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Hawaii County Hazard Mitigation Plan
County of Hawaii AL Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan August 16, 2010 Adopted by the County of Hawaii Prepared By Martin & Chock,Inc. 1132 Bishop Street, Suite 1550 Honolulu,Hawaii 96813 Funding was made possible from the Federal Emergency Management Agency Through the Hawaii State Civil Defense 4OJNtV Us"�!Y William T.Takaba Managing Director William P.Kenoi Mavor Walter K.M.Lau ���ra'ocN►�� Deputy Managing Dir ector County of Hawaii Office of the Mayor 25 Aupuni Street,Suite 2603 • Hilo,Hawaii 96720 • (808)961-8211 • Fax(808)961-6553 KONA: 75-5722 Hanama Place,Suite 102 • Kailua-Kona,Hawaii 96740 (808)327-3602 • Fax(808)326-5663 August 16, 2010 Re: County of Hawai'i Multi Hazard Mitigation Plan The County of Hawai'i, in recognition that the natural island beauty of the island comes with certain hazards and risks, is committed to disaster preparedness and to become a disaster-resilient community. The Hawai'i County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan represents Hawai'i County's commitment to reducing risks from natural hazards. In compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Public Law 106-390 this plan is hereby adopted for the County of Hawai'i on August 16, 2010. The Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency shall be the lead agency for maintenance and updates of the Plan. Aloha, William P. Kenoi MAYOR County of Hawaii is au Equal Opportunity Provider and Employer. Table of Contents EXECUTIVESUMMARY.....................................................................................................................................ix CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................1-1 1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PLAN.......................................................................................................1-1 1.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE PLAN..............................................................................................................1-6 1.3 OVERVIEW OF HAWAII COUNTY...........................................................................................................1-7 1.3.1 Geography....................................................................................................................................1-7 CHAPTER 2- MITIGATION PLANNING......................................................................................................2-1 2.1 PLANNING PROC ESS..........................................................................................................................2-1 2.2 PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS............................................................................................................2-2 2.2.1 Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee Meetings.......................................................................2-3 2.2.2 Public Involvement....................................................................................................................... 2-7 CHAPTER 3- LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT............................................................................................3-1 3.1 POPULATION..................................................................................................................................3-1 3.2 ECONOMY......................................................................................................................................3-2 3.3 LAND USE......................................................................................................................................3-3 3.3.1 General Plan Projections.............................................................................................................. 3-4 3.4 ANALYSIS.......................................................................................................................................3-5 3.5 CRITICAL FACILITIES..........................................................................................................................3-6 3.6 UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII...................................................................................................................3-11 CHAPTER 4- HIGH WIND STORMS...........................................................................................................4-1 4.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD...................................................................................................................4-1 4.1.1 Utilities.........................................................................................................................................4-1 4.1.2 Trade Winds..................................................................................................................................4-1 4.1.3 Kona Storms.................................................................................................................................4-4 4.1.4 Tropical cyclones:......................................................................................................................... 4-4 4.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS.........................................................................................................4-4 4.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE.............................................................................................................4-5 4.4 RISK ASSESSMENT............................................................................................................................4-5 4.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES...................................................................................................................4-6 4.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................... 4-6 4.5.2 Future Plans..................................................................................................................................4-7 CHAPTER 5- TROPICAL CYCLONES...........................................................................................................5-1 5.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD...................................................................................................................5-1 5.1.1 Coastal Wave/Surge..................................................................................................................... 5-1 5.1.2 High Winds...................................................................................................................................5-5 5.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS.........................................................................................................5-6 5.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE.............................................................................................................5-9 5.3.1 Probabilistic Hazard Analysis and Scenario Simulations..............................................................5-9 5.3.2 ASCE 7-10....................................................................................................................................5-10 5.4 RISK ASSESSMENT..........................................................................................................................5-12 5.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES.................................................................................................................5-13 5.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 5-13 5.5.2 Future Plans................................................................................................................................5-19 CHAPTER 6- LANDSLIDES AND ROCK FALLS.............................................................................................6-1 i Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 6.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD...................................................................................................................6-1 6.1.1 Hazard Areas................................................................................................................................6-1 6.2 SIGNIFICANT CATASTROPHIC EVENTS.....................................................................................................6-3 6.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE.............................................................................................................6-4 6.4 RISK ASSESSMENT............................................................................................................................6-7 6.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES...................................................................................................................6-8 6.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................... 6-8 6.5.2 Future Plans..................................................................................................................................6-9 CHAPTER 7- EARTHQUAKES....................................................................................................................7-1 7.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD...................................................................................................................7-1 7.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS............................................................................................................7-6 7.2.1 Kiholo Bay Earthquake................................................................................................................. 7-7 7.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE...........................................................................................................7-12 7.4 RISK ASSESSMENT..........................................................................................................................7-18 7.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES.................................................................................................................7-18 7.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 7-18 7.5.2 Future Plans................................................................................................................................ 7-23 CHAPTER 8- LAVA FLOWS,VOLCANIC GAS,AND ASHFALL.......................................................................8-1 8.1 HAZARD DESCRIPTION.......................................................................................................................8-1 8.1.1 Lava)Volcanoes............................................................................................................................ 8-1 8.1.2 VOG..............................................................................................................................................8-2 8.1.3 Ashfall...........................................................................................................................................8-9 8.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS............................................................................................................8-9 8.2.1 Mauna Loa....................................................................................................................................8-9 8.2.2 Kilauea........................................................................................................................................8-10 8.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE...........................................................................................................8-11 8.3.1 Hazard Areas.............................................................................................................................. 8-11 8.4 RISK ASSESSMENT..........................................................................................................................8-14 8.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES.................................................................................................................8-14 8.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 8-14 8.5.2 Future Plans................................................................................................................................8-18 CHAPTER9- TSUNAMIS...........................................................................................................................9-1 9.