HomeMy WebLinkAbout2026-09-09 Board of Ethics Public Inspection Packet1
BOARD OF ETHICS
COUNTY OF HAWAI‘I
In the Matter of the Petition by Sylvia A. Wan,
Petitioner.
PETITION NO. 2026-16
INFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION
INFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION
The County of Hawaiʻi Board of Ethics (Board), having reviewed the petition for an
informal advisory opinion dated July 30, 2026 (Petition), from Sylvia A. Wan (Petitioner) and
having obtained all the information deemed necessary by the Board to make a proper
determination regarding the subject petition, the Board renders this informal advisory opinion
pursuant to the Charter of the County of Hawaiʻi (CCH) § 14-5(b), Hawaiʻi County Code (HCC)
§ 2-86, and the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Board of Ethics (BOE Rules) Rule 4.
I. FACTS
Petitioner is employed as a deputy corporation counsel in the County of Hawaiʻi
(County) Office of the Corporation Counsel (OCC). Petitioner represents that, as of July 25,
2026, she serves as the Recording Secretary of the Big Island Dance Council (BIDC), a nonprofit
organization that develops, promotes, fosters, and encourages the art of dance by sponsoring and
coordinating dance classes and events of a variety of dance genres throughout Hawaiʻi Island.
Petitioner further represents that her service on the BIDC board is uncompensated volunteer
service.
2
In the Petition, Petitioner requests clearance for BIDC to apply for grants from the
County Council (Council) and other County agencies. Petitioner represents that BIDC has
previously received County District Contingency Funds from the Council and that BIDC plans to
apply for contingency grant funds for upcoming events this year. Petitioner further represents
that she has no financial interest in the operations of BIDC; that other members of the BIDC
board would apply and advocate for the award of grant funds before the Council or the County;
and that she would recuse herself from reviewing or authorizing any contract that may come to
OCC as a result of the award of any grant funds. Petitioner cites HCC §§ 2-83(b)(1), 2-83(c), 2-
84, and 2-85 as the provisions of the Code of Ethics applicable to the Petition.
Petitioner requested an open proceeding, and the Board took up the Petition at its meeting
on August 12, 2026, in open session. Petitioner was present at the meeting and read from BIDC’s
bylaws, which provide that the duties of the Recording Secretary are to keep the minutes of all
BIDC meetings, to have the minutes of previous meetings available at each meeting, and to
provide copies of the agenda at each meeting. Petitioner confirmed that the Recording Secretary
is an officer of BIDC and that only BIDC’s president, vice president, and treasurer may sign on
BIDC’s behalf. Petitioner further represented that she has no contracting authority for BIDC and
no authority to apply for grants on BIDC’s behalf, and that she has informed BIDC that it must
disclose her service on its board, together with this opinion, in connection with any application to
the County.
II. OPINION
3
Petitioner is an “employee” as defined by HCC § 2-82,1 and is subject to Art. XIV of the
Charter and Chapter 2, Art. 15 of the HCC (collectively, the Code of Ethics).2 The Petition is a
petition for an informal advisory opinion concerning Petitioner’s own conduct pursuant to HCC
§ 2-86(a) and BOE Rule 4.1(a), and substantially complies with the filing requirements of HCC
§ 2-86(c) and BOE Rule 4.1(c).3
Based on its review of the record before it, including the Petition, Petitioner’s
representations, and the Code of Ethics, the Board finds4 that Petitioner’s service as Recording
Secretary of BIDC does not constitute a probable violation of the Code of Ethics, for the reasons
discussed below. The Board also sets out certain prospective safeguards with which Petitioner
must comply in her continued service as a deputy corporation counsel.
