrates an example of Hawaii County's susceptibility to wind and wave setup, as well as storm events. On July 22, 1986, the eye of Estelle passed over 100 miles south of Hawaii County. In addition to the high spring tide, high waves generated from Estelle, crashed on the shores of the Big Island. From available reports regarding Hurricane Estelle, major damage in Hawaii occurred at the Vacationland area. The high waves washed away 5 beachfront homes and severely damaged dozens of others. According to records at the Hawaii County Planning Department, 18 houses suffered minor damage that totaled $42,500. In addition, 12 houses had major damage that totaled $194,000 and 7 houses were completely destroyed with an estimated property damage of $160,883. 12.3 Probability of Occurrence High surf events occur quite frequently on all coasts of Hawaii County; however events which actually cause damage to property are far less common. The FIRM coastal zone flood classifications give probabilities of coastal flooding in zones that may be impacted by episodes of high surf as shown in Table 12-1. Although the coastal flood zones were not developed exclusively to address the impacts high surf (development of these zones is discussed in Chapters 9 and 10) they do provide a conservative delineation of areas that may be at risk. Table 12-1. FIRM Coastal flood zone classifications ZONE Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard associated with storm V waves. These areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30 -year mortgage. No base flood elevations are shown within these zones. Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard associated with storm VE, VI - 30 1 waves. These areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30 -year mortgage. Base flood elevations derived from detailed analyses are shown at selected intervals within these zones. 66 Fletcher, C, B. Richmond, E. Grossman, A. Gibbs, Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone, Prepared in cooperation with University of Hawaii, State of Hawaii Office of Planning, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series I-2761, 2002., p. 17. 12-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 12: Hazard Analysis High Surf 12.4 Risk Assessment The economic risk associated with the impacts of high surf is encompassed within the loss prediction and risk assessment of the flooding Hazard. 12.5 Mitigation Strategies Mitigation strategies to address the impacts of high surf are encompassed within the mitigation strategies of hurricane (storm surge), flooding, and tsunami hazards, since all of these will produce similar and likely larger impacts then high surf alone. 12-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 13. Coastal Erosion Chapter 13: Hazard Analysis Coastal Erosion CHAPTER 13 - COASTAL EROSION 13.1 Description of Hazard Beach erosion and coastal erosion are not the same, but they are related. Beach erosion is a reduction in the amount of sand a particular beach has. On a global level, sea level rise causes beach erosion. But beaches also erode (and expand) on a seasonal basis. Beaches get sand from both the ocean and the land. Larger waves move sand from the coastal sand dunes off into the ocean. This raises the seafloor, flattens the overall profile of the beach, and, therefore, causes waves to break further offshore. This, in turn, minimizes the waves' impact on coastal lands. Beaches recover from these seasonal shifts when the waves move the sand back onto the beach and the winds blow the deposited sand into dunes. These dunes will store the land-based sand until the next large wave event. Initial shore proflle. width Ixxeline profile after reheat. �eaeh (no ctuvw m wbM) A beach undergoing net longterm retreat will main.ain its naiufal width. seawall Inifial shore prdlle. Beam wlq+h — k S A�rall Shoreline profile after retreat. Pah ,`�lR iuwS�liO'�41{?'a1E7N4.�1a{.�7] Ber+.ch ln7;L, eventuHlly ncciir:; in front rrf a semall irr. heRch experie.ncing net longterrn retreat. Figure 13-1. The impacts of stabilization on shoreline retreat and beach loss 13-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 13: Hazard Analysis Coastal Erosion Coastal erosion occurs when the beach migrates toward the land in order to compensate for beach erosion as it tries to maintain a constant supply of sand (see the right side of the photo). If sand is not available to a beach, such as when a wall is built to protect the land, the land is stabilized, however beach erosion will occur (see left side of photo). Stabilized - idiiu 1v3L ba:ach lost beach preserved land preserved I Figure 13-2. Effects of beach stabilization Photo courtesy of Charles Fletcher Installing a seawall or revetment (i.e., hardening a shoreline) interferes with the natural cycle of beach erosion. Rather than pulling sand from a landward supply in order to promote waves breaking further off -shore during the seasonal high wave period, the seawall or revetment prevents this natural phenomena from occurring. Thus, the land itself begins to erode. Therefore, it is tragically ironic seawalls or revetments have been installed to prevent coastal erosion, but their very presence exacerbates the very problem they were supposed to resolve. (Source: Fletcher, Charles, Eric Grossman, Bruce Richmond. Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone. 2000.) 13.2 Significant Historical Events Due to the youthful geographic age of Hawaii Island, sandy beaches are fairly uncommon; instead rocks or cliffs line most shores. 13.3 Probability of Occurrence Sandy beaches are dynamic sedimentary systems that naturally experience phases of erosion and accretion that operate over a range of time intervals. Frequent short-term changes are seasonal - erosion mostly occurs in seasons when storms that generate erosional wave regimes are more frequent. Rapid erosional episodes may also be produced by high - magnitude storms, such as tropical cyclones or intense low pressure systems. The degree of erosion that occurs within a particular erosional phase can be highly variable, and this 13-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 13: Hazard Analysis Coastal Erosion likewise is linked to the magnitude and frequency of storms that impact on the coast. For example, during a 100 year high magnitude storm, waves may erode several meters into the foredune that sits well behind the normally active zone of accretion and erosion. Also, several lower -magnitude storms that occur in quick succession can produce a similar degree of erosion because the intervening periods are too short for constructive swell waves to push a significant amount of sediment back to the shoreline. The accretion of sand on beaches occurs during the more quiescent seasons when average swell waves deliver sediment back to the shoreline. Beach accretion, however, is generally a much slower process than beach erosion. For example, it may take several years for a beach to return to its pre -storm condition after one major storm or several smaller storms in quick succession. 13.4 Risk Assessment Since this is not a major hazard in Hawaii County, no method of assessing the economic risk due to coastal erosion has been utilized for this plan. Of greater concern than coastal erosion in Hawaii County is the potential for sea -cliff erosion. Homes perched upon these cliffs may be at risk if significant erosion does occur. There is no established recurrence interval for such events and early warning signs would allow ample time to mitigate any catastrophic failures. 13.5 Mitigation Strategies Below are several potential coastal mitigation measures that have been applied with varying degrees of success in other coastal regions. In the event that mitigation becomes necessary in Hawaii County the validity of each of these measures should be assessed in greater detail. 13.5.1 Revise the Shoreline Setbacks The intent of shoreline setbacks is to establish a coastal -hazard buffer zone to protect beach- front development from coastal erosion. Adequate setbacks allow the natural erosion and accretion cycles to occur and help maintain lateral beach access. Furthermore, setbacks provide open space for the enjoyment of the natural shoreline environment. A 40 -foot shoreline setback has been often inadequate because they are not determined by historical site-specific rates of coastal erosion. Coastal -erosion hazard maps could be used to establish rate -based building setbacks. Setbacks would be site-specific in order to reflect the nature of coastal erosion. These setbacks would also incorporate the proposed style of development. Construction -style considerations would include the size and expected lifetime of the planned structure. Larger, immovable buildings and those with lifetimes of more than 50 years would have deeper setbacks than small, movable structures. 13-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 13: Hazard Analysis Coastal Erosion 13.5.2 Utilize Inter -agency communication Better cooperation between State Parks and the Counties' Parks and Recreation should be sought since these departments maintain many of our beach parks. In addition, discussions should be enhanced with the State Department of Transportation (DOT), because some highway facilities are threatened or will soon be threatened by coastal erosion. In most cases, state highway facilities are the major or only thoroughfare between regions. Proactive planning of new highway construction, widening, and realignment could reduce the threat of coastal erosion and beach loss by anticipating future shoreline trends. 13.5.3 Increase Public Awareness Coastal erosion is largely promulgated by the activities of humankind. Increasing public awareness of the importance of seasonal beach erosion, and how their activities can exacerbate coastal erosion, becomes extremely important. 13.5.4 Promote Research Projects Projects that focus on coastal processes can lead to improved erosion management. Further research, along with beach monitoring, is necessary to increase our understanding of coastal and marine science and to insure effective and efficient management of the coastal zone. 13-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 4 1 14. Droughts Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts CHAPTER 14 - DROUGHTS 14.1 Description of Hazard 14.1.1 Defining and Measuring Drought Drought can be defined in relative or absolute terms. Relative drought is determined by the fluctuations about average local conditions. Absolute drought refers to a single uniform level. Relative drought recognizes that the severity of drought impact varies according to the adaptations and vulnerability of natural and social systems relative to prevailing normal conditions. Absolute drought is used primarily by researchers interested in large drought - impacted areas. Relative drought is useful to examine drought conditions on this island. Much of the information presented in this section was drawn from portions of a statewide drought study (the "Hawaii Drought Plan") applicable to the Island of Hawai'i.67 Drought differs from other natural hazards in three significant ways. First, a drought's onset and end are difficult to determine since the effects accumulate slowly and may linger even after the apparent termination of an episode. Second, the absence of a precise and universally accepted definition adds to the confusion about whether a drought exists, and if it does, the degree of severity. Third, unlike most other natural hazards, drought impacts are less obvious and are spread over a larger geographic area. These characteristics have hindered the development of accurate, reliable, and timely estimates of drought severity and effects. Of the several indicators used to measure drought, the most common is rainfall. A dense network of rain gauges, and long term collected, collated, and published data provide an excellent record of historic rainfall patterns and spatial variations on each Hawaiian Island. There are two popular drought indices. The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) was not appropriate for Hawaii and it was decided that the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) should be used as an initial drought index for the state. The Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) was developed by Thomas McKee at Colorado State for use as a drought monitoring tool and has been embraced by agencies such as the National Drought Mitigation Center and the Western Regional Climatic Center. The beauty of this index is its simplicity because it uses only monthly rainfall as its input. This simplicity also makes it ideal for use in Hawaii, where there is a relatively dense network of rain gages. In comparison, the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PSDI), which is in widespread use across the Mainland U.S., is much more complex and requires temperature and soil moisture as additional data inputs. These types of additional data are either sparse or non-existent in Hawaii. Furthermore, the PDSI is more applicable to broad climatic areas and is not suited for representing conditions in the small-scale climatic zones of the Hawaiian Islands. 67 Wilson Okamoto Corp. "Hawaii Drought Plan". Prepared for the State of Hawaii, Department of Land and Natural Resources, February 2005 14-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts Because the SPI values are normalized, the wide range of rainfall conditions across Hawaii can be assessed on an equal basis. Furthermore, SPI values can be generated for multiple time scales. This is extremely useful for monitoring purposes because drought affects the various sectors over a wide range of time scales. Finally, since the SPI uses standard statistical principles, it can also be used to monitor other data such as stream flow, reservoir levels, and ground water levels. Table 14-1 is an example of a drought classification scheme based on SPI. Table 14-1. Drought Classification Rased On SPI SPI Values Designation Time in Category 0.00 to -0.99 Mild Drought 34.1% -1.00 to -1.49 Moderate Drought 9.2% -1.50 to -1.99 Severe Drought 4.4% -2.00 or less Extreme Drought 2.3% The Honolulu Forecast Office (HFO) of the National Weather Service (NWS) has tailored the SPI software for use in Hawaii. At present, 59 sites have been selected as part of the SPI monitoring network. These sites are separated into two groups called the "quick -look sites" and the "standard sites". The "quick -look sites" use data from selected real-time reporting stations that comprise HFO's flash flood monitoring network. Only 16 out of 69 real-time reporting stations are available for use in SPI calculations due to the fact that most of these locations have short periods of record that can result in risky statistical inferences. The main benefit of the "quick -look site" is that the data are available immediately after the end of a month so that SPI values can quickly be determined. The "standard sites" are selected locations from the NWS Cooperative Observer network. Rainfall readings at these sites are taken manually and submitted via mail after the end of the month to the NWS Pacific Region Headquarters for preliminary quality control. The monthly data for the "standard sites" are intercepted at this point and forwarded to HFO for SPI calculations. The SPI method is designed to be flexible in terms of drought duration specified by users. Short-term drought duration (e.g., 3 months) may be important for agricultural practices while long-term duration (e.g., one year or longer) may be vital for water supply management interests. Here, 3 -month and 12 -month are considered. If 3 -month events are desired, a moving average time series is constructed by summing the first three monthly totals. Next precipitations for months 2, 3, and 4 are summed and then precipitations for months 3, 4, and 5 are summed and so on. The resulting time series is then used to compute the 3 -month SPI. The 12 -month SPI can be obtained in the same manner. The flexibility of multiple SPI time values makes this index attractive because drought affects various sectors across a wide range of time scales. 14.1.2 Causes of Drought Droughts have been postulated to correspond with the global -scale oceanic -atmospheric phenomenon known as ENSO (El Nino -Southern Oscillation). El Nino is the anomalous warming of the eastern equatorial Pacific sea surface. The Southern Oscillation is the seesaw in atmosphere between the eastern and western equatorial Pacific. Various studies have found some correlations but the predictive capabilities for drought events are still in the 14-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts developing stages. To complicate matters, global warming climate changes due to increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other radiation -absorbing gases may change the frequency, intensity, duration, and pattern of droughts. 14.1.3 Impacts of Drought Droughts diminish drinking water supplies, cause agricultural losses, and increase the incidence of wildfires. This island is particularly vulnerable to droughts due to pervasive water catchment systems, reliance on diversified agriculture, and expansive pasture and woodland areas susceptible to wildfires. 14.2 Significant Historic Events Droughts have affected the Hawaiian Islands throughout its history. Farmers, cattle ranchers, and individuals who rely on catchment water systems and surface stream diversions are the communities most immediately affected by drought. Areas susceptible to wildland fires are more vulnerable during very dry conditions, and incidences of wildland fire have increased considerably throughout the State. Droughts have impacted almost every island in Hawaii with the most severe events occurring in the past 15 years associated with the El Nino phenomenon. During the El Nino years, droughts occurred during the winter -spring period. For example, in January 1998, the National Weather Service's network of 73 rain gauges throughout the State did not record a single above -normal rainfall, with 36 gages recording less than 25 percent (%) of the norm (NWS Honolulu Forecast Office). The 0.14 inches of rain recorded for the city of Hilo is the lowest monthly total ever observed for any month since records have been kept. Normal January average rainfall for Hilo is 9.88 inches. Parts of the island of Hawaii continued to receive less than 10% of the normal rainfall until May 1998. Drought conditions will continue to affect Hawaii's environment, but the extent of drought and the respective consequences will probably increase in severity. Severe drought conditions may result in crisis -level shortages in water supplies for human consumption, agricultural irrigation, and fire suppression for severe wildland fire hazards. Crop damage and cattle losses have been major concerns during periods of severe drought, resulting in the implementation of both voluntary and mandatory water conservation measures. The most recent drought of 1998 to 2003 has wreaked havoc on the farmers and ranchers of Hawaii, especially those on the southeastern end of the State. Ranchers are grass farmers whose cattle suffer from decreased grazing areas during drought conditions. The recent drought left the State of Hawaii with reduced cattle carrying capacity, lower calf production, and lower weaning weights, resulting in an enormous loss of revenue. The consequences of this economic impact are compounded by the additional costs to ranchers for supplemental feed and minerals required to sustain the animals during these periods. The economic impacts of drought on Hawaii's cattle industry (i.e., estimated drought -related loss) for 1999 and 2000 have been evaluated. Increased cattle mortality and reduced calving rates led to a direct loss in the total number of marketable cattle. The average live weight for 14-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts all marketed cattle in 1999 decreased by about 10% resulting in decreased revenue. In addition to realized financial losses, overall cattle inventory was reduced by lower calving rates and selloff of mature cattle due to the unavailability of inexpensive feed or forage. This inventory reduction will contribute to economic losses for several years following drought resolution. Cattle loss due to death increased by 4% and weaned weights were lower by 89 lbs/head in 1999. The dollar losses are as follows: Drought -Related Impact 1999 Estimated Revenue Loss ($) Reduced wean weight $3,291,241 Reduced calf crop $687,940 Increased mortality $2,495,750 Total: $6,474,931 The total financial loss for the year 2000 in the same areas of cattle -related impacts shown in the above table is estimated at $9,078,360. Most severe droughts on record in Hawaii have occurred during the years associated with El Nino — 1982/1983 and 1997/1998. According to the Pacific El Nino -Southern Oscillation Application Center, the dry conditions, in general, have been associated with persistent zones of high-pressure systems throughout the islands. This feature related to El Nino is typical in the tropical Pacific. Table 14-2 summarizes the history of severe droughts. Ongoing Drought Conditions 2008 Present: Drought conditions on Hawaii Island was given its first ever D4 (drought -exceptional) designation in March 2010. West Hawaii rain gages showed that April 2010 rainfall was 50% or less. Similarly, January — April 2010 total rainfall was also 50% or less for the majority of rain gages around the island. October 2009 — April 2010 wet -season rainfall was the driest in 30 years of record; ranchers reported the worst drought conditions ever. Hawaii Department of Research and Development reported that in the Kona/Kau districts, the production of coffee and macadamia nuts were down. The floriculture industry had problems with irrigation water supply. In May 2010, DLNR Division of Forestry and Wildlife closed four areas in the Mauna Kea Forest Reserve from the Hilo side of Pohakuloa/Waikahaula to Puu Kemole due to extremely dry conditions. There have been livestock deaths reported in Kawaihae. Parker Ranch is actively managing pastures due to drought by moving herds. In response to the drought conditions, Parker Ranch is culling as needed. Kona coffee farmers are suffering from drought conditions. Coffee trees need steady rainfall beginning from the flowering period in order to produce fruit/berries. For proper growth, coffee tress need 1 inch of rainfall per week. Impacts include the loss of 1/3 of coffee trees and entire harvested coffee crop refused by roaster due to poor berry conditions. Farmers who have access to water are irrigating intensively. Producers that have no county water use rainfall catchments systems. These producers have to pay for water deliveries, which is a financial hardship. Additional drought impacts include feral animals 14-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts (pigs) entering producers' fields and orchards destroying crops and damaging irrigation systems. Commission on Water Resource Management issued a press release asking residents and businesses to conserve water and asked people to be aware of increased risk of wildfire due to these drought conditions. Governor Lingle also sent a memo to all State departments asking for water conservation inside and outdoors of State facilities. CWRM's role is to coordinate any drought assistance efforts in the State and to assist counties to prepare and respond to drought. USDA Farm Service Agency reported that on July 14, 2010, the USDA Secretary designated the four counties in Hawaii as disaster areas due to drought. The disaster designation triggers several FSA assistance and loan programs. FSA regular loan program interest rate is lower than the emergency loan interest rate. There are several disaster assistance programs that producers can apply for. These include Supplemental Disaster Assistance Payment Program (SURE), Livestock Forage Disaster Assistance Program (LFP), Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP) Emergency Livestock Assistance Program (ELAP), Tree Assistance Program (TAP), Non-insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP), Farm Loan Program (FLP), Reimbursement Transportation Cost Program (RTCP), and Emergency Conservation Program (ECP). There is a new FSA program called the Reimbursement Transportation Program, which can reimburse producers' transportation costs for their feed, fertilizer, etc. There is $2.6M available under this program for Hawaii and other U.S. Territories. 14-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts Table 14-2. Historic Drought in the Hawaiian Islands Year Areas Remarks 1901 North Hawaii Severe drought, destructive forest fires. 1905 Kona, Hawaii Serious drought and forest fires. 1908 Hawaii and Maui Serious drought 1912 Kohala, Hawaii Serious drought and severe sugarcane crop damage for two years. 1952 Kauai Long, severe dry spell. 1953 Hawaii, Kauai, Maui, Water rationing on Maui, water tanks in Kona ahnost empty; 867 head of and Oahu cattle died; pineapple production on Molokai reduced by 30%; rainfallin the 1962 Hawaii and Maui State declared disaster for islands of Hawaii and Maui; crop damage, cattle deaths, and severe fire hazards; losses totaled $200,000. 1965 Hawaii State water emergency declared; losses totaled $400,000. 1971 Hawaii and Maui Irrigation and domestic water users sharply curtailed. 1975 Kauai and Oahu Worst drought for sugar plantations in 15 years. 1977- Hawaii and Maui State declared disaster for islands of Hawaii and Maui 1980- Hawaii and Maui State declared disaster; heavy agricultural and cattle losses; damages totaling 1981 at least $ 1.4 million 1983- Hawaii El Nino effect; State declared disaster; crop production reduced by 80% in 1985 Wainma/Kamuela area; $96,000 spent for drought relief projects. 1996 Hawaii, Maui, and Declared drought emergency; heavy damages to agriculture and cattle Molokai industries; losses totaling at least $49.4 ri fion. 1998 Hawaii and Maui State declared drought emergency for Maui; County declared exrnrgency for Hawaii due to water shortages. 2000- Hawaii, Maui, Counties declare drought exrnrgencies; Governor proclaims statewide drought 2002 Molokai, Oahu, Kauai exrnrgency; Secretary of Agriculture designates all Counties as primary 2003 Hawaii, Maui, Secretary of Agriculture designates all Counties as primary disaster areas due Molokai, Oahu, Kauai to drought (2003); Governor proclaims statewide drought exrnrgency. 2008- Statewide The first time that D3 (drought-extrexrn) had covered such a large area Present (percentage) of the State. The current drought is worse than the 2000-2002 14.3 Probability of Occurrence 14.3.1 Hazard Areas The impacts of drought can be categorized as economic, environmental, or social. Economic impacts can be observed as costs and losses to agricultural producers, costs and losses to livestock producers, and loss to the recreation and tourism industry. Environmental impacts can be categorized into damage to plant species, damage to animal species, and hydrological effects. Social impacts can be categorized as either health related, reduced quality of life and changes in lifestyle related, or even in increased conflicts regarding water use. Drought impact assessments begin by identifying direct consequences of the drought, such as reduced crop yields, livestock losses, and reservoir depletion. The risk of drought impact on the three sectors within the County of Hawaii is similar in terms of spatial variation. Most of the areas of concern are on the western side of the island, coinciding with low rainfall zones. What differs between each sector is the stage (moderate, 14-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts severe, or extreme) where drought risk may produce the most significant impacts. For the water supply sector, all stages produce significant risk on the western side of the island. The southern part of the island is also vulnerable to drought risk. The potential risk to this sector is clearly illustrated by applying the 12 -month SPI. W ater Service Area Mapr F aa REserrars. Low Rain Me Um Rain Hgh Rain cesrsus Pop. Per Sq. Mile 0.027 - 0.12$ fIvll, 0. 128 - 0.705 EL0.705 - 297872.34 I Land Use Districts AgrtcWwe (A) Conse"tan (C) Rural (R) Urban (U) Figure 14-1. Drought Vulnerability to the water supply sector in the County of Hawaii In terms of the agriculture and commerce sector, again the western side of the island is at most risk, but the severe drought stage seems to coincide best with low rainfall areas on the west and southwest ends of the island, where various kinds of agricultural activities thrive. The use of a 3 -month SPI shows well the potential risk to this sector. 14-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts IF 10 20 30 44 mom LEGEND Peren rwal 5ueam5 1 Ditrb Systems Msx Roads Resefvumrs EXtens+ve Agriculi are Areas Low Rairtfall Medium Ranfall �J Hrgh Rainfall No Data 1rMU ww Agriculture Areas Low Rairifall Medium Rainfall High Rainfall No Data. Figure 14-2. Drought Vulnerability to the agriculture sector in the County of Hawaii 4E � 3 For the Pahoa area, droughts begin most frequently in July and December. For the Kea'au ar- ea, droughts begin most frequently in April -July and October -December. At the upper eleva- tions near the Volcanoes National Park, droughts begin most frequently in October -January, April, or June -July. Thus, island -wide droughts may begin any time of the year, and rainy pe- riods can end droughts any time of the year. This island is prone to the most intense droughts in the State. For frequency, the most drought -prone areas are the leeward areas such as South Kona and North Kohala. Current drought conditions are monitored nation-wide under a federal program involving several agencies, which produce a coded map. It currently shows portions of the leeward side of the island to be in an "extreme drought" condition, affecting both agriculture and water systems (see Figure 14-3). 14-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts U.S. r Hugh !' n i r Hawaii Qrough? vandr ons '?ercenr Area) fniensity: -0 ADrcr,ralf� Dry -1 CirorSr- - Wder�.e -2 oroL5r- - Severe . o: ::rougrrt-Btzme CU vrougrt-EKcWUonal m� August 18, 2009 Valid 7 am. EST rl� The 3rougtil Wntor focuses an broad scale condfions- USDA ,Local conditions ,gay vary. See accompanying text summary for forecast statements. Released Thursday, August 20, 200; http:!ldrought.unl.eduJdrn Author: Laura Edwards, Western Regional Climate Center Figure 14-3. Federal Drought Monitoring Map For wildfires, the State Division of Forestry and Wildlife (DOFAW) has the responsibility for the prevention and suppression of wildfires on State land and to cooperate with local agencies for the protection of wildlands on non -State land .68 To carry out this responsibility, DOFAW has identified areas where it has primary responsibility and would respond automatically, areas where it could respond mutually with other firefighting agencies upon request, and areas totally out of its jurisdiction but where DOFAW could nevertheless respond under specific conditions (e.g., extreme threats to public safety, local resources fully committed, extreme fire behavior). 14.4 Risk Assessment Currently there is no measure in place to quantify the potential economic impacts due to drought and corresponding wildfire events besides historical data. 68 Hawaii Revised Statutes, chapter 185 (Land Fire Protection Law). 14-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan None DO -D4 131-134 1152-04 � Current 30:0 7O.0 51.4 32.6 3-1 O.0 List Week t2.1 B7.9 55.4 33.6 3-1 O.0 J30M?o2ef, I 5 Months,4ga 0.2 9g.2 L3.4 -- - - O -.- ipS-25-:10 map) sAart Elf Gaendar Year 21-1 .33.7 ' 6 O.0 01 QS-Hcs map) I= of 'A'ater'fear 1JB 72.11 :.. 12.3 0.0 7.7= -=CCE wapi DneYear Agc 1-6 05.E 9.0 1-1.5 T8 0.0 .,19,19-2CCO mapl fniensity: -0 ADrcr,ralf� Dry -1 CirorSr- - Wder�.e -2 oroL5r- - Severe . o: ::rougrrt-Btzme CU vrougrt-EKcWUonal m� August 18, 2009 Valid 7 am. EST rl� The 3rougtil Wntor focuses an broad scale condfions- USDA ,Local conditions ,gay vary. See accompanying text summary for forecast statements. Released Thursday, August 20, 200; http:!ldrought.unl.eduJdrn Author: Laura Edwards, Western Regional Climate Center Figure 14-3. Federal Drought Monitoring Map For wildfires, the State Division of Forestry and Wildlife (DOFAW) has the responsibility for the prevention and suppression of wildfires on State land and to cooperate with local agencies for the protection of wildlands on non -State land .68 To carry out this responsibility, DOFAW has identified areas where it has primary responsibility and would respond automatically, areas where it could respond mutually with other firefighting agencies upon request, and areas totally out of its jurisdiction but where DOFAW could nevertheless respond under specific conditions (e.g., extreme threats to public safety, local resources fully committed, extreme fire behavior). 14.4 Risk Assessment Currently there is no measure in place to quantify the potential economic impacts due to drought and corresponding wildfire events besides historical data. 68 Hawaii Revised Statutes, chapter 185 (Land Fire Protection Law). 14-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts 14.5 Mitigation Strategies 14.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts It is known that a dry winter and possibly a dry spring in Hawaii usually follow the onset of El Nino. Given that the return period of El Nino is approximately three to five years, it would be useful to conduct a study to better anticipate drought patterns and severity in the future once an El Nino is developing. A similar study can be conducted for the La Nina events. None of the many rainfall -enhancement techniques tried have proven successful in practice. Better knowledge is needed on appropriate mitigation measures such as reservoir sizing that factors drought conditions, longer irrigation ditches, drought -resistant crops, low rainfall cul- tivation/tillage practices, changing planting to better areas during droughts, and designated emergency common areas to move cattle .69 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), with support from other agencies, maintains a drought mitigation center which assists states in developing drought mitigation plans. Hawai'i is developing their plan under the State Water Commission. Crop insurance is available for mac nuts and some other primary local crops through the Co- operative Extension Service (CES), a program of the USDA and the University of Hawaii. This organization also provides information on drought -resistant plants and tillage. This section on droughts and wildfires would need to be updated in the future with findings from the ongoing study by the Hawaii Drought Committee .70 This study will identify drought and wildfire hazard areas and suggest mitigation actions. 69 Dr. A.D. Wall, Horticulturist, personal communication, October 2003. 70 Wilson Okamoto Corporation, County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategies (Draft), prepared for the Ha- waii Drought Committee and State of Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management, September 29, 2004. 14-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts 14.5.2 Future Plans Drought Mitigation Goals: • Expand current network of rain gages to improve rainfall monitoring. • Develop a framework to coordinate drought response between agencies. • Enhance current monitoring of ground- and surface -water levels. • Establish alert procedures for declining water level conditions. • Establish conservation programs to reduce water consumption. • Establish contingency water -hauling programs for livestock. • Seek authorization and funding for development of new water supply sources. • Identify areas at risk to drought and plan for regional response actions and strategies. • Develop additional storage and/or alternative sources of water supply. • Develop and implement drought -related public awareness programs. • Develop incentive programs for drought resistant practices. 14-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Project Description Status Drought/Wildland Fire Mitigation Plan County of Hawaii Unfunded Drought Mitigation Strategy 2004 Update Drought Monitor website; Maintenance Ongoing Update of Hawaii Rainfall Atlas: University of Hawaii, March 2012. Improvements to old plantation irrigation $30M Received partial FEMA system tunnels and ditches: Lower Hamakua funding Ditch System Renovations/improvements to old plantation $3M Proposed Project irrigation system tunnels and ditches: Kau Sugar System Reactivation Improvements to old plantation irrigation $26M Proposed Project system tunnels and ditches and new Kauahi reservoir: Waimea Improvements to the Kohala Ditch Irrigation Proposed Project: Post -earthquake repair Aqueduct Improvements to old plantation Ditch lining and/or closed completed irrigation transmission system. piping work still needs to be done Renovate and Reactivate old abandoned $2.5M Proposed Project plantation wells in Pahala Renovate and Reativate old Hamakua $100,000 Proposed Project Slaughterhouse well for non -potable agricultural use in Honokaa/Hamakua Construct new wells, surface water Investigation diversions, storage and transmission lines in areas -priority Irrigating wisely: Promote better irrigation $100,000 Proposed Project practices and water management. Agricultural Water System for Kona, $25M In planning Honomalino: Provide a reliable source of water for agriculture and fire fighting assistance. Evaluate vulnerability of County water $1M Completed systems and water trucking capacity: 14-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14: Hazard Analysis Droughts 14-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Project Descriptio Status Emergency Community Water Stations: Improve access to community water stations and develop additional stations for persons on catchment in priority areas. Dam & Reservoir Improvements Puu Waawaa Reservoir Note: other post - Completed earthquake repairs are currently being done%ompleted on HDWS, DHHL, and HDOA reservoirs Develop wells, storage, and construct $20M for 177 ranch lots This project is undenvay transmission systems for Puukapu encompassing 10,000 and will be completed acres Development and extension of domestic $ IOM Completed water transmission system for Kawaihae Extension of domestic water transmission Well, pump and tank system for Oceanview being completed; water spigot stations �.Develop wells, storage, and construct Needs planning study Need to establish transmission systems for Puna improvement district to finance this project. Makalei Water System Improvements: $5M Proposed 4 -yr Project Develop additional wells and reservoirs as well as upgrade the transmission system in the area from Keahole to Kailua-Kona for agricultural users. Various Water System Improvements within $50M Proposed 15 -yr Project the County of Hawaii: Develop additional sources, storage facilities, as well as upgrade the transmission and distribution systems in high priority areas. 14-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 F61 15. Wildfires Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires CHAPTER 15 - WILDFIRES 15.1 Description of Hazard Wildfires are becoming known as "wildland" fires, defined as any uncontrolled non- structural fire in a wild area. On this island, wildfires range from moderate size grass fires on ranch land to major scrub ohia fires in the Volcanos National Park. Approximately 1.6 million of the island's 2.6 million acre land area is listed as forested while a large but unstated amount is in pasture and brush; areas on the mountains above the tree line are bare. The County fire department handles most of the fires, sometimes with assistance from the forestry division of the State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR), Federal, and landowner crews. Occasionally, there are extensive fires in the National Park which have required fire crews flown in from the mainland to extinguish them. For wildfire and rural use, the Fire Department is equipped with ten tank trucks deployed around the island which have a total capacity of 13,850 gallons. In addition, they have ac- quired two special "brush" trucks for wildfire use. They operate a rescue helicopter and an ambulance helicopter which can dump water when necessary. When more air support is needed small and medium size private helos are hired. The National Guard maintains five large helos (Blackhawks) in Hilo which have water bucket kits and have occasionally been hired from the State (the Guard is a State agency). In addition to DLNR support, federal firefighters may be available from their station in the National Park, National Park crews (Park Rangers), and the Army's Pohakuloa Training Area. The Park and Pohakuloa occupy about 8% of the land area of the island. In coordination with Civil Defense, drought and other fire -hazard conditions are constantly monitored and actions such as burning bans and closures are instituted when needed. The public is informed of these restrictions by radio announcements and newspaper notices. New tools, such as satellite observation of burns, are being examined. 15.2 Significant Historic Events The County Fire Department reported 897 "fire -related incidents" in 2006, these include structural fires, the number of wildfires alone was not available. However, DLNR has reported in the past (in the State Data Book) that 70 to 80 wildfires occurred on this island annually. The 2007 Annual Wildfire Summary for the State of Hawaii is shown in Table 15-1. This data is not separated per county. 15-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires Table 15-1. State of Hawaii annual wildfire summary report In August 2005, nearly 5,000 people were ordered to evacuate their homes and the only road connecting Waikoloa to the rest of the Big Island was closed as a brush fire blazed out of control. The fire charred more than 25,000 acres along the Kohala Coast on the west side of the island. Puako and Waialea have had a history of fire events that threatened life and property. A fire in 1987 consumed three houses and damaged several others. A fire in July, 2007 burned 25 acres adjacent to the entrance road into Puako. On October 28, 2007, nine fires were set in the Puako/Kawaihae/Waikoloa area. The community was evacuated as the largest of these fires, in excess of 1,000 acres, approached within a'/4 -mile of Puako Beach Drive. Only a fortuitous shift in wind prevented a huge loss of property (estimated value in excess of $500 million). Those people who refused to evacuate were also at risk. South Kona was recently reminded that upland wildfire is a significant threat. It took weeks for firefighters to extinguish the 1800 acre wildfire which began at Kealakekua Ranch on December 27, 2009. Grasses ignited by lightning were fueled by mature 'ohi'a and koa trees, hard woods which can burn for weeks. These long burning fuels and rhizomous grasses that can smolder and carry fire underground made the fire extremely challenging to put out. The rugged terrain at the 4,400 -foot elevation where the fire broke out, along with lack of access to water, abundant fuel sources, dry conditions, and warm weather causing smoldering to reignite all combined to create difficult and hazardous conditions for the dozens of firefighter who worked 24-hour shifts to battle the blaze and protect the community. Smoke from the fire, trapped by Kona's temperature inversion layer, created health hazards for fire fighters and the entire South Kona community. 15-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Annual Wildfire Summary Report Calendar Year: 2007 Total Acres Protected: 3,360,000 Acres Burned By Cause: Cause No. Acres Lightning 1 0.1 Campfire 5 40.1 Smoking 1 2,291 Debris burning 11 53.9 Arson 21 6,728.50 Equipment 9 255.6 Railroads 0 0 Children 0 0 Miscellaneous 99 20,222.30 TOTAL: 147 29,591.50 Acres burned by Size Class: Size Class No. Acres Class A - 0.25 acres or less 36 7.1 Class B - 0.26 to 9 acres 60 132.3 Class C - 10 to 99 acres 23 784 Class D - 100 to 299 acres 10 760 Class E - 300 to 999 acres 8 3,228.10 Class F - 1000 to 4999 acres 9 18,180 Class G - 5000 acres or more: 1 6,500 TOTAL 147 29,591.50 In August 2005, nearly 5,000 people were ordered to evacuate their homes and the only road connecting Waikoloa to the rest of the Big Island was closed as a brush fire blazed out of control. The fire charred more than 25,000 acres along the Kohala Coast on the west side of the island. Puako and Waialea have had a history of fire events that threatened life and property. A fire in 1987 consumed three houses and damaged several others. A fire in July, 2007 burned 25 acres adjacent to the entrance road into Puako. On October 28, 2007, nine fires were set in the Puako/Kawaihae/Waikoloa area. The community was evacuated as the largest of these fires, in excess of 1,000 acres, approached within a'/4 -mile of Puako Beach Drive. Only a fortuitous shift in wind prevented a huge loss of property (estimated value in excess of $500 million). Those people who refused to evacuate were also at risk. South Kona was recently reminded that upland wildfire is a significant threat. It took weeks for firefighters to extinguish the 1800 acre wildfire which began at Kealakekua Ranch on December 27, 2009. Grasses ignited by lightning were fueled by mature 'ohi'a and koa trees, hard woods which can burn for weeks. These long burning fuels and rhizomous grasses that can smolder and carry fire underground made the fire extremely challenging to put out. The rugged terrain at the 4,400 -foot elevation where the fire broke out, along with lack of access to water, abundant fuel sources, dry conditions, and warm weather causing smoldering to reignite all combined to create difficult and hazardous conditions for the dozens of firefighter who worked 24-hour shifts to battle the blaze and protect the community. Smoke from the fire, trapped by Kona's temperature inversion layer, created health hazards for fire fighters and the entire South Kona community. 15-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires Figure 15-1. 2009-2010 Upland fire in South Kona. Photo Courtesy of Jody Fergerstrom. Figure 15.2. Smoke from 2009 Kealakekua upland fire spread throughout South Kona. Photo Courtesy of Jesse Acosta, DLNR-DOFAW 15-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires 15.3 Probability of Occurrence From the Hawaii County Drought Plan, for the environment, public health and safety sector, the 3 -month drought interval does not coincide with historical wildfire burn areas. That is, there appears to be no clear overlap between high drought frequency percentages and past wildland fire locations. However, the moderate stage for the 12 -month interval in conjunction with the vulnerability analysis for this sector provides the best representation of risk, as areas of relatively high drought frequency coincide with past wildfire burn areas. 0 Legend Wildfire l list©Z Qurn Areas Communities At Risk Low Rainfall Medium Rainfall 7—High Rainfall Reservoirs r Major Roads Stage Land Use Dis•ncls Agdcullure (Al Conservation (C) Rural (R) — Urban (U) Figure 15-3. Drought Vulnerability to the environment, public health, and safety sector 15.4 Community Wildfire Protection Plans Community Wildfire Protection Plans (CWPP) are being developed by the Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization (HWMO) with guidance and support from community members, decision makers, and local/state agencies concerned about fire issues. The Hawaii County Fire Department, the Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency, the National Park Service, and the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources were primary partners in developing plans for Ka`u and South Kona, Ocean View, and Hawaii Volcanoes National Park. The CWPP planning boundaries are the same as the wildland-urban interface (WUI) at -risk areas, which include surrounding lands to ensure adequate protection of WUI areas. 15-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires The goals and objectives of this plan follow the intent and requirements of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA) HR 1904, which describes a CWPP as a fire mitigation and planning tool for an at -risk community that: A. Is developed within the context of the collaborative agreements and the guidance established by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council and agreed to by the applicable local government, local fire department, and State Agency responsible for forest management, in consultation with interested parties and the Federal land management agencies managing land in the vicinity of the at -risk community. B. Identifies and prioritizes areas for hazardous fuel reduction treatments and recommends the types and methods of treatment on Federal and non -Federal land that will protect one or more at -risk communities and essential infrastructure. C. Recommends measures to reduce structural ignitability throughout the at -risk community.71 Plans address elements of fire protection, hazard assessment, wildfire mitigation priorities, and community outreach and education. The process engaged a diversity of agencies and individuals concerned with the at -risk area, following the guidelines and requirements of federal programs such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Pre -Disaster Mitigation program and the National Fire Plan (NFP). The CWPP is non -regulatory and cooperative in nature. The plan provides (1) a foundation for increased communication, coordination and collaboration among agencies and the public, (2) identification and prioritization of areas for hazardous fuel reduction projects and wildfire mitigation actions, and (3) assistance meeting federal and state planning requirements and qualifying for assistance programs.72 The CWPP works in conjunction with other County and State plans and programs including but not limited to: County of Hawaii: Ka'u Community Development Plan 73 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 74 County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategies75 Ka`u to South Kona Water Master Plan 76 Kona Community Development Plan " Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 — HR 1904. US Federal Register. '' Adapted from Linn County Community Wildfire Protection Plan, ECONorwest, September, 2007. 73 Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 — HR 1904. US Federal Register. 74 Community Planning and Hazard Risk: The Kau Community Development Plan. County of Hawaii Planning Department. 75 County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategies, 2004. 76 Kau Hawaii. Everything Ka u. 15-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires State of Hawaii: State Drought Plan and the County Drought Mitigation Strategies" State of Hawaii Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 78 15.4.1 Multiple -Agency Agreements The federal, state, and local fire agencies of the Big Island have organized into the Big Island Wildfire Coordinating Group (BIWCG). Members include: • National Park Service • U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service • U.S. Army • Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Forestry and Wildlife • Hawaii County Civil Defense • Hawaii Fire Department • Department of Transportation - Airports Division, Hawaii District • Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization • Firewise BIWCG was established to further inter -agency cooperation, communications and coordination, and to implement directions and standards for incident management activities. BIWCG coordinates the programs of the participating wildland fire agencies on the big island of Hawaii and provides a forum for leadership, cooperation and the exchange of information .79 It also improves procedures to rapidly provide the most effective response to wildfires in the island. In coordination with Civil Defense, drought and other fire -hazard conditions are constantly monitored and actions such as burning bans and closures are instituted when needed. The public is informed of these restrictions by radio announcements and newspaper notices.80 15.4.2 Planning Process 15.4.2.1 CWPP Process and Methods The process of developing a CWPP helps to clarify and refine priorities for the protection of life, property, and critical infrastructure in the wildland-urban interface areas. Local residents, landowners, fire suppression agencies, and community leaders have participated in valuable discussions regarding wildfire history, resources at risk, areas of concern, and priority mitigation actions. " State Drought Plan and the County Drought Mitigation Strategies. " State of Hawaii Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2007 79 Big Island Wildfire Coordinating Group 80 Community Planning and Hazard Risk: The Kau Community Development Plan. 15-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires The methods used to create this CWPP followed the guidelines established for the HFRA, which requires the following actions during the planning process: • Step 1- Convene Decision Makers • Step 2- Involve Federal Agencies • Step 3a- Involve State and Local Agencies • Step 3b- Engage Interested parties This CWPP also followed the guidelines and satisfies the requirements of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Pre -Disaster Mitigation program and the National Fire Plan (NFP). 15.4.2.2 Decisions Makers Table 1s-2. Decision -Makers for the Community Wildfire Protection Plan Requirement Agency or Organization Local Fire Chief Hawaii County Fire Department Local/County Government Hawaii County Civil Defense Department State Forestry Agency Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Forestry and Wildlife 15.4.2.3 Federal Agencies The federal agencies involved in managing the land and fires are: • National Park Service • US Army • US Fish and Wildlife Service 15.4.2.4 State and Local Agencies The state/local agencies that have jurisdictional responsibilities are: • Hawai`i County Fire Department • Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Forestry and Wildlife 15.4.2.5 Interested Parties /Affiliation (if any) The parties from our community that have shown interest in forest/fire management and have been involved in the CWPP are: • Community Development Plan Committee Hawaii County • Large Landowners • Local Associations and Organizations Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization, Big Island Wildfire Coordinating Group, Discovery Harbour Community Association • Private Citizens, Public At Large 15-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires HWMO is facilitating continued dialogue between residents and agencies regarding wildfire issues, and intends to posts the plan on its website for public use. The State Division of Forestry and Wildlife (DOFAW) has the responsibility for the prevention and suppression of wildfires on State land and to cooperate with local agencies for the protection of wildlands on non -State land.81 To carry out this responsibility, DOFAW has identified areas where it has primary responsibility and would respond automatically, ar- eas where it could respond mutually with other firefighting agencies upon request, and areas totally out of its jurisdiction but where DOFAW could nevertheless respond under specific conditions (e.g., extreme threats to public safety, local resources fully committed, extreme fire behavior). Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization, in cooperation with the Big Island Wildfire Coordinating Group, will provide technical support, identify and coordinate funding, and serve as a centralized resource for wildfire risk reduction efforts. Together, representatives will prioritize and recommend funding for projects, document the successes and lessons learned from those projects, and evaluate and update the CWPP as needed. 15.4.2.6 Community Concerns In addition to prioritizing resources to protect, community and agency representatives developed a list of concerns regarding wildfire issues. They are listed below in order of priority: 1. Insufficient water infrastructure to adequately and quickly suppress wildfires, including dip tanks. 2. Inadequate fire suppression and support resources, such as rapid and on-site mapping capabilities and GPS technologies, vehicles, water tankers. 3. Regional and local planning and development standards that do not currently require community and subdivision designs to consider and/or mitigate fire risk: a. Landscaping and structural designs, materials, and placement often promote (or do not mitigate) fire risk; and b. Roads and highways are not always constructed with wide shoulders, fire lanes, emergency ingress/egress, or fuel mitigation in mind. 4. Fuel loading along roadsides, in community open areas, around and between individual homes and farms: a. Fuels breaks or areas of fuel reduction are desired around communities where possible and appropriate; b. Fuel reduction along roadsides, around houses and business, on large private property parcels, and in vacant lots is needed; and c. Need to develop and/or enforce community provisions that require fire fuels reduction on developed/undeveloped properties and by permanent/absentee landowners. 81 Hawaii Revised Statutes, chapter 185 (Land Fire Protection Law). 15-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires 5. Lack of public awareness of the wildfire threat, to include lack of appropriate awareness by elected officials, planning agencies, large land owners, land managers, scientists, and homeowners (especially absentee owners) regarding: a. Fire history and fire hazards; b. Fire -mitigating landscaping techniques; c. Importance of mitigation; d. Fuels management tools and methods; and e. Common human -caused fire starts, such as roadside ignitions, fireworks, catalytic converters, green -waste dumping, and arsonists. 6. Need to increase/integrate communication (protocols, equipment, pre- and post- fire planning) between state, federal, and county agencies, particularly to maximize initial attack capabilities and to utilize specialized wildland expertise and training for wildfire situations. 7. Need to reduce and/or control invasive species that possess inherent fire or ignition properties, e.g. ignite easily and/or carry fire easily. 8. Arson-- It is not well known whether there is amnesty for reporting, nor what civil liabilities and penalties exist for arsonists. 9. Lack of emergency access staging areas and safety zones/areas within subdivisions for evacuation purposes. 10. Inadequate community egress and firefighting vehicle ingress during a wildfire a. Need to identify evacuation routes/roads within subdivisions; and b. Need to educate community about evacuation protocols. 15.5 Risk Assessment 15.5.1 Purpose and Methods The purpose of the community risk assessment is to: • Provide site-specific information to the community to promote wildfire awareness; • Help identify and prioritize areas for treatment; and • Determine the highest priority uses for available financial and human resources. The methods for the community wildfire risk assessment followed the guidelines established for the HFRA, which requires the following actions: • Step 4- Establish a Community Base Map • Step 5a- Develop a Community Risk Assessment • Step 5b- Identify Overall Community Priorities 15.5.2 Communities at Risk from Wildfires, Island of Hawaii The communities at risk from wildfires on the Island of Hawaii assessment made by the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Forestry and Wildlife, was mapped in 2005. Community priorities were based on the updated hazard rankings and overall risk assessment (Table 15-2. above) and fire history (Figure 15.4). 15-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires wH 11x1 Khl`A:11. I;I ic WAIPID MAIAL4 R+AXCH:, IiG 6 IiuAIALhF9:uBIQ RF 4GRY°3 RAI 11 1 KAI OW n.AIIA A+01 A KbAI Hail KAIN nl 11 -KI I[ ANI KI x I ArrAlS f'f%]l: 1111\A{151 _11—A{ iAl PAPA %I110111 , - [�f 4 A1KlI]' 4 L Abu -.A; NAIAKI'1 :Inl 1 fv:x COMMUNITIES AT RISK FROM WILDFIRES Island of Hawaii kA L 11.10 IIMAI:KIA �-FMKA 1. 1 I.' 1y LUNE 1. �0Orm s' y Fi ti k:\F Il F tPni Kfll V II'Fnn AI L' AINAKI KAIAIKLI ZONE 4 1XIL0 ZONE 3 xx Plf t6 4 AI Il.i' p ZAPAFAL 1'.11 1111 1 P'%RK rwy e P:IAIi.nA iEi• PANAIA i' •. PL NALLU t\ x l 11 x i i' i•� �1GI]fOb'ERY FWRHl7&� PUI N r Figure 1-5.4. Communities at Risk from Wildfires, Island of Hawaii. DLNR DOFAW 2005. Figure 15.5. Local firefighters discuss hazards and fire history patterns revealed through mapping. Photo Courtesy: HWMO 15-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 1XIL0 KLAA I' K1.N 111 .rl 1'.11 1111 1 P'%RK 11 lKI I g H ,n 1111, lil it 111% t\ x l 11 x i Y, IN)[ HY xn,1 �,.�",i �xti xlitll r I'inol•�• .11,1,11. ul , •'i [19� etiil f11,: KI In. 1 HIM KS IN11.ti .til']5P}I1'Ptiifltii- tli.l111KAP M 1101KI_ K•AL AP:A NA '— Fire Risk Commu.nil y Zani ng Cummuniiy and Risk Raling H igk Medi. Q Luw bre wE fi Figure 1-5.4. Communities at Risk from Wildfires, Island of Hawaii. DLNR DOFAW 2005. Figure 15.5. Local firefighters discuss hazards and fire history patterns revealed through mapping. Photo Courtesy: HWMO 15-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires 15.6 Mitigation Strategies 15.6.1 Hazard Priorities 15.6.1.1 Purpose and Methods Priority action items have been developed from a number of sources, including input from community and agency participants in the planning process, noted deficiencies in local firefighting capabilities, and issues identified through the risk assessment. These actions address the following goals: 1. Enhance wildfire response capabilities. 2. Reduce risk and hazards through pro -active wildfire mitigation, including: • Increasing stakeholder knowledge about wildfire risk through education and • outreach; • Encouraging the treatment of structural ignitability; • Prioritizing fuel reduction projects; and • Increasing opportunities for collaboration and coordination to implement wildfire mitigation projects. 3. Address the list of community concerns. These priority action items follow the guidelines for HFRA, which requires: • Step 6a- Community Hazard Reduction Priorities o Priority Actions (General) o Hazardous Fuels Reduction • Step 6b- Recommendations to Reduce Structural Ignitability 15.6.1.2 Priority Actions Action items addressing wildfire issues are listed below, in order of priority: 1. Install pre -staged static water and helicopter dip tanks. 2. Acquire adequate resources for first responders: a. Appropriate technology resources for mapping at each fire station and on location; b. and c. Water tanker/tenders (minimum 2000 gallon tanker/tender with high wheel base for off-highway capabilities). 3. Wise development in fire prone areas. Create development standards and implement community planning that requires the mitigation of wildfire risks at the regional, community/subdivision, roads/highways, and individual structure levels. 4. Reduce fuel load and/or appropriately convert fuels along road sides, in community open areas, around individual homes: a. Appropriate conversion would include transition to vegetation with low ignition potential and low ability to carry fire, especially native plants. This can be accomplished through installing/ establishing living fuel breaks. b. Reduce fuels through well-managed grazing, mechanical reduction, herbicide, or combinations of all treatments. 15-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires c. Encourage/educate large landowners to reduce fuels on private property. d. Identify opportunities to assist vulnerable populations (elderly, disabled) in creating defensible space around homes and property. e. Develop and or enforce fuels mitigation requirements within communities (to include developed and vacant lots, permanent resident and absentee landowners). 5. Continue fire prevention education and outreach, including arson prevention education: a. Hold community workshops; b. Implement the fire danger rating system; c. Provide individual home and neighborhood assessments; d. Increase public service announcements during high fire hazard periods; and e. Develop wildland fire materials for youth and implement educational programs in local schools. 6. Increase communication capabilities between state, federal, and county agencies, particularly to maximize initial attack capabilities in wildfire events: a. Integrate current and future communication equipment utilized by federal, state, and county fire suppression personnel to increase effective firefighting response. b. Develop protocols for multi -agency involvement to utilize available specialized wildland fire expertise and equipment/resources. 7. Reduce and/or control invasive species that increase fire risk and, where appropriate, convert to vegetation as described in priority number three. 8. Advocate for increased penalties for arson and some level of amnesty for reporting fire. 9. Develop emergency staging areas and safety zones within communities and promote awareness of such areas within the community, including holding mock disaster drills. 10. Create/improve secondary access roads for those communities with only one means of ingress/egress; identify evacuation routes within subdivisions, especially in neighborhoods where secondary access roads are not available. 15-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires Well-managed grazing and other fuels management practices (mechanical / chemical / combination) reduce the risk of wildfire in WUI areas. Sporadic or no fuels management creates high risk. Unmanaged grasses (above left) are found along roads in areas with little to no grazing, including neighborhoods. At times, these fuels can reach 8-12 feet, posing considerable risk of roadside ignition. Note the differences in fuel in above right photo: pasture in foreground has active grazing; areas in background are not currently grazed and are at a higher risk of wildfire occurrence. 15.6.1.3 Reducing Structural Ignitability Individuals and community associations can reduce structural ignitability throughout their community by taking the following measures recommended by the Firewise program as outlined below. However, due to the abundance of native vegetation, it is highly recommended that individuals and communities conduct a simple native vegetation assessment and/or consult with appropriate biologists or foresters before clearing trees and significant amounts of vegetation that may be important to protect. • Create a buffer zone of defensible space around a property of at least 30 feet or to the property line if the house has less than 30 feet of yard. Remove flammable vegetation and combustible growth within 30 feet of the house. Where there is native habitat, please consult with a biologist or forester first. • . Prune tree limbs 6 — 10 feet above the ground. • Space trees and shrubs ten feet apart in the yard. • Make sure that plants closest to the house are low-lying. • Whenever possible use fire-resistant Native Hawaiian species. Succulent plants are also good choices for converting fire fuels into Firewise landscaping. • Routinely remove dead leaves and other organic matter from the yard. • Sweep and/or clean gutters, eaves, and roofs regularly to prevent the build-up of leaves and other matter. • Use fire-resistant building materials for the roof, siding, and decks, such as metal, stucco, tile, brick, and cement. • Install firebrand -proof ceiling vents to prevent structure fires caused by wind-blown firebrands. 15-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires 15.6.2 Future Plans Project Description Status Drought/Wildland Fire Mitigation Plan County of Hawaii Drought Being updated pending funding Mitigation Strategy 2004 Identify wildfire hazard areas: See GIS maps in Drought Completed. Risk and Vulnerability Assessment and GIS Mapping Project, UHSOEST and SSRI, 2003 Wildland Fire Mitigation Resource Core resource inventory Periodic updates needed every Mapping and Inventory Program: Continue completed 18 months. Hawaii Wildfire the development and maintenance of a GIS Management Organization does map and database to identify the location, these updates; HWMO is also type, and contact information for various working on a portable version widland fire protection resources. for first responders Install pre -staged static water and Multiple Agencies: federal, Cooperative Funding $828,000; helicopter dip tanks state, county, and private 2011-2013 Reduce and/or convert fuel load along Multiple Agencies: county Cooperative Funding $850,000; roadsides, community open areas, and 2010-2014 individual homes and lots Create development standards and conduct Multiple Agencies: county Cooperative Funding $150,000, community planning that requires the and state for outreach, any needed impact mitigation of wildfire risks studies and education Increase mapping technologies and Multiple Agencies: federal, Cooperative funding: $100,000, capabilities for fire agencies state, county, and private 2010-2013 Install street signage identifying evacuation Multiple Agencies: federal, Cooperative Funding $50,000; routes state, county, and private 2010-2014 Develop emergency staging areas within Multiple agencies: private Cooperative Funding $33,000 communities, promoting awareness of such for planning and outreach, areas within the community, including 2010-2012 holding mock disaster drills Reduce, control, and or convert invasive Multiple Agencies: federal, Cooperative Funding; species state, county, and private $1,500,000 includes maintenance, grazing, and conversion projects; 2008 - 2012 Continue fire prevention education and Multiple agencies: federal, Cooperative Funding $30,000; outreach, including arson prevention state, county, and private 2010-2014 education Increase effective integrated Multiple agencies Cooperative Funding $150,000, communication and initial attack protocol 2010-2014 between federal, state, and county fire suppression agencies Establish and maintain firebreaks around $2.2M Long-term15-yr proposed roads and communities in North and South project Kohala districts (includes the Kawaihae, Waikoloa, and Waimea communities) Mitigate wildfire threat along strategic $500,000 2 -year project Wildfire mitigation for the corridors in the Puako Forest to reduce the Ladder fuels along these forest is an element in the threat of a catastrophic crown fire that corridors will be removed. South Kohala Community could destroy the forest and homes as well Development Plan, which was as threaten nearby resort complexes. adopted by ordinance by Hawaii County in 2008. 15-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15: Hazard Analysis Wildfires Project Description Status Install dry hydrants and develop static $10,000/site in high hazard Proposed Project water sources: The water source/dry wildland fire districts hydrant will allow fire trucks to refill their water tanks when fighting forest and grassland fires in the Hamakua area. Remote Weather Montoring: Establish and $85,000; Intellisense 5 -yr proposed project maintenance Remote Automated Weather telemetry system under This project partially completed Stations in the districts of North Kohala, development by UH with 3 new RAWS stations in South Kohala, Kau, Kona, and Mauna Kea. S. Kohala & Kona Use of prescribed burns to reduce fuel loads $1.1M annually for 500- 15 -yr proposed project in fire prone areas of Hawaii County: Use acres; DOFAW prescribed burns in fire prone areas Note that the proposed active including the communities of Waimea, may be in conflict where Kawaihae, Puako, Waikoloa, Pun Anahulu, there are native forests and Kailua-Kona. Roadside fuel management: Develop and Proposed Project maintain a roadside fuel management program along an identified corridor of Highway 190, South Kohala/North Kona. Agricultural practices to mitigate wildland Needs a tax break incentive Continue to investigate and fires in communities and subdivisions: expand agricultural practices to mitigate wildfire impacts by using livestock grazing in open pastures as a fuel management tool. 15-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 16. HAZMAT Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT CHAPTER 16 - HAZMAT 16.1 History The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act or SARA became law in 1986 (PL 99- 499). A major SARA provision is Title III, or SARA Title III, also referred to as Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act (EPCRA). EPCRA established guidelines for Federal, State and local governments, and industry regarding emergency planning and providing communities with information on hazardous chemicals within their jurisdiction. The Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act became law in 1993 (HRS 128E), and promulgated SARA Title III in the State of Hawaii. The State Department of Health Office of Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response is responsible for implementing Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapters 128D (Environmental Response Law) and 128E, Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act. Chapter 128D, HRS, Environmental Response Law, Section 7, HRS mandates that a State List of Sites be published annually listing the sites with potential or known hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants. The DOH Hawaii SRP List of Priority Sites shows 464 sites with potential or known hazardous substance or petroleum contamination. The Hawai'i SRP List of Priority Sites is sorted in order of Island, Locality, the Program Area, and the Facility/Site Name. The site Status and Potential Hazard are also identified for each Facility/Site. Chapter 128E, HRS, Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, governs the threshold quantities of hazardous chemical material subject to inventory, reporting, and emergency response plans required to be filed by the facility owner/operator. The Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act (HEPCRA) requires that facilities must report annually on hazardous substances stored on their premises if the amounts stored exceed specified threshold planning quantities. HEPCRA requires that an owner or operator of a facility that stores, uses, or manufactures above defined thresholds, any hazardous substance, or extremely hazardous substance, is required to file a notification of such "Tier 11" activity, and to pay a filing fee. A Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission (HSERC) was formed and each of the four counties in Hawaii was designated as an emergency planning district. A Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) was established in each county. Functions of the LEPC include preparing a hazardous material emergency response plan, reviewing the plan annually, evaluating resources to mitigate an emergency, receiving emergency response notifications, and receiving and processing requests for information from the general public. 16.2 Organization of the State and Local Emergency Planning Committee The Hawaii state emergency response commission, is placed within the Department of Health for administrative purposes and to carry out the requirements of HRS 128-E. The 16-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT commission shall consist of the following members, who shall be appointed by the governor as provided in section 26-34: (1) The director of health; (2) The chairperson of the board of agriculture; (3) The adjutant general; (4) The director of labor and industrial relations; (5) The chairperson of the board of land and natural resources; (6) The director of the office of environmental quality control; (7) The director of business, economic development, and tourism; (8) The director of transportation; (9) The dean of the University of Hawaii school of public health or the dean of the University of Hawaii school of medicine, as determined by the governor; (10) The director of the environmental center of the University of Hawaii; (11) One representative from each committee designated by the mayor of each respective county; and (12) Other persons appointed by the governor to meet the minimum requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986. Federal: USCINCPAC Private: Brewer Environmental Chevron Healthcare Association of Hawaii Tesoro Hawaii American Red Cross Hawaiian Electric Hawaii Agricultural Research Center The Local Committee shall be composed of at least one person from each of the following groups: (1) Elected state and county officials; (2) Law enforcement, first aid, health, environmental, hospital, and transportation personnel; (3) Firefighting personnel; (4) Civil defense and emergency management personnel; (5) Broadcast and print media personnel; (6) Community groups not affiliated with emergency service groups; (7) Owners and operators of facilities subject to the requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986; and (8) Other groups recommended by the mayor and appointed by the commission. 16-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT The Local Emergency Planning Committee is to take appropriate actions to ensure the preparation, implementation, and annual update and review of the local emergency response plan required by this chapter and the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986. The local emergency response plans shall include, but not be limited to, the following: (A) Identification of each facility subject to the requirements of section 303 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11003 and within the emergency planning district; identification of routes likely to be used for the transportation of substances on the list of extremely hazardous substances; and identification of additional facilities contributing or subjected to additional risk due to their proximity to facilities subject to the requirements of this section, such as hospitals or natural gas facilities; (B) Methods and procedures to be followed by facility owners and operators and local emergency and medical personnel in responding to any release of these substances; (C) Designation of a community emergency coordinator and facility emergency coordinators, who shall make determinations necessary to implement the plan; (D) Procedures providing reliable, effective, and timely notification by facility emergency coordinators and the community emergency coordinator to persons designated in the emergency plan, and the public, that a release has occurred, consistent with the notification requirements of this chapter and section 304 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986, 42 U. S.C. § 11004; (E) Methods for determining the occurrence of a release, and the area or population likely to be affected by the release; (F) A description of emergency equipment and facilities in the county and at each facility in the county subject to the requirements of this section, and the identification of the persons responsible for the equipment and facilities; (G) Evacuation plans, including provisions for precautionary evacuation and alternate traffic routes; (H) Training programs, including schedules for training of local emergency response and medical personnel; and (I) Methods and schedules for exercising the emergency plan; (3) Request additional information from the facilities, if necessary, to develop emergency response plans; 16-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis H4ZAI4T (4) Submit local emergency response plans to the commission for review, and to other affected agencies upon request; (5) Report to the commission on alleged violations of this chapter; (6) Prepare reports, recommendations, and other information related to the implementation of this chapter, as requested by the commission; (7) Have the primary responsibility for receiving, processing, and managing hazardous chemical information forms and data, trade secrets, and public information requests pursuant to this chapter; (8) Accept and deposit into the state treasury any grants, gifts, or other funds received for the purpose of carrying out this chapter; and (9) Evaluate the need for resources necessary to develop, implement, and exercise the emergency plan, and make recommendations with respect to additional resources that may be required and the means for providing these additional resources. 16.3 Environmental Response Law The list of Hawai' i Sites Eligible Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) shows there are currently three sites on Oahu listed on EPA's CERCLA National Priority List (NPL) for cleanup. Ten Hawaii County sites that may be eligible for possible listing under CERCLA are presented below and managed by the HEER Office Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection (PA/SI) Program Remedial Project Managers (RPMs). Locality Facility Site Name Hakalau Hakalau Air Strip Pahala Kau Sugar Company (Hawaiian Agricultural Company) Kau Sugar Mill Paauhau Hamakua Sugar Company, Inc. Paauhau Seed Dipping Plant Paauilo Paauilo Seed Dipping Plant Paauilo Seed Dipping Plant Pepeekeo Pepeekeo Airstrip Paauilo Hamakua Mill Company Paauilo Sugar Mill Hakalau Mauna Kea Agribusiness Company Lands Hakalau Seed Dipping Plant Paauhau Paauhau Sugar Plantation Paauhau Sugar Mill Papaikou Papaikou Sugar Mill Waipunalei Hamakua Sugar Company Waipunalei Seed Dipping Plant The Department of Health Hawai' i State Response Program List of Priority Sites presents all Hawaii sites identified for potential or known non -emergency response actions managed by the NEER Office Site Discovery, Assessment, and Remediation Section Remedial Project Managers (RPMs). Sites are categorized as a potential hazard when sampling data indicate that contaminant concentrations exceed Hawaii Environmental Action Levels. The list 16-4 Hairaii Corttaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiori Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis H4ZAI4T includes 469 sites statewide that are managed within the NEER Office. The DOH Hawai' i SRP Priority List of Sites shows 83 sites on the Big Island with potential or known hazardous substance or petroleum contamination. Three sites were determined to require No Further Action (NFA). NEER Office Remedial Project Managers (RPMs) continue active oversight on 70 assessment and response actions. Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Hazard Hamakua Sugar Managed With Haina State Company, Inc - Haina Ongoing Assessment Institutional Sugar Mill Controls Hakalau PA/SI Hakalau Air Strip Inactive Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hakalau PA/SI Hakalau Sugar Ongoing Response Hazard Plantation Undetermined Hamakua State Agent Orange Ongoing Assessment Hazard Application Undetermined Hilo Brownfields Hilo Rubbish Dump Inactive Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hilo Brownfields Kanoelehua Industrial Ongoing Assessment Hazard Warehouse Undetermined Hilo State 187 Silva Street Ongoing Response Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Alamo Rent A Car, Hilo Ongoing Assessment Hazard International Airport Undetermined Hilo State Aloha Petroleum Hilo Ongoing Assessment Hazard Bulk Plant Undetermined Hazard Hilo State Bayside Chevron Ongoing Assessment Managed With Service Institutional Controls Hilo State Big Island Asphalt Co Ongoing Response Hazard Inc Present Equilon Enterprises Hazard Hilo State LLC - Hilo Terminal Ongoing Assessment Undetermined (Shell Oil Co) Hazard Hilo State Haaheo Elementary Inactive Response Managed With School Institutional Controls Hazard Hilo State Hatada Bakery Ongoing Response Managed With (Former) Institutional Controls Hilo State Hawaii Cane Products Ongoing Assessment Hazard Plant - Waiakea Pond Present Hilo State Hawaii Pest Control Ongoing Response Hazard Undetermined Hilo State HELCO Pipeline Ongoing Assessment Hazard Release Hualani Hilo Undetermined 16-5 Hawaii Corttaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiotz Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Hilo State Hilo Airport Aloha ' Ongoing Assessment Hazard Airlines et fuels ill Undetermined Hazard Hilo State Hilo Arsenic Ongoing Response Managed With Engineering Controls Hilo State Hilo Bay Front Soccer Ongoing Assessment Hazard Field Undetermined Hazard Hilo State Hilo Judiciary Center Ongoing Assessment Managed With Proj ect Engineering Controls Hilo State Hilo Quality Washerette Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Hilo Terminal 666 Ongoing Assessment Hazard Kalanianaole Avenue Undetermined Hilo State Hilo Wood Treating, Inc. Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Kawailani Central Office Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Larry's Waiakea Chevron Ongoing Response Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Stationers Corporation of Ongoing Assessment Hazard Hawaii Undetermined Hazard Hilo State Tank 19 Ongoing Assessment Managed With Institutional Controls Tesoro Hawaii Hazard Hilo State Corporation Terminal Ongoing Assessment Undetennined Department - 595 Kalanianaole Tesoro Hawaii Hazard Hilo State Corporation Terminal Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Department - 607 Kalanianaole Tesoro Hawaii Hazard Hilo State Corporation Terminal Ongoing Assessment Undetennined Department - 701 Kalanianaole UH Hilo Pacific Hazard Hilo State Aquaculture and Ocean Ongoing Assessment Undetennined Resources Center Hilo State University of Hawaii -Hilo Ongoing Assessment Hazard Auto Shop Undetennined Hilo State Wailoa Small Boat Ongoing Assessment Hazard Harbor Undetennined Hilo State Western Auto Hydraulic Ongoing Assessment Hazard Oil Undetennined- 16-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Wood Protection Hazard Hilo State Company (HPM Building Ongoing Assessment Undetermined supply) Hilo State Young Brothers, Pier 2, Ongoing Assessment Hazard Hilo Undetermined Honokaa State DOH Honokaa Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Honokaa State Hamakua Sugar Company Ongoing Assessment Hazard Inc - Honokaa Airstrip Undetermined Hamakua Sugar Company Hazard Honokaa State Inc - Kawela Pesticide Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Mixing Area Hamakua Sugar Company Hazard Honokaa State Inc - Paauhau Seed Cane Ongoing Assessment Undetermine Dipping Plant Honokaa Medical Center Hazard Present Honokaa State Wastewater Treatment Inactive Assessment Plant Hazard Kailua-Kona State Big Island Honda NFA Response Managed With Mercedes Dealership Institutional Controls Hawaii Petroleum- Kona Hazard Kailua-Kona State Branch (Kona Warehouse Ongoing Assessment Undetennined & Cardlock) Honokohau Industrial Hazard Kailua-Kona State Park -Lower Boat Park Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Soil Contamination Hazard Kailua-Kona State Kona Village Resort NFA Response Managed With Institutional Controls Hazard Kailua-Kona State Snow White Linen, Ongoing Assessment Managed With Former Engineering Controls Kamuela State Kamuela Baseyard Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Kamuela State Waimea Quarry Ongoing Response Hazard Undetermined TOSCO Corporation- No Hazard Kawaihae State Kawaihae Terminal NFA Assessment #0317 Keaau Brownfields Keaau Middle School Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetennined Hazard Keaau State Keaau Hotel Site Inactive Response Managed With Engineering Controls Keaau State Keaau Pahoa Road 118 Inactive Response Hazard Present Acre Parcel 16-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Keaau State Keaau Triangle Lot Ongoing Response Hazard Present Keaau State Puna Sugar Mill Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hazard Kealakekua State Kona Community Ongoing Assessment Managed With Hospital (Kona Hospital) Engineering Controls Keauhou State Keauhou Mechanics Yard Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetennined Kohala Former Meridian Hawaii Hazard Coast State Resort Transportation Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Facility Kukaiau State Kukaiau pump system Ongoing Assessment Hazard releases Undetermined Hamakua Sugar Hazard Laupahoehoe State Company, Inc - Papaaloa Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Pesticide Mixing Area Hazard Mauna Kea State Canada France Hawaii Inactive Response Managed With Telescope Observatory Engineering Controls Naalehu Brownfields Residential Property 95- Ongoing Assessment Hazard 5579 O ukea Street Undetermined Hazard Naalehu State 95-5572 Mamalahoa Ongoing Assessment Managed With Highway Engineering Controls Hawaii Petroleum Hazard Naalehu State Distributors, Inc 200 Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Gallon Fuel Spill Ookala Brownfields Ookala Gym and Ball Ongoing Assessment Hazard Park Undetennined Hamakua Sugar Hazard Paauhau PA/SI Company, Inc - Paauhau Ongoing Response Undetermined Sugar Mill Hamakua Sugar Hazard Paauilo PA/SI Company, Inc - Paauilo Inactive Assessment Undetermined Seed Dipping Plant Hamakua Sugar Hazard Paauilo PA/SI Company, Inc - Paauilo Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Sugar Mill Hamakua Sugar Hazard Paauilo State Company, Inc - Ookala Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Fuel Station Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Hazard Paauilo State Association Research Ongoing Assessment Undetennined Station - Paauilo Paauilo State Mauna Kea Ranch Inactive Assessment Hazard Overspill Spillage Undetermined 16-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Pahala PA/SI Kau Sugar Mill Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hazard Pahala State ML Macadamia Orchards, Ongoing Response Managed With LP (Kau Div) Engineering Controls Papaikou PA/SI kua Sar Ongoing Assessment Hazard Coamaan , In aikou Undetermined Pepeekeo PA/SI Pepeekeo Airstrip Inactive Response Hazard Undetermined Pepeekeo State Black Oil and Drum Sites Ongoing Response Hazard Present Hilo Coast Power Hazard Pepeekeo State Company Diesel Fuel Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Storage Tank Petroleum Impacted Soil Hazard Present Pepeekeo State Downslope of Former Ongoing Response HCPC Maintenance Garage South Kona State Kamehameha Schools Ongoing Response Hazard Present Estoy Property Hawaii Volcanoes Hazard Volcano State National Park Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Aboveground Storage Tank Waimea State Waimea Chevron Food Ongoing Assessment Hazard Mart Undetermined Waimea State Waimea Landfill Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hamakua Sugar Hazard Waipunalei PA/SI Company, Inc - Ongoing Assessment Managed With Waipunalei Institutional 16-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis H4ZAI4T RESPONSE PROGRAM EMERGENCY REPONSE NOTIFICATIONS LIST The Hawai' i State Response Program Release Notification Log presented in this section shows a listing of all chemical and petroleum release notifications received by the NEER Office emergency response team during the fiscal year. The Release Notification Log is sorted in order of Locality, and the Case Name. Locality Case Name Incident Substance Media Hilo Hawaii Petroleum, Inc. Hilo While loading a boat, tanker Diesel Fuel Ocean Pier #3 truck's suction hose vibrated loose and released diesel onto the pier and into Hilo Bay Hilo HELCO Generating Station: In preparation for painting, Fuel Oil Soil Hill/ Kanoelehua hydroblasting caused a small hole, releasing oil; oil contained within a sub -berm made; berm has earthen bottom. Oil collected via vacuum truck and being burned in the generating units. Hilo Hilo Bay Boat Ramp Release of 200 Gals of Diesel Fuel Ocean Diesel into Wailua River from Hilo Bay Boat Ramp Hilo Hilo Harbor Diesel release due to Diesel Fuel Ocean unknown Reasons Hilo Pole Mount Transformer Transformer Failure Ergon HyVolt II Soil 13946 Insulating Oil Hilo Pole Mount Transformer Rust decayed transformer HYVOLT II Soil 24275 release Hilo Pole Mount Transformer Release from Transformer HYVOLT II Soil 3613 due to transport Hilo Yandah Services Hilo Bay 125 gal diesel tote fell out of Diesel Fuel Ocean Diesel truck making turn. 15-20 gal diesel ran into Hilo Bay Kailua-Kona HELCO Generating Station: Overfill of Oil Water Diesel Fuel Soil Keahole Separator Kailua-Kona Kailua Kona Alleged High Caller alleging 5 R/hr None Air Radiation Readings readings Kawaihae Harbor Kawaihae Harbor Unknown Unknown Sheen Sheen Ocean Sheen Upolo Hamakua HWY 19 Release from truck fuel tank Diesel Fuel Asphalt 16-10 Hairaii Corttaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiori Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT 16.4 Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act The Hawaii State Legislature enacted an update to Hawaii Revised Statutes 128 (D - environmental response law and E - Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act), clarifying and affecting the threshold quantities of hazardous chemical material subject to inventory, reporting, and emergency response plans by the facility owner/operator. RELATING TO THE HAWAII EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT -TO KNOW ACT. BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF HAWAII: SECTION 1. The purpose of this Act is to clarify the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act reporting requirements. SECTION 2. Section 128E-6, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is amended by amending subsection (a) to read as follows: "(a) The owner or operator of a facility in the [fie] state that stores, uses, or manufactures any hazardous substance shall comply with the following requirements: (1) Each owner or operator of a facility in the [fie] state shall comply with the emergency planning and notification requirements of sections 302 and 303 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986, 42 [U.S. § § 11002 and 11003,] United States Code sections 11002 and 11003, if an extremely hazardous substance is present at the facility in an amount in excess of the threshold planning quantity established for the substance; (2) Each owner or operator of a facility in this [fie] state that is required to prepare or have available a material safety data sheet for a hazardous chemical under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended, 15 [U. S.C] United States Code Section 651 et seq., and regulations promulgated under that Act, for [flu- and &itr-emeiy hazar-detis stibstanees present a+ the faeilit-y in ametints not less than shall eamply with the following r-epe orfs]: All hazardous substances, except for extremely hazardous substances, present at the facility in amounts not less than ten thousand pounds, and B� All extremely hazardous substances present at the facility in amounts not less than five hundred pounds, or the threshold planning quantity for that substance, whichever is less, shall comply with the following reporting requirements: [{ }] Q Complete a chemical list by March 1 of each year and submit material safety data sheets not more than thirty days after a request; [(R)] ii Complete the state chemical inventory form by March 1 of each year; provided that a Tier II list shall be used until a state form is available; [(C)] fiW Submit facility diagrams and location area maps by March 1 of each year, and update the maps annually as needed; and [fB} ] iv Submit emergency response plans required under state or federal law. 16-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Hazard Analysis HAZMAT The [iii fe - +ie deser-ibe a] documents required in [ ] clauses i through ["] iv shall be submitted by March 1 of each year to the commission, the respective committee, and the respective fire department [ o est by the e]; L � (3) Each owner or operator of a facility in this [fie] state that is subject to [seetien] Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986, 42 [ ,] United States Code Section 11023, shall comply with the toxic chemical release form requirements of [seetien] Section 323 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986 by July 1 of each year; and (4) Each owner or operator of a facility in this [fie] state covered under [seetie}l] Section 304 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986, 42 [rr c r §11 nnn ] United States Code Section 11004, shall comply with the notification requirements of [seetiee] Section 304 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act of 1986, and section 128E-7, if a release of an extremely hazardous substance occurs from the facility." SECTION 3. Statutory material to be repealed is bracketed and stricken. New statutory material is underscored. SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon approval. 16-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Appendix A LEPC Bylaws HAWAII COUNTY LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE BYLAWS Article I. Name and Location Section 1. The name of this body shall be the Hawaii County Local Emergency Planning Committee, hereinafter referred to as the Committee. Section 2. The Committee shall be located in Hilo, Hawaii. The mailing address for the Committee shall be Hawaii County Local Emergency Plan- ning Committee, c/o Hawaii State Department of Health„ 1582 Kamehameha Avenue, Hilo, Hawaii 96720. Section 3. The Mayor of Hawaii County, hereinafter referred to as the Mayor, may change the principal office location within Hawaii County. Article II. Purposes and Responsibilities Section 1. The purposes of this Committee are to develop and maintain a hazardous materials emergency response plan in compliance with the Emer- gency Planning and Community Right -to -Know Act (EPCRA) for Hawaii County, hereinafter referred to as the Plan. Section 2. The duties of this Committee are as follows: A. To review the Plan annually, and to revise it, as may be necessary. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. §11003(a)] B. To evaluate the need for resources to de- velop, implement, and exercise the Plan, and to make recommendations with respect to additional resources that may be re- quired and the means for providing such additional resources. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. §11003(b)] 16-A1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Appendix A LEPC Bylaws C. To receive follow-up emergency notifica- tions for Hawaii County. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A, §11004(c)] D. To organize and to maintain all EPCRA data that is reported to the Committee. This includes, but is not limited to, the Tier Two forms, material safety data sheets, facility site maps, and written notifica- tions of releases. E. To reply to all public inquiries regarding EPCRA information and the Plan, [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. §11022(e)(3); [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. §11044(a)] F. To publish annually in the local newspa- per(s) the availability and location of Tier Two Inventory Forms, material safety data sheets, and the Plan, [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. 911044(4)] Section 3. The Hawaii County Civil Defense will be empowered by the Committee to implement the Plan under emergency conditions. Article III. Hembership Section 1. The original list of members was submitted by the Mayor of Hawaii County to the Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission (HSERC). Subsequent changes in the membership will be made by written notice from the Chairperson of the Committee to the Chairperson of the HSERC. Section 2. Each member shall he entitled to one (1) vote at annual or.special meetings. All voting members shall he entitled to receive ap- propriate publications, attend meetings, and shall be entitled to participate in all other activities accrued by members. Section 3. Currently designated members of the Committee are listed in Attachment 1. 16-A2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Appendix A LEPC Bylaws Article IV. Officers Section 1. The Committee shall elect a Chairperson and a Vice Chairperson from its membership. [Ruth. 42 U.S.C.A. §11001(c)] Section 2. The Chairperson shall serve as Coordinator, or designate another member to do so. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. 911001(c)] Section 3. The Chairperson shall preside over all gener- al meetings, exercise general supervision over the affairs of the Committee, and ap- point a Chair for each sub -committee as may be established. Section 4. If the Chairperson is absent, or if the posi- tion should become vacant by unforeseen cir- cumstances, the Vice Chairperson shall preside over the affairs of the Committee. Article V. meetings Section 1. Meetings of the Committee shall be held at least annually at a time and place to be determined by the Chairperson. Notice of the meetings shall be sent by mail to all members at least ten (10) days prior to the meeting. A written agenda shall accompany all meeting notices. Section 2. A quorum of the voting members or their pre - designated alternates shall be present to conduct business. Section 3. Special meetings of the Committee may be held at the call of the Chairperson. Section 4. The meeting agenda will be posted at the County Clerk's Office six (6) calendar days before each meeting. Article VI. sub -Committees Section 1. There shall be four (4) standing Sub - Committees: 16-A3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Appendix A LEPC Bylaws A. The responsibilities of the Planning Sub - Committee shall include, but not be limited to: 1. Developing and maintaining the Plan. 2. Updating the resource list for the response and mitigation of a hazardous material incident. B. The responsibilities of the community Awareness/Right-to-I[now Sub -Committee shall include, but not be limited to: I. Establishing guidance for public educa- tion and communication, with the news media. 2. Promoting EPCRA awareness in the com- munity. 3. Requesting and maintaining information required by EPCRA. 4. Processing all requests from the public for EPCRA information. Fees for duplicating records shall be levied in accordance with Hawaii State rules. C. The responsibilities of the Legislative Sul, -Committee shall include, but not be limited to: 1. Evaluating present laws and ordinances regarding hazardous materials. 2. Proposing legislation concerning haz- ardous materials releases. D. The responsibilities of the Hazard/'Vulnerability Analysis Sub - Committee shall include, but not be limited to: 1. Collect and maintain Tier Two Forms as submitted by facilities. 16-A4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Appendix A LEPC Bylaws 2. Creating a risk map and defining vul- nerability zones around facilities. 3 -Identifying vulnerable facilities within the vulnerable zone. Section 2. Each Sub -Committee shall have two Co -Chairs appointed by the Chairperson. Section 3. Members of each Sub -Committee shall be ap- pointed by the Chairperson. The current Sub - Committee members are listed in Attachment 2. Section 4. The Chairperson can appoint members of the Committee to special Sub -Committees or groups as needed. Article vil. Rules of Order Section 1. In all matters not otherwise prescribed herein, procedure shall be governed by !Robert's Rules of Order. Article vIII. Amendments ADOPTED section 1. These bylaws may be amended or repealed by a majority vote of the members. (Date) [Chairperson 16-A5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Appendix B LEPC Members Hawaii County Local Emergency Planning Committee c/o Hawal'i District Health Office 1582 Kamehamehe Avenue Hilo, Hawaii 86720 December 6, 2009 To: Mr. Laurence K. Lau, Chair Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission Department of Health 919 Ala Moana Boulevard, Sa' Floor Honolulu, Hawaii 96814 From: Henry G. Silva, HSERC Commissioner Hawaii County LEPC c/o Hawaii District Health Office 1582 Kamehameha Avenue Hilo, Hawaii 96720 Subject: Hawaii County L.E.P.0 Committee Aloha Mr. Laurence K. Lau, On December 3, 2009; the Hawaii County L.E.P.0 met and voted, to update its membership. These submitted names, will replace any existing voting members or appointment to'thc Hawaii County LEPC. Henry G. Silva- Chairman, Hawaii County L.E.P.0 John Bowen- Vice Chairman, Hawaii County L.E.P.0 -r Jason Armstrong- Media Tracy Aruga- Hospital- Hilo Medical Center Hunter Bishop- Count), of Hawaii, Mayor's Office Newton Inouye- State of Hawaii, District Health Office Gerald Kosatci- County of Hawaii, Fire Dept. Special Operations Kaipo Parish- County of Hawaii, Fire Dept. HAZMAT, John Peard- State of Hawaii, HEER Office r 16-B1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16: Appendix B LEPC Members Barry Periatt- County of Hawaii, Civil Defense John Jack Roney- Citizen Member Paul Smith- Hamakua Energy Partners Elton Sugamuma- State of Hawaii, DA.T Harbors Larry Weber- County of Hawaii, Police Dept. Reviewed and approved by, William P. Kenoi Mayor, County -of Hawaii Submitted by, Henry G. Silva Chairman, Hawaii County LEPC 16-132 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 Q 7. Shelters Chapter 17: Shelters CHAPTER 17 - SHELTERS 17.1 Public Emergency Shelters Hawaii is vulnerable to a wide -range of emergencies and disasters ranging from hurricanes, earthquakes, rockfalls, tsunamis, and floods. Hurricanes, above all others, are clearly the most dangerous and capable of inflicting enormous damage and loss of life. Hurricanes provide the greatest challenge to Civil Defense and emergency management agencies at all levels of government. In Hawaii, residents and visitors cannot move away from a storm, as they do on the U.S. mainland, to reduce the life-threatening effects of a hurricane. They must remain in-place and have immediately available hurricane resistant homes, businesses, hotels, public shelters, etc., in which to seek refuge. In that regard, government in Hawaii has a more difficult responsibility to provide for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. Two important aspects of this responsibility as it pertains to the hurricane hazard is the adoption of building codes that afford hurricane protection to both public and private sector property, and the provision of sufficient, reasonably provisioned hurricane resistant public shelters and identification of reasonably hurricane -resistant buildings that can function as refuges during the storm. A list of all facilities currently used as emergency shelters in Hawaii County is given below. North Kohala District Kohala High and Elementary [S] • Building X Kohala Intermediate [S] South Kohala District Waikoloa Elementary [S] Waimea Elementary [S] • Building J • Building B • Building C • Building E • Building F • Building G • Building L Waimea Intermediate Waimea State Office Building North Kona District Holualoa Elementary Kahakai Elementary [S] • Cafeteria • Building A • Building B • Building D • Building F 17-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Kealakehe Elementary [S] • Building B • Building C • Building D • Building E • Building F • Building G Kealakehe High [S/P] • Building C • Building V • Building D • Building E • Building H • Building G • Building M Kealakehe Intermediate [S] • Building C • Building F • Building D • Building H • Building G South Kona District Honaunau Elementary • Building F Hookena Elementary • Building D Konawaena High [S/P] • Building C • Building S • Building D • Building E • Building G • Building F • Building O Kau District Kau High and Pahala Elementary [S/P] • Building I • Building N • Building Q Pahala Elem School • Building F • Building M • Building I • Building Q 17-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Hamakua District Honokaa High and Intermediate [S/P] • Building N • Building T • Building X • Building A Kalanianaole Elementary [S/P] • Building A • Building I • Building J • Building H Laupahohoe • Building A -main South Hilo District E B de Silva Elementary • Building F Hilo Union School • Building H Hilo High [S/P] • Building G • Building R • Building S • Building L • Building C1 • Building C2 • Building Q • Building A • Building BB Hilo Intermediate [S] • Building D • Building L Kaumana Elementary [S] • Building C • Building E • Building F Waiakea Elementary [S] • Building A • Building B • Building C • Building D • Building F • Building G • Building H • Building I 17-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Waiakea High [S/P] • Building G • Building D • Building C • Building M • Building U • Building R • Building B • Building E • Building F • Building H • Building Q Waiakea Intermediate [S] • Building M • Building D • Building I Waiakea Waena Elementary Puna District Keonepoko Elementary [S] • Cafeteria • Building E • Building F • Building G • Building H Keaau Elementary • Cafeteria • Building I • Building O • Building T • Building D Keaau High [S/P] • Building C • Building G • Building E • Building I • Building O Keaau Middle [S/P] • Cafeteria • Building M • Building K Mountain View Elementary [S] • Cafeteria • Building D • Building I • Building G 17-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Pahoa Elementary [S] • Building A Pahoa High and Intermediate [S/P] • Building Q • Building H • Building S • Building T • Building U Legend: [S] = Special Needs + General Population [P] = Pet Friendly + General Population [S/P] = Special Needs + Pet Friendly + General Population Facilities designated to serve as Special Needs Shelters provide limited support to persons with special health needs. Special health needs evacuees must either be capable of taking care of their own needs or be accompanied by a caregiver. Pet Friendly Shelters are co -located with some general population shelters. Household pets entering a pet friendly shelter must be caged for safety and owners should provide water and food for their pets. 17-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Kohala High & InterKohala Elementary NORTH KOHIALA Pnpulatlpn = 7517 Honokaa High & Intermediate Waimea State Offices & Courthouse Waimea Elementary & Intermediate SOUTH KORA. Population _1 1d HAMAkUP Papulation=6`GI NORTH HILO - '1'aPUation = 7720 Hilo Intermediate Hilo High souTH Hao Waiakea High Kealakehe Eleme taryKeafakehe High Population=4T47ilva Elementary Kealakehe Into NORTH KONA Kahakai Elerrre population = 94024 I MidKeaau High Holualoa Elementary Mountain View Elementary * Keonepoko Elementary Konawaena High Pahoa High & Intermediat*ailoa E,I_ementary Honaunau ElementaryPUNA--„� Population = 42591 Hookena Elementary SOUTH KONA Population = 11414 K Populatonion = 7050 Kau High and Pahala Elementary Legend * Emergency Shelters Major Road -. 