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD...................................................................................................................9-1 9.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS............................................................................................................9-3 9.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE.............................................................................................................9-5 9.3.2 Hazard Areas................................................................................................................................9-6 9.4 RISK ASSESSMENT..........................................................................................................................9-11 9.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES.................................................................................................................9-14 9.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 9-14 9.5.2 Future Plans................................................................................................................................9-16 CHAPTER 10- FLOODS.............................................................................................................................10-1 10.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 10-1 10.1.1 Rainfall Flooding......................................................................................................................... 10-1 10.1.2 Dams...........................................................................................................................................10-3 10.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS....................................................................................................... 10-4 10.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 10-7 10.3.1 Regional Hazards........................................................................................................................ 10-8 10.4 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................10-24 10.4.1 Previous/Current Efforts........................................................................................................... 10-24 ii Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 10.4.2 Future Plans.............................................................................................................................. 10-37 CHAPTER 11- DAM FAILURES..................................................................................................................11-1 11.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 11-1 11.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED........................................................................... 11-3 11.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 11-7 11.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 11-7 11.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 11-7 11.5.1 General.......................................................................................................................................11-7 11.5.2 Previous/Current Efforts............................................................................................................. 11-9 11.5.3 Future Plans.............................................................................................................................. 11-14 CHAPTER 12- HIGH SURF........................................................................................................................12-1 12.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 12-1 12.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS.......................................................................................................... 12-2 12.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 12-2 12.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 12-3 12.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 12-3 CHAPTER 13- COASTAL EROSION............................................................................................................13-1 13.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 13-1 13.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS....................................................................................................... 13-2 13.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 13-2 13.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 13-3 13.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................. 13-3 13.5.1 Revise the Shoreline Setbacks..................................................................................................... 13-3 13.5.2 Utilize Inter-agency communication........................................................................................... 13-4 13.5.3 Increase Public Awareness......................................................................................................... 13-4 13.5.4 Promote Research Projects......................................................................................................... 13-4 CHAPTER 14- DROUGHTS........................................................................................................................14-1 14.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 14-1 14.1.1 Defining and Measuring Drought............................................................................................... 14-1 14.1.2 Causes of Drought...................................................................................................................... 14-2 14.1.3 Impacts of Drought..................................................................................................................... 14-3 14.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS.......................................................................................................... 14-3 14.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 14-6 14.3.1 Hazard Areas.............................................................................................................................. 14-6 14.4 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 14-9 14.5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................14-10 14.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts........................................................................................................... 14-10 14.5.2 Future Plans.............................................................................................................................. 14-11 CHAPTER 15- WILDFIRES.........................................................................................................................15-1 15.1 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD................................................................................................................. 15-1 15.2 SIGNIFICANT HISTORIC EVENTS.......................................................................................................... 15-1 15.3 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE........................................................................................................... 15-4 15.4 COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLANS......................................................................................... 15-4 15.4.1 Multiple-Agency Agreements..................................................................................................... 15-6 15.4.2 Planning Process......................................................................................................................... 15-6 15.5 RISK ASSESSMENT.......................................................................................................................... 15-9 15.5.1 Purpose and Methods................................................................................................................. 15-9 15.5.2 Communities at Risk from Wildfires,Island of Hawaii................................................................ 15-9 iii Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 15.6 MITIGATION STRATEGIES................................................................................................................15-11 15.6.1 Hazard Priorities....................................................................................................................... 15-11 15.6.2 Future Plans.............................................................................................................................. 15-14 CHAPTER 16- HAZMAT............................................................................................................................16-1 16.1 HISTORY...................................................................................................................................... 16-1 16.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE............................................. 16-1 16.3 ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE LAW...................................................................................................... 16-4 16.4 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW ACT..............................................................16-11 CHAPTER 17- SHELTERS..........................................................................................................................17-1 17.1 PUBLIC EMERGENCY SHELTERS.......................................................................................................... 17-1 17.1.1 Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classification....................................17-6 17.2 PRIVATE HURRICANE SHELTERS........................................................................................................17-15 17.3 SAFE ROOMS...............................................................................................................................17-15 17.4 ENHANCED HURRICANE PROTECTION AREAS........................................................................................17-19 17.5 FUTURE MITIGATION PLANS............................................................................................................17-25 CHAPTER 18- RISK ASSESSMENT.............................................................................................................18-1 18.1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES AND CAPABILITIES.............................................................................. 18-1 18.1.1 Emergency Operations Center.................................................................................................... 18-1 18.1.2 Emergency Shelters.................................................................................................................... 18-3 18.1.3 Police Stations............................................................................................................................ 18-6 18.1.4 Fire and EMS Stations................................................................................................................. 18-7 18.1.5 Department of Public Works Baseyards................................................................................... 18-10 18.1.6 Hospitals...................................................................................................................................18-11 18.1.7 Hawaii County All Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities...................................................... 18-12 18.1.8 University of Hawaii Study........................................................................................................ 18-19 18.1.9 Warning Sirens and Evacuation System................................................................................... 18-20 18.1.10 Critical Lifeline Infrastructure Facilities.................................................................................... 18-23 18.1.11 Energy Systems......................................................................................................................... 18-31 18.1.12 Communication Systems.......................................................................................................... 18-33 18.1.13 Water Systems.......................................................................................................................... 18-36 18.1.14 Wastewater Systems................................................................................................................ 18-37 18.1.15 Recovery Facilities and Capabilities.......................................................................................... 