1 See HCC § 2-82 (“‘Employee’ means any person, except an officer, employed by the County or any agency thereof but the term shall not include an independent contractor”). Petitioner is not an “officer” as that term is defined in HCC § 2-82, which reaches only elected officials, administrative heads of agencies, the first deputy or first assistant to the administrative head of any agency of the County, members of boards and commissions having more than advisory powers, and the managing director and deputy managing director. By contrast, CCH § 13-1(d)(5) and BOE Rule 1.4(a)(6)(E) each define “officer” to include assistants or deputies of the corporation counsel and prosecuting attorney, and Petitioner is therefore an officer for purposes of Article XIV of the Charter and the BOE Rules. The distinction is not material here, as each substantive provision discussed below applies to officers and employees alike. 2 See HCC § 2-81 (“This article shall apply to every officer or employee of the County”); see also CCH §§ 14-2 to 14-4; HCC § 2-82.
3 The Petition omits her mailing address, see HCC § 2-86(c)(1), and does not include a memorandum of authorities, see HCC § 2-86(c)(6). Neither omission defeats substantial compliance, as Petitioner’s position and the factual basis for it are discernible from the Petition. See HCC § 2-86 (providing that any petition which does not substantially comply with the requirements in HCC § 2-86 may be rejected); BOE Rule 4.5(b)(3) (stating much the same as to the requirements in the BOE Rules). 4 At its meeting on August 12, 2026, the Board voted six in favor, and none opposed, to render this informal
advisory opinion for the reasons discussed herein.
4
A. HCC §§ 2-83(c) and 2-85 Are Inapplicable Here
Petitioner cites HCC § 2-83(c)5 and HCC § 2-856 among the applicable provisions.
Together, those provisions govern situations in which an officer or employee of the County, or a
business in which an officer or employee or the officer’s or employee’s immediate family
member has a “controlling interest,” contracts for goods or services (or, in the case of HCC § 2-
85, construction or property) with a County agency. Both provisions apply only where the
officer, employee, or immediate family member has a “controlling interest” in the contracting
business as defined by HCC § 2-82.7 Petitioner’s position as Recording Secretary of BIDC does
not, without more, constitute a controlling interest in BIDC. Petitioner represents that she has no
contracting authority for BIDC, and only BIDC’s president, vice president, and treasurer may
sign on its behalf. Moreover, County grants are not contracts for goods, services, construction, or
property, and therefore do not fall within the purview of HCC §§ 2-83(c) and 2-85.8 On the
information presented, HCC §§ 2-83(c) and 2-85 are not implicated.
5 HCC § 2-83(c) (providing, in relevant part, that “[a]n officer or employee of the County, or a business in which an officer or employee or the officer or employee’s immediate family member has a controlling interest, may contract for goods or services with any County agency provided that: (1) The nature of the relationship between the officer or employee and the County is provided in full disclosure to the agency seeking goods or services as part of the bid for a contract or response to a request for proposals; and (2) The officer or employee has obtained an opinion from the board that there is no conflict of interest resulting from the officer or employee’s position with the County,” and that “[a] contract shall be void if an officer or employee fails to comply with these disclosure requirements or if the board finds there is a conflict of interest or any preferential treatment involved”). 6 HCC § 2-85(a) (providing, in relevant part, that “[a] County agency may enter into a contract involving services or property or to procure or dispose of goods or services, or for construction, with an officer, an employee, or a business in which an officer or an employee or the officer or employee’s immediate family member has a controlling interest, provided the provisions in section 2-83, subsection (c) have been met, and further provided: (1) The contract is awarded by competitive sealed bidding pursuant to the state public procurement code; or (2) The contract is awarded by competitive sealed proposal pursuant to the state public procurement code”). 7 HCC § 2-82 (“‘Controlling interest’ means an interest in a business or other undertaking which is sufficient in fact to control, whether the interest be greater or less than fifty percent”). 8 See HCC § 2-136 (“‘Grant’ means an appropriation of County funds pursuant to [Chapter 2, Art. 25, HCC (Appropriation of Funds to Nonprofit Organizations)]”); HRS § 103D-104 (“‘Grant’ means the furnishing of assistance, whether financial or otherwise, to any person to support a program authorized by law. The term does not include an award whose primary purpose is to procure an end product, whether in the form of goods, services, or construction; a contract resulting from such an award is not a grant but a procurement contract”).