0 4 8 16 24 32 Miles Figure 17-1. Map of shelter locations on Hawaii Island 17.1.1 Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classification Evaluations of 29 buildings throughout the Hawaiian Islands were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Accounting and General Services (DAGS), Division of Public Works, Scope of Services and Procedure for Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classification. The primary objective of these evaluations were to identify whether the structures substantially meets the wind load criteria for a Shelter rating of Type B or better. The evaluations also identify recommendations for any further incremental structural or nonstructural retrofits to achieve substantial compliance with Shelter Types B, A, and EHPA, where economically feasible. 17-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Shelter Assessment Procedures and Design Standards for New Shelters Type B Shelter Type A Shelter Shelter with an EHPA Essential Facility with Protection Area COOP Structural capacity expressed in peak gust wind speeds calculated at the strength level [i.e., V'x �(L.F. x I) V'x x(1.6 x 1.15) ] Strength Capacity>_108 Strength Capacity >130 Strength Capacity>_156 Strength Capacity>_190 mph peak gust mph peak gust I mph peak gust mph peak gust Main Wind Force Resisting System Load Criteria for LRFD Evaluation by Method 2 Analytical Procedure, ASCE 7-05 80 minimum peak gust 95 minimum mph peak 115 minimum mph peak 140 mph or greater peak basic wind speed V gust basic wind speed V gust basic wind speed V gust basic wind speed V Load factor of 1.6 Load factor of 1.6 Load factor of 1.6 Load factor of 1.6 Importance Factor I of Importance Factor I of Importance Factor I of Importance Factor I of 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 On Oahu, Exposure, On Oahu, Exposure, On Oahu, Exposure, Directionality of 1.0 Directionality and Directionality and Directionality and On Oahu, Exposure, and Topographic factors per Topographic factors per Topographic factors per Topographic factors per Honolulu Building Code; Honolulu Building Code; Honolulu Building Code; Honolulu Building Code; otherwise per ASCE 7-05 otherwise per ASCE 7- otherwise per ASCE 7- otherwise per ASCE 7-05 Gust Effect Factor of 0.85 05 05 may be used Gust Effect Factor of Gust Effect Factor of Gust Effect Factor of 0.85 Evaluate Design for 0.85 may be used 0.85 may be used may be used interior pressure Evaluate Design for Evaluate Design for Evaluate Design for interior pressure interior pressure interior pressure Wall and Glazing Windborne Debris Resistance Criteria Walls and Glazing to Walls and Glazing must Walls and Glazing must Walls and Glazing must resist ASTM E1996-05 resist ASTM E1996-05 resist ASTM E1996 -05 resist ASTM E1996-05 Level A Level C Level D Level E 2g steel balls at 130 fps 4.5 lb. 2 X 4 (c[ 40 fps 9 lb. 2 X 4 O 50 fps (34 9 lb. 2 X 4 O 80 fps (55 (90 mph) (27 mph) mph) mph) Positive and Negative Positive and Negative Positive and Negative Positive and Negative Pressure shall be Pressure shall be Pressure shall be Pressure shall be detennined for the bldg determined for the bldg determined for the bldg determined for the bldg enclosure glazing and enclosure glazing and enclosure glazing and enclosure glazing and door door elements door elements door elements elements Shelter Type B Shelter Type A Enhanced Hurricane Essential Facilities Protection Area necessary for COG and Shelter COOP provides structural provides structural provides capacity for provides capacity for 190 capacity for 108 mph capacity for 130 mph 155 mph (upper mph (upper Category 4 (upper Category 1 (upper Category 2 Category 3 hurricanes) hurricanes) hurricanes) hurricanes) 17-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Saffir-Simpson Storm Categories and Shelter Classes � 0 1 Category 1 V- 82 96 v8 1�6 114 122 13 138 146 154 182 178 173 186 194 3 -Second Peak Gust Windspeed Strength Capacity Four school buildings in Hawaii County which were evaluated according to this procedure. The results for each of these evaluations are as follows. 17.1.1.1 Holualoa Elementary School - Cafe torium Building S�ffir-Sin7ps.�i7 Starrn Catego ries and Shelter Masses MEMEMEMEEMEN MOMMM 82 72 1;2 1. '22 132 '4= -72 102 192 3 -Seo - � 0 1 and Peak €gust Wintlspeeo 0:r_ngth rapacity 17-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Building A would classify as a Type B hurricane shelter in its existing condition. Essentially, a Type B hurricane shelter is possible because the exterior doors and windows, exterior dormer louvers, and interior doors are all estimated to be capable of providing protection for an ASTM -E-1996 Level A missile. The analysis of the standing seam metal roof indicates that the roof panels are not adequate to resist the wind uplift pressures required for a Type A hurricane shelter. Nonetheless, given that the peak gust wind velocity associated with the capacity of the standing seam metal roof (120 -mph) is close at hand with the upper bound peak gust wind velocity required for a Type A hurricane shelter (130 -mph), it is recommended that a more in depth analysis be made based on the specific properties of the standing seam metal roof used in Building A. Upon verification that the standing seam metal roof is capable of resisting the wind pressures required for a Type A hurricane shelter, it would be necessary to retrofit the multi-purpose dining hall exterior windows and dormer openings so that an ASTM -E-1996 level C missile protection is provided inconformity with such shelter designation. The interior doors in the multi purpose dining hall would not have to be upgraded to resist an ASTM -E-1996 Level C. While retrofits to the exterior windows and dormer openings in the multi purpose dining hall are required to attain a Type A or better shelter qualification, the main -wind -resisting -system and other secondary structural components are theoretically capable resisting wind loads that correspond to an EHPA type shelter. The analysis of the main -wind -force -resisting -system and secondary structural components suggests that the capacity of Building A to resist hurricane wind loads is most likely governed by the capacity of the steel tapered columns that form part of the interior gable rigid frames. This value of velocity corresponds to a very high Category 4 hurricane and almost borderline Category 5 hurricane. It is important to note that an enclosed condition was not evaluated or considered in the recommendations because in order to prevent pressurization of the interior spaces (including the eave cavity and ceiling plenum) it would be required to seal off all window and vent openings temporarily or permanently. Since Building A is a naturally ventilated building, it would be necessary to condition the interior spaces mechanically — a very costly retrofit. Therefore, prevention of interior pressurization is considered economically impractical. A summary of the retrofits recommended above, based on Shelter Type, is as follows: All Types: Remove or mitigate the possible debris sources indicated in this report. Type A Shelter: Upon verification that the standing seam metal roof is adequate for the wind loads required for a Type A Shelter (based on project specific data), provide impact protection for all exterior windows and dormer openings at the multi-purpose dining hall (ASTM -E-1996 Level C Missile or better. 17-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters 17.1.1.2 Waikoloa Elementary School - Classroom Building D surrir -sir iiptiui1 8Cul in CnLCyu1 imi in d 91vt liar Clmsses ^_ 92 1 112 122 132 142 152 -"' '72 182 192 3Sccond "Pcok Guat Windspecd Strcn Oth G opacity Classroom Building D in its current condition complies with the strength capacity wind load requirements of a Type B hurricane shelter, and although unrated openings and impact protection exist it can safely be assumed that the existing openings and protection devices meet the wind load requirements for this shelter type and the required missile impact level A. However, some structural deficiencies were noticed during the inspection. The items listed below require attention to assure compliance: Although the structural analysis determined that the uplift capacity of the hip girder truss just meets the requirements of a Type B shelter, the missing uplift connector is considered a structural flaw and should be retrofitted. This can be accomplished by installing uplift connectors per Figure 13, or equivalent method (minimum capacity of 1000 lbs. each), at the top and bottom chords of each hip -girder truss to setback - girder at each truss connection. Install remedial uplift connectors at the hip truss connections to the setback girders, anywhere improper installation is noticed. Provide the missing fasteners at all other improperly installed connectors, particularly at the hip truss connections to the bottom 17-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 11111 111MMINE 111111111111111111 ^_ 92 1 112 122 132 142 152 -"' '72 182 192 3Sccond "Pcok Guat Windspecd Strcn Oth G opacity Classroom Building D in its current condition complies with the strength capacity wind load requirements of a Type B hurricane shelter, and although unrated openings and impact protection exist it can safely be assumed that the existing openings and protection devices meet the wind load requirements for this shelter type and the required missile impact level A. However, some structural deficiencies were noticed during the inspection. The items listed below require attention to assure compliance: Although the structural analysis determined that the uplift capacity of the hip girder truss just meets the requirements of a Type B shelter, the missing uplift connector is considered a structural flaw and should be retrofitted. This can be accomplished by installing uplift connectors per Figure 13, or equivalent method (minimum capacity of 1000 lbs. each), at the top and bottom chords of each hip -girder truss to setback - girder at each truss connection. Install remedial uplift connectors at the hip truss connections to the setback girders, anywhere improper installation is noticed. Provide the missing fasteners at all other improperly installed connectors, particularly at the hip truss connections to the bottom 17-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters chord bearing points. Other retrofits and/or documentation are required to comply with the criteria of a Type A hurricane shelter. • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type B classification • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 115 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level C protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements In addition to retrofits that must be made to Building D, architectural requirements must be considered as well. The Summary of Recommended Criteria and Guidelines for Hurricane Shelter Classifications require that Type EHPA hurricane shelters have a restroom within the shelter area. Although the restrooms are contained within Building D, they are not accessible through interior openings of all other designated shelter areas within the building. • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type A and Type B classification • Install a deployable protective screen enclosure or similar device around the building to allow a safe access corridor to the restrooms. The screen must be pressure rated for design wind speeds of 140 mph or greater and missile level D impact rated or higher • Since most structural elements begin to approach or exceed their allowable load capacity under partially enclosed conditions at around the minimum acceptable wind speeds for Type EHPA shelters, the wind loads can be reduced by creating enclosed conditions. To accomplish this all fixed louvers must be closed by some method during storm events or operable louvers installed. These and all other openings must be pressure rated for design wind speeds of 140 mph or greater and missile level D impact rated or higher. • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 140 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level D protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements 17.1.1.3 Waikoloa Elementary School - Classroom Building E 17-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Saffi r- Simpson Storm Categories and Shelter Classes 02 92 I = 122 132 1' 1:` :" 172 192 12 3 -Second Rf-ak Gust Win dspeed StrenUtII Capacity Classroom Building E in its current condition complies with the strength capacity wind load requirements of a Type B hurricane shelter, and although unrated openings and impact protection exist it can safely be assumed that the existing openings and protection devices meet the wind load requirements for this shelter type and the required missile impact level A. However, some structural deficiencies were noticed during the inspection. The items listed below require attention to assure full compliance: • Repair or replace any damaged existing opening protections. • Missing uplift connectors are considered a structural flaw and should be retrofitted. This can be accomplished by installing uplift connectors, or equivalent method (minimum capacity of 1000 lbs. each), at the top and bottom chords of each hip - girder truss to setback -girder at each truss connection. • Install remedial uplift connectors at the hip truss connections to the setback girders anywhere improper installation is noticed. Provide the missing fasteners at all other improperly installed connectors, particularly at the hip truss connections to the bottom chord bearing points. Other retrofits and/or documentation are required to comply with the criteria of a Type A hurricane shelter. • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type B classification • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 115 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level C protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements In addition to retrofits that must be made to Building E, architectural requirements must be considered as well. The Summary of Recommended Criteria and Guidelines for Hurricane Shelter Classifications require that Type EHPA hurricane shelters have a restroom within the shelter area. Although the restrooms are contained within Building E, and themselves could be considered shelter areas, they are not accessible through interior openings of other designated shelter areas within the building 17-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan ------------- 02 92 I = 122 132 1' 1:` :" 172 192 12 3 -Second Rf-ak Gust Win dspeed StrenUtII Capacity Classroom Building E in its current condition complies with the strength capacity wind load requirements of a Type B hurricane shelter, and although unrated openings and impact protection exist it can safely be assumed that the existing openings and protection devices meet the wind load requirements for this shelter type and the required missile impact level A. However, some structural deficiencies were noticed during the inspection. The items listed below require attention to assure full compliance: • Repair or replace any damaged existing opening protections. • Missing uplift connectors are considered a structural flaw and should be retrofitted. This can be accomplished by installing uplift connectors, or equivalent method (minimum capacity of 1000 lbs. each), at the top and bottom chords of each hip - girder truss to setback -girder at each truss connection. • Install remedial uplift connectors at the hip truss connections to the setback girders anywhere improper installation is noticed. Provide the missing fasteners at all other improperly installed connectors, particularly at the hip truss connections to the bottom chord bearing points. Other retrofits and/or documentation are required to comply with the criteria of a Type A hurricane shelter. • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type B classification • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 115 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level C protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements In addition to retrofits that must be made to Building E, architectural requirements must be considered as well. The Summary of Recommended Criteria and Guidelines for Hurricane Shelter Classifications require that Type EHPA hurricane shelters have a restroom within the shelter area. Although the restrooms are contained within Building E, and themselves could be considered shelter areas, they are not accessible through interior openings of other designated shelter areas within the building 17-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type A and Type B classification • Install a deployable protective screen enclosure or similar device around the building to allow a safe access corridor to the restrooms. The screen must be pressure rated for design windspeeds of 140 mph or greater and missile level D impact rated or higher • Since most structural elements begin to approach or exceed their allowable load capacity under partially enclosed conditions at around the minimum acceptable windspeeds for Type EHPA shelters, the wind loads can be reduced by creating enclosed conditions. To accomplish this all fixed louvers must be closed by some method during storm events or operable louvers installed. These and all other openings must be pressure rated for design windspeeds of 140 mph or greater and missile level D impact rated or higher. • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 140 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level D protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements. 17.1.1.4 Konawaena Elementary School - Cafetorium Building C Saf ir-Simpson Storm Categories and Shelter Clas-ses EAstng :4ncows %'V -:'FRS -'able Cape- ngE & Dormer Opening_ 'ar. ;=-1olvse::l ~ m T a-=g:y1 Catejo 2 y Category 1=.a:_gory4 Exist ng hle-al hoof at E neher �` re3s i9 �s=d vn' 'ect aeei is D - t. 32 92 1C2 12 122 132 142 152 162 172 i3` 1g� 3 -Second Peak Gust LYndspeedSatrerM th Capacity Building C would classify as a Type B hurricane shelter in its existing condition. Essentially, a Type B hurricane shelter is possible because the exterior doors and windows, interior doors, 17-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters and gable openings in all the shelter -designated areas are estimated to be capable of providing protection for an ASTM -E-1996 Level A missile. If it desired to achieve a Type A hurricane shelter, it would be necessary to retrofit the windows and gable openings in all the shelter -designated areas so that an ASTM -E-1996 level C missile protection is provided in conformity with such shelter designation. The interior doors between the kitchen and the multi-purpose dining hall would not have to be upgraded to resist an ASTM -E-1996 Level C missile. The analysis made based on the specific properties of the standing seam metal roof indicates that the roof panels over the shelter -designated areas are adequate to resist the wind uplift pressures required for an EHPA Type hurricane shelter in Building C. It would be necessary to retrofit the windows and gable openings in all the shelter -designated areas so that an ASTM -E-1996 level D missile protection is provided in conformity with an EHPA shelter designation. The MWFRS and other secondary structural components are theoretically capable resisting wind loads that correspond to an EHPA type shelter. The capacity of Building C to resist hurricane wind loads is most likely governed by the capacity of the web verticals in the trusses over the multi-purpose dining hall. It was found that these truss elements are capable of resisting wind pressures corresponding to a peak gust wind speed at the strength level of 155 -mph for the partially enclosed condition. It is important to note that an enclosed condition was not evaluated or considered, since Building C is a naturally ventilated building. Therefore, prevention of interior pressurization is considered economically impractical. A summary of the retrofits recommended above, based on Shelter Type, is as follows: • All Types: Provide and enclosure to protect exterior propane storage tank from windborne debris. • All Types: Verify, and if necessary provide, adequate anchorage of mechanical ventilation units in roof above kitchen. • All Types: Provide adequate bracing for the framing of the lay -in acoustic tile and gypsum board ceilings as they constitute a falling hazard in their existing condition. • Type A Shelter: Provide impact protection for all exterior windows and gable openings in all the shelter -designated areas (ASTM -E-1996 Level C Missile or better). • EHPA Type Shelter: Provide impact protection for all exterior windows and gable openings in all the shelter -designated areas (ASTM -E-1996 Level D Missile or better). In addition to these recommendations, it is advised that portions of two other buildings in the school — Buildings B and E — be considered as potential candidates for hurricane shelters. 17-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters 17.2 Private Hurricane Shelters As a future mitigation project the criteria used to evaluate existing public emergency shelters can be adapted for application to privately owned facilities. This evaluation procedure would be particularly relevant in Hawaii due to the large tourist resorts and hotels that may need to be utilized as emergency shelters in the event of a hurricane or other disaster. 17.3 Safe Rooms The State Building Code has adopted provisions that allow Residential Safe rooms in lieu of fulfilling the windborne debris protection requirements of the IBC. An excerpt of this section taken from the Hawaii State Building code is as follows: 17-15 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters Section U102 Mawaii reside ntlaI aafe room. Cha Wer 4 is amended b adding Sectian 422 to read as follows, SECTION 422 Hawaii residential safe room 422,1 Performance -Based design criteria. The residential safe roarn shall meet the minimum performance specifications of Sections 422. 1.1 through 422.9- 42 2. 1.1 22,9. 422.1.1 1Ment and scone. The intent of the residential safe roam is to temporarily provide an enhanced protection area, fully enclosed wtthfn a dwelling or within an accessory structure to a residen e, which is designed and constructed to withstand the wind pressures, windbome debris iMD3Cts. and other requirements of this section 42 2.1.2 Altemative standards. I . Manufactured safe room designs subject to approval. A manufactured safe room or safe room.kit may be substituted if documentation is submitted and aooroved by the building official. The safe room shall be engineered, tested 211d Manufactured to meet or exceed the criteria of this section. 2. FEMA in-resIdonce shelter designs nerrnitted._It shall he permissible to build FEMA In -Residence Shelters of up to 64 square feet of floor area with walls up to S feet long tat are bjilt in accordance with construction deta°ls of FEMA 32U. 4222 Site c riteri a. Residential safe rooms shall not be constructed within areas subject to stream flooding_, opastal flooding or dam failure inundation within any of the following areas: 1, FEMA SDecial Flood Lazard Areas (SFHA) sub-ect tc rainfall runoff flooding or stream or flash flooding: 2, Coastal zon+es'V or "A" identified_in the Flood Insurance Rate May (FIRM) issued by FEMA for floodplain manaclement purposes, in which the flood hazard are tides, storm surge, waves, t^sunarnis, or a combination of these of Land and Natural Recours. 422.3 Maximum occupgney. The safe room is permitted to be used for a maximum'+ occu ari cy teased on at least 15 square feet per person with a maximum cf 8 persons in a room of up to 128 square feet of floor area - 422.4 Provisions for exiting. The room shall be ecluipped with an inward -swinging dour and an impact -protected operable wFndow suitable for a nlean5 of alternative exiting Ill ::Irl mergence. 17-16 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: ,Shelters 42 2. 5 D esig n for dead I lure wind rain and Impact loads. 422.15.1 Structural intearity criteria. 1. The residential safe room shall be built with a com plete structurals stern end a complete load path for vertical and lateral loads caused by gravity and wind. 2. The building that the residential safe room is in shall be assumed to be destroyed by the storm and shall not be taken as offering anyprotective shielding to the safe room enclosure. 3. The ceiling structure and wall shall be capable of su ortin_q a u er m posed debris load of the full wei ht of a ny building floors and roof above, but not less than 125 psf. 4. They resdential safe room enclosure shell be capable of simultaneouslly resisting_lateral and uplift wind Pressures_Mrresponding to a 160 mph 3 - second peak q ust determined in accordance with ASCE ®7 11+1inimum Desian Loads for Buildings and Other Structures calculated usin-q load and importance Factors of 1.0. The site exposure iactcr shall be based on exposure C, The a ust factor and the directi onalityr factor shall be taken as 0 85. TDpog ra phic wind amiplification caused by mountainous terrain shall be considered in accordance with the building code. Intemal pressure shall be determined in accordance with ASCE -- 7. 5. The _r_esidential safe room shall be anchored to a foundations stern capable of resisting the above loading c nditions_ 422.5.2 Windborne debris Impact protection of building enclosure elements. The entire enclosure of the safe room including all walls ceilings, and openincgs. fixed or operable windows. and all entry doors into the safe room, shall meet or exceed. Level D requirements of ASTM E 1996 (Tabl(- 422-5-1)- Any 22.5-1)_Ay wall or ceiling penetration greater than 4 square inches shall be considered an gpgning. Exception: Electrical outlet bones and interior lighting switches not penetrating more than .5 -inches into the interior wall surface and a plumbing piping or conduit not greater than 1 _b -inch in dia meter shall be exempted from this requirement. ru re I lm pact iprotective systems shall meet the ,ASTM E 1 reg uinement for the lcading_9iv n in Table 422.5-1. 17-17 Hairaii Cotttaty-llttlti-Hazard llitzgatzori Placa Chapter 17: Shelters Table 422.5-1 — Wlndborne Dermis Protection and Cyclic Pressure Criteria for Residential Safe Rooms AGTM E 1996 Missile Level Rating Debris Missile Size Debris Impart Spee Enclosure) all Ceiling. and Floor Cyclic Air Pressure Testing - maximum inward and marrirrnum outward press u res x 4 weighing 9,0 lb. rl-. 0.25 lb_, aria 60 ft.,"sec_ or 35 Psf inward 45 psf outhvard -- T at least 34 mph with rain. lencith 8 ft +f- 4 -inch 422.6 Ventllatlon. The residentia safe morn shall be naturally ventilated to allow the enclosure to have approximately one air change every two hours. This,recluirement may be satisfied by 12 square inches of venting per occupant. There shall be at least two operable vents. The verits shall be protected by a cowling or other device that shall be impapt tested to comply with ASTM E 1996 are of sumcient are defined in ASCE 7, 422..7 Communications. The residential safe room shall be equipped with a Phone I ne and telephone that sloes ng: rely on a separate electrical poor outlet_ .Alternatively, a wireless telephone shall' to permitted to rely on ars ~3 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) battery deviee. - 422.8 Construction documents. Construction documents for the residential safe room shall be dire_ ctlV prepared by a Hawaii licensed professional structuralengineer. 422,9 U ecial iris ectllon. The construction or installation of the residential safe room shall be verified for conformance to the drawin-gs in accordance with Chapter 17. 422.10 Nvltifiication. The own or of the safe room shall notVy the state gWrtment of defense and county civil defense agency of the property's Tax map key or global positioning syystern coordinates, 17-18 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters 17.4 Enhanced Hurricane Protection Areas Section 423, Design Criteria for Enhanced Hurricane Protection Areas (EHPA), follows the criteria developed under Act 5, Disaster Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, this criteria is applicable to new buildings utilized as shelters and those health-care facilities that should be capable of self -sheltering. bulldinas - des C Section 423 to 423.1 Intent. The purpose of this section is to establish minimum life sarfaty design criteria for enhanced hurricane orMach or areas in high occueanc�r state- and county -owned buildings occupied during hurricanes of up to Saffir Simsan, Gate -gory 3. 423.2 Scapa. This section shall aVoly to state- and county -yawned buildings which are of Occupancy Catrtqorl III and IV defined by Table 16Q4.5 and of the following s odfic occupancies: 1. Enclosed and pardally enclosed structures whose primary occippancy is public assembly vAth an occupant load greater than 300, 2. Health care facilities with an occuparrit load of 50 or more resident patients, but not having surgery or emergency treatment facilities. 3. Any other state- and county -owned enclosed or partially enclosed bu 1 Id ing with an occu pant Icad greater than 000. 4. Hosaitals and other heatth care fsoil ities .having surgery or_emergenc� treatment f3cilitiS, Exception: Facilities bcated within flood zone `al and flood zone A that are designated by the owner to be evacuated during hurricane warn incs declared by the hlational Weather Service, shall not be subject to these reauirements. 423.3 Site criteria. 17-19 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters 423.3.1 Flood and tsunami zones. Comply with ASCE 24-05, Flood Resistant Des ig n and Construction based on provisions for Occu anc tate o ]ILli_ 1. Floor slab on Qrado shall be 1.5 foot above the base flood elevation cf the county's tloDd hazard maps, or at higher elevation as determined by a modeling methodcloqy that vredicts the maximum envelope and death of with respect to a Category 3 hurricane. 2. Locale outside of V and Coastal A flood zones unlace justified by site- specific analygis or designed for vertical evacuation in accordance wikh a method approved by the building official_ When a building within a V or Coastal A flood zone is a pproved. the bottom of the lowest structural fram g member of any elevated first floor space shall be 2 feet above the base fland elevation of the. r.atint 's florid hazard map,or at higher elevation as determined by a modeling methodology that predicts the maximum envelope and depth of inundation including the combined effects of stcErm surge and wave actions with respect to a Gategory 3 hurricane. 3 Locate outside of tsunami evacuation zones unless 'ustified by site-specific analysis or d"gned for vertical evacuatim lir) accordance with a method approved by the building official_ 42.3.3.2 Emercenu vehicle access. Provide at least one route for erneraency.ahicle amass. The portion of the emer enr. rnirtp within the site shall be atove the 1 DD -veer flood elevation_ 423.3.3 Lan dsca i ng and uti I Ity la dowln im pa ct hazards. Landscaping around the buiildmg shall be designed to provide standoff separation sufficient to rimakTtain erner-gency vehicle acces8 in the event of mature tree bio do n. Trees shall not interfere with the functioning of overhead or underground utlllty lines, nor cause lavdovwn orfallinq imDact hazard to the building envelope or utility litres_ 423.3.4 Aolacent buildingl. The tuilding shall not be located within_ 1,000 fept of any hazxdnus material facilities defined by Table '1604.5. Unanchored light -framed portable structures shall be not permitted within 300 feet of the byiIdinp. -- 423.4 Enhanced hurricane protection area program requirements. 423.4.1 Applicable net area. At least fifty percent of the net square feet of a faciINN shall be constructed to quaxlifv as an enhanced hurricane orotecttian area- The net Roor area shall be determined by subtractirm. from the gross sq uare feet the flogr area of excluded spaces, exteria r walls cc fixed or movable objects, eguilpmerit or other features that under probable c+ondtiong cannot be removed or stared d u ri ng use as a storrr shelter, 17-20 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters 423.4.2 Excluded spaces. Spaces such as mechani:al rooms, electrical rocms. story a rooms attic and cravd s paces shall not be cr-nSiderod ai� net floor area permitted to be occupied audnci a hurrcane_ 423.4.3 Occupancy capacity. The occu ,aanay canacAv shali be determined by cividing the net area of the enhanced hurricane protection area b 15 square feet net floor arca per person, 423.4.4 Toilets and hand washing faclilties. Provide a minimum of 1 toilet per 50 enhanced hurrfcan* protection area ooauyarts aId a minimum sof 1 sink Per 100 enhanced hurricane prctection area occu Pa nts as determined in accordance with Section 423.4.3 located within the geri mote r Of the enhanced hurricane protection argg. These required todetand hared -washing facilities are not in addition to those required for normal occupancy and shall be included in the overall fsoil ily fixture count. 423.4.6 Acessibility. Where the refuge occupancy accommodales more than 50 persons, vrovide an ADS. -accessible route to a shefter arca at each facility with a minimum cf 1 wheelchairs ace for every 200 enhanced hurricane Protection area occupants determined in accordance with Section 423,4.3. 423.5 Desian wind, rain, and impact loads. 4423.5.1 Structural desion criteria. The buildin+u main wind force resistiny system and structural components shall be designed per ASCE 7 for a 115 mph minimum i3eak 3 -second a ust desig n with a load factor of 1.6 anti an importance factor for Occupancy Category IiI. Topographic a n directionality factors shall to the site-specific valuo determined ver Appendix W. Design for interior Pressure shall be based on the largest opening in anv exterfor facades or roof surface 423.5.21 indborrte debris missile impact for building enclosure elements. Exterior glazing and glazed openings. louvers, roof openings and doors. shall be provided with windborne debris impact r,esistanoe or protection systems conforming to AS TiM E1995-05 LeveI D, i.e., 9 Ib. 2 X 4 {+ 50 fps { 4 1 423.6.3 Cyclic pressure loading of impact resistive glazing or windbome impact protective systems- Desistance to the calculated maximum inward and outward pressure shall be desicrned to conform to ASTM E199M5. 423.6.4 Mndows. All unprotected window assemblies and their anchoring s stems shall be designed and installed to meet the wind load and missile impact criteria of this section. 17-21 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters S. designed and instated to meet the wind load and missile impact criteria and completely covers the window assembly and anchorin system - 423.5.6 stent_ 423.5.6 Doors. All exterior and interior doors sub'ect to p Ossible wind exposure or missile impact shall have doors frames anchoring devices and vision panels designed and installed to resist the wind load and missile impact criteria or such doors, frames, anchoring devices, and vision panels shall be rD ided vAth im act rotective systems designed arta installed to resin' the VA load and missile impact criteria of this section. 423.5.7 Exterior envelope. The building enclosure, including walls, roofs, lazed openings, louvers and doorsr shall not be-porforated or metrated b windbome debris, as determined by co mDIiance with ASTM E1996-05 LeyeI C. 423.5.8 Parapets. Parapets shall satisfy the wind load and missile impact criteria of the exterior envelope. 423.6.9 Roofs 423.6.9.1 Roof openings. Roof o enin s (e. -g., HVAC fans dints skylights) shall be provided with protection for the wind load .and missile impact criteria of Sections 423.5,2 and 423-5.3- 423.5.9.2 Mall wind LW covarin s_ Roof coverings shall hes "ed and designed ed accordin to the latest .ASTM Standards for hi h Wind uplift forces. 423.5.9.3 Roof drainage. Roofs shall have ade u e sloe drains and OverflOw drains or scuppars sized to acgommodale 900 -year hogrlV rainfal ratez; in accordance w4h Section 1611, 1, but not less than -inches per hour for 6 continuous hours. 423.6 Ventilation 4Z3.6.1 Mechanical ventilation. McChanical ventilation as required in accordance with the International Mechanical Code_ Air intakes and exhausts shall be desiyned and installed to meet the wind load and missile impact criteria of Sections 423,5.2 and 423.5,3. ,423.6.2 HVAC equipment anchorage. HVAC equipment mounted on roofs and anchodng systems shall be designed and installed to meet the wind load cr�e def_ Bo of otoeninas for roof -mounted HVAG eauioment shall have a I,; - inch -high curb designed to prevent the entry of ra n water. `! 17-22 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters 423.7 Standby electrical system capablft, Provide a standby emergency electrical Powers stem per Chapter 27 and NFPA 70 Article 700 EmeEgency SMIems and Article 701 Le ail Re aired Standby stems which shall have the capability of beim connected to an emergency generator or other temporary_ power source. The emergency system caebilfies shall include: 1. An emergency Iighting system; 2_ Illuminated exit signs; 3. Fire protection 6ystems, fire alarms stems and firesprinkler sprinkler systems; and 4, Minimum mechanical ventilation for heafthisafety purposes. 423.7.1 Emer enc +enerator. When emerge nenerators are p re- installed, the facility housing the generator, permanent or portable, shall be an enclosed area des ig ned to protect the generators from wind and missile im pact. Generators hardened by the manufacturer to withstand the area's design wind and missile impact criteria shall be exempt from the enclosed area criteria requirement. 423.8 Quality assurance 423.8.1 Information on construction documents. Construction Documents shall include design crite7a, the occupancy capacity of the enhanced hurricane protective area, and Project Specifications shall include opening protection devices. Floor plans shall indicate all enhanced hurricane protection area portions of the facility and exitinq routes there from. The latitude and longitude coordinates of the building stall be recorded on the construction documents. - 423.8.2. S pedal ins paction_ Ire addition to #hie re uirements of Q hay Pter 17, sr,ecial inspections shall include at least the folloWng systems and components: I e Roof cladd n g and roof fro min q conn ct -Ms 2. Wall connections to rogf and floor d japhraa rns andfram_ j ng; Roof and floor d iaphraqM systems,gystems, inclWing collectors d rN struts arnd boundary elements, 4, Vertical wrirndforce-resisting systems, including brad frames, moment frames and shear walls, . 5, Windforce-resisting system connections to the foundation; and 6. Fabrication and installation of s sterns or components required to meet the i mpact-resiatance reg uire rnenls of Section '1609;1:2, Exception: Fabrication cf manufactured systems or components that have a label indicating Compliance with the wind -load and impact - resistance requirements of this cote. 17-23 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters 423.9.3 Quality assurance plan. rA constructiongu ft assurance ram shall be included ir7 the t;L)F1str 4 uhorl documents and shalt #ncludee 1. The materials, systems, components and work TgOred to .have special 2. The type and extent of each special insyection; _ The tWe and extent of each test: 4. Additional re uirements for special ins pecton or testi na for seismic or wind resistance, and 5. For each type of sptcial in, pertian identii:wcation as tc whether it will pe continuous seecial inspection or periodic smdaf inspection_ 423.8.4 Peer review. Construction documents shall be Inde endend reviewed by a Hawaii -licensed structural L -n -q inear. A written o inion repo I of comp'i n a shall be.submitted to State Civil Defen;o. the building pff tial, and the owner. 423.8 Maintenance. The buildin shell be periDdically inspected eve three years and maintained by the owner to ensure structural integrity and oompliance with this section. A report of inspection shall be furnished tc the State Dlvll Defense. Ki to determine whether an y alterations would cause a violatic)n ,of this section, deterioration or damage tc env component of the buildng shall require an (Auth: HISS §107-29) (Ir-np: NRS §§107-24, IOT-25) 17-24 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17: Shelters 17.5 Future Mitigation Plans Recommended future hazard mitigation projects for shelter facilities are listed below: Project Description Status Emergency shelter evaluation; Harden Perform a 1 -year study to identify Proposed Project; public schools for emergency shelters. and rank Hawaii building types that Then follow-up with the more There is a shortage of shelter buildings in could be deemed safer for hurricane detailed DAGS-standardized Hawaii County. Of the 14 hurricane resistance without exhaustive site structural evaluation shelters on the island, only four shelters investigations. Use this screening procedure for those public have been evaluated for safety by DAGS: criteria to determine the number of shelter facilities that have • Holualoa E. S. low vulnerability buildings available higher vulnerability, taking • Waikoloa E. S. bldg D for refuge in the private sector. This into account the revised net • Waikoloa E. S. bldg E could result in a decrease in the shelter demand. • Konawaena E.S. number of persons that would report Perform a comprehensive screening to a public shelter. evaluation of public hurricane shelters and private sector buildings for possible use for refuge Hawaii County All -Hazard Assessment of The three to four facilities with the Proposed Project: Hurricane Shelters highest -ranked losses will be taken This detailed evaluation will This project will conduct onsite building to a detailed evaluation using Benefit be identifying priority construction as -built data collection for the Cost Analysis of potential mitigation buildings and providing the remaining 10 hurricane shelter buildings, measures. information necessary to using the more detailed DAGS- submit PDM grant standardized structural evaluation applications for three to four procedure that follows the criteria retrofit projects. established by the legislature Hardening of Waiakea High School Gym Waiakea High School Gym is a Last proposed for FY09 PDM Window, Door & Enclosure Retrofitting designated hurricane shelter, but has grant. Application requires Possible Roof & Framing connection glass doors and glass louvers further investigation to define retrofitting. When re -roofing a critical precise scope and cost, as facility, provide extra protection from well as developing the BCA water damage, check and refasten the roof sheathing. Hawaii Residential Safe Room Requirements for room construction NOAA and DBEDT features are given in the State sponsored research project to Building Code; effective by 2011 for develop and test wall those homes that do not provide assemblies rated for safe glazing windborne debris protection room use. 17-25 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 18. Risk Assessment Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent CHAPTER 18 - RISK ASSESSMENT In assessing vulnerability to various hazards, there are four categories of concern: • Emergency response capabilities. What are the components of an effective emergency response system for all hazards and how adequate and resilient are these facilities? • Lifeline facilities. What are the critical lifelines to provide for our basic needs and do we need to relocate or fortify any of these facilities to withstand hazard risks? • Recovery capabilities. What facilities are necessary to facilitate recovery after a disaster and how adequate are these facilities? • Special at risk populations or areas. What special populations or areas require particular attention during emergencies for evacuation or to contain potential secondary hazards? This chapter inventories the facilities, populations, or areas in each of the above categories, and assesses their risk to hazards. 18.1 Emergency Response Facilities and Capabilities The County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan is the basis for the County's emergency response programs to promptly implement a fully coordinated response and measured appli- cation of resources when disaster threatens or occurs. 82 Although fully functional, the plan needs review and updating since it is over ten years from the last revision. 18.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is the command center during a civil emergency. In a major emergency, numerous agencies must carry out the many different functions needed in an emergency swiftly and well. Many of these functions are interdependent; one agency cannot do its job well without information from another agency. The EOC activates at different levels depending on the emergency. For minor emergencies, activation would not go beyond the Civil Defense staff working with the Fire and Police de- partments, and operational decision making may transition to an incident command center at the scene as the emergency situation becomes clearer. For advance readiness for what may become a full emergency (e.g., issuance of a "watch"), limited activation of other agencies for the EOC is necessary to coordinate and support more complex field operations. A full disaster requires mobilization of the entire organization shown in Figure 18-1 to carry out and coordinate warning, evacuation, police, fire, rescue and ambulance services, mass care, damage assessment, debris clearance, health, medical and sanitation services, public works, radiological protection and any other service required to protect public health and safety. 82 County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan, 1989. 18-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessinent COUNTY OF HAWAII DISASTER RESPONSE ORGANIZATION I STATE CIVEL DEFENSE POLICE I I FIRE -RESCUE POLICE I I FIRE DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS iS F I " INIV.11 114"1M I M 71 Dept of Civil Service Dept ofFinanoe Planning Department Dept- ofT iquorContrni Dept- of Pales and Recreation Dept. ofResearch & Development Corporation Counsel Mass Transit Office of Aging Otiuer County Agencies (As needed) MAYOR STATE DEPUTYDIRECTOR OR CIVIL DEFENSE HAWAII CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY PUBLIC WORKS Hawaii Electric Light Co- EBS Statm HEALTH AND & ENGWEFKING Amateur Radio Club Dept of Accaunting & Gen Sers2ces MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF Dept ofAgncuhir a Civil Air Patrol DIST. HEALTH PUBLIC WGRSS BoylGui Scouts Civic & Service Grourps OFFICE (DOH) AMERICAN RED CROSS MASS CARE UTILtITIES Pi7BLIC WELFARE BRANCH CDHS) DEPARTMENT OF WATER SUPPLY COOPERATING AGENCIES STATE DISTRICT AND BRANCH OFFICES Hawaii Electric Light Co- EBS Statm Verizon Amateur Radio Club Dept of Accaunting & Gen Sers2ces Gas Co. Sugar Plantation Assoc. Dept ofAgncuhir a Civil Air Patrol Medical Grmrps Dept- of Bks- & Erna Dev- BoylGui Scouts Civic & Service Grourps Dept- of Com. & Cam Affairs Religions Groups Coast Guard Reserve Dept- of Corrections Cliaitable Organ mums Coast Guard Auxiiiary- Dept. ofDefmse T=BnsQxgaoies SalvationAmW Dept of Education Fratunal Groups News Media Dept. of Hawn- Home I and Business & Professional Radio & Television Dept of Labor & Iudns- Rel- Associations Broadcasting Stations Dept of Land & Natural Res. Labor Unions. Trade Associations Dept of Taxation YMCA-YWCA-YBA Hotel Resorts Dept- of Transportation Civic and Somme Groups Visitor Industry IAB j University of Hawaii Nursing Associations Private SChoals Office of Coo Protection Figure 18-1. Emergency Response Organization Source: County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan The County's EOC is located in the Civil Defense office which is part of the Hawaii Public Safety Complex on Kapiolani Street in Hilo. The facility is designed to have self-sufficient enclosed live-in capacity for 75 persons for two weeks and is equipped with the following: • Communications radio and telephone links to the rest of the County and the State; • Warning systems controls; • Meeting area capacity of 50 persons to accommodate the team; • Information such as maps, contact information, departmental plans and SOPS; • 24-hour personal accommodations (e.g., restrooms, shower, food preparation area); • Standby water and power (i.e., 2 emergency generators and associated fuel storage); • Designed for radiation protection factor (PF) of at least 100. The EOC is not in the tsunami evacuation zone, flood hazard zone, or high-risk lava hazard zone (Lava Hazard Zone 1 or 2). 18-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Should the EOC become inoperable for any reason, there is a mobile command post that is ready as the alternate EOC. There is also a backup facility in Kona at the Department of Pub- lic Works' baseyard. 18.1.2 Emergency Shelters Shelters are a place of refuge for residents and visitors in anticipation of a hazard event and after the event as necessary. These shelters are primarily public facilities consisting of schools, parks, community centers and office buildings that have capacity to accommodate large numbers of people and are assumed to be basically structurally sound to withstand hurricanes (many of these facilities have not been evaluated for structural adequacy). This section evaluates adequacy in terms of location/capacity, structural integrity, and staffing. 18.1.2.1 Location and Capacity The current Civil Defense shelter inventory island wide is listed and illustrated in Chapter 17. Shelter needs depend on the hazard. For tsunamis, shelters are needed only for residents and visitors in the tsunami evacuation zone. Similarly, for lava flow hazards, shelters are needed only for residents in the lava inundation area. In contrast, shelter needs for hurricanes are widespread. For planning purposes, therefore, meeting the needs for hurricane shelter will ensure adequate shelter needs for all other hazards. A Hurricane Emergency Sheltering Plan developed by the State Civil Defense in 1998 utilized behavioral analyses studies to determine the amount of shelter space government must be capable of providing for evacuees in public facilities. 83 Information obtained from the Oahu behavioral analyses provided information about likely evacuation rates, i.e., the percentage of the population that will evacuate in response to advisories from local officials, and the evacuation destinations-- i.e., the percentages of evacuees who would seek shelter in public facilities, as compared to homes of relatives and friends, hotels and other destinations. Based on the data collected, the State's sheltering plan utilized the following averages to determine public sheltering needs: • Average percentage of people leaving their homes for another location: Weak Storm - 60 percent Strong Storm - 90 percent • Average percentage of those leaving their homes who will go to public shelters: All Storms - 35 percent Applying these guidelines to determine the resident shelter needs for strong storms in Hawaii County, the greatest deficiencies are in North Kona, followed by South Hilo, Puna, and South Kohala (see Table 18-1). The total shortfall based on the stated assumptions is 9,100 spaces. The only districts which have excess capacity are North Hilo and Hamakua. 83 State of Hawaii, Department of Defense, State Civil Defense Division, Hurricane Emergency Sheltering Plan, December 1998. 18-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Table 18-1. Resident Shelter Needs by District District Est. Population 84 Shelter Space 85 NeedsS6 Deficiency 87 N. Kohala 6,038 1,590 1,902 312 S. Kohala 13,131 2,920 4,136 1,216 N. Kona 28,543 5,275 8,991 3,716 S. Kona 8,589 2,225 2,706 481 Ka'u 5,827 1,175 1,836 661 Puna 31,335 8,435 9,871 1,436 S. Hilo 47,386 13,100 14,927 1,827 N. Hilo 1,720 640 542 -98 Hamakua 6,108 2,375 1,924 -451 Totals 148,677 37,735 46,835 9,100 It should be noted that these figures are for the resident population only and do not address our visitor needs. Hotels need to be prepared to self -shelter their guests. As an incentive, liability coverage for private shelters, as outlined in Hawaii Revised Statutes section 128-19, is available to those facilities that create suitable guest shelter space. A coordinated program needs to be in place to assist hotel and resort managers to identify hurricane -resistant space and to train staff. For cruise ship passengers, the County needs to coordinate with various hotels or identify public shelter spaces to accommodate these passengers. 84 Hawaii County Data Book 2000 85 Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency 86 Calculated from [Population] x [People Leaving Their Homes (.90)] x [People Leaving Home That Will Go to Shelters (.35)]. 87 Calculated from [Needs] - [Shelter Space]. 18-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Kohala High & InterKohala Elementary NORTH KUHIALA Population = 7517 Honokaa High & Intermediate Waimea State Offices & Courthouse Waimea Elementary & Intermediate SOUTH KOHA. Population _1 1d HAMAkUP Papulation=6`GI NORTH HILO - '1'aPUation = 7720 Hilo Intermediate Hilo High ! SOUTH Hao Waiakea High Kealakehe Eleme taryKealakehe High Population = 4T47IIva Elementary Kealakehe Intermedia 11111TH Konig Fit W Kahakai Ele population IMidKeaau High Holualoa Elementary Mountain View Elementary Konawaena High * Keonepoko Elementary Pahoa High & Intermediat*ailoa E,I_ementary Honaunau ElementaryPUNA--„� Population = 42591 Hookena Elementary SOUTH KONA Population = 11414 K Populatonion = 7050 Kau High and Pahala Elementary Legend * Emergency Shelters Major Road 0 4 8 16 24 32 Miles Figure 18-2. Map of shelter locations on Hawaii Island 18.1.2.2 Structural Evaluation Ideally, all shelters should be hurricane -resistant in that the roof, walls, and windows will withstand hurricane forces. Although these shelters do not meet all of the guidelines established for evaluating hurricane -resistant facilities, they are the best that are available at the moment. No facility can be completely "hurricane -proof' and facility managers will be instructed to take precautions which will minimize the potential danger to shelter occupants. Known deficiencies will be addressed as part of an overall mitigation program to identify cost-effective retrofit projects that will improve the safety and capacity of the available shelters. A number of the shelters/centers are situated within lava hazard zone 2, including the Hawai- ian Ocean View Estates Community Center in the Ka'u District, the Keonopoko Elementary School complex in Puna, the Pahoa High and Intermediate School complex in Puna, the Pahoa Neighborhood Center in Puna and the Ho'okena Elementary School in South Kona. The Hawaii Volcanoes National Park Visitor Center, designated as a center, is situated in lava hazard zone 3. 18-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 18.1.2.3 Staffing Future updates to this plan should evaluate staffing needs as the number of shelters increase. 18.1.3 Police Stations The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Police Depart- ment during disaster response and recovery phases as follows: Evacuation • Direct and control traffic flow into and out of restricted disaster areas, and ensure open trafficways for all emergency and lifesaving services; protect life and property. • Assist in disseminating warning information. • Direct evacuation of the public from threatened areas. • Provide for security of vacated homes and facilities. • Establish and man roadblocks and barricades as required; deny entry into restricted areas. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Provide the department's operations control and emergency communications and activate emergency procedures. • Transmit vital information and requests for assistance from field units to the Civil De- fense EOC by timely spot and situation reports; keep field units currently informed. • Maintain interagency communication, coordination and support to facilitate operations as established by CD procedures. • Assist with conducting radiological monitoring and reporting as required. • Post -disaster • Survey, assess and report estimated disaster -related damages, losses and relief needs to the Civil Defense EOC on a continuing basis, especially during the initial stages. • Perform other tasks related to the situation as may be directed by appropriate authority. At a hurricane or tsunami watch, all off-duty and volunteer officers report to their respective main station. There are eight main district police stations around the island along with four substations and ten mini police stations (see Figure 18-4). Central dispatch facilities are located in the Hilo station. There are approximately 350 officers assigned to the various stations with an island -wide average of approximately 2.5 officers per 1,000 residents. None of the main stations are located in the tsunami evacuation zone. Two of the substations are unavoidably located in the lava hazard zone 2 (Pahoa, Hawaiian Ocean View). 18-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Yard �.�.,.��....Statinn 0 Police Substation Asset located in Volcanic Major Roads Hazard Zone 2 Figure 18-3. Map of Police Stations, DPW Baseyards, and Hospitals 18.1.4 Fire and EMS Stations The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Fire Department during disaster response and recovery phases as follows: • Fire -fighting, rescue, emergency medical • Direct and control fire hazard reduction, fire fighting, search and rescue operations to save life and property and to maintain or restore lifeline services and facilities. • Operate the department's Communication Control Center to facilitate the direction and control of all Fire -Rescue forces and operations "round the clock" shifts. • Provide ambulance and emergency medical services. • Assist in damage control. 18-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent • Evacuation • Assist in disseminating warning information and evacuating public. • Coordinate use of vehicles from other agencies for ambulatory and evacuation needs. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Transmit vital information and requests to the Civil Defense EOC by timely spot and situation reports; keep field units informed. • Assist in dispatching health and medical personnel to areas where their services are re- quired. • Request on -scene augmentation as soon as the need is anticipated. • Initiate and maintain interagency communication, coordination and cooperation to facilitate operations. • Conduct radiological monitoring and reporting as required. • Post -disaster • Survey, assess and report to the Civil Defense EOC estimated disaster -related damage, losses and relief needs. • Perform other tasks as may be required by the situation or directed by appropriate authority. There are fourteen regular fire stations around the island along with eighteen volunteer fire stations and two federal fire stations (see Figure 18-4). Centralized dispatch facilities are located in the Central Fire Station in Hilo. There are approximately 281 fire fighters assigned to the county fire stations around the island augmented by approximately 309 volunteer fire fighters. EMS (emergency medical service), rescue, and hazard materials teams are located at the following stations: 18-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent F F iy F + Fire Station F T + EMS Hazmat 40 Rescue Asset located within Tsunami Evacuation Zone Rescue &EMS Asset located within Volcanic Hazard Zone 2 • Asset within FIRM 100Year or500Year FloodZone Fire Volunteer Station F Figure 18-4. Map of Fire Stations • EMS-- all County fire stations (as distinguished from volunteer and federal stations) have EMS capability, except Waiakea and Laupahoehoe; • Ocean and/or helicopter rescue-- Waiakea, South Kohala (helicopter only), Kailua; • Hazardous materials response team-- Kaumana. A response team is needed for West Ha- waii. None of the fire stations are located within the flood or tsunami evacuation zones. Two sta- tions are unavoidably located in lava flow hazard zone 2: Pahoa, Hawaiian Ocean View (vol- unteer). 18-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent A study conducted in 1993 evaluated the seismic risks of fire stations." This study evaluated the structural conditions and non-structural hazards that could disrupt operational emergency services. Typical non-structural hazards include: garage doors that may bind if the support- ing structure experiences significant permanent racking and may consequently prevent fire fighting and rescue equipment from responding to an emergency; poorly anchored propane tanks that may roll over, rupture supply lines, cause uncontrolled releases of propane, and start fires; and unsecured batteries for emergency power generation which can fall, rupture, and cause a loss of power supply for emergency communication equipment. In addition, the desktop and console communications equipment and computers housed in the communications bunker at Hilo Central Fire Station must be secured to prevent falling. Since this equipment functions as the central dispatch and command center, damage to this equipment would jeopardize emergency response throughout the County. The study evaluated the structural conditions of four fire stations in more detail. Structural improvements were found to be necessary for each of these stations. Similar detailed structural evaluations need to be performed for the other stations. Overall, because of the high seismic risk in this County, and the age of the majority of the fire stations, the study rated the emergency preparedness of these essential facilities as poor. Hardening these essential facilities and mitigating non-structural hazards should be a high priority. 18.1.5 Department of Public Works Baseyards The County Department of Public Works carries out an important role during and after emer- gencies. The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Depart- ment of Public Works as follows: • Lifeline infrastructure repair and debris clearance • Direct and control overall public works and engineering operations to maximize the sav- ing of life and property and maintenance or restoration of lifeline services and facilities. • Direct and control emergency debris clearance, hazard removal and repair of vital facili- ties. • Isolate damaged sewer mains, disinfect raw sewage spills, restore service on priority ba- sis and decontaminate polluted areas in coordination with the District Health Office. • Assist in providing emergency transportation, emergency power and illumination. • Assist in search and rescue operations in conjunction with debris clearance and other public works functions. • Construct emergency fallout shelters, or improve existing shelters, in accordance with plans for expedient public shelter construction during a period of national emergency. • Evacuation • Provide assistance to the Police Department in establishing roadblocks or other traffic and crowd controls. 88 Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc., June 1993. Potential Seismic Hazards and Emergency Response Pre- paredness of Essential Fire Stations and Hospitals i the County of Hawaii. Prepared for the State of Hawaii Office of Civil Defense and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board. 18-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent • Assist with warning and evacuation of department personnel and the public. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Provide the required liaison in the Civil Defense EOC with appropriate "round-the- clock" shifts. • Assist in damage control. Transmit vital information and requests to the Civil Defense EOC by timely spot and sit- uation reports; keep field teams informed. • Initiate and maintain interagency communication, coordination and cooperation with all Public Works engineering centers, base yards and work teams to facilitate operations. • Conduct radiological and other hazardous material monitoring and response as required ensuring the safety of the work crews. • Post -disaster • Prepare mass burial sites in coordination with the District Health Officer. • Assess disaster -related damage and operational requirements; report estimates to Hawaii Civil Defense EOC. • Assume other responsibilities as may be required by the situation or directed by compe- tent authority. The Department of Public Works has eight base yards which serve as their operational, storage and maintenance centers (see Figure 18-3). These base yards are situated in Kurtistown, Hilo, Honokaa, Waimea, Hawi, Honalo, Captain Cook and Waiohinu. None of these base yards are situated in areas highly susceptible to natural hazards. 18.1.6 Hospitals There are five hospitals on the island with emergency medical and intensive care facilities (see Figure 18-3). Because of the expansiveness of this island, it is important and fortunate that the State hospital system is able to subsidize the hospitals in the outlying rural districts. A 1993 study evaluated the seismic risk of hospitals.89 The study found that non-structural hazards at all the hospitals were severe. Typical non-structural hazards include: poorly se- cured emergency power generators; unsecured hot water heaters, boilers, and piping that jeopardize sterilization, kitchen, and laundry services; and unsecured laboratory equipment, medical supply cabinets, pharmaceuticals, toxic chemicals, patient records, x-ray equipment, hung ceilings, corridor lighting, sprinkler lines, and propane tanks. The study conducted a detailed structural evaluation only of the Kona Hospital. Similar evaluations should be done of all hospitals. The findings of the Kona Hospital indicate the level of concern and urgency to ensure that these essential facilities are able to remain functional after a major earthquake. 89 Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc., June 1993. Potential Seismic Hazards and Emergency Response Pre- paredness of Essential Fire Stations and Hospitals in the County of Hawaii. Prepared for the State of Hawaii Office of Civil Defense and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board. 18-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent For the Kona Hospital, the study found that the Kona Hospital has several structural features reminiscent of the Olive View Hospital in California that contributed to its severe damage and partial collapse in the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake. These features of the Kona Hospital include: discontinuous shear wall along the west side which creates a partial soft story effect; irregular layout of shear walls at the ground floor which may lead to significant torsional response of the building; and the lack of adequate shear reinforcing bars in the columns where they are restrained by the concrete slab -on -grade that may lead to brittle failure of these columns. A structural engineer conducted a post-Kiholo Bay assessment to evaluate the safety of the facility and assured hospital personnel that the building was operable. This was followed by a more detailed review of seismic adequacy, preformed by the Hawaii Health Systems Corporation. 18.1.7 Hawaii County All Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities This project consisted of conducting an all -hazard rapid visual screening (RVS) of approximately 70 to 80 critical facilities in the County of Hawaii, including: • emergency operations center • 10 fire stations • 13 ambulance facilities • 10 police stations • 6 hospitals and clinics • Hilo and Kona airport facilities The project engineering team lead by the University of Hawaii conducted an all -hazard rapid visual screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii. FEMA 154 procedures were followed for the seismic evaluation, while similar procedures developed by Martin & Chock, Inc., for SCD were used for hurricane evaluation. A HAZUS MH risk assessment model has been used to evaluate the expected losses for each building due to earthquake, hurricane and flooding, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and the site visits. Complete vulnerability rankings lists of all facilities studied are included in Table 18-2 through Table 18-4. Two facility groups that ranked worst based on the site observations and HAZUS analysis were designated for more detailed Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) evaluation and development of recommended mitigation procedures. This detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit a PDM grant applications for the most needed retrofit project, and prioritize the most vulnerable critical facility buildings for future retrofits. The vulnerability of a building can be measured by economic loss or by loss of functionality related to the extent of damage. Both of these risk measures for earthquake and hurricane hazards were analyzed at an equivalent level of probability, so that an "apples to apples" comparison of effects for each building was possible. Both of these risk measures were analyzed for earthquake and hurricane hazards at an equivalent level of probability (750- to 1000 year RP). 18-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Total aggregated losses for each event are given below: • Hurricane Event Total Losses — Essential Facilities • Hurricane Event Total Losses — General Building Stock • Earthquake Scenario Total Losses — Essential Facilities • Earthquake Scenario Total Losses - General Building Stock $48,000,000 $7,138,000,000 $117,000,000 $4,243,000,000 From the results of these analyses a short list of the critical facilities with the highest economic losses or greatest loss of functionality (most severely damaged) was created for review by county officials. This list is included below: Group A Kaiwalani Fire Station, Honokaa Fire Station, North Kohala Fire Retrofits primarily consist of installing a Station, and the Central Fire Station Dispatch Office complete load path for hurricane wind upl ift Group B Kona Civic Center Fire Station, Kona Civic Center Police Station, Work primarily consist of seismic Keaau Fire Station, Keaau Police Station, and Laupahoehoe Police retrofits of masonry and concrete, Station (LPS) except LPS Group C Kohala Hospital Seismic and Hurricane retrofits Group D Kau Hospital Hurricane and some Seismic retrofits From the short list of highest expected loss facilities, Group B plus the Central Fire Station Dispatch Office and Kau Hospital were selected by HCDA for detailed Benefit Cost Analysis. Ka'u Hospital in Pahala, Hawaii, provides long-term care and acute care, obstetrics, emergency room, ambulance, and outpatient services. It is an essential facility for the southern Hawaii County districts of Puna, Kau, and South Kona. It is located in the Kau District of the County of Hawaii, the region of highest seismic hazard in the state, highest concentration of volcanic gas emissions, and is subject to hurricanes and windstorms since Hawaii is a hurricane and windborne debris hazard region. Built in 1968, its as -built condition predates modern requirements for seismic bracing of nonstructural elements and protection against windborne debris impacting windows. A common gas produced during the nearby Hawaiian eruptions just to the east that is potentially harmful to human health is sulfur dioxide. Exposure to gases can endanger those with heart and respiratory ailments. The Kau Hospital Hurricane and Seismic Retrofit project was developed as a result of the Hawaii County All -Hazards Assessment of Critical Facilities investigation that was conducted in 2008-2009. After a preliminary engineering design and cost estimate, a Benefit -Cost Analysis was performed to evaluate the mitigation project because the analysis indicated high vulnerability to seismic and hurricane hazards.. This same detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit the full PDM grant application to FEMA. Type of mitigation activity proposed: Non-structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings and Facilities: Modifications to the non- structural elements of an existing isolated hospital facility to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage, protect patients, and ensure continuity of operations. Non-structural retrofits include bracing of building ceilings to prevent earthquake damage, protection against windborne debris breaching of the enclosure, and protection of ventilation systems, 18-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent enhancement of the ventilation system to include better indoor air quality, and the abatement of hazardous material. This is a multi -hazard retrofit in which the State of Hawaii's contribution is the retrofit of the ventilation system to mitigate against harmful volcanic gas emissions and abatement of some indoor hazardous material. The Federal share contribution is for seismic bracing of the ceiling grid in essential facility areas, removal of an incinerator stack that is a potential seismic falling hazard, and mitigation against hurricane and windstorms through protection against windborne debris impacts on windows and rooftop mechanical systems and anchorage of nearby ancillary structures on site that would otherwise be large debris sources. Matching funds will come from two sources, both expenditures of the Hawaii Health System Corporation: 1) Final design and construction documents for the retrofits prepared by a structural engineer, and 2) a Capital Improvement Project for Kau Hospital to provided enhanced supply air handling system to mitigate against Volcanic Gas (VOG), ceiling asbestos abatement, and the replacement of vulnerable jalousie louver windows for improved hurricane resistance and better control of the interior air environment. In past VOG episodes, patients have needed to be relocated to other hospitals because of lack of sufficient air pre- conditioning to eliminate sulfur dioxide and other VOG particulates. According to Hawaii Volcano Observatory 2008 estimates, Kilauea Volcano emits 2,300 tons of sulfur dioxide per day. The project was determined by the FEMA BCA tool to have over $4 million in benefits over 25 years accrued from building loss protection, contents loss prevention, and functionality protection to enable continuity of operations during hurricane and earthquake disasters. The Benefit Cost Ratio is expected to be 6.67. Thus, the combination of the proposed FEMA PDM retrofits with the state's already planned air handling and enclosure retrofits will mitigate against hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic gas hazards. 18-14 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Risk Assessment Table 18-2. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking, sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic earthquake event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Vulnerability List Earthquake Probabilistic Senario period) (750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario period) (1000 year return Building Name Uescri ption Estimated Estimated$ %Loss Loss $Loss %Loss Soil FEMA Building Design Rank Rank T Score T Level YPe YPe Est.% Loss $Loss Est.$Loss Rank %Loss Loss of Rank Use Rank Building Root T T YPe YPe Acute Ca re Faci l ity/ Hi to Med ica l Cente Ca reFa ci lity 39.7%$33,431,818 1 37 D 3.3 C2M MC 8.351. $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBM BUR Building 1 and 2/Kona Community Hospit CareFacility 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 1.3 C11- MC 26.45. $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Hale Ho'ola Hamakua CareFacility 40.85. $7,481,502 3 32 D 0.9 RM11- LS 35.55. $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL Hawaii Public Safety BuildingA EmergencyCtr 46.35. $5,049,757 4 26 D 0.5 C21- LC 6.35. $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety Building B EmergencyCtr 46.35. $5,001,817 5 26 D 1 C21- LC 6.35. $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFacility 28.85. $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 20.25. $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kohala Hospital CareFacility 49.75. $3,671,684 7 21 D 0.7 RM11- PCI 21.25. $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Psychiatric Facility/Kona Community Ho CareFacility 43.05'. $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C21- MC 26.45. $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Extended Care Facility/ Hilo Medical Ce CareFacility 39.85. $3,021,799 9 36 D 0.7 RM11- PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL VA Outpatient Clinic/ Hilo Medical Cent CareFacility 49.5% $2,887,890 10 22 D 1.9 RM21- LS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Special Services Building/Kona Communi CareFacility 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21- MC 26.4% $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Kona PoliceStation (Kealakehe Police St PoliceStation 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 C11- MC 14.5% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Centra l Fire Station FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C21- PC 6.3% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Hale Hoola/ Hilo Medica l Center Ca reFaci lity 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM11- LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Maintenance Building/ Hilo Medical Cent Ca reFacility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 1.7 RM21- PC 8.1% $393,177 25 46 48 MECBL METAL Maintenance Office/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFaci lity 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D 0.5 W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Keaa a Fire Station a no Police Station PoliceStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM11- PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaa a Fire Station a no Po lice Station FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM11- PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL La undry Building/ Hilo Medica l Center Ca reFaci lity 49.5% $1,349,815 19 23 D 0.7 RM21- LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Kaumana Fire Station FireStation 66.3% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM11- PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Police Station PoliceStation 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM11- PC 26.7% $368,258 28 25 25 MECBL METAL Hama kua Health Center Ca reFaci lity 40.7% $1,110,051 22 33 D 1.7 RM11- LS 35.4% $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua PoliceStation PoliceStation 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 C11- PC 35.5% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D 0.7 C11- PC 31.6% $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Central FireStation Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Kau PoliceStation (Naalehu Police Stati PoliceStation 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 RM11- LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Hospital CareFacility 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C21- PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Kawailani FireStation FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D 1.7 RM11- PC 4.2% $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Ocean View Estates Fire Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Waimea Fire Station FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM21- LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM Dialysis Center/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFaci lity 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 W1 PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSF1 METAL Waimea Pol ice Station (Ka muela Police St PoliceStation 34.7% $622,439 32 42 D 1.7 RM1L LC 28.6% $512,443 20 24 24 MECBL BUR Keauhou-Kona FireStation FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM11- LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.8% $29,510 58 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kau FireStation (Pahala FireStation) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 D 1.7 RM11- LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus Building(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station lMauna Lani Fi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 D 1.2 RM11- LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Naalehu EMS CareFacility 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 1.4 W1 PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSF1 METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 RM1L LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 C21- MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Radiation Oncology/Kona Community Hosp CareFacility 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 W1 MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 57 D 4.2 RM11- HC 19.4% $327,845 31 34 34 MECBL METAL Pahoa FireStation FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 D 1.4 W1 LS 8.1% $64,151 50 48 43 WSF1 METAL Pahoa PoliceStation PoliceStation 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 W1 PC 14.6% $55,572 53 39 33 WSF1 METAL Waiakea FireStation Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kawailani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D 2.6 S3 MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 W1 PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSF1 METAL Infusion Center/Kona Community Hospita CareFacility 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 4.3 W1 LS 47.3% $326,312 321 10 8 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 W1 PC 4.7% $13,897 63 57 45 WSF1 METAL Kau PoliceStation Generator Building (N PoliceStation 73.3% $151,733 50 10 D 2.2 RM11- LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBL METAL North Kohala Police Station lKapaau Poli PoliceStation 13.2% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM11- LS 21.2% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 63 D 4.2 RM11- HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Laupahoehoe Police Station (North HiloP PoliceStation 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 W1 PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSF1 METAL Keaau FireStation Vehicle Shed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau PoliceStation Vehicle Shed PoliceStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSF1 METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 W1 PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSF1 METAL Naalehu FireStation Vehicle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 W1 MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSF1 METAL Kona PoliceStation Generator Building( PoliceStation 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM11- LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Central FireStation Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 50 D 1.7 RM11- LS 6.8% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Acres Volunteer Fire Station an FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 W1 LS 20.7% $57,180 52 31 26 WSF1 METAL Kailua-Kona Fi re Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61 59 D 6.3 W1 LS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSF1 METAL La upahoehoe Volunteer Fire Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 54 D 3.9 W1 PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSF1 METAL La upahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 1 4.4% $24,441 63 64 D 4.3 W1 LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSF1 METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station Vehicles PoliceStation 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 W1 LS 68.21 $105,884 45 6 6 WSF1 METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 W1 LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSF1 METAL North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus Buil IFireStation 1 3.2% $5,522 66 651 DI 1.41 W1 LS 47.1% $81,316 48 11 9 WSF1 METAL 18-15 Hawaii Coattaty-llialti-Hazard llitigatiotz Placa Chapter 18: Risk Assessment Table 18-3. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking, sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic earthquake event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Vulnerability List Earthquake Probabilistic Senario period) (750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario period) (1000 year return Building Name Uescri ption Estimated Estimated$ %Loss Loss $Loss %Loss Soil FEMA Building Design Rank Rank T Score T Level YPe YPe Est.% Loss $Loss Est.$Loss Rank %Loss Loss of Rank Use Rank Building Root T T YPe YPe Kona Civic Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D 0.7 C11- PC 31.6% $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus Building(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Waiakea FireStation Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.8% $29,510 58 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kona Civic Center Police Station PoliceStation 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM11- PC 26.7% $368,258 28 25 25 MECBL METAL Kawailani Fire Station FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D 1.7 RM11- PC 4.2% $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Keaa a Fire Station a no Police Station PoliceStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM11- PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaa a Fire Station a no Police Station FireStation 76.55. $1,531,6271 17 5 D 0.7 RM11- PCI 1.8?/.l $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Ocean View Estates Fire Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kau Fire Station (Pa ha la Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 D 1.7 RM11- LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Police Station Generator Building (N PoliceStation 73.3% $151,733 50 10 D 2.2 RM11- LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau PoliceStation (Naalehu Police Stati PoliceStation 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 RM11- LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Pahoa PoliceStation PoliceStation 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 Wl PC 14.6% $55,572 53 39 33 WSF1 METAL Ka a ma na FireStation FireStation 66.3% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM11- PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL Centra l Fire Station FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C2 PC 6.3% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Hamakua Police Station PoliceStation 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 C11- PC 35.5% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 Wl PC 4.7% $13,897 63 57 45 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 Wl PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSF1 METAL Keaa a Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Kea a u Pol i cc Stati on Veh i cl a Sh ed PoliceStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSF1. METAL Maintenance Office/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFaci lity 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D 0.5 W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Kohala Hospital CareFacility 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 D 0.7 RM11- PC 21.2% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL VA Outpatient Clinic/ Hilo Medical Cent CareFacility 49.5% $2,887,890 10 22 D 1.9 RM21- LS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Laundry Building/ Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 49.5% $1,349,815 19 23 D 0.7 RM21- LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Hale Hoola/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM11- LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Kawailani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D 2.6 S3 MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSF1 METAL Hawaii Public Safety Building B EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 5 26 D 1 C21- LC 6.3% $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety Building A EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 D 0.5 C21- LC 6.3% $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSF1 METAL Buildingland 2/Kona Community Hospit CareFacility 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 1.3 C11- MC 26.4% $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Psychiatric Facility/Kona Community Ho CareFacility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C21- MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Special Services Building/Kona Communi CareFacility 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21- MC 26.4% $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Hale Ho'ola Hamakua CareFacility 40.8% $7,481,502 3 32 D 0.9 RM11- LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center CareFacility 40.7% $1,110,051 22 33 D 1.7 RM11- LS 35.4% $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Central FireStation Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Extended Ca re Facility/Hilo Medical Ce Ca reFacility 39.8% $3,021,799 9 36 D 0.7 RM11- PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL Acute Care Facility/ Hilo Medical Cente Ca reFaci lity 39.7%$33,431,818 1 37 D 3.3 C2M MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBM BUR Maintenance Building/ Hilo Medical Cent Ca reFacility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 1.7 RM21- PC 8.1% $393,177 25 46 48 MECBL METAL Keauhou-Kona FireStation FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM11- LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Waimea FireStation FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM21- LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM Naalehu EMS Ca reFacility 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 1.4 Wl PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSF1 METAL Waimea Pol ice Station(Kamuela Police St PoliceStation 34.7% $622,439 32 42 D 1.7 RM11- LC 28.6% $512,443 20 24 24 MECBL BUR Kona Pol ice Station(Keala kehe Pol ice St PoliceStation 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 C11- MC 14.5% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Pahoa FireStation FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 D 1.4 Wl LS 8.1% $64,151 50 48 43 WSF1 METAL Kona Pol ice Station Generator Building( PoliceStation 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 R 1 LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFacility 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A. W2 MC 20.2% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Infusion Center/ Kona Community Hospita CareFacility 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 4.3 Wl LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 8 WSF1 METAL Naalehu Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSF1 METAL Radiation Oncology/ Kona Community Hosp CareFacility 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL Central FireStation Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 50 D 1.7 RM11- LS 6.8% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna Lani Fi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 D 1.2 RM11- LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 RM11- LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 C21- MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Laupahoehoe Volunteer Fire Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 54 D 3.9 Wl PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSF1 METAL Laupahoehoe Police Station (North HiloP PoliceStation 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 Wl PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Acres Volunteer FireStation an FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl LS 20.7% $57,180 52 31 26 WSF1 METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 57 D 4.2 RM11- HC 19.4% $327,845 31 34 34 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station Vehicle S PoliceStation 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSF1 METAL Kai lua-Kona Fi re Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61 59 D 6.3 Wl LS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSF1 METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSF1 METAL North Kohala PoliceStation (Ka paau Poli PoliceStation 13.2% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM11- LS 21.2% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Kau Hospital CareFacility 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C21- PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 63 D 4.2 RM11- HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Laupahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 D 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSF1 METAL North Kohala FireStation Apparatus Buil FireStation 3.2% $5,522 66 65 D 1.4 Wl LS 47.1% $81,316 48 11 9 WSF1 METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 Wl LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSF1 METAL 18-16 Hawaii Coattaty-llialti-Hazard llitigatiotz Placa Chapter 18: Risk Assessment Table 18-4. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking, sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic hurricane event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Vulnerability List Earthquake Probabilistic Senario period) (750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario period) (1000 year return Building Name Uescri ption Estimated Estimated$ %Loss Loss $Loss %Loss Soil FEMA Building Design Rank Rank T Score T Level YPe YPe Est.% Loss $Loss Est.$Loss Rank %Loss Loss of Rank Use Rank Building Root T T YPe YPe Bui Id i ng 1 and 2/ Kona Commu nity Hos pit Ca reFaci l ity 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 1.3 C11- MC 26.451. $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Acute Ca re Faci l ity/ Hi to Med ica l Cente Ca reFa ci lity 39.7%$33,431,818 1 37 D 3.3 C2M MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBM BUR Hale Ho'ola Hamakua Ca re Fa ci l ity 40.8% $7,481,502 3 32 D 0.9 RM11- LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFacility 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 20.2% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kau Hospital CareFacility 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C21- PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Psychiatric Facility/ Kona Community He CareFacility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C21- MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Special Services Building/Kona Communi CareFacility 43.05'. $2,638,9381 11 31 B 4.2 C21- MCI 26.45. $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Kohala Hospital CareFacility 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 D 0.7 RM11- PC 21.2% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Kona PoliceStation (Kealakehe Police St PoliceStation 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 C11- MC 14.5% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center CareFacility 40.7% $1,110,051 22 33 D 1.7 RM11- LS 35.4% $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Extended Care Facility/ Hilo Medical Ce CareFacility 39.8% $3,021,799 9 36 D 0.7 RM11- PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL VA Outpatient Clinic/ Hilo Medical Cent CareFacility 49.5% $2,887,890 10 22 D 1.9 RM21- LS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Naalehu EMS Ca reFacility 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 1.4 W1 PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Ocean View Estates Fire Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Hawai i Publ is Safety Building A EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 D 0.5 C21- LC 6.3% $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawai i Publ is Safety Building B EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 5 26 D 1 C21- LC 6.3% $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR Hamakua PoliceStation PoliceStation 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 C11- PC 35.5% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Waimea FireStation FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM21- LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM Laupahoehoe Police Station (North HiloP PoliceStation 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 W1 PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSF1 METAL Waimea Police Station(Kamuela Police St PoliceStation 34.7% $622,439 32 42 D 1.7 RM11- LC 28.6% $512,443 20 24 24 MECBL BUR Keauhou-Kona FireStation FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM11- LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Laupahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 D 4.3 W1 LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSF1 METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 W1 PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSF1 METAL Kau PoliceStation (Naalehu Police Stati PoliceStation 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 RM11- LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Maintenance Building/ Hilo Medical Cent CareFacility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 1.7 RIALL PC 8.1% $393,177 25 46 48 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D 0.7 C11- PC 31.6% $381,596 26 181 17 MECBL METAL Central FireStation Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Kona Civic Center Police Station PoliceStation 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM11- PC 26.7% $368,258 28 25 25 MECBL METAL Hale Hoola/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFaci lity 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM11- LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus Building(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kai lua-Kona Fi re Station FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 57 D 4.2 RM11- HC 19.4% $327,845 31 34 34 MECBL METAL Infusion Center/ Kona Community Hospita Ca reFacility 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 4.3 Wl LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 8 WSF1 METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station (Mauna La ni Fi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 D 1.2 RM11- LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Radiation Oncology/ Kona Community Hosp Ca reFacility 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 W1 MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 RM11- LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 W1 PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSF1, METAL North Koha la Police Station(Ka paa a Poli PoliceStation 13.2% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM11- LS 21.2% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Ka a ma na FireStation FireStation 66.3% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM11- PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL North Koha la FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 W1 LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSF1 METAL Centra l Fire Station FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C2 PC 6.3% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Laundry Building/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFa ci l ity 49.5% $1,349,815 19 23 D 0.7 RM21- LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Naa lehu Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 W1 MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSF1 METAL Kau Fi re Station(Pa ha l a Fi re Sta ti on) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 D 1.7 RM11- LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL La a pa h oehoe Vo l u nteer Fi re Sta ti on FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 54 D 3.9 W1 PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSF1 METAL Kon a Civi c Center Fi re Sta ti on Veh i c l e S PoliceStation 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 W1 LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSF1 METAL Maintenance Office/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFa ci l ity 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D 0.5 W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 C2 L. MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR North Koha la Fire Station Apparatus Buil FireStation 3.2% $5,522 66 65 D 1.4 W1 LS 47.1% $81,316 48 11 9 WSF1 METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61 59 D 6.3 W1 LS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSF1 METAL Pahoa FireStation FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 D 1.4 W1 LS 8.1% $64,151 50 48 43 WSF1 METAL Kau Police Station Generator Building (N PoliceStation 73.3% $151,733 50 10 D 2.2 RM11- LS 29.9% $61,922 51 191 20 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Acres Volunteer Fire Station an FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 W1 LS 20.7% $57,180 52 31 26 WSF1 METAL Pahoa PoliceStation PoliceStation 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 W1 PC 14.6% $55,572 53 39 33 WSF1 METAL Kawailani Fire Station FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D 1.7 RM11- PC 4.2% $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 63 D 4.2 RM1L HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Keaau FireStation and PoliceStation PoliceStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM11- PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaau FireStation and PoliceStation FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM11- PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.8% $29,510 58 55 57 SPMBS METAL Waiakea FireStation Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kona PoliceStation Generator Building( PoliceStation 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM11- LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 W1 PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSF1 METAL Kawailani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D 2.6 S3 MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 1 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 W1 PC 4.7% $13,897 63 57 45 WSF1 METAL Central FireStation Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 50 D 1.7 RM1L LS 6.8% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Keaau FireStation Vehicle Shed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau PoliceStation Vehicle Shed PoliceStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSF1 METAL 18-17 Hairaii Coattaty-llialti-Hazard llitigatiotz Placa Chapter 18: Risk Assessment Table 18-5. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking, sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic hurricane event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Vulnerability List Earthquake Probabilistic Senario period) (750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario period) (1000 year return Building Name Uescri ption Estimated Estimated$ %Loss Loss $Loss %Loss Soil FEMA Building Design Rank Rank T Score T Level YPe YPe Est.% Loss $Loss Est.$Loss Rank %Loss Loss of Rank Use Rank Building Root T T YPe YPe La upa hoehoe Pol ice Station (North Hi lo PoliceStation 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 W1 PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSF1 METAL La upa hoehoe Fi re Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 D 4.3 W1 LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSF1 METAL La upa hoehoe Vol unteer Fi re Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 54 D 3.9 W1 PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSF1 METAL Naalehu EMS Ca reFaci l ity 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 1.4 W1 PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSF1 METAL Naa lehu Fi re Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 W1 MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSF1 METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station Vehicle S PoliceStation 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 W1 LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSF1 METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 W1 PCI 61.8?/.l $404,933 23 9 7 WSF1 METAL Infusion Center/ Kona Community Hospita Ca reFacility 27.25. $187,975 48 47 B 4.3 W1 LS 47.35. $326,312 32 10 8 WSF1 METAL North Koha la FireStation FireStation 3.25. $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 W1 LS 47.15'. $227,684 39 11 9 WSF1 METAL North Koha la Fire Station Apparatus Buil FireStation 3.25. $5,522 66 65 D 1.4 W1 LS 47.15'. $81,316 48 11 9 WSF1 METAL Kailua-Kona Fi re Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.55. $30,922 61 59 D 6.3 W1 LS 39.95. $79,794 49 13 11 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Ocean View Estates Fire Station FireStation 74.35. $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.65. $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kau Fire Station Appa ratus Bui lding (Pa h FireStation 85.65. $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.65. $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Hamakua PoliceStation PoliceStation 59.75. $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 C11- PC 35.55. $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Hale Ho'ola Hamakua CareFacility 40.85. $7,481,502 3 32 D 0.9 RM11- LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center CareFacility 40.7% $1,110,051 22 33 D 1.7 RM11- LS 35.45. $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station FireStation 88.85. $1,072,827 24 1 D 0.7 C11- PC 31.65. $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Kau Hospital CareFacility 12.35. $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C21- PC 33.15'. $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Keauhou-Kona FireStation FireStation 37.65. $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM11- LS 29.85. $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Kau PoliceStation (Naalehu Police Stati PoliceStation 73.35. $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 RM11- LS 29.95. $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau FireStation Pahala FireStation) FireStation 73.65. $482,659 35 9 D 1.7 RM11- LS 29.95. $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL Kau PoliceStation Generator Building(N PoliceStation 73.3% $151,733 50 10 D 2.2 RM1L LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBL Waimea FireStation FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM2L LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBLWaimea Police Station(Kamuela Police St PoliceStation 347% $622,439 32 42 D 1.7 RM1L LC 28.6% $512,443 20 24 24 qETA MECBLKona Civic Center Police Station PoliceStation 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM1L PC 26.7% $368,258 28 25 25 MECBL Hawaiian Acres Volunteer Fire Station an FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 W1 LS 20.7% $57,180 52 31 26 WSF1 Building 1 and 2/ Kona Community Hospit Ca reFacility 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 1.3 C1L MC 26.4% $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBLPsychiatric Facility/ Kona Community Ho Ca reFacility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C2L MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL Special Services Building/Kona Communi Ca reFacility 43.05'. $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21- MC 26.45. $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Dialysis Center/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFaci lity 46.15'. $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 W1 PC 17.05'. $258,696 36 35 30 WSF1 METAL North Koha la Police Station (Ka paa a Poli PoliceStation 13.25. $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM11- LS 21.25. $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Kohala Hospital CareFacility 49.75. $3,671,684 7 21 D 0.7 RM1L PC 21.25. $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Pahoa PoliceStation PoliceStation 66.75. $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 W1 PC 14.65. $55,572 53 39 33 WSF1 METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.25. $273,710 42 57 D 4.2 RM11- HC 19.45. $327,845 31 34 34 MECBL METAL Radiation Oncology/Kona Community Hosp CareFacility 24.55. $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 W1 MS 19.75. $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFacility 28.85. $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 20.25. $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station (Mauna La ni Fi FireStation 22.85. $424,027 37 51 D 1.2 RM11- LS 16.25. $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.45. $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 RM11- LS 16.25. $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Kona PoliceStation (Kealakehe Police St PoliceStation 33.85. $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 C11- MC 14.55. $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Maintenance Office/ Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 50.35. $1,735,545 16 20 D 0.5 W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Ka a ma na FireStation FireStation 66.3% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM11- PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL VA Outpatient Cl inic/ Hilo Medical Cent Ca reFa c i l i ty 49.5% $2,887,890 10 22 D 1.9 RM21- LS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Pahoa FireStation FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 D 1.4 W1 LS 8.1% $64,151 50 48 43 WSF1 METAL Extended Care Facility/ Hilo Medical Ce Ca reFa ci l i ty 39.8% $3,021,799 9 36 D 0.7 RM11- PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 W1 PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 W1 PC 4.7% $13,897 63 57 45 WSF1 METAL Kona Police Station Generator Building( PoliceStation 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM1L LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Maintenance Building/ Hilo Medical Cent Ca reFa c i l i ty 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 1.7 RM21- PC 8.1% $393,177 25 46 48 MECBL METAL Hale Hoola/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFa ci l ity 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM11- LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Ka wa i l a n i Fi re Stati on Appa ratu s Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D 2.6 S3 MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSF1 METAL Laundry Building/ Hilo Medical Center Ca reFa ci l ity 49.5% $1,349,815 19 23 D 0.7 RM21- LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Central FireStation Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 50 D 1.7 RM11- LS 6.8% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Central FireStation Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Hawai i Publ is Safety Building A EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 D 0.5 C2 L, LC 6.3% $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety Building B EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 5 26 D 1 C2 LC 6.3% $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR Acute Care Facility/ Hilo Medical Cente Ca re Fa ci I ty 39.7%$33,431,818 1 37 D 3.3 C2M MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBM BUR Centra l Fire Station FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C2 PC 6.3% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Waiakea FireStation Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.8% $29,510 58 55 57 SPMBS METAL Waiakea FireStation Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kawailani FireStation FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D 1.7 RM11- PC 4.2% $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 C21- MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Keaa a Fire St a tion Vehicle Shed FireStation 1 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaa a Police Station Vehicle Shed PoliceStation 1 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSF1 METAL Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 63 D 4.2 RM1L HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Keaau FireStation and PoliceStation PoliceStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaau FireStation and PoliceStation FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL 18-18 Hawaii Coattaty-llialti-Hazard llitigatiotz Placa Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 18.1.8 University of Hawaii Study As part of the State of Hawaii hazard mitigation plan the vulnerability of all buildings within the University of Hawaii system were assessed. Average annual losses were computed for hurricane, earthquake, and flood hazards on each campus. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 18-5 and Figure 18-6. More detailed site specific modeling was conducted to rank each building on each campus in terms of the expected losses and loss of functionality due to probabilistic earthquake, hurricane, and flood scenarios. For simplicity, the buildings of both the UH Hilo and Hawaii CC campuses were included in one rank list, this list is shown in Table 18-6. ■uH Manoa Honolulu CC Leeward CC Kapiolani CC, $398,539,4% ■Honciuiu CC $352,869 $202,502 Windward CC ElLeeward CC 5% 3% $144,233 Kauai CC 2% $139,564 ClKapiolani CC 2% mWindward CC — _ Maui CC ■Kauai CC $219,670 ■Maui CC \ 3% DOtiner Facilities and General Facilities ■uHHiioi CC Other Facilities and General Facilities $994,084 14% UH Manoa $3,545,826 51% UH Hilo/Hawaii CC $1,075,816 16% Annual Losses All Hazards, All Buildings Figure 18-5. University of Hawaii AAL losses per campus Figure 18-6. Annual losses per hazard for UH Hilo and Hawaii CC 18-19 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Table 18-6. Vnlnernhility rnnkinu of ITH Hiln and Hawaii CC facilities UH Hilo & Hawaii CC - Building Vulnerabili::4 Campus Buildings= 132 Building Earthquake ventVulnerability $ Loss Risk Loss of Functionality ys) 1000 -year Hurricane Modeled Building $ Loss Event Vulnerability Loss of $ Loss Risk Functionality Percentile (Num. of Days) UHH-LEARNING RESOURCES CENTER >95% 82 S 3,374,601 >95% 28 UHH-UCB >95% >90 $ 2,759,306 >95°/a 28 UHH-WENTWORTH HALL $ 7,041,499 >95% >90 $ 975,155 90-95% 44 UHH-THEATER $ 6,559,633 >95% >90 $ 900,880 90-95% 28 UHH-LIFE SCIENCE COMPLEX $ 6,194,326 >95% >90 $ 1,024,260 90-95% 57 N UHH-BUSED/COMPUTER crR $ 5,476,613 >951% >90 $ 794,824 85-90% 44 o UHH-HALE KAUANOE-DORM II $ 4,992,235 90-95% >90 $ 1,330,454 90-95% 31 UHH-CAMPUS CENTER BUILDING $ 4,948,361 90-95% >90 $ 1,758,364 >95°/a 28 v UHH-BUSINESS OFFICE $ 4,554,295 90-95% >90 $ 1,244,384 90-95% 57 C UHH-KANAKA'OLE HALL(EKH) $ 4,339,733 90-95% 82 $ 2,023,685 >95% 31 UHH-HALE KEHAU DORMITORY $ 3,754,989 90-95% 41 $ 611,100 80-85% 80 x HAW CC -CAFETERIA $ 3,496,075 90-95% >90 $ 736,298 85-90% 57 BAN K OF HAWAI I BLDG DOWNTOWN HILO $ 3,276,531 90-95% >90 $ 679,581 80-85% 49 UHH-HALE KANILEHUA DORMITORY $ 2,181,045 85-90% 1 >90 $ 1,398,069 90-95% 131 Kukahauula Institute of Astronomy $ 1,811,419 80-85% 22 $ 3,342,365 >95% 47 UHHilo Musuem and Astronomy Building $ 1,699,836 80-85% 22 $ 4,577,015 >95% 100 Pa naewa -Covered Equine Arena $ 191,714 <50% 21 $ 933,623 90-95% 280 UHH-STUDENT SERVICES $ 3,244,905 85-90% >90 $ 472,289 70-75% 28 UHH- MARINE SCIENCE BUILDING $ 3,031,175 85-90% >90 $ 661,690 80-85% 57 HAW CC -TRADE & INDUS/LABS $ 1,481,454 80-85% >90 $ 591,631 80-85% 100 HAW CC -TRADE & INDUS/LABS $ 1,481,454 80-85% >90 $ 591,631 80-85% 100 c HAW CC -CARPENTRY SHOP B $ 1,411,915 80-85% >90 $ 548,605 75-80% 100 Id HAW CC -Agricultural Mechanics & Biology Lab $ 1,074,382 70-75% >90 $ 429,064 70-75% 100 LL HAW CC -Learning Center & IT Support $ 1,074,382 70-75% >90 $ 429,064 70-75% 100 c HAW CC-Auxilary Services Shops $ 1,002,664 70-75% >90 $ 389,589 60-70% 100 HAW CC -Administration & Student Services $ 821,766 70-75% >90 $ 181,186 50-60% 31 UHH-HALE IKENA,B $ 386,633 50-60% >90 $ 606,652 80-85% 322 toa HAW CC -CAS, ART LABS $ 217,403 <50% 57 $ 236,740 50-60% 211 x Fish Hatchery Greenhouse $ 490,991 50-60% 39 $ 697,833 85-90% 129 Pearl Hatchery Greenhouse $ 490,991 50-60% 39 $ 697,833 85-90% 129 HAW CC-OCET & Financial Aid $ 75,389 1 <50% 22 $ 247,113 50-60% 239 Based on the results of this analysis a more specific assessment of the highest ranked buildings can be conducted to determine the benefit/cost ratio of any potential retrofits. 18.1.9 Warning Sirens and Evacuation System Sudden -onset hazards such as earthquakes and local tsunamis occur with little or no warning. For most other hazards, an effective warning system requires a reliable forecasting system. The County relies on the following sources for forecasting of the various hazards: • Tsunami-- The Federal Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC), based on Oahu, provides capable warning for distant tsunamis. Figure 18-7 illustrates the warning procedure. The system has never missed warning of a damaging tsunami since its beginning in 1947, but has caused a number of unneeded evacuations. 18-20 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Risk Assessment POSSIBLE TSUNAMI --450mph _ AWAII TIDE GAUGE^ ks. 2 SEISMOGRAPH EARTHQUAKE � s� CHECK � ? REPORTIS YEES IS 6 REPORTS OUT MAG17? PT WC IN "/ET"V147CH 3 jo_, s.m:n NQ - IGNO,tE .. EBS 7 DECISION YES CIVIL EVAC— ? TSUNAMIS DEFENSE UATION NO 3hr SIRENS WATCH Tsunami Warning System Flow Chart F"'ff HOW DOES THE TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM WORK? When a significant earthquake (1) occurs in the Pacific, it is detected (T) at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Ewa Beach, Oahu. Five geophysicists man the Center around the clock. If the magnitude (3) is greater than 7, the epicenter is located. If the epicenter is in an area likely to cause a tsunami, a tsunami warning (4) is sent to nearby coasts and a tsunami watch is set for ares with a travel time more than three hours away. Messages are sent to tide observers for a report on the first wave, (5) and telemetered water level gage are checked. In addition, the earthquahe' s moment is calculated. The geophysicists (6) quickly review the earthquake and sea level data and historical information to decide if a warning is needed for areas currently under a watch condition. If hazardous waves are predicted (7), the warning is sent to emergency officials across the Pacific at least three hours ahead of the first wave (the speed of the waves has been pre -calculated for all areas). People can then be cleared from all coastal areas (8) that might be hit by the waves. Red numbers correspond to numbers on the Tsunami Warning 5Vstem Flow Chart Figure 18-7. Pacific Tsunami Warning System • Flooding (rainfall, high waves) and Hurricanes-- National Weather Service Forecast Office (NWS) • Lava flow-- Hawaiian Volcano Observatory, U.S. Geological Survey The warnings from the PTWC and NWS are issued as a "watch" and/or a "warning" to the County Civil Defense Agency. The Civil Defense activates the sirens to alert people to seek further information from the ra- dio or TV. The Civil Defense transmits warnings to the public through the Emergency Alert System, which consists of simultaneous broadcasts over all radio and television stations. An 18-21 Hairaii Coittaty-lltilti-Hazard llitigatiotz Placa Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent effective public education program ensures a calm, organized, and efficient response to the warnings. The County currently has 68 sirens and 12 simulators in operation around the island. Simula- tors provide a signal to manned stations where personnel are utilized to disperse the warning, these are shown in Figure 18-9. Sirens have an effective average range of one-half mile. Sirens are critical for populated coastal areas for tsunami warnings. Figure 18-8 shows the deficiencies in the coverage of coastal areas. = Civil Defense Sirens with 112 Mile Buffer Figure 18-8. Civil Defense Warning Sirens and Evacuation Routes 18-22 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Hawaii Hilo Honokohau Old Kona Airport * Pahoehoe {• Kahaluu Pohoiki Napoopoo Opihikau� Honaunau MJ6 Milolii Keahou Halape ha Punaluu gk/ Honuapo / - Cellular Runup Detector Satellite Runup Detector �- Sea Level Gauge Figure 18-9. Site locations for Cellular Run-up Detectors (CRD's), Satellite Run-up Detectors (SRD's), and Pacific Tsunami Warning Center sea level gauges Police, fire and other emergency vehicles equipped with siren and PA equipment will sound and broadcast warnings in areas to be evacuated, particularly in affected areas not covered by the CD sirens or in radio reception "dead spots". The Civil Air Patrol, County, military and private helicopters provide warnings to isolated areas. 18.1.10 Critical Lifeline Infrastructure Facilities A community's infrastructure provides services, utilities and linkages which allow society to function. The term "lifelines" is commonly used for this infrastructure and can be defined as systems or networks which provide for the circulation of people, goods, services and information, upon which health, safety, comfort and economic activity depends. Lifelines are the means whereby a community supports its day to day activities and include mechanisms used to respond to emergencies. During and after hazard events, the Big Island's 'lifelines' are vulnerable to disruption and/or damage. These systems are often large, complex and interdependent. Failure of one system (or part of it) causes repercussions in other systems and therefore increases a community's vulnerability further. For example, the vulnerability of the Port of Hilo, a transportation component, could affect the entire island's energy and transportation system since all propane, diesel, gasoline, and fuel oil for the island is supplied through this one location with no alternate. When stored fuel is used up, 18-23 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent transportation would falter first; eventually, the electrical supply for the island would be reduced to geothermal (about 20% of the usual total) and hydro power (less than 5%). Most water and sewage systems would halt as would most communication systems. This section will assess the vulnerability for the following lifelines: • Transportation systems -- harbors, airports, roads and bridges, buses, automobile rental agencies • Energy systems -- electrical/fuel, gas • Communication systems -- telecommunication networks, cell phone sites, radio transmitters • Water systems -- County water system • Wastewater systems -- County sewerage system 18.1.10.1 Transportation 18.1.10.1.1 Harbors Hawaii Island has two deep -draft harbors with port facilities that enable large ships to dock and unload: Hilo Port and Kawaihae Port (see Figure 18-10). For island communities, the resilience of port facilities is crucial to efficient post -disaster recovery since this is the entry point for bulk supplies and heavy equipment. 18-24 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 13 Harbor Airport Asset within Tsunami Evacuation & 100 or 500 Year Flood Zone Major Roads Figure 18-10. Harbors and Airports The Hilo and Kawaihae Ports compare as follows: Table 18-7. Hilo and Kawaihae Port Facilities 18-25 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Hilo Kawaihae Wharf length 2700 1600 Cargo embarked (tons annually) 1,500,000 1,000,000 Storage (1000 sf) -sheds -open 122 23 680 427 Passengers 3000 (in a day) 200 if needed (no terminal) Fuel handling all types very limited Relative vulnerability -tsunami more less -hurricane less more Earthquake/Liquefaction more more 18-25 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent While the basic cargo capability of both ports is redundant, Kawaihae does not handle passengers nor large amounts of fuel. Some basic fuel manifolds were installed at Kawaihae several years ago but capped off for future use.90 One gasoline supplier (Union/Costco) does use one intake to supply their service station. Most of the fuel tanks at the harbor are supplied by trucks from Hilo, and have a capacity of 814,000 gallons which is about a 60 days' supply for the current users. Both ports are subject to tsunami and hurricane surge. However, it is very unlikely that both ports would be severely damaged by the same event, but probable that both could receive some damage, one more than the other. The harbor master does not know of any specific hardening methods nor of any such plans by the State DOT. Passenger ships can simply be diverted from this island while any in port upon a tsunami warning will put to sea and can then proceed to an undamaged port. In case of a tsunami or hurricane threat, any passengers unable to board in time for sailing will be kept on their busses and sent to shelters specified by Civil Defense. For information on the Port of Kawaihae, and the damage it suffered during the Oct. 2006, Kiholo Bay Earthquake, see Section 7.2.1.1. 18.1.10.1.2 Airports and Landing Strips Hawaii Island has four public airports-- two primary commercial airports with the ability to receive large carriers (Hilo and Kona International Airports) and two smaller airports (Waimea-Kohala and Upolu Airports). Upolu Airport is not heavily used for passenger or cargo. None of the airports are located in a tsunami evacuation zone, flood zone, or high -hazard lava flow zone. The terminals are not considered satisfactory for hurricane sheltering. They would depend on tour busses to move people to Civil Defense -specified shelters. The Hilo terminal and related functions can run for 47 hours at full capacity (78 at 50%) from the fuel with the emergency generator. The FAA tower, which is separate, can operate at full capacity for at least three days around the clock, and possibly for 12 days. In an emergency, the basic control functions of the tower can be handled by portable radio equipment from any location in the airport area. In addition to the main 10,000 ft. runway, Hilo has a second runway 5600 ft long which easily handles inter island airliners. The Kona airport has similar backup capabilities, except for having just one runway of 11,000 ft and handles more passengers (1.3 million vs. 800 thousand enplaned for Hilo). The Waimea-Kohala airport has minimal passenger capability but with a 5600 ft runway can handle interisland aircraft if needed. There are numerous military and civil heliports around the island. The National Guard has six large (12 passenger) helicopters at Hilo, which the Governor can make available for emergency use and can fly to Oahu nonstop. The County has two smaller ones, and the tour industry has over 20; none can go as far as Oahu without refueling. 90 Ian Birnie, Harbor master, personal communications, September 2003. 18-26 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent The Army has an airport at Pohakuloa training area, with a runway 3600 ft long. It is of little value for supply or evacuation due to the remote location and short runway combined with the elevation of 6000 ft. Airline fuel is loaded only in Honolulu. Fuel for smaller aircraft and helicopters could become a problem when tank trucks are emptied if the storage tanks are unable to refill them. There are about eight small (ranch and crop duster) airstrips around the island. Civil Defense has a map of them, as they are no longer shown on aviation maps. 18.1.10.1.3 Roads and Bridges The major arterial highway system circles the island with a mix of State and County jurisdic- tion (see Figure 18-11). However, during emergency evacuations, the County police control all State highways or County roads, assisted by the Department of Public Work's pre -planned barricade system. Barricade locations are shown in the tsunami evacuation maps. If a bridge or crossing on a State highway is damaged or threatened, the County will respond during the emergency to determine whether to close and to designate alternate bypass routes. During the recovery phase, the State and County cooperate in clearing and restoring roads around the is- land. 18-27 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent • Bridges Accuracy: Roads USGS Quad Major Roads Figure 18-11. Roads and Bridges Roads and bridges may be (and have been) affected completely by stream flooding, tsunamis, earthquakes, and landslides. The 7.2 magnitude Halape earthquake in 1975 not only damaged roads in the Volcano area but caused landslides that affected the highway at Laupahoehoe and Honomu.91 The heavy rain and flooding in November 2001 completely blocked a major road in Hilo and the only highway through Ka u. The tsunami of 1946 ruined the railroad bridges at Wailuku River and Kolekole stream (the railroad right-of-way is now highway 19). Several bridges on this coast are now being reinforced against earthquake damage which may also make them more resistant to tsunami or hurricane storm surge. Ali'i Drive in Kailua is susceptible to these hazards but there are alternate routes. Figure 18-11 identifies the bridges on the major roads. Future updates to this plan will identify road segments and bridges that are within the VE zone (at risk to tsunami and hurricane surge), the bridges that have been or are programmed for reinforcement, and the highway segments that have experienced past closure from landslides with no alternate routes. Key repairs were made after the 2001 flood to bridges that have required repetitive repairs. 91 USGS 18-28 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent The 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake had a relatively minor impact on the roads and bridges in Hawaii County. Although rock and soil slides in cuts above roadways were numerous, damage to road embankments and pavements was less prevalent, with a few exceptions (Figure 18-12). The most dramatic of these was the collapse of half of the roadway at Mile 35 on Highway 19 near Pa`auilo, resulting in the closure of one lane of traffic (Figure 18-13). This was caused by failure of a 20 -foot high embankment and rock wing wall on the approach to a concrete girder bridge. The cast -in-situ concrete girder bridge is supported on rock wall abutments. The bridge suffered no damage but the adjacent embankment failed. The wing wall consisted of mortared rock and was approximately 14 inches thick. Because of the lack of redundancy in the highway system on the Island of Hawaii, road closures due to rockfalls, landslides or embankment slope instability can have a significant effect on emergency response and economic recovery efforts. For a number of hours after the earthquakes, the area of North Kohala, including the town of Hawi, was cut off from the rest of the island because of road closures on Highways 250 and 270, the only access roads to this region. Fortunately, the rockfalls and landslides caused by these earthquakes could be cleared relatively easily, and all roadways on the Island of Hawaii were open to at least one -lane traffic within two days of the earthquakes. 18-29 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Figure 18-12. Road damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake Figure 18-13. Bridge embankment Damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake In many districts a scarcity of access roads creates a problem should lava flows, storms or earthquakes, sever these roads. For example, Highways 11 and 190 are the primary roads in Kona and they are sub -parallel to the coast and vulnerable to the lava hazard. Only a second- ary road provides access to the ocean in South Kona where the lava flow hazard is highest. This and other more minor roads may be essential in the evacuation of people to the ocean. Future updates to this plan will identify critical road segments that require hardening or an emergency bypass. 18-30 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 18.1.11 Energy Systems 18.1.11.1 Electrical/Fuel The Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc. (HELCO) operates the electrical system on this is- land. The electrical system consists of power generating plants, substations, and transmission lines (see Figure 18-14). HELCO power plants are located at Keahole, North Kona, Waimea, South Kohala, Waiakea Peninsula and Kanoelehua, South Hilo, and Keaau, Puna. Generating plants rely on petroleum to produce 75% of the power, with the balance generated from renewable sources such as geothermal, hydroelectric, and wind. Should the supply of petroleum become a problem, HELCO has fuel storage to generate power from oil for an average 30 days, per a PUC requirement. The fuel tanks are at the Hilo base and located out of flood, tsunami, and lava hazard zones. All major transmission lines are overhead. 18-31 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent ® Electric Substations ri Figure 18-14. Electrical Substations One generation station (Waiakea) is in a tsunami/hurricane flood zone. This is not a signifi- cant problem since its capacity is only 15 MW and adequate generation is available in safer locations. The major risk (in addition to fuel supply) is damage to transmission lines by hurri- cane winds, possible earthquake shaking or lava flow. Two transmission lines to the Kona side run along the Saddle Road and are in or near lava flow zone 2, from Mauna Loa. HELCO has a modern remote switching system, as well as a remote sensing and control dispatch system, to work around limited damage areas or resolve and restore service, but lacks generation capacity on the Kona side. If that side of the island is isolated, only 25% of normal usage can be supplied .92 92 Personal communication with Jay Ignacio, HELLO. 18-32 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 18.1.11.2 Gas Propane gas is widely used on the Island of Hawaii. Public Utilities Commision regulates 67 miles of gas mains and service lines on the Big Island. These lines serve approximately 1,600 customers and are located mainly in Hilo. In addition, approximately 9,300 customers throughout the county are provided gas service by tank or cylinder. The Public Utilities Commission does not regulate this type of service. Major liquid propane gas substations on the island of Hawaii are located in Hilo, Kailua-Kona, Waimea, and Ka'u. 18.1.12 Communication Systems The basic communication system for the island is the Verizon (formerly Hawaiian Telephone Co.) wire, standard and optical cable connections. The County has an extensive radio repeater and microwave -linked system which serves the police and fire department mobile units via VHF frequencies (see Figure 18-15). VHF frequencies are limited to line -of -sight contact. Hawaiian Electric has a private radio, microwave, and leased phone line system which has some interconnection with the County system. The television cable company (Time -Warner) provides video service around the island which includes high speed data service supplying Internet service for homes and offices. 18-33 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Microwave Only y Asset located in Volcanic Hazard Zone 2 Repeater Only Asset within FIRM 100 or 500YearFlood Zone Repeater & Microwave 40 Asset located within Volcanic Hazard Zone 1 Figure 18-15. Communication Systems. Two primary cellular phone networks serve the island: AT&T and Verizon. Coverage is nec- essarily concentrated in populated areas and some highways. It is important to note that the cellular network depends on the land line phone system for interconnections and cannot func- tion without working telephone service. Interisland phone service is now provided exclusively by underwater optical fiber cable. The State has a digital microwave link. There is no interisland satellite service. Figure 18-16 shows the cables in place as of 1996. While cables have broken from hurricane surge (Hurricane Iwa, at Makaha, Oahu), it appears that there is ample redundancy in the present cable array. Telephone (including cell phones), emergency services radios, and interisland communica- tions are vulnerable not only to long-term power failure (Verizon says most exchanges will 18-34 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnient last only a day on their battery power but diesel service will last 72 hours 93) but especially to hurricane, earthquake, and in a few locations, tsunami, lava flow, and landslide damage. In Hurricane Iwa, five undersea cables near the Oahu coast were broken. In Hurricane Iniki, all communications were lost until one portable radio channel was put in use. Even when radio amateurs were able to set up temporary antennas and communicate, lack of telephone connection remained a major problem of having communications with all vital locations. The Civil Defense EOC includes radio systems for amateur and Civil Air Patrol use, as well as police and fire. It has backup propane generators and tanks for at least four days of service, but may be extended to two weeks. For new telecommunication towers, the Planning Department requires the submittal of "Building plans for the tower, certified by a licensed structural engineer, verifying that the tower, together with the initial antennas and other equipment proposed to be installed thereon, will have a hard survivability for sustained winds of one hundred miles per hour. ,94 Communication Networks, January 1996 441 Kaua'i ♦ Oahu ♦ i; 4 _ `------- i GTE fiber optic GTE microwave Distance Education Skybridge ------ HITS State digital microwave 1 -not fiber ------ 1 " _ —� Maui ♦ r r r I Figure 18-16. Communications Network. Source: Juvik, S. & J. Juvik, Atlas of Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1998, p. 274 93 Personal communication with Duane Miyashiro, Manager, Verizon. 94 Hawaii County Code section 25-2-74. 18-35 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 18.1.13 Water Systems Domestic water systems on this island include the County water system, private water systems (e.g., Waikoloa), and individual water catchments. Besides domestic uses, water is essential for fire fighting. Since the County water system serves a majority of the island's population and would be relied upon by non -County users during emergencies, the resilience of the County's system is the focus of disaster mitigation. The County water system consists of source, storage, and transmission facilities (transmission lines and booster pump stations). The GIS inventory of the water system facilities is in progress. The Department of Water Supply facilities are generally at small direct risk from most haz- ards other than possible leaks after an earthquake. The primary problem would be electrical supply for the pumps. More than half of the water supply is pumped, with a few small systems gravity fed (i.e.,Waimea, Honomu). None of the pump stations have backup diesels. The Department estimates that, with typical water use, their tank storage would last only a day or two.95 Water can always be trucked to areas without a functioning system. Water hauling trucks are available from the following sources: • Fire Department: ten tankers of 750 to 3500 gallon capacity, totaling 13,850 gallons, located around the island; • National Guard: four 500 gallon tankers at Hilo; • Private water haulers: There are 29 PUC -licensed trucks hauling water; most are based in Puna or Hilo. Their capacity ranges from 2500 to 7500 gallons, with an average of 4000 gallons. Their total capacity is 1,206,000 gallons. 96 Thus, the totals are 43 tank trucks and 1,221,850 gallons. Most Department of Water Supply reservoirs would normally be depleted within two days if no electricity is available for pump- ing, though there are a few gravity -fed sources such as Waimea and Honomu that could be utilized to fill tankers. However, the trucks would be dispersed by Civil Defense to serve household locations in the damaged areas rather than being used to try to refill tanks or reser- voirs, if any were available. 95 Personal communication with Glenn Ahuna, Engineer, Department of Water Supply. 96 Hawaii County Civil Defense, data tables. 18-36 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 18.1.14 Wastewater Systems On this island, the predominant method of wastewater disposal is onsite individual wastewater systems (i.e., cesspools or septic systems). The County sewerage system serves approximately 30% of the resident population. The priority area to sewer is the coastal areas to prevent cesspool seepage to the nearshore coastal waters. The County presently operates six sewerage systems: Hilo, Papaikou, Kulaimano, Kapehu, Kailua-Kona, and Keauhou (see Figure 18-17). During tsunamis, hurricanes, or earthquakes, disaster mitigation focuses on preventing leakage from the sewerage system. During the recovery phase, the operation of the system is not critical since portable toilets and facilities with onsite disposal are available. 18-37 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Kaupakuea Hmstd. Rd Homestead d Kulaimano System qB 6 yin cP °o K_alika I 12 �Yy '0,. 6 m l J2 M1 s— m R4 Fd yCu18� sno Hom ServicePointST ••.... ForceST Parcels O ManholeST - GravityST • DischargePointST OutfaIIST - LatefalST - TreatmentST Kulaimano Section in Detail Figure 18-17. County Wastewater System. 18-38 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 6 Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent The 1946 tsunami filled Hilo Bay with sewage which took weeks to flush out. Hilo's waste- water treatment plant has been relocated out of the tsunami zone. All other County treatment plants are outside the VE flood zone. However, 16 out of the 18 sewage pump stations appear to be in hazard zones. It would take careful mapping and site visits to determine with certain- ty whether such stations are at risk. All treatment plants and pump stations are designed to withstand earthquakes. All treatment plants and pump stations have standby diesel or propane generators in case of electrical failure. 18.1.15 Recovery Facilities and Capabilities Recovery involves all activities needed to provide emergency services and resumption of at least temporary normal services such as water, electricity, food distribution, and basic trans- portation. As with other aspects, these responsibilities fall under the umbrella of the County Civil Defense and are carried out by County departments, private agencies, and businesses. 18.1.16 Debris Management Removal and disposal of debris will clearly be a major problem. The island of KauaTs experience after the hurricanes showed what an extensive problem debris was, and how important its removal, storage, and disposal - temporarily or long term - is to recovery .97 Hawaii County's problem is intensified compared to the 1946 and 1960 tsunami debris clearance due to the closure of all sugar plantations. Machinery and experienced manpower from the plantations was a major factor in clean-up after those disasters.98 Hawaii County does not have a public curbside solid waste collection system. Instead, resi- dents dispose their solid waste at transfer stations located at 21 existing sites, and businesses hire private contractors who collect and dispose the waste at the landfills. The County trans- ports the solid waste from the transfer stations to two landfills: in Hilo and Puuanahulu (see Figure 18-18). Based on the existing reliance on residents to transport their solid waste to designated sites, the County's Disaster Debris Action Manual" emphasizes the need to educate the public and businesses on post -disaster solid waste disposal practices (particularly the need to separate recyclables) and pre -arranged contracts with private contractors for emergency debris clearance and collection. None of the landfill or transfer station sites are within the flood or tsunami inundation zone. 97 For the State report on the problems and recommendations on this task, after Hurricane ' Iniki, see Hawaii Disaster Debris Management Plan, prepared by IT Corporation (prime contractor) for State of Hawaii Department of Health and Civil Defense Agency, June 2000. 98 Personal and newspaper accounts at the Pacific Tsunami Museum describe the contributions of the planta- tions and the unions to recovery after tsunamis. 99 Harding ESE, County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual, prepared for the County of Hawaii, December 18, 2001. 18-39 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent ■ TDSR TRANSFER STATION Figure 18-18. Landfills, Transfer Stations, and TDSRs. Because of the limited remaining capacity at the Hilo Landfill, a major disaster will likely overwhelm the capacity. The Hilo Landfill has an estimated remaining capacity of 400,000 cubic yards. The Puuanahulu Landfill has a remaining capacity of 14,000,000 cubic yards. The estimated generation of hurricane debris from a Category 4 storm is about 1,600,000 cu- bic yards for the South Hilo district, and about 1,800,000 cubic yards for the combined Kona and Kohala districts. The strategy, therefore, is to minimize the amount to be landfilled and thereby minimize the hauling costs from Hilo to Puuanahulu. A tentative list of priorities for debris clearing, which Civil Defense will determine according to the situation, is as follows: 1. Life Safety 2. Communications 3. Essential roadways; access 18-40 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 4. Water 5. Electricity 6. Fuel (for emergency generators; emergency and recovery vehicles) 7. Airports 8. Barge docks (including fuel manifolds). The Disaster Debris Action Manual addressed the following • Debris Estimation. The Action Manual used spreadsheet models to estimate the quantities and composition of disaster debris generated by a hurricane, flood event, or tsunami. It did not estimate debris generation for earthquakes. A HAZUS run of the 04/02/1868 Ka'u Earthquake on the current day building inventory of Hawaii County produced debris generation of 1.27 tons. The hurricane table considers both with and without heavy rains - a factor overlooked in the hurricane studies done for Kaua'i and Oahu. • Temporary Debris Storage and Reduction (TDSR) Sites. Since the existing transfer stations will not be sufficient to handle disaster debris, TDSR sites are pre -identified areas to temporarily dispose debris. The Action Manual identified seven of the transfer stations that are large (10 acres or more) and/or have significant contiguous areas that are available for expanding to TDSR sites: Kalapana, Keaau, Waiohinu, Keei, Kailua, Waimea, and Hilo. Hilo site is in the quarry area adjacent to the landfill. The Puuanahulu Landfill has an area set aside in the landfill plan for TDSR use. A typical material processing flow for a TDSR site is shown in Figure 18-19. 18-41 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 0810 Houde Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent QNSffE i---i--ForrSITE Debris Mixed Crush --- Rnar1l3ase klatgria% Compcstabies Air Currin Incineration Shrew l.amfilt Public —• G�enwaste �ti l3ffle ric^usatHes Cerrtxjaicd Boxes_ Reusatre4 & d-lousehold Rrcpcahas Recyclac$es Plastk; Sheeting nge -- -- - _ tket Procdss for On r pfd Transporr Island Pi3cli or Ha,",�s Grind Ecl�rs Medals and 1 Segregate Markel Apphanoes _ - _ On or OR Dens,dy Island Mixed Aggregate Debris Mixed Crush --- Rnar1l3ase klatgria% --- Clean Shrew l.amfilt Wood —• 7Rrrce Rause ric^usatHes Cerrtxjaicd Boxes_ Reusatre4 & d-lousehold Rrcpcahas Recyclac$es Plastk; Sheeting nge -- -- - _ tket Procdss for On r pfd Transporr Island Residues and Msnzards WndhC Bulky Wastes Density Woody C&D Dansildr Landfill ""-- Boilers Figure 18-19. Typical Material Process Concept for TDSR Site. Source: Harding ESE, County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual, December 18, 2001. 18-42 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Risk Assessment A typical site plan is shown in Figure 18-20. � Processed 1 I MiAod Cddi kArLris salvagaaole 1 s 13 Acre 011ody D;zhris Scrap'Nood r __--_.-___-_ 0.7 Acre Storage I 1 0 7 Acre r t t ! I 1 l r Mixed CSG i Debris [�I.Iprinl.laratao:! . .waw r 1.3 Acres a as - 1 I C i..we i — — — Roofing —— — —_ 1 7.$ Acre < 1 1EteU3dtliB$. i Metal 1 0.5 Acre ---------- !?_ 7 1 ■.?�iftle a.1 A[r� Iq......................... i Pawr; a � Ac.w 1 p'Ily-accts - a.1 Acta 1 i I f 1 1 t r 1 I I 1 k 1 �' ...�....p.....`....... - fi ie u i µ n i IBLI r 0 4 Auvm 1 To fv grke.ts 11 or Landfill k ; Gus Hcitse l Office ■ ■ ; Allow For putwng spm: S+te Functions Key t. Green Waste lo__.,....r... l 2 Mixed C&D 3 ReusaNes & Reeydanle3 4. BulKp Wastes Public and Disposer Acnes; Roads .......... - Pcrirceter Service ?toad Data Program Area 8.9 Acres 20% Circulation 1.3 Buffer 0.7 Perimeter Road 1.4 Tola1 TOSR 10.0 Acres Figure 18-20. TDSR Conceptual Site Plan. Source: Harding ESE, County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual, December 18.2001. 18-43 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent There is a problem, however, in that some of these areas are private property and use agreements have not yet been negotiated. 44 CFR 10.8 (c) Statutory exclusions. The following actions are statutorily excluded from NEPA and the preparation of environmental impact statements and environmental assessments by section 316 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), as amended, 42 U.S. C. 5159; 1. Action taken or assistance provided under sections 402, 403, 407, or 502 of the Stafford Act; and 2. Action taken or assistance provided under section 406 of the Stafford Act that has the effect of restoring facilities as they existed before a major disaster or emergency Actions falling within the bounds of these Statutory Exclusions are exempt from NEPA, including all NEPA review and documentation. These actions must, however, still comply with all applicable environmental laws and Executive Orders. For section 402, General Federal Assistance For section 403, Essential Assistance For section 406, Repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of a facility damaged or destroyed. These 406 funded activities must take place on the same site as the damaged facility, and conform substantially to the pre-existing condition. Also, the proposed facility must conform substantially to the pre-existing footprint and location on the site of the pre- existing damaged facility. Alternate or improved projects not meeting the above criteria do not fall within the STATEX, and require NEPA review For section 407, Debris removal For section 502, Federal emergency assistance • Response Protocols. The Action Manual specified best management practices for various types of wastes (e.g., green waste, metal, mixed debris, woody C&C debris, asphalt roofing, putrescible wastes). Although cleanup of private property is the responsibility of the owners, curbside pickup for a specified time period may be eligible for FEMA funding. Civil Defense would instruct residents and businesses to separate disaster debris and set these materials out at curbside during debris collection sweeps for a green waste collection sweep, metals debris collection sweep, and mixed debris collection sweep (mixed debris, woody C&C, roofing, gypsum, plastic sheeting, aggregate and rubble, household furnishings and belongings). Residents and businesses shall be instructed to not set out the following materials: household rubbish (take to transfer stations); hazardous waste (hold for organized collection events or handled by private contractors under contract to the business); putrescible waste (take to transfer stations); dead animals (special instructions). For public roadways and facilities, green waste cleared from roadways and public facilities should be kept separate from other debris for collection and removal to designated temporary storage sites. Mobile chippers should be used to chip the tree limbs, brush and leaves at the time of collection and the chips transported to and stored at designated temporary storage sites. County parks may be suitable for temporary storage sites. Tree 18-44 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent trunks and stumps should be transported to TDSR sites for processing through a tub grinder or, if of millable timber quality, for possible reuse. Building debris and personal property debris encountered on public property should be diverted to TDSR sites for processing and land filling. Debris consisting of utility poles and lines, and utility devices should be handled by the utility companies. • Inventory of Contractors and Equipment. The Action Manual compiled an initial inventory of equipment in public ownership and list of potential contractors and their equipment. The contractors' equipment, however, is not listed in the Action Manual, nor is the availability of the Hawai'i National Guard or the Army. The Guard will certainly be called upon for personnel to aid in debris removal. It is planned that much of the clearance will be done under the Department of Public Works. • Contract Management. The Action Manual provides references for model contracts (time and materials, lump sum, or unit price contracts); • Public Education Programs. Hazard mitigation public education programs should include proper handling of disaster debris. The Action Manual provides references for examples of public communication materials. A debris hotline should also be established during the Increased Readiness, Response, and Recovery Phases. Update and follow-up action requirements include: • Update debris estimation with earthquake estimates, using modeling such as HAZUS provided the modeling has been validated against historic events and local conditions, and refine the estimates provided with any updated methodology; • Annual civil defense training should include the response actions specified in the Action Manual (section 5.0 entitled Action Steps for Response to a Disaster Event); • Develop a TDSR site in Puna; coordinate agreements with private owners for TDSRs on private land; determine applicability of environmental assessments for emergency, temporary uses such as TDSRs; • Maintain the resource inventory (e.g., contact list of contractors and equipment) to keep it updated; • Update the information specified in the Action Manual, such as estimates of remaining capacity of disposal facilities; availability and capacities of biomass burners; lists of equipment in public ownership; changes in land uses and access of potential TDSR sites and surrounding lands; • Periodically review boilerplate contracts for debris management services. 18.1.17 Economic Assets The following types of economic assets facilitate post -disaster recovery: • Survival and building supplies. Retail outlets that sell food, bottled water, blankets, clothes, matches, toilet paper, building materials, fuel, pumps, and other basic items will be a resource to the community; 18-45 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Risk Assessment • Financial institutions. To purchase needed supplies, residents and businesses may need access to cash or arrange loans; • Businesses. Returning to normal operations as quickly as possible will avert massive unemployment. Mitigation measures include educating and providing assistance as necessary for businesses to obtain business interruption insurance to minimize post - disaster business failures. Future updates to this plan will include GIS inventories of these assets. 18.2 Special at Risk Populations and Areas 18.2.1 At Risk Populations Certain segments of the population require special attention for hazard education efforts to build their readiness capability or during a hazard event for evacuation assistance. These population segments include: • Young and elderly-- require special hazard education and evacuation assistance; • Non-English speakers-- require special hazard education; • Persons with disabilities-- require special hazard education and evacuation assistance for the sensory, mental, and physically impaired; • Lower income-- requires special hazard education to implement readiness measures and may require assistance during recovery phase. • Visitor-- lack knowledge of hazards and warning systemsioo The concentrations of these special populations are as follows: • Relatively high percentage of youngsters (<18 years old) • Puna District-- several communities (e.g., Ainaloa, Fern Acres, Nanawale Estates, Orchidland Estates, Hawaiian Beaches) • Pahala and Naalehu in the Ka'u District; • Waikoloa and Waimea in the South Kohala District. 100 Preparing the tourism sector (and other transient populations) for disaster in Hawai'i County, Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Limited (NZ) & the University of Hawaii Manoa, February 2004 18-46 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent • Relatively high percentage of elderly (60+ years old) • South and North Hilo Districts-- several communities (e.g., Honomu, Papaikou, Paukaa, Wainaku, Laupahoehoe); • Pahoa in the Puna District; • Honokaa in the Hamakua District; • Keauhou in the North Kona District; • Pahala in the Ka'u District. • Places with more than 1,000 disabled persons (excluding employment disabilities): • Hilo in the South Hilo District; • Kailua and Holualoa in the North Kona District; • Hawaiian Paradise Park, Hawaiian Beaches, and Volcano in the Puna District; • Waimea in the North Kohala District. • Highest percentage of public assistance as an indicator of lower income: • Puna District; • Ka'u District. • Highest numbers of persons who do not speak English well or not at all: • Hilo and Pepeekeo in South Hilo District • Keaau, Hawaiian Paradise Park, Pahoa in Puna District Kailua and Holualoa in North Kona District • Waimea and Waikoloa Village in South Kohala District • Captain Cook in South Kona District 18.2.2 Buildings, Residences and Remote Off -Grid Settlement Areas The location of residential areas is important for evacuation and shelter planning. The value of buildings at risk indicates whether special measures are warranted to reduce vulnerability. As of December 2009, there were approximately 132,555 lots in this County of which 59,249 were zoned for residential use. Table 18-8 summarizes the number of residential lots and total building values entirely or partially located within the tsunami evacuation zone, special flood hazard zone, or lava hazard zone 1 or 2. 18-47 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Tnhle 19-9_ Vnlnernhility Annlvsis nfResidentinl Arenslm 18.2.3 Hotels and Resorts Hotels and resorts pose special concerns for the safety of visitors, with most of the major facilities located in the tsunami evacuation zone. Since public shelters do not have capacity to accommodate all visitors, the hotels and resorts would be relied upon for in-place sheltering. Future planning will strive to have each major hotel and resort has an emergency plan approved by Civil Defense to ensure a trained staff and appropriate shelter capabilities. An updated database of hotels and resorts would track the status of emergency plans and contact information to communicate as necessary with the resort before, during, or after a disaster. 18.2.4 Schools, Day Care Centers, and Nursing Homes If evacuation is necessary during school hours, the location of all day care centers and schools from pre-schools to university, public and private, is critical to control traffic flow. For daycare centers, pre-schools and elementary schools, significant traffic will be incoming for parents to pick up their children, as well as outgoing. Nursing homes will require emergency response plans to ensure sheltering, evacuation, supply of emergency provisions, and back-up systems to sustain vital medical equipment. 18.2.5 Parks and Shopping Centers Parks and shopping centers are a concern since large numbers of people may be at these facilities and may not be aware of warnings. Future planning will ensure that managers of major shopping centers have emergency plans. Federal, State, and County park personnel participate in the EOC to ensure proper warnings and evacuation of these facilities, as necessary. Park buildings and shopping centers may also serve as shelters. Park grounds may serve as potential temporary storage areas for green waste or other debris. 101 Based on 2008 County Tax Appraiser data 18-48 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Islandwide Special Flood Tsunami Lava Hazard Hazard Zone Evacuation Zone 1 or 2 Zone Total Lots 132,555 6,300 33,124 Residential Lots 59,249 1,618 2,668 5,752 Total Lots 44.7% 1.2% 2.0% 4.30,,o Total Building $22,997M $1,321M $1,391M $1,448M Value of Residential Lots 18.2.3 Hotels and Resorts Hotels and resorts pose special concerns for the safety of visitors, with most of the major facilities located in the tsunami evacuation zone. Since public shelters do not have capacity to accommodate all visitors, the hotels and resorts would be relied upon for in-place sheltering. Future planning will strive to have each major hotel and resort has an emergency plan approved by Civil Defense to ensure a trained staff and appropriate shelter capabilities. An updated database of hotels and resorts would track the status of emergency plans and contact information to communicate as necessary with the resort before, during, or after a disaster. 18.2.4 Schools, Day Care Centers, and Nursing Homes If evacuation is necessary during school hours, the location of all day care centers and schools from pre-schools to university, public and private, is critical to control traffic flow. For daycare centers, pre-schools and elementary schools, significant traffic will be incoming for parents to pick up their children, as well as outgoing. Nursing homes will require emergency response plans to ensure sheltering, evacuation, supply of emergency provisions, and back-up systems to sustain vital medical equipment. 18.2.5 Parks and Shopping Centers Parks and shopping centers are a concern since large numbers of people may be at these facilities and may not be aware of warnings. Future planning will ensure that managers of major shopping centers have emergency plans. Federal, State, and County park personnel participate in the EOC to ensure proper warnings and evacuation of these facilities, as necessary. Park buildings and shopping centers may also serve as shelters. Park grounds may serve as potential temporary storage areas for green waste or other debris. 101 Based on 2008 County Tax Appraiser data 18-48 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent 18.2.6 Hazardous Materials Sites Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) are potential secondary hazards if released into the environment by a hazard event, or if it is potentially explosive from the heat of a lava flow or wildfire. HAZMAT carriers may cause spills in accidents caused by flooding or earthquake. HAZMAT transported through pipelines may leak as a result of earthquakes. HAZMAT releases pose short- and long-term toxicological threats to humans and to terrestrial and aquatic plants and wildlife. Toxic materials affect people through one of three processes: inhalation, ingestion, or direct contact with skin. The State Department of Health requires the registration of storage sites for hazardous materials and notification to the Fire Department. The Department of Health maintains a database on these storage sites. Future updates to this plan will include a map produced from the County's GIS database. 18.3 Relationship of Land Use Growth Trends to Hazard Areas 18.3.1 Growth Trends The County of Hawaii encompasses the entire island of Hawaii which consists of 4,028.2 square miles, larger than all of the other Hawaiian Islands combined. While the largest in size, Hawaii County also enjoys the lowest population density in the state at approximately 37 persons per square mile which compares to a statewide average of approximately 189 persons per square mile. 102 The census registered 148,677 residents in the year 2000, a 24 per cent increase over the 1990 resident population. The County General Plan revision anticipates that the resident population will continue to grow and projects annual growth rates ranging from 1.95 per cent to 2.1 percent till the year 2020. Projected estimates for 2020 indicate an island resident population of 217,718, or an increase of 46 per cent over the estimated 2000 population of 148,677.103 The low population density is reflected in the broad land use patterns established within the county. The State Land Use Law established four basic land use categories within the state in 1961. These categories are described by the County General Plan revision as follows: "The Urban District is generally defined as lands in urban use with sufficient reserve to accommodate foreseeable growth. In the County of Hawaii this district is comprised of approximately 55,989 acres or two per cent of the island's total land area. Rural Districts are defined as lands primarily comprised of small farms mixed with low density residential lots that have a minimum lot size of one-half acre under the State Land Use Law. Of the four districts, this is the smallest, with approximately 1,005 acres of the island's total land area. The Agricultural District includes lands with a high capacity for intensive cultivation as well as those with low capacity. The minimum lot size in this district under the State Land Use Law is one acre. The Agricultural District has the second greatest land area with approximately 1,184,599 acres or slightly under 46 per cent of the total land area of the 102 County of Hawaii, Department of Research and Development, Data Book, 2008. 103 County of Hawaii, Planning Department. General Plan, 2005. 18-49 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent island. Conservation Districts are primarily those lands in the existing forest and water reserve zones. This district has the largest land area with approximately 1,339,770 acres or 52 per cent of the total land area of the island." 104 The state land use district acreages are broken down by judicial district below. Tnhle 19-9. State Lnnd 1Tse Districts Aerenue (ns nf.hily 20071 District Agricultural Conservation Rural Urban Total Puna 175,064 138,538 140 6,431 320,173 South Hilo 71,858 168,462 18 12,622 252,960 North Hilo 53,644 120,073 78 582 174,377 Hamakua 1621,769 236,315 14 1,042 400,140 North Kohala 64,740 12,641 20 2,435 79,836 South Kohala 150,163 15,366 183 10,728 176,440 North Kona 159,149 186,244 519 19,496 365,408 South Kona 110,796 35,041 33 815 146,685 Ka'u 232,855 427,090 - 1,838 661,783 Total 1,181,038 1,339,770 1,005 55,989 2,577,802 The existing land use pattern in the County has its origins in the historical agricultural based economy which was the predominant industry for most of the past 100 years. These patterns have been modified by the more recent emergence of the visitor industry which is now the predominant economic engine for the County. The Puna District, with a population of 31,335 in 2000, had the highest growth rate in the County for the ten year period from 1990-2000 at 50.8 per cent. The district is primarily rural and agricultural in nature with the major agricultural businesses being the growing of macadamia nuts, flowers, foliage, papaya, bananas, tropical fruits and vegetables. The high growth rate in the district can be attributed to the availability of relatively cheap land that was developed in the 1950's and 60's into thousands of non -conforming residential -sized lots that lack the basic infrastructure found in current subdivision standards. Nevertheless, construction of single-family dwellings within these non -conforming subdivisions has increased as the district serves as a bedroom community to the Hilo area. Many of these existing non -conforming parcels in the southeastern end of the Puna district are situated within lava hazard zones 1 and 2 which have the greatest risk of possible inundation. Flooding during heavy rains is also an ongoing concern within the district. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes to the established land use pattern over the next several years. The South Hilo district had a population of 47,386 in 2000 which represented approximately 32 per cent of the total population for Hawaii Island. The City of Hilo is the largest population center on the island with the main offices of the county government, branch offices of federal and state agencies located there. The island's major deep draft harbor and 104 County of Hawaii, Planning Department. General Plan, 2005. 18-50 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent international airport are also located in Hilo. In addition to industrial, commercial and social service activities, the University of Hawaii at Hilo and Hawaii Community College and affiliated research programs play an important role in Hilo's economy. The entire City of Hilo, south of the Wailuku River is situated within lava hazard zone 3. Low lying coastal areas are within the tsunami inundation zone and evacuation areas. Sections of the city are also subject to flooding during periods of heavy rain. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes to the established land use pattern over the next several years. The North Hilo and Hamakua Districts are two rural agricultural districts that are undergoing significant socio-economic changes. The two districts experienced the loss of their two remaining sugar operations during the 1990's which resulted in the loss of 1,200 jobs and approximately 43,500 acres of cane production. Eucalyptus trees have been planted on a portion of the former sugar acreage but much of the area remains unutilized. The 2000 population in the Hamakua District was 6,108 while the North Hilo population was 1,720. The majority of these residents reside in former plantation communities that are scattered along the Mamalahoa Highway. Many of the remaining residents are employed outside of the region either in resort related jobs in the neighboring South Kohala District or other jobs in South Hilo. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The North Kohala District is another rural agricultural district that was formerly reliant on the sugar industry. Ranching, macadamia nut production, and nursery production are the principal agricultural activities currently operating in the district. The 2000 population in North Kohala was 6,038 with many of them employed in resort related jobs in neighboring South Kohala. Although a major landowner in the North Kohala district, obtained rezoning of approximately 15 acres of land in 1993 for the development of a 200 to 240 -unit lodge hotel at Mahukona, no activity towards the development of the lodge hotel has occurred to date. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The South Kohala District contains a diverse mix of agriculture in the Waimea region as well as one of the world's premiere resort destinations along the coast. With a population of 13, 131 in 2000, the South Kohala district had the second highest growth rate in the County during the period between 1990-2000 at 43.7 percent. The Waimea region contains the most extensive truck farming area in the County growing vegetables, fruits, flowers and foliage. Most of the lands in South Kohala, between the farms of Waimea and the resorts on the coast, are used for cattle ranching. Nevertheless, the visitor industry is the major economic force in the district. There are three major resort nodes that have been developed by Mauna Kea Properties, Mauna Lani Resort, and the Waikoloa Land Company. These resort nodes include hotels, condominiums, single family residential subdivisions, golf courses and commercial centers. The number of hotel rooms within these three resort nodes totals over 3,250. The district is also served by major transportation facilities which include Kawaihae Harbor, Waimea-Kohala airport and major highway systems linking the communities of Waimea, Waikoloa Village and Kawaihae. The Waimea community is experiencing growth pressures with proposals for expanded residential growth by the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands and Parker Ranch, the major land owner in the district. 18-51 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent The North Kona District, with a population of 28,543 in 2000, includes Kailua-Kona which is considered to be the center of government, commercial and industrial activities in West Hawaii. The primary employment generator in the district is tourism with visitor accommodations and facilities extending from the Keauhou-Kona Resort at the southern end of the district to the Hualalai Resort and Kona Village Resort at the northern end. These visitor accommodations include world class destination resorts with a full range of amenities as well as resort condominium units, timeshare units and stand alone hotels. Currently there are approximately 4,000 visitor accommodations in the North Kona district which accounts for over 45 per cent of the total on the island. The major agricultural activities within the district include coffee, macadamia nut, avocado and ranching. Major infrastructure facilities serving the district include the Honokohau Small Boat Harbor, Keahole Airport and the Kailua pier. North Kona is facing major growth pressures including additional resort, commercial, industrial and residential development throughout the district. The South Kona district is another rural agricultural district that had a population of 8,589 in 2000. The major economic activity in the district is agriculture with coffee, macadamia nut, avocado and ranching leading the way. Many South Kona residents are employed in the visitor industry in the adjacent North Kona District. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The Kau district is another rural agricultural district that is undergoing a socio-economic transition after closing of the Kau Sugar Company in 1996. The population in the district totaled 5,827 in 2000. The major economic activity in the district remains agriculture with macadamia nuts and ranching leading the way. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The County Planning Department is in the process of developing a GIS spatial growth model that would be a useful tool to evaluate growth trends in relation to hazard areas. 18.3.2 Land Use Tools The County General Plan, first adopted by ordinance on December 15, 1971 and most recently updated in 2005, provides the foundation for a comprehensive planning program for the County of Hawaii. This program, consisting of three interrelated parts, is depicted in Figure 18-8 and described in the County General Plan Revision as follows: The General Plan represents the first level and encompasses long-range goals, policies, standards, and courses of action for the entire County. The General Plan also provides the legal basis for all of the other elements of the County's planning structure. As such, the General Plan is the highest order, or 'umbrella' plan. It establishes the outer limits or boundaries within which the County must operate. The second level consists of short and middle range plans that further define the long-range goals and policies of the General Plan. These plans are related to specific regions or districts (Hilo, Kona, Kohala, Ka'u, etc.), functions (recreation, agriculture, drainage, highways, etc.), and specific areas within a region (Kailua Kona, Downtown Hilo, etc.). 18-52 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent The third level consists of specific mechanisms to implement the two higher levels of the planning hierarchy. These include the Zoning and Subdivision Codes and both the operating and capital improvement program budgets.'Os GENERAL PGAM Functional .Flora Corninunity Development Plan � Area Irnprovement Plan Rt{. tape Hilo Hilo bowntown Development Sewerage 1 [7rainoge Ka tm P Ion Kailua Village hes 9n Plan Historic Sites kioln to Et Etc. Etc. c. bund Use bevulopmnt Cperatnng Budget Capi#al Improvements Program I Codes (CIF's Zan. ng Subdivision i Other CQaes ani Regulations Figure 18-21. County of Hawaii Land Use Planning System The Hazard Mitigation Plan is a functional plan that is part of the second level of the County's comprehensive planning program described above. As such, the hazard mitigation objectives, strategies and implementing actions need to be consistent with the broader goals, policies, standards and courses of action contained in the General Plan. Working within the framework of the comprehensive planning program, implementing mechanisms that will be utilized to address the mitigation objectives include the Zoning and Subdivision Codes, the Operating and Capital Improvement Program Budgets and other County ordinances. The County General Plan recognizes that certain areas susceptible to natural hazards may need to be kept open and not utilized for buildings, structures or other economic development purposes. These areas may be designated as Conservation or Open in the County General Plan, Land Use Pattern Allocation Guide Map. Within the County Zoning Code, the "Open" district applies to areas generally intended for open type uses although it does permit golf courses, with a use permit, some recreational facilities, and various public and utility -type facilities. There is currently no County zoning district that calls for land to be preserved in a largely natural state. As such the General Plan Revision is proposing a new policy to "Amend the Zoning Code to create a category for lands that should be kept in a largely natural state, but that may not be in the Conservation District, such as certain important view planes, buffer areas, and very steep slopes." 105 County of Hawaii, Planning Department. General Plan, 2005. 18-53 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent Existing mechanisms within the General Plan and Zoning Code allow the County to direct new development proposals away from known natural hazard locations. Areas that are already developed or have existing land use entitlements for future development present a significantly more difficult and complex challenge for achieving hazard mitigation objectives. Areas that are subjected to repetitive losses or have experienced total devastation may be targeted for public acquisition and relocation. Short of acquisition and relocation the County can utilize tools such as Cluster Plan Development or Planned Unit Development measures that encourage developers to restrict development on certain portions of their property due to flooding (or other natural hazard conditions) in exchange for allowing higher densities or other code deviations for the remainder of their property. 18.3.3 Loss Estimation and Hazard Ranking The relative severity of the various hazards can be measured by the estimated losses. Expected losses when expressed in dollars do not include loss of lives. The components of loss estimates usually include: structural loss (structure replacement value x percent damage), contents loss (content replacement value x percent damage), and functional loss (functional downtime costs + displacement time Costs). 106 One estimate developed for the State of Hawaii, which focused only on structural property loss, concluded that the most severe losses for the County of Hawaii are earthquake, hurricane, lava flow, flood, and tsunami in that order (see Table 18-10). Compared to the other counties, Hawaii County had the highest earthquake losses, second highest hurricane losses, and the only county with lava flow losses. Table 18-10. Relative Hazard Severity of Major Hazards Based on Average Annual Loss Estates Hazard AAL Hurricane $69 million Earthquake $65.1 million Lava Flow $24 million Flood $0.5 million Tsunami $0.25 million Source: Martin & Chock, Inc., 2009. Average Annualized Loss Estimates for Hazards in the County of Hawaii Updates to this plan have refined the loss estimates, using the HAZUS model. HAZUS involves two steps: analysis of the specific risk, then application of the analysis to the area. Extensive data bases are provided for these purposes. The programs can be used at three levels: a basic level with default inputs, a second level with more specific inputs, and a third, very expert and detailed level with most defaults replaced by local inputs where allowable. 106 FEMA, State and Location Mitigation Planning How -To Guide: Understanding Your Risks, chapter 4. 18-54 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent HAZUS was first developed for earthquakes and was made available to State Civil Defense as HAZUS 99. A more recent version called HAZUS-MH (for multi -hazard) has been provided which includes wind and flooding modules. Through a series of studies beginning in 2000, the State of Hawaii Civil Defense extensively revised the HAZUS-99 inventory information for Hawaii and Maui Counties to account for code adoption and enforcement policy histories of each county, Hawaii building construction types, the number and locations of specific building types, geospatial centroids of population centers, as well as Hawaii construction costs. Ground motion calculations in HAZUS-99 were significantly enhanced by State Civil Defense by using a Hawaii -specific ground motion attenuation model. Soil amplification effects were incorporated into HAZUS-99 using a NEHRP site class map for the island of Hawaii prepared by URS in 2004. The implementation and testing of each of these parameters was carried out under the technical supervision of the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee (HSEAC). In 2004-2005, further studies were conducted to quantify loss reductions and the mitigation effectiveness of seismic retrofit, code adoption and enforcement policies. A more recent study completed by Martin & Chock in 2009 incorporated a modern-day equivalent of Level 3 Hawaii and Maui County building inventories, and updated the hazard and modeling improvements completed by State Civil Defense into the latest HAZUS-MH platform. The study also used the observed impacts associated with the recent Hawaii Kiholo Bay earthquake disaster of 2006 to validate the model results produced by the enhanced HAZUS earthquake loss estimation tool. A summary of the loss estimation procedure for each hazard is as follows: • Flood - census tracts/blocks overlaid with flood maps, such as FIRM. But, note that the tsunami portion of such maps is based on all possible tsunamis and any one event will affect less property. The State is presently in the process of updating the FIRM's. By 2010, HAZUS will be available for this use and can include probability. • Hurricane - a HAZUS hurricane model has been developed, tested, and validated against Hurricane 'Iniki on Kaua i. This model is available for use on Hawaii Island. • Lava flow - predictive data are now available from the Hawaii Volcano Observatory (HVO) which can be used with GIS layers to make probability estimates of losses. A more simple, "first cut" would use the published lava hazard zones. • Windstorms and high waves (except hurricanes) and landslides are not considered a significant enough loss risk to require a formal evaluation. The repetitive losses presently cataloged for these events can provide estimates of future losses. • Earthquake - as noted above, HAZUS is used for loss predictions and was originally developed for earthquakes. The default HAZUS data has been updated and enhanced based on data collected from the tax appraiser's database to more accurately reflect the building exposure in Hawaii County. • Landslides - there appears to be no methodology in place to predict the loss from such events as the massive coastal slide at Waipunalei ten years ago. 18-55 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: RiskAssessnzent • Tsunamis - existing models and data can provide probable (usually maximum expectable) inundation for a tsunami of any magnitude from any direction. Unfortunately, there is no valid prediction of the probability of such an event. (See tsunami section for discussion of this question). For estimation purposes, a "100 year" event is usually used, as in flood work. This actually means simply a 1% annual chance of occupancy. A worst case tsunami, based on earthquakes from each of the four common source areas, can then be run in a model and inundation overlaid on census block data for loss estimation. When available and in use, the HAZUS flood module can use this information as an input and provide estimations more automatically. Focusing only on property losses may not provide a reliable ranking of hazards. Future up- dates of this plan may attempt a broader analysis. For hazard ranking analysis purposes, the models such as HAZUS will focus on the anticipated maximum likely event rather than the worst case. 18-56 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Appendix Preparing the tourism sector (and other transient populations) for a disaster in Hawai'i Introduction World wide, tourists flock to areas of natural beauty which are often also sites prone to natural hazards, such as coastal zones, river valleys, forests and mountains. Hawai'i County is no exception with its white and black sand beaches, and Volcano National Park, with its active lava flows enticing thousands of visitors to the Big Island each year. Managing the tourists that visit the Island in the event of a. disaster is of paramount importance if risk to life and negative impacts on the tourism industry are to be minimised. Problems with managing tourists in a disaster There has been a considerable effort over the last few decades to increase awareness of the general populace about natural hazards in Hawai'i. Tourists (and other transient populations) however, remain a difficult group to assess in terms of understanding their level of knowledge of hazards and possible actions they may take in the event of a disaster. This group is also difficult to target with hazard education program because of its transient nature and language differences. As an example, research on improving the effectiveness of warnings systems has frequently highlighted the difficulty of preparing transient populations to respond appropriately to warnings (Drabek 1994, 1996). Due to these reasons, tourists should be regarded as part of the `at -risk population' in a natural disaster. The expanding tourist industry in Hawaii means that the tourist population is increasingly exposed to disasters. Particular vulnerabilities result from: ■ unfamiliarity of surroundings • lack of knowledge of local hazards • language barriers ■ transient movement in remote areas 10 difficulty in educating Hazard education and warning systems A range of education programs (e.g. brochures, articles, signs) are traditionally used for educating people about natural hazards generally with the aim of increasing individual, business and household preparedness. Warning systems are used to warn people of imminent threat in the event of a disaster. Although these approaches may be acceptable for the general populace, they may not be ideal when putting in place measures to protect tourists, and the tourism economy. Education Hazard education can be considered from two perspectives: lnsitute of Geotogicaf & Nuclear Sciences Limited (NZ) B the U► aversityofHawa'i— Manoa Preparing he tourism sector(& other tramient populations) for a disaster in Hawa?i County February 2004 Al s-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Appendix 1) education of tourists about hazards and how to respond during a disaster 2) education and capacity building of the tourism sector to manage and respond to a natural disaster. The former is discussed below, the latter later in this paper as the most effective form of education for the tourism sector. Effective education about hazards specifically aimed at tourists is difficult to achieve due largely to the transient nature of tourists and language barriers. If tourists were able to gain a clear understanding of the potential hazards in Hawaii, the warning systems, and how to respond to these, there would be less reliance on other parties (most likely tourism personnel) to assist. However, reaching tourists with this type of information is unlikely to be successful so other strategies, such as focussing on tourism firms and personnel, need to be considered. Discussing and showing tourists potential natural hazards is not generally favoured by the tourist industry; the exception is warnings about problems they are likely encounter such as sea urchins or property theft from their car. The perception from tourism personnel has been that if tourists are told that an area is disasterprone it would deter people from visiting the area, and result in a downturn in business. In contrast, interviews held with visitors [(Drabek 1996)] have shown that there is an expectation for competent disaster preparedness from managers and goverment and that failure in an event of a disaster would be remembered as a negative experience that could cause the loss of future revenue and lives. From this we can deduce that it is better not to spend too much effort telling tourists about potential natural hazards, but to make sure that tourism firms and personnel are educated and trained how to respond in the event of a disaster. Warning systems Having tourists respond correctly to warning systems is crucial to minimize the loss of life. Response to warning systems is not always that expected by those giving the warning - a problem likely to be exemplified when tourists are involved (given the unfamiliar surroundings they may find themselves in). A number of factors tell us why people would react in an unexpected manner to a warning, and these can be applied to the tourist population: ® warning content and style ® level of perceived personal risk 4 ability to confirm a warning message ■ receiver (e.g. tourist) characteristics Although the: content and style of a warning system can be controlled, it is hard to understand and interpret how a receiver may react to the warning system. When dealing with tourists who are likely to be unfamiliar with local warning systems, it is even more difficult to predict their response actions. Insftute of Geological& Nuclear Sciences limited (NZ) & the Udwrsily ofHava`i— Marroa Preparing the tourism sector(& other transierd populations) for a 6sasterin Nawai'i County February 2009 AIX -2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Appendix Developing a fail safe warning process is complex due to the diversity and number of sources and the difficulty in reaching diverse groups. The range of sources creates potential problems in the design and implementation of warning systems. Another issue identified is the potential adverse impact of false alarms on the tourism sector and resultant impact on the effectiveness of future warning response. Again, training tourism personnel on how to respond to warnings and keep tourists safe has been identified as an effective way of improving warning response effectiveness. Education programs and warning systems appear to be the two most common approaches aimed directly at tourists to educate them about natural hazards and warn of impending danger. The effectiveness of these approaches however can be questioned as there is more likely to be more success in directly approaching tourism firms and working with tourism personnel on how to keep tourists safe in the event of a disaster. Who is responsible for the tourist? Expecting tourists to take the time to find out about hazards while they are on vacation is unrealistic. A 2001 Washington State Tsunami Survey confirmed this when results showed that tsunami hazard maps in survey communities had been seen by 62% of residents but only 19% of visitors. Of those surveyed, 28% of residents and 46% of visitors were unaware of the tsunami warning system (Johnston et al 2002) Because of this, education and warning systems (discussed above) are unlikely to be the primary means to ensure tourists are kept safe in a disaster. Such findings reinforce the need for Civil Defense to work closely with tourism fines and personnel before a disaster occurs in order to ensure they understand the hazards in their area and how best to respond in the event of a disaster. Roles and responsibilities of tourism personnel need to be identified and expectations clarified. Understanding the tourism sector Given that most tourism ventures are privately owned firms, there is a need to establish relationships with these business owners and convey the importance of emergency planning for their staff (tourism personnel) and clients (tourists). Tierney (2001) discusses how private firms are "less than enthusiastic about emergency preparedness" so bringing this idea to fruition will not be easy. Research has shown that a number of factors can influence a private firm's disaster preparedness such as size and age of the business; whether there is national head office for multiple local offices; and type of business. Except for the size of the business (where it has been shown that the larger the organisation the better prepared they are), other factors remain inconclusive and contradictory in terms of their influence on a firm's emergency preparedness and willingness to participate in emergency planning. Gamble (2000), found that the impacts of and the recovery from Hurricane Floyd were greatest to small tourism facilities. This may indicate that smaller fines do not lnsbtute of Geological& NuclearSaoncos Limited (MZ) & the UtwetsityofHawa'i— Manoa Preparing the tourism sector(& other transient populations) for a disaster in Hawaii County Febmany 2004 A18-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Appendix have the time and resources to commit to preparedness, which will make it difficult to engage them in any training program. Important lessons for the tourism sector in Hawai'i can be drawn from the experience of the two hurricanes that struck Hawaii in recent years: tourist resources can recover quickly from disasters if their base appeal is not significantly compromised, when the island infrastructure is again functioning and an strong program is needed to publicize the recovery to agencies and potential tourists who may have an image of the island being devastated. .Hawai' i of course is very reliant upon its natural environment to entice tourists and if this remains sustained in the event of a disaster then tourists will continue to came to Hawai' i. However, it is important to emphasize the restoration of the infrastructure that supports tourists (from hotel beds and food to accessible transport routes) as well as the resident population. A significant event similar to that on Kauai (Iwa, Iniki), affecting this island, could impact severely on such infrastructure and restrict the number of tourists to the Island. The importance of tourism personnel training Engaging and educating tourism firms (particularly small firms) and training tourism personnel are critical factors to reduce loss of life to tourists in the event of a disaster. Drabek carried out two studies that highlighted this issue. Drabek's 1994 study looped at 185 tourist companies and their level of evacuation preparedness; and in 1996 Drabek studied 800 transients including 520 tourists who had experienced evacuation during a disaster. The most significant lessons learned by tourism personnel that had been involved in a natural disaster were: Plan appropriate protective actions ■ Resist threat denial ■ Debunk the panic myth (a myth that the public panics when warned of disaster) ■ Have one person in charge ■ Improve employee and customer communication ■ Plan to provide customer sheltering ■ Anticipate the needs of special populations ■ Provide records protection ■ Recognise family priorities ■ Structure media relationships (This is a major issue as there have been cases of exaggeration and misinformation presented from the media. This can have adverse impacts on current and fixture tourism business) Key findings of the 1996 study of tourists who experienced evacuation in a disaster found: ■ that policies and procedures to evacuate tourists were adhoc ■ tourists in disasters were frequently critical of whom they perceived to be responsible (e.g. hotel owners) 4 lns9lute of Geokgical & Nuclear Sciences bmded (AQ Phe Urxuetsily of Hawaii— Mama Preparing the tourism sector(& othertransient populations) fur a disaster in Hawaii County Febmary2Q04 A18-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Appendix investment and public/private interagency partnerships in emergency management are essential In a 2002 a `Survey of Residents Sentiments on Tourism in Hawaii' (DBEDT) was carried out that highlighted a number of key issues that could assist with future tourism planning and management. Although not focussed on tourism personnel, the results from a number of the questions can be used to assist with understanding how to manage tourism in Hawaii County: o Many residents of Hawai'i were more likely to favor tourism growth than oppose it, with support for main growth areas to be Hilo and East Hawaii, especially Volcano. This could be indicative of future growth areas for tourism and acceptance of tourism by residents. ■ Do not assume that `visitor industry jobs' are `hotel jobs' as only 45% of those surveyed agreed they were, therefore highlighting that a number of other sectors (unidentified) involved tourism personnel. ■ There has been increasing support for government to improve infrastructure in tourist areas. This finding may indicate support for future emergency management program such as shelters and escape routes. Improving the resilience of the tourism sector To ensure that the tourism sector remains resilient in the event of disaster, Hawaii Civil Defense needs to maintain their dialog with tourism firms and personnel and assist them to integrate emergency preparedness into their core activities. A training needs analysis could be carried out to assess tourism personnel's understanding of hazard risk, emergency planning issues, levels of personnel training, barriers to implementing mitigation and ways to overcome negative impacts of false alarms. A training needs analysis will help with developing appropriate personnel training for emergency management functions. This analysis should: 1. Determine what groups will be involved 2. Specify everyone's roles 3. Define decision-making procedures 4. Ensure effective co-ordination among the organizations involved 5. Define communication procedures 6. Ensure resources are sufficient and available Although there is a financial cost associated with training, benefits will be that tourism personnel are better prepared and able to respond more effectively in the 5 Institute of Geological & 1Vuclear Sciences limited (MZ) & the Urduersdy of Hawaii — Mawa Preparing the tourism sector(& other tmwierd populations) for a disaster in Hawaii County February 2004 A18-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Appendix event of a natural hazard. This could prevent loss of life and reduce business losses at both a local and State level. A training needs analysis could also: • create a checklist for onsite analysis of operating conditions of tourism environments for tourism firms to "self -check" their procedures ■ identify, in conjunction with tourism personnel, ongoing training programs that will suit their needs and schedules • considerpublic education programs that are specifically targeted at the tourist (e.g. different languages, short simple messages) Public education effectiveness can be increased by repeating the same message in varying formats such as brochures, signs, and in a variety of languages and locations. farm agreements with tourism firms or tourist body as to who is responsible for tourists in a disaster (tools to encourage tourism firms to undertake emergency planning can be via the use of non. -regulatory methods (e.g. education/workshops) and/or regulatory mandates set by the State). Conclusion Targeting tourists as a means to teach them about hazards in flawai' i may prove futile, with the exception of short, simple, repetitive messages (such as tsunami signs at the beach). Organizational buy -in from tourism firms and training of tourism personnel are two key issues that need addressing. To reduce risk to the tourism sector, Civil Defense needs to work closely with this group to: • encourage tourism firms {especially small firms) to put preparedness measures in place prior to an event occurring, and • train tourism personnel how to respond during a disaster with the aim of keeping tourists safe • have media reiations in place to avoid negative portrayal of hazard events (i.e. instead work with these media so that `success' stories are portrayed). Institute of Geological & NuolearSciences Limited (hf2) & the Uriimmity of Hawaii— IManoa Preparing the tourism sector(& other iransierripop Mons) for a disaster in Hawaii County February 2004 A18-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18: Appendix References and reading list Ballantyne, M,, Paton, D., Johnston, D., Kozach, M., and Daly, M., 2000. Information on volcanic and earthquake hazards: The impact on awareness andpreparation. Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Limited Science Report #200012. Wellington, New Zealand. Drabek, T.E. 1994. Disaster Evacuation and the Tourist Industry. Boulder, BO: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science, Program on Environment and Behaviour. USA. Drabek, T.E. 1996. Disaster Evacuation Behavior: Tourists and other Transients. Boulder, BO: University of Colorado, institute of Behavioral Science, Program on Environment and Behaviour. USA. Gamble, D.W. 2000. Field evaluation of Hurricane damage to water resources, tourism infrastructure, and emergency response of San Salvador, Bahamas. Boulder Natural Hazards Center Quick Response Report #124. USA. Gerrard, J. 1994. Report on the 23 December Kaikoura, flood, Jiro Gerard, AR Rangiora. Parliament House, Wellington, New Zealand. Handmer, J. 2000. Are flood warnings futile? Risk communications in emergencies. The Australasian Journal of Disasters and Trauma Studies 2002-2. Australia. Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism and the Hawaii Tourism Authority. 2003. `2002 Survey of Resident Sentiments on Tourism in Hawaii'. Market Trends Pacific Inc., John M. Knox & .Associates Inc, Hawaii, USA. "Hurricane Iwa, Hawdi, November 23, 1982", National Research Council, 1983 Johnston, D-2002- Results of the August -September 2001 Washington State Tsunami Survey_ Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Limited. Science Report #2002117. Wellington, New Zealand. Krausse, G. 2000. `There's a big wind coming': a profile of survival and the culture of response after Hurricane Mitch on Isla Guanaja, Honduras. Boulder Natural Hazards Center, Quick Response Report #123. USA. National disaster Survey Report, Hurricane hiila, NOAA/N WS, April 1993 Ward, R., Paton, D., Johnston, D., and Becker, J., 2003. TWhakapapa Ski Field, lahar warning system, Ruapehu: A review of training issues. Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Limited. Science Report #2003/7. Wellington, New Zealand. Tierney, K.J, Lindell, M.K., and Perry R.W. 2001. Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States. USA. 7 JmObte of GeologicaJ & Muclear Sciences Limited (AQ & the University of Hawaii— Manoa Preparing the tourism sector(& other trensientpopulatlons) fora drsasterin HawaPi County Febrvary2004 A18-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 19. Mitigation Strategy Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy CHAPTER 19 - MITIGATION STRATEGY 19.1 Mitigation Goals and Objectives To become a "disaster -resilient" community, the mitigation goals and objectives are as follows: 1. Goal: Continually strive to improve the state of the art for the identification of hazard areas, prediction capabilities, and warning systems. Objectives: 1.1. Prepare GIS maps for all hazards with the best available information and formulate a strategy to maintain/upgrade the data. 1.2. Improve applicability of modeling systems to Hawaii Island conditions for hazard mapping, mitigation planning, and scenario training purposes. 1.3. Improve flood prediction and field -monitoring systems. 1.4. Establish a warning system that is cognizant of warning siren gaps that require supplemental field warning, which strives to fill those gaps based on population, that is routinely tested and maintained, and that educates the public on proper response. 1.5. Establish a rigorous reporting system after each major event to document the extent and cause of damage, lessons learned, and actions required to improve hazard mitigation, preparedness, response, or recovery. 2. Goal: Control future development and retrofit existing structures within hazard areas to minimize losses. 2.1. Update the building code to cost-effectively resist earthquake, hurricane, and flood susceptibility. 2.2. Periodically review the effectiveness of current land -use -related plans, codes, and standards to control future development within hazard areas. 2.3. Develop incentives, such as tax deductions and insurance discounts, to encourage retrofitting of existing structures to resist earthquake, hurricane, and flood susceptibility. 3. Goal: Ensure that all emergency response critical facilities and communication systems remain operational during hazard events. 3.1. Harden all essential emergency facilities and communication systems to withstand earthquake and hurricane forces (Ensure road access to hospitals remains clear and that all hospitals have helicopter access, no emergency facilities should be located in the 100 - year flood -prone areas). 4. Goal: Ensure that all lifeline infrastructures are able to withstand hazard events or have contingency plans to quickly recover after a disaster. 4.1. Harden ports and airports to enable post -disaster operations. 4.2. Harden major highway segments that have no alternate bypass to withstand earthquake and 100 -year floods as well as rockfalls/landslide closure. 4.3. Harden fuel storage facilities and ensure distribution network to critical facilities. 4.4. Reduce vulnerability of electrical system to all hazards. 4.5. Develop water systems that resist damage to all hazards and contingency plans to truck water. 19-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy 5. Goal: Provide adequate pre- and post -disaster emergency shelters to accommodate residents and visitors. 5.1. Identify and harden selected shelters to withstand hurricane. 5.2. Establish a standardized due diligence procedure for qualifying a building for private self -sheltering. 6. Goal: Develop a level of awareness among the general public and businesses, particularly the visitor industry, that results in calm and efficient evacuations, self- sufficient survival skills, and willingness to abide by preventive or property protection requirements. 6.1. Develop a broad-based public information program that utilizes a diversity of communication media. 6.2. Develop special public information programs targeted to vulnerable populations. 6.3. Develop a community-based network that double -functions as the Community Emergency Response Team and provides input into mitigation planning. 7. Goal: Minimize post -disaster recovery disruption by developing systems for efficient clean-up, documentation of damage and injury, and processing of appropriate aid to rebuild businesses and the economy. 7.1. Educate businesses on business interruption planning. 8. Goal: Protect natural and cultural resources to the extent practicable that buffer hazards or have significant value. 19.2 Mitigation Actions by Hazard Type This section summarizes applicable mitigation actions by the hazard type. Mitigation actions can be grouped into six broad categories: 107 • Prevention. Government administrative and regulatory actions or processes that influence the way land and buildings are developed and built (e.g., planning and zoning, building codes, drainage standards). • Property Protection. Actions that involve the modification of existing structures to protect them from a hazard, or removal from the hazard area (e.g., acquisition, elevation, relocation, structural retrofits, storm shutters, shatter -resistant glass). • Public Education and Awareness. Actions to inform and educate citizens, elected officials, and property owners about the hazards and potential ways to mitigate them (e.g., outreach projects, real estate disclosure, hazard information fairs, school-age and adult education programs). • Natural Resource Protection. Actions that minimize hazard losses while also preserving or restoring the functions of natural systems (e.g., erosion control, stream restoration, watershed management, wetland restoration and preservation). 107 FEMA, Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions and Implementation Strategies, State and Local Mitigation Planning How -To Guide #3, April 2003. 19-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy • Emergency Services. Actions that protect people and property during and immediately after a disaster or hazard event (e.g., warning systems, emergency response services, protection of critical facilities). • Structural Projects. Actions that involve the construction of structures to reduce the impact of a hazard (e.g., dams, levees, flood walls, seawalls, diversion ditches). 19.2.1 Hurricanes and Wind Storms Mitigation actions include improving emergency services and protecting property through enhanced structural integrity: • Warning Systems. Warning has improved with the use of weather satellites, weather buoys, and tracking aircraft, but it is not possible to predict, more than a very few hours ahead, just where in the islands the main force of a hurricane will impact. Hurricane Iniki exemplified the sudden unpredictable track of a hurricane. However, the intensity of a storm approaching the islands is known before it makes landfall and thus the effects may be anticipated. Although the position of a storm refers to its center (the "eye"), hazardous wind, rain, and surf can extend 200 miles from the center. Therefore advance warning and preparation for a hurricane must consider the potential periphery effects. All cyclonic storms in this part of the ocean are carefully monitored by the Central Pacific Hurricane Center, which is established at the National Weather Service forecast office in Honolulu at the start of the "hurricane season" on June 1. "Warning" is actually provided in several stages: advisories of tropical depressions (incipient storms); warning of tropical storms (winds less that 74 mph); hurricane watch (hurricane within 36 hours) and hurricane warning (hurricane conditions - winds over 73 mph expected within 24 hours). [Note:74 mph = 64 knots, sometimes used in reports]. • Hurricane Shelters. Sheltering and preparation in Hawaii is primarily the responsibility of residents themselves, since major evacuation as is done in the Gulf and Atlantic coasts is obviously impractical. Adequate public shelters capable of withstanding hurricane -force winds are limited; they can hold 80% of the population who will seek shelter, by State Civil Defense standards. These standards expect only 35% of the population to seek public shelters. Most of the shelters shown are schools and some are marginal for this purpose but are the best refuge available. Homeowner's preparations are vital and have been publicized in print by the UH Social Science Research Institute (SSRI)108 and are repeated by Civil Defense via the media during a hurricane watch. However, evacuation of coastal areas threatened by storm surge is done in an ad hoc fashion by using the tsunami evacuation maps. These maps have some validity for this purpose in areas such as Kailua-Kona, (although they may be too small) but may encompass too large an area such as in Hilo, where some buildings in the zone are more important as shelters. There is a paradox in hurricane evacuation - it is important not to expose people to wind hazards while avoiding the flooding hazard. • Structural Integrity. Structural integrity has only been tested on this island by winter storms (winds over 40 mph; Chapter 4). In areas with frequent hurricanes, such as Guam, the most vulnerable structures are damaged or removed by prior events. Since we have been lucky enough to not have such experience, a high percentage of homes and also commercial 108 Social Science Research Institute, UH, "Hurricanes in Hawaii: What Are The Risks of Damage?", undated. 19-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy buildings will be lost when a hurricane moves through parts of the island. It has been esti- mated that 38% of homes will be heavily damaged and an equal number will suffer minor damage from an Iniki-strength hurricane striking any island.109 State Civil Defense has published a guide on strengthening houses to minimize losses.110 Adopting and enforcing a building code with adequate wind load requirements is the primary mitigation tool for structures. The code requirements for wind pressure have increased by a factor of 2:1 since 1958 as the Uniform Building Code changed. The current level is based on a 95 mph peak gust, is applicable to commercial structures only and was adopted by the County in 1993. Prior to 1993, the County had no specific code requirements related to wind forces for residences. The code implemented in 1993 (the 1991 UBC) requires roof -to -wall uplift ties. The most important action the County can take other than code revision is to ensure that public buildings, shelters, and other vital facilities meet the code requirements. The FEMA 1993 report is an excellent manual on structural lessons from Iniki while the ARA 2001 report covers implementation of these factors in detail."' The 2006 IBC significantly improves the wind design requirements of the 1991 UBC, therefore its adoption in the county of Hawaii is of the utmost importance. • Infrastructure lifelines. Harden exposed communication and electrical systems. Consider underground installation for new development and in strategic existing areas. 19.2.2 Earthquakes Hawaii County is believed to be exposed to the highest seismic hazard in the State. In approximately the past 50 years, the County has experienced at least eight earthquakes with a Richter Magnitude of 6.0 or greater, and the geological structure of the island is believed to be capable of generating even larger earthquakes. Moreover, because the vast majority of structures in the County were designed and constructed before adoption of the 1976 Uniform Building Code (UBC), which is the earliest UBC edition whose seismic design requirements are similar to the 1991 UBC, many of these structures most likely do not conform to the minimum seismic design requirements adopted by other high seismic risk regions of the United States. Mitigation actions include preventive measures and emergency services improvements: • Identification of Vulnerable Structures and Areas. Refine the applicability of the HAZUS model to Hawaii Island to assess earthquake risks and identify appropriate mitigation actions. The findings of a recent study prepared for the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee 109 Schroeder, Tom, 1993, "Hawaii Hurricanes: Their History, Causes, and Future," Office of State Planning, December 1993. 110 Hawai' i State Civil Defense, 1997, "Construction Guide: On Strengthening Houses Against Hurricanes and Earthquakes, May 1997. III Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 1993, `Building Performance: Hurricane Iniki in Ha- wai i", January 1993, Federal Insurance Agency, Washington, D.C.; Applied Research Associates (ARA), 2001, "Hazard Mitigation Study for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund" (incorporates part of FEMA -sponsored Iniki Building Performance Report), December 2001. 19-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy that focused on Maui and Hawaii County needs to be examined and follow-up actions implemented such as incorporation of appropriate changes to the building code. 112 • Hardening Critical Facilities. A 2009 study conducted a seismic evaluation of essential fire stations and hospitals. The findings of that study need to be fully implemented. Similar evaluations need to be made of the communication systems and fuel tanks. • USGS and HVO has tools such as ShakeCast that can be used for post -earthquake potential damage assessment of discrete building inventories, using HAZUS damage relationships applied to individual buildings that have detailed construction input. 19.2.3 Tsunamis Mitigation actions improve emergency services, protect property, and provide public education • Warning. Warning in time for evacuation is, of course, the key to the public safety aspect of tsunami mitigation. There are two distinct warning scenarios for this island: for a distant tsunami source such as Alaska where three hours notice for evacuation is possible, and for a local tsunami where a few minutes, if any, warning can be provided. The distant tsunami warning is provided by a well developed and capable Federal system (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, PTWC), based on O' ahu and covering the Pacific Ocean area. A local tsunami is an unusual event, but the source is most likely to be near the southern coastal areas of this island. The wave may travel faster than a feasible warning but fortunately the wave height diminishes fairly rapidly with distance. The primary warning is simply feeling the earthquake, coupled with education on the response. The new system which senses water rise at six locations on the Kona -Kau shoreline is now operational. It alerts the warning center which immediately confirms the event by an earthquake signal and advises County Civil Defense (or the police, after working hours). This system supplements the slower and less definite earthquake -only local system that was in service since 1978. • Evacuation. Evacuation zones have been developed and used. These zones are based on a combination of historical data where available and numerical modeling, to produce maximum expectable inundation limits. County Civil Defense then uses these data to provide a map with zones related to physical features where possible and always mauka of or at the inundation limit. These zones apply to distant tsunamis only and are published in the front of the telephone directory. Because of the short warning time for a local tsunami, referring to published zones for this island is not considered feasible and so the public is advised to quickly move inland from the shore. Thirty five sirens around the island are operated by the County to alert the public to a tsunami warning, with specific information broadcast from Civil Defense via the emergency alert system (EAS) radio stations. Short-term sheltering is provided as well as bus evacuation of schools in risk areas. Civil Defense, in conjunction with other County, State, and Federal agencies has developed thorough plans for response to a warning. 113 These plans and procedures cover matters from roadblocks to school evacuation and are reviewed in periodic exercises with responsible agencies but which do not involve the 112 Martin & Chock, Inc., Earthquake Loss Estimation/Mitigation Project, prepared with funding from the Hawaii Coastal Zone Management Program, December 2003. 113 County of Hawai i, Emergency Procedures, Civil Defense Agency, 2000 (draft revision in process 2003). 19-5 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy public. These warning and evacuation operations were most recently publicly tested in 1994 by evacuation for a tsunami which turned out to be non -hazardous. • Public Education. The Disaster Preparedness pages of the telephone directory (provided by Civil Defense) are a basis for education of the public and are usually referred to in other safety material. The State provides a recent tsunami safety video which is shown on television and to various groups; it emphasizes checking the phone book pages to see if you are in an evacuation zone. The Pacific Tsunami Museum in Hilo has a primary mission of public education and awareness and safety and has exhibits on warning and response. The monthly siren test includes an EAS message about public response, on all radio stations. • Structural Integrity. The Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM), which used much of the same data as the inundation/evacuation work, are an aid to minimize risk to structures, along with County planning and building restrictions. The FIRM is considered more reliable for tsunamis than for stream flooding, but is known to also have some questionable areas in this regard. The County permitting process considers both public and structural safety in its regulations. The FEMA flood insurance program is a significant force in limiting home construction and design in probable inundation areas. The mortgage lenders are especially careful in this regard. Thus, in recent years, exposure has become more limited in scope. A detailed engineering publication which deals specifically with structural design to resist tsunamis is available to building code, permitting, and architecture users, is available. 