18-39 18.1.16 Debris Management................................................................................................................. 18-39 18.1.17 Economic Assets....................................................................................................................... 18-45 18.2 SPECIAL AT RISK POPULATIONS AND AREAS.........................................................................................18-46 18.2.1 At Risk Populations................................................................................................................... 18-46 18.2.2 Buildings,Residences and Remote Off-Grid Settlement Areas................................................. 18-47 18.2.3 Hotels and Resorts.................................................................................................................... 18-48 18.2.4 Schools,Day Core Centers,and Nursing Homes....................................................................... 18-48 18.2.5 Parks and Shopping Centers..................................................................................................... 18-48 18.2.6 Hazardous Materials Sites........................................................................................................ 18-49 18.3 RELATIONSHIP OF LAND USE GROWTH TRENDS TO HAZARD AREAS...........................................................18-49 18.3.1 Growth Trends.......................................................................................................................... 18-49 18.3.2 Land Use Tools.......................................................................................................................... 18-52 18.3.3 Loss Estimation and Hazard Ranking........................................................................................ 18-54 CHAPTER 19- MITIGATION STRATEGY.....................................................................................................19-1 19.1 MITIGATION GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................. 19-1 19.2 MITIGATION ACTIONS BY HAZARD TYPE.............................................................................................. 19-2 19.2.1 Hurricanes and Wind Storms...................................................................................................... 19-3 iv Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19.2.2 Earthquakes................................................................................................................................19-4 19.2.3 Tsunamis.....................................................................................................................................19-5 19.2.4 Rainfall Flooding and High Waves.............................................................................................. 19-6 19.2.5 Lava Flows..................................................................................................................................19-7 19.2.6 Droughts and Wildfire................................................................................................................ 19-8 19.2.7 Landslides and Sea Cliff Erosion.................................................................................................. 19-8 19.3 PRIORITY CRITERIA......................................................................................................................... 19-9 19.4 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.................................................................................................................19-10 19.S DISCUSSION ON PAST IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS.................................................................................19-13 19.6 PRESENT IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS.................................................................................................19-16 CHAPTER 20- PLAN UPDATE PROCEDURES..............................................................................................20-1 20.1 PLAN UPDATE PROCEDURES.............................................................................................................20-1 CHAPTER21- REFERENCES......................................................................................................................21-1 CHAPTER 22- GLOSSARY.........................................................................................................................22-1 CHAPTER 23- LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK.................................................................23-1 List of Figures Figure 1-1. Map showing all of the tsunamigenic earthquakes in the Pacific Ocean as colored circles.... 1-8 Figure 1-2. Wind contour map for the Island of Hawaii.The complex topography of the island creates acceleration and decelerations of a 105 mph basic design event windspeed as shown........ 1-9 Figure 1-3. Map of Tropical Cyclones Formed Worldwide from 1985 to 2005.......................................1-10 Figure 2-1. Hawaii resident survey on disaster preparedness.................................................................2-10 Figure 3-1. Land use for Hawaii County.....................................................................................................3-4 Figure 3-2. Critical facilities map of Hawaii Island.....................................................................................3-7 Figure 3-3. Critical facilities map,Hilo area zoom......................................................................................3-8 Figure 3-4. Critical facilities map,Puna area zoom....................................................................................3-9 Figure 3-5. Critical facilities map,Kona area zoom..................................................................................3-10 Figure 3-6. Critical facilities map,Kohala area zoom...............................................................................3-11 Figure3-7. UH Hilo Campus map.............................................................................................................3-12 Figure 3-8. UH Hilo/Hawaii CC Manono Campus map.............................................................................3-13 Figure 4-1. Typical diurnal wind patterns on Hawaii Island.......................................................................4-2 Figure 4-2. Monthly wind roses for Hilo International Airport(shown for each quarter).........................4-3 Figure 4-3. High Wind Events for Hawaii County by Month,January 1992 to October 2002....................4-5 Figure 4-4. Wind hazard curves for the Hawaiian Islands for Tropical Cyclone and Non-Tropical Winds.4-6 Figure 5-1. Extents of Hurricane storm surge inundation study................................................................5-3 Figure 5-2. Track of Hurricane Iwa and Iniki(Cheung, K.F.2003)..............................................................5-8 Figure 5-3. Historic Central Pacific hurricane tracks..................................................................................5-8 Figure 5-4. Central Pacific Hurricane Occurrences by month....................................................................5-9 Figure 5-5. Eastern and Central Pacific Hurricane frequency map.Contours show number of times a hurricane(intensity>64 knots)passes within 75 Nmi per 10 years......................................5-10 Figure 5-6. Wind speed recurrence intervals for Hawaii(from ASCE 7-2010 Standard).........................5-11 Figure 5-7. ASCE 7-10 relationship between Saffir/Simpson category and wind speed..........................5-11 Figure 5-8. Effective wind speed map(mph)for Hawaii Island(Chock,2007)........................................5-12 Figure 6-1. Massive coastal escarpment landslides into the ocean,Hamakua Coast................................6-2 Figure 6-2. Examples of earthquake-induced rock falls causing road hazard or closure...........................6-3 Figure 6-3. Slope hazards and soil types on Hawaii Island ........................................................................6-5 Figure 6-4. Precipitation and groundwater condition on Hawaii Island....................................................6-6 Figure 6-5. Landslide susceptibility map of Hawaii Island.........................................................................6-7 Figure 6-6. Map of historic landslide locations impacting major roads.....................................................6-8 V Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Figure 7-1. Cutaway Showing Earth's Layers.............................................................................................7-1 Figure 7-2. Hawai'i Historical Earthquakes and Inferred Rupture Zones of the Larger Events..................7-2 Figure 7-3. Fundamental flexural models for plates under island loads...................................................7-3 Figure 7-4. Earthquake focal mechanisms in Hawaii.................................................................................7-3 Figure 7-5. Effects of Earthquakes on Nonstructural Components...........................................................7-5 Figure 7-6. Locations of damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater for Hawaii Island since 1868 7-6 Figure 7-7. Peak ground accelerations resulting from the Oct. 15,2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake.............7-8 Figure 8-1. Volcanic Gas Emissions at Kilauea Volcano's Summit Vent on May,2009..............................8-2 Figure 8-2. Aerial view of Hawai'i showing circulation of VOG under prevailing winds,May 13,2009....8-3 Figure 8-3. Aerial view of Hawai'i showing circulation of VOG under prevailing winds,June 2,2008......8-3 Figure 8-4. Concentrations of SO2 under prevailing winds in the Main Hawaiian Islands,April 30,2009 8-4 Figure 8-5. Photograph of 1960 eruption taken 10:00 am January 14,1960..........................................8-11 Figure 8-6. Lava Flow Hazard Zone Map..................................................................................................8-13 Figure 8-7. Lava Flow Inundation Map....................................................................................................8-16 Figure 9-1. Travel Times for Distant Tsunamis...........................................................................................9-2 Figure 9-2. Historic Tsunamis of Hawaii Island..........................................................................................9-3 Figure 9-3. Tsunami Height vs. Recurrence Probability for Hilo................................................................9-5 Figure 9-4. 1975 Halape Local Tsunami Wave Heights vs. Distant Tsunami..............................................9-6 Figure 9-5. Run-up height vs.time and distance,data from 1975 local tsunami......................................9-6 Figure 9-6. Definition Sketch of Tsunami Inundation Terms.....................................................................9-7 Figure 9-7. Tsunami evacuation zones.......................................................................................................9-8 Figure 9-8. Tsunami evacuation zones, Kailua-Kona zoom........................................................................9-8 Figure 9-9. Historical and Hypothetical tsunamis for inundation mapping...............................................9-9 Figure 9-10. Updated tsunami evacuation zone map locations being developed.......................................9-9 Figure 9-11. Comparison of Historical Tsunami Inundation to FIRM VE Zone for Hilo..............................9-10 Figure 9-12. Tsunami prone communities in the County of Hawaii..........................................................9-12 Figure 9-13. Results of USGS tsunami vulnerability study.........................................................................9-14 Figure 9-14. Locations of DART buoys.......................................................................................................9-15 Figure 10-1. Kona Storms and Cold Fronts................................................................................................ 10-2 Figure 10-2. Map of dams on Hawaii Island............................................................................................... 10-4 Figure 10-3. Historical Stream Flooding Events for Hawaii Island............................................................. 10-5 Figure 10-4. Flood Insurance Rate Map Terminology................................................................................ 10-7 Figure 10-5. 100-year return period 1 hour rainfall for Hawaii Island.......................................................10-9 Figure 10-6. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map,County View.................................................................... 10-20 Figure 10-7. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map,Hilo zoom........................................................................ 10-21 Figure 10-8. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map,Kona zoom...................................................................... 10-22 Figure10-9. FIRM Coverage..................................................................................................................... 10-31 Figure 10-10. Comparison of Paper vs. Preliminary Digitized FIRM Draft,showing alignment issue being resolved............................................................................................................................... 10-32 Figure 10-11. Extents of Hurricane storm surge inundation study............................................................ 10-33 Figure11-1. Dam Inventory and Rating..................................................................................................... 11-2 Figure 11-2 Shaded Relief of Ka Loko Dam and Vicinity,Island of Kauai...................................................11-4 Figure 11-3 Ka Loko Dam Breach,Island of Kauai......................................................................................11-5 Figure 11-4 Ka Loko Dam Breach,Island of Kauai......................................................................................11-5 Figure 11-5 Houses Amid Debris from Ka Loko Dam Failure, Island of Kauai............................................11-6 Figure 11-6 Road Infrastructure Damage from Ka Loko Dam Failure, Island of Kauai...............................11-6 Figure 11-7 Comparison of One-Dimensional(MIKE 11)&Two-Dimensional(MIKE 21) Dam Failure Modeling...............................................................................................................................11-12 Figure 11-8 Serial Dam Failure Modeling using MIKE FLOOD..................................................................11-12 Figure 11-9 Example Map Using Reference Dam Inundation Maps to Develop Potential Dam Break EvacuationMaps..................................................................................................................11-13 Figure 12-1. Storm Wave Directions and Events for Hawaii Island ........................................................... 12-1 Figure 13-1. The impacts of stabilization on shoreline retreat and beach loss.........................................13-1 Vi Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Figure 13-2. Effects of beach stabilization................................................................................................. 13-2 Figure 14-1. Drought Vulnerability to the water supply sector in the County of Hawaii.......................... 14-7 Figure 14-2. Drought Vulnerability to the agriculture sector in the County of Hawaii.............................. 14-8 Figure 14-3. Federal Drought Monitoring Map......................................................................................... 14-9 Figure 15-1 2009-2010 Upland Fire in South Kona....................................................................................15-3 Figure 15-2 Smoke from 2009 Kealakekua Upland Fire Spread Throughout South Kona.........................15-3 Figure 15-3 Drought Vulnerability to the Environment,Public Health,and Safety Sector........................15-4 Figure 15-4 Communities at Risk from Wildfires, Island of Hawaii..........................................................15-10 Figure 15-5 Local Firefighters Discuss Hazards and Fire History Patterns...............................................15-10 Figure 17-1. Map of shelter locations on Hawaii Island............................................................................. 17-6 Figure 18-1. Emergency Response Organization....................................................................................... 18-2 Figure 18-2. Map of shelter locations on Hawaii Island............................................................................. 18-5 Figure 18-3. Map of Police Stations, DPW Baseyards,and Hospitals........................................................ 18-7 Figure 18-4. Map of Fire Stations............................................................................................................... 18-9 Figure 18-5. University of Hawaii AAL losses per campus....................................................................... 18-19 Figure 18-6. Annual losses per hazard for UH Hilo and Hawaii CC..........................................................18-19 Figure 18-7. Pacific Tsunami Warning System......................................................................................... 18-21 Figure 18-8. Civil Defense Warning Sirens and Evacuation Routes......................................................... 18-22 Figure 18-9. Site locations for Cellular Run-up Detectors(CRD's),Satellite Run-up Detectors(SRD's),and Pacific Tsunami Warning Center sea level gauges............................................................... 18-23 Figure 18-10. Harbors and Airports........................................................................................................... 18-25 Figure 18-11. Roads and Bridges............................................................................................................... 18-28 Figure 18-12. Road damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake.................................................18-30 Figure 18-13. Bridge embankment Damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake........................18-30 Figure 18-14. Electrical Substations........................................................................................................... 18-32 Figure 18-15. Communication Systems..................................................................................................... 18-34 Figure 18-16. Communications Network................................................................................................... 18-35 Figure 18-17. County Wastewater System................................................................................................ 18-38 Figure 18-18. Landfills,Transfer Stations,and TDSRs................................................................................ 18-40 Figure 18-19. Typical Material Process Concept for TDSR Site.................................................................. 18-42 Figure 18-20. TDSR Conceptual Site Plan................................................................................................... 18-43 Figure 18-21. County of Hawaii Land Use Planning System....................................................................... 18-53 List of Tables Table 1-1. Hawaii County Major Natural Hazard Events Since 1975........................................................ 1-2 Table 3-1. Hawaii County Demographic Profile........................................................................................3-1 Table 3-2. Employment statistics for Hawaii Island per the 2002 census................................................3-2 Table 4-1. Design Wind Pressures per UBC/IBC Code Years.....................................................................4-6 Table 5-1. Summary of Study Limits.........................................................................................................5-3 Table 5-2. Saffir Simpson Scale and damage potential ............................................................................5-6 Table 5-3. Significant Hurricanes Since 1950............................................................................................5-7 Table 5-4. Hurricane Windspeed vs. Recurrence Interval and Modern-Day ASCE Design Speeds.........5-10 Table 5-5. Wood frame,double wall,residential construction statistics for Hawaii County.................5-14 Table 5-6. Wood frame,single wall,residential construction statistics for Hawaii County...................5-14 Table 7-1. Conversion of MMI to PGA Values Specific to Hawaii...........................................................7-15 Table 7-2. Statistics for double wall construction,seismic design level in Hawaii County.....................7-19 Table 7-3. Statistics for single wall construction,seismic design level in Hawaii County.......................7-19 Table 7-4. Hawaii County comparison of W1 and MH SBT Enhanced Data model run with ShakeMap vs. publicly documented damage counts....................................................................................7-22 Table 8-1. Legend for Lava Flow Hazard Zone Map................................................................................8-13 Table 8-2. Lava inundation AAL..............................................................................................................8-14 Table 9-1. Tsunamis with Run-up of 2 meters or more: 1812 to present................................................9-4 Vii Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Table 10-1. Repetitive loss property list and ranking............................................................................. 10-23 Table 10-2. County of Hawaii Flood Study list........................................................................................ 10-25 Table 10-3. List and Status of Levees...................................................................................................... 10-26 Table 10-4. Estimated Inundation Area and Number of Parcels Potentially Affected if Levees are not Certified............................................................................................................................... 10-30 Table 10-5. USACE October 1 MOA Compensation Allocation............................................................... 10-30 Table 12-1. FIRM Coastal flood zone classifications................................................................................. 12-2 Table 14-1. Drought Classification Based On SPI...................................................................................... 14-2 Table 14-2. Historic Drought in the Hawaiian Islands............................................................................... 14-6 Table 15-1. State of Hawaii annual wildfire summary report................................................................... 15-2 Table 15-2 Decision-Makers for the Community Wildfire Protection Plan..............................................15-7 Table 18-1. Resident Shelter Needs by District........................................................................................ 18-4 Table 18-2. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic earthquakeevent................................................................................................................ 18-15 Table 18-3. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic earthquakeevent................................................................................................................ 18-16 Table 18-4. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic hurricane event....................................................................................................................................18-17 Table 18-5. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic hurricane event....................................................................................................................................18-18 Table 18-6. Vulnerability ranking of UH Hilo and Hawaii CC facilities....................................................18-20 Table 18-7. Hilo and Kawaihae Port Facilities......................................................................................... 18-25 Table 18-8. Vulnerability Analysis of Residential Areas.......................................................................... 18-48 Table 18-9. State Land Use Districts Acreage(as of July 2007).............................................................. 18-50 Table 18-10. Relative Hazard Severity of Major Hazards Based on Average Annual Loss Estates...........18-54 viii Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Island and County of Hawaii has experienced 42 natural disaster events since 1977 and five tsunamis (1946, 1952, 1957, 1960, and 1964) since 1940. This island is uniquely exposed to all the major natural hazards due to its active volcanoes (lava flow and earthquake hazards), young geological age (sheetflow flooding due to undefined drainage-ways), vast land area larger than all the other islands combined(expansive areas vulnerable to wildfires), varied topography dominated by five mountains (complex hurricane wind acceleration patterns), and easternmost location in the Hawaiian islands chain (hurricane exposure). Of lesser concern is sandy beach erosion due to the geologically youthful age of this island resulting in few sandy beaches; instead, sea cliff erosion is of greater concern to control building too closely to the cliff edge. The purpose of this multi-hazard mitigation plan is to provide a strategy to reduce or eliminate loss of life or property caused by natural hazard events. A multi-hazard strategy addresses the relationship among various types of hazards, leverages resources to benefit multiple hazards, and allocates limited resources to areas susceptible to the most severe or frequent hazards. Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Hazard Anal The state of knowledge and hazard mapping are summarized below: • High Wind Storms. For high wind risks, the areas exposed to wind acceleration due to topography have been mapped. • Hurricanes. Similar to high winds, the areas exposed to wind acceleration due to to- pography have been mapped. For storm surge risks, the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (VE zone)will be updated based on hurricane surge modeling. • Landslides and Rock Falls. GTS mapping has been developed to identify areas susceptible to landslide or rock falls based upon the slope of the terrain, soil type, and ground moisture level. • Earthquake. The County should adopt the 2006 International Building Code as the official building code; this better classifies the probabilistic acceleration parameters of the Island than previous versions of the obsolete 1991 Uniform Building Code currently enforced by the County. Maps have also been developed to distinguish areas where ground motion could be significantly increased by softer soil conditions. • Lava Flows and Volcano Gases (VOG). Although mapping exists that zones the entire island into nine lava hazard zones, the Hawaii Volcano Observatory is presently working to replace this map with a probabilistic hazard map. UH Manoa Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes (CSAV) is developing a modeling system to predict direction and speed of flow for a given eruption. ix Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv • Tsunami. New mapping is being developed for tsunami inundation areas (delineation of historical and modeled run-up used to control development) and tsunami evacuation areas (more conservative delineation than inundation areas based on identifiable landmarks such as roads and used to facilitate field evacuation logistics). Historically in Hawaii Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) also accounted for the tsunami inundation risk areas and limits of historical inundations (VE zone). • Flooding. FEMA and the County are working on making the FIRMS available in digitized format, which will improve the GTS. The County is also working on improving the accuracy of the FTRMs based on updated topographic information. Additionally, the GIS includes revisions to the FIRM (called Letter of Map Revisions or LOMRs). Improvements are needed to the rainfall and stream-flow gauging system to improve forecasting and real-time monitoring. In December 2008 and February 2009, FEMA submitted to the the County Preliminary Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps (Pre-DFTRMs). The County is currently doing flood studies (map updates) in the following areas: Puna, Hilo, North and South Kona. There are several privately funded flood studies ongoing in the Kona, Hilo and Waimea. As part of FEMA's mapping process, the County is also pursuing, with the help of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, levee certifications for Alenaio, Paauau and Wailoa Flood Damage Reduction Control Projects. All of these studies will be completed within the next year to year and one half. • Dam Failures.Dam break studies have been conducted to map areas were flooding may result due to dam failure. • High Surf. The entire coastline of Hawaii Island is susceptible to the effects of high surf, areas were the potential for coastal flooding exists are defined as the VE zones on the current FIRM maps as described in the Hurricane and Flood chapters. • Coastal Erosion.No studies or GIS data exist to establish safe setback limits to address sea cliff erosion risks. Beach erosion in Hawaii County is not a significant enough problem to presently warrant detailed mapping. • Droughts and Wildfire. As part of the Hawaii Drought Plan areas where the water supply sector, agriculture and commerce, and/or environment, public health, and safety are vulnerable to the effects of drought were mapped in GTS. This mapping also identifies areas where historic wildfires have occurred and where this risk is present. • HAZMAT. The Department of Health Hawaii State Response Program List of Priority Sites identifies all Hawaii sites for potential or known non-emergency response actions managed by the HEER Office Site Discovery, Assessment, and Remediation Section Remedial Project Managers (RPMs). Sites are categorized as a potential hazard when sampling data indicate that contaminant concentrations exceed Hawaii Environmental Action Levels. The DOH Hawaii SRP Priority List of Sites shows 83 sites on the Big Island with potential or known hazardous substance or petroleum contamination. Three sites were determined to require No Further Action (NFA). HEER Office Remedial Project Managers (RPMs) continue active oversight on 70 assessment and response actions. X Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv Risk Assessment Risk can be defined as exposure to the chance of loss or injury. Critical Facilities and Special Populations/Areas This plan focused on mitigating hazards to critical facilities and special populations or areas. Critical facilities include those public and private facilities that need to be operational during and after a hazard event to meet public health and safety needs, or to speed economic recov- ery. These facilities include: • Emergency response facilities-- Civil Defense Emergency Operations Center, emergency shelters, fire and ambulance stations, hospitals, police stations, Department of Public Works base yards; • Infrastructure lifeline facilities-- transportation (harbors, airports, roads/bridges), energy (electrical, fuel, gas), communication (wired/cabled telecommunication, wireless), water, wastewater; • Recovery facilities-- debris clearing and disposal, car rentals,buses, financial institutions, survival and building supplies; • Secondary hazard facilities-- facilities that increase the hazard risk if damaged, including wastewater facilities and hazardous waste sites. A study of the critical facilities on the Big Island has been preformed to evaluate and rank the vulnerability of each building to the above hazards. Loss estimations have been developed and a benefit cost analysis of potential retrofits will be performed on facilities of highest priority. This study will be detailed in Chapter 16; this loss estimation information is used as one of several criteria to prioritize the allocation of limited resources to mitigate hazards. Estimates of historical and potential future losses for each of the above hazards can be further refined in future updates of the plan to rank the severity of the risk imposed by each hazard. Special populations identified with demographic data are those that are more vulnerable and may require special assistance to prepare, evacuate, or recover include: • Young and elderly; • Non-English speakers; • Persons with disabilities. Special areas that are more vulnerable and may require special assistance to prepare, evacuate, or recover include: • Schools, day care centers, and nursing homes; • Residences and buildings built before 1985 under building code additions prior to the adoption of the 1982 UBC and therefore more susceptible to hurricane and earthquake damage; • Residences and buildings in high hazard areas; • Remote residences that are distant from sirens or off-grid; • Hotels and resorts, due to their economic importance; Xi Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv The GIS system superimposed the hazard layers over the critical facilities and special populations/areas to identify those located in high hazard areas. Vulnerable critical facilities were assessed to determine whether the facility should be hardened. Vulnerable special populations and areas require a range of mitigation measures discussed in the plan. The following table summarizes the vulnerable critical facilities, special populations, and special areas based on the best available data. xii Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summary Summary of Vulnerable Critical Facilities,Special Po mulations,and Special Areas by District Puna South Hilo North Hamakua North South Kohala North Kona South Kona Ka'u Hilo Kohala Emergency shelters--major shelters--major commu- communication communleatlon shelters--major shelters--major communication Ka'u Hospital and operations facilities capacity capacity deficiency; ecation system hardening system harden- capacity deficiency; cefoelty defi- system hardening Naalehu EMS ranked deficiency;Pahoa communication system and/or redundancy; ing and/or Kohala High& ciency;commu- and/or redun- high in a critical Fire Station In lava system hardening hardening Hale H.W. redundancy; Elementary School nication system carry;Building 1 facilities vulnerability flow hazard zone and/or redundancy; and/or Hamakua and Kohala and Waimea State hardening arid/ and 2 and the study 2;communication The Acute Care redundancy; Hamakua Health Hospital and office building require or redundancy; Psychiatric Facility system hardening Facility and the Laupahoeho Center ranked high in North Kohala hardening;cam- Kona Police at Kona and/or redun- Extended Care e Police critical facilities Police Station munication system Station and Community carry; Facility at Hilo Station and vulnerability study ranked high in hardening and/or Keauhou-Kona Hospital ranked Keaau Fire and Medical Center Laupahoeho a critical redundancy;North Fire Station high In a critical Police Station and ranked high in a e fire Station facilities Hawaii Community ranked high in a facilities Pahoa Fire Station critical facilities ranked high vulnerability Hospital and Waimea critical facilities vulnerability study ranked high In a vulnerability study in a critical study Fire Station ranked vulnerability critical facilities facilities high In a critical study vulnerability study vulnerability facilities vulnerability study study Infrastructure Hilo Harbor--no Kawaih rdening plans for due to damage no hae Harbor— Kona Airport-- lifeline facilities haardening tsunami or during the Kiholo Bay hurricane surge; Earthquake several Hilo Airport--no mitigation measures hardening;Eleo- have been trical generating recommended:high station(Walakea)in strength piling and VE flood zone:elec- anchorage retrofits, trical transmission ground and subg.de lines along Saddle improvement, Road in lava flaw performance hazard zone 2 monitoring Special populations High%of young- high%of elderly; high%of high%of elderly Hlgh%of high%of high non-English High%of sters;high%of high disahled;high elderly youngsters;high elderly;high dis- speakers youngsters;high elderly;high n-English n-English added; high of elderly;high dis- disabled;high% speakers speakers non-English added;high%public public assistance; speakers assistance high non-English speakers xiii Hai raii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv Mitigation Strategy Mitigation goals and objectives to eliminate or reduce risk include: 1. Goal: Continually strive to improve the state of the art for the identification of hazard areas,prediction capabilities, and warning systems. Objectives: 1.1. Prepare GIS maps for all hazards with the best available information and formulate a strategy to maintain/upgrade the data. 1.2. Improve applicability of modeling systems to Hawaii Island conditions for hazard mapping,mitigation planning, and scenario training purposes. 1.3. Improve flood prediction and field-monitoring systems. 1.4. Establish a warning system that is cognizant of warning siren gaps that require supplemental field warning, which strives to fill those gaps based on population, that is routinely tested and maintained, and that educates the public on proper response. 1.5. Establish a rigorous reporting system after each major event to document the extent and cause of damage, lessons learned, and actions required to improve hazard mitigation,preparedness,response, or recovery. 2. Goal: Control future development and retrofit existing structures within hazard areas to minimize losses. 2.1. Update the building code to cost-effectively resist earthquake, hurricane, and flood susceptibility. 