5
B. HCC § 2-84(a) (Official Action)
The provision most directly relevant to Petitioner’s service on the BIDC board is HCC §
2-84(a), which prohibits an officer or employee from taking “any official action directly
affecting a business or other private undertaking” in which the officer or employee has a
substantial financial interest, is engaged as a legal counsel, advisor, consultant, or representative,
or other agency capacity, or knows or has reason to know that an immediate family member has
a substantial financial interest.9
Petitioner represents that she has “no financial interest in the operations of BIDC.” That
representation is accurate in the colloquial sense that Petitioner receives no compensation from
BIDC and does not hold a pecuniary interest in it. HCC § 2-82, however, defines “financial
interest” to include “a directorship or officership in a business,”10 and a “business” expressly
includes nonprofit organizations.11 BIDC is therefore a “business” within the meaning of HCC §
2-82, and Petitioner confirmed to the Board that the Recording Secretary is an officer of BIDC.
Petitioner’s service as Recording Secretary is accordingly a financial interest in BIDC,
notwithstanding that the position is uncompensated and that neither compensation nor a
pecuniary interest is required under HCC § 2-84(a)(1). The Board has determined that this
officership constitutes a substantial financial interest for purposes of HCC § 2-84(a)(1). HCC §
2-84(a)(3) is not implicated on these facts.
HCC § 2-84(a)(2) applies independent of the determination above. It reaches official
action directly affecting a business in which the officer or employee “is engaged as a legal
9 HCC § 2-84(a) (providing, in relevant part, that “[n]o officer or employee shall take any official action directly
affecting a business or other private undertaking in which the officer or employee: (1) Has a substantial financial interest; (2) Is engaged as a legal counsel, advisor, consultant, or representative, or other agency capacity; or (3) Knows or has reason to know that an immediate family member has a substantial financial interest”). 10 HCC § 2-82 (“‘Financial interest’ means an interest held by an individual, the individual’s spouse, or dependent children which is: [. . .] (6) A directorship or officership in a business” (emphasis added)). 11 HCC § 2-82 (“‘Business’ includes a corporation, a partnership, a sole proprietorship, a trust or foundation, or
other individual organization carrying on a business, whether or not operated for profit” (emphasis added)).
6
counsel, advisor, consultant, or representative, or other agency capacity,” and, unlike subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(3), contains no substantiality threshold. As Recording Secretary of the BIDC
board, Petitioner is engaged with BIDC in an “other agency capacity,” and would additionally
fall within the “legal counsel” and “advisor” prongs were she to provide legal advice to BIDC.
The prohibition in HCC § 2-84(a), however, reaches only “official action.” HCC § 2-82
defines “official action” as “a decision, recommendation, approval, disapproval, or other action,
including inaction, which involves the use of discretionary authority.”12 A “discretionary act” is
one “involving an exercise of personal judgment and conscience,” whereas a “ministerial act” is
“an act performed without the independent exercise of discretion or judgment.”13 The substance
of a deputy corporation counsel’s work, including rendering legal advice, drafting and reviewing
legal instruments, approving documents as to form and legality, and formulating legal opinions
and recommendations, involves the exercise of professional legal judgment and is therefore
official action. Moreover, the corporation counsel is “the chief legal advisor and legal
representative of all county agencies, the council and all officers and employees in matters
related to their official powers and duties,”14 and OCC therefore advises both the Council, which
appropriates the County District Contingency Funds that BIDC intends to seek, and the agencies
that would administer any resulting award.
Petitioner assumed the Recording Secretary position on July 25, 2026, and filed the
Petition five days later, in advance of BIDC’s anticipated application. Nothing in the record
indicates that Petitioner has taken any official action directly affecting BIDC. On the information
12 HCC § 2-82 (“‘Official act’ or ‘official action’ means a decision, recommendation, approval, disapproval, or other action, including inaction, which involves the use of discretionary authority”). 13 Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “discretionary act” as “[a] deed involving an exercise of personal judgment and conscience” and “ministerial act” as “[a]n act performed without the independent exercise of discretion or judgment”). See also Informal Advisory Opinion, Petition No. 2025-26 (applying the same distinction). 14 CCH § 6-5.3.