114 The report was prepared for FEMA and coordinated with Tsunami Technical Advisory Committee and the University of Hawaii. Much of it applies to all exposed structures, not just residential. A recent, less technical report describes procedures to improve the tsunami resilience of communities. 115 It is primarily oriented toward the mainland coast although the California zonation example they describe was performed here. • Recovery of Critical Facilities. Recovery may be the most difficult to plan because of the unpredictability of the nature and extent of the damage. For example, major damage to harbor facilities, interrupting the fuel supply, can result in loss of part of the electrical supply and thus of water and sewage. Other islands may (or may not) compete for recovery support, compounding the problem for this island. The Department of Transportation has recovery plans which are supplemented with current GIS layers in other portions of this report. 19.2.4 Rainfall Flooding and High Waves Of the major natural hazards, flooding occurs most frequently. Mitigation measures include preventive land use measures, warning systems and public education, flood control structural projects, repetitive loss buyout programs, and natural resource protection programs. • Land use measures. Preventive land use measures rely on accurate flood zone identification. The existing Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) does not cover all flood -prone areas and require updating for areas that are covered. Recognizing the cost to modernize the FIRM island wide, mitigation actions will prioritize the modernization effort. When updating, 114 "Design and Construction Standards for Residential Construction in Tsunami -prone Areas in Hawai i", Dames and Moore, Honolulu and Washington, D.C., January 1980. 115 "Designing for Tsunamis", National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Steering Committee, NOAA, March 1991. 19-6 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy tsunami and hurricane surge inundation limits and base flood elevations require verification with modeling and historical data. The zoning and flood control code use the FIRM as the basis to avoid exposure or apply special flood -proofing standards. Repetitive loss programs need to be incorporated into the flood control and land use systems to buyout and prevent future construction in such areas. Current drainage standards, which are based on 10 -year storms, need to be reevaluated to better account for cumulative upslope development. • Warning and public education systems. The National Weather Service has installed tele - metered rain gages to aid in flood prediction and wave buoys for high waves. Two Doppler radars on this island provide rainfall intensity in quantitative graphic form. NWS's system needs to be supplemented with an improved field reporting system and stream gauging sys- tem related to rainfall gages to better predict flash flooding and to extend flood warnings to areas that NWS's system cannot monitor. Warnings for specific areas are broadcast via nor- mal and special radio/TV forecasts and by special County Civil Defense announcements, as well as over the NOAA Weather Radio (for airplanes and boats). Public education needs to be improved to address the problem of vehicles being driven across flooding streams-- road hazard signs need to be quickly erected along highways, and hunters and residences in re- mote areas should be educated. For high waves, the most effective action is the closure of beaches and coastal roads. • Flood control structural and nonstructural projects. Flood control channels have long been established on this island; however, with increased urbanization some channels have been overloaded and need or have received enlargement or rerouting. The recent upgrade of Alenaio Stream in Hilo is a good example. As part of the cost -benefit for such projects, nonstructural alternatives need to be examined such as better watershed management. To reduce coastal damage to high waves, improvements to the seawall system in Hilo and Kailua-Kona have been discussed, but there are no firm plans. There is a tradeoff between the cost of expensive structural improvements and the cost of more frequent and extensive cleanup. 19.2.5 Lava Flows Mitigation actions include preventive measures such as zoning, emergency services improve- ments such as warning systems based on improved predictive mapping, and limited structural protection measures. • Identification of hazard areas. The Hawaiian Volcanoes Observatory (HVO), part of the U.S. Geological Survey, has developed very capable methodology and systems for predicting eruptions in a timely manner, and evaluating the probable lava now hazard areas. All historical lava flows have been well mapped, and zonation depicted showing the chances of more lava flow for all parts of the island. In recent years, improved mapping programs have moved away from the discrete zonation boundaries to indicate more realistic probabilities for hazard areas and transition regions. Lava shed programs, analogous to water flooding maps, are under development. Planning, zoning, and insurance factors now mitigate against unwarranted development in high hazard areas. • Warning systems. HVO, in conjunction with Civil Defense and other County agencies, is on standby to provide warning and evacuation when an eruption occurs. Though most lava flows have been slow enough to allow easy evacuation and even removal of some structures, 19-7 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy an eruption from Mauna Loa toward Kona can (and has) required rapid response in that area as communities may be both threatened and escape routes cut. • Structural protection. One lava diversion dike has been constructed. On Mauna Loa, it pro- tects the government's long term atmospheric observatory on the mountain. (This diversion dike built upslope of the NOAA climate monitoring facility on Mauna Loa has not yet been tested.) Ad hoc diversions using bulldozers, bombs, and water spray have been tried in the past, with varied and generally minimal results. See Chapter 2 for a report on the public option survey that included questions about attitudes regarding the possible use of lava diversion techniques. 19.2.6 Droughts and Wildfire The mitigation actions for drought are primarily structural and non-structural programs to withstand droughts (since rain -enhancing measures have proven ineffective). Wildfire mitiga- tion includes preventive land use measures, improved hazard identification, and critical facilities development. • Identification of hazard areas. For high hazard areas, appropriate conditions to zoning and subdivision applications need to be developed, such as requiring fire -resistive materials or maintenance of fire breaks. • Critical facilities and training. Potential water sources to fight wildfires need to be invento- ried. Roads that may be closed by wildfires and lava flows need to be identified and bypass routes or other contingencies planned. In addition to recently acquiring brush trucks, the County Fire Department sponsored 45 volunteer firefighters (from rural areas) to participate in the Firewise Community Development Workshop and helped establish the Big Island Wildfire Coordination Group. This group is expected to improve procedures to rapidly provide the most effective response to wildfires in the island. • Structural and nonstructural projects. Mitigation measures practiced or recommended by agriculturists include ample reservoirs, longer irrigation ditches, drought -resistant crops in certain areas, low rainfall cultivation/tillage practices, changing planting to better areas dur- ing droughts, and moving cattle. More usage of catchment reservoirs can help growers get through dry periods without crop loss. The National Resource Conservation Service provides technical assistance with establishing ponds and reservoirs, and may also provide grants. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), with support from other agencies, maintains a drought mitigation center which assists states in developing drought mitigation plans. The County will defer to the plan being developed by the State Water Commission. Crop insurance is available for Mac nuts and some other primary local crops through the Cooperative Extension Service, a program of the USDA and the University of Hawaii. This organization also provides information on drought -resistant plants and tillage. 19.2.7 Landslides and Sea Cliff Erosion Mitigation actions include structural protection measures and preventive land use controls. • Structural projects. The major problem with landslides is road closure. Heavy rainfall or earthquakes could cause the landslide. Structural slope stabilization along highways is ex- pensive, but is often the best long-term solution. 19-8 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy • Preventive land use measures. Existing shoreline setback regulations require a minimum of 40' setback from the certified shoreline. Whether this 40' provides adequate buffer relative to the rate of sea cliff erosion such as in the Hamakua area requires further study. Based on the findings, the shoreline setback requirement should be adjusted accordingly for these areas. 19.3 Priority Criteria Mitigation actions were selected for implementation based on community acceptance criteria referred to as the STAPLEE criteria (Social, Technical, Administrative, Political, Legal, Eco- nomic, and Environmental) and then prioritized. 116 The STAPLEE evaluation criteria analyze the appropriateness of alternative mitigation actions by considering the following questions: • Social • Will the proposed action adversely affect one segment of the population? • Is the proposed action culturally insensitive? • Technical • Is the proposed action technically feasible? • Is the proposed action a long-term solution or a short-term "band-aid"? • Are there secondary effects resulting from the proposed action? • Administrative • Does the proposed action require additional staffing? • Does the proposed action require additional training? • Does the proposed action require ongoing maintenance? • Political • Is the proposed action controversial? • Does the proposed action require legislative approval? • Does the proposed action affect multiple stakeholders and have they all had an opportunity to be involved? • Legal • Does the County have jurisdiction to implement the proposed action? • Are new laws required to implement the proposed action'? • Are liability risks involved with the proposed action? • Economic • What are the costs involved to implement the project? • Is the proposed action eligible for outside funding? • Is the burden of the choice of funding borne by those who benefit? • Is a more detailed cost -benefit analysis warranted'? • Environmental 116 Priority -setting methodology from FEMA, How -To Guide #3: Developing The Mitigation Plan; Identifying Mitigation Actions And Implementing Strategies, FEMA No. 386-3, April 2003. 19-9 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy • Does the proposed action protect or restore the environment? • Does the proposed action have potentially negative effects on the environment? • Is an EA or EIS required? The selected actions that passed the STAPLEE criteria were then prioritized using the following criteria: • Critical to public health or safety. Actions that significantly improve emergency services. • Hazard severity. Actions that mitigate priority hazards based on loss estimation analyses. • Ease of implementation. Actions that have negligible cost and/or require minimal effort. • Multi -objective. Actions that meet multiple objectives (e.g., flood control project that provides recreational benefits) or address multiple hazards. • Time. Actions that can be quickly accomplished. Once the easy actions are done then the more difficult actions can be focused upon. • Post -disaster mitigation. Actions that may be more appropriate for post -disaster imple- mentation when there is the political will and access to post -disaster assistance funding. 19.4 Implementation Plan Table identifies the actions to achieve the mitigation objectives. The actions are sorted into the following categories: • Administrative actions not requiring major funding; • Ongoing funded studies that need to be incorporated into future updates of this plan; • Actions requiring funding. Evaluation, Ranking, and Approval of Mitigation Projects The County of Hawaii Civil Defense Agency will establish a special committee to evaluate, screen, and prioritize eligible hazard mitigation projects submitted by county government agencies and private nonprofit agencies. The county committee will use a scoring system that emphasizes projects that addresses repetitive losses, high risk to public safety, cost-effective, State and local priorities, and environmentally and technically sound. Committee members will be selected from the following organizations (note: The Administrator of the County Civil Defense Agency will act as chair of the committee): • Fire Department • Police Department • Office of the Mayor • Data Systems Management • Department of Environmental Management • Department of Planning • Department of Public Works 19-10 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy • Department of Research and Development • Department of Water Supply • University of Hawaii at Hilo According to State mitigation priorities, all of the four counties will receive equal priority for the following natural hazards because all jurisdictions are vulnerable: hurricane and high winds, floods, drought, wild land fire, landslides, coastal erosion, and tsunamis. The County of Hawaii will receive top priority for projects involving lava flow and VOG. Priorities (in order) for earthquake projects are: (1) County of Hawaii; (2) County of Maui; (3) City and County of Honolulu; and (4) County of Kauai. The County and State will use FEMA's cost benefit models to include HAZUS-MH. Also, EPA standards and State Historical Preservation Guidelines will supplement the cost-effectiveness review of each project. State Civil Defense has trained appropriate county personnel in the cost benefit models. Also, the State Mitigation Forum will be developing a program to better assess potential losses especially with wind events. This will involve windspeed maps for all counties and a customized hurricane simulation model with geocoded building inventory, user -defined damage functions, and other variables into a GIS -based hurricane loss estimation software package. All mitigation projects must also meet all appropriate Federal, State, and county laws and regulations. The Committee scored and ranked each project. The State Civil Defense Mitigation staff will provide technical assistance to the applicants in the preparation of the applications, cost -benefit analysis to include training, and acquisition of environmental data. In the past, staff members have personally visited potential applicants and explained the application process and requirements. This effective practice will be continued. Priorities for Hazard Mitigation The following are the County priorities regarding hazard mitigation projects: 1. Hardening and Retrofitting of Critical Facilities Conduct all hazard evaluations and develop cost-effective retrofits for priority facilities including: • hurricane shelters and schools, • hospitals, fire stations, and police stations, airports • Hilo and Kawaihae harbors and fuel storage facilities • key County bridges and plan alternative transportation routes, • power plants, water systems, communications sites, sewage treatment plants, and other facilities/buildings providing critical services 2. Upgrading of County Building Codes in accordance with Hawaii Revised Statues Chapter 107, State Building Code and Design Standards 3. Mapping/Assessments/Studies 19-11 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy Analysis of high hazard areas and studies to develop mitigation measures: • perform screening evaluations of alternative facilities to augment public shelters to address shelter shortfall • investigate and document effectiveness of VOG mitigation techniques and incorporate in public awareness meetings • Update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate current bridge status and adapt HAZUS MH with enhanced building information data for hurricane loss estimation and identification of vulnerable structures Develop mapping of all major natural hazards: • flood map modernization with incorporation of both hurricane flood and tsunami inundation into DFIRM's • updated tsunami evacuation maps • earthquake ground failure hazard maps o probabilistic lava inundation maps o probabilistic tsunami inundation maps o dam inundation evacuation maps o landslide and slope stability hazard maps o LIDAR-based remapping of streams 4. Wildfire Prevention (firebreak establishment and fire mitigation resource inventory) 5. Drought Mitigation by improvements to irrigation aqueduct, reservoirs, and water management 6. Policy for Repetitive Flood Loss Properties 7. Develop natural hazard mitigation criteria policies for county facility site selection and design 8. Public Awareness/Education, with additional focus on implementation of Multi -Hazard Mitigation Techniques and VOG • Incentives for Homeowners and Business to retrofit vulnerable structures: To further support this type of outreach, the following actions are still needed: o an expedited permit process if the homeowner uses the standard recommended plans; o working with insurance companies to get homeowners insurance credits for implementing these retrofits; o need to expand the Expert System to add the hurricane mitigation techniques that were previously developed for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund's Loss Mitigation Grant Program. o Retrofit training, videos, displays, and demonstration/pilot retrofit projects • Multi -hazard public information website consolidating GIS mapping products for hazards & zoning 9. Mitigation of Erosion/Land/Rock Slides in residential areas and highways. (Highways have greater priority) 19-12 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy 19.5 Discussion on Past Implementation Actions The 2005 hazard mitigation plan had a high proportion of implementation actions that were actually emergency response rather than hazard mitigation. Hazard Mitigation excludes emergency response actions after disaster has occurred: • Hazard Mitigation is action taken before a disaster to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and their property from hazards and their effects. • Emergency Operational Plans (EOP) exist with the objective to heighten preparedness and establish plans and responsibilities for responding to and recovering from the occurrence of a natural disaster. Thus, emergency response system improvements belong in the EOP accounting of resource and needs, rather than in a hazard mitigation plan. Thus, with the priorities for hazard mitigation updated, it was recognized that many of the 2005 plan actions were not actually hazard mitigation at all; it was decided that the 2010 Hazard Mitigation Plan should be exactly that, and rather than be forced to continue past misunderstandings because of "precedent,' should utilize more clarity of purpose and formulate implementation actions based on their current merits. This aligns better with the fact that the entire hazard mitigation plan has been re -written as discussed in Chapter 1 Appendix A. "To accommodate greater detail in hazard and risk assessment, as well as to more clearly identify hazard mitigation activities and their specific impacts, the Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan has been substantially reorganized... In short, this plan is a near-total re -write with the objective of greater clarity in addition to a major update of technical knowledge." The following table (former 2005 Plan Table 4-1) tracks the status of the past implementation actions, now superseded. I.D. No. Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Status 1.0 Administrative actions not requiring major funding: 1.1 Review the General Plan natural hazard policies All hazards Planning Being continued in current plan in light of this mitigation plan and American Planning Association suggested policies 1.2 Review the feasibility to adopt the 2003 Inter- Hurricane, Earthquake Department of In current plan to update with 2006 national Building Code Public Works IBC 1.3 Update tsunami evacuation maps Tsunami Data Systems w/ Being completed in current plan Civil Defense 1.4 Develop relocation policies for repetitive loss All hazards Civil Defense w/ Repetitive loss structure mitigation structures Public Works may be addressed other than by condemnation / relocation, which is cost -prohibitive; see current plan 1.5 Work with hotels, cruise ship industry, nursing Hurricane, Earthquake. Civil Defense This is an emergency operations homes, schools, hospitals, and shopping centers Tsunami action to develop emergency response plans 1.6 Study feasibility of participating in the Community Flooding Public Works Being completed in current plan Rating System 1.7 Study feasibility of including nonstructural earth- Earthquake Public Works Being incorporated in building code quake damage prevention into building code I I I update per current plan 19-13 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19: _llitigatiora Strategy I.D. No. Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Status 1.8 Identify hardening projects to implement 1993 Earthquake, Hurricane Civil Defense, with Project modernized in current plan seismic evaluation study of fire stations and Public Works, Fire, to reference 2009 seismic evaluation hospitals and Hospitals of current facilities 1.9 Explore with utilities feasibility of underground Hurricane, Earthquake, Civil Defense, with Continued into current plan power lines Tsunami Planning & utilities 1.10 Conduct hazard loss estimation study; incorpo- All hazards Civil Defense Performed in current plan's Hawaii rate cost -benefit methodology as a factor in priori- County all -hazard assessment of tizing projects critical facilities 1.11 Develop routine training program for disaster All hazards Civil Defense This is not a hazard mitigation action response and recovery 1.12 Evaluate warning sirens coverage All hazards Civil Defense Completed by HCDA 1.13 Develop a formal post -event reporting system All hazards Civil Defense This is not a hazard mitigation action and information clearinghouse 1.14 Evaluate disaster -level search & rescue capa- All hazards Civil Defense, w/ This is not a hazard mitigation action bilities Fire, Police, DPW 1.15 Evaluate vulnerability of County water systems Hurricane, Earthquake Dept of Water Made a more generalized action to and water trucking capacity Supply, w/ Civil improve water resources Defense 1.16 Evaluate waterless wastewater disposal options Hurricane, Earthquake Dept of Environ- This is no longer a DEM project mental Mgt 1.17 Implement Disaster Debris Action Manual Hurricane. Earthquake, Dept of Environ- This is a post -disaster emergency Tsunami, Flood mental Mgt operation action rather than hazard mitigation 1.18 Develop post- disaster transit plan Hurricane, Earthquake, Mass Transit This is a post -disaster emergency Tsunami, Flood Agency, w/ Civil operation action rather than hazard Defense mitigation 1.19 Update debris estimation Hurricane, Earthquake, Dept of Environ- This is a post -disaster emergency Tsunami, Flood mental Mgt operation action rather than hazard mitigation 1.20 Coordinate TDSR sites Hurricane, Earthquake, Dept of Environ- This is a post -disaster emergency Tsunami, Flood mental Mgt operation action rather than hazard mitigation 1.21 Maintain list of debris management contractors Hurricane, Earthquake, Dept of Environ- This is a post -disaster emergency and update boilerplate contracts Tsunami, Flood mental Mgt operation action rather than hazard mitigation 2.0 Ongoing funded studies that need to be incorporated into future updates of this plan 2.1 Emergency shelter evaluation Hurricane Army COE Continued in current plan 2.2 GIS mapping of hotels, church shelters, hazard- Hurricane, Earthquake, Data Systems Made a more generalized GIS Multi- ous waste sites Tsunami, Flooding Hazard Information One -Stop website 2.3 Develop probalistic lava flow maps and modeling Lava flow Hawaii Volcanoes Continued in current plan Observatory 2.4 Organize public awareness and preparedness All hazards Civil Defense w/ Continued in current plan, however, program, including CERTs, through Project Research & Project Kumiai no longer exists Kumiai; also include public education on pet care Development, Planning 2.5 Update Emergency Operations Plan All hazards Civil Defense This is obviously an emergency operation action rather than hazard mitigation 2.6 Implement State Drought Plan Drought Civil Defense, with Continued in current plan Fire and DWS 2.7 Identify wildfire hazard areas Wildfire State Drought Identified in the current plan Council, with Civil Defense & Fire 19-14 Hawaii Conti y Ali-tlti-Hazard-llitigatioii Plali Chapter 19: _llitigatiora Strategy I.D. No. Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Status 2.8 Adapt HAZUS-M or other hazard modeling to Hurricane, Earthquake, State Civil Defense Continued in the current plan, Hawaii Island Flood actions made more hazard -specific 3.0 Actions requiring funding 3.1 Harden public schools for emergency shelters Hurricane, Flooding, Dept of Acctg and Continued in the current plan Tsunami Gen Services (DAGS) 3.2 Modernize FIRM maps in accordance with priority Flood, Hurricane, Dept of Public Continuing towards completion in mutually established between County and DLNR Tsunami Works the current plan 3.3 Identify high windspeed areas and vulnerable Hurricane, Earthquake Civil Defense w/ Continue in the current plan structures Public Works 3.4 Identify earthquake -induced ground failure areas Earthquake Civil Defense w/ Continued in the current plan Public Works 3.5 Explore incentives for existing homeowners and Hurricane, Earthquake, Department of Continued in the current plan businesses to retrofit their structures, and Flooding Public Works participate in building fairs to publicize 3.6 Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Tsunami, Hurricane, Dept of Trans- Continued in the current plan Kawaihae Harbors Earthquake portation 3.7 Study hardening and evacuation requirements for Hurricane, Earthquake Dept of Trans- Incorporated in Hawaii County all - Hilo and Kona Airports portation hazard assessment of critical facilities in this plan 3.8 Study hardening, floodproofing, and bypass All hazards Dept of Public Continued in the current plan alternatives for major highways Works 3.9 Study hardening requirements for fuel storage Hurricane, Earthquake, Civil Defense, with Continued in the current plan and distribution to critical facilities Tsunami fuel providers 3.10 Develop rainfall and streamflow gaging system Flooding USGS Continued in the current plan suitable to flood monitoring 3.11 Develop technology and training system for effi- All hazards Civil Defense This is an emergency operations cient field monitoring of in- progress event action 3.12 Identify landslide and coastal erosion hazard Landslides Civil Defense w/ Continued in the current plan areas and mitigation actions Dept of Trans- portation, Public Works 3.13 Upgrade and coordinate emergency com- All hazards Civil Defense, w/ This is an emergency operations munication system Fire, Police, action military, ham operators, wired and wireless operators 3.14 Study hardening requirements for electrical Hurricane HELCO Continued in the current plan system 3.15 Upgrade EOC's GIS and communication systems All hazards Civil Defense This is an emergency operations action 3.16 Develop scenario training and mitigation planning All hazards Civil Defense Continued in the current plan capabilities 3.17 Prepare multi- objective open space plan All hazards Planning Discontinued except as a focused wildfire mitigation action 19-15 Hawaii Coz-tyzty-lli-tlti-Hazard-llitigatioii Plali Chapter 19: -Mitigation Strategy 19.6 Present Implementation Actions Note: Italics indicate vroiects similar to a 2005 plan action. Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Required Funding Priority Budget Source Administrative actions not requiring major funding: Update the building code from the 1991 UBC to the Hurricane, Department of minimal County High 2006 IBC with its structural and nonstructural earthquake Earthquake Public Works damage prevention into the building code Update tsunami evacuation maps: Tsunami Tsunami Data Systems w/ minimal State High Inundation and Runup Mapping: Analysis of the island of Civil Defense Hawaii based on scenarios from tsunami -genic source regions along the Pacific Rim. Big Island mapping focuses on 13 populated areas around the island. Identify hardening projects to implement 2009 seismic Earthquake, Civil Defense, with minimal County High evaluation study of critical facilities Hurricane Public Works, Fire, and Hospitals Modernize FIRM maps. Investigate the differences Flood, Hurri- Dept of Public FEMA, State, High between the existing and new DFIRM maps and adapt cane, Tsunami Works County maps so that tsunami inundation is included along the south and west coasts Identify earthquake -induced ground failure areas Earthquake Civil Defense w/ $100,000 FEMA, State, High Public Works County Study hardening requirements for fuel storage and Hurricane, Civil Defense, with $50,000 Homeland High distribution to critical facilities Earthquake, fuel providers Security, Tsunami FEMA, County Develop policies and procedures for establishing site $50,000 specific hazard mitigation design criteria for critical facilities Review the General Plan natural hazard policies in All hazards Planning minimal County Medium light of this mitigation plan and American Planning Association suggested policies Develop policies for repetitive loss structures and All hazards Civil Defense w/ minimal County Medium high hazard watersheds Public Works Participate in the Community Rating System Flooding Public Works minimal County Medium Conduct hazard loss estimation studies, incorpo- All hazards Civil Defense minimal County Medium rate cost -benefit methodology as a factor in priori- tizing projects Evaluate warning sirens coverage All hazards Civil Defense minimal County Medium Develop scenario training and mitigation planning capa- All hazards Civil Defense to be determined FEMA, County Medium bilities Develop a GIS -based Multi -Hazard Information "One -Stop" All hazards Civil Defense/PDC TBD County Medium website Ongoing funded studies that need to be incorporated into future updates of this plan: Develop probabilistic lava flow maps and modeling Lava flow Hawaii Volcanoes budgeted else- USGS High Observatory where Organize public awareness and preparedness VOG and all Civil Defense w/ budgeted else- FEMA, County High program, including mitigation techniques and hazards Research & where retrofit training Development, Planning Develop Dam Evacuation Maps Flood FEMA/PDC Medium Adopt tsunami design provisions for buildings (to be Tsunami Medium released in Sept 2010) for new and for evaluating existing buildings.) 19-16 Hawaii Coz-tyzty-lli-tlti-Hazard-llitigatioii Plali Chapter 19: _llitigatiora Strategy Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Required Funding Priority Budget Source Implement State Drought Plan; improve water Drought Civil Defense, with budgeted else- DLNR Medium resources Fire and DWS where Identify wildfire hazard areas, maintain fire breaks Wildfire State Drought budgeted else- FEMA, State Medium Council, with Civil where Defense & Fire Actions requiring funding: Perform a comprehensive screening evaluation of private Hurricane $125,000 High sector candidate building types for possible hurricane refuge use Emergency shelter evaluation: All -Hazard Assessment Hurricane $125,000 High of Hurricane Shelters & Identify Effective Retrofits Harden public schools for emergency shelters Hurricane, Dept of Accounting Included in FEMA, State, High Flooding, Tsu- and Gen Services State's mitigation County nami (DAGS), DOE plan Study hardening, flood proofing, and bypass All hazards Dept of Public $125,000 FEMA, State, High alternatives for county budges Works County Update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate data on State Earthquake $125,000 High and County Bridges Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Tsunami, Hurri- State Dept of Trans- included in State Homeland High Kawaihae Harbors cane, Earth- portation plan Security, quake FEMA, State Study hardening requirements for fuel storage Tsunami, Hurri- Civil Defense $75.000 Homeland High cane. Earth- Security, quake FEMA, State Identify earthquake -induced ground failure areas Earthquake High Investigate effectiveness of VOG mitigation techniques VOG Medium Identify high windspeed Hurricane, Civil Defense w/ $150,000 FEMA, State, Medium vulnerable structures; adapt HAZUS MH for hurricane Earthquake Public Works County analysis Testing of the seismic and wind performance of single wall Hurricane, Civil Defense w/ Medium construction Earthquake Public Works Explore incentives for existing homeowners and Hurricane, Department of $125,000 County Medium businesses to retrofit their structures Earthquake, Public Works w/ Flooding Civil Defense Develop rainfall and stream flow gauging system Flooding USGS, NOAH, PSC USGS, State, Medium suitable to flood monitoring County Identify landslide and coastal erosion hazard areas Landslides Civil Defense w/ DOT study done; FEMA, State, Medium and mitigation actions Dept of Trans- $50,000 for County portation, Public coastal cliffs Works New UH study is to generate potential slope stability Landslides Medium hazard maps which could be used to identify zones that may warrant further detailed evaluation Study hardening requirements for electrical system Hurricane HELCO to be determined HELCO Medium Explore with utilities feasibility of underground Hurricane, Civil Defense, with to be determined County shared Medium powerlines Earthquake, Planning & utilities w/ utilities Tsunami 19-17 Hawaii Coz-tyzty-lli-tlti-Hazard-llitigatioii Plali Chapter 19: Mitigation Strategy HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/ PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING PRIORITIZATION RESULTS INDICATED) OCTOBER 12, 2009 PAGE 1 Type Project Cost/Status H, M, or L? PolicyNatural hazard policies for the General Plan & Community Development Plan Coordination / Medium Integration Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Kona Airports SDOT Planning Project Low d N Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Kawaihae Harbors SDOT Planning Project High L= Study hardening, floodprooflng, and bypass alternatives for maior highways SDOT Planning Project Medium w LL Study hardening requirements for fuel storage and distribution to critical Planning Project High facilities Study hardening requirements for electrical systems HECO Planning Project Medium Hawaii County All -Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities Retrofits of fire, Kau Hospital Retrofit is High N police, medical, airports. the first =a Update the building code from the 1991 UBC to the 2006 IBC Required per HRS 107 High — mIncentives LL for homeowners and businesses to retrofit their structures Outreach Project Medium Testing of the Seismic and Wind Performance of Single Wall Construction $250K Medium Water Conservation and Watershed Management Education Low Build demonstration earthquake and hurricane retrofits to example homes Medium Create Hazard Retrofit Training Course at Hawaii Community College Medium Create Hazard Retrofit Training Shop Course for High Schools Low .0 Add Mitigation Displays at Libraries (hardcopy and digital) Medium 0 'Ma Home retrofit construction performed by Boy Scouts Low v 5 Produce Do-it-yourself retrofit training videos Medium Z E Conduct Public Meetings on VOG / SO2 and how to mitigate it's effects High a E Conduct Public Meetings for Persons with Special Needs Medium > Visitor Industry Disaster Preparation & Training Medium yDisaster Mitigation Planning Service for Communities Performed by High School Low V Students Multi -Hazard Information GIS Mapping Public Website PDC Medium Install seismometers in Middle Schools for educational awareness purposes Low Identify high windspeed areas and vulnerable structures; Planning Project Medium Adapt HAZUS-MH for use with hurricane hazard to Hawaii County $150K Perform a comprehensive screening evaluation of private sector candidate $125K High building types for possible hurricane refuge use •L Emergency shelter evaluation: All -Hazard Assessment of Hurricane Shelters $125K High _ & Identify Effective Retrofits Hardening of Waiakea High School Gym $322K - HMGP High Identify earthquake -induced ground failure areas Planning Project High CY Lu Lu Update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate data on State and County $125K High Bridges Update tsunami evacuation maps for 13 priority areas UH Ongoing High UHM SOEST to produce 100 -year and 500 -year tsunami hazard maps Planning Project Medium y Adopt tsunami design provisions for buildings (to be released in Sept 2010) Adopt in Building Code Medium ~ for new and for evaluating existing buildings.) Investigate the differences between the existing and new DFIRM maps, and Upcoming FEMA High adapt maps so that tsunami inundation hazard is included along the south project (2010) 'a and west coasts °o Develop rainfall and streamflow gauging system suitable to flood monitoring PSC Tool Medium LL Develop Dam Evacuation Maps FEMA/PDC Project Medium Develop policies for repetitive loss structures Policy/HazMitPlan Medium Note: Italics indicates project called for in the 2005 County of Hawaii Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-18 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan C/iaPter 19: _llitzgation ,Strategy HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/ PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING PRIORITIZATION RESULTS INDICATED) OCTOBER 12, 2009 PAGE 2 Type Project Cost/Status H, M, or L? Area Development Plan for Existing and Future Development & CRS Ongoing @ DPW Medium (ongoing) LIDAR-based remapping of stream beds (list by NRCS RC&D) See Area Development Medium Plan Use non-uniform return periods for flood tains Low U) Control development with region -specific ordinances in high hazard or Medium W E unknown hazard watersheds Evaluate applicability of FEMA floodproofing mitigation for Hawaii homes Low Z E Evaluate feasibility of absorption approach to floodplain management Low Evaluate use of retention structures for high slope areas Medium Wildland Fire Mitigation Resource Mapping and Inventory Program HWMO updating High Establish and maintain firebreaks around roads and communities in North $2.2M/15 -yr: Puako High and South Kohala districts; Mitigate wildfire threat along strategic corridors in only for $500K the Puako Forest annually/2-yr Change county zoninq code to establish setbacks for a larger interface between urban Policy needs detail Low and natural areas for wildfire mitigation Requiring all applicants for subdivision approvals to complete a wildfire hazard Low mitigation plan Install dry hydrants and develop static water sources $10,000/site Medium Establish Remote Automated Weather Stations $85K/ 5 -yr Low Prescribed burns to reduce fuel loads in fire prone areas (not for native forest areas, $1.1 M/yr. for 15 -yrs Low also not eligible for FEMA grant funding) L Roadside fuel management program along an identified corridor of Highway Needs Budget & Scope Medium 4- 190, South Kohala/North Kona definition Renovations/improvements to old plantation irrigation system tunnels and $3 M Medium ditches: Kau Sugar System Reactivation (not eligible for FEMA grant) Improvements to old plantation irrigation system tunnels and ditches and new $26M Medium Kauahi reservoir: Waimea (not eligible for FEMA grant) 0 Improvements to the Kohala Ditch Irrigation Aqueduct (install lining and ? High o piping) L o Renovate and Reactivate old abandoned plantation wells in Pahala $2.5M Medium Renovate and Reactivate old Hamakua Slaughterhouse well for non -potable $100K Medium agricultural use in Honokaa/Hamakua (not eligible for FEMA grant) Construct new wells, surface water diversions, storage and transmission lines in Needs Planning / Low priority areas investigation Promote better irrigation practices and water management. $100K High Agricultural Water System for Kona, Honomalino: Provide water for $25M Medium agriculture and fire fighting assistance. (not eligible for FEMA grant) In planning Poohoohoo Reservoir Relining and pipeline $250K High Develop wells, storage, and construct transmission systems for Puna Needs Planning / Low Scope definition Makalei Water System Improvements $5M / 4 -yrs Low Various Water System Improvements within the County of Hawaii $50M / 15 -yrs Low Identify landslide and coastal erosion hazard areas and mitigation actions Planning Project Medium y =d New UH study is to generate potential slope stability hazard maps which Project starting Medium J could be used to identify zones that may warrant further detailed evaluation Investigate Effectiveness of VOG Mitigation Techniques High L Develop Natural Hazard Mitigation Criteria Policies for County Facility Siting Medium and Design O Investigate Vulnerability of County Bridges and Plan Alternative Routes High 19-19 Hawaii C'ouyaty llitlti-Hazard llitzgatioli Plan U o� 0 0 N N r -I m LU m O a x ED L C CV 0) 'a V co a N N C O co Co 2 0) c t U U a a • _ L L O O N L ,0 co O O O O O O a y L o >, V)Co :3 N U o Co Y V) d d d N 0 0 0 x tC cn co a) ' � � o > 0) 0) 0) w co a)D0-0 O 0 C c c c >, U ;a 7 i (� E a) O N NO O L N D a) O CU O CU CU CU p - Z +�+ -0 U = O C a) co Q .� 0 O .� a) Q U �' Q a) > Co d O d O d O d O m N 0 y Q .O N O 7 y C >, - ;_ (n C O a) � L CU co CU Q a) N CU -oz,-9Y) O - O = U �� a) N a) N a) N a) N �, O +, O y�VOD'cQ0aa)E aco 0 0 0 0 fA 0240- m 2 CL cu U H-9 CL c 0) 2 (n 0 O u a 4- C) o ch O 7 y ch ++ OU OU OU U i N LN x o N N N = ch > w o CC a) a) a) ° -E.ow CL + rCL w cm w N O_ > i a ch O •� L v CL O > •L L ch o '� Q i L .N a) a) a) o a. 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CU> E� 7 N 2 ° ° ) _ _ @ < G a 2[ Z= E I I B � CL 2 $ C4 CL 2 $ \ Chapter 19: -Mitigation Strategy 41)1)endix Hazard Mitigation Project Proposal - State of Hawaii FY 201 O��� Agency/Organization: Hawaii Health Systems Jurisdiction: County of Hawaii Corporation, a public benefit corporation of the State of Hawaii ; the nation's fourth largest public hospital system Project Title: Hurricane and Seismic Retrofit of Contact Person: Warren Okabayashi Phone: (808) 974-4773 Ka'u Hospital, Island of Hawaii email: wokabayashi@hhsc.org Project Physical Address:1 Kamani Street, Pahala, Hawaii 96777 Project TMK: 190 11' 59.76" N 1550 28' 18.90" W Natural Hazard(s) to be Mitigated (check hazard[s] that apply): ❑Drought ❑Erosion ❑Flood MHurricane, High Winds ❑Landslide Eseismic ❑Tsunami Volcano/Lava Flow ❑Wildfire ❑Other (specify): HAZMAT Meets Criteria for Environmental/Historical Preservation Long Range Solution (+15 years): Soundness: ❑ No 0 Yes ❑ No Yes If Yes, # years:_25_ Is Project Currently Listed in the State Multi Hazard Mitigation Plan and/or Applicable County Multi Hazard Mitigation Plan? State Plan: ❑ No Yes County Plan: ❑ No Yes Applying For (check all that apply): EHMGP PDM State Mitigation Plan Project List Estimated TOTAL Cost of Project: $600,000 Project Period (duration): Estimated Federal Share of Project: $450,000 Estimated Non -Federal Share of Project: $150,000 Estimated Value of Structure or Facility: $8,640,000 Estimated Value of Structure's Contents: $4,320,000 Source(s) of Non -Federal Cost Match: State of Hawaii Hawaii Health Systems Corporation Project Description (use additional pages if necessary): Non-structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings and Facilities. Modifications to the non-structural elements of an existing isolated hospital facility to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage, protect patients, and ensure continuity of operations. Non-structural retrofits include: • Install exterior mounted roll -down storm shutters for windborne debris protection of windows • provide seismic bracing of existing ceilings in essential facility areas , • removal of an incinerator stack that is a potential falling hazard, and • mitigation against hurricane and windstorms through protection against windborne debris impacts on rooftop mechanical systems and • anchorage of nearby ancillary structures on site that would otherwise be large debris sources.. This is a multi -hazard retrofit in which the State of Hawaii's contribution is • the retrofit of the ventilation system to mitigate against harmful volcanic gas emissions and • abatement of some indoor hazardous ceiling material. With these retrofits, the capability for continuity of operations during hurricanes and earthquakes is improved. Ka'u Hospital is the only hospital serving the southern part of the County of Hawaii; the nearest alternate hospital is over 60 miles away. The Hawaii County All -Hazards Assessment of Critical Facilities identified this 1968 facility as having a higher priority for hazard mitigation from a comprehensive risk analysis of 80 critical buildings in Hawaii County. $600,000 Cost (Design and Construction) are itemized as follows: Window Protection against Windborne Debris $287,000 Ancillary Structure Anchorage for Wind $5,000 Rooftop Equipment Protection against Windborne Debris $65,000 Incinerator Demolition to Remove Falling Hazard $80,000 Ceiling Seismic Bracing $163,000 The Benefit Cost Analysis Tool Version 4.5.5 indicates a 25 -year Benefit of $4.001M; Benefit Cost Ratio of 6.67 A19-1 Hawaii Comity l-lulti-Hazard AIitigatioii Plan Oiapter 19: _Mitigation Strategy Appendix Today's Date: September 30, 2009 (Revised November 2009) CategoryEvaluation Community Acceptance Yes Social Adversely Affects Segments of the Population No Technical Feasibility Yes Technical Long -Term Solution Yes Secondary Impacts No Staffing Yes Funding Allocated Cost -match of $130,000 letter of certification available Administrative Maintenance/Operations Minimal long-term maintenance costs are included in the BCA Political Support Yes, high level support Political Plan Proponent Hawaii Health Systems Corporation Public Support Yes Authority Yes Legal Action Subject to Legal Challenge No Extensive benefit to ensuring continuity of critical Economic Benefit services provided by this hospital during hurricanes and earthquakes Cost of Action $520k total project cost, fed share=$390,000 (75% of total Contributes to Economic Goals Yes Outside Funding Required State of Hawaii has appropriated for its required 25% cost -match Affects Land/Water Bodies No Affects Endangered Species No Environmental Affects Hazardous Materials and Waste Sites No Consistent w/Community Environmental Goals Yes Consistent w/ Federal Laws Yes Community Profile The Ka'u district is a rural agricultural district. Per the Hawaii County General Plan (2005), Ka'u district has high percentages of special needs and vulnerable populations (youth under <18, elderly 60+ years, public assistance). These populations tend to be disproportionately impacted by natural hazard events, and may require special consideration when preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a disaster. Communities in Ka'u district are at risk from a number of hazards including hazard events such as earthquakes, tsunamis, lava flows and hurricanes, and chronic hazards such as volcanic gas emissions. How the proposed activity relates to the FEMA -approved mitigation plan: The first priority for implementation of the Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan is the hardening and retrofitting of critical facilities, i.e., those providing critical services such as hospitals. How the proposed activity relates to the State's FEMA -approved mitigation plan: Per the State of Hawaii Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7 Mitigation Strategy, "Hospitals, fire stations, police stations, and other facilities statewide have been determined to be critical. Hawai'i County is also subject to hurricane and coastal flooding hazards. A comprehensive engineering screening of vulnerability of critical facilities would be of considerable benefit by A19-2 Hawaii Coz-tyzty-lli-tlti-Hazard-llitigatioii Plali Oiapter 19: _Mitigation Strategy Appendix evaluating building performance and prioritizing the need for retrofit." The proposed PDM project is the result of that strategic process of selecting the most vulnerable critical facilities and developing the most cost-effective retrofits to enable improved functionality during a disaster. The Kau Hospital Hurricane and Seismic Retrofit project was developed as a result of a Hawaii County All -Hazards Assessment of Critical Facilities investigation that was conducted in 2008- 2009. The project engineering team lead by the University of Hawaii conducted an all -hazard rapid visual screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii. This included emergency command and control facilities, emergency first responders (fire stations, ambulance and police facilities), hospitals and clinics, and the two major airports (KOA and ITO). The assessment comprised approximately 80 buildings. A HAZUS MH risk assessment model has been used to evaluate the expected losses for each building, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and the site visits. The vulnerability of a building can be measured by economic loss or by loss of functionality related to the extent of damage. Both of these risk measures for earthquake and hurricane hazards were analyzed at an equivalent level of probability, so that an "apples to apples" comparison of effects for each building was possible. From the HAZUS MH analysis of all critical facility buildings in the study, we first identified a shorter candidate list of 32 structures that ranked higher in risk. Then building design and construction feature vulnerabilities were explicitly reviewed in order to determine, from the nine best mitigation candidates, the two higher -ranked facilities that were designated by Hawaii Civil Defense Agency for more detailed evaluation and development of recommended mitigation. After a preliminary engineering design and cost estimate, a Benefit -Cost Analysis was performed to evaluate the mitigation project because the analysis indicated high vulnerability to seismic and hurricane hazards.. This same detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit the full PDM grant application to FEMA. Type of mitigation activity proposed: Non-structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings and Facilities. Modifications to the non- structural elements of an existing isolated hospital facility to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage, protect patients, and ensure continuity of operations. Non-structural retrofits include bracing of building ceilings to prevent earthquake damage, protection against windborne debris breaching of the enclosure, and protection of ventilation systems, enhancement of the ventilation system to include better indoor air quality, and the abatement of hazardous material. Ka'u Hospital in Pahala, Hawaii, provides long-term care and acute care, obstetrics, emergency room, ambulance, and outpatient services. It is an essential facility for the southern Hawaii County districts of Puna, Kau, and South Kona. It is located in the Kau District of the County of Hawaii, the region of highest seismic hazard in the state, highest concentration of volcanic gas emissions, and is subject to hurricanes and windstorms since Hawaii is a hurricane and windborne debris hazard region. Built in 1968, its as -built condition predates modern A19-3 Hawaii Coa-tyzty-lli-tlti-Hazard-llitigatioii Playa Oiapter 19: _Mitigation Strategy 41)pendix requirements for seismic bracing of nonstructural elements and protection against windborne debris impacting windows. A common gas produced during the nearby Hawaiian eruptions just to the east that is potentially harmful to human health is sulfur dioxide. Exposure to gases can endanger those with heart and respiratory ailments. This is a multi -hazard retrofit in which the State of Hawaii's contribution is the retrofit of the ventilation system to mitigate against harmful volcanic gas emissions and abatement of some indoor hazardous material. The Federal share contribution is for seismic bracing of the ceiling grid in essential facility areas, removal of an incinerator stack that is a potential seismic falling hazard, and mitigation against hurricane and windstorms through protection against windborne debris impacts on windows and rooftop mechanical systems and anchorage of nearby ancillary structures on site that would otherwise be large debris sources. Matching funds will come from two sources, both expenditures of the Hawaii Health System Corporation: 1) Final design and construction documents for the retrofits prepared by a structural engineer, and 2) a Capital Improvement Project for Kau Hospital to provided enhanced supply air handling system to mitigate against Volcanic Gas (VOG), ceiling asbestos abatement, and the replacement of vulnerable jalousie louver windows for improved hurricane resistance and better control of the interior air environment. In past VOG episodes, patients have needed to be relocated to other hospitals because of lack of sufficient air pre -conditioning to eliminate sulfur dioxide and other VOG particulates. According to Hawaii Volcano Observatory 2008 estimates, Kilauea Volcano emits 2,300 tons of sulfur dioxide per day. The project was determined by the FEMA BCA tool to have over $4 million in benefits over 25 years accrued from building loss protection, contents loss prevention, and functionality protection to enable continuity of operations during hurricane and earthquake disasters. The Benefit Cost Ratio is expected to be 6.67. Thus, the combination of the proposed FEMA PDM retrofits with the state's already planned air handling and enclosure retrofits will mitigate against hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic gas hazards. A19-4 Hawaii Conti y Ali-tlti-Hazard-llitigatioii Plali CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 20. Plan Update Procedures Chapter 20: Plan Update Procedures CHAPTER 20 - PLAN UPDATE PROCEDURES 20.1 Plan Update Procedures In recognition of the need for establishing a formal process for hazard mitigation planning and preparedness within the County's operational structure, the County will initiate an approach to ensure that this plan is kept updated and pertinent actions are incorporated in other plans as applicable. Rather than just describe the need for plan maintenance and general tasks, this chapter was revised to provide specific actions and summary of specific ongoing hazard mitigation projects that will impact the next adoption of the mitigation plan. Thus, this provides a checklist of the resources expected for the plan maintenance taskings. This should ensure continuity and connectivity with ongoing and future work that should improve the next plan. This chapter now includes a checklist of presently ongoing or future hazard mitigation projects which should be explicitly monitored for future implementation into the plan: The plan will be monitored and updated according to the following procedures to maintain a reliable compendium of the latest information and a compass to keep the County pointed toward the disaster -resilient goals of this plan: 1. Continuing Role of the Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee: Within the County government itself, the County will continue to convene the Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee that will be responsible for monitoring, evaluating and updating the plan. The Planning Committee will include representatives from each County agency or department having hazard mitigation responsibilities. The Planning Committee will meet on a semi- annual basis with State Civil Defense to ensure that the monitoring, evaluation and updating tasks are being carried out. This enhanced communication will enable the various agencies to gain a comprehensive view of the County's hazard mitigation activities and a better understanding of the interrelationship of their actions. The semi-annual reports will enable the Planning Committee to participate in an annual workshop which will serve as an evaluation tool measuring the progress that has been made toward achieving the objectives of the plan. 2. The department and agency representatives will also prepare an annual briefing with the Mayor's office, possibly in conjunction with a joint county workshop / meeting of the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee of State Civil Defense. The Planning Committee will prepare an annual report by September of every year and present it to the Mayor. The annual report will: 1) evaluate progress on meeting the mitigation objectives set forth in Section of this plan; 2) indicate the status of the projects in the checklist; 3) identify priority projects for the upcoming year by potential funding source; 4) propose a work -plan for advancing new priority projects during the year assigning responsibilities and identifying target deadlines; 5) identify and list future revisions to the mitigation plan; and 6) highlight other plans that should incorporate hazard mitigation measures. The Committee will finalize the report by the end of the calendar year, to provide timely input to the County's capital improvement and operational budget process. Information from this annual report of hazard mitigation activities will be incorporated into Civil Defense's section of the Hawaii County Annual Report. 20-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 20: Plan Update Procedures 3. By March of 2012 and 2014, the County's Civil Defense Agency will prepare a list of necessary revisions to the mitigation plan based on the annual reports and input from the Planning Committee. The Civil Defense Agency will prepare final revisions by June, in time for any last minute changes to the County's budget necessitated by a plan revision. 4. SCD plans to team to conduct regular annual briefings with County Civil Defense, in order to stay updated on funding opportunities and requirements of NOAA and FEMA. The Plan Maintenance and Update Strategy checklist of Hawaii County hazard mitigation projects to be monitored for the future implementation into the plan: Mitigation Project Entity in Responsible Charge Estimated Completion of Technical Work Lava Flow Modeling Flow -Go II Don Thomas, University of Hawaii 2011 at Hilo Area Development Plan for Flood Galen Kuba, County of Hawaii 2011 Ordinance and Policv Revisions DPW Landslide Hazard Mapping; UH will Peter Nicholson, University of 2011 develop maps that will identify priority Hawaii at Manoa criteria and critical areas for more detailed study (e.g., road cuts and lifelines). Tsunami evacuation map updates based on Hawaii County Civil Defense December 2010 revised inundation model by Kwok Fai Cheung, University of Hawaii at Manoa (inundation maps completed) Dam Break evacuation maps Pacific Disaster Center December 2010 All -Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities University of Hawaii Social Science Completed September 2010 Statewide Research Institute Hurricane, Seismic, VOG, and Hazmat Hawaii Health System Corporation, 2012 abatement retrofits at Ka'u Hospital Hawaii State Civil Defense Post & Pier Retrofit Expert Don Thomas, University of Hawaii Fall, 2010 Tool at Hilo Use HAZUS MH MR4 with Hawaii Pacific Disaster Center Fall, 2010 Enhanced Data; discontinue HAZUS 99 Update the Building Code to the 2006 County of Hawaii Department of 2012 deadline; bill to adapt International Building Code using the Public Works currently in county council Hawaii State Building Code as mandated by hearings HRS §107 Part II Harden public school emergency shelters. Department of Accounting & 2012 • Holualoa E. S. General Services, Hawaii State • Waikoloa E.S. Bldg D Civil Defense • Waikoloa E. S. Bldg E • Konawaena E.S. 20-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 20: Plan Update Procedures Mitigation Project Entity in Responsible Charge Estimated Completion of Technical Work New DFIRM's to be based on the most FEMA, County of Hawaii 2011 protective of FEMA's 2008 hurricane study boundaries and the current FIRM's coastal Department of Public Works floodplain boundary. The northeast coastline will continue to reflect the current FIRM's coastal floodplain boundary, which is based on Tsunami indundation. Iimprove the riverine flood zones on the FEMA, County of Hawaii 2011 DFIRMs Department of Public Works Other anticipated work in the next 1 to 4 years includes: • Public awareness community-based workshops and symposia where public input is gathered while providing specific hazard, risk, and mitigation information. Hawaii County agencies regularly have several such public meetings every month, supported by coordinated efforts of the Hawaii Volcano Observatory and University of Hawaii • Public Symposia and Teacher Training Workshops on Natural Hazards (2010) CSAV will host a series of four public symposia and teacher training workshops that will address the major natural hazards occurring in Hawaii (Volcanic Eruptions, Earthquakes, Tsunami, and Hurricanes). The format of each workshop and symposium will consist of a morning set of presentations that will address various aspects of the hazard: the "science of the hazard"; the impacts of the hazard on individuals; the impact of the hazard on the community and critical infrastructure; mitigation measures that individuals can take to reduce the threat of the hazards; mitigation and assistance measures that the government has taken or can take to reduce the threat to the community. The symposia will be free and open to the public. School teachers on the island will be offered an opportunity to attend the symposia and participate in follow-on workshops for professional training credit that will contribute to their advancement in their profession. Enrolled teachers will be required to attend the morning Public Symposium session and, after a noon break, will reconvene for the first of the follow-on workshop sessions. In this meeting, the experts who provided presentations to the morning session will participate in discussion sessions with the teachers to: answer more technical questions, provide guidance on available curricular materials relevant to the hazard, and assist teachers to develop ideas and concepts for incorporating hazards awareness in their lesson plans. Discussions with the domain experts will be followed by a group activity under the guidance of a master teacher in the refinement of lesson plans that contribute to their students' ability to meet current curricular standards for their grade level. These activities will conclude the first workshop. About two weeks later, the teachers will be required to attend a second workshop to provide feedback and discussion on the results of their use of the hazards - related lesson plan in the classroom. The second workshop will also incorporate a field trip and visit to a facility relevant to the hazard (e.g. a visit to the Kilauea summit and the 20-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 20: Plan Update Procedures Hawaiian Volcano Observatory) with a domain expert who will be able to discuss the scientific background of the field visit and the relevance of the facility to the hazard. The Public Symposia and Teacher Training program will be conducted in Hilo and Honolulu to target teachers on the Big Island and on Oahu; if resources permit, additional symposia will be conducted in Kona and a series of Symposia and Workshops will be offered on Maui. • Further assessment of the public comments received during the public survey on disaster preparedness to identify needs • Continuing project nomination opportunities for funding • Within the County government itself, the County will continue to convene the Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee that will be responsible for monitoring, evaluating and updating the plan. The Planning Committee will include representatives from each County agency or department having hazard mitigation responsibilities. The Planning Committee will meet on a semi-annual basis with State Civil Defense to ensure that the monitoring, evaluation and updating tasks are being carried out. • The department and agency representatives will also prepare an annual briefing with the Mayor's office, possibly in conjunction with a joint county workshop / meeting of the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee of State Civil Defense. The Planning Committee will prepare an annual report by September of every year and present it to the Mayor. The annual report will: 1) evaluate progress on meeting the mitigation objectives set forth in Section of this plan; 2) indicate the status of the projects in the checklist; 3) identify priority projects for the upcoming year by potential funding source; 4) propose a work -plan for advancing new priority projects during the year assigning responsibilities and identifying target deadlines; 5) identify and list future revisions to the mitigation plan; and 6) highlight other plans that should incorporate hazard mitigation measures. • Involvement of State Civil Defense to inform on funding opportunities and FEMA requirements • Update of the State Civil Defense hazard mitigation public website (200 1) As an aid to the Planning Committee, notes relating to FEMA conditions and rules for funding of hazard mitigation projects are included in the following section. 20-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan V W a LL 0 z 0 z LL W LL z O W F- 0 O ij 0 N o C o C�j CA CA � U CA CCA o C °? 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N O Cd.�a Cd f6 u c:n5 C +� +' L C a� ." 4 O a) Q 3 N C > N •� ,� �" /•� rN�, /•� O O fL6 = C 0 N O=-0 O Q O S a) i f6 3 +� a to E O a) 1 m to N �, �' • O L C s a� {c6n �j o +>_, Q L C i-•� M N E .— a) i -J L Vl M a -J N C (6 'a -a :.% a) C O L C •> NOi N C \LfO -a c♦ a Z♦ O 0 V E O ' ♦ ♦ v ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ �N CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAII 96720 LJ 21. References Chapter 21: References CHAPTER 21 - REFERENCES Applied Research Associates (ARA), "Hazard Mitigation Study for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund" (incorporates part of FEMA -sponsored Iniki Building Performance Report), December 2001. 2. Cheung, Kwok Fai, "Status Report: Evaluation of Tsunami Evacuation Maps for Hawaii", University of Hawaii, November 2002. Cheung, K. F., et al. "Modeling of Storm -Induced Coastal Flooding for Emergency Management," Ocean Engineering 30 (2003) 1353-1386. 4. County of Hawaii, Emergency Operations Plan, 1989. Cox, Doak, "Hurricane Iwa and Coastal Flood Hazard Estimation in Hawai'i, Environmental Center, University of Hawaii SR:0032, January 1983. 6. Curtis, George, D., Hawaii Inundation/Evacuation Map Project, Final Report, Joint Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research, University of Hawaii, April 1991. 7. Fletcher, C, B. Richmond, E. Grossman, A. Gibbs, Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone, Prepared in cooperation with University of Hawaii, State of Hawaii Office of Planning, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series I-2761, 2002. 8. Giambelluca, T.W., et al. 'Drought in Hawai'i". Prepared for the State of Hawaii, Department of Land and Natural Resources, Report R88. December 1991. 9. Giambelluca, T.W., et al. Rainfall Atlas of Hawaii. Prepared for Department of Land and Natural Resources, Report R76, June 1986. 10. Haraguchi, P., Hurricanes in Hawaii, prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1984. 11. Haraguchi, Paul, 1980, "Storm of January 8 - 10, 1980, State of Hawai'i," DLNR, December 1980. 12. Harding ESE, County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual, prepared for the County of Hawaii, December 18, 2001. 13. Hawaii Hazard Mitigation Forum website, http://www.mothernature-hawaii.com 14. Hawaii Multihazard Science Advisory Council (MSAC). Hurricane Hazard Advisory from the Hawaii MSAC to the State Hazard Mitigation Forum, 2002. 15. Hawaii Multihazard Science Advisory Council (MSAC). Earthquake Hazard Advisory from the Hawaii MSAC to the State Hazard Mitigation Forum, 2002. 16. Hawaii Multihazard Science Advisory Council (MSAC). Lava Inundation Hazard Advisory from the Hawaii MSAC to the State Hazard Mitigation Forum, 2002. 17. Heliker, C. "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii", U.S. Geological Survey, 1990. 21-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 21: References 18. Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Limited (NZ) & the University of Hawaii at Manoa, "Methodology for Hazard Ranking for Hawaii County," October 2003. 19. IT Corporation (prime contractor), Hawaii Disaster Debris Management Plan. Prepared for Office of Solid Waste Management, Department of Health and Civil Defense Agency, Department of Defense, June 2000. 20. Johnson, C. and J. Michaud. Dam Failure Inundation Mapping Project, NASA Contract No. NASW-99044, January 15, 2003. 21. Juvik, S. and J. Juvik, Atlas of Hawaii (3d ed.), University of Hawaii Press, 1998. 22. Macdonald, G.A., A. T. Abbott, F.L. Peterson, Volcanoes in the Sea (2d ed.), University of Hawaii Press, 1983. 23. Martin & Chock, Inc., Average Annualized Loss Estimates for Hazards in the State of Hawaii, Prepared for the Multi -Hazard Science and Technical Advisory Committee to the Statewide Hazard Mitigation Forum, 2003. 24. Martin & Chock, Inc. "HAZUS-MH, Summary of Issues and Comments Relating to Applications in the Pacific Region for Earthquake, Flood, and Hurricane Loss Estimation", Hawai' i HAZUS Training and Proposed User Group Attendees, January 2004, compiled June 2, 2004, Version 1.0, including FEMA replies as of May 17, 2004. 25. Schroeder, Tom, 1993,"Hawai'i Hurricanes: Their History, Causes, and Future," Office of State Planning, December 1993. 26. SSFM, Inc., Hawaii Island Flood Hazard Mitigation Plan, Prepared for the County of Hawaii Planning Department with a FEMA flood mitigation planning grant, 2003. 27. State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, National Flood Insurance Program in Hawaii, Circular C90, 1994. 28. Thomas, W. "The Variety of Physical Environments among Pacific Islands," in Man's Place in the Island Ecosystem (ed. by F.R. Fosberg), Bishop Museum Press, 1965. 29. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, The Waiakea Stream Preliminary Investigation report, November, 1999. 30. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, The Wailuku- Alenaio Watershed Reinvestigation report, December, 1999. 31. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Excerpt from letter to JIMAR/UH; original not presently available, 1987. 32. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses, State and Local Mitigation Planning How - To Guide, Version 1.0, August 2001. 33. Walker, Daniel, "Local Tsunami Real-time Warning System," Science of Tsunami Hazards, v. 20, n. 1, 2002. 34. Wentworth, C. "Principles of Stream erosion in Hawaii" in Journal of Geology, v. XXXVI, n. 5, July -August 1928. 21-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 21: References 35. Wilson Okamoto Corporation, County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategies (Draft), prepared for the Hawaii Drought Committee and State of Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management, September 29, 2004. 36. Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc., June 1993. Potential Seismic Hazards and Emergency Response Preparedness of Essential Fire Stations and Hospitals in the County of Hawaii. Prepared for the State of Hawaii Office of Civil Defense and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board. 37. Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc., September 1994. Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide. FEMA 74 (3rd ed.). 38. ASCE-TCLEE (American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering), 1998. "Seismic Guidelines for Ports", ASCE-TCLEE Monograph No. 12 (S. Werner, editor), ASCE Press, Reston VA. 39. Geolabs, Inc., 2007. "Liquefaction evaluation of Kawaihae Harbor," damage assessment report to the State of Hawaii Harbors Division, Honolulu, HI. 40. Sea Engineering, Inc. 2006. "Kawaihae Harbor Earthquake Damage Dive Survey Report", prepared for Miyasato Kuniyoshi Engineers, LLC, Honolulu, HI. 41. UFC (Unified Facilities Criteria), 2005. "Design: Piers and Wharves". Standard 4-152- 01. United States Department of Defense, Washington, DC. 42. University of Hawaii, 2006. "Reconnaissance Following the October 15th, 2006 Earthquakes on the Island of Hawaii", Research Report UHM/CEE106-07, October 26, 2006, Manoa, HI. 43. URS Group, Inc., 2007. "Port Facility Analysis of Kawaihae Harbor and Seismic Hazard Mitigation Guidelines for Pacific Island Ports", prepared for FEMA Hazard Mitigation Technical Assistance Program, FEMA 1664 -DR -HI, Oakland, CA. 21-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 LJ 22. Glossary Chapter 22: Glossary CHAPTER 22 - GLOSSARY Adverse Consequences - Negative impacts that may result from failure. The primary concerns are loss of human life, economic loss (including property damage), lifeline disruption, and environmental impact. Annualized Benefits and Costs - The value of benefits and costs based on the probability the benefit or cost will be realized in a given year. Assets - Lives, buildings, utilities and transportation systems, cultural, social... Benefit - Any increase in utility or well-being to an individual, group or society associated with an action or choice. Bounded from below by price. It is synonymous with value in economic theory. Benefits and costs are complementary - a cost is a negative benefit, since costs decrease well-being and benefits increase well-being. Benefit/Cost Analysis - A systematic quantitative method of assessing the desirability of government projects or policies when it is important to take a long view of future effects and abroad view of possible side-effects. Benefit/cost analysis is recommended as the technique to use in a formal economic analysis of government programs or projects. (From OMB A-94) Consequences - Damages (full or partial), injuries, and losses of life, property, environment, and business that can be quantified by some unit of measure, often in economic or financial terms. Cost - Any reduction in utility or well-being to an individual, group or society associated with an action or choice. Generally it is not the same as price, which bounds cost from above. Cost Effective - The least cost alternative means for achieving the same stream of benefits or a given objective. Cost-effectiveness analysis is less comprehensive than benefit/cost analysis, but can be appropriate when the benefits from competing alternatives are the same or where a policy decision has been made that the benefits must be provided. It can be used to compare programs with identical costs but differing benefits. FEMA guidance has defined cost-effective as the benefits equal to or exceeding the costs. (From OMB A-94) Damage - Damage refers to physical destruction measured by physical indicators such as the number of deaths and injuries or the number of buildings destroyed. Disaster - The impact of a natural event upon a vulnerable community resulting in disruption, damage, and casualties that cannot be relieved by the unaided capacity of locally - mobilized resources. Disaster Management - The efficient use of resources to coordinate the processes of relief, recovery, and reconstruction. 22-1 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 22: Glossary Disaster Response - Activities occurring in the aftermath of a disaster which assist disaster victims and which rehabilitate or reconstruct damaged infrastructure. Discount Rate - Discount rate is the interest rate used in calculating the present value of expected yearly benefits and costs. Net present value represents the discounted value of future benefits and costs. Discounting reflects the time value of money and the view that benefits and costs are worth more when they are experienced sooner. OMB determines the discount rate for analysis of federally funded projects. Empirical - Relying on experience or observation, capable of being verified or disproved by observation or experiment. Exposure - The number, types, qualities, and monetary values of various types of property or infrastructure and life that may be subject to an undesirable or injurious hazard event. GIS - Geographic Information System. A computerized mapping system and tool that enables the visual display of geography to various scales linked with information, often from databases. For the purposes of hazard mitigation, the system allows planners to take information about a specific area, to overlay a hazard to see areas that might be impacted, and to develop actions to minimize the impacts. Hazard - An event or physical condition that has the potential to cause fatalities, injuries, property damage, infrastructure damage, agricultural loss, damage to the environment, interruption of business, or other types of harm or loss. Hazard Mapping - The process of establishing geographically where certain phenomena are likely to pose a threat to human settlements. Hazard Potential - Possible adverse consequences. Hazard Potential Classification - A system that categorizes dams according to the degree of adverse incremental consequences of a failure or mis-operation of a dam. The hazard potential classification does not reflect in any way on the current condition of the dam (e.g., safety, structural integrity, flood routing capacity.) Impacts - The impacts of a disaster include market-based and non market-based effects. Market-based impacts include destruction of property and a reduction in income and sales. Non -market effects include environmental consequences and psychological effects suffered by persons involved in a disaster. Incremental Consequences - Under the same conditions (e.g. flood, earthquake, or other event), the difference in impacts that would occur due to failure or mis-operation of the dam over those that would have occurred without failure or mis-operation of the dam and appurtenances. 22-2 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 22: Glossary Loss - Any reduction in value, or well-being to individuals, groups or society. A loss is a cost. Losses avoided are benefits. Direct Losses - Losses linked directly to a hazard event including all damages and employment losses due directly to the closure of damaged facilities. Indirect Losses - All losses other than direct losses. Indirect losses include economic losses due to dislocations in undamaged factories or commercial ventures, banking, and insurance as well as non financial losses such as loss of historical resources, pain, and suffering. Maximum Foreseeable Loss - An estimate of losses assuming the worst combination damage and disruption to a business. This estimate allows consideration of the worst possible consequences. Mitigation - All actions taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects. Mitigation activities contrast with short-term risk -reducing actions such as preparedness, response and recovery measures and risk spreading measures such as insurance. Multiplier - The ratio between the direct effect on output or employment and the full effect including the effects of second order rounds or spending. (From OMB A-94) Natural Hazard - The probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging natural phenomenon within a specific period of time. Some of these include tropical cyclones, hurricanes, drought, earthquakes, floods, landslides, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. Net Present Value - The discounted monetized value of expected net benefits (i.e., benefits minus costs). This is the standard criterion for deciding whether a government program can be justified on economic principles. Net present value is compute by assigning monetary values to benefits and costs, discounting future benefits and costs using an appropriate discount rate, and subtracting the sum total of discounted costs from the sum total of discounted benefits. (From OMB A-94) Opportunity Cost - The value of alternatives foregone to achieve the mitigation activity. It can be thought of as the value of the good or service in its best alternative use. Present Value - The value of a stream of benefits or costs when discounted back to the present time. Probable - Likely to occur; reasonably expected; realistic. Probability and Frequency - A measure of how often an event is likely to occur. Frequency can be expressed as the average time between occurrences or exceedances (non- exceedances) of an event or the percent chance or probability of the event occurring or being exceeded (not exceeded) in a given year or a longer time period. 22-3 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 22: Glossary Process Mitigation - Indirect mitigation activities that lead to policies, practices and projects that reduce risk. They include efforts to assess hazards, vulnerability and risk; conduct planning to identify projects, policies and practices and set priorities; educate decision - makers and build constituencies and political will; and to facilitate the selection, design, funding and construction of projects. Project Mitigation - Project mitigation includes measures to avoid or reduce damage resulting from hazard events. They include projects to elevate, acquire and/or relocate buildings, lifelines and structures threatened by floods, strengthen buildings to resist earthquake or wind forces, and to improve drainage and land conditions. Rehabilitation - Action undertaken in the weeks or months following a disaster to restore basic services which enable life in the region to return to normality. However, it should be recognized that normality also gave rise to a disaster. Therefore, the term can be equated with vulnerability, and there is thus a need to advance from the status quo towards post -disaster improvements. Relief - Attention to immediate and basic needs of disaster survivors. These needs include food, clothing, shelter, and medical or emotional care. In the case of fast -impact disasters such as floods, earthquakes or cyclones, this process is directed at saving lives and alleviating further suffering. Risk - Potential losses associated with a hazard, defined in terms of expected probability and frequency, exposure, and consequences. Risk is therefore the product of specific risk and elements at risk; the convolution of the probability hazard, vulnerability (or fragility), and asset exposure. Risk Assessment - A process or method for evaluating risk associated with a specific hazard and defined in terms of probability and frequency of occurrence, magnitude and severity, exposure, and consequences. Shadow Prices - If a market in a good is not perfectly competitive, then market prices will not reflect the opportunity costs of that good. The price of the good, as corrected to equal its opportunity cost, is termed its shadow price. Vulnerability - The susceptibility to physical injury, harm, damage, or economic loss. 22-4 Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO. HAWAH 96720 LJ 23. 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Introduction • Appendix A: Overall reorganization and reformatting of the 2010 plan recommendation in Chapter 19 • Changes to the new Plan Maintenance chapter described 2. Mitigation Planning Minor editorial corrections 3. Land Use and • Section on Economy -Agriculture discussion Development • Section of Analysis of Development Trends impacting hazard mitigation planning is added 5. Tropical Cyclones • Reference added to Figure 5-2 • Future Plans — Hawaii Residential Safe Room discussion is updated for new mitigation project 11. Dam Failure • Figure numbers are corrected • Section on PDC Dam Failure Inundation Map Project and Future Plans are updated relating to hazard mitigation measures 14. Droughts • Discussion of current drought conditions is added to the Section on Significant Historic Events Table 14-2 • Future Plans Projects are updated 15. Wildfires • Discussion of recent wildfires is added to Significant Historic Events • A new section on Community Wildfire Protection Plans is added • Section on Mitigation Strategies is updated and completed as of 2010, and establishes priorities 17. Shelters Future Mitigation Plans are updated for a new 2010 project follow- up for the Hawaii Residential Safe Room 19. Mitigation Strategy • Section 19.5 discusses the status of past implementation actions listed in the 2005 plan. • Section 19.6 is editorially revised to indicate actions that are similar or continuations of the 2005 plan actions 20. Plan Update Procedures The revised approach to Chapter 20 is explained. Elaborated information is given by other anticipated work in the next 1 to 4 ears (in addition to the specific maintenance checklist). 21. References Updated list 23. Plan Review Crosswalk The responses to the July 23, 2010 FEMA Crosswalk Review is given, along with this summary of significant changes to the Final Plan. Hawaii County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS SUBJECT TAB PAGE Base Plan Base Plan Section 1: Introduction Base Plan 1 Purpose Base Plan 1 Scope Base Plan 1 Situation Base Plan 1 Emergency/Disaster Base Plan 2 General Situation Base Plan 2 Hazards Base Plan 2 Natural Base Plan 3 Geological Base Plan 3 Severe Weather Base Plan 3 Technological Base Plan 4 Intentional Base Plan 4 Vulnerability Base Plan 5 Population Base Plan 6 Distribution Base Plan 6 Special Needs Base Plan 6 Language Base Plan 6 Age Base Plan 7 Disabled Base Plan 7 Assumptions Base Plan 8 Section 2: Mission Base Plan 8 Section 3: Execution Base Plan 9 Concept of Operations Base Plan 9 Phases of Emergency Management Base Plan 9 Preparedness Base Plan 9 Planning Base Plan 9 Organization Base Plan 10 Equipping Base Plan 10 Training Base Plan 10 Exercise Base Plan 10 Evaluation and Improvement Base Plan 10 Response Base Plan 11 Situational Understanding Base Plan 11 Activating and Deploying Resources Base Plan 11 Coordinating Response Actions Base Plan 11 Demobilization Base Plan 11 Recovery Base Plan 11 Short-term Recovery Base Plan 12 Long-term Recovery Base Plan 12 Mitigation Base Plan 12 Intelligence Base Plan 12 Relevant Information Base Plan 13 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Common Operating Picture Base Plan 13 Critical Information Requirements Base Plan 13 Essential Elements of Information Base Plan 13 Distractions Base Plan 13 Scheme of Maneuver Base Plan 13 Emergency Operations Center Base Plan 14 Activation Base Plan 14 Levels of Activation Base Plan 14 Additional Staffing Base Plan 15 Liaisons Base Plan 15 County Employees Base Plan 15 Clerical Pool Base Plan 16 COOP Non-essential Personnel Base Plan 16 Volunteers Base Plan 16 Emergency Declarations Base Plan 16 Civil Defense Emergency Period Base Plan 16 State of Emergency Base Plan 16 Emergency Ordinances Base Plan 16 Unified Command Base Plan 17 Organization and Responsibilities Base Plan 17 County, State, and Federal Agencies in Residence Base Plan 17 Volunteer Agencies Base Plan 17 American Red Cross Base Plan 18 Citizens Corps Base Plan 18 Neighborhood Watch Base Plan 18 Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) Base Plan 18 Medical Reserve Corps Base Plan 19 Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster Base Plan 19 Coordinating Instructions Base Plan 19 Government Agencies with Identified EOP Roles Base Plan 19 Specific Instructions Base Plan 20 Hawai'i County Base Plan 20 County Organizations and State Branch Offices Base Plan 20 State Departments and Agencies Base Plan 21 Federal Agencies Base Plan 21 Supporting Agencies Base Plan 21 Cooperating Agencies Base Plan 21 County Residents Base Plan 22 Tourism Industry Base Plan 22 Industry Base Plan 22 Businesses Base Plan 23 Interoperable Communications Base Plan 23 Section 4: Administration, Finance, and Logistics Base Plan 23 Administration Base Plan 23 General Support Requirements Base Plan 23 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Liability Base Plan 24 County/State Employees Base Plan 24 Volunteers Base Plan 24 Department of Defense Personnel Base Plan 24 Finance Base Plan 24 Logistics Base Plan 24 Resource Management Policies Base Plan 24 Resource Availability Base Plan 25 Department/Agency with Jurisdiction over the Incident Base Plan 25 Mutual Aid Agreements Base Plan 25 Personnel Base Plan 25 Supplies Base Plan 25 Existing Stocks Base Plan 25 Contingency Contracts Base Plan 26 Donated Goods Base Plan 26 Section 5: Authorities and References Base Plan 26 Authorities Base Plan 26 Federal Base Plan 26 State Base Plan 26 Local Base Plan 27 Extent and Limits on Emergency Authority Base Plan 27 Pre -Delegation of Emergency Authorities Base Plan 27 Authority to Accept Volunteers' Services Base Plan 27 Continuity of Government Base Plan 27 Plan Maintenance Base Plan 28 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS) AnnexA Section 1: Abbreviations and Acronyms AnnexA A-1 Section 2: NIMS Terms and Definitions AnnexA A-3 Incident Typing AnnexA A-7 Type 1 Incident AnnexA A-7 Type 2 Incident AnnexA A-8 Type 3 Incident AnnexA A-8 Type 4 Incident AnnexA A-8 Type 5 Incident AnnexA A-9 Emergency Management Phases AnnexA A-9 Preparedness AnnexA A-9 Planning AnnexA A-10 Organization AnnexA A-10 Equipping AnnexA A-10 Training AnnexA A-10 Exercise AnnexA A-10 Evaluation and Improvement AnnexA A-11 Response AnnexA A-11 Initial Response AnnexA A-11 Extended Response AnnexA A-12 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Recovery AnnexA A-12 Mitigation AnnexA A-13 Incident Response Organization Structure AnnexA A-14 Incident Commander AnnexA A-14 Command Staff AnnexA A-14 Public Information Officer AnnexA A-15 Liaison Officer AnnexA A-15 Safety Officer AnnexA A-15 General Staff AnnexA A-15 Operations AnnexA A-15 Planning AnnexA A-16 Logistics AnnexA A-16 Finance/Administration AnnexA A-17 Annex B, Direction and Control Annex B Purpose Annex B B-1 Situation and Assumptions Annex B B-1 Concept of Operations Annex B B-1 Task Organization and Responsibilities Annex B B-2 General Annex B B-2 Organization Annex B B-4 Task Assignments and Responsibilities Annex B B-4 Policy Group Annex B B-4 Unified Command Annex B B-5 Operations Group Annex B B-5 Operations Section Annex B B-5 Planning Section Annex B B-5 Operations Support Group Annex B B-6 Logistics Section Annex B B-6 Administration Section Annex B B-6 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Annex B B-6 Direction and Control Annex B B-7 Continuity of Government Annex B B-7 Administration and Logistics Annex B B-9 Emergency Operations Center Annex B B-9 Reports and Records Annex B B-9 Media Annex B B-11 Plan Development and Maintenance Annex B B-11 Authority and References Annex B B-11 Annex C, Emergency Public Information Annex C Purpose Annex C C-1 Situation and Assumptions Annex C C-1 Concept of Operations Annex C C-1 Joint Information System Annex C C-1 Key Elements of Relevant Public information Annex C C-2 Public Information Annex C C-2 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Task Organization and Responsibilities Annex C C-3 Type 5 incident Annex C C-3 Type 1 through Type 4 Incident Annex C C-3 Direction and Control Annex C C-4 Continuity of Government Annex C C-5 Administration and Logistics Annex C C-6 Plan Development and Maintenance Annex C C-6 Authorities and References Annex C C-6 Annex D, Communications Annex D Purpose Annex D D-1 Situation and Assumptions Annex D D-1 Concept of Operations Annex D D-1 Task Organization Annex D D-1 Direction and Control Annex D D-2 Continuity of Government Annex D D-2 Administration and Logistics Annex D D-2 Communications protection Annex D D-2 Security Annex D D-3 Training Annex D D-3 Plan Development and Maintenance Annex D D-4 Authority and References Annex D D-4 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in -Place Annex E Purpose Annex E E-1 Situation and Assumptions Annex E E-1 Concept of Operations Annex E E-1 General Annex E E-1 Shelter -in -Place Annex E E-2 Evacuation Annex E E-2 Voluntary Annex E E-2 Compulsory/Directed Annex E E-3 Shadow Annex E E-4 Spontaneous Annex E E-5 Sheltering Annex E E-5 Special Needs Sheltering Annex E E-6 Tourists/Visitors Annex E E-7 Service Animals Annex E E-7 Pet Evacuation Annex E E-8 Return to Home or Community Annex E E-9 Task Organization Annex E E-9 Office of the Mayor Annex E E-9 Policy Group Annex E E-10 Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Annex E E-10 Hawai'i Police Department Annex E E-11 Hawai'i Fire Department Annex E E-11 Department of Public Works Annex E E-11 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Mass Transit Agency Annex E E-11 Department of Parks and Recreation Annex E E-12 American Red Cross Annex E E-12 Humane Society Annex E E-13 Department of Education Annex E E-13 Department of Health Annex E E-13 County Residents Annex E E-13 Direction and Control Annex E E-14 Command Annex E E-14 Evacuation Timeframes Annex E E-14 Tsunami Annex E E-14 Hurricane Annex E E-15 Lava Flow Annex E E-15 Brush Fire Annex E E-15 Small Incidents Annex E E-16 Continuity of Government Annex E E-16 Administration and Logistics Annex E E-16 Plan Development and Maintenance Annex E E-16 Authorities and References Annex E E-16 Annex F, Damage Assessment Annex F Purpose Annex F F-1 Situation and Assumptions Annex F F-1 Concept of Operations Annex F F-1 Task Organization and Responsibilities Annex F F-1 Direction and Control Annex F F-3 Continuity of Government Annex F F-3 Administration and Logistics Annex F F-3 Plan Development and Maintenance Annex F F-4 Authorities and References Annex F F-4 Annex G, Resource Management Annex G Purpose Annex G G-1 Situation and Assumptions Annex G G-1 Concept of Operations Annex G G-1 Task Organization and Responsibilities Annex G G-1 Type 5 Incidents Annex G G-1 Type 1 Through Type 4 Incidents Annex G G-1 Responding Agency Annex G G-1 Emergency Operations Center Annex G G-2 Unified Command Annex G G-3 ESF #7 Annex G G-4 County Organizations Annex G G-4 VOAD Annex G G-4 Direction and Control Annex G G-4 Continuity of Government Annex G G-5 Administration and Logistics Annex G G-5 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Communications Annex G G-5 Resources Annex G G-5 Records Annex G G-5 Donated Relief Supplies Annex G G-6 Authorities and References Annex G G-6 Annex H, Emergency Support Functions Annex H Executive Summary Annex H H-1 Introduction Annex H H-1 Emergency Support Function (ESF) Appendices Annex H H-2 ESF Roles and Responsibilities Annex H H-2 ESF Coordinator Annex H H-3 Primary Agencies Annex H H-3 Support Agencies Annex H H-4 Enclosure 1, Responsibilities Annex H H-1-1 Enclosure 2, Primary and Support Agencies Annex H H-2-1 Appendix 1, ESF #1 Transportation, to Annex H Appendix 1 Agencies Appendix 1 ESF 1-1 Purpose Appendix 1 ESF 1-1 Scope Appendix 1 ESF 1-1 Policies Appendix 1 ESF 1-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 1 ESF 1-2 Responsibilities Appendix 1 ESF 1-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 1 ESF 1-3 Primary Agency Appendix 1 ESF 1-3 Support Agencies Appendix 1 ESF 1-3 Appendix 2, Communications, to Annex H Appendix 2 Agencies Appendix 2 ESF 2-1 Purpose Appendix 2 ESF 2-1 Scope Appendix 2 ESF 2-1 Policies Appendix 2 ESF 2-1 Concept of Operations Appendix 2 ESF 2-2 Organization Appendix 2 ESF 2-3 Responsibilities Appendix 2 ESF 2-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 2 ESF 2-4 Primary Agency Appendix 2 ESF 2-4 Support Agencies Appendix 2 ESF 2-4 Appendix 3, Public Works and Engineering, to Annex H Appendix 3 Agencies Appendix 3 ESF 3-1 Purpose Appendix 3 ESF 3-1 Scope Appendix 3 ESF 3-1 Policies Appendix 3 ESF 3-1 Concept of Operations Appendix 3 ESF 3-2 Organization Appendix 3 ESF 3-2 Responsibilities Appendix 3 ESF 3-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 3 ESF 3-3 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Primary Agency Appendix 3 ESF 3-3 Support Agencies Appendix 3 ESF 3-4 Appendix 4, Firefighting, to Annex H Appendix 4 Agencies Appendix 4 ESF 4-1 Purpose Appendix 4 ESF 4-1 Scope Appendix 4 ESF 4-1 Policies Appendix 4 ESF 4-1 Concept of Operations Appendix 4 ESF 4-3 Organization Appendix 4 ESF 4-3 Response Actions Appendix 4 ESF 4-3 Responsibilities Appendix 4 ESF 4-4 ESF Coordinator Appendix 4 ESF 4-4 Primary Agency Appendix 4 ESF 4-4 Support Agencies Appendix 4 ESF 4-5 Appendix 5, Emergency Management, to Annex H Appendix 5 Agencies Appendix 5 ESF 5-1 Purpose Appendix 5 ESF 5-1 Scope Appendix 5 ESF 5-1 Policies Appendix 5 ESF 5-1 Concept of Operations Appendix 5 ESF 5-2 Organization Appendix 5 ESF 5-3 Responsibilities Appendix 5 ESF 5-4 ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency Appendix 5 ESF 5-4 Support Agencies Appendix 5 ESF 5-5 Appendix 6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services Appendix 6 Agencies Appendix 6 ESF 6-1 Purpose Appendix 6 ESF 6-1 Scope Appendix 6 ESF 6-1 Policies Appendix 6 ESF 6-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 6 ESF 6-3 Responsibilities Appendix 6 ESF 6-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 6 ESF 6-3 Primary Agency Appendix 6 ESF 6-3 Support Agencies Appendix 6 ESF 6-4 Appendix 7, Logistics Management and Resource Support Appendix 7 Agencies Appendix 7 ESF 7-1 Purpose Appendix 7 ESF 7-1 Scope Appendix 7 ESF 7-1 Policies Appendix 7 ESF 7-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 7 ESF 7-2 Responsibilities Appendix 7 ESF 7-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 7 ESF 7-3 Primary Agency Appendix 7 ESF 7-3 Support Agencies Appendix 7 ESF 7-4 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Appendix 8, Public Health and Medical Services Appendix 8 Agencies Appendix 8 ESF 8-1 Purpose Appendix 8 ESF 8-1 Scope Appendix 8 ESF 8-1 Policies Appendix 8 ESF 8-2 Organization Appendix 8 ESF 8-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 8 ESF 8-3 Responsibilities Appendix 8 ESF 8-4 ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency Appendix 8 ESF 8-4 Support Agencies Appendix 8 ESF 8-4 Appendix 9, Search and Rescue Appendix 9 Agencies Appendix 9 ESF 9-1 Purpose Appendix 9 ESF 9-1 Scope Appendix 9 ESF 9-1 Policies Appendix 9 ESF 9-1 Concept of Operations Appendix 9 ESF 9-2 Organization Appendix 9 ESF 9-2 Actions Appendix 9 ESF 9-3 Responsibilities Appendix 9 ESF 9-4 ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency Appendix 9 ESF 9-4 Support Agencies Appendix 9 ESF 9-5 Appendix 10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Appendix 10 Agencies Appendix 10 ESF 10-1 Purpose Appendix 10 ESF 10-1 Scope Appendix 10 ESF 10-1 Policies Appendix 10 ESF 10-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 10 ESF 10-2 Organization Appendix 10 ESF 10-3 Responsibilities Appendix 10 ESF 10-4 ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency Appendix 10 ESF 10-4 Support Agencies Appendix 10 ESF 10-4 Appendix 11, Agriculture & Natural Resources Appendix 11 Agencies Appendix 11 ESF 11-1 Purpose Appendix 11 ESF 11-1 Scope Appendix 11 ESF 11-1 Policies Appendix 11 ESF 11-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 11 ESF 11-3 Organization Appendix 11 ESF 11-4 Responsibilities Appendix 11 ESF 11-4 ESF Coordinator Appendix 11 ESF 11-5 Primary Agencies Appendix 11 ESF 11-5 Support Agencies Appendix 11 ESF 11-7 Appendix 12, Energy Appendix 12 Agencies Appendix 12 ESF 12-1 Purpose Appendix 12 ESF 12-1 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Scope Appendix 12 ESF 12-1 Policies Appendix 12 ESF 12-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 12 ESF 12-2 Organization Appendix 12 ESF 12-3 Actions Appendix 12 ESF 12-7 Responsibilities Appendix 12 ESF 12-7 ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency Appendix 12 ESF 12-7 Support Agencies Appendix 12 ESF 12-8 Appendix 13, Public Safety and Security Appendix 13 Agencies Appendix 13 ESF 13-1 Purpose Appendix 13 ESF 13-1 Scope Appendix 13 ESF 13-1 Policies Appendix 13 ESF 13-1 Concept of Operations Appendix 13 ESF 13-2 Organization Appendix 13 ESF 13-2 Responsibilities Appendix 13 ESF 13-3 ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency Appendix 13 ESF 13-3 Support Agencies Appendix 13 ESF 13-3 Appendix 14, Long -Term Community Recovery Appendix 14 Agencies Appendix 14 ESF 14-1 Purpose Appendix 14 ESF 14-1 Scope Appendix 14 ESF 14-1 Policies Appendix 14 ESF 14-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 14 ESF 14-2 Activities Appendix 14 ESF 14-3 Responsibilities Appendix 14 ESF 14-4 ESF Coordinator Appendix 14 ESF 14-4 Primary Agency Appendix 14 ESF 14-4 Support Agencies Appendix 14 ESF 14-5 Appendix 15, External Affairs Appendix 15 Agencies Appendix 15 ESF 15-1 Purpose Appendix 15 ESF 15-1 Scope Appendix 15 ESF 15-1 Policies Appendix 15 ESF 15-1 Concept of Operations Appendix 15 ESF 15-2 Responsibilities Appendix 15 ESF 15-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 15 ESF 15-3 Primary Agencies Appendix 15 ESF 15-4 Support Agencies Appendix 15 ESF 15-4 Appendix 16, Special Needs Appendix 16 Agencies Appendix 16 ESF 16-1 Purpose Appendix 16 ESF 16-1 Scope Appendix 16 ESF 16-1 Policies Appendix 16 ESF 16-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 16 ESF 16-2 SUBJECT TAB PAGE Responsibilities Appendix 16 ESF 16-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 16 ESF 16-3 Primary Agency Appendix 16 ESF 16-3 Support Agencies Appendix 16 ESF 16-3 Appendix 17, Tourist Sheltering and Evacuation Appendix 17 Agencies Appendix 17 ESF 17-1 Purpose Appendix 17 ESF 17-1 Scope Appendix 17 ESF 17-1 Policies Appendix 17 ESF 17-1 Concept of Operations Appendix 17 ESF 17-2 Responsibilities Appendix 17 ESF 17-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 17 ESF 17-3 Primary Agency Appendix 17 ESF 17-3 Support Agencies Appendix 17 ESF 17-4 Appendix 18, Mass Fatalities Appendix 18 Agencies Appendix 18 ESF 18-1 Purpose Appendix 18 ESF 18-1 Scope Appendix 18 ESF 18-1 Policies Appendix 18 ESF 18-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 18 ESF 18-2 Responsibilities Appendix 18 ESF 18-3 ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency Appendix 18 ESF 18-3 Support Agencies Appendix 18 ESF 18-4 Appendix 19, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering Appendix 19 Agencies Appendix 19 ESF 19-1 Purpose Appendix 19 ESF 19-1 Scope Appendix 19 ESF 19-1 Policies Appendix 19 ESF 19-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 19 ESF 19-2 Organization Appendix 19 ESF 19-3 Responsibilities Appendix 19 ESF 19-3 ESF Coordinator Appendix 19 ESF 19-3 Primary Agency Appendix 19 ESF 19-3 Support Agencies Appendix 19 ESF 19-4 Appendix 20, Military Support Appendix 20 Agencies Appendix 20 ESF 20-1 Purpose Appendix 20 ESF 20-1 Scope Appendix 20 ESF 20-1 Policies Appendix 20 ESF 20-2 Concept of Operations Appendix 20 ESF 20-2 Organization Appendix 20 ESF 20-3 Responsibilities Appendix 20 ESF 20-4 ESF Coordinator Appendix 20 ESF 20-4 Primary Agency Appendix 20 ESF 20-4 Support Agencies Appendix 20 ESF 20-5 COUNTY OF HAWAII PLAN FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS BASE PLAN SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose This Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) has been researched and prepared with the intent to achieve effective governmental and private sector preparedness for prompt, fully coordinated, flexible response to, and effective recovery from natural, technological, and intentional -caused incidents that threaten to, or occur anywhere in Hawai'i County. The EOP defines key National Incident Management System (NIMS) terms, identifies and prioritizes hazards that may impact Hawai'i County, assigns roles and responsibilities for Hawai'i County Departments and Agencies, and establishes Emergency Operations Center (EOC) organization and procedures based on the Kind and Type of Incident impacting Hawai'i County. Actions conducted in response to and mitigation of an incident will follow these priorities; first, preservation of life and physical safety of persons; second, incident stabilization; third, preservation of historical sites, and public and private property. 1.2 Scope The Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is an all hazards plan designed to serve as the basis for prevention, preparedness, response and recovery actions taken to address the hazards identified in Hawai'i County's Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan. This plan is implemented in whole or in part when the normal business routine is not sufficient to address the incident. This EOP is applicable to all Hawai'i County Departments and Agencies and will serve as the basis for department/agency Emergency Response Plans (ERP). This EOP is based on the National Response Framework. It integrates the capabilities and resources of all governmental jurisdictions, incident management and emergency response disciplines, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector into a cohesive team capable of providing coordinated, seamless incident management and response. The EOP can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an incident. Selected implementation allows for a scaled response, delivery of needed resources, and an appropriate level of coordination. The Hawai'i County EOC functions as the Incident Command Post (ICP) when the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency (HCCDA) is the lead agency for an incident and, as either the ICP, or a Multi -agency Coordination Center (MACC) when another Department or Agency is the lead agency for the incident. The EOC provides administrative and informational support to the Joint Information Center (JIC). An incident or national security emergency for the purposes of this plan is defined as a threat of or occurrence of a natural, technological or intentional -caused Type 4 through Type 1 Incident as defined by NIMS. Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Type 5 Incidents which frequently arise in a community that are routinely handled by emergency services such as Police, Fire, Emergency Medical Services, Public Works and Utilities are not within the scope of this plan and should be addressed by each County organization's standard operating guidelines and/or procedures. 1.3 Situation Overview 1.3.1 Emergency/Disaster An emergency is a natural, technological or intentional -caused incident, which seriously threatens the loss of life and/or damage to property. These incidents usually occur suddenly and unexpectedly and require prompt, effective and coordinated response to protect lives and limit damage to property. When the magnitude of the incident results in significant physical damage, loss of life, and/or social disruption, it becomes a disaster. 1.3.2 General Situation The County of Hawaii is the youngest and largest of the Hawaiian Islands and is located at 19 degrees North latitude and 155 degrees West Longitude. The County is approximately 2000 miles (six hour flight time) from the nearest continental land mass and 150 miles (45 minute flight time; twelve hour surface time) from the major population center of Honolulu. This relative isolation from immediate assistance means that during an incident the County and its residents must be prepared to be self-sufficient for not less than seven days during an emergency or disaster. The County of Hawaii is also one of the most geographically diverse locations on earth. Because of its tropical location and height of its mountains ten distinct climate zones are found within the County. This wide range of topography and associated climates means that the likelihood of a specific hazard impacting the Island varies by District and even by specific locations within a District. 