2.2. Periodically review the effectiveness of current land-use-related plans, codes, and standards to control future development within hazard areas. 2.3. Develop incentives, such as tax deductions and insurance discounts, to encourage retrofitting of existing structures to resist earthquake, hurricane, and flood susceptibility. 3. Goal: Ensure that all emergency response critical facilities and communication systems remain operational during hazard events. 3.1. Harden all essential emergency facilities and communication systems to withstand earthquake and hurricane forces (Ensure road access to hospitals remains clear and that all hospitals have helicopter access, no emergency facilities should be located in the 100-year flood-prone areas). 4. Goal: Ensure that all lifeline infrastructures are able to withstand hazard events or have contingency plans to quickly recover after a disaster. 4.1. Harden ports and airports to enable post-disaster operations. 4.2. Harden major highway segments that have no alternate bypass to withstand earthquake and 100-year floods as well as rockfalls/landslide closure. 4.3. Harden fuel storage facilities and ensure distribution network to critical facilities. 4.4. Reduce vulnerability of electrical system to all hazards. 4.5. Develop water systems that resist damage to all hazards and contingency plans to truck water. xiv Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv 5. Goal: Provide adequate pre- and post-disaster emergency shelters to accommodate residents and visitors. 5.1. Identify and harden selected shelters to withstand hurricane. 5.2. Establish a standardized due diligence procedure for qualifying a building for private self-sheltering. 6. Goal: Develop a level of awareness among the general public and businesses, particularly the visitor industry, that results in calm and efficient evacuations, self- sufficient survival skills, and willingness to abide by preventive or property protection requirements. 6.1. Develop a broad-based public information program that utilizes a diversity of communication media. 6.2. Develop special public information programs targeted to vulnerable populations. 6.3. Develop a community-based network that double-functions as the Community Emergency Response Team and provides input into mitigation planning. 7. Goal: Minimize post-disaster recovery disruption by developing systems for efficient clean-up, documentation of damage and injury, and processing of appropriate aid to rebuild businesses and the economy. 7.1. Educate businesses on business interruption planning. S. Goal: Protect natural and cultural resources to the extent practicable that buffer hazards or have significant value. The followin6 are the County priorities rel!ardinl!hazard mitigation projects: 1. Hardening and Retrofitting of Critical Facilities Conduct all hazard evaluations and develop cost-effective retrofits for priority facilities including: • hurricane shelters and schools, • hospitals, fire stations, and police stations, airports • Hilo and Kawaihae harbors and fuel storage facilities • key County bridges and plan alternative transportation routes, • power plants, water systems, communications sites, sewage treatment plants, and other facilities/buildings providing critical services 2. Upgrading of County Building Codes in accordance with Hawaii Revised Statues Chapter 107, State Building Code and Design Standards 3. Mapping/Assessments/Studies Analysis of high hazard areas and studies to develop mitigation measures: • perform screening evaluations of alternative facilities to augment public shelters to address shelter shortfall • investigate and document effectiveness of VOG mitigation techniques and incorporate in public awareness meetings xv Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summav • update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate current bridge status and adapt HAZUS MH with enhanced building information data for hurricane loss estimation and identification of vulnerable structures Develop mapping of all major natural hazards: • flood map modernization with incorporation of both hurricane flood and tsunami inundation into DFIRM's • updated tsunami evacuation maps • earthquake ground failure hazard maps • probabilistic lava inundation maps • probabilistic tsunami inundation maps • dam inundation evacuation maps • landslide and slope stability hazard maps • LIDAR-based remapping of streams 4. Wildfire Prevention(firebreak establishment and fire mitigation resource inventory) 5. Drought Mitigation by improvements to irrigation aqueduct, reservoirs, and water management 6. Policy for Repetitive Flood Loss Properties 7. Develop natural hazard mitigation criteria policies for county facility site selection and design S. Public Awareness/Education, with additional focus on implementation of Multi-Hazard Mitigation Techniques and VOG • Incentives for Homeowners and Business to retrofit vulnerable structures: To further support this type of outreach,the following actions are still needed: • an expedited permit process if the homeowner uses the standard recommended plans; • working with insurance companies to get homeowners insurance credits for implementing these retrofits; • need to expand the Expert System to add the hurricane mitigation techniques that were previously developed for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund's Loss Mitigation Grant Program. • Retrofit training,videos, displays, and demonstration/pilot retrofit projects • Multi-hazard public information website consolidating GIS mapping products for hazards &zoning 9. Mitigation of Erosion/Land/Rock Slides in residential areas and highways. (Highways have greater priority) xvi Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv Changes to Risk Exposure Due to Successful Mitigation Projects • Critical Facility Study. An all-hazard screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii has been conducted and a HAZUS MH risk assessment model created to evaluate the expected losses for each building. Two facility groups, that ranked high based on these analyses were evaluated in more detail such that recommended mitigation procedures were developed. A Benefit-Cost Analysis of the mitigation project construction funding was performed. This detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit a PDM grant applications for the retrofit project, and prioritize the most vulnerable critical facility buildings for future retrofits. • Shelter Studies Evaluations of 29 buildings throughout the Hawaiian Islands were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Accounting and General Services (DAGS), Division of Public Works, Scope of Services and Procedure for Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classification. The primary objective of these evaluations were to identify whether the structures substantially meets the wind load criteria for a Shelter rating of Type B or better. The evaluations also identify recommendations for any further incremental structural or nonstructural retrofits to achieve substantial compliance with Shelter Types B, A, and EHPA, where economically feasible. Four facilities on the Big Island were evaluated according to this procedure; the results of these studies are presented in Chapter 16. • Wind Map Improvements The building code now used in the County of Hawaii does not include any design requirements for amplified winds caused by topography. The International Building Code (IBC) 2006 Edition that will replace the code now used in the County introduces a new topographic factor and a wind directionality factor that in their default formulations would not give accurate results in Hawaii. This would lead to a high probability of incorrect design unless the State Building code amendments are adopted. The state of Hawaii amendments include several customized map products prepared for the building code in Hawaii County. Significant improvements in wind hazard mitigation can be accomplished through the use of wind speed-up mapping in local building codes and risk assessments. New wind maps incorporating this effect define a standard for a uniform level of protection for hurricane hazard throughout the County. Benefits include explicit quantification of wind-hazard and its mitigation through the identification of the severity of wind environments for planners and building designers that will significantly improve building performance. Determination of the wind hazard in topographically affected critical facility sites is essential for pre-disaster planning and emergency operations planning. Criteria for critical facility use and any necessary mitigation can then be objectively established. The overall effort will support goals of this plan to implement effective public safety planning and mitigation of coastal hazards. A 2008-2009 project sponsored by the State Office of Planning undertook the technical amendments necessary for the adoption of new wind speed design mapping provisions into the International Building Code 2006 and ASCE-7 standard by the County of Hawaii, which xvii Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv is located within a hurricane hazard region. Improvements in wind hazard mitigation can now be implemented through the use of these specialized "uniform-risk" wind speed maps for design use as a local code adoption to the State amendments to the International Building Code (IBC). A consistent level of protection for hurricane hazard would then be achieved in structural design on the island of Hawaii, thereby mitigating future hurricane losses in new construction. Implementation of the topographic and directionality in the County of Hawaii Building Code would fulfill recommendations made by structural engineers after Hurricanes Iwa(1982)and Iniki(1992). In addition, the enactment of the TBC 2006 with these wind provisions would be critical to maximizing federal disaster public assistance aid in future disasters. Section 406(e) of the Stafford Act requires that FEMA provides post-disaster public assistance aid funding only to the level of the code in place at the time of the disaster. When a county building code or any state building regulation is obsolete, any cost differential for repairing state buildings to modern standards currently becomes the responsibility of the State and County. Enacting a modern code would enhance the amount of federal aid available after a disaster to allow the State to rebuild in conformance to the latest disaster-resistant codes. Otherwise, post-disaster rebuilding and repairs may recreate vulnerabilities and weaknesses of antiquated codes that just happened to be in place at the time of the disaster. Thus, key benefits of this project are improved disaster-resistant construction immediately to reduce losses, and increased federal aid for post-disaster recovery of the State after the next disaster. • State Building Code Statute Act 82 (May 21,2007) The State legislature found that the State has traditionally allowed the individual counties to establish their own building codes. In the past the counties adopted various portions of the Uniform Building Code, so the code differs from county to county. The status of fragmented building requirements in Hawaii is of serious concern to those involved in building ownership, design, construction, and insurance. Over forty states have adopted some form of a statewide building code. The adoption of a uniform set of statewide building codes applicable to one and two family dwellings, all other residential uses, and commercial and industrial buildings, and state buildings makes it possible for building owners, designers, contractors, and code enforcers within the State to apply consistent standards. The International Building Code is currently being considered for adoption by all counties. The health and safety considerations related to the codes are of statewide interest, especially relating to emergency disaster preparedness. Act 82 was implemented in Hawaii Revised Stature 107-Part II HRS 107 Part IT created the authority of the State Building Code Council, any law to the contrary notwithstanding, to establish a comprehensive State Building Code. Under HRS §107-25, the State Building Code is required to include various codes and design standards that are listed specifically or generically in the statute. The State Building Code Council includes the State agencies and County jurisdictions with pre-existing regulations affected by a State Building Code. xviii Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv • The purpose of the law is to require the Department of Accounting and General Services to establish and implement a State Building Code • Creates a State Building Code Council with decision making authority • Preserves responsibilities for