7
presented, there is no probable violation of HCC § 2-84(a)(1) or (a)(2). Similarly, nothing in the
record indicates that HCC § 2-84(b), which prohibits an officer or employee from acquiring a
financial interest in any business or other undertaking that the officer or employee has reason to
believe may be directly involved in official action to be taken by the officer or employee, is
implicated.15
Compliance with HCC § 2-84 is, however, a continuing obligation. Going forward,
Petitioner must abstain and recuse herself from any official action, meaning any act involving the
exercise of discretionary authority, directly affecting BIDC or any other business in which she
has a substantial financial interest or with which she is engaged as legal counsel, advisor,
consultant, representative, or in any other agency capacity. The recusal is not limited to contract
review, as contemplated in the Petition. It extends to advising the Council, any Council member,
or any County agency on a BIDC matter; to drafting, reviewing, or approving as to form and
legality any resolution, communication, grant agreement, or other instrument concerning BIDC;
and to rendering any legal opinion or recommendation, formal or informal, on a BIDC matter. It
also reaches inaction where the decision not to act involves the use of discretionary authority.
Petitioner may not rely on the department head disclosure exception in HCC § 2-84(a), because
she is a deputy corporation counsel and not the department head of OCC.16 Petitioner is not,
however, prohibited from performing ministerial acts that are part of her normal job functions
and that are performed without the independent exercise of discretion or judgment as to BIDC.
15 HCC § 2-84(b) (“No officer or employee shall acquire financial interests in any business or other undertaking which that officer or employee has reason to believe may be directly involved in official action to be taken by the officer or employee”). 16 See HCC § 2-84(a) (“A department head who is unable to be disqualified on any matter described in items (1), (2), and (3) above will not be in violation of this subsection if the department head has complied with the disclosure
requirements of section 2-91.1” (emphases added)).
8
To give practical effect to that recusal, it is recommended that Petitioner notify the
Corporation Counsel of her position with BIDC so that any BIDC matters may be assigned to
another deputy and Petitioner may be screened from them.
C. HCC § 2-84(c) (Appearance on Behalf of Private Interests)
HCC § 2-84(c) provides that “[n]o officer or employee shall represent private interests in
any legal action or proceeding against the County or appear on behalf of private interests before
any agency, except as otherwise provided by law[.]”17 BIDC is a private interest, and the
prohibition would be implicated were Petitioner to appear on BIDC’s behalf in connection with
its grant application. HCC § 2-84(c) contains no compensation element, unlike CCH § 14-2(e),
so the absence of compensation to Petitioner from BIDC is immaterial.18 The exception at HCC
§ 2-84(d), which permits a member of any board, commission, or committee to appear on behalf
of private interests before agencies other than the one on which the member serves, addresses
members of County boards, commissions, and committees and does not apply to an employee of
a County department.19
Petitioner represents that other members of the BIDC board would apply and advocate
for the award of grant funds before the Council or the County, and that she has no authority to
apply for grants on BIDC’s behalf. That arrangement is consistent with HCC § 2-84(c), and on
17 HCC § 2-84(c) contains two provisos, neither of which applies here. The first exempts a County officer or
employee who is a registered architect, landscape architect, surveyor, or engineer affixing that person’s registered stamp to plans submitted to the County for permits for the person’s principal residence or that of an immediate family member. HCC § 2-84(c)(1). The second provides that no officer or employee “shall be denied the right to appear before any agency to petition for redress of grievances caused by any official act or action affecting such person’s personal rights, privileges, or property, including real property.” HCC § 2-84(c)(2). 18 See CCH § 14-2(e) (providing that it shall constitute a conflict of interest for an officer or employee to “[a]ppear
in behalf of private interests for compensation before any agency of the county other than a court of law, nor represent private interests in any action or proceeding against the interest of the county in any litigation to which the county is a party”); CCH § 14-1(a) (“The council shall adopt by ordinance a code of ethics which shall provide as a minimum standard the provisions of this article. More stringent provisions may be enacted”). 19 HCC § 2-84(d) (“Notwithstanding any provision of this article to the contrary, a member of any board, commission, or committee may appear on behalf of private interests before agencies other than the board, commission, or committee on which such person serves”).