1.3.3 Hazards Hazards in Hawai'i County can be classified into three general categories; natural, intentional, and technological. Detailed identification and analysis of probable hazards impacting in Hawai'i County can be found in the Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan: County of Hawai'i, dated October 2005. HCCDA will prepare for each hazard, but will follow the priority listed in table 1.1 when allocating limited resources during each phase of incident management. Hazard Severity Probability Priority Earthquake Catastrophic Highly Likely 1 Tsunami — Distant Catastrophic Likely 2 Tsunami — Local Catastrophic Likely 2 Volcanic Activity Catastrophic Likely 3 Hurricane Catastrophic Likely 4 Droughts/Wildfire Limited Highly Likely 5 Rainfall Flooding Limited Highly Likely 6 Coastal Erosion Critical Likely 7 2 Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan 1.3.3.1 Natural 1.3.3.1.1 Geological Hazards Geological hazards capable of causing disasters generally are less frequent in Hawai'i County, but more difficult to predict than severe weather hazards. They include earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, and volcanic activity. o Earthquakes strong enough to cause extensive damage are an ever-present possibility in Hawai'i County, and have occurred in the past. The existing building code places the entire Island of Hawai'i in "Zone 4," heaviest damage. Large earthquakes, unlike volcanic eruptions, occur without warning and are not confined to a particular part of the island. o Tsunamis, although infrequent, are capable of causing disasters anywhere along the low flood - prone coastal areas and environs where the traveling ocean waves can rush inland at high speeds with devastating force. When generated a tsunami's arrival time can be determined with relative certainty and a warning will be issued by the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center through the County Warning Point. However, a tsunami generated by a strong earthquake occurring locally anywhere in the State may reach the Hawai'i County coastline in a matter of minutes. The earthquake itself must be considered as a tsunami warning. o Volcanic activity happens often in Hawai'i County with loss of property, disruption of routes of travel and occasionally loss of life. The nature of Hawaiian volcanoes is such that the likelihood of an eruption can usually be predicted and once underway, the movement of lava can be monitored so that people may be evacuated from its path. Explosive eruptions are very rare, but have occurred. Dangerous gases are present, but usually in low enough concentrations that they do not present a threat at a reasonable distance from a vent. o Landslides are often triggered by earthquakes, but may also occur during heavy rains. They are also likely where man has disturbed the soil by undercutting or overburdening the natural soil condition. Landslides, regardless of reason, can result in loss of life and property, as well as disrupt communications, travel and utility service. 1.3.3.1.2 Severe Weather Severe weather hazards such as storms, flash floods, tropical cyclones (hurricanes), waterspouts, and drought may threaten and occur in any part of Hawai'i County. o Hurricanes are a warm -core, low pressure system with an organized circulation and without an associated storm front that develop over tropical and subtropical waters. The majority of hurricanes that will threaten Hawaii originate off the West coast of Mexico. o Storms, heavy rains, or deluge. o Flash Floods. Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan o Waterspouts/Tornados. o Drought. 1.3.3.2 Technological Technological hazards may result form natural causes, but they are listed separately because they may also be induced by the actions of man. They can be expected to occur with greater frequency as urbanization, tourism and the economy of the County continue to expand: o Fires o Explosions (including explosive devices and ordnance) o Transportation and industrial accidents o Utility failures o Pollution (including oil spills) o Oil and hazardous substance accidents/incidents o Health (including epidemics, pandemics and infestations) 1.3.3.3 Intentional o Major public disorder and unrest o War o Terrorism, while not likely in terms of probability, warrants attention due to the stunning suddenness of its onset, its high emotional impact, and its ability to instill, as it name implies, terror in the population. Since a terrorist incident will almost always affect multiple jurisdictions, a coordinated response among County, State and Federal authorities through a unified command will be necessary for effective response. o Disruption to the Island's economy. o Trade restrictions or embargoes. M Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan 1.3.4 Vulnerability District Geography Weather Pattern Primary Hazard(s) Puna East rift zone of Kilauea Volcano, Trade winds with Volcano slopping heavily wooded land with low average annual Earthquake coastline rainfall between Tsunami 60 and 160 inches Hurricane H droaen Sulfide S. Hilo Slopes of Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa Trade winds with Tsunami (East rift zone), Wailuku River, heavily average annual Volcano wooded with low coastline rainfall between Hurricane 120 and 240 inches Flooding N. Hilo Slopes of Mauna Kea, major gulches, Trade winds with Earthquake extensive sea cliffs, heavily wooded average annual Landslide rainfall between Flash Flood 30 and 160 inches Hamakua Summit and slopes of Mauna Kea, large Trade winds with Earthquake valleys and gulches, extensive sea cliffs, average annual Landslide heavily wooded shifting to grasslands rainfall between Flashflood 20 and 160 inches Tsunami N. Kohala Slopes of Kohala Mountains, sea cliffs Trade winds with Earthquake and low coastline, scrub brush and average annual Flash Flood grasslands rainfall between Brush Fire 10 and 160 inches S. Kohala Kohala Mountains and slopes of Mauna Strong winds from Earthquake Kea, low coastline, scrub brush and summits with Flash Floods grassland average annual Dam Failure rainfall between Brush Fire 10 and 100 inches Tsunami Winds N. Kona Hualalai Volcano and slopes of Mauna Strong winds from Earthquake Loa, low coastline, scrub brush to summits with Flash Flood heavily wooded average annual Brush Fire rainfall between Volcano 10 and 80 inches Tsunami S. Kona Slopes of Mauna Loa, isolated low Variable winds Earthquake coastline, orchards and heavily wooded with average Flash Floods annual rainfall Landslide between 40 and 80 Brushfire inches Ka'u Summit, slopes and SW rift zone of Strong coastal Volcano Mauna Loa, Slopes and SW rift zone of winds with Earthquake Kilauea, Kaawa Flats, heavily wooded average annual Flash Flood to grasslands and desert rainfall between Hurricane 10 and 120 inches Brush Fire Tsunami Table 1.3 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 1.3.5 Population Distribution Hawai'i County has a low population density; however, there are significant population centers in several districts. The population has grown steadily since 1980 and is expected to continue to increase. Hilo, in South Hilo District, is the largest population center but this area is experiencing the smallest population growth. Puna District's population has increased the largest over the last twenty years and is expected to surpass South Hilo as the most populated district. Table 1.4 1.3.6 Special Needs Population Hawai'i County will use FEMA's definition for Special Needs Population. FEMA defines the Special Needs Population as individuals who require additional response assistance and may include those who have disabilities; who live in institutionalized settings; who are elderly; who are children; who are from diverse cultures, who have limited English proficiency, or who are non-English speaking; or who are transportation disadvantaged. 1.3.6.1 Language According to the 2000 Census 3,227 persons have limited English proficiency (LEP) in Hawai'i County which equates to 2.2% of the population. The LEP population is dispersed throughout Hawai'i County with little significant concentrations in a specific area. The highest concentrations of limited English proficiency are in Keaau with 177 persons or 9% of the population and Pahoa with 114 persons or 12% of the population. Ilocano is the most spoken language other than English (less than 2,000 speakers), but is not concentrated in a specific location. I Po ulation District Year 2010 Year 2020 Largest Concentration Other Significant Concentration Puna 42,591 58,246 Keaau (11,553) Pahoa (10,653) South Hilo 47,477 49,791 Hilo (42,916) Pepeekeo (1,895) North Hilo 1,720 1,879 Laupahoehoe (795) Hamakua 6,561 1 7,328 Honokaa (4,435) Paauilo (1,396) North Kohala 7,917 11,273 Kapaau (2,973) Hawi (2,615) South Kohala 18,184 24,426 Waimea (8,546) Waikoloa (5,269) North Kona 34,024 42,275 Kailua-Kona (25,132) Holualoa (2,956) South Kona 11,414 14,092 Captain Cook (6,617) Kealakekua (2,629) Ka'u 7,050 8,408 Ocean View (2,112) Naalehu (1,930) Total 176,938 217,718 Hilo (42,916) Kailua-Kona (25,132) Table 1.4 1.3.6 Special Needs Population Hawai'i County will use FEMA's definition for Special Needs Population. FEMA defines the Special Needs Population as individuals who require additional response assistance and may include those who have disabilities; who live in institutionalized settings; who are elderly; who are children; who are from diverse cultures, who have limited English proficiency, or who are non-English speaking; or who are transportation disadvantaged. 1.3.6.1 Language According to the 2000 Census 3,227 persons have limited English proficiency (LEP) in Hawai'i County which equates to 2.2% of the population. The LEP population is dispersed throughout Hawai'i County with little significant concentrations in a specific area. The highest concentrations of limited English proficiency are in Keaau with 177 persons or 9% of the population and Pahoa with 114 persons or 12% of the population. Ilocano is the most spoken language other than English (less than 2,000 speakers), but is not concentrated in a specific location. I Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan District Population (2000 Census) Population (2000) Census) Total LEP % LEP Puna 31,335 794 3% South Hilo 47,386 1,206 3% North Hilo 1,720 11 1% Hamakua 6,108 116 2% North Kohala 6,038 82 1% South Kohala 13,131 241 2% North Kona 28,543 396 1% South Kona 8,589 209 2% Kau 5,827 172 3% TOTAL 148,677 3,227 2% 1.3.6.2 Age Approximately 40% of the population is under 18 (24%) or over 60 (16%) according to the 2000 Census. These age groups are fairly evenly distributed throughout the County with the highest percentage of young persons located in Puna and the highest concentration of elderly persons located in South Hilo. District Population (2000) Census) Total < 18 % < 18 60+ %60+ Puna 31,335 8,765 28% 4,000 13% South Hilo 47,386 11,285 24% 9,915 21% North Hilo 1,720 107 6% 137 8% Hamakua 6,108 804 13% 752 12% North Kohala 6,038 712 12% 521 9% South Kohala 13,131 3,574 27% 1,513 12% North Kona 28,543 6,637 23% 4,372 15% South Kona 8,589 1,810 21% 1,368 16% Kau 5,827 1,351 23% 980 17% TOTAL 148,677 35,045 24% 23,558 16% 1.3.6.3 Disabled According to the 2000 Census Hawai'i County has 32,484 disabled persons or 22% of the Hawai'i County population. These disabilities include both mental and physical disabilities. Future plans will have to address the types of disabilities and what resources may be required to support this population during Type 1 through 3 incidents as this is a significant portion of the population. 7 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan District Population (2000) Census) Total Disabled % Disabled Puna 31,335 8,375 27% South Hilo 47,386 11,859 25% North Hilo 1,720 85 5% Hamakua 6,108 1,111 18% North Kohala 6,038 611 10% South Kohala 13,131 1,943 15% North Kona 28,543 5,456 19% South Kona 8,589 1,693 20% Kau 5,827 1,351 23% TOTAL 148,677 32,484 22% 1.4 Assumptions o Identified hazards will occur in Hawai'i County at any time or place, with or without warning, in any degree of severity or magnitude. o Individuals and organizations are familiar with the EOP. o Individuals and organizations will execute their assigned responsibilities. o Executing this EOP will save lives and/or reduce property damage. o Hawai'i County is limited to resources on the Island of Hawai'i for initial response to incidents and may only have access to resources from neighboring Counties for extended response to incidents. As such, support and response priorities must be established based on the most significant needs of Hawai'i County as a whole and these priorities must be effectively communicated to the public and rigidly enforced. o Hawai'i County is not considered a high risk area in the event of war or terrorist attack. SECTION 2: MISSION 2.1 County Mission Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency will plan, prepare for, and when an incident threatens to, or occurs, in Hawai'i County promptly implement a fully coordinated response with measured application of the resources necessary to prevent or minimize loss of life; alleviate suffering; reduce damage and/or destruction to property; provide for public safety, health and welfare; restore disrupted public systems and services; expedite recovery/reconstitution; and implement actions in mitigation. Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan SECTION 3: EXECUTION 3.1 Concept of Operations This EOP is an all hazard plan and addresses type 4 incidents through type 1 incidents. A build-up period will precede some emergencies, providing sufficient time to warn the public and implement prevention measures designed to reduce loss of life, property damage, and effects on the environment. Other emergencies occur with little or no advance warning, thus requiring immediate activation of the EOP, and efficient, coordinated mobilization and deployment of resources. All Hawai'i County departments and agencies must be prepared to promptly and effectively respond to any foreseeable emergency, taking all appropriate actions, including requesting and providing mutual aid. 3.2 Phases of Emergency Management Emergency management has four defined phases. These phases are Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation. Preparedness and mitigation are related activities that are intended to reduce an incident's impact on County residents. We are always conducting preparedness and mitigation activities, so it can be said that we are always in the preparedness phase and in the mitigation phase. The response and recovery phases only happen following an incident. Response and recovery actions may overlap. The four phases are identified by the tasks being done as they can not be clearly defined by a specific time period. 3.2.1 Preparedness The Preparedness Phase involves the range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents. Preparedness is essential for effective response. Preparation includes planning, organizing, equipping, training, exercising, evaluating performance (actual and exercise), and then revising the plan based on changes in performance, organization and equipment. The following activities are emphasized in the preparedness phase. 3.2.1.1 Planning Planning makes it possible to manage the entire life cycle of a potential incident by determining response capability requirements, and assigning responsibilities to departments, agencies, and offices. Planning includes the collection and analysis of intelligence and information, as well as the development of policies, strategies, plans, procedures, mutual aid and assistance agreements, and other arrangements required to perform missions and tasks. Planning also improves effectiveness by clearly defining required capabilities, shortening the time required to gain control of an incident, and facilitating the rapid exchange of information about a situation. Incident response is governed by two plans, the Hawai'i County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan which services as the basis for the second plan which is the Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan. The Hawai'i County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan also serves as the basis for the Hawai'i County General Plan. The mitigation required to develop resilient communities should be incorporated into the General Plan. 9 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 3.2.1.2 Organization The ability to execute response activities includes developing an overall organizational structure and assembling qualified teams for essential response and recovery tasks. During planning, response capabilities are identified. These capabilities are the focus of organization. Effective organization is the combined effects of assigning tasks to specific departments/agencies using the emergency support function format, the department's/agency's careful analysis of the assigned tasks to determine the actions required to complete them, and then assigning responsibility within the department/agency to perform the required actions. 3.2.1.3 Equipping With a clear understanding of the tasks that must be accomplished the equipping phase of preparedness can begin. Jurisdictions must identify the equipment and resources required to exercise a capability and develop strategies to obtain and deploy equipment, supplies, facilities, and systems in sufficient quantities to perform assigned missions and tasks. At this point mutual support agreements required to accomplish the mission or task and a source for the support can be identified and initiated. 3.2.1.4 Training Professionalism and experience are the foundation upon which successful response is built. While it is true that training is a poor substitute for experience, it is far better to trained to do the assigned task(s) and lack experience, than to be inexperienced and untrained. Training is also a key element in developing professionalism. Training for emergency response should focus on tasks that can be applied to multiple incidents as opposed to a specific response to a specific incident. This allows the Incident Commander (IC) to make decisions to effectively resolve the incident based on the situation and his assets' capabilities. Each Hawai'i County Department and Agency is responsible for developing a training plan for their employees in regards to their anticipated tasks during incident response. 3.2.1.5 Exercise Exercises provide opportunities to test plans and improve proficiency in a risk-free environment. Exercises are the natural extension of training and allow departments/agencies to assess and validate proficiency levels, clarify and familiarize personnel to roles and responsibilities. The Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency will develop and administer a multi-year training and Exercise Program called Ho'omakaukau (Make Ready). Ho'omakaukau will provide all County organizations an opportunity to test and evaluate their training and provide a means to train and exercise the decision making processes that will be used during an incident. Ho'omakaukau will serve as the Hawai'i County master exercise plan where all County organizations will have the opportunity to exercise their incident response capabilities through both discussion based and operational based exercises involving multiple departments/agencies. Each Hawai'i County Organization will conduct internal discussion based exercises in coordination with the Incident Response Exercise Plan in preparation for Ho'omakaukau exercises. 10 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 3.2.1.6 Evaluation and Improvement It is pointless to prepare if you do not assess your capabilities/abilities on a periodic basis. This assessment or evaluation is used to determine current status of capabilities/abilities and to revise standard operating procedures or guidelines. The goal is to reach and maintain a level of proficiency sufficient to effectively respond to incidents. We evaluate our capabilities through exercises and then adjust our training and exercise program to maintain or improve our capabilities. 3.2.2 Response Responding to an incident is the deployment of resources to save lives, protect property and the environment, and preserve the social, economic, and political structure of the jurisdiction. Response involves four key actions: (1) gaining and maintaining situational understanding; (2) activating and deploying key resources and capabilities; (3) coordinating response actions; (4) demobilization. 3.2.2.1 Situational Understanding Effective response is not possible until responders understand the situation. If you do not know what the problem is, you can not solve it. Situational understanding is gained through effective information management and knowing what resources are available to address the incident. 3.2.2.2 Activating and Deploying Resources With situational understanding an incident action plan can be developed to resolve the incident. Actions can be prioritized and resources required to accomplish the action can be determined, activated and sent to where they can have the greatest impact. 3.2.2.3 Coordinating Response Actions Coordinated actions are essential to successful response. Because response to Type 1, 2, and 3 Incidents may involve multiple jurisdictions, every jurisdiction's actions should complement the actions of the other jurisdictions otherwise resources may be wasted on duplicated effort and/or actions negated because required follow-up and/or supporting actions are not completed. A unified command is essential to ensure coordinated response actions. 3.2.2.4 Demobilization The job is not finished until the tools are cleaned and put away. Once again situational understanding allows the IC to release assets that are no longer required so they can rest and refit for the next incident or be used in the recovery phase. 3.2.3 Recovery Once immediate lifesaving activities are complete, the focus shifts to assisting individuals, households, critical infrastructure, and businesses in meeting their basic survival needs and eventually returning them 11 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan to self-sufficiency. Recovery operations begin even before incident response is completed. Recovery actions are both short-term and long-term. 3.2.3.1 Short-term Recovery Short-term recovery is immediate and most often will overlap with response. It includes actions such as providing essential public health and safety services, restoring interrupted utility and other essential services, reestablishing transportation routes, and providing food and shelter for those displaced by the incident. Although called "short-term," some of these activities may last for weeks. 3.2.3.2 Long-term Recovery Long-term recovery can last from months to years after the incident. Long-term recovery is focused on restoring the community to pre -incident conditions or better. Long-term recovery should progress based on requirements in both the General Plan and the Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan. The goal of long-term recovery is to develop a more resilient community by taking the opportunity to improve hazard mitigation. 3.2.4 Mitigation Mitigation efforts occur both before and after emergencies or disasters. Post -disaster mitigation is actually part of the recovery process. This includes eliminating or reducing the impact of hazards that exist within Hawaii County. Pre -disaster mitigation involves activities designed to reduce the damaging impact of a disaster should it occur at some future date. Mitigation activities may include: o Amending local ordinances and statutes, such as zoning ordinances, building codes, and other enforcement codes; o Initiating structural retrofitting measures; o Assessing tax levies; o Flood control projects; and o Diminishing fuel in areas having a high potential for wild fires. 3.3 Intelligence Information is the key to effective incident response and mitigation. To fully exploit information one has to: first, know what information is required (Critical Information Requirements, essential elements of information); second, know the source(s) of the information (from which organization and from what location); third, know why the information is critical (determines resource allocation, prioritizes response, and prompts decisions). This information may become relevant information which provides the basis for creating and maintaining the common operating picture, which in turn leads to situational understanding. With situational understanding the IC and the general staff can project the course of incident, anticipate resource requirements, and determine future essential elements of information requirements and critical information requirements. Information management is the tool used to achieve situational understanding. Information management is comprised of information systems and relevant information. Information 12 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan management is the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form in order to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. 3.3.1 Relevant Information (RI) Information is RI if it supports command and control of incident response and if it is accurate, timely, usable, complete, precise, and reliable. The Planning Section must screen all information coming into the EOC and determine what information is RI. RI will then be passed to the Operations Section for analysis. From the Operations and Planning Sections' analysis the common operating picture is developed. 3.3.2 Common Operating Picture (COP) The COP consists primarily of knowledge, which the general staff (primarily Operations and Planning) provides through analysis and evaluation. The IC and Strike Team/Task Force Leaders must use their experience and judgment to develop shared situational understanding from the COP. Shared situational understanding allows commanders to visualize the effects of their decisions on other elements of the response team and the overall operation. This, in turn, facilitates collaborative planning between different departments and agencies regardless of their jurisdiction. 3.3.3 Critical Information Requirements (CIR) CIR is information that is not known but critical to developing the COP and/or required to make decisions on emergency response measures. CIR is determined based on the kind of incident and possible risk affects. CIR serves as the key to trigger emergency messages, facility openings and closures, and mobilization and positioning of assets. All CIR are considered essential elements of information. 3.3.4 Essential Elements of Information (EEI) Essential elements of information are information requirements that fill any gaps or holes in the COP. The volume of information entering the EOC necessitates the need to establish EEI. Once EEI is established, distractions can be filtered out so the IC and General Staff only receive the information necessary to develop an accurate COP and to make the best decisions based on the available relevant information. 3.3.5 Distractions Distractions are any information that the IC does not need in order to manage the incident. Distractions include requests for support that should be captured and passed to the appropriate department/agency for action. 3.4 Scheme of Maneuver Hawai'i County will immediately execute this EOP and apply available resources, as required, to respond to and mitigate the situation when an incident is imminent or occurs within Hawai'i County. Effective response is based on the cumulative affects of preparation, response, and recovery. Preparation is the key. The degree of difficulty in response and recovery is inversely related to the amount of preparation 13 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan preceding the incident. Response is based on the initial quick assessment of the situation. The lead agency will make the initial assessment and determine the incident type and initiate the appropriate level of response. Should Hawai'i County assets be overwhelmed by the response effort, the Mayor may request State resources or Federal Assistance to supplement County capabilities. The incident is not over until recovery is complete. 3.4.1 Emergency Operations Center The Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is located at 920 Ululani Street in Hilo. The full-time Civil Defense Agency staff is billeted at this location. The EOC may serve as either, the incident coordination center (ICC), the incident command post (ICP) and/or the joint information center QIC) during incident response. The EOC will coordinate with other multi -agency coordination entities from other jurisdictions and the State. The EOC does not provide on -scene management but manages the overall event through five key functions: o Direction and control (broad guidance, not tactical — tactical direction and control rests with the IC at the scene. o Situation Assessment o Coordination o Priority Setting o Resource Management 3.4.1.1 Activation Authority EOC activation obligates resources and funds, thus activation should not be done for Type 5 incidents and should be carefully considered before activating for Type 4 incidents. The EOC will be activated for Type 1 through Type 3 Incidents. The following positions have the authority to activate the EOC: o Mayor, County of Hawai'i o Administrator, Civil Defense o On -Call Hawai'i County Civil Defense Personnel 3.4.1.2 Levels of Activation The Type of incident, the amount and source of resources required to effectively respond to the incident, and the EOC function (ICP, vs. ICC) will determine the extent of EOC activation. 14 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 1 Level -1: Full Scale Activation of the HCCDA EOC. All primary and support agencies under the County Emergency Operations Plan are notified. HCCDA EOC will be staffed by HCCDA personnel, all Hawai'i County Departments/Agencies' Liaisons, and volunteers. SCD is notified of activation and deactivation. ZDepartments/Agencies Level -2: Partial Activation of the HCCDA EOC. Only responding to the incident along with HCCDA personnel will staff the EOC. County/State Departments/Agencies and Hawai'i County Administration will be notified of activation. SCD is notified of activation and deactivation. 3 Level -3: Monitoring Activation of the HCCDA EOC. Departments/Agencies responding to an incident may use the EOC facilities and equipment to coordinate response and recovery actions. HCCDA personnel may assist in these actions, but the EOC is not officially activated or staffed. SCD will not be notified for this level of activation. 3.4.1.3 Additional Staffing HCCDA's full time personnel are not sufficient in number to man the EOC for extended periods of time during levels 1 & 2 activation. Continuous operations will require persons familiar with the EOP and EOC procedures to supplement HCCDA personnel. Additional staff who are either County or State employees will be compensated in accordance with HRS 128-15, Status of Regular Government Employees. 3.4.1.3.1 Liaisons Hawai'i County Department/Agency liaisons must have extensive knowledge of their department's/agency's capabilities and limitations as well as their ERP. They must also have the authority to commit/obligate their department's/agency's resources during emergency response. Each Hawai'i County Department/Agency must provide their liaison with a delegation of authority in their continuity of operations plan (COOP). The Liaison should be familiar with EOC standard operating guidelines. In many cases the liaison will not be overwhelmed with their department's/agency's response actions. Because the liaison should be familiar with EOC operations and may have idle time the liaison is an ideal candidate to augment HCCDA personnel in carrying out EOC tasks. EOC tasks do not include maintenance and housekeeping activities. 3.4.1.3.2 County Employees County employees who may be called on to augment HCCDA EOC staff should attend quarterly training sessions at the EOC. This training will be planned and prepared by HCCDA staff and will focus on the EOP, the EOC SOG, and interoperable communications. The training session shall not exceed four hours per quarter and will be held at least twice a quarter. County employees who may be called to augment the HCCDA EOC staff need only attend on training session in a quarter. 15 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 3.4.1.3.2.1 Clerical Pool The Clerical Pool will be used to augment HCCDA EOC staff in accordance with section 6-9.1 of the County Charter. 3.4.1.3.2.2 COOP Identified Nonessential Personnel When a disaster impacts Hawai'i County to the extent that Hawai'i County Departments/Agencies must initiate their COOP, employees who are not identified as essential personnel, who would, other wise, be at home, will be used (provided that they have attended training) to augment HCCDA EOC staff in accordance with Hawaii Revised Statutes. 3.4.1.3.2.3 Volunteers The EOC is not the ideal environment for volunteers during an incident. Persons interested in volunteering services during an incident should get involved with the Citizen's Corps or other volunteer organizations such as The American Red Cross before the onset of an incident. By getting involved before the need for their services is acute, interested parties can receive the training necessary to be an asset to their community during a disaster. 3.4.2 Emergency Declarations An emergency declaration is not necessary for HCCDA or first responders to take actions to protect and preserve life, protect property, or alleviate suffering caused by an incident. 3.4.2.1 Civil Defense Emergency Period The Governor of the State of Hawai'i is the only person who can make a declaration of a civil defense emergency period and the only person who can declare that a civil defense emergency period has ended. Provisions under section 128-8 of the Hawai'i Revised Statute may be enacted during a civil defense emergency period. A civil defense emergency period will typically only be declared for intentional hazards. 3.4.2.2 State of Emergency The Mayor of Hawai'i County can declare a state of emergency for Hawai'i County, but the state of emergency does not allow activation of the provisions under section 128-8 of the Hawai'i Revised Statute. 3.4.3 Emergency Ordinances The County Council may adopt emergency ordinances to address public emergencies affecting life, health, and property under section 3-11 of the County Charter. Any ordinance adopted under this section is only valid for 60 days from the date of adoption. 16 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 3.5 Unified Command Incident response within Hawai'i County will often require a unified command structure due to many different Federal, State and County Jurisdictions that reside within a relatively small area which in turn is isolated from immediate assistance beyond what is currently available on island. The incident commander should always be provided by the Department/Agency with primary responsibility for the incident. The command structure is dependant on the Type of incident. Annex B, Direction, Control & Coordination provides specific information about which Department/Agency should provide personnel to incident response positions. 3.6 Organization and Responsibilities 3.6.1 County Departments/Agencies and Federal and State Agencies in Residence The Hawai'i County disaster response organization conforms to the governmental structure set forth in the County Charter. District offices or branches of State departments and agencies may be directly integrated into the ICS incident response structure or integrated as part of an area or unified command. (Refer to Annex H, Hawai'i County Emergency Support Functions.) Incident Lead Agency Incident Lead Agency Incident Lead Agency Earthquake HCCDA Landslide DLNR Pollution DoH Volcanic Activity HCCDA Coastal Erosion DLNR Hazardous Material HFD Tsunami HCCDA Fire HFD Public Health DoH Hurricane HCCDA Explosion HFD Public Disorder HPD Drought Dept of Water Transportation MTA Terrorism HPD Wild Fire HFD Industrial HFD War SCD Flooding HCCDA Utilities Water Supply Plane Crash HFD 3.7 3.6.2 Volunteer Organizations Because Hawai'i County has finite resources, is situated in relative isolation, and has limited modes of access into the County, we can expect our incident response to be limited to the resources currently on - island for a period of seven to ten days before external assistance can arrive. Citizens who get involved with a volunteer organization before an incident/emergency/disaster may receive the training required to be an asset to their community, the knowledge of what hazards may impact them and what the plan is to deal with the specific hazard and its associated risks, and the knowledge required to properly prepare their families and community to be self sufficient during the initial stages of an incident/emergency/disaster. HCCDA will seek ways to integrate volunteer organizations that have trained, and if required certified, personnel into emergency response and/or recovery operations to meet identified personnel/capability shortfalls identified during assessment of our ability to respond to Kinds and Types of incidents. All Volunteer Organizations shall follow the Incident Command system. 17 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 3.6.2.1 American Red Cross The Hawai'i State Chapter of the American Red Cross operating under Federal Charter is responsible for meeting the emergency needs of disaster victims and coordinating with County and State Civil Defense, Federal, and non-governmental agencies. The American Red Cross also provides preliminary residential damage assessment data to the HCCDA. 3.6.2.2 Citizens Corps (CC) Citizen Corps, a vital component of USA Freedom Corps, was created to help coordinate volunteer activities to make our communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to any emergency situation. It provides opportunities for people to participate in a range of measures to make their families, their homes, and their communities safer from the threats of crime, terrorism, and disasters of all kinds. Citizen Corps programs build on the successful efforts that are in place in many communities around the country to prevent crime and respond to emergencies. Programs that started through local innovation are the foundation for Citizen Corps and this national approach to citizen participation in community safety. Citizen Corps is coordinated nationally by the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, DHS works closely with other federal entities, state and local governments, first responders and emergency managers, the volunteer community, and the White House Office of the USA Freedom Corps. 3.6.2.2.1 Neighborhood Watch USAonWatch-Neighborhood Watch works to provide information, training and resources to citizens and law enforcement agencies throughout the country. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Neighborhood Watch programs have expanded beyond their traditional crime prevention role to help neighborhoods focus on disaster preparedness, emergency response and terrorism awareness. USAonWatch- Neighborhood Watch is administered by the National Sheriffs' Association in partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice. The Hawai'i County Police Department administers the Neighborhood Watch program and will serve as the primary point of contact of Neighborhood Watch chapters during incident response. 3.6.2.2.2 Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) The CERT Program educates people about disaster preparedness and trains them in basic disaster response skills, such as fire safety, light search and rescue, and disaster medical operations. Using their training, CERT members can assist others in their neighborhood or workplace following an event and can take a more active role in preparing their community. The program is presently funded by DHS and administered by the Citizens Corps. Because CERT Teams and CERT trained individuals can only perform actions that they are CERT trained and certified to perform within their neighborhood, CERT Teams should focus their efforts on emergency preparedness within their respective neighborhood. CERT Teams will not respond to any incident unless under the direction of an on -scene incident commander designated by the HFD, HPD, ARC, or HCCDA. Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 3.6.2.2.3 Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) The MRC strengthens communities by helping medical, public health and other volunteers offer their expertise throughout the year as well as during local emergencies and other times of community need. MRC volunteers work in coordination with existing local emergency response programs and also supplement existing community public health initiatives, such as outreach and prevention, immunization programs, blood drives, case management, care planning, and other efforts. The MRC program is administered by HHS. The Department of Health District Office for Hawai'i County will administer and activate the MRC as required based on their assessment. 3.6.2.3 Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) is the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cyclepreparation, response and recovery—to help disaster survivors and their communities. VOAD will play a large role in the recovery phase of emergency management. VOAD members must maintain an updated continuity of operations plan (COOP) to ensure that they will be capable of providing assistance when required. VOAD efforts will be coordinated through the EOC and will be focused on community recovery that is in-line with the General Plan and the Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan. 3.7 Coordinating Instructions 3.7.1 Departments and Agencies within Hawai'i County and the State of Hawai'i with roles and responsibilities identified in this EOP. o Will develop and maintain a department/agency-specific ERP, detailed Standard Operating Guides (SOG), and/or checklists based on and consistent with this plan. These documents must reflect actual capabilities, delineate responsibility for incident response and recovery, fix accountability for response and recovery activities, and clarify agency coordination under emergency conditions for both peace and war. Provide a copy (electronic or hard copy) of this plan and any subsequent updates to HCCDA. The ERP will be reviewed and updated on an annual basis o Develop a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) that includes: Essential Functions Delegations of Authority Succession Planning Alternate Facilities Interoperable Communications Vital Records and databases Human Capital A Test, Training, and Exercise Program Plans for Devolution and Reconstruction 19 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o Send a liaison to the EOC if a primary or a supporting agency for a specific incident or ESF when notified that the EOC has been activated or that their ESF has been activated. o Designate a civil defense coordinator who shall have the authority to speak on behalf of the County department, agency or office (or equivalent for each State district or branch office). The civil defense coordinator should be responsible for maintaining the organization's emergency response plan and represent the organization at Ho'omakaukau planning conferences. o Develop, update and implement memorandums of agreement (MOA) or mutual assistance (MMA) with government agencies and private organizations that your organization must cooperate with during emergency response and recovery. o Integrate this plan, along with all other County emergency planning and preparedness documents, into day-to-day operations and planning (both short and long term). o Program and budget essential man-hour and resource costs of planning, training for and exercising their roles and responsibilities within this EOP and their associated ERP. 3.7.2 Specific instructions 3.7.2.1 Hawai'i County The Hawai'i County Government is vested with the responsibility for emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation. o Alert its civil defense organization and activates the EOC as soon as such action is determined prudent, or when requested by State Civil Defense. o Perform basic emergency functions which include without limitation: warning, evacuation, police, fire, rescue and ambulance services, mass care, and sanitation services, public works, radiological protection, and any other service required to meet the public need. o Use local resources, both public and private, to respond to any type incident. When local resources are exhausted or determined to be inadequate, Hawai'i County will request State assistance. The State will then take appropriate action in support of Hawai'i County. (See State of Hawai'i Plan for Emergency Preparedness, Volume 111, Disaster Response Assistance.) o Enact and enforce ordinances, zoning codes, and building codes that are designed to prevent or mitigate the effects of incidents. 3.7.2.2 County Departments and Agencies and State District and Branch Offices All Hawai'i County departments, agencies, committees and councils, as well as State district and branch offices, have incident responsibilities both in peace and war in accordance with their statutory authority, functions, resources and capabilities. These responsibilities are listed in Annex H, Emergency Support 20 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Functions, and the Emergency Support Function Annex to Volume III The State Plan for Emergency Preparedness Disaster Response and Assistance. 3.7.2.3 State Departments and Agencies All State Departments and agencies are responsible for providing disaster support and assistance to Hawai'i County and persons present in Hawai'i County during an incident in accordance with the Hawai'i Catastrophic Plan and its associated emergency support function annex. Support and assistance will be provided in accordance with this Plan and will be responsive in times of disaster—man made or natural, peace or war—to the State Deputy Director of Civil Defense. 3.7.2.4 Federal Agencies o The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through Region IX, is responsible for civil defense and disaster assistance in peacetime emergencies under Section 804 of Public Law 94-361 and Public Law 94-363. Further, it directs and coordinates the activities of all Federal agencies engaged in providing disaster assistance under Public Law 93-288. o The Army, Navy, and Air Force provide military resources and support disaster relief organizations in both war and peace under Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3025.1 (Military Support to Civil Authorities, dated January 15, 1993); DOD Directive 3025.12 (Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, dated February 4, 1994); and DOD Directive 3025.15 (Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, dated February 18, 1997). o Other Federal agencies with offices in the State of Hawai'i have disaster assistance responsibilities delegated to them by their separate statutory authorities. 3.7.2.5 Other Supporting Organizations o Seventh -day Adventists, Salvation Army and other community and professional organizations provide voluntary assistance as able. 3.7.2.6 Cooperating Agencies Cooperating Agencies include all businesses and non-governmental organizations, whether or not they are an official member of VOAD, which may provide assistance during any phase of emergency management. Cooperating Agencies should coordinate their activities through HCCDA in the preparation phase of emergency management, but they will not be turned away during the response and recovery phases of emergency management if they have not previously coordinated their actions. Cooperating Agencies will not be asked to take any action that is not consistent with the General Plan or the Multi - Hazard Mitigation Plan. Cooperating Agencies that have an existing contingency contract for emergency response and/or recovery will receive the first opportunity to fulfill the requirements of the contract before additional resources are contracted. 21 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Cooperating Agencies with assigned responsibilities under this plan are obligated to inform the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency when organizational or operational changes occur or are imminent within their organization. Changes or proposed changes will be submitted in writing to the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency. Changes will be published and distributed to Hawai'i County Departments affected by the change. The County of Hawai'i does not claim, nor infer, any right in stating how any Cooperating Agency is organized or how it conducts its own business. The County of Hawai'i does claim the right to know whether a Cooperating Agency retains the capability to accomplish a task that they have agreed to do during emergency response and/or recovery. There is no existing penalty, nor implied penalty, for a Cooperating Agency that is no longer able to, or willing to, accomplish a task which they have previously agreed to do during emergency response or recovery operations. 3.7.2.7 County Residents The success or failure of emergency preparedness and response in Hawai'i County ultimately depends on community self-help programs. Community action organized to plan and to carry out protective measures and relief services based on detailed knowledge of local environment, needs and capabilities is best provided by the community's civic, business and professional organizations. All residents are encouraged to become a member of one of the Citizen's Corps organizations or to volunteer with a local non- governmental organization before a disaster strikes their community. All residents should develop a family emergency readiness plan and be prepared to sustain themselves for at least seven to ten days in the event of a large disaster. Emergency response will be able to focus on residents who are directly impacted by the disaster if residents who are not directly impacted by the disaster are prepared and self-sufficient for seven to ten days. 3.7.2.8 Tourism Industry Tourism is the primary economic vehicle for Hawai'i County. The nature of the business involves bringing numerous persons to this island that are not familiar with the hazards they may face during their visit and who are completely ignorant of Hawai'i County emergency response procedures. Based on these facts, it is incumbent that the tourism industry work with HCCDA to first, provide basic information to their guests and second, to coordinate their emergency response plans with Hawai'i County's plans to eliminate duplication of effort, multiple jurisdictions planning to use a single resource (thus exceeding its capacity/capability), and to ensure the safety of their guests without placing undue hardship on Hawai'i County residents. Businesses in the tourism industry should develop and maintain a continuity of operations plan so that they are able to fulfill their obligations to their guests. 3.7.2.9 Industry Industry will be essential to recovery should a disaster impact Hawai'i County. Industry will have a duel role in recovery. The first role is being a source of equipment and resources that may be used in recovery and mitigation actions. The second role is that of economic recovery through the continued employment of residents. To accomplish these roles Industry must develop and exercise continuity of operations plans (COOP). Industry must consider how to protect their assets (especially if they are located in an area 22 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan subject to a single or multiple hazards such as the tsunami evacuation zone) and coordinate how they will accomplish this with HCCDA and first responders. They must also consider how they can refocus their operations to meet community requirements during the recovery phase. 3.7.2.10 Businesses Businesses both large and small will also be essential to recovery should a disaster impact Hawai'i County. Businesses may be called on to provide equipment and/or resources during the recovery phase, but the primary focus of business should be on continuity of operations. This requires a plan to protect assets and inventory, so normal business operations can resume in the shortest amount of time possible. Businesses should also consider the need for their product in the recovery phase. If their product will not have a high demand during recovery, a temporary shift of operations into a high demand commodity should be considered. Businesses with goods and services that will be in high demand during response and recovery phases of an incident should participate with the County of Hawai'i in preparing contingency contracts for their goods and services during the prevention phase of emergency management. 3.8 Interoperable Communications One of the most consistent comments following an incident response is the need for timely, accurate uninterrupted communication. Interoperable communications includes the ability to communicate internally with your department/agency and externally with other organizations involved in incident response. To make interoperable communications reality HCCDA and incident responding departments/agencies should coordinate procurement of systems and equipment in accordance with the Hawaii Regional Zone Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan. A coordinated approached to communications will lead to departments/agencies having the equipment they require for internal communications that is also compatible with other incident responding departments/agencies. All communication traffic during incident response must be in plain English to reduce the possibility of miscommunication. SECTION 4: ADMINISTRATION, FINANCE, AND LOGISTICS 4.1 Administration 4.1.1 General Support Requirements HCCDA will provide limited administrative and logistical support to all persons working in the EOC during all phases of emergency management. HCCDA will provide access to the County network (liaisons, volunteers, etc. must provide their own computer), printers with paper, telephone and facsimile, and basic office supplies during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. HCCDA will provide food and beverages to persons manning the EOC during incident response. Persons manning the EOC will also have access to the full service kitchen located in the EOC. 23 Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan 4.1.2 Liability 4.1.2.1 County/State Employees Except for cases of willful misconduct, persons engaged in civil defense functions pursuant to Chapter 128 HRS shall not be civilly liable for the death or injury to persons, or property damage as the result of any act or omission in the course of employment or duties. 4.1.2.2 Volunteers Volunteers, such as American Red Cross and Citizens Corps, whose services have been accepted by an authorized person to perform tasks under HRS Chapter 128 shall have the same immunity as County/State Employees. 4.1.2.3 Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel DOD personnel, to Include Hawaii National Guard Personnel, on any duty or service done under or in pursuance of an order or call of the President of the United States or any proper authority to assist civil authorities engaged in civil defense functions pursuant to HRS Chapter128 shall not be liable, civilly or criminally, for any act done or caused by them in pursuance of duty in service. 128-18(c) HRS. 4.2 Finance All incident response activities will be funded by the department/agency providing the resource. Departments/Agencies should keep an accurate record of expenses related to each specific incident response. This record will serve as the basis for reimbursement of expenses should they be available from any source. Specific criteria for reimbursement of expenses will be determined based on the source of the funds and the amount of funds made available. If the Type incident and the level of response required warrant, the County Council may enact supplemental and/or emergency appropriations per section 10-8 of the County Charter. 4.3 Logistics 4.3.1 Resource Management Policies All equipment, supplies, and personnel responding to an incident will fall under operational control (OPCON) of the IC. This means that the IC (who is assigned by the primary agency with jurisdiction over the incident as stated in this plan) will direct all response actions at the incident regardless of which jurisdiction is providing the equipment, supplies, or personnel. The Department/Agency providing the equipment, supplies, and personnel remains responsible for administrative tasks associated with their equipment, supplies, and personnel and should record all expenses per paragraph 4.2, Finance. 24 Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan 4.3.2 Resource Availability 4.3.2.1 Department/Agency with Jurisdiction over the Incident Equipment identified during the capabilities assessment will be considered available for incident response. The Department/Agency with jurisdiction over the area and responsibility for the Kind of incident will provide the resources required for incident response. Mutual aid agreements will be initiated when the department's/agency's assets are not sufficient to effectively respond to the incident. 4.3.2.2 Mutual Aid Agreements All Departments and Agencies that may play a role in responding to an incident must enter into Mutual Aid Agreements with other departments and/or agencies that are responsible for the Kind of incident in a different jurisdiction or that have capabilities that can enhance the incident response. These agreements must specify the type of aid that will be provided, the conditions under which the aid will be provided, any constraints or restrictions associated with the aid provided, remuneration, if applicable, associated with the aid provided, and who is authorized to request mutual aid and who is authorized to accept mutual aid within each organization 4.3.3 Personnel Response personnel will be provided by the department/agency with jurisdiction over the incident. The number of personnel available must be considered in regards to the incident Type and the duration of the incident response. Identified shortfalls in personnel may be addressed through volunteer organizations that are trained in the tasks that exceed the department's/agency's capabilities, the department's/agency's COOP, and mutual aid agreements. 4.3.4 Supplies Departments/Agencies should capture the amount of supplies by type expended for incident response. This serves three purposes: first, it will help project an accurate budget based on historical expenditures; second, it will facilitate reimbursement should funds be made available by the State of Hawaii or FEMA; third, it will assist in determining stockpile levels for supplies during the prevention phase of emergency management. 4.3.4.1 Existing Stocks Departments/Agencies that maintain operational supplies which may also be expended during incident response should maintain an additional stockage level of duel use supplies capable of sustaining incident response for at least ten days when responding to a Type 1 incident for all items that are not readily available from local sources. A contingency contract should be put in place for those supplies that are readily available from local sources. 25 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 4.3.4.2 Contingency Contracts The Purchasing Division of the Hawai'i County Finance Department will negotiate and maintain contingency contracts for goods and services, that responding agencies have identified as a requirement for incident response, that are readily available from local vendors. Contingency contracts will follow established procurement guidelines and will only be for goods and/or services that will be required for emergency response and/or short-term recovery. 4.3.4.3 Donated Goods HCCDA will only accept donated goods from philanthropic persons/organizations if a need for the donated good has been identified during initial and/or subsequent damage assessments and then placed on the list of requested donations. This is a necessary action to prevent the limited logistics capabilities in Hawai'i County from being burdened with supplies that have no application to incident response efforts. This will also save donating organizations the shipping expense of sending something that will not have a positive impact on incident response and mitigation. SECTION 5: AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES 5.1 Authorities The listed documents provide emergency authorities for conducting and/or supporting incident response: 5.1.1 Federal o National Strategy for Homeland Security. o Homeland Security Act of 2002. o Homeland Security Presidential Directive -5 (HSPD-5) "Management of Domestic Incidents" o Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Public Law 920, as amended). o Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (Public Law 93-288, as amended). o Army Corps of Engineers Flood Fighting (Public Law 84-99). o Federal Communications Corporation. 5.1.2 State o Governor's Administrative Directive No. 95-02, Civil Defense Policy. o Governor's Administrative Directive No. 90-13 State of Hawai'i Plan for Emergency Preparedness. 26 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o State of Hawai'i Plan for Emergency Preparedness, Volume 1, Operational Civil Defense. o Chapter 127, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS), Disaster Relief Act. o Chapter 128, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS), Civil Defense and Emergency Act. 5.1.3 Local o County of Hawai'i Charter, 2008 o The Hawai'i County Code, Chapter 7, 1983 (Revised and Republished 2005). o Resolution 95-206, adopting the Operational Area Agreement, August 15, 1995. o Hawai'i County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan, 29 June 2005. 5.2 Extent and Limits on Emergency Authority This EOP does not expand on any emergency powers or authorities expressed in Federal, State, or County Laws/Ordinances, nor does it imply or infer any emergency powers or authorities other than those expressed in Federal, State, and County Laws/Ordinances. Individual departments and agencies will identify their internal emergency authority during the response and short-term recovery phases of emergency management in their ERP and/or COOP. 5.3 Pre -Delegation of Emergency Authorities This EOP and the individual departments and agencies ERPs that support this Plan serve as the pre - delegation documents for emergency authorities. All Hawai'i County organizations should have established delegations of authority in the COOP plans. 5.4 Authority to Accept Volunteers' Services The formal acceptance of a volunteer's service should only be done when no other means of providing the service is available as accepting their service places obligations on the County should the volunteer be injured or become ill while participating in incident response. For Type 1 through Type 3 incidents HCCDA will authorize responding organizations to accept volunteers' services on a case by case basis. For Type 4 and Type 5 incidents the first responder agency in charge of the response has the authority to accept volunteer services. 5.5 Continuity of Government Each Hawai'i County Department and Agency must be able to provide essential services during the phases of an incident. The Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) is the means by which essential services will be provided to the public. Each Hawai'i County Department and Agency must develop a COOP. HCCDA is responsible for reviewing each COOP for completeness and feasibility in relation to the other 27 Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan COOPs. HCCDA will also suggest assignments and/or tasks for persons not identified as essential personnel in their department's/agency's COOP. 5.6 Plan Maintenance This plan will be reviewed and updated in accordance with section 7-3, Deputy Director Duties, of the County Code. Specific portions of the plan will be exercised throughout the year under the County multi- year training and exercise program, Ho'omakaukau. The after action reports from these exercises will serve as the basis for amended this plan. The after action reports from actual incidents will also be used to revise and update this plan. W. Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan SECTION 1: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS The listed abbreviations and acronyms are used in this document. AAR After Action Report ACP Area Command Post ACWS 169th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron ARC American Red Cross CAP Civil Air Patrol CC Citizens Corps CERT Community Emergency Response Team Cl/KR Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources CIR Critical Information Requirements COP Common Operating Picture COOP Continuity of Operations Plan DCC Donation Coordination Center DLNR Department of Land and Natural Resources DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team DMORT Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team DOE Department of Education DOFAW Division of Forestry and Wildlife DOH Department of Health DOMS Director of Operations and Military Support DPW Department of Public Works EAS Emergency Alert System EC Energy Council EEI Essential Elements of Information EMEDS Expeditionary Medical Support EMP Electromagnetic Pulse EOC Emergency Operations Center EOP Emergency Operations Plan ERC Emergency Response Coordinator ERP Emergency Response Plan ESF Emergency Support Function FCO Federal Coordinating Officer FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FIA Federal Insurance Administration FMAG Fire Management Assistance Grant GEEPAC Governor's Energy Emergency Preparedness Committee HAWAS Hawai'i Warning and Alert System HCCDA Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency HFD Hawai'i Fire Department HPD Hawai'i Police Department HMC Hazard Mitigation Coordinator HRS Hawai'i Revised Statutes HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive A-1 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan IAP Incident Action Plan ICC Incident Coordination Center ICP Incident Command Post ICS Incident Command System JFO Joint Field Office JIC Joint Information Center JIS Joint Information System JSOP Joint Standing Operating Procedures MACC Multi -Agency Coordination Center MACS Multi -Agency Coordination System MHMP Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan MOA Memorandum of Agreement MMA Memorandum of Mutual Assistance MRC Medical Reserve Corps MTA Mass Transit Agency NDAA Natural Disaster Assistance Act NGO Non-governmental Organization NICC National Interagency Coordination Center NIMS National Incident Management System OPCON Operational Control P&R Department of Parks and Recreation PIO Public Information Officer POD Point of Distribution RI Relevant Information RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center RSA Resource Staging Area NRF National Response Framework SCD State Civil Defense SERT State Emergency Response Team SFO State Field Office SHMC State Hazard Mitigation Coordinator SMC Shortage Management Center SOG Standing Operating Guideline SOP Standing Operating Procedure SPF State Protection Forester VOAD Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster VMAT Veterinarian Medical Assistance Team A-2 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan SECTION 2 NIMS TERMS AND DEFINITIONS o Assistant — Support person for an officer. o Base — The location at which primary logistics functions for an incident are coordinated and administered. There is only one base per incident. o Branch — Organizational level within the operations section having functional, geographical, or jurisdictional responsibility for major parts of the incident operations. A branch may have sub -elements of divisions or groups. Branches are identified by the use of Roman Numerals, by function, or jurisdictional name. o Camp — A geographical site, within the general incident area, separate form the incident base, equipped and staffed to provide sleeping, food, water, and sanitary services to incident personnel. o Check-in — The process whereby resources first report to an incident. o Chief — Leader of a general staff section (operations, planning, logistics, finance/administration). o Clear Text — The use of plain English in radio communications transmissions. No ten codes or agency -specific codes are used when using clear text. o Deputy — Support person for incident commander, section or branch. o Director — Leader of a branch. o Emergency Operations Center (EOC) — The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally takes place. o Division — Sub -element of a branch that is responsible for operations within a defined geographic area. Divisions may have strike teams, task forces, and/or single resources as sub -elements. o Event —A planned, non -emergency activity. ICS can be used as the management system for a wide range of events, e.g., parades, concerts, or sporting events. o Finance/Administration Section — The ICS section that tracks response personnel and captures all costs associated with incident management. This section may assistance with loans and grants during recovery. o Group — Sub -element of a branch that divides the operations section into functional areas. Groups may have strike teams, task forces, and/or single resources as sub -elements. A-3 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o Hazard — Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome. o Incident — An occurrence or event, natural or human -caused, that requires an emergency response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, wild -land and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials, spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, war -related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response. o Incident Action Plan (IAP) — An oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing and incident. It may include the identification of operational resources and assignments. It may also include attachments that provide direction and important information for management of the incident during one or more operational period. o Incident Commander (IC) — The individual responsible for all incident activities. This person will come from the department or agency that has the primary responsible for the incident (for example, Hawai'i County Fire Department will provide the IC for a brush fire). o Incident Command Post (ICP) — The field location at which the primary tactical - level, on -scene incident command functions are performed. The ICP may be collocated with the incident base or other incident facilities and is normally identified by a green rotating or flashing light. o Incident Command System (ICS) — A standardized on -scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. It is used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents. ICS is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, to organize field -level incident management operations. o Incident Objectives — Statements of guidance and direction necessary for the selection of appropriate strategy(ies), and the tactical direction of resources. Incident objectives are based on realistic expectations of what can be accomplished when all allocated resources have been effectively deployed. Incident objectives must be achievable and measurable, yet flexible enough to allow for strategic and tactical alternatives. ME Annex A, National Incident Management System (NEWS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o Joint Information Center (JIC) — a facility established to coordinate all incident - related public information activities. It is the central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the incident. Public information officials form all participating agencies should collocate at the JIC. o Jurisdiction —A range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to their legal responsibilities and authority. Jurisdictional authority at an incident can be political, geographical, or functional. o Leader — Leader of a unit, strike team or task force. o Liaison — a person from an agency responding to the incident who serves as the agency's subject matter expert in the EOC. This person also serves as the communication link between the responding agency and incident commander. o Liaison Officer — A member of the Command Staff responsible for coordinating with representatives from cooperating and assisting agencies. o Logistics Section — The ICS section that provides logistics and transportation support to incident responders. o Manager — Support person for a unit leader. o National Incident Management System (NIMS) — A system mandated by HSPD-5 that provides a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments; the private sector; and non-governmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local capabilities, NEWS includes a core set of concepts, principles, and terminology. HSPD-5 identifies these as the ICS; multi -agency coordination systems; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualification and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. o Officer — Leader of a command staff section. o Operational Period — The period of time scheduled for execution of a given set of operation actions as specified in the IAP. Operational Periods can be various lengths, although usually not over 24 hours. o Operations Section — The ICS section responsible for all tactical operations during incident response phase. o Planning Section — The ICS section that documents incident response and prepares the IAP for each operational period. A-5 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o Public Information Officer — A member of the Command Staff responsible for interfacing with the public and media or with other agencies with incident -related information requirements. o Resource —Personnel and major items of equipment, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment to incident operations and form which status is maintained. Resources are described by kind and type and may be used in operational support or supervisory capacities at an incident or at an EOC. o Resource, Allocated — Resource dispatched to an incident. o Resource, Assigned — Resource checked in and assigned work tasks on a incident. o Resource, Available — Resource assigned to an incident, checked in, and available for a mission assignment, normally located in a staging area. o Resource, Kind — Describes what the resource is (for example: medic, firefighter, helicopter, bulldozer, etc.) o Resources Type — Describes the size, capability, and staffing qualifications of a specific kind of resource. (USE NIMS Resource Typing Definitions). o Safety Officer — A member of the Command Staff responsible for monitoring and assessing safety hazards or unsafe situations, and for developing measures for ensuring personnel safety. o Segment — A geographical area in which a Task Force/Strike Team Leader or Supervisor of a single resource is assigned authority and responsibility for the coordination of resources and implementation of planned tactics. A segment may be a portion of a division or an area inside or outside the perimeter of an incident. Segments are identified with Arabic numbers. o Single Resource — An individual piece of equipment and its personnel complement, or an established crew or team of individuals with an identified work supervisor. o Single Source Boss — Support person for a strike team or task force leader. o Span of Control — The number of individuals a supervisor is responsible for, usually expressed as the ratio of supervisors to individuals. Under NIMS, an appropriate span of control is between 1:3 and 1:7 supervisors to individuals. o Staging Area — The area where equipment and teams wait for a tactical assignment. E Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o Strategy— The general direction selected to accomplish incident objectives set by the IC. o Strike Team — Specified combinations of the same kind and type of resources with common communications that reports to a single leader. o Supervisor — Leader of a division or group. o Tactics — Deploying and directing resources on an incident to accomplish incident strategy and objectives. o Task Force — A group of different kinds and/or types of resources with common communications that reports to a single leader. Task forces may be pre- established and sent to an incident, or formed at an incident. o Team — A team is a single resource. o Unit — A sub -element of a section (Planning, Logistics, Finance/Administration), or branch with functional responsibility for a specific incident planning, logistics, or finance activity. o Unified Command — An application of ICS used when there is more that one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. It enables all responding agencies to manage an incident together by establishing a common set of objectives and strategies. o Unity of Command — Each individual involved in incident operations receives instructions from and reports to only one supervisor. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every obj ective. INCIDENT TYPING Incidents are categorized into five types based on complexity, life -span, and response sources. Type 1 Incident A Type 1 incident is the most complex incident. o May result in a disaster declaration. o Duration covers multiple operational periods. o A written Incident Action Plan is required for each operational period. A-7 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o High impact on local jurisdiction. o All Command and General Staff positions are activated. o Requires national resources to effectively resolve the incident. o Operations personnel exceed 200 personnel per operational period; total personnel exceed 500 persons. o HCDA EOC is activated. Type 2 Incident o Duration covers multiple operational periods. o A written Incident Action Plan is required for each operational period. o Most Command and General Staff positions are filled. o Requires regional and/or national resources to effectively resolve the incident. o Operations personnel do not exceed 200 personnel per operational period; total personnel does not exceed 500 persons. o HCDA EOC is activated. Type 3 Incident o Duration may cover multiple operational periods. o A written Incident Action Plan may be required. o Some Command and General Staff positions are filled (all may be filled). o Resources located within Hawai'i County are adequate to effectively resolve the incident. o Operations personnel do not exceed 100 personnel per operational period; total personnel does not exceed 200 persons. o HCDA EOC is activated. Type 4 Incident o Duration does not exceed one operational period. Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o A written Incident Action Plan is not required. o Command and General Staff positions are filled if needed. o Several single resources are required to effectively resolve the incident. o HCDA EOC may be activated. Type 5 Incident Type 5 Incidents which frequently arise in a community are handled routinely by normal emergency services such as Police, Fire, Emergency Medical Service, Public Works and Utilities are not within the scope of this plan and should be addressed by each department and/or agency's standard operating procedures. o Duration may last several hours. o Command and General Staff Positions not activated o One or two single resources are sufficient to effectively resolve the incident. o HCDA EOC is not activated. Emergency Management Phases Emergency management activities during peacetime and national security emergencies are associated with four defined phases: o Preparedness o Response o Recovery o Mitigation Preparedness Phase The Preparedness Phase involves the range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is essential for effective response. Preparation includes planning, organizing, equipping, training, exercising, evaluating performance (actual and exercise), and then revising the plan based on changes in performance, organization and equipment. The following activities are emphasized in the preparedness phase. Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Planning Planning makes it possible to manage the entire life cycle of a potential incident, determine capability requirements, and responsibilities to departments, agencies, and organizations. Planning includes the collection and analysis of intelligence and information, as well as the development of policies, plans, procedures, mutual aid and assistance agreements, strategies, and other arrangements to perform missions and tasks. Planning also improves effectiveness by clearly defining required capabilities, shortening the time required to gain control of an incident, and facilitating the rapid exchange of information about a situation. Organization The ability to execute response activities includes developing an overall organizational structure and assembling qualified teams for essential response and recovery tasks. Effective organization is the result of assigning tasks to specific departments/agencies, their careful analysis of the assigned tasks, determining required actions to complete the assigned tasks, and then assigning responsibility within the department/agency to perform the required actions. Equipping With a clear understanding of the tasks that must be accomplished the equipping phase of preparedness can begin. Jurisdictions must identify and have strategies to obtain and deploy major equipment, supplies, facilities, and systems in sufficient quantities to perform assigned missions and tasks. At this point mutual support agreements required to accomplish the mission or task and a source for the support can be identified and initiated. Training Professionalism and experience are the foundation upon which successful response is built. While it is true that training is a poor substitute for experience, it is far better to trained to do the assigned task(s) and lack experience, than to be inexperienced and untrained. Training is also a key element in developing professionalism. Training for emergency response should focus on tasks that can be applied to multiple incidents as opposed to a specific response to a specific incident. This allows the IC to make decisions to effectively resolve the incident based on the situation and his assets capabilities. Exercise Exercises provide opportunities to test plans and improve proficiency in a risk-free environment. Exercises are the natural extension of training and allow departments/agencies to assess and validate proficiency levels, clarify and familiarize personnel to roles and responsibilities. A-10 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Evaluation and Improvement It is pointless to prepare if you do not assess your capabilities/abilities on a periodic basis. This assessment or evaluation is used to determine current status of capabilities/abilities and to revise standard operating procedures or guidelines. The goal is to reach and maintain a level of proficiency sufficient to effectively respond to incidents Response Phase The Response Phase begins when an incident is imminent or immediately after the incident occurs. Response encompasses the activities that address the short-term effects of an incident. Response also includes the execution of EOPs and of incident mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and unfavorable outcomes. Response is subdivided into initial response and extended response. The subdivisions are chronological in nature with the initial response preceding the extended response. Extended response activities can occur concurrently with initial response activities. Not all incidents will have an extended response. County of Hawaii residents play a key role in response by following their own emergency plans, following directions provided by local officials, and not burdening communication systems with unnecessary status inquiries, or personal calls. Initial Response Initial Response begins with an immediate rapid assessment of the local situation. The rapid assessment serves as the basis for setting response priorities and allocating limited resources. Initial response activities are intended to minimize the effects of an incident on human life and property. Initial response activities include. o Disseminating warnings, emergency public information, and instructions to Hawai'i County citizens. o Coordinating evacuations and/or rescue operations. o Coordinating care of injured and displaced persons. o Clearing priority transportation routes. o Repairing critical facilities and structures. o Conducting initial damage assessments and surveys. o Coordinating restricted access to affected areas. o Developing and implementing incident action plans. A-11 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o Making all necessary notifications, including Hawai'i County Departments and personnel. Extended Response Hawai'i County's extended response activities involve the coordination and management of personnel and resources to mitigate an emergency and facilitate the transition to recovery operations. Extended response activities include, but are not limited to: o Preparing detailed damage assessments. o Coordinating the operation of mass care facilities. o Coordinating coroner operations. o Procuring required resources to sustain operations. o Documenting situation status. o Protecting, controlling, and allocating vital resources. o Coordinating advanced planning activities. o Documenting expenditures. o Developing and implementing incident action plans for extended operations. o Disseminating emergency public information. o Declaring a local emergency. o Coordinating with State and Federal Agencies. Recovery Phase Recovery Activities involve the restoration of services to the public and returning the affected area(s) to pre -incident conditions. Recovery activities may be both short-term and long-term, ranging from restoration of essential utilities, such as water and power, to mitigation measures designed to prevent future occurrences of a given threat. Recovery activities may reflect the continuation of the response phase activities (e.g., restoration of utilities), or they may include new activities wholly enacted as a part of the recovery process after the incident has abated (e.g., debris removal after a flood). Recovery activities include, but are not limited to: o Coordinating restoration of utilities. A-12 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan o Debris management. o Providing long-term recovery housing to displaced victims. o Applying for State and Federal assistance programs. o Conducting hazard mitigation analyses. o Identifying residual hazards. o Determining and recovering costs associated with response and recovery. o Establishing emergency index codes for cost tracking purposes. Mitigation Phase Mitigation efforts occur both before and after emergencies or incidents. Post -incident mitigation is actually part of the recovery process. This includes eliminating or reducing the impact of hazards that exist within Hawai'i County. Pre -incident mitigation involves activities designed to reduce the damaging impact of future incidents. Mitigation activities include, but are not limited to: o Amending local ordinances and statutes, such as zoning ordinances, building codes, and other enforcement codes. o Initiating structural retrofitting measures. o Assessing tax levies. o Flood control projects. o Diminishing fuel in areas prone too wild fires. A-13 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Incident Response Organizational Structure A generic incident response organization chart is depicted in Figure 2.1. The nature of the incident and which department or agency has jurisdiction over the incident will determine who mans each position. General guidance is given in subsequent paragraphs. The IC will determine which sections and subsections are activated based on incident type and complexity. ncident Commander Public Liaison Officer Information Safety Officer Operations Logistics Financial/Admin. Branches Air OperationsJ FSituafiofnqF..d( ervice Branch Support Branch Time Branch Divisions Groups ion Supply Procurement Strike Team Facilities Compensation Task Force I Documentation I I J Medical I I J Ground Support I I I J Cost Single Source 1 Figure 2.1 Incident Commander The incident commander (IC) is the leader of the entire response effort. The department or agency with jurisdiction over the incident will provide the IC. This department or agency is called the lead agency. The IC develops objectives to guide the planning process and approves the Incident Action Plan (IAP) and all requests pertaining to the ordering and releasing of incident response resources. Command Staff The Command Staff reports directly to the IC. The Public Information Officer (PIO), Liaison Officer (LNO), and Safety Officer (SO) comprise the command staff. A-14 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Public Information Officer The IC must approve the release of all incident -related information. Only one incident PIO should be designated. The PIO is responsible for interfacing with the public and media and/or with other agencies with incident -related information requirements. The PIO develops accurate and complete information on the incident's cause, size, and current situation; resources committed; and other matters of general interest for both internal and external consumption. The PIO may also perform a key public information -monitoring role. Liaison Officer The LNO is the point of contact for representatives of other government agencies, non- governmental organizations (NGO), and /or private entities. In either a single or unified command structure, representatives from assisting or cooperating agencies and organizations coordinate through the LNO. Assistants from other agencies or organizations (public or private) involved in incident management activities may be assigned to the LNO to facilitate coordination. Safety Officer The SO monitors incident operations and advises the IC on all matters relating to operational safety, including the health and safety of emergency responder personnel. The SO is responsible for the systems and procedures necessary to ensure ongoing assessment of hazardous environments, coordination of multi -agency safety efforts, and implementation of measures to promote emergency responder safety, as well as the general safety of incident operations. The SO has emergency authority to stop and/or prevent unsafe acts during incident operations. In a unified command structure, a single SO should be designated, in spite of the fact that multiple jurisdictions and/or functional agencies may be involved. The SO must also ensure the coordination of safety management functions and issues across jurisdictions, across functional agencies, and with private -sector and NGOs. General Staff The General Staff allows the IC to maintain an appropriate span of control as the incident grows in size and complexity. This allows the IC to perform critical decision making and evaluation duties, and it establishes clear lines of communication for everyone involved in the incident. The General Staff positions are associated with a one of four sections; operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. Operations The Operations Section Chief will conduct all tasks/actions identified in ICS Form 222-1, Operations Section Chiefs' Checklist. The operations section (OPS) directs and A-15 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan coordinates all incident tactical operations. All field teams (task forces, strike teams, single resources) receive their assignments from OPS. OPS controls the staging area. OPS may be sub -divided into branches which, in turn, may be sub -divided into divisions and/or groups to maintain an appropriate span of control if the incident increases in size or complexity. Planning The Planning Staff Chief will conduct all tasks/actions identified in ICS Form 221-1, Planning Section Chief s Checklist. The most important function of the Planning Staff (PLANS) is to look beyond the current and next operational period and anticipate problems or events. PLANS also maintains resource status, maintains and displays situation status, prepares the IAP, documents incident, prepares demobilization plan, and serves as the primary location for technical specialists assigned to the incident. PLANS may be sub -divided into Resources, Demobilization, Situation, and Documentation units depending of the The Resource Unit is responsible for all check-in activity and for maintaining the status of all personnel and equipment resources assigned to the incident. The Resource Unit will maintain ICS Form 211, Check-in List, and ICS Form 218, Support Vehicle Inventory. The Situation Unit collects and processes information on the current situation, prepares situation displays and situation summaries, and develops maps and projections. The Situation Unit will maintain ICS Form 209, Incident Status Summary, ICS Form 216, Operational Planning Worksheet Draft, and ICS Form 201, Incident Briefing. The Documentation Unit consolidates ICS forms into the IAP, provides duplication services, and maintains ICS Form 214, Unit/Activity Log. The Demobilization Unit will ensure orderly, safe, and cost-effective movement of personnel back to their pre -incident location when release by the IC, and maintains ICS Form 221, Demobilization Checklist, and ICS Form 223, Tentative Release List. Logistics The Logistics Section's (LOG) primary focus is to support personnel and resources directly assigned to the incident. OPS provides all support and services to persons affected by the incident. The exception to this is the Supply Unit, which provides support to incident responders and serves as the single point of entry for all supplies arriving in response to and support of the incident. LOG may be sub -divided into a Service Branch and a Support Branch. Each branch may be further sub -divided. Service Branch is responsible for communications, medical support, and food; each of these responsibilities may be performed by a subordinate unit. A-16 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan The Communications Unit develops the communications plan (ICS Form 205, Incident Radio Communications Plan) designed to effectively use all communications equipment and facilities. The unit also installs and tests communications equipment, supervises the EOC communications room, distributes communications equipment to incident personnel, and maintains/repairs communications equipment. The Medical Unit develops the medical plan (ICS Form 206, Medical Plan) and obtains medical aid and transportation for injured and ill incident personnel. The Food Unit is responsible for the feeding of all incident personnel to include personnel at remote locations and those not able to leave tactical field assignments. Support Branch is responsible for ground support, facilities, and supply; each of these responsibilities may be performed by a subordinate unit. The Supply Unit is the only unit in LOG that provides support to persons not directly involved with incident response. The Supply unit orders personnel, equipment, and supplies; receives and stores all supplies for the incident; maintains an inventory of supplies; and services non -expendable supplies and equipment. The Facilities Unit is responsible for the layout and activation of incident facilities (e.g., Base, Camp(s), and the Incident Command Post (ICP)). The Facilities Unit Leader provides sleeping and sanitation facilities for incident personnel and manages Base and Camp(s) operations. The Ground Support Unit supports out -of -service resources; transports incident personnel, supplies, food, and equipment; maintains (fuel, services, maintenance and repair) vehicles and ground support equipment; and preparing and implementing the Incident Traffic Plan. Finance/Administration The Finance/Administration Section (FIN/ADMIN) is established when incident management activities require finance and other administrative services. FIN/ADMIN will also handle claims to property damage, injuries, or fatalities at the incident. FIN/ADMIN may be sub -divided into Time, Procurement, Compensation/Claims, and Cost Units. The Time Unit records equipment and personnel time usage. The Procurement Unit administers all financial matters pertaining to vendor contracts, leases, and fiscal agreements. The Compensation/Claims Unit is responsible for financial concerns resulting from property damage, injuries, or fatalities at the incident. A-17 Annex A, National Incident Management System (NIMS), to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan The Cost Unit is responsible for tracking costs, analyzing cost data, making cost estimates, and recommending cost-saving measures. A-18 Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan DIRECTION AND CONTROL L PURPOSE This annex establishes policy and procedures for how Hawai'i County will establish incident command, when a unified command will be established, how unified command positions will be filled, emergency operations center roles, and the operational periods for incidents exceeding twenty-four hours in duration. This annex is applicable to all natural, technological, and human caused incidents that occur within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction. IL SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS See Sections 1.3, Situation Overview, and 1.4, Assumptions, of the Base Plan. III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS A. Hawai'i County is a physically isolated location where three levels of government (Federal, State, and County) exercise jurisdiction. An incident in one jurisdiction will affect the other jurisdictions regardless of the location of the incident even when the actual impacted area does not cross any jurisdictional boundaries. None of the jurisdictions within Hawai'i County have sufficient capability or resources on island to independently address an incident that may impact areas under their jurisdiction. This situation requires a Unified Command (UC) structure to respond to incidents. A Unified Command allows each jurisdiction to operate within its legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities while providing coordinated incident response and recovery. B. The UC structure includes a Policy Group which, when activated, provides policy guidance, sets priorities of support, exercises approval authority on strategic decisions, and approves major expenditures accrued during emergency response. The UC is comprised of the incident commander for each primary response agency from each jurisdiction. The purpose of the UC is to jointly develop the incident response strategy and determine the priority of work within the strategy. When fully developed, the Unified Command will supervise two groups; the Operations Group and the Operations Support Group. The Operations Group will develop the operational plan [the Incident Action Plan (IAP)] for the incident response based on the response strategy and allocate the resources required to implement the IAP to the on-site incident commanders. The Operations Support Group will meet the Operations Group's logistical requirements, track incident response expenditures, and address the administrative requirements of the incident response. Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan IV. TASK ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES A. General 1. The Organization with primary responsibility for the incident from the jurisdiction that has the primary responsibility for the incident based on location and/or statute will provide the Incident Commander. The Operations Section Chief, if one is appointed, may be from any jurisdiction as long as he/she hails from that jurisdiction's primary agency for the incident. The remainder of incident command staff and general staff will be filled with persons capable of performing the task regardless of jurisdiction, organization within the jurisdiction, and individual position within the organization. 2. The Incident Commander will make the initial determination on what extent the incident command system will be activated. The County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) may be activated to facilitate the Multi -agency Coordination System (MACS) in order to provide the resources necessary for effective incident response. 3. Only the command structure, support structure, and emergency support functions required to provide effective incident response will be activated. The Incident Commander will determine what is activated for incident response using his/her experience to assess the current and projected situations. The Unified Command will assume this responsibility when the incident warrants establishing a Unified Command. 4. A Unified Command will be established when the incident directly affects more than one jurisdiction and incident response will exceed two operational periods. 5. The Policy Group will be activated when any one of the following conditions exist. a. Incident response exceeds response capability and a priority of response must be established that may result in one or more locations or jurisdictions not receiving immediate action to prevent loss of life, to stabilize the incident, or to preserve the environment. b. Damage to infrastructure will require prioritizing recovery efforts. c. The incident may have long-term impact on the social and/or economic viability of the County. LIM Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 6. Any member of the Policy Group may request that the EOC be activated in response to an incident. The decision to activate the EOC resides with the Hawai'i County Mayor or, if delegated, the HCCDA Administrator. 7. The criteria for priorities of work will be followed sequentially. a. Prevent loss of life. (1) Emergency Support Function # 9, Search & Rescue. (2) Emergency Support Function #13, Public Safety. b. Prevent or mitigate damage to critical infrastructure and key resources (Cl/KR). (1) Emergency Support Function 91, Transportation. (2) Emergency Support Function #4, Firefighting. (3) Emergency Support Function # 12, Energy. c. Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works & Engineering. d. Emergency Support Function 910, Oil & Hazardous Materials. e. Emergency Support Function #6, Mass Care. (1) Emergency Support Function #16, Special Needs. (2) Emergency Support Function #17, Tourist Evacuation. (3) Emergency Support Function #19, Pet Evacuation & Sheltering. f. Emergency Support Function #8, Public Health (includes Emergency Support Function #18, Mass Fatalities). g. Emergency Support Function 911, Agriculture & Natural Resources. h. Emergency Support Function #14, Long -Term Recovery. 8. Each Department/Agency/Office head, or their designated liaison, with a primary or supporting role in the incident will report to the EOC to direct and coordinate their Department's/Agency's/Office's response. 9. Strategic control of all incident response is vested in the policy group and may be delegated to responsible individuals as stated in this plan, or to an appropriate designee as shift arrangements dictate. B-3 Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 10. Operational control and decisions are the responsibility of the Unified Command (Incident Commander if no Unified Command is established). Operational decisions will be made in accordance with the strategy approved by the Policy Group. 11. Tactical control and decisions at the incident location are the sole responsibility of the On-site Incident Commander and will not be overridden or usurped in anyway by the Policy Group. B. Organization See Section 3.6, Organization and Responsibilities, of the Base Plan. C. Task Assignments and Responsibilities 1. Policy Group. a. The Policy Group is comprised elected or legally appointed officials who are responsible for the protection of life and property within their jurisdictions. The composition includes: Organization Person Office of the Mayor Mayor Office of the Mayor Managing Director Corporation Counsel Corporation Counsel HCCDA Administrator Police Chief Fire Chief Public Works Director Planning Director Research and Development Director State Incident Dependent Federal Incident Dependent b. The Policy Group determines the incident response strategy. c. The Policy Group will approve all operational decisions that have political ramifications such as the priorities of incident response. d. The Policy Group must approve all major expenditures accrued during incident response. Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 2. Unified Command. a. The Unified Command, when established, is comprised of the incident commander from each jurisdiction's (County, State, and Federal) organization with primary responsibility for incident response. b. The Unified Command develops the operational plan for incident response. c. The Unified Command allocates incident response resources. d. The Unified Command determines what elements of the incident response structure will be activated. This includes which staff positions and emergency support functions are required for incident response. 3. Operations Group. The Operations Group develops the operational level plan, allocates resources, and develops the common operating picture for incident response and recovery. It is comprised of the Planning Section and the Operations Section. a. Operations Section. The Operations Section is responsible for the current operational period. Specific tasks include: (1) Implementing the IAP. (2) Assigning resources to specific tasks in the IAP. (3) Providing technical input to the Planning Section in order to develop the next operational period's IAP. (4) Making adjustments to the IAP based on the current and/or developing situation. b. Planning Section. The Planning Section is responsible for preparing for the next operational period and for monitoring the current operational period. Specific tasks include: (1) Tracking resources from mobilization through demobilization. (2) Receiving information and reports from the field site(s) and filtering out distractions. (3) Developing and maintaining the common operating picture (COP). (4) Preparing the incident action plan for the next operational period. (5) Documenting the incident response from activation through the end of the recovery period. IM Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 4. Operations Support Group. The Operations Support Group has two primary responsibilities. The first responsibility is to provide the incident response staff with life support services. The second is to document incident response personnel, expenditures, and obligations. a. Logistics Section. The Logistics Section's sole responsibility is to providing supplies and services necessary to sustain incident response personnel. The Operations Section provides relief supplies, medical care, and sheltering to the public. The Logistics Section may be split into two Branches; the Service Branch and the Support Branch. (1) Service Branch. The Service Branch has three responsibilities; communications, medical care, and sustenance. (2) Support Branch. The Support Branch is responsible for basic supplies, facilities (camps, staging areas, etc.), and ground support (this includes transportation to and from work sites and maintenance of equipment). b. Administration and Finance Section. The Administration and Finance Section is focused on supporting responders. The Section has four areas of focus; capturing responder time, procuring incident response materials and resources, capturing incident response costs, and processing responder's compensation claims. 5. Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The EOC may serve in many capacities during incident response and recovery, but the primary function of the EOC is to facilitate the multi -agency coordination system (MACS). To fulfill this responsibility the EOC may function as the Area Command Post or Multi -Agency Coordination Center. a. Area Command Post (Unified Command). The EOC may serve as the area command post (ACP) when a Unified and/or Area Command are/is established. The EOC will continue to function as the Multi -agency Coordination Center when it serves as the ACP. b. Multi -Agency Coordination Center (MACC). The EOC is the only location within Hawai'i County with the space and communications capability to serve as the MACC. All resources required for incident response will be coordinated through the EOC. The Operations Group will always be located in the EOC. The Operations Support Group will initially operate out of the Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan EOC, but may be displaced to the Incident Base when the incident reaches Type 1 through Type 3 in size. V. DIRECTION AND CONROL See IV, Task Organization and Responsibilities, A, General, of this annex. VI. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT A. During any large scale incident the EOC will become the center for all local government control. All decisions in response to the incident and information/direction provided to the public will originate from the EOC. B. Lines of succession for critical personnel will be in accordance with each organization's continuity of operations plan. C. Each Hawai'i County Department/Agency is responsible for developing and maintaining a continuity of operations plan (COOP) that at a minimum address: 1. The essential functions that must continue to be perform during an incident with minimal disruption. These functions provide vital services to the community, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the general public, and sustain the industrial and economic base. 2. Identifies Delegations of Authority necessary to perform the essential functions during extended incident response. The Delegations of Authority specify who is authorized to make decisions or act on behalf of the Department/Agency Head and/or other key individuals in the Department/Agency. The Delegation of Authority will specify what authorities are delegated, to whom they are delegated, exceptions to the successor's authority to re -delegate, and limitations on the delegated authority. 3. Orders of succession during an incident for the senior leadership positions in the Department/Agency when the incumbents are unable or unavailable to execute their duties. Successors are vested with most of the authorities and powers of the incumbent. Orders of succession should be established for the Department/Agency head and officials down to the office directors responsible for performing essential functions. 