administration, permitting, enforcement and inspection as presently held by each county • Prohibits conflict with chapter 464, HRS, Professional Engineers, Architects, Surveyors and Landscape Architects • Requires adaption of the State Building Code by the local county government within 2 years • Permits county amendments without State Building Code Council approval • There is great importance of adopting the IBC as it relates to the County's ability to advance in FEMA's Community Rating System (CRS) program. If the iBC is not adopted, the County cannot advance past CRS Classification 8 or only a 10-percent reduction in flood insurance premiums for all Hawaii County policy holders. • HAZUS MH Earthquake Modeling with updated building inventory database The Hawaii and Maui County general building stock data was enhanced by using residential and commercial property tax databases and several state government property databases. The project incorporated the unique Hawaii building types including the vulnerable post and pier single-wall construction type that statistically exhibited much higher damage levels than conventional wood-frame construction on slab-on-grade. • Post and Pier Retrofit Study A survey of 53 post and pier houses on the island of Hawaii was performed to determine the typical structural characteristics and variations in structural properties of these houses in the most vulnerable areas. The survey also investigated the extent of damage of these homes during the 2006 earthquakes along with any attempts to retrofit the houses at the time of survey. Based on this survey, a number of prototypical models of post and pier houses were analyzed for different levels of ground motion. A number of aspects of the houses were found to require retrofitting for even moderate levels of ground motion. From the analysis, three retrofit options were developed, with the applicability of each retrofit based on the location of the house and its structural properties. The retrofits are presented in a general format that can be applied to a wide range of houses without specific input from a structural engineer, except in special cases. Retrofit Option 1 is primarily a strengthening of connections using the existing post and pier foundation system, applicable in regions of low to moderate seismic hazard and for houses with moderate differential post heights. Retrofit Option 2 uses additional plywood shear walls between the ground and first floor of a house to provide additional lateral strength and stiffness to the foundation system. This retrofit is applicable in all regions with most combinations of differential post height and other structural properties. Retrofit Option 3 uses masonry shear walls to provide additional lateral strength and stiffness. This option is applicable for any post and pier house, although in some extreme cases a structural engineer would need to be consulted if the properties of the house fall outside the range of properties considered in the report. xix Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv • Soil NEHRP Classification Maps To be able to utilize the strong motion data recorded by the USGS Hawaiian strong motion network, knowledge of the subsurface site conditions beneath the USGS stations was required. The subsurface geology and, more important, the shear-wave velocity (Vs) structure beneath the USGS stations has been unknown to date. The information is invaluable to verify the appropriateness of the empirical ground motion attenuation models being used in the state hazard maps produced by USGS and in site-specific hazard analyses for engineering design. To obtain Vs information beneath the USGS strong motion sites, Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW) surveys were performed by the University of Texas, Austin, and URS Corporation in January 2008 (Wong et al. 2008). The SASW technique has been used to obtain Vs profiles at other USGS strong motion sites (e.g., Seattle, the Imperial Valley, and Los Angeles), and this technique has been well validated against other approaches, such as down-hole surveys (e.g., Wong and Silva 2006). The technique has been particularly useful in volcanic regimes where interbedded volcanic sequences can result in low-velocity zones (e.g.,Yucca Mountain and Los Alamos). The SASW methodology is a non-destructive and non-intrusive seismic method. It utilizes the dispersive nature of Rayleigh-type surface waves propagating through a layered material to estimate the shear-wave velocity profile of the material (Stokoe et al. 1994; Joh 1996). In this context, dispersion arises when surface-wave velocity varies with wavelength or frequency. Dispersion in surface-wave velocity arises from the changing stiffness properties of the soil and rock layers with depth. Spectral analysis is used to separate the waves by frequency and wavelength to determine the experimental ("field") dispersion curve for the site. An analytical procedure is then used to theoretically match the field dispersion curve with a one-dimensional layered system of varying layer stiffness's and thicknesses. The one- dimensional Vs profile that generates a dispersion curve that matches the field dispersion curve is presented as the profile at the site. An active seismic source is required for the SASW surveys. In these surveys, one of the NSF's Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES) mobile vibrators, known as "Thumper," was used. Thumper has been designed to be a moderate- to high-frequency vibrator for use in seismic reflection and surface wave projects. The surveys took place from January 7 to 17, 2008 at 22 USGS strong motion. Several surveys were also performed at Kawaihae Harbor. The high PGA's recorded at the Waimea Station and the North Kohala Police Station are probably due to thin soil site amplification where a strong velocity contrast exists between the soil and underlying basalt. Based on the survey results, all of the 22 USGS strong motion sites are "soil" sites with Vs'0 values ranging from 442 ft/sec at the USDA Laboratory in Hilo (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program [NEHRP] site class E) to 1,812 ft/sec at the South Kohala Fire Station (NEHRP Q. Surprisingly, none of the strong motion sites had rock-like Vs30 values, even sites where basalt outcropped at the surface, such as at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. xx Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Executive Summafv As demonstrated in the 2006 earthquake, where some strong motion stations recorded peak horizontal accelerations close to Ig, site response effects can be significant on the Big Island. As part of FEMA-supported studies following the earthquake, a new 1:100,000-scale map of site conditions on the Big Island of Hawaii was produced. The mapping makes use of about 25 new SASW measurements (Wong et al., 2008) and 1:100,000-scale geologic mapping by Sherrod et al. (2007). An earlier 2006 site class map portrayed nearly all of the island as NEHRP site class B; however, based on about 20 SASW measurements in areas mapped as basalt, it is believed that most of the island should be mapped as NEHRP C or D. Vs30 estimates for these basalt sites ranged from 844 to 1,812 ft/sec, spanning NEHRP classes C and D. The median value for these Vs30 estimates is 1,304 ft/sec, with a log mean of 1,274 ft/sec and a standard deviation of 274 ft/sec. The sites cover a range of basaltic rock conditions as depicted on the geologic map, including lava flows, scoria cones, littoral deposits, spatter or tuff cones, cinder cones, and lava domes. Other geologic map unit groups for which only a few Vs30 estimates were made from SASW data include alluvium, ash/tephra, and artificial fill. These were assigned to map units NEHRP site class D, C to E, and C to E, respectively. Geologic deposits for which there is no quantitative velocity data and preliminary site class assignments have been made are sand dunes (D), landslide deposits (D), and glacial deposits (D). • Landslide Hazard Maps A conceptual level slope risk map was prepared for the Hawaii HAZUS Conversion Project, using an adaptation of the slope hazard methodology given in the FEMA 2007 HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual. The URS approach involved the interactions of three primary slope hazard input criteria simplified to low,medium and high hazard susceptibility The current HAZUS mapping for the Island of Hawaii is an initial pilot study allowing a scientific basis for incorporating slope hazards into island wide scenario loss estimates. This approach provides a simplified method where high resolution topography and rainfall data can be used with existing geologic maps in digital format to develop slope hazard criteria for rural,remote and developing areas where detailed slope hazard input data is not available. Plan Update and Maintenance Rather than just describe the need for plan maintenance and general tasks, this chapter was revised to provide specific actions and summary of specific ongoing hazard mitigation projects that will impact the next adoption of the mitigation plan. Thus, this provides a checklist of the resources expected for the plan maintenance taskings. This should ensure continuity and connectivity with ongoing and future work that should improve the next plan. This mitigation plan will be reviewed annually with input from an interagency Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee and an organized network of community groups in each district. The annual review will result in revised work-plans; budget requests to the County CIP, State Civil Defense, and other funding sources; suggested amendments to codes and plans; and proposed revisions to the text of this plan. xxi Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 1. Introduction Chapter 1:Introduction CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Plan Purpose of This Plan The purposes of this multi-hazard mitigation plan are twofold: 1) to protect people and structures from harm and destruction; and 2) to minimize the costs and disruption of disaster response and recovery. Hazard mitigation planning is the process that analyzes a community's risk from natural hazards, coordinates available resources, and implements actions to reduce risks. There are many benefits in developing a hazard mitigation plan: a well-thought-out blueprint provides more direct access to a wide range of technical and financial resources; the planning process promotes the development of a well- informed citizenry knowledgeable about hazards; mitigation strategies are more integrated with other community needs and goals; and the plan would improve the County's ability to recover after a disaster. A hazard mitigation plan is a pre-requisite to receive federal disaster assistance funding. In the past, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) placed primary emphasis on response and recovery. Recent changes in federal law marked a fundamental shift in policy to focus on mitigation as the foundation of emergency management., For disasters declared after November 1, 2004, state and local governments must have a miti- gation plan approved by FEMA to receive pre- and post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grants. This plan is the update and revision of the original "Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan: County of Hawaii," of May 2005. What is a Hazard? A hazard is a natural- or human-caused event that has the potential to cause significant injury, loss of life or property damage. "Disasters" are distinguished from "emergencies"by the degree of response required. An emergency is where local resources are adequate to respond. A disaster is when the marshaling of broader resources such as State and/or national resources is necessary to assist with recovery.z Since 1977, Hawaii County has experienced six events (three floods, a lava flow, and two earthquakes) that have met criteria for Presidential declaration as a disaster area(see Table 1-1). 1 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000(P.L. 106-390),which amended the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act(P.L. 100-707)which in tum amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974,P.L.93-288. 2 `"Disaster' means any situation,usually catastrophic in nature,where numbers of persons are plunged into helplessness and suffering and as a result may be in the need of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or other necessities of life, and the governor of the State or the mayor of the County have declared a state of disaster or emergency."(Hawaii County Code section 7-6). 