9
the information presented there is no probable violation of that subsection. The continuation of
that arrangement is a condition of this informal advisory opinion. Petitioner must not appear on
behalf of BIDC before the Council or any other County agency, which includes giving oral or
written testimony on BIDC’s behalf; signing, certifying, or transmitting BIDC’s grant
application or supporting documents to a County agency; and communicating with County
officers or employees in advocacy of BIDC’s application.
D. CCH § 14-2(c) (Conflict of Interest)
CCH § 14-2(c) independently provides that it shall constitute a conflict of interest for an
officer or employee of the County to “engage in any business, transaction or activity or have a
financial interest, direct or indirect, which might reasonably tend to be incompatible with the
proper discharge of their official duties or to impair their independence of judgment in the
performance of their official duties.”20 Because CCH § 14-1(a) establishes Article XIV of the
Charter as the minimum ethical standard for County officers and employees, the Charter
provision applies independently of, and concurrently with, the analogous HCC provisions, and
any HCC provision must meet or exceed the Charter’s standard. CCH § 14-2(c) is broader in
reach than HCC § 2-84(a) as it does not require that the financial interest be “substantial,” it also
reaches “any business, transaction or activity,” and it is triggered by interests that “might
reasonably tend to” create incompatibility with the discharge of official duties or impair
independence of judgment.
Petitioner’s role at OCC involves the discretionary rendering of legal advice and the
review and approval of legal instruments for the Council and all County agencies. Her service on
20 CCH § 14-2 (providing that “[i]t shall constitute a conflict of interest for employees or officers of the county to: [. . .] (c) Engage in any business, transaction or activity or have a financial interest, direct or indirect, which might reasonably tend to be incompatible with the proper discharge of their official duties or to impair their independence of judgment in the performance of their official duties”).
10
the BIDC board is an “activity” within the meaning of CCH § 14-2(c) and, because the position
is an officership, also a financial interest, direct or indirect. That service, together with her role at
OCC, might, in some circumstances, reasonably tend to be incompatible with the proper
discharge of her official duties or to impair her independence of judgment. On the information
presented, however, there is no probable violation of CCH § 14-2(c) for the same reasons
discussed as to HCC § 2-84(a) above. Going forward, and in accordance with CCH § 14-2,
Petitioner must abstain and recuse herself from any exercise of discretion in her role at OCC that
directly or indirectly affects BIDC or any other organization in which she has a financial interest,
direct or indirect, or that would otherwise reasonably tend to be incompatible with the proper
discharge of her official duties or to impair her independence of judgment. Ministerial acts
performed in Petitioner’s normal job functions, without the independent exercise of discretion or
judgment as to those entities, generally do not violate CCH § 14-2(c).
E. HCC § 2-83 (Fair Treatment)
Petitioner cites HCC § 2-83(b)(1), which identifies as a prohibited use of position
“[s]eeking other employment or contract for services for oneself by the use or attempted use of
the officer’s or employee’s office or position.”21 That subsection is not implicated here.
Petitioner’s position with BIDC is uncompensated volunteer service rather than employment or a
contract for services, and nothing in the record indicates that Petitioner used or attempted to use
her County position to obtain it or any other employment or contract for services.