4. Alternate facilities where the Department's/Agency's essential functions can be performed in the event that their facilities become inoperable. Equipment and supply requirements for the alternate facility(ies) must be identified. IMl Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 5. Interoperable Communications that provide the capability to perform essential functions, in conjunction with other Departments/Agencies and organizations, until normal operations can be resumed. The Department/Agency must be able to communicate to both external (to customers and business partners) and internal (to leadership and coworkers) entities even if the primary means of communication fails. Interoperable communications must support the execution of essential functions, provide capability to communicate within the organization, provide connectivity to outside agencies and customers, and ensure access to data, systems and services. 6. Vital Records and Databases needed to support essential functions must be safeguarded and accessible during an incident. There are two types of vital records; emergency operating records (such as plans and directives, orders of succession, delegations of authority, and references essential for performing essential functions), and legal and financial records (such as personnel records, payroll records, retirement records, insurance records, and contract records to name a few). 7. Human Capital. Human Capital consists of the organizations employees. Emergency essential employees must be identified based on the organizations essential tasks. These emergency essential employees must be notified of their status prior to the incident and provided with reporting instructions once an emergency has been declared. Any employee who is not an emergency essential employ also needs to be informed prior to an emergency and provided with reporting instructions once an emergency has been declared. Any non -emergency essential employee should also be provided training in essential tasks so that they may serve in a back-up role to emergency essential employees. 8. Prepare a training and exercise program in coordination with the Hawai'i County training and exercise program, Ho'omakaukau, managed by HCCDA. This program will ensure that during and incident systems and equipment work as required, employees can move to an alternate facility within a certain timeframe, and that the alternate facility includes everything that is needed to perform the Department's/Agency's essential functions. The training and exercise goals are to train essential personnel in functional areas of mission readiness, provide opportunities to acquire skills and knowledge required to perform assigned incident response tasks, build team unity, and to identify future training needs. 9. A plan for devolution. Devolution is the capability to transfer statutory authority and responsibility for essential functions from a/an Department's/Agency's primary operating staff and facilities to other employees and facilities. It is also the ability to sustain that operational capability for an extended period. Devolution is a way of ensuring a Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan COOP capability in the event COOP personnel are unable to perform their mission or if the alternate facility is unavailable to support it. The plan must identify likely triggers for devolution, how devolution will occur, and the resources that will be required to continue essential functions under a devolution scenario. 10. A plan for reconstitution. Reconstitution is the process by which personnel resume normal agency operations from the original or a replacement primary operating facility. Agencies must identify and outline a plan to return to normal operations. Reconstitution is complex and may require a person appointed as the manager to handle the reconstitution process. VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS A. Emergency Operations Center. 1. Primary EOC. a. The primary EOC for Hawai'i County is located at 920 Ululani Street, Hilo, Hawaii. b. EOC Facilities include: (1) Life support services (restrooms, showers, full kitchen). (2) Communications equipment capable of facilitating communications with all potential response organizations. (3) Meeting space with internet connections (wire to County server and wireless without access to County server). (4) Visual data display to display the COP. (5) Limited facsimile, copy, and reproduction services. 2. The alternate EOC is located at the West Hawai'i Police Station Training Room. This facility will be maintained in a warm status. 3. The primary department/agency with jurisdiction over the incident will establish an ICP at a location close enough to manage the tactical operations of the incident, but far enough away to not endanger the ICP's personnel and equipment. B. Reports and Records. 1. Initial Reports. The appropriate dispatch center will provide the initial report of the incident. Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 2. Event Log. HCCDA will keep an event log using WEB EOC. This task will be done by the Planning Section when activated. 3. Initial Damage Assessments. All responding agencies will provide initial damage assessments of critical infrastructure and key resources. These initial reports will be used to develop the COP and determine priorities of work. 4. Damage Assessment. Each agency with responsibility for damage assessment will compile reports for their area of responsibility and provide the consolidated report to the EOC for inclusion in the after action report. These damage assessments must be done in accordance with FEMA guidance as they will serve as the basis for damage claims if funds are available. 5. Incident Action Plan (IAP). The Incident Commander will prepare an IAP for each operational period during incident response. A copy of each IAP will be included in the after action report. The Planning Section will assume IAP preparation responsibilities when activated. 6. Incident Documentation. Incident documentation includes any request for support and correspondence that is not specifically addressed elsewhere. The Planning Section will review these documents and determine whether they will be included in the after action report. 7. Media Releases. All media releases will be done in accordance with the Emergency Public Information Annex and ESF #15. A copy of all media releases will be included in the after action report. 8. After Action Report (AAR). At the conclusion of the incident, the Planning Section will prepare the AAR for the incident. In some cases there may be two AARs; one for incident response (which includes short- term recovery) and one for long-term recovery. The AAR will be used to determine future equipment acquisition and training requirements. It will also serve as the justification to change procedures when a better method is identified during the incident response. The AAR format is located at appendix one to this annex. The AAR process has three parts: a. The draft AAR. The Planning Section will prepare the draft AAR using the documented information from the incident response. b. AAR seminar. HCCDA will conduct an AAR seminar not later than two weeks after the conclusion of incident response. The purpose of this seminar is to present the draft to all the organizations that participated in the incident. Then have a ff Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan discussion on the content to create the most accurate document possible. c. The Final AAR. The Planning Section will take the results from the AAR seminar and incorporate any additional information into the final product. A copy of the completed AAR will be provided to all organizations that participated in the response. The original with the draft will be maintained by HCCDA. C. Media. 1. JIC not established. a. Media will be allowed into the EOC during an incident unless one or more of the following conditions exist. 1) A meeting with State Civil Defense is being conducted via video teleconference (VTC). 2) A planning meeting where response strategy will be discussed is in session. b. Media will remain in the administrative area behind the counter that separates the EOC from the administrative area unless invited to enter the EOC by a representative of the Office of the Mayor or the HCCDA Administrator. 2. JIC established. Anyone with press credentials or who writes/reports for any organization that provides information to the general public either for profit or as a service will not be allowed into the EOC without an escort from the JIC staff. The restrictions expressed in paragraph C.1 will apply. VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE. HCCDA will review this annex annually and make any warranted changes. If a Type 1 through Type 3 incident occurs during the year, the AAR will serve as the review of this annex and any warranted changes will be made. IX. AUTHORITY AND REFERENCES. See Section 5. 1, Authorities, of the Base Plan. B-11 Annex C (Emergency Public Information) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION L PURPOSE This Annex establishes policies and procedures for the effective collection, control, and dissemination of emergency public information. ESF #15, External Affairs, will follow these polices and procedures when activated. This Annex will also establish policies for how HCCDA will provide local hazards information and emergency response and recovery education to Hawai'i County residents. II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS See Sections 1.3, Situation Overview, and 1.4, Assumptions, of the Base Plan. III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS A. Public Information consists of the processes, procedures, and systems to communicate timely, accurate and accessible information on the incident's cause, magnitude, and the current situation to the public, responders, and additional stakeholders (both those directly affected and those indirectly affected). Public information must be coordinated and integrated across jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations; among Federal, State, and County governments; and with NGOs and the private sector. Well-developed public information, education strategies, and communications plans help to ensure that lifesaving measures, evacuation routes, threat and alert systems, and other public safety information are coordinated and communicated to numerous audiences in a timely, consistent manner. B. County organizations with a Public Information Officer on staff will manage public information for Type 5 incidents without coordinating information with other County organizations. For Type I through Type 4 events, where multiple organizations and/or jurisdictions may be involved, all public information will be coordinated with all the organizations involved in the incident response and recovery. When this occurs the Joint Information System (JIS) concept will be used whether, or not, a Joint Information Center (JIC) has been established. C. Joint Information System. 1. The Office of the Mayor is the coordinating agency for ESF #15, External Affairs, and will develop plan for public information. The plan will include, but not be limited to: a. Interagency coordination and integration. b. Development and delivery of coordinated messages. C-1 Annex C (Emergency Public Information) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan c. Messages that are crafted to support the decisions made by the Policy Group. d. A flexible, modular, and adaptable system that can be tailored to the incident. 2. Key elements to providing relevant public information are: a. Identifying key information that must be communicated to the public. 1) Road closures. 2) Facility closures. 3) Critical Infrastructure problem (power & water). 4) Evacuation Orders. 5) Shelter Locations. b. Crafting messages that convey key information and messages that are clear and easily understood by all, including those with special needs. The message will include what actions, if any, the public should take in regards to the incident. c. Prioritizing messages to ensure timely delivery of information without overwhelming the audience. d. Verifying accuracy of information. e. Disseminating messages using the most effective means available. 3. Public Information (PI) consists of: a. Gathering information from these sources: 1) On -scene command. 2) On -scene PIOs. 3) Media monitoring. 4) News media. 5) Public and elected/appointed officials. b. Verifying Information with the following sources: 1) Other PIOs in the Joint Information Center. 2) The Emergency Operations Center. 3) On -Scene PIOs. C-2 Annex C (Emergency Public Information) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan c. Coordinating information which involves: 1) Establishing key messages. 2) Obtaining approval/clearance from those with authority. d. Disseminating information which includes: 1) Providing accurate, consistent information to the right people at the right time so they can make informed decisions. 2) Using multiple methods of dissemination to increase the probability that the entire intended audience is reached. 3) Monitoring the media to gauge the accuracy and effectiveness of the PI. IV. TASK ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES. A. Type 5 Incident. 1. The responding agency with jurisdiction over the incident. a. Determine whether or not the incident warrants a public information officer. b. Release information to the public using internal resources. 2. The Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency will assist the responding agency with public information dissemination if the agency does not have the capability to release the information in a timely fashion. B. Type 1 through Type 4 Incident. 1. The Policy Group, if established, will appoint the lead agency for public information for the incident. The lead agency will normally be the Office of the Mayor, but may also be the agency with primary responsibility for the incident response. 2. Lead agency. a. Provide the primary public information officer. b. Designate a public information section within the EOC as the single official point of contact for the media during an emergency. c. Establish a Joint Information Center when the situation warrants. C-3 Annex C (Emergency Public Information) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 3. Public Information Officer (PIO). a. Maintain public information standard operating guidance (SOG). b. Schedule and administer information coordination meetings. c. Obtain Policy Group or Unified Command approval of message content. d. Release public information via most appropriate medium(s). e. Monitor all media distribution for accuracy of information and make corrections, if necessary. f Coordinate commercial media access to incident location(s). g. Maintain a record of events and associated PI releases for inclusion in the incident after action report. 4. Joint Information Center (JIC). a. The preferred method is to establish the JIC at a single location with all PIOs working from that location, but a virtual JIC may be established when the preferred method is not feasible. b. The JIC serves as: 1) The sole source of PI for the incident. The PIO will provide incident response from this location. 2) The location for PI coordination meeting. 3) The location for press conferences associated with incident response. 4) The sole location for commercial media to obtain information and/or permission to enter the incident response area(s). V. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. A. Public information dissemination. 1. The incident command authority whether it is an Incident Commander, Unified Command, or a Policy Group must approve all PI before it is disseminated. 2. A coordinated message is a unified message crafted with input from all organizations', participating in the incident, PIOs to address all C-4 Annex C (Emergency Public Information) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan informational needs and is prioritized according to the response/recovery strategy. 3. Public information will be disseminated by one or more of these methods: a. Emergency Alert System. b. Audacity MP3 file sent to radio stations via email. c. City Watch notification system. d. Talisman notification system. e. Press Release. f Press Conference. 4. Uncoordinated messages unilaterally disseminated by any organization, whether or not the organization is participating in incident response, are discouraged and will include a disclaimer stating that the information provided is not an official incident response message, nor will the message in any way imply that the message is an official incident response message. B. Commercial media. 1. Commercial media will be allowed access to all areas associated with incident response at the discretion of the Incident Commander, Policy Group, and or on-site Incident Commander/Strike Team Leader. Every effort will be made to accommodate the media as long as the effort does not interfere with incident response and/or recovery. 2. When requested by Federal and/or State authorities, commercial media will be restricted from the Emergency Operations Center for the duration of the request. 3. When a JIC is established, commercial media access to incident response facilities and personnel will be coordinated through the JIC. VI. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT. See Section VI, Continuity of Government, of Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination to the Base Plan. C-5 Annex C (Emergency Public Information) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Section VII, Administration and Logistics, of Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination to the Base Plan. VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE. The Coordinating Agency for ESF #15 will revise this annex on an annual basis consistent with the time schedule for revision of the base plan. Reasons for revision include, but are not limited to: A. Acquisition of resources and/or capabilities to execute the PI mission. B. Changes to the County Code, County Charter, and/or other laws that impact PI. C. Changes in PI doctrine and/or standards. IX. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. A. Authorities. See Section 5. 1, Authorities of the Base Plan. B. References. See Section 5. 1, Authorities of the Base Plan. C-6 Annex D (Communications) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan COMMUNICATIONS L PURPOSE This Annex provides information concerning the Hawai'i County emergency communications systems. The procedures outlined in this Annex will be used by Emergency Management Officials to manage communications during an incident. IL SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS See Sections 1.3, Situation Overview, and 1.4, Assumptions, of the Base Plan. III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. The Hawai'i County Emergency Management Communications Networks will use the existing County radio system and frequencies, augmented with an additional net for Emergency Management. Emergency Management officials may operate in radio nets of response organizations to effect coordination of activities. IV. TASK ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES. Task Assignments. A. The HCCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics) will: 1. During non -emergency time, be responsible for developing the emergency communications system required to support EOC communications. He/she is also responsible for developing a communications system to support crisis operations to include internal operations and external communications with adjacent jurisdictions and the Hawai'i State EOC. 2. During non -emergency periods, provide advice and technical assistance to the Emergency Management Director in the planning of emergency communications. 3. During emergency operations, supervise all EOC communications activities. 4. Establish an EOC message center and the procedures required to manage, record and distribute incoming and outgoing messages. D-1 Annex D (Communications) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan B. Radio Operators will be responsible for: 1. The proper use of communications equipment and procedures at designated stations. 2. The proper handling of messages. C. HPD. Law enforcement officers assigned to shelters will provide alternate communications using portable radio units. V. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. A. The HCCDA Administrator, under the direction of the Policy Group, at the County level, has overall responsibility for the EOC and the communication systems needed to operate in an emergency. B. The HCCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics), under the supervision of the HCCDA Administrator, is responsible for the activation and operation of all communications systems in the EOC and the associated processing of messages. C. Radio officers and operators from other departments, while under the control of their own office and operating their equipment, will be responsible for knowing and implementing the procedures outlined in this Annex as well as their department SOP. D. During an emergency, the various code systems used for brevity will be discontinued. Radio transmissions will be sent using plain English to ensure comprehension by all responding organizations. In addition, local time (using the twenty-four hour clock) will be used during transmission and recording of messages. VI. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT. See Section VI, Continuity of Government, of Annex B, Direction and Control of the Basic Plan. VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. A. Communications Protection. 1. Radio. a. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). (1) One of the effects of a nuclear detonation that is damaging to communications equipment over a wide area D-2 Annex D (Communications) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan is EMP. To avoid EMP, radios will be disconnected from antennas and power sources when an attack warning is received. (2) Portable radios will be utilized as a backup during the initial attack period to assist in maintaining limited communications with field operations and shelters. (3) Telephones will be utilized as the primary means of communications until they become inoperable. (4) The above procedures will be followed until an ALL CLEAR message is received. b. Wind and Blast Damage. The HCCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics) will prepare for securing, or replacement, of antennas in the event of high winds associated with either severe weather or nuclear weapons. 2. Telephone (Common Carrier). a. All EOC communications equipment including telephones must have high maintenance priority and should be operational at all times. b. The communications officer will ensure that all EOC telephones have been placed on the telephone companies' priority restoration list. B. Security. Due to the vital role of communications during emergency operations, particularly for defense purposes, the Emergency Management Director may investigate the personal background of any communications personnel assigned to the EOC. Due to the stress and urgency of this work, only stable, reliable people should be assigned communications duties. C. Training. 1. Each department assigning personnel to the EOC for communications purposes is responsible for assuring that these individuals are familiar with all department communications operating procedures. 2. Additional training for inexperienced and Amateur Radio operators on EOC communications equipment and procedures will be provided by the HCCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics), as required. D-3 Annex D (Communications) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE. The HCCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics) is responsible for maintaining and updating this Annex annually. IX. AUTHORITY AND REFERENCES. A. Authority. See Section 5, Authorities of the Base Plan. B. Reference. 1. FEMA, State and Local Communications and Warning Systems Engineering Guidance, CPG 1-37, Washington D.C. 2. FEMA, Chapter 4, Attack Environment Manual, FEMA 128, Washington D.C. 3. FEMA, Section 2, Guide for Increasing Local Government Emergency Management Readiness During Periods of International Crisis; State and Local Guide (SLG) 100. 4. FEMA, Electronic Pulse Protection Guidance, CPG 2-17, Volumes 1, 11, & III. 5. OK Dept. of Emergency Management, Oklahoma RACES Plan. D-4 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan EVACUATION L PURPOSE. This annex establishes policy and assigns responsibility for the coordinated voluntary or compulsory evacuation of residents and guests from hazard impacted areas within Hawai'i County whether the evacuation is conducted with or without notice. This annex sets the criteria that will be used to decide between directing residents and guests to evacuate or to shelter -in-place. This annex is applicable to all natural, technological, and human caused incidents that occur within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction. IL SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS. See Sections 1.3, Situation Overview, and 1.4, Assumptions, of the Base Plan. III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. A. General. 1. HCCDA will continuously monitor geological events and the weather affecting or with the potential to affect Hawai'i County. When an event has the potential to seriously threaten life and property HCCDA will assess the situation to determine whether a precautionary or compulsory evacuation is necessary or if shelter -in-place is the appropriate course of action to take. HCCDA will then make a recommendation to the Office of the Mayor or, if activated, the Policy Group. The Office of the Mayor or the Policy Group will make the decisions on whether to declare an emergency and to issue an order to evacuate or to shelter -in-place. The Joint Information Center, if established, will issue the emergency declaration and evacuation order; otherwise, the Office of the Mayor will issue the emergency declaration and HCCDA will disseminate the evacuation order to the general population. The activation of one or more of these ESFs: 1, Transportation; 6, Mass Care; 16, Special Needs; 17, Tourist Evacuation; and 19, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering; may be required to effectively complete evacuation. 2. Immediate Family. Hawai'i County defines the immediate family as the smallest unit of family that an individual lives with. This normally includes a person's father, mother, siblings, children, and grand -parents. 3. Criteria for evacuation versus shelter -in-place. a. Nature of the incident. (1) Threat (The likelihood of a hazard occurring.) (2) Vulnerability (A measure of the extent to which a particular incident is likely to deplete or damage available E-1 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan resources such that the reestablishment of normalcy cannot be achieved within a reasonable period of time.) (3) Consequences [The damages (full or partial), injuries, and losses of life, property, environment, and business that may result from the incident.] b. Isolation distance (The size of the area that must be evacuated in order to protect residents from the incident hazards.) c. Time available before incident impact. Is there enough time to safely evacuate? d. Available resources. B. Shelter -in -Place. Sheltering -in -Place involves seeking immediate shelter where you are currently located (home, business, public venue). It is used when there is little time to react to an incident and it would be more dangerous for persons to be outside trying to evacuate than to seek immediate shelter for a short period of time at their current location. 1. HCCDA will make a quick assessment of the situation and based on available information will recommend whether shelter -in-place is the best course of action to the Office of the Mayor or, if activated, the Policy Group. 2. HCCDA will use all available means to transmit the shelter -in-place order once the decision making authority has decided that this is the best course of action. 3. Residents should shelter -in-place during an incident if no evacuation order is issued. 4. Residents, business owners, and custodians of public venues should become familiar with FEMA's "Safe Room Resources" so they can prepare in advance for this possibility. C. Evacuation. An evacuation is an organized, timed and supervised dispersal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, their reception and care in safer areas, and their return to their home communities. First Responders shall make liberal use of Hawai'i Revised Statute 135 sections one through four when facilitating evacuation from areas in danger. 1. Voluntary. A voluntary evacuation is used when an identifiable section of the population is vulnerable to an impacting threat or potential threat within a definable geographic area. A voluntary evacuation usually E-2 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan involves the removal of priority groups (those that are vulnerable to the threat, which almost always includes special needs populations). a. The Office of the Mayor, in coordination with the Policy Group, will decide whether an emergency will be declared and if a voluntary or compulsory evacuation is necessary. b. Voluntary evacuations will comply with the following: (1) The Policy Group will determine the priority of the groups that should evacuate based on their vulnerability to the threat. (2) Evacuation Centers and/or Shelters will accept persons based on the priorities established by the Policy Group. (3) Immediate family evacuating with the member of a priority group will be treated as a member of the priority group. (4) Persons not falling within a priority group from the evacuation zone are eligible for the services provided by the Center/Shelter. (5) Persons not located within the evacuation zone, but who fall within one of the priority groups, who are shadow evacuating will receive Center/Shelter services if the Center/Shelter is not over capacity. (6) Persons within the evacuation zone do not have to evacuate. Any person in a priority group who chooses not to evacuate is responsible for their actions and will have no claim against Hawai'i County should they suffer injury from the threat. 2. Compulsory/Directed. A compulsory or directed evacuation involves the mandatory removal of a portion or all of the civilian population from a threatened area. A compulsory evacuation is necessary when there is a severe threat to life and property within a geographic location and shelter - in -place will not reduce or mitigate the threat to life. a. No -notice evacuation. A no -notice evacuation occurs when the onset of an incident is very rapid and the population within a geographic location must leave the area to prevent loss of life. (1) HCCDA will immediately notify the Office of the Mayor when a no -notice evacuation incident occurs. (2) The Office of the Mayor will decide whether to issue a no -notice evacuation. (3) HCCDA will disseminate the evacuation order via every means of communication available. E-3 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan (4) HPD, with the assistance of DPW, HFD, MTA and P&R, will activate the evacuation plan for the affected location(s). (5) The Incident Commander, Unified Command, or Policy Group will determine whether evacuation Centers/Shelters will be opened. (6) Persons who fail to comply with the evacuation order will be subject to the penalties listed in Chapter 7 of the County Code. b. Notice or Planned Evacuation. A notice evacuation occurs when the on -set of the incident is slow enough to allow the activation of control measures and the preparation of evacuation destinations. (1) HCCDA will notify the Office of the Mayor or, if activated, the Policy Group when the potential threat warrants the evacuation of one or more geographic areas. (2) The Office of the Mayor or the Policy Group will determine whether an evacuation will be ordered. (3) HCCDA will disseminate the evacuation order via all means available. (4) HPD, with the assistance of DPW, HFD, MTA and P&R, will activate the evacuation plan for the affected location(s). (5) ARC will coordinate with HCCDA on which centers/shelters will be open and then prepare and open evacuation centers/shelters. (6) Persons who fail to comply with the evacuation order will be subject to the penalties listed in Chapter 7 of the County Code. 3. Shadow. A shadow evacuation is a spontaneous evacuation that occurs when people feel that they are in danger and begin to leave in advance of, or in spite of, official instructions to the contrary. A shadow evacuation often occurs in areas that are not immediately threatened by the incident when one or more areas is/are threatened by the incident or is/are being evacuated. a. First Responders on site must quickly recognize when a shadow evacuation is occurring and immediately communicate the occurrence to their dispatch or HCCDA. b. Once notified, the Incident Commander, Policy Group, or Unified Command will determine whether to facilitate the shadow evacuation or attempt to halt the shadow evacuation. Once the decision is made the appropriate spontaneous evacuation E-4 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan procedures will be applied to the situation and, if the decision is to halt the evacuation, efforts will be made to halt the evacuation. c. Persons not from a location under a voluntary or compulsory evacuation who arrive at an evacuation destination, center, or shelter will be accommodated after all persons from the location(s) under a voluntary or compulsory evacuation are accommodated. 4. Spontaneous. A spontaneous evacuation occurs when residents and/or people in the threatened area(s) observe an emergency event or receive unofficial word of an actual or perceived threat and elected to evacuate the area without receiving instructions to do so. This type of evacuation is the most difficult to control and poses the greatest risk to the persons evacuating and to First Responders. a. First Responders on site must quickly recognize when a spontaneous evacuation is occurring and communicate the occurrence to their dispatch or HCCDA immediately. b. Once notified, persons with decision making authority must determine whether there is a verified need to continue the spontaneous evacuation and to activate control measures to facilitate the evacuation process or if an attempt should be made to halt the evacuation. c. If the spontaneous evacuation is warranted, the evacuation plan for the affected location(s) will be activated. d. If the spontaneous evacuation is not warranted: (1) HCCDA will initiate a public information campaign to halt the evacuation (2) HPD will continue to facilitate the evacuation until the public complies with the information campaign. (3) While HPD is facilitating the evacuation they will attempt to discourage the event when prompted by the public. (4) Hawai'i County will not establish or activate any shelters or provide comfort items to the public during a non -warranted spontaneous evacuation. 5. Sheltering. Hawai'i County will provide sheltering to residents and guests when a voluntary or compulsory evacuation is ordered. a. Shelter types. E-5 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan (1) Congregate shelter — a facility used for sheltering large groups of people, but that normally serve other purposes such as a gym or community center. (2) Transitional shelter — a facility that provides short-term lodging and additional privacy, such as a hotel. (3) Temporary housing — is a facility intended to provide living accommodations for an extended period of time, to include single and multi -family homes, apartments and manufactured homes. b. Hawai'i County will only provide congregate shelters during a compulsory or voluntary evacuation. The situation will determine the number of shelters that will be opened, the location or locations of the shelters, and whether the facility(ies) will be County property or Department of Education property. Congregate shelters will provide ten square feet of space to each evacuating individual, restroom facilities, and access to food and drinking water. Residents should bring their emergency kits with them which should include bedding, medications, and personal hygiene items. c. The American Red Cross has the discretion to offer transitional sheltering to a displaced population when the number of displaced persons is small and/or the time that they will be displaced is less than 72 hours. d. Temporary housing will only be used when a Type 1 or Type 2 incident impacts the County and residents will displaced from their homes for an estimated period of time exceeding thirty days. Temporary housing will normally be a Federal Government program with minimal input from the County. 6. Special Needs Sheltering. Facilities that are designated as special needs shelters will be austere at best and will not be capable of providing specialized care to evacuees. Special needs shelters will be staffed by members of the medical community and/or Medical Reserve Corps volunteers who will provide medical related assistance within their authorization and skill level. a. Persons with special needs evacuating to a designated special needs shelter must bring any specialized equipment that they require for care and/or comfort and the supplies required to operate that equipment with them to the shelter. E-6 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan b. Persons with special needs evacuating to a designated special needs shelter must bring any medication that they require with them to the shelter. c. Persons with special needs will be given additional space and privacy in the congregate shelter as determined by medical personnel staffing the shelter. d. Persons with special needs must be accompanied to the shelter and attended to by a person or persons who will serve as their primary care provider during their stay at the shelter. Medical personnel staffing the shelter are not equipped to provide specialized care or to be the primary care provider for individuals at the shelter. e. Medical personnel at the designated special needs shelter may refuse to accept a special needs person who requires treatment that should be done in a medical facility or licensed care facility. 7. Tourists/Visitors. Hawai'i County does not have sufficient evacuation space to accommodate County residents. a. Shelter -in-place is the primary emergency response for tourist/visitors who are staying in resort/hotel facilities. b. If shelter -in-place is not appropriate for the incident, tourists/visitors will be evacuated to the nearest evacuation center or shelter with open capacity. Resort/hotel facilities will provide assistance to their guests during an evacuation to include directions to the nearest open shelter/center and a contact number to the BIVSA. 8. Service Animals. The Americans with Disabilities Act defines a service animal as an animal that is individually trained to perform tasks for people with disabilities — such as guiding people who are blind, alerting people who are deaf, pulling wheel chairs, alerting and protecting a person who is having a seizure, or performing other special tasks. Service animals are considered working animals, not pets. a. Service animals will be allowed into all shelters and will be allowed to remain with the person whom they serve without restriction. b. Identification or certification that the animal is a service animal will not be requested. E-7 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan c. The service animal's owner will be responsible for the care and feeding of the service animal while staying in the shelter. d. A service animal may be removed from the shelter, if there is not sufficient space to isolate the service animal from the general population, when one of the following conditions exists. 1) The animal is out of control and the animal's owner does not take effective action to control it. 2) The animal poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. 9. Pet Evacuation. Pet friendly evacuation centers and/or shelters will not be opened if the incident is expected to last less than twenty-four hours. a. Only household pets will be accepted at pet friendly shelters. A household pet is defined as a domesticated animal, such as a dog, cat, bird, rabbit, rodent, or turtle that is traditionally kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes, and can travel in commercial carriers, and be housed in temporary facilities. Household pets do not include reptiles (except turtles), amphibians, fish, insects/arachnids, farm animals (including horses, chickens, and potbellied pigs), and animals kept for racing purposes. b. Pet owners who bring their pet to a pet friendly shelter will be required to: (1) Bring sufficient food to sustain their pet for at least seven days. (2) Bring their pet to the shelter in a commercial carrier. The pet will remain in this carrier in the designated pet area within the shelter except for brief exercises periods with the pet owner. (3) Care for their pet (food, water, exercise) which will be housed in a designated location away from where people are being sheltered. (4) Assist shelter personnel with cleaning and maintaining the pet area within the shelter. c. Shelter personnel may: (1) Refuse to admit any pet to the shelter when they believe that the pet poses a danger to other pets or to people at the shelter. M'? Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan (2) Refuse to admit any pet that does not arrive in a commercial carrier capable of serving as temporary living quarters for the animal. (3) Remove a pet from the shelter that causes harm to other pets or to people at the shelter. (4) Remove a pet from the shelter when the pet owner does not provide the proper care for the animal. 10. Return to home or community. Hawai'i County will make every reasonable effort to facilitate the return of displaced residents to their homes or community once the incident transitions into the recovery phase of emergency response. a. As congregate shelters are facilities that have a primary purpose other than sheltering displaced persons, they will be closed as soon as it is safe for displaced persons to return to their homes. b. It may be necessary to transfer displaced persons from a DOE facility to a County facility in order to resume pre -incident activities once a Type 3 or Type 4 incident enters the recovery phase. c. Persons displaced by a Type 1 or Type 2 incident may be transferred to temporary housing when the incident enters the recovery phase. d. Evacuation centers and shelters will close within seven days from the date that the incident enters the recovery phase and the evacuated area or areas have been declared safe for residents to return. IV. TASK ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES. A. Organization. See Annex A. B. Task Assignments. 1. Office of the Mayor. a. Declare an emergency in accordance with Section 13-23 of the County Charter. b. Decide what course of action to take (shelter -in-place or evacuate) based on the information provided by HCCDA. E-9 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan c. Make or approve all decisions that have political ramifications or that may be controversial due to the need to prioritize where limited resources will be dispatched which will result in some communities or areas receiving response before other areas that are also affected by the incident. d. If the Joint Information Center has not been established, prepare and disseminate evacuation press release to the media which will include area(s) to be evacuated, shelter(s) that will be open, and a request to follow all instructions of first responders in the area. e. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. 2. Policy Group. When activated, the Policy Group will: a. Develop the evacuation strategy and determine the policies that the Operations Group will follow when conducting the evacuation and sheltering of County Residents. b. Make recommendations to the Operations Group on the priority of work and resource distribution. 3. HCCDA. a. Serve as the multi -agency coordination system. b. Disseminate public information in coordination with the JIC, if activated. c. Coordinate with ARC, P&R and DOE to determine which shelters/centers will be opened. d. Coordinate through State Civil Defense for additional State and Federal evacuation resources, if required. e. Establish a disaster assistance center if needed (Type 1 through Type 3 incidents). f. Coordinate evacuation with other jurisdictions as required. g. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Receive this data from all County Departments/Agencies/Offices and compile County wide data for AAR and Federal reimbursement, if applicable. E-10 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan a. Provide Incident Commander for evacuation. b. Activate evacuation plan for affected communities/areas. c. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. 5. HFD. a. Assist HCCDA with evacuation notification. b. Assist HPD with evacuation of the special needs population. c. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. 6. DPW. a. Assist HPD with evacuation barriers. b. Keep evacuation routes clear of obstructions. c. Direct ESF#1 actions, if activated. d. Provide maintenance service and fuel to all equipment used to support emergency operations. e. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. 7. MTA. a. Assist HPD and HFD with special needs population evacuation by providing and coordinating for transportation assets. b. Provide transportation and other resources required to aid evacuation. c. Identify County owned and commercial transportation assets that may be available to evacuate special needs populations and integrate then as needed into the evacuation process. E-11 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan d. In conjunction with Coordinated Services for the Elderly manage and dispatch all County assets used to evacuate individuals from the evacuation area. e. Provide evacuation assignments to Federal, State, and volunteer resources participating in the evacuation. f. Establish/coordinate special needs population pickup points within the evacuation area(s). g. Establish, coordinate, and manage mutual aid agreements with other government and non-government organizations that may provide transportation resources during an evacuation. h. Maintain an updated inventory of public and private vehicles for use by the Transportation Coordinator or other EOC staff to meet emergency needs. i. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. a. Open, prepare, and man County property that will be used as a congregate shelter. b. As requested, assist DPW with keeping evacuation routes open. c. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. 9. American Red Cross. a. Provide volunteers to manage designated emergency shelters. b. Provide shelter statistics to EOC on a regular basis. c. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. E-12 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 10. Humane Society. a. Provide volunteers to manage pet friendly shelters. b. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. 11. Department of Education. a. Provide facilities for sheltering as directed by SCD. b. Provide facilities and resources for congregate feeding, if required. c. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. 12. Department of Health. a. Assist the Emergency Management Director in planning the scheduled evacuation of hospitals and nursing homes in the event of hazards or other threats to these institutions. b. Coordinate staff and services for designated special needs shelters. c. Keep records of equipment use, man-hours, and incident associated costs by incident phase. Provide this data to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase. 13. County Residents. a. Prepare a family emergency plan. Know what important papers you need to take with you and store them together for quick retrieval. Do not endanger you or your family over material possessions which can be replaced. b. If you live in an evacuation area, comply with compulsory evacuation orders. It is highly recommended that you evacuate the area when the evacuation order is voluntary especially if you fall in a special needs category. E-13 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan c. Comply with all instructions from First Responders within the evacuation area and while in the process of leaving the evacuation area. d. Check-in to the shelter at your evacuation destination. Family and loved ones will not be able to locate you and you will not be able to locate them through the American Red Cross unless you check-in to the shelter. The ARC's locator system does not work if your information is not collected at the shelter. V. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. A. Command. 1. An Area Command will be established at the County EOC for all evacuations that involve more than one geographic location. HPD will provide the Area Commander and the Site Commanders at each geographic location. The American Red Cross or the Department of Education, and Parks & Recreation Department will provide the Site Commanders at the shelters. 2. An Area Command will not be established when the evacuation only affects one geographic location. 3. The EOC will function as the multi -agency coordination center with or without an Area Command. B. Evacuation Timeframes. 1. Tsunami. a. Tsunami evacuations will always be compulsory. b. The evacuation will be completed not later than one hour before the estimated initial impact of the first wave. The amount of time available to evacuate will be determined based on the location of the geological event that generates the tsunami and cannot be predetermined. c. First responders will continue to facilitate all evacuation efforts until thirty minutes before the estimated initial impact of the first wave. All First Responders will immediate leave the evacuation area when the Warning Siren Sounds thirty minutes before the estimated initial impact of the first wave. E-14 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan d. Residents evacuating due to a tsunami must be prepared to be away from their home for an extended period of time and should anticipate returning to nothing more than the foundation of their house. 2. Hurricane. a. Hurricane evacuations will almost always be voluntary. Residents with homes that have been built to hurricane specifications and that do not reside in a flood zone should consider shelter -in-place as their first option. b. There is ample time to prepare for a hurricane evacuation. The evacuation will be initiated twelve hours before the estimated arrival time of tropical storm force winds. Hurricane evacuation may be initiated earlier if the majority of the evacuation time is during hours of darkness to take advantage of visibility. c. Traffic control will be done by exception for a hurricane evacuation. d. Persons with special needs that require an uninterrupted power supply should evacuate to a designated shelter where the probability of having back-up power is better than at their residence. 3. Lava Flow. a. Lava Flow evacuations will always be compulsory. b. An evacuation due to Lava Flow will be ordered as soon as the Hawaiian Volcano Observatory determines that a specific geographic location is threatened. c. County facilities will be the primary source for shelter locations for Lava Flow evacuations. d. The size of the area threatened will determine whether an Area Command will be established. 4. Brush Fire. a. Brush Fire evacuations will always be compulsory. Any resident who chooses to remain at their residence and fight the fire does so at their own risk and will have no claim against the County for any injuries that they sustain during the course of the incident. E-15 Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan b. FWD will determine when a residence or community is threatened by a brush fire and when to order that the area be evacuated. c. Traffic control will be by exception for brush fire evacuations. 5. Small Incidents. a. Incidents such as a chemical spill, multi -dwelling fire, or civil disturbance may require a small or isolated area to be evacuated for a short duration. b. The First Responder Organization with jurisdiction over the incident will determine if an evacuation is necessary and, if so, the extent of the evacuation area. c. Traffic control will be by exception for this kind of incident. VI. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT. See Section 5.5, Continuity of Government, of the Base Plan and Section VI, Continuity of Government, of Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to the Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan. VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Section 4 (Administration, Finance, and Logistics) of the Base Plan. VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE. HCCDA will review this annex annually and make any warranted changes. If an incident that requires an evacuation or shelter -in-place order occurs during the year, the AAR will serve as the review of this annex and any warranted changes will be made. IX. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. A. See Section 5, Authorities and References of the Base Plan. B. Federal Insurance Administration (FIA), FIA -2, Questions and Answers on the Flood Insurance Program. C. FIA -13, Flood Emergency and Residential Repair Handbook. E-16 Annex F (Damage Assessment) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan DAMAGE ASSESSMENT I. PURPOSE. This annex provides guidelines for the assessment of damage resulting from incidents that may occur within Hawai'i County. This annex is applicable to both initial assessments and detailed assessments which will serve as the basis for Federal assistance. All Federal, State, County and non-governmental organizations will comply with this annex when conducting an assessment within Hawai'i County. II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS. See Sections 1.3, Situation Overview, and 1.4, Assumptions, of the Base Plan. III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Disaster intelligence is a tool for action and involves the complete cycle in which information about an event is collected, processed, evaluated, and disseminated to those who need it. This is a key process in caring for the short and long-term disaster needs of the people in the community. Damage assessment, which is an element of disaster intelligence, is an appraisal or determination of the actual effects on human, economic and natural resources resulting from an incident. A Delay in conducting an assessment in any area may cause hardship as well as erode resident's confidence in the County's ability to react in time of emergency. Although a rapid preliminary assessment is desirable and should be reported to the State EOC as soon as possible, a more accurate assessment should be compiled as soon as weather and other local conditions permit. Trained observers should be used to assess actual damage. IV. TASK ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. A. General. Disaster intelligence and damage assessment are two functions that must be properly conducted in order to properly respond to and recover from an incident. B. Task Assignment and Responsibility. 1. The Policy Group. a. Approve in what order the affected areas will be assessed. b. Approve priority of response efforts based on initial and subsequent assessments. c. Authorize non-governmental organizations to conduct assessments. 2. HCCDA Administrator responsibilities. a. The Administrator will be located in the EOC and will be responsible to the Policy Group for overseeing all disaster intelligence and damage assessment activities. F-1 Annex F (Damage Assessment) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan b. Coordinate additional resource procurement and distribution based on advice from the Policy Group, and coordination with volunteer groups, surrounding jurisdictions, and the State EOC. c. Ensure that all information and Structural Damage Assessment reports are completed and summarized on the Structural Damage Assessment Summary Worksheet which will be forwarded to State Civil Defense (SCD) as soon as they become available. d. Ensure that coordination is made with SCD and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in scheduling and conducting joint preliminary damage assessments if the joint surveys are required. This coordination will be made through SCD. 3. The County Damage Assessment Officer. a. The Damage Assessment Officer should be located in the EOC and be responsible to the HCCDA Administrator for the operation of damage assessment teams and for receiving and compiling all damage reports. b. Activate the teams to assess damage to public and private property; assign teams to the areas which are to be surveyed; and, coordinate the surveys with other groups. c. Compile all damage assessment team reports and reports from other sources, such as the American Red Cross. Provide this information to the HCCDA Administrator (See Appendix 1). d. Assist the HCCDA Administrator in establishing the recommended sequence of repairs and priorities for restoration of facilities by the appropriate service organizations. 4. Damage Assessment Teams. a. The Damage Assessment teams, each of which should consist of a minimum of three individuals, a team leader/recorder, an observer and a driver, are responsible for particular portions of Hawai'i County. b. Response activities when a disaster occurs are as follows: (1) Damage Assessment Teams report to EOC for assignment instructions. (2) Damage Assessment Teams record damage information, plot locations on maps, and take pictures if the F-2 Annex F (Damage Assessment) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan situation permits. NOTE: Team members must not interfere with First Responder personnel. (3) Teams return the information they collect to the Damage Assessment Officer at the EOC and receive further instructions. (4) The Damage Assessment Officer compiles all information received from the teams and provides same to the Emergency Management Director. 5. The American Red Cross (ARC). a. The American Red Cross, by ARC Regulation 3029, is required to submit a preliminary damage assessment survey of homes to the operations headquarters of the jurisdiction involved in a disaster within 24 hours and submit a detailed damage assessment within 72 hours. b. A copy of the Red Cross damage survey information is provided to the State EOC. V. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. See Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to the Base Plan. VI. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT. See Section VI, Continuity of Government, to Annex B, Direction, Control, and Coordination, to the Base Plan. VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. A. Reports and Records. 1. Damage assessment report forms will be forwarded to SCD. 2. Sufficient records will have to be maintained to document all costs to the community caused by the disaster. B. Individual Relief Assistance. All individual disaster assistance provided by the government will be administered with policies set forth by the HCCDA and those Federal agencies providing said assistance. F-3 Annex F (Damage Assessment) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan C. Public Relief Assistance. All public relief disaster assistance provided by the government will be administered with policies set forth by SCD and those Federal agencies providing said assistance. VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE. See Section 5.6, Plan Maintenance, of the Base Plan. IX. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCE. See Section 5. 1, Authorities, of the Base Plan. F-4 Annex G, Resource Management, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan RESOURCE MANAGEMENT L PURPOSE. The Hawai'i County Government is responsible for protecting the lives and property of residents and the lives of the transient population within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction during emergencies and incidents that reach the level of a disaster. This annex establishes the policy for requesting and coordinating resources during incident response and short-term recovery to meet those obligations. The intent of this annex is to effectively employ available resources, including trained personnel, during the response and short-term recovery phases of emergency management for Type 1 through Type 4 incidents. IL SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS. See Sections 1.3, Situation Overview, and 1.4, Assumptions, of the Base Plan. III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. County resources are the primary means to meet our obligations to residents and to the transient population. Hawai'i County will commit all the resources necessary to bring the incident to a swift conclusion in order to protect lives and/or property and to restore the community to pre -emergency conditions. The Civil Defense Coordinators in every Hawai'i County organization should maintain a Resource Management Manual that contains information on all resources that the organization controls, copies of all mutual aid agreements to provide assistance during an emergency with Federal, State, County, and private organizations, and a list of sources for all locally available resources that may be required by the organization during emergency response. When all local resources have been expended, Hawai'i County will request assistance through Hawai'i State Civil Defense. The County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will host the multi -agency coordination system which will include ESF 97, Logistics Management and Resource Support, if activated. IV. TASK ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES. A. Type 5 incidents. The responding agency with jurisdiction over the incident will provide and/or make all the necessary coordination for the resources required to satisfactorily resolve the incident. B. Type 1 through Type 4 incidents. 1. Responding agency with primary jurisdiction for the incident. a. Establish necessary ICS positions and request and/or coordinate resources using existing agency polices and procedures. 1) The Agency's assets are the first source of resources. G-1 Annex G, Resource Management, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 2) Mutual Aid/Assistance Agreements are the secondary source of resources. 3) Private assets located within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction are the tertiary source of resources. 4) State assets, whether on island or located on a neighbor island, are the quaternary source of resources. 5) Federal assets are the final source of resources for incident response. b. Once the Emergency Operations Center is activated, a Unified Command is established, or ESF #7 is activated. 1) The Incident Commander will request resources through the activated element (EOC, Unified Command, or ESF #7) and the activated element will procure and/or make necessary coordination for the requested resources. 2) The requesting agency is responsible for proper employment of the resource and for providing a periodic status of the resource to the activated element. 2. Emergency Operations Center (EOC). a. The HCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics). 1) Receive all requests for resources and prioritize the acquisition of resources based on the overall situation. 2) Prioritize the distribution of resources to multiple sites based on the overall situation. 3) Coordinate the procurement of and the movement of resources from the source to the incident staging area(s). 4) Keep a record of expenses exclusive to the incident. b. The EOC will follow these priorities when coordinating resources: 1) County assets are the primary source of resources. 2) Private assets located within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction are the secondary source of resources. 4) State assets, whether on island or located on a neighbor island, are the tertiary source of resources. 5) Federal assets are the final source of resources for incident response. c. The Planning Section will track the resource from procurement (mobilization) through demobilization. G-2 Annex G, Resource Management, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan d. The agency submitting the resource request to the EOC is responsible for all expenses associated with the resource procured. e. If the Mayor proclaims a "Local State of Emergency" or the Governor declares a "Civil Defense Emergency Period" for the incident all expenses associated with the resource(s) procured will be funded by Hawai'i County's Disaster and Emergency Fund. Provisions of Section 2-212, Reimbursement from Grants, will apply to any expenses covered by the fund. 3. Unified Command. a. Policy Group. The Policy Group will decide where to employ and/or approve the employment of resources when a resource required for incident response is not available in sufficient quantity to be simultaneously employed in every location that requires the resource. b. Operations Section. 1) Employ resources within restrictions. 2) If an unidentified resource is required before the next operational period, coordinate procurement with the Planning and Logistics Sections. c. Planning Section. 1) Project resource requirements for the next operational period. 2) Coordinate procurement of resource shortages with the Logistics Section. 3) Track all resources involved in the incident response from mobilization through demobilization. d. Logistics Section. 1) Procure resources to sustain incident response. 2) Procure resources requested by the Planning Section. 3) Procure resources requested by the Operations Section. 4) Follow EOC resource coordination priorities. 5) If the Finance/Administration Section has not been activated, keep a record of expenses exclusive to the incident response. 6) Establish Base Camp if necessary. 7) Establish Staging Areas as Required. G-3 Annex G, Resource Management, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan e. Finance/Administrative Section. 1) Keep a record of expenses exclusive to the incident response. 2) Identify fund source for each procurement action. 3) Process resource expenses and vendor claims. 4) Keep time records for all incident response personnel and hired equipment. 4. ESF #7. a. Follow EOC and Unified Command procedures for procurement of resources. b. Activate all parts of ESF #7 appendix of the Emergency Support Function annex necessary for incident response and short-term recovery. 5. County Departments/Agencies/Offices. a. Provide persons with expertise required for specific incident response to advise the UC. b. Execute incident response and recovery mission assignments in accordance with the UC's priorities. 6. Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. a. Provide persons with expertise required for specific incident response to advise the UC. b. Execute incident response and recovery mission assignments in accordance with the UC's priorities. V. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. The HCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics), under the direction of the HCDA Administrator, will be responsible for the acquisition, distribution, management, and coordination of resources and supplies until ESF #7 is activated. ESF #7 will assume these responsibilities once activated. The Resources Management Manual(s) will be used to identify and list available sources from which needed resources can be obtained during emergencies. The Resource Coordinator will develop and maintain the Resources Management Manual for use during times of crisis. Routine checks of supplies and equipment availability will be made to ensure the manual is accurate. G-4 Annex G, Resource Management, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan VI. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT. See Section 5. 1, Authorities, of the Base Plan. VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. A. Communications. 1. The existing County communication network will be used to obtain resources in times of emergency. 2. The HCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics) has the responsibility to maintain the communications system during an incident. B. Resources. 1. A copy of the County Departments'/Agencies'/Offices' Resource Management Manuals will be maintained in the EOC for ready reference. 2. The Operations Group requests and employees resources that support the response/recovery actions and the affected populations. 3. The Logistics Group requests and employees resources to sustain the emergency response staff. 4. County Organizations will maintain a supply of materials that will be in high demand during emergency response if that material is not readily available on island. The amount of on -hand resources should be determined by the rate the resource is expended during incident response, the probability that the resource will be used, and cost associated with the purchase and storing of the resource. C. Records. 1. Each Organization involved in the incident response will keep a record of expenses directly associated with their response actions. Expenses include but are not limited to expended supplies, fuel, wages, and direct incident response purchases. A copy of these expenses will be provided to HCCDA at the conclusion of each phase of incident response. 2. The HCCDA Assistant Administrator (Logistics) will: a. Compile a record of all material, supplies, and equipment used from private sources during incident response. A copy of expenses will be provided to the Finance Department to settle the account when the incident is resolved, if required. G-5 Annex G, Resource Management, to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan b. Compile the incident response expenses for all County Organizations involved in incident response. The total of this compiled expense list will be submitted to FEMA for reimbursement, if applicable. D. Donated Relief Supplies. 1. Hawai'i County will assess the initial impact of the incident to determine what resources are required for incident response and what resources the population affected by the incident may need. 2. All the resources that the population requires due to the incident will be placed on a required resources list. 3. The required resources list will be released through the JIC to inform the general public what resources Hawai'i County requires to sustain the affected population. The JIC will include a caveat that only the items requested will be accepted by the Volunteer and Donations Coordinator. 4. Any item that is shipped to Hawai'i County that is not on the required resources list will not be accepted by the Volunteer and Donations Coordinator. VIII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. A. Authorities. See Section 5. 1, Authorities, of the Base Plan. B. References. FEMA, State and Local Guide 100 (SLG 100); Guide for Increasing Local Government Civil Defense Readiness During Periods of International Crisis. State Emergency Operations Plan, State of Hawai'i. Hawai'i County Resources Management Manual. Hawai'i County Inventory Reports. Hawai'i County Code. G-6 Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The County of Hawaii Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annex aligns County Departments/Agencies with State, Federal, and non-governmental departments and agencies into twenty (20) ESFs. The Annex incorporates the fifteen ESFs from the National Response Framework and adds an appendix for each State developed ESF which are Special Needs, Tourist Evacuation, Mass Fatalities, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering, and Military Support. The Annex, in concert with the other annexes to the Hawai'i County EOP, supersedes Annexes A -P of the County of Hawaii Plan for Emergency Preparedness dated 1989 and updated in 1992. The County will respond to both potential and impacting incidents that require a coordinated response from two or more County Departments or Agencies, or that require State or Federal assistance for effective incident response through either full or partial activation of one, or more, ESF. An ESF may be selectively activated for an incident and may be tasked to provide staffing and/or resources to respond to incidents in other Hawaii Counties. Selective implementation allows for a scaled response of personnel and resources to effectively bring each incident to a satisfactory conclusion in the most efficient manner possible. The Annex assigns roles and responsibilities to all Federal, State, County and NGO Departments/Agencies with assets located on the Island of Hawaii and it provides the framework for these departments/agencies to coordinate response actions and to integrate resources during incident response. All departments and agencies with a role or multiple roles assigned must be prepared to execute their assigned responsibilities when required. These departments and agencies should also participate in the County's exercise and evaluation program to increase the probability of an effective and efficient coordinated response to incidents. The Annex is an essential portion of the County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan. Introduction The introduction summarizes response levels and provides an overview of the County response organization and structure. The County is the first level of government to respond to an incident or disaster and remains the primary level of government responsible for incident response regardless of the type of incident. The majority of emergency situations are resolved at the County level without State assistance. The Mayor, through HCCDA, may request State assistance when the incident response exceeds the County's resources. State government resources are applied to response and recovery efforts in proportion to the need. State assistance may involve only a few ESF and limited resources or it may require commitment of considerable resources in the event of a major or catastrophic disaster. The Governor may request Federal assistance, under the provisions of the Stafford Act, PL 93- 288, as amended, when the incident response and/or recovery requirements exceed County and State resources. H-1 Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan It briefly discusses the role of the Deputy Director of Civil Defense (appointed by the Governor with approval by the County Council, usually the Mayor) who has overall responsibility for coordinating County resources, providing strategic guidance, requesting State assistance, and setting incident response priorities. It also discusses the role of the Civil Defense Administrator, and the purpose and organization of the Local Emergency Response Team (LERT). It introduces the Policy Group which convenes, at the request of the Mayor, and recommends priorities for County resources. The introduction also provides general roles and responsibilities applicable to all departments/agencies, training requirements, position descriptions, and the common responsibilities for the ESF Coordinator for both the Primary Agency, and the Support Agency(ies). Matrices at the end of the introduction identify: 1) County, State and Federal ESF Coordinator/Primary Agencies; 2) County ESF Coordinator/Primary and Support Agencies: and 3), Department/Agency Assigned ESF Roles. ESF-Specific Appendices An appendix is provided for each of the following ESF and function: ESF FUNCTION 1 Transportation 2 Communications 3 Public Works & Engineering 4 Firefighting 5 Emergency Management 6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing & Human Services 7 Logistics Management and Resource Support 8 Public Health & Medical Services 9 Search & Rescue 10 Oil & Hazardous Materials Response ESF FUNCTION 11 Agriculture & Natural Resources 12 Energy 13 Public Safety & Security 14 Long Term Community Recovery 15 External Affairs 16 Special Needs 17 Tourist Evacuation 18 Mass Fatalities 19 Pet Evacuation & Sheltering 20 Military Support Each ESF appendix addresses the specific functional need, provides capabilities, and has County, State, Federal, and non-governmental departments/agencies assigned roles as an ESF Coordinator, Primary, and Support Agencies. Each appendix describes the purpose, scope, policies, concept of operations, and the specific responsibilities of the ESF Coordinator, Primary Agency, and Support Agencies for that function. ESF Roles and Responsibilities Each ESF Annex identifies the ESF coordinator and the primary and support agencies pertinent to the ESF. Several ESFs incorporate multiple components, with primary agencies designated for each component to ensure seamless integration of and transition between preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities. ESFs with multiple primary agencies will designate an ESF coordinator for the purpose of pre -incident planning and coordination. H-2 Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Following is a discussion of the roles and responsibilities of the ESF coordinator and the primary and support agencies. ESF Coordinator The ESF coordinator has ongoing responsibilities throughout the preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation phases of incident management. The role of the ESF coordinator is carried out through a Unified Command approach as agreed upon collectively by the primary agencies. ESF Coordinator responsibilities include: • Pre -incident planning and coordination; • Maintaining ongoing contact with ESF primary and support agencies; • Conducting periodic ESF meetings and conference calls; • Coordinating efforts with corresponding private -sector organizations; and • Coordinating ESF activities relating to catastrophic incident planning and critical infrastructure preparedness as appropriate. Primary Agencies When an ESF is activated, the primary agency is responsible for: • Orchestrating support within their functional area for the affected population and area; • Providing staff for the operations functions at fixed and field facilities; • Notifying and requesting assistance from support agencies; • Managing mission assignments and coordinating with support agencies, as well as appropriate State agencies; • Working with appropriate private -sector organizations to maximize use of all available resources; • Supporting and keeping other ESFs and organizational elements informed of ESF operational priorities and activities; • Executing contracts and procuring goods and services as needed; • Ensuring financial and property accountability for ESF activities; • Planning for short-term and long-term incident management and recovery operations; and H-3 Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Maintaining trained personnel to support interagency emergency response and support teams. Support Agencies When an ESF is activated in response to an incident, support agencies are responsible for: • Conducting operations, when requested by HCCDA or the designated ESF primary agency, using their own authorities; subject -matter experts, capabilities, or resources; • Participating in planning for short-term and long-term incident management and recovery operations and the development of supporting operational plans, SOGs, checklists, or other job aids, in concert with existing first -responder standards; • Assisting in the conduct of situational assessments; • Furnishing available personnel, equipment, or other resource support as requested by HCCDA or the ESF primary agency; • Providing input to periodic readiness assessments; • Participating in training and exercises aimed at continuous improvement of preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities; • Identifying new equipment or capabilities required to prevent or respond to new or emerging threats and hazards, or to improve the ability to address existing threats; • Nominating new technologies that have the potential to improve performance within or across functional areas to HCCDA for review and evaluation; and • Providing information or intelligence regarding their agency's area of expertise. 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Because the State and County jurisdictions are co-dependent, a coordinated and complimentary approach must be adopted to enable a seamless incident response. ESF #1 provides considerable inter -modal expertise and public and private sector transportation stakeholder relationships. ESF #1 is responsible for coordinating transportation in support of State agencies and County government. Activities are coordinated with federal transportation officials and private sector representatives, as appropriate. Scope ESF #1 includes all activities that may affect roadways (County and State) and ports (sea and air). It includes the Department of Public Works (DPW) statutory responsibilities in regards to transportation infrastructure. It also acknowledges the jurisdiction the State of Hawai'i has over harbors, airports, and State highways, and the safety and security of the State's transportation systems. Support includes, but is not limited to the following activities: • Debris clearance for area assessment and to facilitate movement of emergency personnel and equipment. • Debris clearance and removal from all transportation arteries: State highways, airports, and harbors. • Establish and operate transport terminals, cargo handling operations and tracing systems for disaster response passengers and cargo. • Restricted access to roadways to facilitate emergency response. ESF #1-1 Appendix I (Emergency Support Function #1, Transportation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Policies The primary incident management responsibility is shared by the Hawai'i County Department of Public Works for County roads and facilities, Hawai'i State Department of Transportation for State roads and air & sea port facilities, and the private sector, which owns most of the transportation resources. The Unified Command will establish transportation policies and plans and their priorities for the movement of relief personnel and supplies. County requests for ESF #1 support are forwarded to State Civil Defense or the State EOC, if activated, and coordinated by the State Emergency Response Team (SERT). Requests that cannot be supported by State and private sector assets will be forwarded to the Hawaii National Guard, if they possess the required transportation or response capabilities. Route clearance priorities to CR/KI in impacted areas are: 1. SAR (ESF #9). 2. Mass Care (ESF #6). 3. Utilities (ESF #12) 4. Businesses capable of providing relief supplies. a. Water. b. Food. c. Temporary shelter. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS General ESF #1 provides the County with a single point to obtain key transportation -related information, emergency management, planning, response, and recovery capabilities. Initial response activities that ESF #1 conducts during emergencies include the following: • Reporting the status of and damage to the transportation system and infrastructure. • Assist with identifying temporary alternative transportation solutions when primary systems or routes are unavailable or overwhelmed. • Coordinating appropriate air, harbor, and highway management measures with federal authorities. • Coordinating the issuance of regulatory waivers and exemptions. In addition to the above initial activities, ESF #1 provides longer term coordination of the restoration and recovery of the affected transportation systems and infrastructure, if required. HDOT operates and maintains two commercial service airports, and the general aviation airports, two commercial harbors, and 2,450 miles of highway. Access to harbors and airports are a significant concern due to the need to evacuate personnel and to receive response personnel and resources from the other islands and the continental United States. Initial response support will focus on emergency access to the distribution routes, rapid restoration of airports to support sustainment operations, and restoration of maritime routes to access harbors. ESF #1-2 Appendix 1 (Emergency Support Function #1, Transportation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Following a catastrophic event, restoration of the transportation networks is critical to all response operations. Damage to transportation systems will influence the means and level of accessibility for disaster relief services and supplies. In coordination with county officials, ESF #1 will immediately conduct a damage assessment of State and County transportation systems and assets and submit a prioritized list of resources needed for transport system restoration to the SCO via the County Coordinating Officer (CCO) and Mayor. ESF #1 provides support to ESF #3 for debris removal and disposal. ESF #1 assists and provides technical expertise for debris removal from public roads, airports, and ports. Debris removal efforts will focus first on clearing airports, harbors, and roadways (collectors and arterials) to critical infrastructure and key resources to allow for the movement of emergency vehicles and emergency resources and supplies. Once major transportation routes have been cleared, debris will then be removed from other collector roadways and then remaining county roadways. Private roads will only be cleared to the extent that allows emergency vehicles to enter and egress, if required. Contracting for commercial transportation services will be accomplished by ESF #7. The Corporate Counsel will assist with the preparation and review of emergency contracts. RESPONSIBILITIES The ESF #1 coordinating agency and all the primary and the supporting agencies will send a liaison to the EOC or location of the Unified Command when ESF#1 is activated by HCDA. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Department of Public Works • Responsible for the planning and coordination of activities affecting transportation. Activities include planning, coordination, building and maintaining relationships with ESF primary and support agencies, and conducting periodic training and meetings. • Provide technical assistance in the assessment of damage to the transportation infrastructure and the analysis of the impact of the disaster on transportation operations in the disaster area. • Assess the condition of roadways and bridges to identify unsafe sites that must be closed and, in coordination with the Unified Command and Public Information Officer, issue appropriate warnings. • Provide signage and barricades to control access to hazardous routes. • Coordinate the reconstruction and repair of the County transportation system, including the designation of alternate modal routes in coordination with the State and private sector. • Coordinate law enforcement support for traffic control, public safety, and security at transportation hubs with ESF #5 and ESF #13. ESF #1-3 Appendix 1 (Emergency Support Function #1, Transportation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Primary Agency: Hawai'i Department of Transportation (Highways, Airports, & Harbors Divisions) • Responsible for the planning and coordination of activities affecting transportation. Activities include planning, coordination, building and maintaining relationships with ESF primary and support agencies, and conducting periodic training and meetings. • Provide technical assistance in the assessment of damage to the transportation infrastructure and the analysis of the impact of the disaster on transportation operations in the disaster area. • Assess the condition of airports, roadways, bridges, tunnels, and harbors and identify unsafe sites that must be closed and, in coordination with the Unified Command and Public Information Officer, issue appropriate warnings. • Provide signage and barricades to control access to hazardous routes. • Coordinate the reconstruction and repair of the State transportation system, including the designation of alternate modal routes in coordination with the county and private sector. • Coordinate law enforcement support for traffic control, public safety, and security at transportation hubs with ESF #5 and ESF #13. SUPPORT AGENCIES Agency Functions Office of Corporate • Provide legal advice and representation, as needed, to Counsel protect the interests of the State. • Provide assistance to draft, review, and approve Memorandums of Agreement and emergency contracts. • Develop "hold harmless" and other releases, as required. Hawai'i County Civil • Activate the County EOC, as required. Defense Agency • Coordinate federal, State, County, and private sector support. • Coordinate requests for National Guard Civil Support and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. Hawai'i County • Designate and operate temporary debris collection sites. Department of • Properly dispose of all incident debris. Environmental Management Finance Department • Provide expertise on procurement and support to establish a list of approved vendors and execute pre -event and post - event contracts. • Collect and maintain information for historical databases. Mass Transit Agency • Provide status of County Roads. • Assist with coordinating traffic patterns. • Provide transportation for Incident response workers as required. ESF #14 Appendix I (Emergency Support Function #1, Transportation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Office of Aging • Coordinate transportation for special needs population (elderly) Hawai'i County Police . Provide traffic control. Department Department of Health . Assist with identifying locations for debris disposal and recycling sites. • Assist with obtaining emergency environmental waivers and legal clearances for debris clearance and disposal. • Develop procedures for the safe handling and disposal of radioactive, chemical, and biological materials, including fugitive materials and wastes. • Determine the need for disaster debris clearance from private property. Department of Parks and . Provide transportation for special needs population. Recreation Big Island Contractors • Provide services per contract. Association ESF #1-5 Appendix 2 (Emergency Support Function #2, Communications) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Data Systems Department Primary Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency (HCCDA) Hawaii Police Department (HPD) INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Finance Department Hawai'i Fire Department (HFD) Department of Public Works Pacific Disaster Center Time Warner AT&T Verizon This appendix establishes the policies that will guide the restoration/repair of Hawai'i County's communications network during the response, recovery, and mitigation phases of emergency management. It also establishes policy on which communication system will be used for what purpose and assigns responsibility to County organizations Scope ESF #2 applies to County owned and/or operated communication systems that may be or will be used during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. State and Federal communication systems used during any phase of emergency management fall outside the scope of this appendix. Issues affecting communication systems outside of the scope of ESF #2 will be handled by the affected jurisdiction. Private communication system providers such as telephone, cell phone, cable, and internet do not fall within the scope of this appendix, but ESF #2 will coordinate repair/restoration of these systems for priority areas with the provider of the affected system(s). Policies Public Information will be disseminated in accordance with Annex C, Emergency Public Information, to the Base Plan. Public Information will be disseminated by one or more of the following methods: • The primary means of mass notification is the Emergency Alert System (EAS) via local radio broadcast stations. • The Citywatch notification system will be used for response personnel notifications and when a specific area (district, town, neighborhood, etc.) or population requires notification. • The Talisman notification system is a cellular phone based text message system and will be used to notify the transient population that registers for the service. ESF #2-1 Appendix 2 (Emergency Support Function #2, Communications) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • HPD mobile megaphone announcements may be used to supplement other means of public notification (particularly in areas that have poor or non-existent radio reception and/or poor or non-existent cellular phone coverage). Oral and written public information messages will be transmitted in English. If the resources are available to translate public information into another language and there is sufficient time to do so, public information will be transmitted in non-English languages. The County Radio System is the primary means to convey emergency message traffic within the County Government. Cellular telephone service (voice primary; text secondary) is the secondary means to convey emergency message traffic within the County Government. Landline telephone service is the tertiary means (secondary means for County Agencies that do not have County issued cellular telephones) to convey emergency message traffic within the County Government. The internet, to include email, is not an acceptable means to convey emergency information within the County Government. The internet may be used to post public information that does not have to be updated frequently. Requests for telecommunications equipment and resources are routed through ESF #2. Resource allocation to support emergency contracting for telecommunications equipment and services and backup contracting support is provided through ESF #7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Data Systems Department is designated as the coordinator for ESF #2. As ESF coordinator, Data Systems develops, through the Ho'omakaukau Training and Exercise Program, plans, training, and other activities in coordination with HCCDA, the private sector, and with ESF #2 support agencies. When activated, ESF #2 provides communications support to augment capabilities in the affected area and supports the County EOC, Incident Command Post, State Field Office, or Federal Joint Field Office, as needed. ESF #2 assembles reports of damages to County and State agency communications infrastructure as well as to commercial service provider infrastructure. The ESF will coordinate restoration priorities for private and public networks and systems based on established guidelines. The magnitude of a particular situation determines the extent of the emergency response and the need for communications. The degree to which and the type of telecommunications systems are utilized is directly related to the scope of the incident. ESF #2 will respond to service requests during emergencies according to priorities set by the Policy Group or County EOC. ESF #2 will review its overall roles and responsibilities; document the financial and human resources required to undertake those roles; and establish commitments for government and non-government services required by this ESF. ESF #2-2 Appendix 2 (Emergency Support Function #2, Communications) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF #2 will develop a pool of trained volunteers with specific skill and knowledge sets to provide back up availability during prolonged emergencies and when one or more primary members are not available during an incident. ESF #2 will oversee the employment and status of emergency communications and warning systems. Based on ESF #2 priorities, ESF #5 will coordinate deployment of emergency response satellite communications systems and employment of National Guard communications resources. ESF #2 coordinates County actions to restore and maintain information processing capabilities and telecommunications support to response and recovery operations. ESF #2 assesses the status of County telecommunication capabilities and facilitates the recovery of systems and applications, to include recovery from cyber attacks. ESF #2 coordinates with commercial telecommunications companies to determine the status of their facilities and identify the magnitude of the service disruption. ESF #2 identifies available telecommunications facilities, equipment, and personnel within and outside of the County and coordinates deployment of additional telecommunications equipment and support. ESF 92 requests state, federal and military telecommunications resources through ESF 95 and coordinates deployment of systems to augment County and commercial networks. ORGANIZATION Data Systems is the primary agency for coordinating ESF #2 operations for provisioning with commercial service providers, and oversight of telecommunications and information management resources and support during emergency response operations. HCCDA is the primary agency for coordinating and deployment of ESF 92 emergency response communications resources and support, to include assistance under the Stafford Act (PL 93-288 as amended) Federal Public Assistance Program when authorized. HCCDA will provide technical planning support for employment of state agency, federal agency, and military unit communications resources when provided to augment incident communications capabilities. The private sector plays a key role in restoration of services and providing supplemental services to support the incident response, and will be invited to provide liaisons to ESF #2. RESPONSIBILITIES The ESF #2 coordinating agency and all primary and supporting agencies will send a liaison to the EOC or location of the Unified Command when ESF#2 is activated by HCCDA. ESF #2-3 Appendix 2 (Emergency Support Function #2, Communications) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Data Systems Department • Coordinate with private sector providers and support their efforts to restore services. • Coordinate with County, state, public agencies to determine priorities for restoral of first responder networks, and facilitate provisioning of emergency restoral actions, where appropriate. • Coordinate with service providers to establish temporary emergency telecommunications facilities for use by emergency personnel and the general public until normal capabilities have been restored. • Receive and process requests for telecommunications equipment and coordinate deployment of communications personnel and resources. • Coordinate contracting for telecommunications equipment and services. • Restore the County government information, internet, and video conferencing systems. • Coordinate operations in accordance with the State Communications Interoperability Plan. • Establish and maintain a master list of commercial carrier and service provider contacts with Data Systems, County, and DOD/SCD for emergency responses. • Inventory services and assets that may be required and develop specific contracts with service providers that stipulate how and when telecommunications equipment and related services will be available in emergencies. Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency • Coordinate the operation and maintenance of emergency communications and warning systems. • Coordinate deployment of emergency satellite communications resources to the impacted area to support the overall response. • Operate and maintain backup communications systems between the State EOC and county EOCs to assure continuity of operations in impacted areas. • Coordinate and manage the deployment of federal agency and military unit communications resources which are made available to support disaster operations. Primary Agency: Hawai'i Police Department Assist with emergency telecommunications and warnings, as required. Provide maintenance and technical support to County communications systems, as needed. Support Agencies Agency Functions Finance Department • Identify and allocate funding sources to support communications infrastructure restoration operations. • Coordinate legislative measures for emergency appropriations in support of communications infrastructure repairs. ESF #24 Appendix 2 (Emergency Support Function #2, Communications) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Hawai'i Fire Department • Provide communications support to augment State and county capabilities, as required. • Provide support from department telecommunications systems, as needed. Department of Public • Coordinate transportation for communications equipment, Works resources, and personnel to the impacted area. • Prioritize shipment and deployment of resources in accordance with restoration plans and schedules. • Provide support from department telecommunications systems, as needed. Department of Defense • Provide communications support to augment County and state (Hawaii National Guard) capabilities, as requested. • Provide transportation for communications resources and personnel, as required, to restore the communications infrastructure. Pacific Disaster Center . Provide backup public information dissemination, as requested. Commercial Providers • Restore communications links as quickly as possible in (AT&T, Verizon, accordance with the priorities set by the Mayor or Policy Group. Hawaiiantel, etc.) ESF #2-5 Appendix 3 (Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works & Engineering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Department of Public Works Primary Agencies: Department of Public Works Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Corporate Council Environmental Management Finance Department Human Resources Office of Housing and Community Development Research and Development Department of Water Supply Hawai'i National Guard Department of Education Department of Health Department of Hawaiian Homelands Department of Transportation University of Hawaii, Hilo U.S. Army Corps of Engineers HELCO Emergency Support Function (ESF) #3, Public Works and Engineering, establishes the policy that governs public works and engineering projects, assigns specific responsibilities to primary and support agencies, and creates the framework required to coordinate resources and to manage capabilities that support public works and engineering requirements during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. Scope This appendix applies to all public works and engineering projects that are a direst result of one or more hazards' impact on the Island of Hawai'i when a Unified Command has been established regardless of which jurisdiction (County, State or Federal) is primarily affected by the hazard(s). Policies State and Federal departments and agencies will provide assistance within the constraints of their own authorities to public works and infrastructure assignments. The Unified Command will develop and/or approve work priorities for ESF #3. If a Unified Command has not been established the ESF Coordinating Agency will coordination with County, State, and Federal agencies to develop priorities of work. These priorities will be coordinated with the State Coordinating Officer. County, State, and Federal resources will be coordinated to provide integrated and complimentary support to ESF #3 assignments. ESF #3-1 Appendix 3 (Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works & Engineering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan • The Unified Command or Multi -Agency Coordination Center (MACC) will be responsible for obtaining required statutory and/or regulatory waivers and clearances required to implement ESF #3 assignments. • The MACC will integrate the private sector into incident action planning and response activities that affect critical infrastructure and key resources that partially or completely reside within the private sector. • County, State, and Federal resources and capabilities may assist the private sector in restoring critical infrastructure and key resources that reside in -part or completely within the private sector. • The private sector may take the lead role in the rapid restoration of infrastructure -related services that reside within the private sector. • The ESF #3 coordinator in coordination with HCCDA, the private sector, and ESF #3 support agencies will develop the plans, training, and exercises required to enhance incident response within the framework provided by the Ho'omakaukau Training and Exercise Program. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS In most cases ESF #1, Transportation, will precede ESF #3, Public Works & Engineering, in activation. Once ESF #3 is activated their mission assignments may overlap with ESF #1 mission assignments. When this occurs ESF #1 mission assignments will take priority over ESF #3 mission assignments when there are not enough resources to simultaneously execute both mission assignments. ESF #3 Effective incident response may require significant resources, including personnel with engineering and construction skills, construction equipment, and construction materials, from State, Federal, and private commercial sources within and outside of Hawai'i County. ORGANIZATION DPW is the primary agency for coordinating ESF 93 technical assistance, engineering, and construction management resources and for providing support during incident response. HCCDA is the primary agency for coordinating ESF #3 recovery resources and support, to include assistance under the Stafford Act (PL 93-288 as amended) Federal Public Assistance Program when authorized. The Federal Public Assistance Program provides supplemental assistance for debris removal and disposal, emergency protective measures, and for the repair of disaster -damaged public facilities and the facilities of certain qualified private non-profit organizations. The private sector plays a key role in providing available resources in support of ESF #3. A Unified Command will be established when response and recovery involves two or more jurisdictions. ESF #3-2 Appendix 3 (Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works & Engineering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan RESPONSIBILITIES The ESF #3 coordinating agency and all primary and supporting agencies will send a liaison to the EOC (MACC) or location of the Unified Command when ESF#3 is activated. State organizations' responsibilities are listed in the State ESF Annex. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Department of Public Works • Provide engineers and technical specialists in support of emergency response teams and facilities. These may include: Rapid Needs Assessment teams; Damage Assessment teams; State Emergency Operations Center; SFO, Joint Field Office; and Disaster Assistance and Recovery Centers. • Conduct damage assessments of County -owned buildings and public systems and provide this information to the Unified Command and/or Policy Group. • Repair and/or restore County -owned equipment, buildings and facilities that are under the control of County organizations that do not have the capability to accomplish this task. • Coordinate repair and restoration of damaged public systems (i.e., water, electrical, natural gas, sanitary sewage, generating, distribution systems, etc.), as required. • In coordination with ESF 99, Search and Rescue, demolish or stabilize damaged public and private structures to facilitate search and rescue and/or to protect public health and safety. • During damage assessment, provide technical assistance to County agencies with respect to flooding, water management, structure integrity, and impact assessments of infrastructure. • Provide construction management, construction contracting, and real estate services for all County organizations during the recovery phase of emergency management. Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency • Develop the common operating picture to facilitate the assessment of the extent of damage and the establishment of priorities of work. • Coordinate joint preliminary damage assessments, and damage inspections. • Coordinate the distribution of emergency power supply capability. • Coordinate the distribution of water and ice supplies in accordance with State priorities for health and safety with ESF #6, Mass Care. • Coordinate temporary housing with ESF #6, Mass Care. • Coordinate Federal funding, if available, for post -disaster recovery projects. • Monitor, and if necessary coordinate, the private sector's response and recovery actions to repair and/or restore critical infrastructure and key resources that are partially or completely reside within the private sector. ESF #3-3 Appendix 3 (Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works & Engineering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan Support Agencies Agency Functions Corporation Counsel • Provide legal support for the demolition of and debris removal from private property. • Address County liability issues in all four phases of emergency management. • Review Memorandums of Agreement, emergency contracts, and other documents required to conduct the response and recovery phases of emergency management. • Prepare "Right of Entry" and other legal documents, as required. Department Environmental . Lead agency for all incident -generated debris management Management activities to include pick-up, removal, separation/segregation, recycling, reduction, and disposal of debris. • Coordinate and prioritize debris clearance and removal operations with ESF #1, Transportation, and ESF #9, Search and Rescue during the response phase of emergency management and with ESF #5, Emergency Management, and ESF #14, Long Term Community Recovery, during the recovery phase of emergency management. • Prioritize debris removal projects and coordinate the capabilities and resources required to complete the projects. • Develop a plan for emergency collecting, sorting, and disposing of debris from public and private property and identify collection sites and routes to these sites. Finance Department • Provide budgeting and financial management assistance to County organizations to facilitate the response and recovery phases of emergency management. • Coordinate the documenting of costs directly associated with incident response and recovery for all County organizations involved in the incident. • Monitor incident contracting to ensure that no statutory or regulatory requirements are violated. Human Resources • Provide worker safety advice, assistance, and policy support for debris removal and building demolition. Assistance may include site safety monitoring, worker exposure sampling and analysis, and respirator fit -testing. Office of Housing and • Conduct preliminary damage assessments of business and Community Development commercial facilities. Planning Department • Facilitate reconstruction projects. • Ensure reconstruction projects are in accordance with the General Plan and the Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan. ESF #34 Appendix 3 (Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works & Engineering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Research and Development • Coordinate with the Energy Council and ESF #12, Energy, to prioritize allocation of energy resources during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. Department of Water Supply . Provide engineering support to assist in evaluating damage to water control systems, i.e., dams, levees, and water delivery facilities. • Provide engineering support to other County organizations to facilitate damage assessments, if requested. • Provide construction trade employees, equipment, and vehicles, as requested during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. Department of Defense • Provide staff engineers to assist ESF #3 in the coordination of (Hawaii National Guard) debris removal, emergency power, water and ice. • Provide transportation and engineering resources for debris IF REQUESTED, AND clearance, debris removal, and emergency construction, when APPROVED VIA ESF 920 requested. • Provide potable water, Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU), when requested. • Provide environmental resources including GIS support to ESF #3 for response and recovery activities. Department of Education • Provide engineering support to other State and County organizations for facilities assessment, as requested. • Provide technical support/assistance to facilitate damage assessments of public schools and other facilities, as necessary. • Provide construction trade employees, equipment, and vehicles, as requested during the response phase of emergency management. Department of Health • Provide environmental health personnel to assist in assessing (See Note 1) the status of wastewater and solid waste facilities. • Provide guidance and technical assistance related to health problems associated with hazardous materials. • Assist in monitoring water supplies and determining suitability for human consumption. • Coordinate emergency landfill requirements for disaster debris. • Provide investigative support and intelligence analysis for incidents involving oil or hazardous materials. • Provide guidance and technical assistance for debris management and disposal issues. Department of Hawaiian Home . Identify potential debris management staging areas. Lands . Provide technical support for damage assessments of Department of Hawaiian Home Lands facilities and other facilities as necessary. ESF #3-5 Appendix 3 (Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works & Engineering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Transportation . Perform damage assessments of State infrastructure (airports, harbors, highways) and other facilities, as required. • Conduct debris clearance and removal activities from State transportation infrastructure (may include county roads). • Conduct repairs of roads and highways to support the initial emergency response. • Support State priorities for debris removal. • Repair damaged segments of transportation facilities (airports, harbors, highways, and bridges). • Provide engineering support for facilities assessment and other technical support, as required. • Provide construction trade employees, equipment, and vehicles, as required. University of Hawaii, Hilo • Provide engineering support for facilities assessment and other technical support, as required. • Provide construction trade employees, equipment, and vehicles, as required. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers • Coordinate Emergency Power team missions to establish priorities for emergency generator installation. • Provide emergency power generation technical advice and support, as required. fiELCO • Determine the level of damage to energy production and PGV transmission facilities and provide the assessment to the EOC. Hamakua Energy • Safely resume/restore operations in the shortest amount of time possible. (A delay of 24-48 hours for a permanent repair is preferable to a hasty repair that will require loss of service at a later date to critical infrastructure and key resources. Note 1: Major disasters, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, will cause the destruction of buildings, other structures, and vegetation. This destruction will create significant quantities of debris of uncertain composition. The extraordinary volume of debris can result in the rapid depletion of approved and operating landfill sites and overwhelm existing recycling storage sites and processing capacity. Debris disposal efforts will focus on minimizing the impact on remaining landfill capacity by use of an alternative means of disposal such as recycling or diversion whenever possible. The Department of Health and county officials will designate the location of debris disposal and recycling sites. All necessary emergency environmental waivers and legal clearances for debris clearance and disposal will be obtained by the counties with the assistance of the Department of Health. ESF #3-6 Appendix 4 (Emergency Support Function #4, Firefighting) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Hawai'i Fire Department (IVD) Primary Agency: Hawai'i Fire Department (HFD) Department of Land and Natural Resources (Division of Forestry and Wildlife) INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency (HCCDA) Department of Public Works Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) American Red Cross Joint Task Force Homeland Defense (JTF- HLD) U.S. Coast Guard, District 14 Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4, Firefighting, establishes the policies and procedures for a coordinated County, State and/or Federal response to detect and suppress Type 1 through Type 3 wild land, rural, and urban fires within the County of Hawaii regardless of the jurisdiction in which the fire originates or the jurisdiction(s) impacted by the fire. Scope ESF #4 is applicable to County firefighting operations when responding to a Type 1 through Type 3 incident in fire response zones 1, 3, and 4 and to all (Federal, State, and County) firefighting operations in fire response zones 2 and 5. Policies Firefighting actions will follow this priority: the safety of the general public and firefighters, protection of property, and impact on the environment. Each firefighting agency, with resources in the County of Hawaii, has the primary responsibility for firefighting within their assigned zone of responsibility. The jurisdiction with the primary responsibility for each zone should provide the Incident Commander (IC) until a Unified Command (UC) is established. The firefighting agencies actively engaged in response will determine which agency will provide the IC once a UC is deemed necessary. The Battalion Chief is in charge of planning, coordinating, and executing wildlife fire protection and control per Chapter 185, Land Fire Protection Law, Hawai'i Revised Statutes. The State of Hawaii has Joint Standing Operating Procedures (JSOP) for Mutual Civil Emergency Support, applicable to non -Presidential declared civil emergency support, provided by any U.S. Pacific Command Service Component Commander to the State of Hawai'i and also to any civil emergency support provided by SCD to U.S. Pacific Command Service Component Commands in Hawaii. This agreement is activated if lives and property ESF #4-1 Appendix 4 (Emergency Support Function #4, Firefighting) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan are endangered and available State and HING assets are not capable of providing adequate resources. Existing memorandums of agreement for the allocation and sharing of federal, state, County, or private firefighting resources will be followed. The agreements hold each agency responsible for their own salaries, losses, damages, and injuries to their personnel and equipment while engaged in a mutual undertaking. The agreements also provide that each agency waives all claims against the other for compensation for any loss, damage, personal injury, or death occurring as a consequence of the performance of the agreement. Hawai'i County, U.S. Army Support Command Hawai'i, and the National Park Service will establish a mechanism for mutual support and training. The Incident or Unified Commander will coordinate additional resources through the Multi - Agency Coordination Center (MACC). The County or State jurisdiction with primary responsibility for a wild -land fire will submit a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) request when the incident nears the threshold to qualify for this program. All eligible County and State support agency incident costs will be included in the FMAG request. If a declaration is approved and the cost thresholds are met, up to 75% of the eligible costs will be reimbursed by FEMA in accordance with 44 Code of Federal Regulations Part 204 guidelines. Federal agencies are not eligible to apply for FMAG reimbursement. Requests for state manpower and equipment are submitted through the HCCDA EOC to the SCD EOC. Division of Forestry and Wildlife (DOFAW) Administrator or his designate. The State Protection Forester (SPF) will coordinate mobilization of additional resources. The requesting DOFAW branch is responsible for the administrative/logistical support and tactical deployment of off -island resources from time of arrival to departure. Requests for military firefighting support are initiated by the IC/UC and are forwarded through the HCCDA EOC to SCD or the State EOC, if activated. SCD, or the State EOC, will forward the request to the HING Director of Operations and Military Support (DOMS) for coordination. SCD will coordinate with Joint Task Force—Homeland Defense (JTF-HD) to request active military assets when HIARNG assets are not available when the affected County requests additional assets. All actual costs for HIARNG and active military organizations providing fire suppression resources will be billed at 100% of the cost to the requesting County or State. In the event of a significant fire incident that overwhelms the State's resources, requests for federal assistance, for incidents other than wildland fires, are transmitted from the FEMA Region IX Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or Joint Field Office (JFO), if activated, ESF #4 representative to the Northern California Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC). For wildland fire incidents, requests for assistance in obtaining firefighting resources are submitted as per the National Interagency Mobilization Guide to the GACC and coordinated with the JFO. For resources beyond those available within the geographic ESF #4-2 Appendix 4 (Emergency Support Function #4, Firefighting) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan area, the requests are sent to the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) in Boise, Idaho, by the Geographical Area Coordinator. The NICC contacts the national ESF #4 coordinator in the event of national -level shortages or unavailability of needed resources. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The jurisdiction in which the fire originates will respond to the location, establish an incident command structure, and assess the situation. Type 4 and Type 5 incidents will not require activation of ESF #4. ESF #4 may be activated if the conditions have the potential to exacerbate the fire to an extent that may overwhelm the jurisdiction's ability to effectively respond to the incident. When the Incident Commander determines that ESF #4 should be activated the HCCDA EOC will be activated. At that point the jurisdictions that are, or that will be, active in the incident response will form a Unified Command (UC). The HCCDA EOC will function as the MACC for the incident. ESF #4 will operate out of the HCCDA EOC to manage and coordinate firefighting activities and to mobilize the resources for future operational periods. ESF #4 will also coordinate with mutual aid providers, U.S. Department of Agriculture/Forest Service, and with the HO during Stafford Act declarations for additional firefighting resources. The UC will use available public resources and any available private resources to fight wild - land fires. The Multi -Agency Coordination Group (MACG) at the HCCDA EOC will coordinate resources and support when incident response overwhelms County resources. The State Protection Forester and/or SCD or the State EOC, if activated, will coordinate State, and any Federal support, for fire suppression operations. ORGANIZATION The Jurisdiction with primary responsibility for the incident response will establish the incident command structure and determine how the operations section will be organized. Qualified firefighters from any jurisdiction involved in the incident response may serve in any capacity within the ICS structure. Each jurisdiction's resources should operate as an independent group under the operations section. The independent groups will receive their mission assignments from the operations section. The remaining incident command structure may be filled by any qualified individual regardless of which jurisdiction they represent. RESPONSE ACTIONS • Establish communication links HCCDA and HFD. Obtain initial fire situation and damage assessment; determine the appropriate management response to the request for assistance; and obtain and distribute incident contact information to responders and HCCDA. Analyze requests for personnel and resources and verify that responding personnel have the correct personal protective equipment and training for the response. ESF #4-3 Appendix 4 (Emergency Support Function #4, Firefighting) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Ensure appropriate all -hazard incident -specific training and briefings are conducted prior to deployment. • Obtain, maintain, and provide incident situation and damage assessment information through established procedures. • Coordinate incident resource needs; identify and resolve issues related to resource shortages or ordering. • Maintain close coordination with HCCDA and FWD. • Provide HCCDA the data required to prepare Exhibit E to the FEMA -State Agreement for the FMAG Program for each declared fire (as necessary). • Maintain a complete log of actions taken, resources used, records, and reports. Recovery • Priority of effort is to ensure that firefighting resources are reconstituted and repaired or replaced to maintain response capabilities. • Compile information on incident costs and resource utilization to facilitate reimbursement of eligible costs under the Fire Management Assistance Grant Program, if a declaration is requested and approved. • Settle financial obligations for contracted services. RESPONSIBILITES The primary and supporting departments or agencies will assemble appropriate staff at a designated location to conduct incident response. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawai'i Fire Department • Directs firefighting activities in all areas under Hawai'i County jurisdiction. • The Hawai'i Fire Department has the primary mission to respond to fires, emergency medical incidents, and hazardous materials incidents, to save lives, property, and the environment within Hawai'i County. • Coordinates with appropriate ESF or state and federal agencies to determine and fulfill firefighting resource requirements. • Maintain and periodically update existing mutual aid agreements with state and federal fire fighting agencies with jurisdictions within the County of Hawaii. ESF Primary Agency: Department of Land & Natural Resources Directs firefighting activities in State-owned lands within forest reserves, public hunting areas, wildlife and plant sanctuaries, and natural area reserves. Responsible for measures to prevent, control, and extinguish wildland fires within forest reserves, public hunting areas, wildlife and plant sanctuaries, and natural area reserves. State Protection Forester (SPF) serves as the Principal State Advisor to FEMA for requests for a FMAG declaration. The SPF assesses the threat to life and improved ESF #4-4 Appendix 4 (Emergency Support Function #4, Firefighting) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan property (homes, critical facilities, and infrastructure), as well as fire weather, fire behavior, and fire prognosis. Sunnort Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil Defense • Mobilize and coordinate resources to support operations, as Agency requested. • Assist the IC/UC with disseminating public information. • Recommend and coordinate requests for a Governor's Emergency Proclamation for a drought/fire disaster, as appropriate. • Coordinate and request National Guard Civil Support and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. • Process and forward requests for fire management assistance declarations to State Civil Defense. • Update the County Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan, every 5years, and obtain FEMA approval of the plan. Forward FMAG applications as requested. • Coordinate with ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services) to make sure that emergency first aid and medical triage are available. Department of Public Works • Provide requested resources to fight brush/wild fires. • Provide personnel and resources to close County roads threatened by brush/wild fires. Department of Defense • Support fire fighting operations with air and ground fire (Hawaii National Guard) fighting resources, as requested. • Maintain a record of incident costs, resource utilization, and water bucket drop locations to support reimbursement. • Provide aircraft reimbursable rates to SCD at the start of the new fiscal year. American Red Cross • Provide disaster relief services to meet immediate emergency needs, to include shelter, food, health, and mental health services, to victims and responders. Joint Task Force -Homeland • Assume full responsibility for firefighting activities on Defense DoD installations. • Support firefighting operations in nonmilitary lands with personnel, equipment, and supplies under the terms of the existing Memorandum of Agreement. • Coordinate and provide support as authorized and in accordance with the JSOP for Mutual Civil Emergency Support. U.S. Coast Guard, District 14 • Provide support for marine firefighting incidents. ESF #4-5 Appendix 5 (Emergency Support Function #5, Emergency Management) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Support Agencies: Office of the Mayor Corporate Council Data Systems Department Department of Environmental Management Finance Department Hawai'i Fire Department Human Resources Immigration Information Office Liquor Control Mass Transit Agency Office of Aging Office of Housing and Community Development Parks and Recreation Planning Department Hawai'i Police Department Prosecuting Attorney Department of Public Works Research and Development Department of Water Supply American Red Cross Civil Air Patrol INTRODUCTION Purpose Emergency Support Function (ESF) 95, Emergency Management, establishes the policy and procedures that govern how emergency response and the incident command will be organized and assigns roles and responsibilities to organizations that may play a role during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. Scope ESF #5 is applicable to all County Departments, Agencies, and Offices during incident response to and recovery from Type 1 through Type 4 incidents. ESF #5 will also apply to all State and Federal organizations that provide incident response and recovery resources in support of the Hawai'i County's incident response efforts Policies All County of Hawai'i Departments, Agencies, and Offices will assign the additional duty of Civil Defense Coordinator to someone in their organization who is knowledgeable about the entire organization and who has been delegated, in accordance with the organizations continuity of operations plan, the authority to make decisions for the organization and to ESF #5-1 Appendix 5 (Emergency Support Function #5, Emergency Management) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan commit the organizations resources during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. All County of Hawai'i organizations will participate in Ho'omakaukau, Hawai'i County's multi-year training and exercise program, to prepare for incident response. All County of Hawai'i organizations should have their employees take the four basic Incident Command System (ICS) classes: ICS 100a, Introduction to Incident Command System; ICS 200a, ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents; ICS 700a, National Incident Management System (NEVIS) and Introduction; and ICS 800b, National Response Framework an Introduction. ESF #5 facilitates information flow in the pre -incident phase and is the conduit for situation reports from each activated ESF. Departments/agencies will provide the names and contact information for their primary and alternate representatives to the HCDA Plans and Operations Branch Chief. The HCDA Plans and Operations Branch Chief will maintain a roster of the assigned department/agency representatives and incorporate them into their emergency contact roster. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ESF #5 will be activated when an incident has the potential to exceed the responding organization's ability to effectively respond to the incident. When activated ESF #5 will review the responding organizations assessment of the situation and develop a plan to coordinate the additional resources and support required for effective incident response. The County EOC, which is staffed by ESF #5 and other ESFs when activated, monitors potential or developing incidents, develops the common operating picture, and coordinates resources and support for field operations. In the event of a no -notice event, the Deputy Director of Civil Defense (The Mayor), or his/her designated representative (Hawai'i County Civil Defense Administrator), may direct execution of the Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF #5 will not take command of the incident. ESF #5 will assume the role of the Multi - Agency Coordinating Group (MACG) as part of the effort to resource the incident response which will be based on the Incident Commander/Unified Command's assessment of the situation. ESF #5 coordinates with ESF #6, Mass Care; ESF #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support; ESF #8, Public Health and Medical Services; and ESF #16, Special Needs, to transport personnel requiring emergency medical treatment or special emergency sheltering facilities. ESF #5 works closely with ESF #17, Tourist Evacuation, to coordinate and provide transportation for the evacuation of visitors to other Hawaiian Islands or to other locations. ESF #5-2 Appendix 5 (Emergency Support Function #5, Emergency Management) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan ESF #5 activities carry over from the response phase to the recovery of emergency management. As such, ESF #5 will be the last ESF deactivated. Because ESF #5 activities reach into recovery, organizations providing personnel to support ESF #5 may be required to provide support for an extended period of time following the conclusion of the response phase of emergency management. ESF #5 supports the activation and deployment of damage assessment and emergency response teams. ESF #5 in conjunction with ESF #7 will coordinate, control, prioritize and allocate all modes of transportation in accordance with Senior Policy Group objectives. ESF #5 and ESF #7 will coordinate contracts and other agreements for transportation assistance. The County EOC coordinates operations and situational reporting to the State Civil Defense EOC and FEMA. ORGANIZATION Response Structure Hawai'i County will employ the ICS organizational structure when responding to type 1 through type 5 incidents. This structure includes sections for Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance & Administration. The coordinating agency will provide the Incident Commander, Operations section chief and technical assistance to the Planning section while the Planning, Logistics and Finance & Administration sections will be staffed by Hawai'i County Departments and Agencies with expertise in those areas. The Operations Section is further divided into branches for Human Services (ESF #6, ESF #11, ESF #16, ESF #17 and ESF #19), Emergency Services (ESF #1, ESF #4, ESF #8, ESF #9, ESF #10, ESF #12, ESF #13, and ESF #18), Infrastructure Support (ESF #3), Military Support (ESF #20), and Mitigation (ESF #14) as needed. Each Operations branch will be staffed by Hawai'i County Department or Agency designated as the ESF coordinator for that branch. The Operations Section provides support and services to persons affected by the incident. The Planning Section is further divided into four branches; Resources, Demobilization, Situation, and Documentation. The Planning Section develops the common operating picture, tracks resources, and documents the incident response. The Logistics Section (ESF #7) is further divided into two branches, Service Branch and Support Branch, which in -turn are sub -divided. The Service Branch is divided into Communication (ESF #2), Food, and Medical. The Support Branch is divided into Supply, Facilities, and Ground Support. The Logistics Section is only provides support to organizations and personnel actively involved in response to the incident. Persons affected by the incident receive assistance through the Operations Section. ESF #5-3 Appendix 5 (Emergency Support Function #5, Emergency Management) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan The Financial & Administrative Section is further divided into four branches; Time, Procurement, Compensation, and Cost. The Financial and Administrative Section only provides support to the organizations and personnel actively involved in response to the incident. Every County government employee has a role to play in incident response; regardless of their designation as essential personnel required to conduct their department's/agency's essential functions under their department's/agency's continuity of operations plan. County employees who are not designated as essential personnel are available to fill positions in the ICS staff or provide surge capability for other department's/agency's essential functions. All County departments and agencies will have support plans and emergency roles to perform during incident response to Type 1-3 incidents. Departments and agencies will provide qualified personnel, as tasked, to staff the sections, branches, and units in the ICS organization. All County agencies will provide available vehicles to support response operations, as required. Responsibilities ESF #5 is performed by the County EOC staff in support of the lead agency for the incident. The HCCDA Administrator or the Plans and Operations Branch Chief may be designated as the lead for ESF #5 and may serve as the Planning Section Chief in the ICS command and staff structure. All County departments/agencies will identify essential functions that must be performed to ensure continuity of government and continuity of operations. Personnel required to perform the identified essential functions must be identified as well. Departments/agencies will designate and assign a qualified person as their Civil Defense Coordinator to provide technical advice and coordinate the responsibilities assigned to their department or agency. Departments/agencies must be able to provide representation to support continuous operations over extended periods, as necessary. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency (HCDA) • Conducts preparedness planning with other County departments to develop response plans. • Receives and acts upon requests for assistance from County Departments and Agencies in accordance with established procedures. • On order, activates and convenes the ICS and required ESF(s) to prevent and respond to incidents that may require a coordinated County, state and/or federal response. • Coordinates County assets and capabilities to prepare for and respond to an incident. • Coordinates County preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation planning activities including incident action, current, and future operations planning. • Coordinates staffing at the County EOC. ESF #5-4 Appendix 5 (Emergency Support Function #5, Emergency Management) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan Coordinates law enforcement support for activating, maintaining, and deactivating one- way plans for ordered evacuations. Support Agencies Support agency responsibilities are outlined in the ESF appendices. Support agencies provide liaisons to the County EOC as requested, to assist with the delivery of resources and to provide departmental reports. All agencies, as appropriate, identify points of contact to provide technical and/or subject matter expertise, data, advice, and staff support for operations that fall within their domain. Support capabilities of other organizations may be used as required and available. ESF #5-5 Appendix 6 (Emergency Support Function #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Primary Agency: American Red Cross INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Office of the Mayor Data Systems Department Finance Department Fire Department Immigration Information Office Mass Transit Agency Office of Aging Office of Housing and Community Development Department of Parks and Recreation Police Department Department of Public Works Department of Research and Development Department of Agriculture Department of Agriculture Department of Consumer Affairs Hawai'i National Guard Department of Education Department of Hawaiian Homelands Department of Health Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Department of Land and Natural Resources Department of Taxation Hawai'i State Bar Association VOAD Salvation Army Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services establishes the policy and procedures that govern who is eligible for mass care during an incident and specifies what supplies and services may be available through ESF #6 during an incident. SCOPE ESF #6 is applicable to all County Departments, Agencies, and Offices for Type 1 through Type 4 incidents during the response and recovery phases of emergency management and to all County of Hawaii residents and guests during the incident. All Federal, State, and Non-governmental organizations that provide support to Hawai'i County during an incident are subject to the stipulations and provisions of ESF #6. ESF #6-1 Appendix 6 (Emergency Support Function #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF #6 includes four primary functions: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services • Mass Care: Involves the coordination and provision of services to include sheltering victims, organizing feeding operations, providing emergency first aid at designated sites, collecting and providing information on victims to family members, and coordinating bulk distribution of emergency relief supplies. • Emergency Assistance: Involves support to evacuations (including registration and tracking of evacuees), reunification of families, coordination of donated goods and services, and coordination of voluntary agency and private sector assistance. • Housing: Involves the provisions of assistance for short and long term housing needs of emergency disaster victims. • Human Services: Includes implementation of programs to assist victims of emergencies and disasters to recover their non -housing losses. It includes: referral services, disaster unemployment assistance, tax information, debris removal, health and sanitation assistance, disaster loans, and emergency food stamps. It also includes appropriate case management, crisis counseling and supportive mental health services. Policies ESF 96 policies and concept of operations apply to County Departments and Agencies, the American Red Cross, and any other governmental or non-governmental organization participating in the preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation phases of emergency management. Underlying principles include the following: • ESF #6 may be activated to initiate a County response to an official request from an impacted area. • County assistance and support may vary depending on an assessment of incident impact(s), the magnitude and type of event, and the stage of the response and recovery efforts. • All government/voluntary/private resources will be utilized based on the needs of individuals, households and families impacted by the event as requested and as available. • Supporting medical special needs activities and services will be provided without regard to economic status or racial, religious, political, ethnic, and/or other affiliation. Congregate shelters operated by the County of Hawai'i will follow the provisions specified in Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, to the Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan. Congregate shelters operated by private organizations should consult with the American Red Cross or State Civil Defense in order to conduct safe shelter operations. ESF #6-2 Appendix 6 (Emergency Support Function #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Prior to activation, ESF #6 functions are managed and coordinated by the organization with daily responsibility for that function. When the organizations resources are overwhelmed or the number of affected persons is large, ESF #6 may be activated to prioritize how the limited available resources will be organized and tasked. Initial response activities will focus on immediate health, safety, and shelter needs of victims directly impacted by the incident. Recovery efforts may be initiated concurrently with response activities if the situation warrants immediate recovery actions. ESF #6 operations will be performed in parallel with other ESF activities in accordance with guidance from the Policy Group. ESF #6 will coordinate support requirements with the Multi - Agency Coordination Group. ESF #6 will coordinate operations with ESF #16, Special Needs, to provide for the care of the special health needs and vulnerable population groups, and with ESF #19, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering, to provide for pet care. ESF #6 may provide representatives to the Joint Field Office (JFO), if a Federal Disaster Declaration authorizes individual assistance. RESPONSIBILITIES The primary and support departments and agencies assemble staff at a designated location to support operations. The location may be the County EOC, State Field Office, or the federal JFO. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency • Activate required support agencies and coordinate ESF #6 logistical and fiscal activities. • Coordinate support with ESF # 8, Public Health & Medical Services, and ESF #18, Mass Fatalities, for mass casualty incidents. • Coordinate requests for water and ice with ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering. • Coordinate Special Needs sheltering with ESF #8, Public Health & Medical Services. • Coordinate Pet sheltering with ESF #19, Pet Evacuation & Sheltering. ESF Primary Agency: American Red Cross • Support evacuation and sheltering operations in the impacted area. • Procure, store, and distribute supplies and equipment at the shelters. • Coordinate for the feeding of disaster victims and emergency workers through the combination of fixed sites, mobile feeding units and bulk food distribution with ESF 911. • Implements Disaster Welfare Information (DWI) systems to collect and provide information regarding individuals residing within the affected area to immediate family members outside the affected area. • Coordinate disaster assistance programs including support for crisis counseling, disaster unemployment assistance, and disaster legal services. ESF #6-3 Appendix 6 (Emergency Support Function #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Provide assistance with short-term and long-term temporary (and possibly permanent) housing requirements of eligible victims. Housing assistance provided to victims may include: o Rental assistance o Temporary housing o Loans for the repair and/or replacement of primary residences • Coordinate emergency shelter and congregate care operations. • Provide food and emergency first aid services to disaster victims. • Develop and maintain DWI services. • Provide disaster damage assessments to HCCDA. Support Agencies Agency Functions Office of the Mayor • Take lead for ESF 915, if activated. • Provide policy guidance for incident response. Data Systems • Provide communication links to the DWI centers, as required. Department Finance Department • Provide logistical support for mass care requirements through ESF #7, Logistics Management and Resources Support. Hawai'i Fire Department • Provide EMS support. Immigration Information . Facilitate public information to special needs population (new Office arrivals, limited English proficiency). Mass Transit Agency . Provide and coordinate transportation resources and networks to support response and distribution operations. • Provide technical assistance, as required. Office of Aging • Provide assistance to special needs population (elderly). • Coordinate with ESF 45, Emergency Management to facilitate incident response to special needs population (elderly). Office of Housing and • Provide assistance for the short and long term temporary and Community permanent housing needs of Section 8 participants. Development • Assess federal grants and coordinate the use of existing grants to finance loans for the repair of eligible homes and other eligible disaster assistance/loans. Parks and Recreation . Make facilities available for temporary shelter and as assembly points/ staging areas for response personnel. • Assist DPW with ESF #1, Transportation, as requested. Police Department • Secure mass casualty sites. • Provide traffic control between mass casualty site(s) and medical facilities. ESF #6--4 Appendix 6 (Emergency Support Function #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Public • Keep route(s) between mass casualty site(s) and medical facilities Works clear of debris and obstructions Research and • Coordinate mass care support for stranded visitors with ESF #17, as Development required. • Provide disaster loan assistance in accordance with the Commercial and Personal Loan Program. Department of • Coordinate emergency farm loan assistance through ESF #14. Agriculture Department of . Provide assistance to consumers affected by adverse insurance Commerce and industry actions on personal and household property impacted by Consumer Affairs disaster. Department of Defense • Provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities for security, (Hawaii National Guard) transportation, evacuation, and communications, as required. • Provide support to staff logistic supply points and deliver essential supplies to critical areas. • Provide support to law enforcement agencies to augment security for food sources, distribution points, supplies, and emergency shelters, when directed. Department of Education . Provide support from available school facilities for emergency feeding and sheltering, as required. • Coordinate with USDA Food and Nutrition Services (FNS) to obtain food commodities. • Perform duties as the State Distributing Agency for USDA FNS commodities to distribute food to eligible organizations. • Coordinate use of the school lunch program and food supplies, as needed, for congregate care. Department of Hawaiian . Assess the condition of departmental homestead programs in Home Lands communities impacted by disaster. • Provide resources to support disaster relief operations. Department of Health . Provide medical supplies and services, as required. • Provide public health workers to augment shelter management teams. • Coordinate health care (including the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams and Medical Reserve Corps) and mental health services for the impacted population. • Provide casualty information from the affected area in support of a DWI system. • Coordinate assistance for the disabled and community based program recipients with ESF #1 and ESF #16. • Provide a database on licensed care providers and home -care facilities, as required. ESF #6-5 Appendix 6 (Emergency Support Function #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Labor and • Establish temporary unemployment compensation and employment Industrial Relations offices in disaster areas, as required. • Provide employment information regarding labor and unemployment. • Assist in solving special employment problems brought about by the disaster. • Administrate the federal program for Disaster Unemployment Assistance. • Support efforts and programs which provide outreach messages to inform individuals with limited English proficiency, and immigrant population of preparedness procedures and response actions. Department of Land and • Provide National Flood Insurance Program information to disaster Natural Resources victims. • Provide engineering technical assistance to ESF #6 and ESF #5, as required. Department of Taxation . Provide technical assistance to disaster victims, as required. Hawaii State Bar • Coordinate legal assistance support from the Young Lawyers Association Division for eligible disaster victims, as needed. Voluntary Organizations • Coordinate disaster relief volunteers, commodities, and services from Active in Disaster supporting organizations. • Provide call center support (2-1-1) as available. • Provide referral services, as needed. Pacific Disaster Center . Provide geographical information systems support, as needed. ESF #6-6 Appendix 7 (Emergency Support Function #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Primary Agencies: Finance Department INTRODUCTION Purpose Office of the Mayor Corporation Council Mass Transit Agency Parks and Recreation Department of Public Works Human Resources Department Department of Education Hawai'i National Guard East Hawai'i VOAD Emergency Support Function (ESF) 97, Logistics Management and Resource Support, establishes the policy and procedures for procuring, managing, and distributing resources by County of Hawaii organizations during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. Scope Logistics management and resource support consists of emergency relief supplies, equipment, services, temporary facilities, and contracting services in support of County incident response and recovery efforts. Functions include, but are not limited to: • Accounting for all County emergency response and recovery expenditures in order to quantify costs and develop future budgets. • Locating, procuring, receiving, distributing, and if necessary contracting for resources necessary to support response and recovery efforts. • Transporting personnel requiring emergency medical treatment. • Transporting special emergency sheltering facilities from port of debarkation to their assigned location. • Creating and maintaining a data base of County, State, and private transportation (air, surface, marine) resources. • Providing transportation for emergency response personnel, equipment, and supplies when requested. This may include prioritized booking on federal, State, or commercial transport. ESF #5, Emergency Management, will set priorities of movement for supplies and personnel. • Hiring and providing orientation to personnel when requested by County departments to meet emergency response and recovery operations. • Managing unsolicited cash, goods, and donated services. • Negotiating contingency contracts to be activated during incident response prior to an incident occurring. ESF #7-1 Appendix 7 (Emergency Support Function #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Policies Hawai'i County's primary source of resources for incident response is Public resources. Privately held resources physically located on the island are the secondary sources for incident response. Requests for State and Federal resources will be submitted to State Civil Defense (SCD) or the State EOC, if activated. Hawai'i County will request through SCD that the Governor of Hawai'i make an emergency declaration when the incident warrants the request. ESF #7 provides transportation support to all personnel participating in incident response from the port of debarkation to their response location and back to the port of embarkation. All County agencies will provide available County vehicles to support incident response operations when requested by ESF #5, Emergency Management, or ESF # 7. Once State and/or Federal resources are available, ESF #7 will coordinate the transportation of these resources with the federal emergency response teams under FEMA. The County Coordinating Officer, State Coordinating Officer, FCO and the Unified Coordination Group will identify, prioritize, and support county requirements for transportation. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS When an incident occurs, County organizations will coordinate the distribution of materials and supplies necessary to meet the immediate emergency needs of disaster victims through ESF #7, when activated. County organizations will activate contingency contracts and/or seek expedient sources of procurement of facilities, resources and supplies as on -hand assets are depleted or overwhelmed, and the need for interim facilities and/or emergency contractor services is identified. The measure of success for ESF #7 is the timeliness in which identified needs are met (establish time procurement goals for commodities, resources, and services; but with the understanding that these are only arbitrary goals, the extent of the situation will determine actual, reasonable timeliness). Critical to those efforts is the need to coordinate shipments into the County and the reception and distribution of goods. Coordination with ESF #1 is necessary to gain proper authorization and priority for movement of goods into and within the County. Establishment of one or more Points of Distribution (PDA) may be required to serve as a centralized site for receiving, inventorying, storing, and distributing relief supplies. Media attention may generate spontaneous offers of assistance from the public which will complicate resource management and require coordination with volunteer manager in the Coordination Group. ESF #7-2 Appendix 7 (Emergency Support Function #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Resource support operations, as a minimum, must be prepared to provide the following goods or services: Ice Vehicles Relief supplies Office supplies/equipment Duplicating/printing RESPONSIBILITIES Water Generators Medical supplies/services Portable toilets Telecommunications Food Fuel Waste/debris removal Office/warehouse space Transportation When public and private resources are insufficient for incident response, the County will seek assistance with a request to the Governor for support from the federal government through a Presidential Disaster Declaration. As recovery efforts progress and the situation is stabilized, arrangements may be made, by mutual consent, to shift these initial responsibilities to other appropriate organizations or agencies. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency • Prioritize resource support requirements from all organizations involved in incident response. • Maintain a database of food supplies available through retail and wholesale suppliers. • Identify emergency food stocks for use in ESF 96 operations. • Coordinate law enforcement escort -support for the strategic national stockpile (SNS), emergency materials, supplies, and personnel vehicles, singularly or in conjunction with ESF #5. • Locate and coordinate use of space for incident management and response activities. • Activate a Donation Coordination Center (DCC) to centrally manage donations. • Establish and direct a program, when requested, to use spontaneous unaffiliated volunteers to meet exigent manpower requirements for incident response. • Establish a phone bank with an 800 number in the DCC to receive and respond to donation offers and volunteer services. • Oversee and coordinate management of spontaneous volunteers and unsolicited donations. Receive, account for and distribute all donated cash and goods specifically designated for County (government) use. Primary Agency: Finance Department • Establish communications with private vendors to prevent inadvertent redundancy of government agency efforts to procure materials and services. • Locate, procure, receive, distribute, and if necessary, contract for resources necessary to support response and recovery efforts. • Coordinate with HCCDA or ESF #5 to pre -identify POD sites. Coordinate emergency contracts, as needed. Provide funding to purchase and contract goods and services ESF #7-3 Appendix 7 (Emergency Support Function #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Negotiate contingency contracts for emergency supplies and services listed in the concept of operations with local venders to be activated, if needed, during incident response. Support Agencies: Agency Functions Office of the Mayor • Provide policy guidance to incident response. Corporate Council • Provide assistance regarding legal issues such as licensing of professional volunteers, contracts, liability, and interpretation of State statutes. • Assist with the preparation of emergency contracts, as required. Mass Transit Agency • Identify, procure, prioritize and allocate available transportation resources. • Coordinate transportation assets to support mass care and evacuation plans. Parks and Recreation • Provide staging areas for incident response equipment and personnel. • Provide locations for warehousing of incident response supplies (Points of Distribution). Human Resources • Publish and maintain personnel policies applicable to State civil service employees during an emergency. • Provide assistance with labor issues. Public Works • Establish and operate an emergency supply warehouse. Department of Defense • Assist in the distribution of relief supplies to RSAs, (Hawaii National Guard) distribution centers, and isolated portions of the community. • Provide support to law enforcement agencies and assist with security for the transport and storage of relief supplies. • Provide air and surface transportation to assist with movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. • Provide staff support to the Logistics Section, SERT Organization, when requested. Department of Education • Provide vehicles, equipment, and personnel to assist with logistics operations. • Provide space, as required, to warehouses resources required to support incident response. ESF #74 Appendix 7 (Emergency Support Function #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency operations clan Agency Functions East Hawai'i Voluntary • Coordinate resource support requirements and capabilities of Organizations Active in volunteer organizations with HCCDA or through the Disaster volunteer organizations' designated representatives at the Multi -Agency Coordination Group (MACG). ESF #7-5 Appendix 8 (Emergency Support Function #8, Public Health and Medical Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Support Agencies: Department of Health Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Hawai'i Fire Department Primary Agencies: Office of Aging Office of Housing and Community Department of Health Development Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs Department of Defense (State Civil Defense) Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) Department of Human Services Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Department of Land and Natural Resources Department of Transportation Hawaii Health Systems Corporation County Emergency Services/Fire Department American Red Cross INTRODUCTION Purpose Emergency Support Function (ESF) 98, Public Health and Medical Services, establishes the policy and procedures for coordinated County and State incident response to a public health and medical disaster, potential or actual incident requiring a coordinated response, and/or during a developing potential health and medical emergency during the preparation, response and recovery phases of emergency management. ESF #8, in conjunction with ESF #5, coordinates incident related health and medical support to individuals and groups affected by the incident. Medical Services support to incident response personnel is an ESF #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support, responsibility. Public Health and Medical Services support is categorized in the following core functional areas: • Health surveillance and assessment of public health/medical needs. • Injury prevention. • Medical and veterinary care personnel, equipment, and supplies. • Patient care and evacuation. • Safety and security of drugs, biologics, and medical devices. • Safety and security of blood, blood products, and food. ESF #8-1 Appendix 8 (Emergency Support Function #8, Public Health and Medical Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Public health and medical consultation, technical assistance, and support. Behavioral health care. • Vector Control Public health and medical services include responding to medical needs associated with mental health, behavioral health, and substance abuse considerations of incident victims and response workers. Services also cover the medical needs of members of "at risk" or "special needs" population described in the Pandemic and All -Hazards Preparedness Act and in the National Response Framework. This includes a population whose members may have medical and other functional needs before, during, and after an incident. Public health and Medical Services include behavioral health needs consisting of both mental health and substance abuse considerations for incident victims. Policies All requests from appropriate county authorities for medical and public health assistance will be assumed to be valid. Upon receiving conflicting or questionable requests, ESF #8 will attempt to confirm the actual needs. Assistance in pre -event evacuation may be provided whenever patients or clients of the State and the Department of Health are affected, or pre -established plans for health care institutions have failed. Medical care is provided at a cost to be determined by DOH during the incident. The cost to the individual may be waived if State or Federal funds are made available to pay for incident response. Patients will be seen per the triage guidelines used by hospital emergency rooms. Organization Department of Health (DOH): serves as the primary coordinating agency for ESF #8 within Hawai'i County and will provide the link to Federal medical resources through the DOH Department Operations Center. Multi -agency Coordination System (MACS): The EOC provides the location for the MACS. All resources and support requirements that are not Federal medical resources will be arranged through the MACS. Hospitals: The hospitals are primary critical infrastructure for ESF #8. Secondary critical infrastructure includes licensed care facilities and established points of distribution (POD). ESF #8-2 Appendix 8 (Emergency Support Function #8, Public Health and Medical Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Emergency Medical Services: EMS is the primary mode of transportation for victims to the critical infrastructure. EMS assets should not be assigned tasks that pull them from their primary task, such as manning a POD or staffing a shelter. DMAT/DMOTNMAT: These specialized teams are available from State and Federal sources that may augment the existing medical resources when the incident response exceeds the islands response capacity. DOH will establish one or more of the following sites when the situation warrants: • Alternate Care Site (ACS) which will provide basic medical care and triage. • Pandemic Alternate Care Site (PACS) which will provide basic medical care during a pandemic incident. • Disaster Alternate Care Site (DACS) which will provide licensed care facility support when intermediate care facilities are overwhelmed or incapacitated. • Acute Care Module (ACM) which will provide acute care when hospitals are overwhelmed or incapacitated. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS When State public health and medical services support is required, the District Health Administrator deploys a DOH civil defense coordinator to the County EOC. The DOH civil defense coordinator will normally serve as an agency representative to the County EOC and may fulfill the role of a special health advisor to the Policy Group. The District Health Administrator will liaison with the DOH Department Operations Center which is a fixed facility located at Kinau Hale in Honolulu. The center is a critical node for health resource management. It maintains redundant emergency communications links with District Health Officers, who are located in the counties of Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii, and with health coalition organizations. The DOH Department Operations Center may be activated to perform the following tasks: • Evaluate and analyze the situation and monitor the operational capability of the State's healthcare facilities and emergency medical services. • Evaluate and respond to reports of health concerns and requests for technical and public health assistance. • Provide health advisories and coordinate public information. • Coordinate and deploy medical teams and health care resources. • Conduct contingency planning to meet anticipated demands. The Director of Health also designates a SERVESF #8 cell to serve in the SERT Organization. The SERVESF #8 cell works closely with the DOH Department Operations Center staff to coordinate the following: • Requirements for additional medical personnel and resources. ESF #8-3 Appendix 8 (Emergency Support Function #8, Public Health and Medical Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Hospital bed availability and patient transport needs. • Mental health, sanitation and medical resource needs for victims and responders. • Health risk communication materials and public information releases. • Medical resources for the emergency sheltering of special health needs groups. • Vector control. • Status of potable water and wastewater systems and solid waste transfer stations. • Victim identification, mortuary services, and death certificates. • Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT); Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT); and Veterinarian Medical Assistance Teams (VMAT). • Pharmaceutical and Strategic National Stockpile operations. RESPONSIBILITIES ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Department of Health • Direct, coordinate and integrate the overall State effort to provide medical, public health, substance abuse services and mental health assistance to affected areas. • Mobilize and deploy medical resources to provide patient care and assessment teams to identify medical needs/priorities. • In coordination with ESF #5, direct the activation and deployment of Hawaii disaster medical assistance teams and volunteers under the Medical Reserve Corps. • Coordinate the evacuation and/or relocation of patients and victims through ESF #1, when deemed appropriate. • Ensure the safety of food, drugs, biologic products and medical devices and arrange for the seizure and disposal of contaminated or unsafe products. • Assess the threat of vector-borne diseases and hazardous materials. • Test air, potable water sources, and near -shore waters for hazards or contamination and issue appropriate warnings and restrictions. • Coordinate technical assistance requirements with the Centers for Disease Control, US Department of Health and Human Services. • Establish lines of communication and coordination with FEMA Region IX ESF #8. • Coordinate and manage receipt and distribution of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). • Coordinate any waiver of rules and regulations regarding licensed professional personnel. Support Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency • Activate EOC, if required. • Coordinate County incident response through the MACS Hawai'i Fire Department • Provide EMS services, as required. Office of Aging • Coordinate assistance to special needs populations (elderly) who do not reside in an assisted care facility. ESF #84 Appendix 8 (Emergency Support Function #8, Public Health and Medical Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Office of Housing and • Coordinate assistance to special needs populations (economically Community disadvantaged). Development Department of • Provide technical assistance, management and response to foreign Agriculture animal diseases in domestic livestock and poultry. • Provide technical assistance regarding the handling of contaminated and non -contaminated animal remains. Department of • Verify licensure of medical/health care personnel and provide Commerce and credentialing, as required. Consumer Affairs Department of Defense • Coordinate and request National Disaster Medical System (State Civil Defense) (NDMS) support. • Coordinate with DOH to request the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and support storage, security, and distribution operations, as required. • Coordinate requests for federal assistance and/or Defense Support to Civil Authorities. • Coordinate and assist with dissemination of public health information, as required. Department of Defense • Provide assistance from the Chemical, Biological, (Hawaii National Guard) Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP), as required. • Provide support from the 93rd Civil Support Team (CST), as required. • Provide Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) support to augment civilian medical capabilities, as required. • Provide security for the Strategic National Stockpile, when released. • Provide transportation and communications support, as required. Department of Human . Provide funeral payments for deceased persons who are eligible Services for medical or financial assistance from the State or for those with no known or surviving relatives. • Provide assistance with Medicaid applications. Department of Labor and . Monitor the health and well-being of emergency workers. Industrial Relations . Provide technical assistance and guidance on health and safety measures for responders. Department of Land and . Provide management and response to foreign animal diseases in Natural Resources the wildlife and feral animal population. • Provide watercraft, as required, for collection and sampling. ESF #8-5 Appendix 8 (Emergency Support Function #8, Public Health and Medical Services) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of • Provide technical assistance in identifying and arranging for Transportation transportation to support movement of seriously ill or injured patients from the impacted area. • Coordinate air traffic control and maritime support to expedite priority missions and cargo. • Provide transport for personnel, medical supplies and equipment. Hawaii Health Systems • Coordinate State hospital resources, as required. Corporation . Provide operational status reports. • Perform damage assessments of State hospital facilities. American Red Cross • Provide emergency first aid and supportive counseling. • Assist community health personnel, as available. • Provide available personnel to assist with health services, administrative and logistics support. • Provide blood products and services as needed. ESF #8-6 Appendix 9 (Emergency Support Function #9, Search and Rescue) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Hawai'i Fire Department Primary Agency: Hawai'i Fire Department INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Hawai'i Police Department Department of Agriculture Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) Department of Land and Natural Resources Department of Transportation U.S. Coast Guard, District 14 Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9, Search and Rescue, establishes the policy and procedures for Search and Rescue (SAR) operations during the response phase of emergency management for Type 1 through Type 4 incidents within Hawai'i County. ESF #9 will coordinate all SAR (County, State, and Federal) during and incident even if the SAR activity is not associated with the incident for which ESF #9 has been activated. Scope This appendix applies to Hawai'i County SAR resources when they are assigned missions within the County of Hawai'i's jurisdiction. State, Federal, and Neighbor Island resources will operate in accordance with this appendix when operating as part of a Unified Command either within their jurisdiction or within another jurisdiction while conducting SAR in Hawai'i County during a Type 1 through Type 4 incident. SAR activities involve locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to persons trapped in collapsed structures. ESF #9 also includes other disaster related SAR activities, including locating persons trapped in natural debris or in water. Policies The State disaster response system assists and augments local SAR capabilities. Upon activation by State Civil Defense (SCD), resources are considered State assets. All volunteers are considered State employees in accordance with Chapter 128 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes. The Hawaii Search and Rescue Team (HI SAR) operates under a Memorandum of Understanding between the four counties and the State Department of Defense. First response agencies will command single jurisdiction incidents. When ESF #9 is activated for an incident that requires and extensive SAR effort, ESF #9 will identify and request the specialized SAR disciplines required for effective incident response and then prioritize and coordinate their missions upon arrival. ESF #9-1 Appendix 9 (Emergency Support Function #9, Search and Rescue) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Jurisdictions: Each jurisdiction residing within Hawai'i County is responsible for SAR activities within their jurisdiction. If they lack the required resource for effective SAR, then they may activate the mutual aid agreement with the jurisdiction that has the required resource. Mutual Aid Agreements: Each jurisdiction in Hawai'i County should enter into a codified mutual aid agreement with the other two jurisdictions to provide SAR resources when requested. The Agreements should also specify which jurisdiction will specialize in which SAR capabilities in order to reduce duplication of effort. Reimbursement: The private citizen who requires the use of SAR resources is financially liable for the direct SAR expenses. If the individual does not survive the SAR event, the individual's family is responsible for direct SAR expenses. If the SAR event is associated with a large incident where State or Federal funds are made available to offset response and recovery expenses, the SAR expenses may be covered with those funds. Under what conditions does SAR switch to recovery operations? County Assets supporting region (State SAR Response System) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The State SAR Response System integrates specialized statewide resources and coordinates response from out- of -state resources. The system is based on the concept of flexible response to disasters. While the Federal SAR Response System focuses on deploying large "Task Forces," to collapsed structure incidents, the State SAR Response System focuses on preparing local resources to respond and supports local efforts by coordinating deployment of additional resources as necessary. SCD may activate the State SAR Response System for any actual or potential event likely to result in persons trapped in collapsed structures, under natural debris, or in bodies of water that may overwhelm existing local SAR resources. Activation is dependent upon the nature and magnitude of the event, the suddenness of onset, and the capabilities of SAR resources in the affected area. ORGANIZATION SCD coordinates SAR resources through ESF #9. The Vice Director of Civil Defense appoints a State Search and Rescue Coordinator, who acts as Liaison between SCD and the various counties, State, and private SAR resources and coordinates the activities of ESF #9. SCD supports the HI SAR by providing training, equipment, and coordination activities. The State Disaster SAR Response System consists of HI SAR and the Hawaii National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP). ESF #9-2 Appendix 9 (Emergency Support Function #9, Search and Rescue) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan The HI SAR Team consists of five elements: Command, Rescue, Medical, Search, and Support. The Command Element coordinates field activities and maintains safety controls. The Support Element provides logistics, communications, structural safety assessment and planning functions. The HI SAR Team is centered on the Rescue Element, comprised of a Rescue Squad in each of the four counties. Each Rescue Squad is comprised of volunteers from the county fire departments who serve at the discretion of the Fire Chief. The Rescue Element is enhanced by a Medical Element consisting of professional medical personnel with specialized training in treating patients in disasters and a Search Element consisting of volunteer personnel capable of locating trapped and inaccessible subjects utilizing canines and technical search equipment. If a disaster involves a large geographic area or multiple remote incidents where persons may be trapped, State -activated resources from different HI SAR Elements can be teamed and sent to locations to support local responders or can be assigned to primary responsibility for operations in a specific area. For response to incidents involving collapsed reinforced masonry structures, State -activated resources can be combined as the complete HI US&R Team, capable of conducting highly technical operations similar to the capability of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) style "Task Forces." The CERFP consists of three elements: Medical, Decontamination, and Search and Extraction. The elements can be activated individually or as a combined force. In cases where CERFP resources are needed to support SAR efforts, SCD will coordinate CERFP activation through the Hawaii National Guard Director of Operations and Military Support. ACTIONS Initial Actions State Civil Defense When an event may require State activation of Disaster SAR resources, SCD can place HI SAR on Advisory. During the Advisory Phase, HI SAR utilizes internal processes for notifying personnel and determining response capability based on availability of personnel, equipment, and canines. When a local authority requests State -activated Disaster SAR resources or in the event of an impending or current event likely to overwhelm local resources, SCD can place HI SAR on Alert. During the Alert Phase, SCD utilizes the Civil Defense System to alert local governments and State agencies with employees who serve on HI SAR that personnel may be needed for State Disaster SAR response. HI SAR utilizes an internal process for alerting HI SAR volunteers. Local governments, State agencies, and volunteers advise SCD of response availability. ESF #9-3 Appendix 9 (Emergency Support Function #9, Search and Rescue) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Based on the availability of resources, ESF #9 provides SCD with recommendations on activation of individual HI SAR and other resources. SCD authorizes specific resources to be activated for State service and assumes responsibility for coordinating transportation and logistical support for the deployment. ESF #9 begins planning for demobilization as soon as practical after activation. During demobilization, SCD coordinates demobilization of resources and assists HI SAR in returning to operational readiness. Continuing Actions State Civil Defense ESF #9 continuously evaluates ongoing SAR operations. ESF #9 makes recommendations to SCD for additional State registered resources, in-state federal resources, and out-of-state federal resources. When federal SAR resources are activated for service in the State of Hawaii, ESF #9 coordinates the deployment with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Civil Defense Agencies/Department of Emergency Management Civil defense agencies of counties where State -activated resources are deployed coordinate the ground transportation requirements of the State resources from other islands. Once State - activated resources arrive at an incident, the civil defense agency supports logistical needs through the Incident Command. During sustained operations, the civil defense agency will provide SCD with periodic reports on the status of resources and SAR operations. SCD, through ESF #9 will constantly re- evaluate operations to determine if additional resources are needed. When the civil defense agency no longer requires the services of State -activated resources or the resources must otherwise discontinue operations, the civil defense agency will initiate demobilization by advising SCD. RESPONSIBILITIES ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawai'i Fire Department • Develop County SAR policy, provides planning guidance and coordination assistance. • Standardize SAR procedures. • Fund special equipment and training requirements within available appropriations, and reimburses, as appropriate, costs incurred as a result of deployment. • Coordinate logistical support for SAR assets during field operations. • Develop policies and procedures for the effective use and coordination of SAR assets. ESF #94 Appendix 9 (Emergency Support Function #9, Search and Rescue) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan SUPPORT AGENCIES Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil Defense • Activate EOC, if Required. Agency • Coordinate additional resources requested by HF D. • Provide logistics support for SAR resources responding from off -island. Hawai'i Police Department • Provide incident site security. Department of Agriculture • Provide veterinary support for HI SAR canine assets. • Assist with clearance of search dogs from out-of-state. Department of Defense • Provide transportation and logistics support for HI SAR (Hawaii National Guard) resources, as required. • Authorize and coordinate response of CERFP resources. Department of Land and • Provide personnel for HI SAR. Natural Resources . Provide personnel and equipment for water rescue operations. • Provide ESF 94 support, when requested. Department of Transportation • Provide personnel for HI SAR, when requested. • Provide personnel and equipment for water rescue operations in commercial harbors. U.S. Coast Guard, District 14 . Coordinate maritime and waterborne SAR. • Facilitate resolution of any conflicting demands for waterborne or maritime distress response resources. ESF #9-S Appendix 10 (Emergency Support Function #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Support Agencies: Hawai'i Fire Department Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Department of Environmental Management Primary Agency: Department of Public Works Department of Agriculture Hawai'i Fire Department Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism Department of Defense (State Civil Defense) Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Department of Land and Natural Resources Department of Transportation US Coast Guard, District 14 US Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX American Red Cross INTRODUCTION Hawai'i County's geographical isolation makes it imperative for the County to develop on - island capabilities to plan for and respond to oil and hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant emergencies. Purpose Emergency Support Function (ESF) 910, Oil and Hazardous Materials, provides an all - hazards approach in responding to an actual or potential discharge or release of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials. ESF #10 will provide a coordinated interagency response to an actual or potential release of hazardous materials, resulting from a transportation incident, fixed facility incident, natural disaster (i.e., hurricane, flood, etc.), or terrorist attack. ESF #10 will use a broadly defined definition Hazardous materials which will include oil; hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), as amended; pollutants and contaminants defined under Section 101 (33) of CERCLA; and certain chemical, biological, and radiological material, including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). ESF #10 includes the appropriate actions for all four phases of emergency management. ESF #10-1 Appendix 10 (Emergency Support Function #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Policies As the ESF #10 coordinator, the Hawai'i County Fire Department (HFD) is responsible for monitoring and enforcing environmental laws relating to releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants. As such, the HFD develops hazardous materials plans, provides planning guidance and coordinating assistance, evaluates operational readiness, and oversees site cleanup actions. All County departments and agencies with statutory responsibilities and assets to support local response efforts support ESF #10. County agency actions are determined by specific State and County statutes, and agency plans and policies. Appropriate response and recovery actions can include efforts to detect, identify, contain, decontaminate, cleanup or dispose of released hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants. If the incident is large enough to require a response by State or federal resources, the HFD will request a State On -Scene Coordinator (SOSC); neighbor islands SOSC will be the State OSC representative. ESF #10 executes responses to hazardous materials incidents according to the policies outlined in the following documents: • State of Hawaii, Oil and Hazardous Substances Emergency Response Plan (March 2001); • State of Hawaii Plan for Emergency Preparedness, Volume 111, Disaster Response and Assistance; • Title 12, Subtitle 8, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, Chapter 99: Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response; • Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapters 128D (Environment Response Law) and 128E (Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right -To -Know Act); • Hawaii Administrative Rules Chapter 11-451, the State Contingency Plan, adopted on August 17, 1995; • National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR part 300); and • National Response Framework (NRF) ESF #10—Oil and Hazardous Materials Annex for applicable federal laws and related annexes. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS HFD is the responding agency to all hazardous spill incidents within the County of Hawai'i. Hazardous spill incidents will be handled through a coordinated effort by HFD, the Department of Health and the United States Coast Guard. HFD will request State public environmental health support, if required, through the County EOC. ESF #10-2 Appendix 10 (Emergency Support Function #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Private and/or commercial entities that use hazardous substances on a routine basis may respond to internal spills with their own resources or with a commercial company capable of handling the incident in accordance with EPA guidelines. Entities that chose to respond in this manner must still notify HFD. HFD will inspect the site and determine what, if any, danger there is to the public. Notification Hazardous material incidents are normally reported directly to county warning points (police dispatch 9-1-1 operators). The National Response Center (NRC) is the sole national point of contact for reporting all oil, chemical, radiological, biological, and etiological discharges into the environment anywhere in the United States. Spills are reported to the NRC through their website (http://nrc.uscg.mil) or by calling the National Spill Hotline (800) 424-8802. The minimum information in the report is a description of the incident, location, material released (if known), and suspected responsible parry (if known). The NRC will notify the appropriate federal on -scene coordinator and other appropriate agencies. Notified agencies will analyze the information and respond accordingly. ORGANIZATION Response Structure Fire HAZMAT teams, police, and emergency medical personnel are usually the initial responders to HAZMAT incidents. The County will notify State Civil Defense if the hazard is significant and may request State assistance if the severity of the event is beyond their capability or if local resources are overwhelmed. The Department of Health is the lead agency for the State of Hawai'i for hazardous material response. Support from federal agencies is requested in accordance with the Stafford Act (as amended) and coordinated by State Civil Defense (SCD) when it appears that County and State response capabilities are not sufficient to bring the incident to a satisfactory conclusion. Under an agreement with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the lead federal response agency for oil and hazardous substance spills in Hawaii. When an oil or hazardous substance spill results in a federal response, the State and county agencies will provide support, as available, and as requested by the lead federal agency. The EPA serves as the federal ESF #10 coordinator and is responsible for oversight of all preparedness and response actions associated with federal ESF 910 activities. When there is no identifiable responsible party, DOH is the lead State agency for coordinating the cleanup, removal, and remediation of hazardous substance releases. ESF #10-3 Appendix 10 (Emergency Support Function #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Regardless of the nature of the HAZMAT emergency, the State will establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) that functions as the principal source of information about the HAZMAT incident response in the State. The State JIC coordinates closely with federal officials to ensure consistency in the information released to the communications media and the public. RESPONSIBILITIES ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Fire Department • Provide overall coordination, leadership, assessment, and technical assistance for public health needs for potential or actual events including radiological and human biohazard incidents. • Perform damage assessments. Determine short- and long-term health effects posed by radiological, biological or chemical events and coordinate with State Public Information Officers (PIO) the release of such information to the media and public. • Provide technical assistance and guidance regarding necessary protective actions. • Provide assistance in hazard determination, including air monitoring, dispersant monitoring, and soil sampling. Provide laboratory analytical support as needed. • Provide support to hospital emergency room for contamination control and toxicological information. • Identify cleanup requirements and work with governmental and private industry to ensure that clean-up/restoration is accomplished in accordance with existing regulations. • Provide technical guidance concerning appropriate disposal of debris, wastes, and contaminated materials at temporary and permanent disposal sites. • Coordinate environmental variances or waivers when required. Such waivers may include, but are not limited to, disposal, open and incinerator burning, application of mitigation materials (e.g., surfactants), in situ burning of petroleum, and waste water treatment plant bypasses. Support Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil • Activate EOC, if required. Defense Agency • Coordinate additional resources should County assets be overwhelmed. Department of • Assist with proper disposal of hazardous material. Environmental Management Department of Public Works • Assist with proper disposal of hazardous material. Department of Business, • Provide technical support and assess the economic impact of a Economic Development and major hazardous materials release or oil spill. Tourism • Report damages to energy facilities that present an environmental health hazard to communities. ESF #10-4 Appendix 10 (Emergency Support Function #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Agriculture . Provide on-site technical support to agricultural chemical spills. • Perform damage assessments and evaluate the adverse impact of an incident involving agricultural resources. • Provide support for the sampling and analysis of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals. • Provide livestock owners with information to decontaminate premises exposed to oil or hazardous materials. Department of Business, • Provide technical support and assess the economic impact of a Economic Development and major hazardous materials release or oil spill. Tourism • Report damages to energy facilities that present an environmental health hazard to communities. Department of Defense • Activate the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) and (State Civil Defense) request Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) as needed. • Coordinate damage assessment teams to assess the severity of the HAZMAT event. • Establish a Joint Information Center (or Virtual-JIC) and coordinate the flow of information to the public. • Coordinate federal assistance for hazardous spill incidents with EPA Region IX and with US Coast Guard, District 14. Department of Defense • Provide support, e.g., 93rd Civil Support Team, CBRNE (Hawaii National Guard) (Chemical, Biological Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP), as needed, to assist local and State authorities at domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident sites or other HAZMAT related incidents by identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional military support and additional HAZMAT support. • Provide personnel, equipment, and other resources, when requested, to support HAZMAT response and recovery operation efforts including: traffic control, emergency transportation, evacuation of civilian population, search and rescue, communications assistance, area security, debris removal, and damage assessments. • Monitor radiological, chemical and biological effects and assist in controlling contaminated areas. ESF #10-> Appendix 10 (Emergency Support Function #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Labor and • Provide technical support for air monitoring and analysis to Industrial Relations emergency responders. • Ensure that occupational safety and health is not compromised. Department of Land and • Respond to environmental hazards that could adversely affect Natural Resources and degrade State parks (land or waters) including fish, wildlife or their habitat. • Evaluate and document impact on fish and wildlife and determines natural resource damages for loss of fish, wildlife or habitat, to include preparation of natural resource damage assessments and recovery activities. • Enforce all State laws and rules involving State lands, waterways, parks, historic sites, forest reserves, aquatic life and wildlife areas, coastal zones, conservation districts, and shores. • Coordinate with the Department of Health cleanup operations for spills that occur on State land and waterways. Department of • Provide technical assistance regarding oil and hazardous Transportation substances transportation spill incidents. • Issue alerts related to oil pollution, marine contingencies and hazards related to highways, harbors, and airports. • Coordinate the closure of State roads, harbors, or airports and re-routes traffic, as needed, for public safety or to allow for investigation and cleanup activities. • Provide barricades and signage to implement closures and detours of State roads and assist local government in doing the same around the incident area. • Support damage assessments and perform structural evaluations of roads and bridges as needed. • Coordinate with the Department of Health on cleanup operations for spills that occur on state highways, harbors and property under DOT jurisdiction. US Coast Guard, District 14 Provide emergency response and technical assistance under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan through the Hawaii Area Contingency Plan under the direction of the federal On Scene Coordinator. ESF #10-6 Appendix 10 (Emergency Support Function #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions US Environmental • Provide technical assistance under CERCLA, when required. Protection Agency, Region IX American Red Cross . Identify and coordinate, if needed, shelter requirements for displaced population. • Report environmental health hazards discovered during disaster outreach activities. ESF #10-7 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Research and Development Primary Agencies: Department of Parks & Recreation Department of Health District Office State Department of Agriculture State Department of Land and Natural Resources INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Finance Department Office of Aging Hawai'i National Guard State Civil Defense Department of Education American Red Cross Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources, establishes the policies and procedures that the County of Hawaii will follow to enable continued agricultural operations and to ensure that commercial food sources are available to the public during the response and recovery phases of Type 1 through Type 3 incidents impacting Hawai'i County. ESF #11 also sets policy and procedures for combating plant and animal epidemics during all phases of emergency management. Scope ESF #11 is applicable to all County, State, Federal, and Non-governmental organizations providing or assisting with response and recovery operations within Hawai'i County. ESF #11 includes four primary functions: Identification and provision of nutrition assistance: Includes determining nutrition assistance needs, obtaining appropriate food supplies, and arranging for delivery of the supplies. Animal and plant disease and pest response: Includes implementing an integrated, State, county, and federal, response to an outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/zoonotic disease, an outbreak of a highly infective exotic plant disease, or an economically devastating plant pest infestation. Provides technical support to ESF 98- Public Health and Medical Services and ESF 919- Pet Evacuation and Sheltering, on animal/veterinary/wildlife issues during disasters.. Assurance of the safety and security of the commercial food supply: Includes the inspection and verification of food safety aspects of slaughter and processing plants, products in distribution and retail sites, and import facilities at ports of entry; laboratory analysis of food samples; control of products suspected to be adulterated; plant closures; food borne disease surveillance; and field investigations. ESF #11-1 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Protection of natural and cultural resources: Includes appropriate response actions to conserve, rehabilitate, recover, and restore natural and cultural resources. ESF #11 provides for an integrated response to an outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/zoonotic disease, an outbreak of a highly infective exotic plant disease, or an economically devastating plant or animal pest infestation in Hawaii. ESF #11 ensures the safety and security of the County's commercial supply of food (e.g., meat, poultry, and egg products) following a potential or actual emergency or disaster, and mitigates the effect of the incident(s) on all affected parts of County's population and environment. Policies General • ESF #11 will coordinate their actions with ESFs that either impact or will be impacted by ESF #11 actions. • ESF #11 will coordinate resource requirements through ESF #7. The County is the primary source for resources required to implement ESF #11 actions. Secondary sources include State, Federal and private resources. • ESF #11 actions such as temporary food distribution and refrigeration support will be terminated in a systematic manner as shelter, utilities and commercial establishments reopen for business. • Each supporting agency is responsible for managing its respective assets and resources after receiving direction from the primary agency for the incident. Nutrition • Residents are responsible for providing for their own food and water through Assistance existing commercial vendors requirements during all incidents. When residents are not capable of providing for their own requirements due to circumstances directly related to the incident the County of Hawaii will make feeding arrangements either through ESF #6 (large scale congregate feeding) or by temporarily expanding existing nutrition programs to meet the feeding requirement. • If the conditions warrant temporary rationing of food ESF #11 will assume control of all wholesale food stocks in the County that are not subjected to United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) control and incorporate them into the nutrition program. Commercial vendors will be compensated at the wholesale rate for their merchandise. When necessary the County of Hawaii will distribute food and water to affected residents at established Points of Distribution (PODS). Animal and • Priorities are first, to isolate, second, treat, third, eradicate. All animal Plant Disease depopulation activities will be conducted as humanely as possible. and Pest . Disposal methods for infected or potentially infected carcasses and plant host Response material will be coordinated with ESF #8, Public Health & Medical Services, and ESF #10, Oil & Hazardous Materials Response. ESF #11-2 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Food Safety and Security • The ownership and management integrity of food producers, processors and distributors will be maintained to the extent possible. • Established health and sanitation measures related to food safety, storage and handling will be maintained to the highest degree possible. Resources • The Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) is the primary Protection agency for State Natural and Cultural Resources and Historic Properties (NCH). • Actions undertaken under ESF 911 to protect, conserve, rehabilitate, recover, and restore NCH resources are guided by the existing internal policies and procedures. • As the primary agency for NCH related emergencies, DLNR will coordinate with appropriate ESF to ensure appropriate use of volunteers and their health and safety. DLNR will also ensure appropriate measures are in place to protect the health and safety of all workers who are engaged in damage assessments and recovery operations. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Most of the capabilities and expertise for ESF #11 reside at the State and Federal levels. Hawai'i County will not play a major role in ESF #11, but will provide recommendations for areas to be supported and facilitate residents' requests for support with ESF #11. Emergency Support Function (ESF) 911 — Coordinates support for County and state government efforts to meet essential needs in agriculture and natural resources during an emergency or disaster. ESF #11 is responsible for planning, coordination, and identification of the following: • Provision of nutrition assistance. • Control and eradication of an outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/zoonotic (communicable from animals to humans) disease, highly infective exotic plant disease, or economically devastating plant pest infestation. • Assurance of food safety and food security. • Protection of natural and cultural resources and historic properties (NCH) resources prior to, during, or after an emergency or disaster. Primary and support agencies for ESF #11 should establish and cultivate relations with other agencies across jurisdictions in order to seamlessly transition into incident response. ESF #11 officials will work with ESF #6 for the use of congregate feeding centers or hub emergency shelters as the primary distribution points for disaster food supplies. ESF #11 identifies, secures, and coordinates with ESF #7 for the transportation of food to affected areas. ESF #11-3 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ORGANIZATION ESF #11 operates under the lead of the Research and Development Department which serves as the ESF Coordinator. When ESF #11 assistance involves only NCH resources protection and recovery, DLNR provides this function. During emergencies or disasters, matters pertaining to food safety and security fall under the purview of the Department of Health. In the event of an outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/zoonotic disease, the State Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Plan provides for interagency response protocols including; The State Coordinating Officer in collaboration with the State Veterinarian serves as the State's principal point of contact with the Federal Government, represented by the Area Veterinarian in Charge for the State. The HCDA Emergency Operating Center (EOC) serves as the coordination center for all federal, state, county, and private sector actions taken in response to and mitigation of the incident. The State Veterinarian and Area Veterinarian in Charge may establish a Departmental Operations Center, which serves as the focal point for coordinating the disease management decision-making process. In the event of an outbreak of a highly infective exotic plant disease or an economically devastating plant pest infestation, the State Department of Agriculture serves as the County's lead agency. The County activates the Emergency Operating Centers (EOC), as needed, for response coordination, interface with local community, State agencies, and the private sector. The Department of Agriculture may establish a Departmental Operations Center, Area Command, or Unified Command as the focal point for coordinating the disease or pest management decision-making process. Regardless of the nature of the disease or pest emergency, the State establishes a Joint Information Center (JIC) that functions as the principal source of information about the disease outbreak or pest infestation response in the State. Hawai'i County Information Officers will coordinate all public information releases with the State JIC. The State JIC will also coordinate with federal officials to ensure that information released to the public is consistent. RESPONSIBILITIES The primary and supporting departments or agencies assemble appropriate (pre -selected) staff at a designated location to support operations. The location may be the HCCDA EOC, a Field Office, or a Federal JFO. ESF #11-4 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Department of Research and Development • Organizes and coordinates the movement of people, conveyances, and/or things in response to zoonotic and/or botanical incidents. • Coordinates with the USDA State Emergency Board and Food Advisory Council when responding to USDA claims for non-food requisites needed to support food production, and the processing and distribution of commodities which Hawaii produces in surplus through the wholesaler level. • Coordinates a marketing strategy for economic recovery in the event of a zoonotic and plant disease emergency or disaster. : Parks and Recreation Food Supplies • Catalogs available resources of food, transportation, equipment, storage, and distribution facilities and is able to locate these resources geographically. • Determines the availability of food products, including raw agricultural commodities (e.g., taro, sweet potato, vegetables and fruits) that could be used for human consumption and assesses damage to food supplies. • Coordinates shipment of food to staging areas within the affected area. • Initiates direct market procurement of critical food supplies that are unavailable from existing inventories. • Works with county and voluntary agencies to develop a plan of operation that ensures timely distribution of food in good condition to the proper location, once need has been determined. Determines the critical needs of the affected population in terms of numbers of people, their location, and usable food preparation facilities for congregate feeding. • Assists in making emergency food supplies available through ESF #6 to households for take-home consumption in lieu of providing Supplemental Nutrition Assistance benefits for qualifying households. • Expedites the request to the USDA, FNS for the authorization of emergency Supplemental Nutrition Assistance benefits. • Provides the issuance of Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance benefits to qualifying households within the affected area, after access to commercial food channels is restored. Primary Agency: Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Diseases • Detects animal disease anomalies and assigns Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians to conduct investigations. • After diagnosis of disease, circulates warning notice to appropriate State officials in order to facilitate a more timely and efficient response. • Coordinates tasks with other ESF, Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams, and voluntary animal care organizations to respond to a highly contagious animal disease. • Coordinates surveillance activities along with ESF 98 in zoonotic diseases. ESF #11-5 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Coordinates with ESF 98 in the case of a natural disaster, in which animal/veterinary/wildlife issues arise, to ensure technical support for such issues. • If criminal activity is suspected in connection with an outbreak, the responding veterinary diagnostics staff ensures the proper handling and packing of any samples to include shipping to the appropriate diagnostic or reference laboratory for testing and forensic analysis. • Provides information and recommendations for incidents involving an outbreak of highly contagious/zoonotic animal disease that may require quarantine actions or that may impact intrastate/interstate commerce. • For incidents involving an outbreak of highly contagious/zoonotic animal disease, coordinates animal health care to injured or abandoned livestock and veterinary preventive medicine activities, including the conducting of field investigations and the provision of technical assistance and consultation as required. • Coordinates and provides technical assistance to ESF #19 for incidents involving pet evacuation and emergency sheltering needs. • After diagnosis of disease, circulates warning notice to appropriate State officials in order to facilitate a more timely and efficient response. • If criminal activity is suspected in connection with an outbreak, the responding plant diagnostics staff ensures the proper handling and packing of any samples to including shipping to the appropriate diagnostic or reference laboratory for testing. • Provides information and recommendations for incidents involving an outbreak of highly infective exotic plant disease, or economically devastating plant pest infestation that may require quarantine actions or that may impact intrastate/interstate commerce. Primary Agency: Department of Land and Natural Resources • As the primary agency for NCH resources, DLNR organizes and coordinates the capabilities and resources of the State to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, expertise, and other support for the protection, conservation, rehabilitation, recovery, and restoration of NCH resources in prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from a disaster. • DLNR will maintain a Programmatic Agreement with FEMA for historical preservation for historical sites and will implement the agreement during disaster response and recovery operations. Serves as the point of contact for any zoonotic diseases involving wildlife. Assists in responding to a highly contagious/zoonotic disease, biohazard event, or other emergency involving wildlife by providing wildlife emergency response teams; geospatial assessment and mapping tools; assistance in the identification of new emerging and resurging zoonotic diseases; assistance with the prevention, control, and eradication of any highly contagious/zoonotic disease involving wildlife; and carcass disposal facilities, as appropriate. Determines the critical needs and resources available for NCH resources protection. Provides scientific/technical advice, information, and assistance to help prevent or minimize injury to and to preserve, protect, conserve, stabilize, rehabilitate or restore NCH resources. ESF #11-6 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Establishes logistical links with organizations involved in long-term NCH resources protection, preservation, conservation, rehabilitation, recovery, stabilization, and restoration. • Implements Programmatic Agreements for historic properties. • Makes available an environmental data archive for determining baseline conditions. Sunnort Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil • Activate EOC, if required. Defense Agency • Coordinate additional State and Federal resources when required. Finance Department • Supports necessary procurement efforts required to meet the needs of the affected population. Procurement actions may include: transportation; food supplies; and facilities. Office of Aging • Provide assistance to special needs populations Department of Defense • Provides security for food sources, distribution points, and (Hawaii National Guard) supplies when directed. • Provides transportation resources when requested. • Provides Meal Ready to Eat, drinking water, Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU), and perishable rations when requested. • Provides environmental resources and support for NCH response and recovery activities when requested. Department of Defense • Coordinates all issues regarding the recovery and restoration of (State Civil Defense) the associated critical infrastructure sector supported by the ESF, including the allocation and prioritization of resources, demographic information about the disaster area, and private sources of food. • Provides additional support in interdicting adulterated products in transport and at ports of entry; subject -matter expertise and technical assistance; and air and transport services as needed, for personnel and laboratory samples. • Maintains a database of critical infrastructure and key assets and maintains detailed information on selected sites derived from site visits and collection of vulnerability assessments. • Provides assistance on issues relating to disasters on historic properties. ESF #11-7 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Health • Evaluates the adequacy of available inspectors, program investigators, and laboratory services relative to the emergency on a geographical basis. • Inspects and verifies slaughter and processing plants, distribution and retail sites, and import facilities at ports of entry. • Engages in laboratory analysis activities to screen meat, poultry, and egg products for chemical, biological, and radiological agents. • Suspends operations of meat, poultry, and egg processing plants as appropriate. • Engages in surveillance of food safety/security-related illness, injury, and other consumer complaints. • Conducts product tracing to determine the source, destination, and disposition of adulterated and/or contaminated products. • Works with State and county authorities as well as industry to conduct tracing, recall, and control of adulterated products. This includes proper disposal of contaminated products in order to protect public health and the environment in the affected area. • Identifies potential problems of contaminated foods. • Provides health education in the areas of food preparation and storage. • Provides laboratory and diagnostic support, subject -matter expertise, and technical assistance as well as field investigators to assist in product tracing, inspection and monitoring, and interdiction activities. • Provides human health-related information, including surveillance for food borne disease and occupational safety and health issues. • Provides technical assistance, subject -matter expertise, and support for biological, chemical, and other hazardous agents on contaminated facility remediation, environmental monitoring, and contaminated agriculture (animal/crops) and food product decontamination and disposal. • Provides surge capacity for laboratory and diagnostic support. • Provides investigative support and intelligence analysis for incidents involving oil or hazardous materials. • Provides technical assistance in determining when water is suitable for human consumption and canning. ESF #11-8 Appendix 11 (Emergency Support Function #11, Agriculture & Natural Resources) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Education . For federally approved disasters, coordinate, as required, with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food and Nutrition Services (FNS) to release food stocks from the National School Lunch and Summer Food Service Programs. • Perform duties as the State Distributing Agency for USDA FNS commodities in the event of a disaster or situation of distress. Department of • In the event of a plant or animal disease, enforce a quarantine Transportation zone by inspection and movement control at commercial airports and harbors. American Red Cross . Identifies and assesses requirements for food and distribution services on a two-phase basis: (1) critical emergency needs immediately after the disaster (acutely deficient, moderately deficient, self-sufficient, and surplus supplies), and (2) longer- term sustained needs after the emergency phase has ended. • Coordinates the food distribution efforts of other voluntary organizations. • Establishes logistical links with organizations involved in long- term congregate meal services. ESF #11-9 Appendix 12 (Emergency Support Function #12, Energy) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Department of Research and Development Primary Agency: Department of Research and Development INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Department of Accounting and General Services Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs Department of Defense (State Civil Defense) Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) Department of Transportation Emergency Support Function (ESF) #12 - Energy provides a coordinated response in the restoration of energy services in a disaster in order to save lives and protect health, safety and property, and carry out other emergency response functions. Scope Hawaii is unique in that it is almost totally dependent on petroleum for all of its energy needs. Petroleum provides the fuel that generates electricity, is the raw material for propane and liquid natural gas, and provides the energy for nearly all transportation (land, air, water -borne). Hawaii is also unique in that the State has no indigenous fossil fuels, no interconnected electrical grids, and limited opportunities to reduce oil consumption through conservation programs. In addition, all U.S. military bases in Hawaii are on the commercial power grid, fueled mostly by oil. ESF #12 involves the provision of emergency power and fuel to support the immediate response activities within a disaster area, as well as providing power and fuel to normalize community functions. The scope of the activities includes: 1. Assessing energy system damage, energy supply, demand, and requirements to restore such systems, 2. Assisting State agencies, Hawai'i County Government, and other ESFs to obtain emergency fuel for critical facilities, transportation, communications, and emergency operations. 