The introductory portion of HCC § 2-83(b) is relevant, however. It prohibits an officer or
employee from using or attempting to use official position “to secure or grant unwarranted
21 HCC § 2-83(b)(1).
11
privileges, exemptions, advantages, contracts, or treatment, for oneself or others.”22 The
enumerated subsections thereunder are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and the prohibition
expressly reaches benefits secured for “others,” which includes BIDC. The record does not
indicate that Petitioner has used or attempted to use her position as a deputy corporation counsel
to secure or grant any unwarranted privilege, exemption, advantage, contract, or treatment for
BIDC or any other private interest. On the information presented, there is no probable violation
of HCC § 2-83(b).
Compliance with HCC § 2-83 is a continuing obligation. Petitioner must not invoke, refer
to, or otherwise leverage her position at OCC in connection with any BIDC matter, and must not
identify, or permit BIDC to identify, her County position in BIDC’s application materials or in
BIDC’s communications with County officers or employees for the purpose of securing any
unwarranted privilege, exemption, advantage, contract, or treatment. Relatedly, HCC § 2-
83(b)(4) prohibits “[u]sing County property, facilities, equipment, time, or personnel for private
business, campaign purposes, or for any purpose other than for a public purpose,”23 and BIDC
business should accordingly be conducted on Petitioner’s personal time using personal electronic
mail, telephone, and equipment. Petitioner’s use of County contact information in filing the
Petition does not implicate that subsection, because a petition to the Board concerning her own
conduct as a County employee serves a public purpose. Petitioner must also continue to adhere to
the precepts of fair treatment in HCC § 2-83(a) in discharging her duties and dealing with the
public.24
22 HCC § 2-83(b) (providing that “[n]o officer or employee shall use or attempt to use the officer’s or employee’s
official position to secure or grant unwarranted privileges, exemptions, advantages, contracts, or treatment, for oneself or others”). 23 HCC § 2-83(b)(4). 24 HCC § 2-83(a) (providing that officers and employees, “while discharging their duties and dealing with the public,” shall adhere to the precepts that “[a]ll public property and equipment are to be treated as a public trust and are not to be used in a proprietary manner or for personal purposes without proper consent” and that “[a]ll persons shall be treated in a courteous, fair, and impartial manner”). See also CCH § 14-4 (setting out the same precepts).
12
F. Disclosure of Interest Under HCC § 2-91.1(g)
Although Petitioner’s service as Recording Secretary of BIDC does not constitute a
probable violation, that officership is an interest that might reasonably tend to create a conflict
with the public interest in the performance of her official duties. The Board therefore
recommends that Petitioner file a written disclosure of interest pursuant to HCC § 2-91.1(g),25
disclosing her service on the BIDC board and on any other private board on which she serves
that might reasonably tend to create such a conflict. Consistent with HCC § 2-91.1(g), CCH §§
14-3(a) and (b), and BOE Rule 9.1, the disclosure should be filed with Petitioner’s appointing
authority and with the Board, with a copy filed with the County Clerk as a matter of public
record.26
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Board concludes that BIDC is a “business” and that
Petitioner’s service as its Recording Secretary is an officership, and therefore a “financial
interest,” as those terms are defined by HCC § 2-82, notwithstanding that the position is
uncompensated; that the interest is substantial for purposes of HCC § 2-84(a)(1); and that HCC §
2-84(a)(2) applies regardless of substantiality. HCC §§ 2-83(c) and 2-85 do not apply. On the
25 HCC § 2-91.1(g) (providing, in relevant part, that “[n]otwithstanding any other disclosures filed under this
section, it shall be incumbent upon all employees or officers of the County to make a full disclosure in writing to their appointing authority or to the council in the case of an elective officer, whenever the employee or officer possesses or acquires any interests, financial or otherwise, that might reasonably tend to create a conflict with the public interest in the performance of the public duties and responsibilities of the officer or employee,” and that “[a] copy of any disclosure of interest filed under this subsection shall be filed by the employee or officer with the County clerk which shall be a matter of public record”). See also CCH §§ 14-3(a), (b); BOE Rule 9.1(c) (disclosure statements are submitted to the appointing authority and to the Board); BOE Rule 9.1(d) (such statements are a matter of public record and are filed with the County Clerk). 26 This disclosure of interest is distinct from the annual financial disclosure required under HCC § 2-91.1(b) and (c), which Petitioner is not required to file. That obligation reaches candidates for elective office, officers as defined by HCC § 2-82, and “regulatory employees” as defined by HCC § 2-91.1(a)(4); see also BOE Rule 8.1(a) (enumerating the officers required to file and reaching only the first deputy or first assistant to an administrative head). A deputy
corporation counsel is not within those categories. See supra note 1.