3. Providing assistance, if needed, to energy suppliers to obtain equipment, specialized personnel, and transportation to repair or restore energy systems. 4. Administering, if necessary, statutory authorities for energy priorities and fuel allocations. 5. Administering public information, education, and conservation guidance concerning energy emergencies to the general public via Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency. ESF #12-1 Appendix 12 (Emergency Support Function #12, Energy) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Policies ESF #12: • Addresses significant disruptions in energy supplies for any reason, whether caused by physical disruption of energy transmission and distribution systems, unexpected operational failure of systems, or unusual economic or international political events. • Addresses the impact that damage to an energy system in one area may have on energy supplies, systems, and components in other areas that rely on the same system or systems that are interdependent. • Coordinates with and assists public- and private -sector partners to ensure that electrical energy service is restored in minimum time. • Is the primary County point of contact with the energy industry for information sharing and requests for assistance from private -sector and public -sector owners and operators. • Maintains lists of energy -centric critical assets and infrastructures, and continuously monitors those resources to identify or mitigate vulnerabilities to the energy system. • Establishes policies and procedures regarding preparedness for "all hazards" and response and recovery due to shortages and disruptions in the supply and delivery of petroleum products. • Formulates and recommends specific proposals, as necessary, for conserving energy and fuel, including the allocation and distribution thereof, to the Mayor and to the County Council. • When shortages of fuel occur or are anticipated, control the distribution and sale of petroleum products, to procure such products, and to impose rules that will provide extraordinary measures for the conservation of petroleum products and for their distribution and sale in an orderly, efficient, and safe manner. Restoration of normal operations at energy facilities is the responsibility of the facility owners. The authority to activate the State of Hawaii Energy Emergency Preparedness Plan rests with the following parties: • Office of the Mayor • Civil Defense Administrator • Director of Research and Development • Director of Water Supply The DBEDT/Energy Resources Coordinator (ERC) is the lead agency in a "non -disaster" related fuel shortage in the State (Chapter 125C, Hawaii Revised Statutes). CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The Concept of Operations provides information on the overall management of ESF #12 in the event of activation due to a significant disaster causing loss of electrical power, or gasoline and fuel supplies to a large population and/or area of the State. Pursuant to DBEDT's Energy ESF #12-2 Appendix 12 (Emergency Support Function #12, Energy) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Emergency Preparedness Plan, the Shortage Management Center (SMC) ensures centralized coordination of all ESF 912 activities in the event of a declared emergency or fuel shortage. The SMC (ESF 912), following a disaster and once activated, will serve as the focal point within the State government for receipt of information on actual or projected damage to energy supply and distribution systems, and on procedures/requirements for preparedness, restoration, recovery, and mitigation. The SMC functions as the DBEDT Department Operations Center for ESF #12 and integrates with the State of Hawaii Emergency Operations Center, when activated. 2. The SMC (ESF #12) will coordinate closely with Federal, State, County, and private utility and fuel industry officials to establish priorities to repair damaged facilities and to coordinate the provision of temporary, alternate, or interim sources of emergency fuel, and power. 3. The SMC (ESF #12) will provide guidance on the conservation and efficient use of energy to State and County agencies and to the public. 4. The SMC (ESF 912) will provide logistical support for DBEDT personnel and facilities as relates to ESF #12 response operations and ensure accurate fiscal tracking of DBEDT expenditures pursuant to the activation of the SMC. ORGANIZATION Disaster -related Energy Emergency Federal Support DHS FEMA USDOE Lead Agency Support Agency State DBEDT as ESF-12 (SI Division) CSvil Defense Energy Council tate Government Depts. County Civil Defense N County Emergency Liaison Officials Hawaii's Energy Companies Oil Market -related Energy Emergency Federal Support USDOE Local Support Lead Agency Energy Resources Governor's Coordinator - DBEDT EEP (SI Division) ;Advisory Committeeair: DBEDT Director Counties Hawaii's Energy Companies Chapters 128, HRS, Civil Defense and Emergency Act Chapter 125C, HRS, Procurement, Control, Distribution, and Sale of Petroleum Products Hawaii's Organizational Concept for Energy Emergency Preparedness & Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection Governor's Energy Emergency Preparedness Committee (GEEPAC) The GEEPAC is a multi -agency, multi -organizational committee which is chaired by the Director of DBEDT. The committee is comprised of policy -level executives and managers from ESF #12-3 Appendix 12 (Emergency Support Function #12, Energy) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan government, private sector organizations, and representatives from the energy industry and employee unions. The GEEPAC assesses the effectiveness of energy emergency plans and procedures prior to oil market -related energy emergencies. During an oil market -related emergency, the GEEPAC will advise the DBEDT Director and the Governor on the implementation of specific actions and will evaluate their impacts at appropriate times to decide whether the actions should be continued, modified, replaced or ended. State of Hawaii Energy Council (EC) The State of Hawaii Energy Council is a multi -agency, multi -organizational coordinating group which is chaired by the DBEDT Director/Energy Resources Coordinator (ERC). It is made up of executives, managers, and technical representatives from a cross-section of government, energy industry, and private sector organizations. The council meets regularly to review/update response procedures and protocols to ensure support to the SMC. The council coordinates activities and information necessary to facilitate the safe, rapid restoration of the commercial energy grid and the adequacy and availability of fuel supplies, storage, and distribution. The illustration below depicts the parallel representation of the GEEPAC and EC. Inter -Agency Coordination During a disaster or terrorism event State Civil Defense is the lead agency responsible for overall coordination of all activated Emergency Support Functions, to include ESF #12. DBEDT's SMC representative(s) respond to the State Emergency Operations Center to coordinate energy support needs between the State Emergency Operations Center and SMC staff. During a global, regional, or local oil market supply disruption or shortage DBEDT's SMC acts as "lead agency" for such non -disaster related shortages. The SMC coordinates and implements the Fuels Set -Aside Program pursuant to a Governor's Declaration of an Energy Emergency and allocates fuel consistent with established priorities. State Civil Defense may function as a "clearing -house" for all State Government requests associated with public safety and emergency services. The SMC coordinates all Set -Aside requests from other eligible applicant categories. Governor's Energy Emergency Preparedness Committee Membership Energy Council Membership Chair: DBEDT Director Chair: Energy Resources Coordinator, DBEDT — State Agencies: — State Agencies: o DBEDT o ESF #1 Transportation o Attorney General o ESF #2 Communications o Public Utilities Commission o ESF #3 Public Works & Engineering o Health o ESF #7 Resource Support o Transportation — Federal Agencies: o Human Services o NRF Reps for ESF #1, 2, 3, & 7 o Defense (RING) o U.S. DOE for ESF #12 o Commerce & Consumer Affairs o Defense Coordinating Officer — Federal Agencies: — Oil Refiners o FEMA — Electric and Gas Companies o U.S. DOE — County Representatives — Oil Refiners — Airlines — Electric and Gas Companies — County Representatives — Coalition of Gasoline Dealers — Longshoreman's Union — Hawaii Government Employees Association ESF #12-4 Appendix 12 (Emergency Support Function #12, Energy) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 1. The organization structure of the Shortage Management Center for ESF #12 is shown below. SCD Operations Public Information/ int Information Cent Planning Governor DBEDT Director Shortage Manager (Management) Logistics Energy Council DBEDT SCD PUC/DOT/DAGS C & C of Honolulu Maui, Kauai, & Hawaii Counties 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) US Army Corps of Engineers 19e Infantry Brigade Hawaiian Electric Company Kauai Island Utility Cooperative Hawaii Electric Light Company Maui Electric Company Board of Water Supply The Gas Company Oahu Gas/Maui Gas/AmeriGas Chevron Tesoro Aloha Petroleum Hawaii Fueling Facilities Corporation Finance Admin 2. The Governor provides direction to the citizens of Hawaii and for all State government agencies during an energy emergency or shortage. The Governor may recommend voluntary energy conservation measures and may also declare an Energy Shortage and sign executive orders that implement mandatory conservation programs as deemed necessary, and as recommended by the DBEDT Director/ERC. The DBEDT Director/ERC oversees the progressive implementation of the Energy Emergency Preparedness Plan. Based on information and analyses provided by the SMC staff, the Director recommends the enactment of appropriate energy demand reduction and shortage mitigation measures to the Governor. 4. State Civil Defense is the lead agency responsible for overall coordination of all activated ESFs. A DBEDT representative responds to the State Emergency Operations Center, and coordinates energy support needs between the State EOC and the SMC. 5. The DBEDT Director appoints the Shortage Manager whenever the SMC is activated. The Shortage Manager is responsible for direct supervision and operation of the SMC, ensuring that all appropriate functions are effectively staffed. When the Hawaii State Energy Council is convened, the Shortage Manager promotes inter -agency coordination at all levels of government, and facilitates management level coordination and ESF #12-5 Appendix 12 (Emergency Support Function #12, Energy) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan communication with industry groups. The Shortage Manager keeps the Chief Technology Officer/SID Administrator and DBEDT Director/ERC informed at all times. 6. The Energy Council (EC) functions as a multi -agency, multi -organizational coordinating group. The EC integrates into and provides support for all activated SMC functions, to include: member -agency policy information and clarification, direct coordination augmentation to operations function, critical situation and status information to the planning function, and material resources as appropriate in support of the logistics function. As a comprehensive coordinating group, the EC may provide constructive strategy and solutions to resolving both mid-term and prolonged energy shortages. Those involved must be cognizant of the need to communicate individually with oil companies on proprietary information in order to avoid any anti-trust issues. 7. The Public Information Officer is responsible for implementing the EEP Public Information Program. With the authorization of the Governor, DBEDT Director, Chief Technology Officer/SID Administrator, or Shortage Manager, the PIO can schedule media conferences and media releases. The PIO ensures that the information released to the general public is coordinated prior to the release with the Governor's Office, State Civil Defense, and affected Energy Council agencies and industry organizations. The PIO participates in joint information center activities that ensure consistent, coordinated media releases and information dissemination. 8. The SMC functional areas (Operations/Planning/Logistics/Finance-Administration) are made up of staff of the Strategic Industries Division of DBEDT. Other DBEDT staff and/or other support agencies' staff will assist, dependent upon the nature of the event). 9. Upon notification of an emergency requiring activation of the State Emergency Operations Center or other significant State response, the Shortage Manager will brief and consult with designated essential personnel, supporting agency representatives, and SCD to implement the Energy Emergency Preparedness Plan's Operating Guidelines, as appropriate, during the Verification, Pre -Shortage, Declared Energy Shortage, and Post- Shortage/Evaluation Phases of the energy emergency. That response may involve: • Other Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) • State Agencies • Non -State Agencies, including County governments • Federal Agencies • Private Industry • Military Units • Hawaii State Energy Council • Governor's Energy Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee ESF #12-6 Appendix 12 (Emergency Support Function #12, Energy) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Actions ESF 412 uses a phased response to an event that may cause an energy shortage. Phase 1: Verification This initial phase of a shortage event or response is activated when ESF 912 receives information that global or regional petroleum supplies may be disrupted to the extent that will negatively impact shipments to Hawaii, or that local events, such as a natural disaster or refinery or storage facility failure, may impair supply availability. ESF #12 will utilize the Energy Council network to verify to the extent possible the nature of the information received. Every effort is made to determine the nature of the event, potential impacts to the State's energy supply, and the likely duration of a potential shortage. Phase 2: Pre -Shortage This phase is activated when actions taken during the Verification Phase result in a determination that an impending shortage may be imminent and further preparations are warranted. Activation may be triggered by unpredictable supplies, market instability, rising prices for petroleum fuel, natural disaster, or local events that threaten availability. ESF #12 prepares for potential implementation of mitigation and conservation programs and measures, facilitates meetings with the Energy Council, and provides updates and recommendations to the Governor. Phase 3: Declared Shortage This phase is characterized by the Declaration of an Energy Emergency or Energy Shortage, pursuant to Chapter 125C, HRS, independent of or in addition to a disaster declaration by the Governor. The ESF #12 response is situation dependent and contingent on the severity of the shortage (mild, moderate to severe, or severe). ESF #12 activates the SMC, coordinates with State Civil Defense and the Energy Council, intensifies pubic information and outreach programs, assures there is adequate Set -Aside fuel for public safety, prioritized Emergency Support Functions as determined by State Civil Defense, critical services and industries, and institutes supply and demand intervention measures, as required. Phase 4: Post -Shortage Evaluation The final phase occurs when supplies are normalized and restored. Energy emergency response measures are suspended. Utilities and critical facilities are operational, global or regional supplies have been restored, and local production and distribution networks are functioning. ESF #12 recommends suspension of emergency response measures and stands down the SMC. ESF #12 will continue to analyze the situation to ensure sustainment of the energy network and develop a Corrective Action Plan based on lessons learned. RESPONSIBILITIES ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Department Research and Development • Activate and sustain operation of appropriate components of the Hawaii Energy Emergency Plan pursuant to a Gubernatorial Proclamation or request from State Civil Defense. • Recommend and implement supply and demand intervention measures. ESF #12-7 Appendix 12 (Emergency Support Function #12, Energy) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Recommend the Governor declare an Energy Shortage and implement mandatory conservation programs. • Serve as claimant for the State's emergency petroleum requirements to the DOE. • Facilitate partnership planning with supporting ESFs, agencies, private utilities and energy providers. • Maintain and update an ESF #12 Continuity of Government Operations (COGO) plan. Support Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil Defense • Activate EOC, if required. Agency • Coordinate State assistance as required. Department of Accounting and • Prepare Governor's proclamations and executive orders, General Services as required. • Assist in the preparation and execution of emergency contracts. • Provide legal opinions and services, as required. Department of Commerce and • Monitor and enforce price controls, as appropriate. Consumer Affairs • Assess the impact of the emergency upon the State. Department of Defense (State • Coordinate requests for support and response efforts. Civil Defense) • Coordinate the dissemination of emergency public information. • Advise the Governor on the need to implement State disaster assistance programs and request Federal assistance. • Coordinate the efforts of the supporting ESF agencies. Department of Defense • Provide support to law enforcement agencies, as required. (Hawaii National Guard) • Provide transportation services, as required. • Assist with debris clearance and emergency operations, as required. • Provide emergency electrical power and water purification support, as required. Department of Transportation • Support fuel transportation requirements. • Design and implement transportation policies to support contingency measures. ESF #12-8 Appendix 13 (Emergency Support Function #13, Public Safety and Security) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Hawai'i Police Department Primary Agencies: Hawai'i Police Department INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Prosecuting Attorney Department of Agriculture Department of Defense (State Civil Defense) Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) Department of Health Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Coast Guard, District 14 U.S. Transportation Security Administration Emergency Support Function (ESF) #13 — Public Safety and Security coordinates and integrates County public safety and security resources and capabilities to support the County across the full spectrum of incident management activities for potential or actual disasters and emergencies. Scope Effective law enforcement is essential during emergencies or disasters to ensure protection of lives and property. ESF #13 provides a mechanism for coordinating federal -to -State and State -to -county support for law enforcement, public safety, and security operations. ESF #13 assesses public safety and security needs, and responds to requests, mission assignments, or tasks for law enforcement resources and planning/technical assistance as needed. Policies County, State, and specific Federal authorities each have the primary responsibility for public safety within their respective jurisdictions. Private -sector authorities have primary responsibility for security of their facilities. The County, State, Federal, Military, and private sector retain primary authority and responsibility for law enforcement and security activities within their respective jurisdictions. The Hawai'i Police Department retains direction and control of the incident response when ESF 913 is activated. When directed, ESF#13 will integrate state and federal resources to support the county or, if required, County resources to support state and/or federal jurisdictions. The Hawai'i Police Department serves as the ESF Coordinator for ESF #13. All support requests for ESF #13 are coordinated through the Hawai'i County EOC or ESF #5. ESF #13-1 Appendix 13 (Emergency Support Function #13, Public Safety and Security) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF #13 activities may also include criminal investigative law enforcement activities for investigations related to any emergency, disaster, or terrorist acts or threats. Hawaii Revised Statutes, §§ 128-10(11) and 128-15 will govern the interchange of all State law enforcement officers with jurisdictional limitations on the exercise of police officers by detail or transfer to the Hawai'i Police Department to serve as public safety officers, State law enforcement officers, or deputy sheriff officers (HRS § 353C-4), or to the Department of the Attorney General to serve as Attorney General Investigators (HRS § 28-11) whichever option is appropriate under the circumstances as determined by ESF #13. This appendix does not usurp or override the policies and mutual aid agreements of the County, including the standing agreement that establishes the State Law Enforcement Coalition (SLEC). Law enforcement activities and criminal investigations are conducted in conformance with existing codes and statutes. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ESF #13 is activated when County law enforcement resources are overwhelmed by incident response, or lack the capability to respond to specific incident requirements. The Mayor or Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency will request the required resources from State Civil Defense or the State EOC, if activated. ESF #13 will coordinate with supporting agencies to obtain and deploy the required resources. Mission assignments or tasks will be issued by the Operations Section within the Unified Command Structure. ESF #13 will coordinate with ESF #5 and ESF #20 to provide transportation support to the response force. ESF #13 will coordinate with ESF #20 to provide National Guard assets when incident response overwhelms County and/or federal resources. National Guard assets will be deployed in support of and accompanied by sworn law enforcement officers. ORGANIZATION Hawai'i Police Department is responsible for enforcement of laws, traffic control, investigation of crimes, and other public safety activities within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction. Hawai'i County participates in the State Law Enforcement Coalition (SLEC) which is a multi -agency committee comprised of representatives from the State law enforcement agencies, United States Coast Guard, State Civil Defense, National Guard, private security, and private sector companies. SLEC assembles and deploys response forces to support the counties upon request. ESF #13-2 Appendix 13 (Emergency Support Function #13, Public Safety and Security) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan The location, jurisdiction, or type of incident will determine which primary agency serves as the lead for the SLEC Command Group. The Primary and Supporting Agencies assemble appropriate (pre -selected) staff at a designated location to support operations. The location may be at the County EOC, an alternate facility designated by HCDA, or a JFO. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawai'i Police Department • Prepare to take the lead in coordinating or assisting in the performance of all functions under ESF #13. • Provide representatives to the State Emergency Response Team for ESF #13. • Provide a representative for the SLEC Command Group who has the requisite authority to serve in the position. • Be prepared to take the lead of the Operations Section and/or Planning Section of the Unified Command. Support Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil Defense • Activate EOC, if required. Agency Type of Incident Prosecuting Attorney • Prosecute all violations of the law. Department of Agriculture • Be prepared to provide agricultural and food related technical support as needed. • Be prepared to help plan, prepare, and coordinate security needs during an agricultural or food related incident. 0 o Cd 0 C x O p Cd O N C U Cd C • ., CnD `n O `n O CdCd Lead Agency H U a H Cd O U d Department of the Attorney General X X Department of Land & Natural Resources X X Department of Pubic Safety X X X Department of Transportation — Airports Division X — Harbors Divison X RESPONSIBILITIES The Primary and Supporting Agencies assemble appropriate (pre -selected) staff at a designated location to support operations. The location may be at the County EOC, an alternate facility designated by HCDA, or a JFO. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawai'i Police Department • Prepare to take the lead in coordinating or assisting in the performance of all functions under ESF #13. • Provide representatives to the State Emergency Response Team for ESF #13. • Provide a representative for the SLEC Command Group who has the requisite authority to serve in the position. • Be prepared to take the lead of the Operations Section and/or Planning Section of the Unified Command. Support Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil Defense • Activate EOC, if required. Agency • Coordinate State and Federal resources, as needed. Prosecuting Attorney • Prosecute all violations of the law. Department of Agriculture • Be prepared to provide agricultural and food related technical support as needed. • Be prepared to help plan, prepare, and coordinate security needs during an agricultural or food related incident. ESF #13-3 Appendix 13 (Emergency Support Function #13, Public Safety and Security) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Defense • Provide a representative for the SLEC Command Group (State Civil Defense) who has the requisite authority to serve in the position. • Issue mission assignments and tasks for ESF #13. • Provide logistics support as needed by ESF #13. • Coordinate security for critical infrastructure and key resources. • Coordinate security for emergency shelter operations, SNS distribution, and civil disturbances through ESF #13 and ESF #20. Department of Defense • Provide a representative for the SLEC Command Group (Hawaii National Guard) who has the requisite authority to serve in the position. • Provide Quick Reaction Force and National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) support, as required. • Provide DSCA support to augment county law enforcement agencies in accordance with existing plans. • Provide transportation and facility support, as required. • Provide WMD CST support and technical assistance, as required. • Provide CERFP support and technical assistance, as required. Department of Health • Be prepared to provide health related technical support as needed. • Be prepared to help plan, prepare, and coordinate security needs during a public health emergency, distribution of the Strategic National Stockpile, Chempack, or other health related incident. • Be prepared to give technical assistance regarding the ease of transmissibility and the lethality of any communicable or dangerous disease during any quarantine and participate in identifying, determining, and providing direction regarding the amount of force that is reasonable to enforce quarantine if ESF 913 is called upon to enforce quarantine. Federal Bureau of • Serves as lead federal agency for criminal and/or terrorist — Investigation related investigations. • Serves as the lead federal agency in support of the FBI/Joint Terrorism Task Force. US Coast Guard, District 14 • Serves as the lead federal agency for criminal investigations involving maritime incidents. ESF #13-4 Appendix 13 (Emergency Support Function #13, Public Safety and Security) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions US Transportation Security • Provides screening detection and protection of travel in and Administration out of the State of Hawaii. • Provides, on request, explosive detection resources to State and county law enforcement agencies. ESF #13-> Appendix 13 (Emergency Support Function #13, Public Safety and Security) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan SAMPLE ESF #13 ICS STRUCTURE Federal STATE CIVIL DEFEI Joint FieldOftl "_.._.._.._..� MAND STATE EMERGENC P RESPONSE TEAM Lim mander CommaSLEC Representatives Liaison Offic OPERATIONS SECTI Chief Deputy Chief Area Mana INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH Director Investigations Gro I Supervisor Intel & Survey Groj Supervisor ENFORCEMENT BRANCH Director Security Group Supervisor Tactical Ops Gror Supervisor Maritime Group Supervisor Additional Group Can be added as ne ed Units Can beadded with n groups as needed The Department of the Attorney General and/or Department of Public Safety will provide the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Operations and Planning Sections. The Department of the Attorney General will provide the Director of the Investigations Branch of the Operations Section. Officer PLANNING SECT] Chief Deputy Chief Resources Unit Leader Situation Unit Leader Documentation L Leader Demobilization U Leader Technical Special Leader LOGISTICS Chief Deputy Chief SERVICE BRANC Director Communications U Medical Unit Food/Shelter FIN/ADMIN SECTI Chief Deputy Chief Time Unit Leader Procurement Uni Leader Compensation Un Leader Cost Unit Leader SUPPORT BRANC Director Supply Unit Leader Facilities Unit Leader Ground Support U ESF #13-6 Appendix 14 (Emergency Support Function #14, Long -Term Community Recovery) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Hawai'i County Planning Department Primary Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Department of Research and Development INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Office of the Mayor Corporate Counsel Finance Department Office of Housing & Community Development Hawaii Police Department Department of Public Works Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs Department of Education Department of Health Department of Human Services Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Department of Land and Natural Resources Department of Taxation Hawaii Community Development Authority Hawaii Housing Finance and Development Corporation U.S. Small Business Administration U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Pacific Disaster Center American Red Cross Emergency Support Function (ESF) #14, Long -Term Community Recovery, establishes the policy and procedures that will be used to facilitate the return to normalization of communities once an incident is stabilized. ESF #14 coordinates the County's, non- governmental organizations' (NGOs), and the private sector's recovery actions to include identifying available programs and resources designed for or focused on long-term community recovery. ESF #14 is applicable to all households and business that are directly impacted by the incident and to businesses that are indirectly impacted by the incident. Activities that may fall under ESF #14 include those actions taken by incident victims that begin the process of rebuilding homes, replacing property, resuming employment, and restoring businesses. Recovery activities also include repairing, rebuilding, or relocating public infrastructure. All activities or actions taken under ESF #14 will comply with General Plan and the Multi - Hazard Mitigation Plan. ESF #14-1 Appendix 14 (Emergency Support Function #14, Long -Term Community Recovery) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan POLICIES • All long-term recovery actions must focus on permanent restoration of infrastructure, housing, and the economy and must also be based on, and compatible with, both the General Plan and the Multi -hazard Mitigation Plan. • ESF #14 will coordinate recovery assistance among the levels of government, the private sector, and private citizens until the recovery is completed. • Only dwellings and businesses directly impacted by the incident will be eligible for assistance through ESF #14. Businesses indirectly impacted by the incident may be eligible for assistance through ESF #14. • ESF #14 will follow the strictest building code standards in regards to repairs to critical infrastructure to mitigate future incident impacts. (e.g., in repairing hospitals or emergency operations centers to mitigate for future seismic or hurricane risk). • Economic policy-making and economic stabilization activities that are not in the General Plan are beyond the scope of ESF #14. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ESF #14 is responsible for returning communities to pre -incident conditions. To accomplish this task ESF #14 will use the General Plan and the Multi -Hazard Mitigation Plan as the basis for all actions. ESF #14 will focus on these areas: returning residents to permanent housing, facilitating the return of normal business activity (with an emphasis placed on major revenue generating industries such as tourism), and repairing infrastructure (with an emphasis on hazard mitigation). ESF #14 will only provide assistance support to persons and businesses directly impacted by the incident. The goal is the return of normalcy as quickly as possible. To reach the goal some ESF #14 tasks must begin pre -incident. Specifically, each County Department and Agency needs to prepare a continuity of operations plan (COOP) and businesses, especially businesses that control or operation critical infrastructure and key resources, should be encouraged to develop a COOP. Additional actions included in ESF 914 include: • Establishing procedures to integrate pre -incident risk assessment and planning into post -incident recovery and mitigation efforts. • Determining recovery priorities based on community assessments. • Assessing the social and economic consequences in the impacted area to identify specific long-term community and coordinating multi -agency efforts to address long- term community recovery issues. • Providing technical assistance to response activities. • Conducting comprehensive market disruption and loss analysis and developing a long-term recovery plan for the affected community. • Identifying appropriate government programs and agencies to support implementation of the recovery plan. • Avoiding duplication of assistance. • Coordinating program application processes and clarifying policy and program issues. • Identifying and assigning responsibilities for recovery activities. ESF #14-2 Appendix 14 (Emergency Support Function #14, Long -Term Community Recovery) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan A developed, coordinated, resourced, and trained Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) is the key to short-term and long-term recovery following an incident that reaches the disaster level. As the first process in COOP planning, individual County departments and agencies will determine their essential functions and assess their ability to provide these essential functions during an incident. The County Government's ability to provide essential services without prolonged interruption is a key component to returning to normalcy. Following an incident, the County's departments and agencies will initiate their COOP and conduct damage assessments of properties under their control and/or jurisdiction. County departments and agencies will provide an assessment or an estimate of the capabilities of critical infrastructure sectors that they may interact with, i.e., agricultural sector, public health, transportation, energy, etc. These assessments or estimates will be reported to the County EOC (ESF #5) to determine whether or not ESF #14 should be established. ESF #14 will take the lead in short-term and long-term recovery efforts until the County of Hawaii returns to a condition equivalent to a pre -incident level. Short -Term and Long -Term Recovery Activities Initial and short-term recovery activities focus on the safety and welfare of the affected community and restoration of essential services to include: • Coordinating and conducting initial damage assessments to facilitate decision making and to establish priorities. • Coordinating the restoration of essential public services, utilities, and facilities (e.g., removal of debris from emergency routes, emergency repairs to hospitals and public safety facilities). • Recovery of visitor industry services (temporary visitor accommodations). • Coordinating temporary housing for disaster victims. • Estimating the economic impact on the affected communities. Long-term recovery efforts focus on redeveloping communities and restoring the economic viability of disaster areas, including: • Coordinating and integrating the resources and assistance programs of voluntary agencies and other community-based organizations. • Restoring and making permanent repairs to public infrastructure damaged in the disaster. • Reestablishing an adequate supply of permanent housing, including affordable housing. • Restoring the economic base of disaster -impacted communities, including the loss of jobs, businesses, and infrastructure. • Identifying hazard mitigation opportunities and implementing long-term hazard mitigation plans, projects and measures (e.g., land use plans, hazard -zone restrictions and building codes). ESF #14-3 Appendix 14 (Emergency Support Function #14, Long -Term Community Recovery) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan RESPONSIBILITIES The primary and supporting departments or agencies will assemble appropriate (pre -selected) staff at a designated location to support ESF 914 operations. The location may be the County EOC or another location based on the incident. The activation of ESF #14 may not occur during initial incident response. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Planning Department • Provide zoning clarification for community planning and recovery. • Provide building code information for reconstruction and new construction projects. • Ensure all reconstruction and new construction projects comply with the General Plan. • Approve construction of temporary housing that complies with federal standards. Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency • Coordinate development of strategies and plans to address housing (temporary and reconstruction), contaminated debris management, decontamination and environmental restoration, restoration of public facilities/infrastructure, restoration of the business and agricultural sectors, and short- and long-term economic recovery. • Coordinate dissemination of information on State and Federal emergency assistance programs. • Coordinate and administer Federal, individual, and public assistance programs. • Coordinate and administer recovery and mitigation grant programs. • Coordinate assessment and revision of existing risk analysis and mitigation plans. Provide technical assistance in infrastructure damage assessments, continuity of government services, and risk management (State insurance policies). • Activate and stage Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) teams to identify and document the impact and determine response requirements. • Determine the need for and coordinate joint preliminary damage assessments. • Provide periodic damage assessment training opportunities for County personnel and maintain damage assessment forms and guidelines to use following disaster events. Primary Agency: Department of Research and Development • Gather and analyze information from County authorities and State departments to determine the economic impact on the community, identify remediation options, and to develop priorities of work. • Provide demographic information about the disaster area. • Provide technical assistance for economic recovery and growth assistance • Develop strategies and plans to support restoration of the tourism and business sectors. • Assist businesses, agriculture and non -agriculture, in reestablishing operations following the incident. • Assess the impact on the visitor industry. • Coordinate tourism promotion, marketing, and development. ESF #14-4 Appendix 14 (Emergency Support Function #14, Long -Term Community Recovery) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan SUDDort Agencies Participate in planning efforts for areas of agency expertise, and provide program assistance and expertise as appropriate and in coordination with other ESF departments and agencies. Agency Functions Office of the Mayor • Provide policy guidance. • Approve priority of reconstruction projects. Corporate Counsel • Ensure all projects comply with existing laws and statutes • Conduct or assist in the investigation of potential/reported fraud associated with disaster assistance. • Ensure appropriate measures are in force to provide consumer protection during emergency response and recovery operations Finance Department • Coordinate identification of appropriate government programs to support implementation of long-term community recovery plans and gaps under current authorities and funding. • Identify programs, waivers, funding levels, requests for additional authorities, and possible new legislation needed to address identified program gaps. • Coordinate implementation of recommendations for long-term community recovery with appropriate government agencies if recommendations include program waivers, supplemental funding requests, and/or legislative initiatives. Office of Housing and • Ensure special needs population (economically disadvantaged) Community requirements are included in reconstruction. Development . Ensure special needs population has the opportunity to participate in reconstruction. Hawai'i Police • Assess damage and coordinate repairs to correctional facilities. Department . Provide inmate worklines, as required. • Provide support to the Hawaii Correctional Industries, as required. Department of Public • Provide technical assistance in transportation planning, Works engineering, and transportation assistance programs. • Provide expertise in private -sector capabilities and services. • Provide coordination with private -sector transportation organizations. Department of • Provide emergency agriculture loans, as required. Agriculture . Provide technical assistance to evaluate damage to the agricultural sector and resource conservation. • Provide support to inspect and coordinate repairs to agricultural reservoirs and irrigation systems. Department of Public • Identify long-term repair projects in accordance with the Works General Plan and the Multi -hazard Mitigation Plan and either conduct the repair or prepare a contract for the repair. ESF #14-5 Appendix 14 (Emergency Support Function #14, Long -Term Community Recovery) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of • Investigate insurance and consumer protection related Commerce and complaints. Consumer Affairs . Provide assistance to facilitate the recover and operation of regulated industries. • Provide listings of licensed contractors and authorized vendors. Department of Education . Provide alternate sites for education of displaced students. • Coordinate transportation requirements for displaced students with ESF #1. Department of Health • Provide expertise on long-term health and medical concerns. • Coordinate delivery of mental health and crisis counseling services to disaster victims. • Provide for technical assistance and support planning for contaminated debris management and environmental remediation. Department of Human • Assess the incident's impact on residents receiving social Services benefits and services from the State. • Coordinate with county human services departments to ensure continued delivery of public assistance and human services programs. • Coordinate Disaster State Nutrition Assistance, emergency housing, and outreach activities. Department of Labor and • Establish temporary unemployment compensation and Industrial Relations employment offices in disaster areas, as required. • Provide employment information regarding labor and unemployment. • Assist in solving special employment problems brought about by the disaster. • Administer the federal program for Disaster Unemployment Assistance. • Assist with post -disaster special employment efforts, problems, and issues. Department of Land and • Provide technical advice on repair and preservation of historical Natural Resources property/artifacts. • Provide personnel to serve on Damage Assessment and Hazard Mitigation teams to provide expert advice with respect to losses and repairs for public historical sites and artifacts. • Provide natural and cultural resources expertise. • Coordinate technical and financial assistance for emergency watershed protection. Department of Taxation . Provide tax policy and technical assistance, as required. ESF #14-6 Appendix 14 (Emergency Support Function #14, Long -Term Community Recovery) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Hawaii Community • Assess the impact to publicly owned properties under HCDA Development Authority jurisdiction Hawaii Housing Finance • Coordinate development and construction of housing for low - and Development and moderate -income households, elderly, and special needs Corporation and the groups impacted by the disaster. Office of Housing and Community Development American Red Cross . Provide mass care services. • Provide individual immediate and long-term family services. • Provide health and mental health services and referral support. Pacific Disaster Center • Provide modeling to assess socio-economic impacts. • Provide GIS support, as required. US Small Business • Provide long-term loan assistance to eligible homeowners, Administration renters, businesses, and non-profit organizations for repair, US Small Business replacement, mitigation, relocation, or code -required upgrades Administration of incident -damaged property. (continued) . Provide loan assistance to small businesses to address adverse economic impact due to the incident. US Army Corps of • Assess the impact to flood control works and dam safety in Engineers accordance with Public Law 84-99 (Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act), as amended. • Provide public works and engineering technical assistance. ESF #14-7 Appendix 15 (Emergency Support Function #15, External Affairs) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Mayor's Office Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Hawai'i Fire Department Hawai'i Police Department Department of Public Works INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: All County Departments and Agencies Emergency Support Function (ESF) #15, External Affairs, establishes the policy and procedures for disseminating public information during all phases of emergency management. ESF #15 also establishes the policies and procedures for establishing and conducting relations with foreign governments and other American governmental agencies during the response and recovery phases of emergency management. Scope ESF 915 is applicable to all jurisdictions operating within the County of Hawai'i. The intent is to provide a coordinated message to the public and interested parties (news media, foreign governments, etc.) through a Joint Information Center (JIC). ESF #15 provides support for four essential functions: • Emergency public information • Community Relations • Legislative affairs • County and State coordination Policies The Office of the Mayor's Public Relations Staff oversees community relations efforts using web - based communications, public service announcements, print and video information materials, events, and all other external communications. HCCDA will provide the initial emergency public information based on available information. Subsequent emergency public information will be coordinated by ESF #15 and then disseminated by the most appropriate methods. ESF #15-1 Appendix 15 (Emergency Support Function #15, External Affairs) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan For Type 5 incidents, the external affairs activities of County, State, and Federal departments and agencies operating within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction will be the responsibility of those respective departments and agencies and will not require coordination with ESF #15. The Office of the Mayor's Public Relations Staff is responsible for all interface with legislative bodies. The information provided will be coordinated through the JIC to ensure a coordinated message consistent with public information and community relations efforts. In the event that the County is unable to fulfill its responsibility to provide the public with health and safety information, the State may provide relevant messages to Hawai'i County residents. External affairs resources are coordinated by the ESF #15 through the County Joint Information Center (JIC). ESF #15 primary and support agencies will provide staff public relations staff to fill JIC positions in accordance with the standing operating procedures for ESF #15 and Annex C, Public Information, the Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan. Messages produced by ESF #15 personnel will follow the Joint Information Systems model as outlined in the National Response Framework (NRF). In the event of a Presidential Declaration within the State of Hawaii, the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) will work with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and/or the Principal Federal Official (PFO) to ensure that the State's external affairs efforts are coordinated with the Federal external affairs efforts. Hawai'i County's JIC will provide input to this message if Hawai'i County is affected by the declaration. ESF #15 operations may transfer from the County EOC to the State Field Office (SFO) or Federal Joint Field Office (JFO), if established. When the SFO and/or JFO stand down, ESF #15 operations will transfer back to the County JIC. No member of the Media, credentialed or un -credentialed, will be allowed in the EOC during video teleconferences (VTC) with the State Civil Defense or Hawai'i County Organizations, or when meetings are being held in the EOC regarding current or future operations. CONCEPT OF OPERATION ESF #15 operations are performed in three phases: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. • Preparedness. ESF #15 implements a comprehensive multi -media emergency information program which places an emphasis on family preparedness through coordinated print and broadcast outlets as well as press conferences and briefings. • Response. ESF #15 publicizes, through the media, response activities that directly impact or benefit affected communities. Publicized activities can include: the location of shelters and feeding stations, the location of comfort stations, boil water orders, road closure information, school and office closing information and environmental hazards. ESF #15-2 Appendix 15 (Emergency Support Function #15, External Affairs) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Recovery. ESF #15, working in conjunction with the County EOC, responds to media inquiries for damage assessment statistics and estimates. In coordination with the FEMA, the ESF #15 publicizes the status of any emergency or disaster declarations, the types of assistance available to emergency -disaster victims and the recovery center locations. When requested, ESF #15 staff will support a State Field Office or federal Joint Field Office operation. The Mayor of the County of Hawaii or the Civil Defense Administrator may activate ESF #15. Depending on the severity of the incident, the County EOC may establish a JIC that functions as the principal source for public information. ESF #15 will assume all external affairs activities once activated. The nature and magnitude of the incident will determine the type of information that must be disseminated, to whom the information is directed, and the frequency of information dissemination. If a JIC is established, it will be at a different location than the incident command post, emergency operation center, and/or multi -agency coordination center. The JIC will: • Synthesize input from all affected jurisdictions and/or organizations to present an accurate and coordinate message to the public. • Schedule and conduct official press briefings and situational updates. • Establish communications with the consulates of Countries that have citizens affected by the incident. • Schedule, coordinate, and conduct field tours of the impacted area for the media. RESPONSIBILITIES The primary and supporting departments or agencies assemble appropriate (pre -selected) staff at a designated location to support operations. The location may be the County EOC, County JIC, State Field Office, or federal JFO. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Office of the Mayor • Oversees media relations (to include media monitoring). • Coordinates emergency public information activities to ensure consistency and accuracy of information released to the general public through the County Joint Information Center (JIC). • Coordinates information -sharing amongst all agencies involved in the incident management. • Notifies support agencies to staff ESF #15 in the event of a declared disaster • Establishes and maintains the County JIC and media center. • Establish contact with legislators representing affected areas to provide information on the incident. • Respond to State legislative and Congressional inquiries. ESF #15-3 Appendix 15 (Emergency Support Function #15, External Affairs) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Provide escort and itinerary support for Legislative and Congressional visits. • Provide additional public affairs support, when needed. • Establishes priorities for external communications. • Approves and schedules County press conferences. • Augments ESF #15 staffing, as appropriate. Primary Agency: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency • Broadcast county -specific EAS messages. • Coordinates County JIC activities. Coordinate emergency public information activities to ensure consistency and accuracy of information released to the general public. • Coordinate with community leaders and neighborhood advocacy groups to assist in the rapid dissemination of information. • Coordinate information -sharing amongst all agencies involved in incident management. • Disseminate information with assistance of County and state agencies. Primary Agency: Hawai'i Fire Department • Provide Public Information Officer to the JIC. Ensure HFD message is incorporated into public information. Assume lead role in JIC as required. Primary Agency: Hawai'i Police Department • Provide Public Information Officer to the JIC. Ensure HPD message is incorporated into public information. Assume lead role in JIC as required. Primary Agency: Department of Public Works • Provide Public Information Officer to the JIC. • Ensure DPW message is incorporated into public information. • Assume lead role in JIC as required. Support Agencies Agency Functions All County Departments and • Provide staff and support for ESF #15 functions, as required. Agencies • Provide community relation support, as required. • Coordinate departmental media releases through ESF #15. • Perform Joint Information Center (JIC) staffing tasks, as required. ESF #15-4 Appendix 16 (Emergency Support Function #16, Special Needs) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Office of Aging Primary Agency: Department of Health (state) INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Hawai'i Fire Department Immigration Information Office Mass Transit Agency Office of Housing and Community Development Parks and Recreation Hawai'i Police Department Department of Education American Red Cross Emergency Support Function (ESF) 916, Special Needs, defines special needs populations, establishes emergency response roles, and assigns responsibilities for assisting special needs and other vulnerable population groups to County Organizations during the preparation, response and recovery phases of emergency management. There is no absolute definition of the population of individuals with disabilities or special healthcare needs within the context of County planning initiatives. However, the population can be described, rather than defined, by its needs in the event of an emergency or disaster and can be clustered by their level of independence and need for health or medical support. The special needs and vulnerable population groups, however, include individuals with physical, mental, sensory, cognitive, socio-economic (including homeless), or any other circumstance creating barriers to understanding or the ability to act/react as requested during an incident. This population also includes persons who: • Are ethnically and culturally diverse. • Have limitations or are unable to read or understand English. • Have reduced or no ability to speak, see or hear. • Have limitations in learning and understanding. • Are elderly and unable to adequately provide for themselves during incidents. • Are young and do not have family or their family is not capable of meeting their needs during an incident. • Are mentally or physically disabled and require constant care. • Have either a temporary or permanent health issue that requires specialized or constant care. ESF #16-1 Appendix 16 (Emergency Support Function #16, Special Needs) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Policies Support to special needs activities and services will be provided without regard to economic status or racial, religious, political, ethnic, or other affiliation. The County of Hawai'i will not assume the care or the responsibility for special needs persons during an incident. The County of Hawai'i will take reasonable steps to provide space requirements, sources of power for specialized equipment, and assistance to the primary care givers of special needs persons. ESF #16 recommends evacuation priorities for critical special health needs residents and provides risk communications for vulnerable population groups. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ESF #16 assistance is managed and coordinated at the lowest possible level. Effective response during an incident requires that persons with special needs be identified before an incident occurs. Once identified the magnitude of required care can be determined and a plan and procedures can be developed. Initial response activities are focused on immediate needs of people who require assistance with public information, incident alert and warning, evacuation, and temporary emergency sheltering. Office of Aging staff elements will assume the role and responsibility for ESF #16 and will coordinate with support agencies as needed. ESF #16 operations will be performed in parallel with other ESF activities. ESF #16 will coordinate with ESF #6, Mass Care, to provide for the care of the special health needs and vulnerable population groups. ESF #16 will provide (a) representative(s) to the County EOC and/or Joint Field Office (JFO) when a federal disaster declaration authorizes "Individual Assistance." ESF #16's priority is to alert, warn, evacuate, and provide appropriate emergency shelter facilities for persons with special healthcare needs and to other vulnerable groups. Presently, the County has limited capabilities and facilities to support the special healthcare needs population groups. Therefore, special healthcare needs population groups must be prepared to provide for their own care and nutrition requirements when seeking shelter in a County sponsored congregate shelter. Outreach efforts to the vulnerable populations, disability organizations, care facilities, patient educators, and health associations will provide preparedness information. Outreach messages encourage these groups to: Develop plans to shelter in place or report to a designated shelter. Organize a support network to assist them at home, shelter, and work. Develop plans to provide specialized transportation and assistance to travel from their home to appropriate shelters. ESF #16-2 Appendix 16 (Emergency Support Function #16, Special Needs) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Create and bring their own disaster supply kit, which includes any required medication and specialized equipment (i.e., oxygen, wheel chair, etc.), with them. RESPONSIBILITIES ESF COORDINATOR/Primary Agency: Office of Aging • Coordinate the integration of special needs population planning into County policies and plans. • Coordinate the development and distribution of warning messages for special needs population groups. • Coordinate the acquisition and distribution of resources to support special health needs emergency shelters. • Support education programs and provide outreach messages to inform the special needs/vulnerable population and caregivers of preparedness procedures and response actions. • Coordinate the inspection of possible shelter sites and the development of memorandums of agreement to utilize facilities as shelters. • Coordinate the warning, evacuation, and sheltering of special health needs population groups with ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). • Establish an advisory group with representation from selected support agencies to assist in risk communications, evacuation, and sheltering of vulnerable population groups. ESF Primary Agency: State Department of Health Staff Special Needs shelters when requested. Coordinate medical care required as a result of the incident for the affected Special Needs population. Establish Special Needs triage system in order to facilitate movement of special needs persons to the appropriate facility based on their medical care requirements. Support Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil Defense • Activate EOC, if required. Agency • Facilitate Multi -agency Coordination System (MACS) to address special needs population requirements. Hawai'i Fire Department • Provide EMS, as required Immigration Information Office . Reach out to special needs population to identify requirements. • Work requirements through the MACS. Mass Transit Agency • Support special needs population's transportation requirements, as requested. ESF #16-3 Appendix 16 (Emergency Support Function #16, Special Needs) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Office of Housing and • Reach out to special needs population to identify Community Development requirements. • Work requirements through the MACS. Parks and Recreation • Reach out to special needs population to identify requirements. • Work requirements through the MACS. Hawai'i Police Department • Assist with locating and identify special needs populations. Department of Education • Identify emergency power needs for DOE facilities that are designated as public emergency shelters. • Assist in the retrofit and equipping of designated shelters at public schools. • Assist in the expeditious opening of designated DOE facilities that serve as emergency shelters, and special health needs shelters, including pet friendly shelters. American Red Cross • Provide food, clothing, emergency shelter assistance, crisis counseling, referrals, and other services, as required. • Assist with training individuals and caregivers that furnish support services to the special needs population. ESF #16-4 Appendix 17 (Emergency Support Function #17, Tourist Sheltering and Evacuation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Primary Agencies: Department of Research and Development INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Office of the Mayor Corporate Counsel Mass Transit Agency Hawai'i Police Department Department of Public Works Planning Department Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) Department of Health Joint Task Force — Homeland Defense Department of Transportation American Red Cross Hawaii Hotel and Lodging Association Hawaii Hotel Visitors and Security Association Emergency Support Function (ESF) #17, Tourist Sheltering and Evacuation, establishes the policy and procedures for ensuring the safety of non-residents during an incident that may require all of or a portion of the County of Hawai'i to evacuate from their homes/temporary dwellings and seek shelter in a congregate care facility. Scope ESF 917 is applicable to any incident within the County of Hawai'i when Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, and ESF #6, Mass Care, are activated and the evacuation area includes one or more hotels/resorts. The visitor industry is a significant contributor to Hawaii's economy, visitor expenditures account for approximately 21% of the State's Gross Domestic Product. According to visitor statistics, there are approximately 160,000 visitors in the State on any given day. Policies Shelter -in -Place is the preferred method for hotel/resort guests. To enable hotel owners and operators the opportunity to shelter their guests, Hawai'i Statutes provide the Director of Civil Defense the authority to designate hotel facilities to serve as private emergency shelters. These private shelter facilities must meet the State hurricane shelter criteria guidelines established by the Director of Civil Defense. The limited shelter capacity available within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction will be filled based on these priorities: ESF #17-1 Appendix 17 (Emergency Support Function #17, Tourist Sheltering and Evacuation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan 1. Special Needs Population (Resident and Non-resident). 2. Big Island Residents. 3. Visitors. Shelter Managers have the authority to exceed stated shelter capacity during incident impact when necessary to save lives or prevent injury. Repatriation of foreign visitors will not take place during initial incident response. The decision to begin repatriation will be made once the incident is stabilized and enters the recovery phase of emergency management. Hawai'i County is responsible for developing evacuation plans, establishing protocols, and ordering evacuation of Big Island residents and visitors. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Tourism generates a significant portion of Hawai'i County's income. Hawai'i County cannot afford negative publicity associated with not taking care of tourists during an incident that requires evacuation of one or more hotels/resorts. Visitors present special challenges in that they are not familiar with the area, evacuation plans, or evacuation procedures. The hotels/resorts have the primary responsibility for the safety of their guests during an incident. Hotels/Resorts also have better facilities than what the County can offer when it comes to sheltering visitors during an incident. Better facilities combined with the fact that the South Kohala and North Kona Districts do not have enough shelter space to accommodate residents in the event of a compulsory evacuation make it imperative that hotels/resorts develop a plan for taking care of their guests during an incident. Visitors will probably not have any emergency supplies and may have language and cultural barriers. They may have special medical needs, disabilities, and mobility impediments that must be addressed. Hotels/Resorts should prepare to shelter guests when an imminent threat to public safety occurs from a natural or man-made hazard, the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency or Unified Command, in collaboration with the visitor industry, will determine whether shelter -in-place or tourist evacuation to safe destinations is the appropriate action. The visitor industry, i.e., hotels, airlines, shopping centers, and cruise ships, should review the County Emergency Operations Plan and then prepare their Emergency Response Plans and then make basic preparations for hazards that may impact Hawai'i County. When an incident does impact a hotel/resort the facility should take the appropriate actions in accordance with their plans and communicate these intentions and actions to the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency. The Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency will implement the following pre -disaster initiatives: • Support mutual assistance and emergency preparedness planning with visitor and transportation industry representatives. • Develop and maintain tourist evacuation and hotel sheltering plans. • Identify capabilities and shortfalls that require assistance from other agencies or organizations. ESF #17-2 Appendix 17 (Emergency Support Function #17, Tourist Sheltering and Evacuation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan • Develop and maintain risk communications plans that address hazard awareness and evacuation procedures on resort information channels, print media, and intranet home pages. When activated, ESF #17 works collaboratively with ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care), and ESF #16 (Special Needs) to: • The extent possible, provide information on registered hotel guests in affected areas to identify their location and physical condition. This information may be requested by national and foreign diplomatic agencies. • Utilize the American Red Cross Safe and Well website to account for visitors in the affected area and notify families and friends of their status, as required. • Coordinate the relocation of visitors to other safe vacation destinations in State if feasible. • Evacuate visitors when necessary and provide for their emergency sheltering and special medical health needs. • Reunite families and friends and return the visitors to their homes. • Coordinate return of visitors to international destinations. Because of its capabilities in EOC operations, HCCDA will serve as the coordinator and a primary agency for ESF #17 activities. The Department of Research and Development will serve as primary agency due to its capabilities, emergency preparedness plans, and day to day relationship with the visitor and travel industries. The private sector plays a key role in providing available resources in support of ESF #17. RESPONSIBILITIES ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency • Establish communications with R&D (provide public information and receive estimates on current number of visitor arrivals and departures). • Maintain communications with the Hawaii Hotel Visitors and Security Association (HHVISA). The EOC will receive assessments on facilities and visitor conditions and provide public information. • Support ESF #5 and the State Department of Transportation in establishing an evacuation incident management team to be situated at the Kona International Airport at Keahole. • If the situation permits, send a liaison for ESF #5 to the Kona International Airport at Keahole EOC to support the State Department of Transportation's tourist evacuation operations. ESF Primary Agency: Department of Research and Development • Send liaison to the County EOC. ESF #17-3 Appendix 17 (Emergency Support Function #17, Tourist Sheltering and Evacuation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan • Establish and maintain communications with the Hawaii Hotel and Lodging Association (HHLA), HHVISA EOC, Hawaii Visitors and Convention Bureau, and island visitor bureaus to obtain an estimate of conditions, capabilities, requirements, and damage to hotel properties and other related visitor industry capabilities. • Maintain communications with the Governor's Liaison to Tourism. • Provide a representative to the State Department of Transportation Evacuation Incident Management Team at the Kona International Airport at Keahole EOC, when requested. • Coordinate with the HHLA and maintain an estimate of hotel and visitor conditions including requirements for evacuation and sheltering. • Coordinate transportation requirements through ESF 91 and ESF #5. • Coordinate food and shelter requirements through ESF #5, ESF #6, and ESF #11, Agriculture and Natural Resources. Support Agencies Agency Functions Office of the Mayor • Declare Emergency. • Authorize evacuation. Corporate Counsel • Provide legal assistance in the evacuation and repatriation of visitors, as required. • Provide assistance, as requested, in the evacuation or repatriation of foreign visitors who have lost their identification/ passports. Mass Transit Agency • Maintain communications with HTA Command Center; gather and disseminate information, as directed. • Maintain communications with visitor industry businesses and members of the organizations, as directed. • Assist ESF #1 and ESF #5 with ground evacuation of visitors to and from island airports, when required. Hawai'i Police Department • Provide evacuation route security. • Provide crowd control, as required. Department of Public Works • Provide debris clearance and debris removal assistance of high priority areas through ESF #3 as required. Planning Department • Coordinate the conduct of damage and safety inspections of hotels through ESF #3, as requested. Department of Defense • Provide support to ESF #13 for the security, evacuation (Hawaii National Guard) and sheltering of visitors, as required. • Provide transportation to evacuate visitors and response personnel and distribute resources, as required. • Provide air traffic control support, as required. • Provide debris removal assistance to facilitate response operations, as required. ESF #17-4 Appendix 17 (Emergency Support Function #17, Tourist Sheltering and Evacuation) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of Health • Provide medical support to visitors through ESF #8, as required. • Establish and maintain communications with the Centers for Disease Control, Quarantine Station, Honolulu International Airport. Department of Transportation . Provide an estimate of transportation facilities i.e. airports, harbors, and highways) through ESF #1. • Establish and maintain communications with the State EOC or SERT Organization, when requested. • Establish and maintain communications with airline and maritime industries to identify capabilities and requirements. • Establish evacuation incident management teams to coordinate tourist evacuations at all commercial airports. • Coordinate transportation for the evacuation of visitors through ESF #1. • Coordinate shelter requirements for those visitors stranded in State transportation terminals through ESF #5, #6 and #16. Joint Task Force — Homeland • Provide defense support to civil authorities through ESF Defense #5 or ESF #20, when requested. • Coordinate and provide emergency assistance for the evacuation of tourists in accordance with the Joint Standing Operating Procedures for Mutual Civil Emergency Support in the State of Hawaii, as requested. • Coordinate with and provide a liaison to the State EOC or to the Honolulu Airport EOC, evacuation incident management team, when requested. American Red Cross • Provide shelter managers to State transportation terminals, and other facilities, when requested. • Coordinate food, water, and other personal comfort items to transportation terminal shelters, when requested. • Implement Disaster Welfare Information systems in coordination with ESF #6. Hawaii Hotel and Lodging • Maintain communications with the HTA Command Association Center. Hawaii Hotel and Visitor • Maintain communications with the HTA Command Industry Security Association Center and with the State EOC or SERT Organization when requested. • Provide an estimate of safety and security conditions at hotel properties. • Assist with the ground evacuation of visitors. ESF #17-5 Appendix 18 (Emergency Support Function #18, Mass Fatalities) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: District Office of Department of Health Primary Agencies: District Office of Department of Health INTRODUCTION Purpose Sc Support Agencies: Office of the Mayor Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Hawai'i Fire Department Hawai'i Police Department Department of Accounting and General Services Department of the Attorney General Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) Department of Land and Natural Resources Department of Public Safety Department of Transportation Medical Examiner/Coroner Joint Task Force -Homeland Defense U.S. Department of State Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team American Red Cross Hawaii Funeral Directors Association Emergency Support Function (ESF) #18 — Mass Fatalities establishes the policy and procedures for how the County of Hawaii will coordinate response to a catastrophic event involving the recovery of human remains that exceed existing capabilities. This appendix describes and defines roles and responsibilities for interagency support during mass fatality incidents. ESF #18 is applicable to all mass casualty events that occur within the County of Hawaii's jurisdiction. ESF #18 will most likely be activated as a result of a request from either ESF #8, Public Health & Medical Services, or ESF #9, Search & Rescue. ESF #18 may also be activated, at the request of another jurisdiction, to support an incident that occurs within Hawai'i County but in another entity's jurisdiction. ESF #18 coordinates County of Hawaii resources to: • Recover and identify human remains. • Establish temporary/mobile morgues. • Decontaminate human remains, if required. • Provide temporary storage and eventual permanent disposition of human remains. • Provide mortuary services. • Produce vital records. ESF #18-1 Appendix 18 (Emergency Support Function #18, Mass Fatalities) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan POLICIES A mass fatality incident is defined as any situation in which local resources are overwhelmed by the volume of human remains to be recovered and processed. The threshold that determines a mass casualty event is not the number of casualties, but the point where local resources are overwhelmed. ESF #9 search and rescue operations have priority over ESF #18 mass fatality response activities until the ESF #9 Coordinator determines that SAR is no longer a viable operation. The chief of police or his authorized subordinate serves as the coroner under section 841-1, Hawaii Revised Statutes. The deceased will be treated with respect and dignity at all times. If known, cultural and religious preferences of the deceased will be accommodated within the means available. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The County of Hawaii has a plethora of opportunities for a mass casualty event to occur, to include, but not limited to: natural disasters and accidents especially in the aviation and maritime industries. ESF #18 response will be conducted in accordance with the State of Hawaii Mass Fatality Response Plan. A mass fatality incident includes recovery and identification of human remains, and assistance to victim's families. County officials will request ESF #5, ESF #8, and ESF #18 assistance through the SCD when an incident occurs to the magnitude where the deceased overwhelm county resources. ESF #18 provides support to scene investigation, search and recovery, morgue operations, and family assistance center operations. ESF #18 coordinates and provides assistance to: • Locate and remove remains from the incident scene. • Determine the cause of death. • Identify the decedent. • Provide to and obtain information from relatives/friends of victims. • Arrange initial grief counseling. As required and authorized, ESF #18 will coordinate with ESF #5 and appropriate federal officials to request Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) support. DMORT is a program of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that responds ONLY when requested. DMORT support can be activated by four methods: ESF #18-2 Appendix 18 (Emergency Support Function #18, Mass Fatalities) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan 1. Request for DMORT support from SCD through a federal disaster declaration 2. National Transportation Safety Board request for DMORT support under the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act 3. US Public Health Service request for DMORT support, under the US Public Health Act, if the State cannot provide the necessary response. 4. A federal agency request for DMORT support to provide disaster victim identification. This appendix will address how Hawai'i County will manage a mass casualty event occurring within Hawai'i County's jurisdiction. This event will be very difficult to manage in a timely and efficient manner due to the lack of qualified personnel and resources specialized or adaptable to the unique requirements of a mass casualty event occuring on the Big Island. Resuonsibilities ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: District Office of the Department of Health • Identify and coordinate deployment of qualified medical response personnel from outside of the impacted area to the incident scene. • Coordinate requests for a Governor's and/or Presidential Disaster Declaration, when needed. • Request and coordinate State, federal, military, private non-profit, and private sector support, as required. • Request DMORT support through a federal disaster declaration or in collaboration with an appropriate federal agency. • Coordinate Emergency Management Assistance Compact requests to support mass fatality response. • Facilitate identification and coordination of temporary storage areas, transportation resources; special equipment; supplies; portable morgue units; and temporary burial sites. • Collect and analyze reports from emergency medical services and healthcare facilities to determine the number of casualties and fatalities and identify support requirements. • Conduct epidemiological surveillance and disease control activities and provide public health messages, as required. • Provide environmental health support and technical assistance for temporary morgues, mass burial sites, and temporary storage of remains. • Coordinate with the Centers for Disease Control, as required. • Identify and provide qualified medical personnel to assist morgue operations, when needed. • Provide technical assistance to identify and establish temporary morgues and burial sites. • Assist with forensic examinations, victim identification, and disposition of remains. • Provide crisis counseling and victim identification. • Process and distribute certificates of death. • Coordinate NDMS and DMORT assistance. ESF #18-3 Appendix 18 (Emergency Support Function #18, Mass Fatalities) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan • Provide laboratory support, as required. Support Agencies Agency Functions Office of the Mayor • Establish JIC. Hawai'i County Civil • Activate EOC, if required. Defense Agency • Facilitate Multi -Agency Coordination System (MACS) to address logistics requirements. Hawai'i Fire Department • Assist with recovery of remains. Hawai'i Police Department • Provide incident site security. • Perform coroner responsibilities. Department of Accounting . Identify through ESF #3, State facilities that could be used and General Services for temporary morgues and family assistance centers. • Provide support through ESF #7 to procure generators, refrigerated trailers, and mortuary supplies (i.e., body storage bags, caskets, etc.), and other equipment and supplies, as required. Department of the Attorney . Provide legal advice and support for the recovery, treatment, General burial, or transportation of remains. • Provide guidance and coordination for repatriation of remains to other countries. Department of Defense • Provide mortuary affairs assistance to State and county (Hawaii National Guard) authorities, as available. • Provide decontamination and casualty extraction support, as required. • Provide transportation, heavy equipment, and material handling support, as required. • Provide chaplain support to HING personnel, response personnel, and family assistance centers, as required. Department of Land and . Coordinate with counties to designate and obtain approval Natural Resources of burial sites. Department of Public Safety . Provide support to secure incident scenes and morgue facilities, as required. • Provide assistance to local authorities for notification of next of kin. Department of • Coordinate National Transportation Safety Board assistance, Transportation as required. • Coordinate transportation of response personnel and equipment, as required. • Coordinate and provide transportation for remains from incident sites to morgues, as requested. • Coordinate transportation for repatriation of remains, when requested. ESF #18-4 Appendix 18 (Emergency Support Function #18, Mass Fatalities) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Medical Examiner/Coroner . Identify remains and determine cause of death. • Prepare and sign death certificates. Joint Task Force -Homeland • Coordinate support from the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing Defense in Action (POW/MIA) Accounting Command, Central Identification Laboratory, when requested. • Coordinate use of military facilities for temporary morgue operations, when requested. • Coordinate transportation for repatriation of remains, as requested and authorized. • Coordinate US Pacific Command mortuary affairs and forensic assistance, as requested. US Department of State • Repatriation of foreign remains. Disaster Mortuary • Provide support for human remains recovery operations. Operational Response Team . Provide morgue operations support. Disaster Mortuary . Assist with forensic examination and DNA acquisition. Operational Response Team . Provide family assistance center support. (continued) . Provide technical assistance, as required. American Red Cross • Provide family assistance center support and grief counseling, as required and available. • Provide referral services, as required. Hawaii Funeral Directors . Provide worker and site safety advice. Association . Provide local morgue capacity status. • Provide assistance to incident commanders through county EOC. • Assist in identifying temporary holding or cold storage areas or temporary morgue sites. • Provide technical assistance in the burial of remains and transportation of remains to out-of-state destinations. • Provide services once remains are released. ESF #18-5 Appendix 19 (Emergency Support Function #19, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Humane Society Primary Agencies: American Red Cross Department of Education INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Department of Parks and Recreation Department of Accounting and General Services Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) Department of Education Department of Health Department of Transportation Hawaii Association of Animal Welfare Agencies Hawaii Veterinary Medical Association Emergency Support Function (ESF) #19 — Pet Evacuation and Sheltering, establishes the policy and procedures for County of Hawai'i efforts to protect public and to ensure public health and human safety through effective management and humane care of pets, as defined by FEMA, during an incident. Scope ESF 919 is applicable when Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place, and ESF #6, Mass Care, are activated and the conditions indicate that residents will be away from their homes for more than twenty-four hours and they are temporarily housed in a congregate care shelter operated by the American Red Cross in support of the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency. ESF #19 is not applicable to service animals. ESF #19 is not applicable to farm animals which are addressed in ESF #11, Agriculture and Natural Resources. ESF #19 is not applicable to private shelters. ESF #19 includes three primary functions: • Evacuation of pets: Develop and implement plans and services to assist with the evacuation of pets from emergency or disaster impact areas. ESF #19-1 Appendix 19 (Emergency Support Function #19, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Policies Sheltering of pets: Identify emergency sheltering facilities for household pets and provide support at general population and special health needs shelters, as required, for service animals in accordance with State law, communicate information to the public and develop proper pet release forms and procedures to ensure return of pets to their rightful owner(s). Accessibility to veterinary care for injured or sick pets: Provide emergency pet first aid and veterinary care for injured or sick pets. Household Pet — (Federal Emergency Management Agency's definition) A domesticated pet, such as a dog, cat, bird, rabbit, rodent, or turtle that is traditionally kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes and can travel in commercial carriers and be housed in temporary facilities. Household pets do not include reptiles (with the exception of turtles), amphibians, fish, insects/arachnids, farm animals (including horses), and animals kept for racing purposes. Pets will be allowed to access government and contracted transportation vehicles during emergency evacuations. Pets will be humanely handled and transported in a manner that is safe for both the pet and the public. The safety of the public takes precedence over the safety and/or sheltering of a pet. During an emergency, pet food, if it is available, will be distributed to pet owners housed in congregate care shelters. Annex E, Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place requests that persons using a pet friendly shelter bring sufficient food for their pet as part of their emergency kit. The initial distribution of food for displaced persons with pets will be through ESF #6. The general population (persons not displaced from their place of residence) will purchase pet food from retail outlets. If it is necessary to distribute pet food to residents the priority will be to areas of acute need and then to areas of moderate need as determined by the access to commercial sources of pet food. Supplies may be provided through County or State procurement, Federal distribution channels, and/or private donations. Temporary pet food and refrigeration support will be terminated in a systematic manner as shelter, utilities and commercial establishments reopen for business. Priorities and allocations related to pet food purchasing and distribution will be established in accordance with guidance provided by ESF #5. All wholesale pet food stocks in the County not subject to United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) control will be under distribution control of ESF #19. Emergency pet first aid and veterinary care may be available for injured or sick pets at the pet owner's expense. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The Humane Society will train volunteers in congregate pet care and sheltering. When ESF #19 is activated the Humane Society will coordinate HCCDA and the American Red Cross to determine which shelters will be pet friendly with. The Humane Society will coordinate ESF #19-2 Appendix 19 (Emergency Support Function #19, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan staffing requirements with the American Red Cross and assign trained volunteers to run the pet friendly area of the designated shelter(s). The Humane Society will develop a network of Veterinarians who are willing to provide emergency veterinary service at the pet friendly shelters. ESF #19 officials will coordinate with ESF #6 to collocate distribution of emergency pet food with congregate feeding centers. ORGANIZATION The Humane Society of the Big Island will assume the coordinator and a primary agency role for ESF #19 and will coordinate with support agencies, as needed. ESF #19 will work collaboratively with ESF #5 and ESF #6 to provide for the care of the appropriate evacuation and sheltering of household pets. For matters involving public health and human safety regarding pet issues during an emergency or disaster, Hawaii Association of Animal Welfare Agencies is the lead agency. For matters concerning pet first aid, emergency veterinary care and pet food safety the Hawaii Veterinary Medical Association acts as a consulting agency. Responsibilities The primary and support agencies assemble appropriate (pre -selected) staff at a designated location to support operations. The location may be the County Emergency Operating Center, State Field Office, or the federal Joint Field Office. ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: Humane Society • Coordinate the inspection of possible emergency pet shelter sites and the development of memorandums of agreement to utilize identified facilities. • Support education programs and provide outreach messages to inform pet owners of emergency pet shelter procedures and locations. • Coordinate the acquisition and distribution of resources to support emergency pet shelters. • Provide an integrated State and local response for evacuating pets from emergency or disaster impact areas through government, non-government organizations and volunteers. • Coordinate efforts to identify, secure, and transport pet food to affected areas. Primary Agency: American Red Cross • Manage shelters and provide assistance to the Humane Society with their shelter operations co -located with ARC managed shelters • Identify requirements for pet food during initial disaster outreach and assessment operations • Coordinate pet food distribution activities of other voluntary organizations ESF #19-3 Appendix 19 (Emergency Support Function #19, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Primary Agency: Department of Education • Identify facilities that may be used for pet shelters. SUDDort Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil • Activate EOC, if required. Defense Agency • Facilitate Multi -Agency Coordination System (MACS) to address sheltering requirements. Department of Parks and . Provide open space (outdoor) as pet evacuation area, if Recreation required. Department of Accounting . Support funding for the retrofit of public facilities that may and General Services serve as emergency shelters, including pet friendly emergency shelters. • Assist in identifying public facilities for use as pet friendly emergency shelters. Department of Agriculture . Assist in identifying available resources of pet food, transportation, equipment, storage, and distribution facilities and be able to identify these resources geographically. • Assist in the procurement of critical pet food supplies that are unavailable from existing inventories. • Provide information and recommendations for incidents involving an outbreak of highly contagious/zoonotic animal disease. • For natural disasters, provide technical assistance related to animal care to injured or abandoned animals. Department of Commerce • Provide a database of licensed veterinarians to ESF #19. and Consumer Affairs . Develop policies to credential out of state veterinarians that volunteer to support State emergencies. Department of Defense • Provide security for pet -friendly shelters, pet food sources, (Hawaii National Guard) distribution points, and supplies, as required. • Provide transportation resources, as required. • Provide environmental resources and support for response and recovery activities, as required. Department of Health • Provide technical assistance in determining when water is (continued) suitable for human/pet consumption and canning. ESF #19-4 Appendix 19 (Emergency Support Function #19, Pet Evacuation and Sheltering) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawai'i County Emergency Operations Plan Agency Functions Department of • Coordinate and provide transportation for personnel, pets, and Transportation supplies, as required. Department of Health • Coordinate with State and county authorities and private industry to conduct tracing, recall, and control of adulterated products. This includes proper disposal of contaminated products in order to protect public health and the environment in disaster areas. • Provide human health-related information, including surveillance for pet food borne disease and occupational safety information for pet friendly shelter managers. • Provide technical assistance, subject -matter expertise, and support for biological, chemical, and other hazardous agents on contaminated facility remediation, environmental monitoring, and contaminated agriculture (animal/crops) and pet food product decontamination and disposal. Hawaii Association of • Provide and train pet friendly shelter managers. Animal Welfare Agencies . Identify private sector capabilities and resources to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, expertise, and other support prior to, during, or after an emergency or disaster. • Coordinate plans for emergency first aid and veterinary care for pets. • Ensure that a system is in place to ensure the return of pets to the rightful owner(s). Hawaii Veterinary Medical . Provide a list of veterinarians willing to assist with sick and Association injured animals during emergencies and disasters. ESF #19-5 Appendix 20 (Emergency Support Function #20, Military Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan ESF Coordinator: Hawai'i National Guard (Army or Air) Primary Agency: Hawai'i National Guard INTRODUCTION Purpose Support Agencies: Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency Department of the Attorney General Department of Transportation Pacific Disaster Center Joint Task Force -Homeland Defense Emergency Support Function (ESF) #20, Military Support, establishes the policies by which the Department of Defense and/or Hawai'i National Guard will provide support to Hawai'i County during a Type 1 through Type 4, establishes the procedures to request military support, defines the conditions that must exist to request military support, and defines what they type of support that may be requested. Specific responsibilities are assigned to primary and support agencies. Emergency Support Function (ESF) #20 - Military Support coordinates and provides National Guard Civil Support (NGCS) for potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated State and/or federal response. ESF #20 provides a ready force with general capabilities suitable for most incident response and specific capabilities, that the County may not possess, essential to responding to certain incidents. ESF #20 assets come with an organic chain of command which retains command and control of their assets. Scope ESF 920 provides a mechanism for coordinating and providing NGCS to County authorities. ESF #20 provides capabilities and resources for four (4) primary functions: • Support to Law Enforcement: Includes providing security forces to assist law enforcement agencies with patrols, site security, critical infrastructure protection, detainment of individuals, traffic control, and civil unrest. • Incident Management: Includes support for command and control, damage assessment and recovery center operations, fire suppression, communications, medical treatment and triage, mortuary affairs, chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) assessment and response, casualty extraction, and air traffic control. • Transportation Support: Includes airlift, clearing routes to restore access and mobility for emergency operations, evacuation of personnel to shelters, and transportation of personnel and supplies. • Service and Support: Includes shelter support, water purification, food preparation and distribution, distribution points, power generation, engineer support, and facilities. • ESF #20 is a support ESF for ESFs #1, #2, #7, and #13, but may also support ESFs #3, 94, 96, #7, 910, #12, and 918. ESF #20 is the last resort and will only be activated when there is no other source for a specific resource or resources. • ESF #20 is applicable only in Hawai'i County's jurisdiction and will most likely only be activated for a Type 1 or aType 2 Incident. ESF #20-1 Appendix 20 (Emergency Support Function #20, Military Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan Policies ESF #20 will be a stand alone branch using their internal command structure. They will receive missions from the Operations Section/Group, but will not operate within the ICS chain of command. All requests for NGCS are forwarded to State Civil Defense (SCD) or the State EOC, if activated. If HING assets are not available or more assistance is required a request for federal forces for non -Presidential declared events from Joint Task Force -Homeland Defense under the Joint Standing Operating Procedures for Mutual Civil Emergency Support in the State of Hawaii (JSOP) may be submitted through SCD, or the State EOC. For Presidential declared events, requests will be forwarded through the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and coordinated by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and Joint Task Force -Homeland Defense (JTF- HD). Federal property, used during State emergencies, will remain under National Guard or active military control. Costs associated with this support are reimbursable. Military assistance is always provided in support of civil authorities. Military support will not be furnished if it is in direct competition with private enterprise or the civilian labor force. The on -scene commander, or the senior officer/non-commissioned officer present, will make the final determination as to whether the mission can be safely accomplished with the available personnel and equipment or if the mission is beyond their capabilities. When performing missions in support of law enforcement, National Guard personnel will be deployed with a sworn and commissioned State or county law enforcement officer. National Guard personnel in a State Active Duty or Title 32 status are not subject to the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). If active federal forces are utilized, effort should be made to assign non -law enforcement missions to those forces to avoid violation of the PCA. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS General When the IC, Planning Section Chief, or Operations Section Chief determines that resource requirements exceed available public or private resources, and this condition is likely to exist for more than 24 hours, activation of ESF 920 may be requested by the EOC/MACC through SCD. The request will be evaluated at SCD and if a mission is assigned to Department of Defense (DOD) the tasked organization will send a liaison to the EOC to coordinate any support required and to provide a communications link with the DOC element. Once the mission is ESF #20-2 Appendix 20 (Emergency Support Function #20, Military Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan completed, the DOD resource will be released unless another mission assignment has already be requested and approved. National Guard forces will begin to draw -down when the situation begins to stabilize and county and State officials are able to handle the situation with their own assets. National Guard personnel may be ordered to duty under one of the following statutory frameworks: Title 10 (United States Code). Under Title 10 status, National Guard personnel are federally funded and under federal command and control. National Guard forces activated under Title 10 are subject to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and are prohibited from law enforcement activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law. Title 32 United States Code). Under Title 32 status, National Guard personnel are federally funded, but under the control of the State. The federal government reimburses States for Guard units' activities in response to federally designated disasters. While in Title 32 status, National Guard personnel do not fall under PCA restrictions and may perform law enforcement duties. State Active Duty (SAD) status. Under State law, the Governor may order National Guard personnel to respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, or perform other duties. National Guard personnel performing State missions are State funded and under State control. Personnel on SAD do not fall under PCA restrictions and may perform law enforcement duties. ORGANIZATION HING is composed of Army and Air National Guard forces and is organized under Joint Force Headquarters -Hawaii with separate Army and Air National Guard headquarters. The Army National Guard has four major subordinate commands: • 29th Brigade Combat Team • 103rd Troop Command • 298th Regional Training Institute • Medical Command The Air National Guard is composed of an Air Wing and Communications Group: • 154th Wing • 201st Combat Communications Group HING has two special organizations to assist responses to incidents and emergencies. The 93rd Civil Support Team identifies CBRNE agents/substances, assesses current and projected consequences, advises on response measures, and assists with appropriate requests for State support. The Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) provides a capability to perform mass patient/casualty decontamination, triage and emergency medical treatment, and casualty extraction. ESF #20-3 Appendix 20 (Emergency Support Function #20, Military Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan As required, additional National Guard forces may be requested and coordinated through EMAC and the National Guard Bureau. Hawaii is located in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility. Joint Task Force- Homeland Defense (JTF-HD) serves as the USPACOM executive agent for homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). JTF-HD coordinates and provides DSCA from active military forces, as required and authorized. RESPONSIBILITIES ESF Coordinator: Department of Defense (State Civil Defense) • Direct and control the State response and recovery efforts. Coordinate requests for support of disaster operations including protective measures, debris clearance, emergency repairs, mass care, and health services. • Collect and prioritize requests for ESF #20 support from the counties. • Coordinate the planning and mission tasking for ESF 920 with HING, supported counties, State and federal agencies. Primary Agency: Department of Defense (Hawaii National Guard) • Provide National Guard Civil Support, on a mission request basis, within HING capability and applicable laws and regulations. • Provide liaison officers to State Civil Defense. • Provide liaison officers or representatives to the supported EOC and the JFO, as required. • Track all expenses incurred by the HING during the response. • Coordinate the Memorandum of Agreement and reimbursement projections for disaster response with the State Fiscal Officer. ESF #20-4 Appendix 20 (Emergency Support Function #20, Military Support) to Annex H (Emergency Support Functions) to Hawaii County Emergency Operations Plan Suanort Agencies Agency Functions Hawai'i County Civil • Request ESF #20 support through SCD when County assets are Defense Agency overwhelmed. Department of the Attorney . Assist in the development and review of Rules on Use of Force General for use by National Guard personnel. • Provide legal advice and develop "hold harinless" and other releases. • Assist in the preparation and execution of EMAC contracts for out-of-state National Guard support. Department of . Provide support and coordinate assets to move resources and Transportation personnel, as required. • Provide technical expertise to expedite and coordinate road and highway clearance. Pacific Disaster Center • Provide GIS and modeling support, as required. Joint Task Force - • Provide defense support to civil authorities, as required and Homeland Defense authorized. • Coordinate and provide emergency assistance in accordance with the Joint Standing Operating Procedures for Mutual Civil Emergency Support in the State of Hawaii, as required. • Coordinate with and provide a liaison to the State EOC, when activated. • Coordinate and provide Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer support. ESF #20->