13
information presented, Petitioner’s service does not constitute a probable violation of HCC §§ 2-
83(b), 2-84(a), 2-84(b), or 2-84(c), or of CCH § 14-2(c).
In her continued service as a deputy corporation counsel, Petitioner must comply with the
Code of Ethics and with the safeguards set out in Section II above. In summary, Petitioner must:
(1) recuse herself under HCC §§ 2-84(a)(1) and (a)(2) from any official action directly affecting
BIDC; (2) recuse herself under CCH § 14-2(c) from any exercise of discretion at OCC directly or
indirectly affecting BIDC; (3) not acquire a financial interest prohibited by HCC § 2-84(b); (4)
not appear on behalf of BIDC before the Council or any other County agency, HCC § 2-84(c);
and (5) continue to comply with HCC §§ 2-83(a) and (b), and the Code of Ethics. Petitioner
remains free to perform ministerial acts that are part of her normal job functions and that are
performed without the independent exercise of discretion or judgment as to BIDC. The Board
further recommends that Petitioner notify the Corporation Counsel of her BIDC position so that
BIDC matters may be assigned to another deputy and Petitioner screened from them; and file a
written disclosure of interest under HCC § 2-91.1(g), CCH §§ 14-3(a) and (b), and BOE Rule
9.1.
The Board’s informal advisory opinions are limited to the interpretation and application
of the Code of Ethics pursuant to the Board’s authority under CCH § 14-5(b)(1) and (b)(2),27 and
do not affect the appointing authority’s power to otherwise supervise its employees28 or to set
policies as provided by law. Petitioner must therefore also comply with any applicable policies
27 CCH § 14-5(b) (providing, in relevant part, that “[w]ithout limitation of its functions, the board shall: (1) Interpret the code of ethics for both county officials and the public and on its own may initiate and render opinions with respect thereto. (2) Render advisory opinions to county officers and employees with respect to the code of ethics pursuant to written requests by officers and employees”). 28 See HCC § 2-91 (providing that, in addition to any other powers the appointing authority may have, the appointing authority may reprimand, put on probation, demote, suspend, or discharge an employee found to have violated the standards of the Code of Ethics); BOE Rule 4.10 (providing that, after an informal advisory opinion has been rendered, the Board shall notify the appointing authority of the officer or employee involved, or the Council in the case of elected officials, of its informal advisory opinion).
14
of OCC and the County, including any adopted in the future, and this opinion does not address
her independent obligations as a licensed attorney under the Hawaiʻi Rules of Professional
Conduct, which are outside the Board’s jurisdiction.29 This informal advisory opinion addresses
only the specific facts presented and does not bind the Board in any future proceeding or
investigation involving different or additional facts. If the facts or circumstances change
materially, Petitioner should seek further guidance from the Board.
Adopted by the Board on _______________________, 2026.
BOARD OF ETHICS, COUNTY OF HAWAI‘I
By_______________________________ LISA FUKUMITSU, Chairperson
29 The Board’s jurisdiction extends to the Code of Ethics. Petitioner’s obligations under the Hawaiʻi Rules of Professional Conduct are enforced by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi and are not addressed here.
Supplemental Statement to Petition
Chris Sloman, HFD Safety Specialist
June 24, 2026
1.State the nature of your interest, including reason(s) for the submission of this
Petition:
a.I am the Hawaiʻi Fire Department Safety Specialist seeking an advisory
opinion on whether it is permissible under the Hawaiʻi County Code of Ethics
for the Fire Department (or me in my official capacity) to solicit financial
support or sponsorship from HMSA and Kaiser Permanente for a voluntary
pilot cancer screening program using the Cancerguard® multi-cancer blood
test for approximately 380–400 Big Island firefighters (and potentially
spouses).
The purpose is to address the well-documented elevated occupational
cancer risk faced by firefighters. Exact Sciences has offered a reduced rate
($649 vs. standard $689) plus logistical support. We are also exploring grants
through the University of Hawaiʻi Cancer Center and Hawaiʻi Department of
Health. This petition is submitted proactively following advice from Deputy
Corporation Counsel.
2.Provide the specific section(s) of the Code of ethics in question:
a.Hawaiʻi County Code § 2-83(b)(2) — prohibition on using official position to
solicit additional compensation or other consideration. I request the Board’s
review of all relevant sections of Chapter 2, Article 15.
3.Provide a complete statement of the facts:
a.The Hawaiʻi County Fire Department is exploring a one-time pilot cancer
screening event.
b.Draft letters were prepared to HMSA and Kaiser Permanente (the two health
plans covering HFD personnel) requesting sponsorship to cover or subsidize
testing costs.
c.No solicitations have been sent yet.
d.Corporation Counsel reviewed the drafts and recommended consulting the
Board of Ethics prior to any action.
e.This is a department-wide wellness initiative, not for personal gain.
f.For reference, Resolution No. 588-26 (accepting a donation of specialized
medical examination services from 1582 Medical Group in honor of the late
Fire Chief Kazuo Todd) was unanimously approved by the County Council
last week.
4.Provide a statement of your position or contention:
a.I respectfully request an advisory opinion clarifying whether this solicitation
activity is permissible and, if so, what procedural steps are required for
compliance (e.g., Council approval via resolution before acceptance of any
donations). The Fire Department is committed to full transparency and
adherence to all ethics requirements while pursuing proactive occupational
health measures for our personnel.
to review de-identified results and potentially track outcomes as part of broader research
efforts—creating further value for public health in Hawaiʻi.
In recent years, our department has strengthened prevention efforts, including installation of gear
extractors at stations, implementation of on-scene post-fire decontamination procedures, and
development of clean CAB standard operating procedures. This screening pilot represents the
next logical step in our commitment to proactive occupational health and safety.
We would be grateful for any level of support you can provide—whether full coverage for the
pilot, a per-test subsidy, or assistance with event logistics. Your partnership would not only
demonstrate Kaiser’s leadership in preventive care but also create meaningful public recognition
of your commitment to the first responders who serve our islands.
I have attached a tri-fold pamphlet from Exact Sciences describing the Cancerguard test for your
review. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this proposal in more detail and answer any
questions. Please feel free to contact me directly at or
.
Mahalo nui loa for your leadership and for the vital coverage Kaiser provides to our firefighters
and their families. I look forward to the possibility of working together to catch cancer early and
protect those who protect us.
Sincerely,
Chirs Sloman
Safety Specialist
to review de-identified results and potentially track outcomes as part of broader research
efforts—creating further value for public health in Hawaiʻi.
In recent years, our department has strengthened prevention efforts, including installation of gear
extractors at stations, implementation of on-scene post-fire decontamination procedures, and
development of clean CAB standard operating procedures. This screening pilot represents the
next logical step in our commitment to proactive occupational health and safety.
We would be grateful for any level of support you can provide—whether full coverage for the
pilot, a per-test subsidy, or assistance with event logistics. Your partnership would not only
demonstrate HMSA’s leadership in preventive care but also create meaningful public recognition
of your commitment to the first responders who serve our islands.
I have attached a tri-fold pamphlet from Exact Sciences describing the Cancerguard test for your
review. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this proposal in more detail and answer any
questions. Please feel free to contact me directly at or
Mahalo nui loa for your leadership and for the vital coverage HMSA provides to our firefighters
and their families. I look forward to the possibility of working together to catch cancer early and
protect those who protect us.
Sincerely,
Chirs Sloman
Safety Specialist