1-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction Table 1-1. Hawaii Count y Mayor Natural Hazard Events Since 1975 Event Date Areas Affected Disaster Declaration Tsunamis November 29, 1975 Halape,Punaluu,Honuapo,Kaalualu Unknown Bay,Hilo,Kailua-Kona Floods Flooding February 2,2008 Countywide Mayor Flooding Severe Storms, December 4-7,2007 Countywide,Statewide Mayor,Governor,President High Surf,and Mudslides Flooding October 25-26,2004 Kona Mayor Flooding January 25,2004 Kohala,Hilo,Puna,Ka'u Mayor Flooding November I&2,2000 Ka a,Pahala, Waiakea Uka,Komohana Mayor,Governor,President Flooding high surf Novemher 17, 1996 Countywide Governor Flooding September 19,1994 Hilo,Puna,Ka'u Mayor Flooding August 12,1994 Hilo,Hmnakua Puna Ka'u Mayor,Governor,President Flooding,high winds April 7, 1989 N&S Kohala,Hamakua Mayor Flooding,high winds February 11,1982 N&S Kona Mayor Flooding March 14-26,1980 Puna,Ka'u,N&SHilo,Hamakua,N&S Mayor, Governor Kohala Flooding,high surf,high Jarnuany 8-14, 1980 Countywide Mayor, Governor winds Flooding Novemher 15-17, 1979 Puna,Ka'u,N&S Hilo,Hanuakua,N&S Mayor, Governor Kohala Flooding October 9,1979 Ka'u Mayor Flooding February 17-22,1979 Puna,Ka'u,N&S Hilo Mayor, Governor Flooding,high winds January 12, 1979 Waipio Valley,N&S Hilo,Hamakua Mayor Lava Flow and VOG Kilauea March 25,31 and October Countywide Mayor 24,2008 Pu a'O'o March 3,2008 Puna Mayor Kilauea eruption May 18, 1990 Puna Mayo,Governor,President Kilauea eruption April 23,1990 Puna Mayor Kilauea eruption February 4,1987 Puna Governor Kilauea eruption December 9, 1986 Puna Mayor Mauna Loa eruption March 29, 1984 E&SE portions of County Mayor Kilauea eruption September 30, 1977 Kalapana Mayor Earthquake October 15,2006 Countywide Mayo,Governor,President 1-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction Event Date Areas Affected Disaster Declaration Earthquake November 16, 1983 Countywide Mayor,Governor,President Hurricane and High Winds High winds,high surf February 27,2004 Countywide Mayor High winds,high surf January 14,2004 Countywide Mayor Hurricane Jimena August 30,2003 Countywide Mayor Hurricane Fernanda August 16, 1993 Countywide Mayor Hurricane Iniki September 28, 1992 Countywide Mayor High Winds February 16,1986 Hamakua,N&S Hilo,Puna Mayor High Winds December 12, 1978 Waimea,Kawaihae,Waikoloa,Kiholo Mayor Hurricane Fico July 19, 1978 Kapoho,Kaimu,Honuapo Mayor Drought June 5,2007 Kohala,Hamakua,Ka'u Mayor May 25,2005 Countywide Mayor August 20,2003 Statewide Governor July 1,2003 Puna,Hilo,Hamakua,Countywide Mayor August 10,2000 Kau,Kona,Kohala Mayor March 14,2000 Hilo,Puna,Kau,Kona,Kohala, Mayor Hamakua July 22, 1999 Ka'u,N&S Kona,N&S Kohala, Mayor Hamakua January 30, 1998 Countywide Mayor November 8, 1996 N&S Kohala,Hamakua Mayor November 22, 1995 Hamakua,Hilo,Puna Mayor January 10,1994,February Initially N&S Kohala,Ka'u,Kona; Mayor 22,1995(amended),March amended to include all districts 2,1995(amended) May 11,1993 Kohala,Ka'u,Kona Mayor February 28,1992 Countywide Mayor February 10, 1986 Countywide Mayor December 16, 1983 Countywide Mayor March 14, 1983 Countywide Governor February 15,1983 Countywide Mayor July 15,1981 S.Kohala,Hamakua Governor June 29,1981 Countywide Mayor 1-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction Event Date Areas Affected Disaster Declaration January 30,1981 Hamakua,S.Kohala Mayor January 5,1981 Waiakea Uka,Puna Governor Wildfire July 1, 1987 S.Kohala Mayor Bold—Presidential Declaration Hawaii Island is uniquely at risk to several natural hazards. Compared to the other counties in this State, the relative risks are as follows: • High Wind Storms. Comparable risk to the other counties; wind speed-up patterns occur due to five dominant mountains; • Hurricanes. Higher risk relative to the other counties due to the easternmost location, but fortuitously low historic events; • Landslides and Rock Falls. Higher relative risk to other counties, due to higher level of seismic activity; • Earthquakes. Higher risk relative to the other counties; • Lava and VOG. Unique risk relative to other counties, as the only county with active volcanoes; • Tsunamis. Comparable risk to the other counties,but higher historic events; • Floods. Comparable risk of flash flooding to other counties due to small drainage basins with steep-walled amphitheater-shaped valleys; higher sheetflow flooding risk due to rela- tively youthful geological development of defined drainage ways, especially in the leeward areas; • Dam failures.Fewer dams than other islands however potential for failure maybe greater due to greater seismic activity; • High Surf. Lesser risk to other counties on Northwest facing shorelines due to shadowing effects of other islands, comparable risk on all other shorelines; • Coastal Erosion. Of lesser concern is sandy beach erosion due to the geologically youthful age of this island. Instead, sea cliff erosion is of greater concern to control building too closely to the cliff edge. • Droughts and Wildfires. Higher risk to droughts and wildfires relative to other counties due to more extensive rural settlements that rely on water catchments, a dominant agricultural industry that relies on rainfall, expansive open land area, and strong winds that make wildfires difficult to fight. • HAZMAT. The potential technological hazards of stored hazardous chemical materials are under the planning of the Local Emergency Preparedness Committee (LEPC) per Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 128D Environmental Response Law, and Chapter 128E Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. In each chapter focusing on the above hazards will be profiled in terms of: • Description of the hazard; 1-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction • Significant Historical Events; • Probability of Occurrence; • Risk Assessment Methods; • Mitigation Strategies; Scope of this Multi-Hazard Plan This plan focuses on natural hazards, with a priority on disaster-potential hazards. Other plans focus on human-caused hazards such as terrorism and hazardous wastes. Rather than create separate plans for each type of natural hazard, this plan is a multi-hazard plan. A multi-hazard plan has several advantages: 1) certain hazards cause cascading hazard effects (e.g., earthquakes may cause landsliding, local tsunamis, or dam break flooding; hurricanes cause wind damage and flooding); 2) priorities can be established to allocate limited resources to areas susceptible to the most severe or frequent hazards; 3) areas identified as susceptible to multiple types of risks may require special attention; 4) common responses often apply to different hazards; 5) resources or mitigation measures can be leveraged where they could benefit multiple hazards; for example proposed changes to building design standards could consider both wind-loading(hurricane)and ground-shaking(earthquake). 1-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction The Value of Mitigation Emergency management includes preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. This plan will focus on mitigation-- i.e., strategies to reduce risks. For example, retrofitting bridges can keep them from washing out; installing hurricane clips can reduce personal and property losses thereby reducing the need for public assistance. The money spent today on preventive measures can significantly reduce the impact of disasters in the future. Reducing overall economic losses and social disruption will enable the community to recover to pre- disaster conditions as quickly and efficiently as possible, not to mention the costs saved. The goal is to become a "disaster-resilient" county where our lifeline systems of roads, utilities, infrastructure, and other support facilities are designed to continue operating in the midst of high winds, rising water, or shaking ground. Critical facilities such as hospitals, schools, and fire stations would be located in safe areas, rather than areas prone to high hazards. Resilient structures would be built or retrofitted to meet the safest building code standards available. Natural areas that provide buffers to flooding or other hazards would be conserved. Coordinated Approach Effective planning and response to hazard events involves local, State, and federal agencies. This plan has been coordinated and is consistent with the State of Hawaii Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan and guidelines of the Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA)3. 1.2 Organization of the Plan The plan is organized into the following subject areas: • Mitigation Planning(Chapter 2). • Land Use, and Development(Chapter 3). • Hazards Analysis (Chapters 4-15). All natural hazards that pose a potential threat to the County of Hawaii were analyzed to determine the degree of threat posed by each. The analysis provides a description of the hazard, significant historical events, probability of occurrence,risk assessment techniques, and mitigation strategies. ➢High Wind Storms (Chapter 4) ➢Hurricanes(Chapter 5) ➢Landslides and Rock Falls (Chapter 6) ➢Earthquakes(Chapter 7) ➢Lava and VOG(Chapter 8) ➢Tsunamis (Chapter 9) ➢Floods (Chapter 10) 3 The federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000(P.L. 106-390)encouraged states and local governments to de- velop integrated natural hazard mitigation plans. States and local governments with plans in place would be eligible for faster funding and more effective risk reduction projects. Local Multi-Hazard Mitigation Guidance,FEMA July 1,2008 1-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction ➢Dam Failures (Chapter 11) ➢High Surf(Chapter 12) ➢Coastal Erosion(Chapter 13) ➢Droughts (Chapter 14) ➢HAZMAT(Chapter 15) • Shelters(Chapter 16). Facilities used for the purposes of sheltering residents in the event of a hazard are presented in this chapter. • Risk Assessment (Chapter 17). Those hazards determined to be of sufficient threat to the County of Hawaii were further examined to determine the degree to which the population, structures and land areas are vulnerable to the hazards. The analysis examined location of population concentrations, critical facilities, community resources, major transportation routes and infrastructure lines. • Mitigation Strategy (Chapter 18). By overlaying the hazard areas and community assets, problems and issues were identified. The strategy to address these problems and issues consisted of clarifying mitigation goals and objectives, identifying alternative mitigation actions, selecting and prioritizing the actions to be implemented, and developing an action plan. Mitigation actions include improving warning systems and evacuation plans; "hardening" critical facilities to withstand hurricane and earthquake forces; structural and land treatment measures that contain or redirect natural hazards; planning and regulatory measures to guide development away from hazards and establishing standards for managing exposure to hazards; and incentive and educational measures to encourage practices which are consistent with the disaster resistant community goals. • Planning process and update procedures (Chapter 19). The last chapter documents the extent of public participation and methodology used to develop the plan, as well as the methods and frequency to keep the plan updated. 1.3 Overview of Hawaii County 1.3.1 Geography The State of Hawaii consists of eight major islands (Kauai, Niihau, Oahu, Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Kahoolawe, Hawaii) and 124 small islands, reef, and shoals (referred to as the Northwest Hawaiian Islands). Located in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, it is one of the most isolated places on Earth-- 2,400 miles to the West Coast, 3,800 miles to Japan, 6 time zones separating Hawaii from the eastern United States. The Pacific Ocean is rimmed by active faults where tectonic earthquakes occur that can generate tsunamis (see Figure 1-1).4 4 Most of the tsunamis that have affected the Hawaiian Islands originated in the major earthquake belts, or ocean trenches,that surround the Pacific Ocean. These massive earthquakes along faults are called tectonic earthquakes. The devastating tsunamis of 1946 and 1960 were both generated by this type of tectonic earthquake, the former originating in the trench along the Aleutian Islands and the latter along a fault near Chile. 1-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction Emmons, 0 .N .Xi loo 80 75 70 65 }- /�� 20 3.0 10.0 Figure 1-1. Map showing all of the tsunamigenic earthquakes in the Pacific Ocean as colored circles. Hawaii Island is the southeastern most island in the Hawaiian archipelago. The islands are divided into four counties-- Kauai, City & County of Honolulu (Oahu), Maui, and Hawaii. Hawaii County encompasses the entire island of Hawaii. Although the Hawaiian Islands were all formed by volcanic eruptions, only Hawaii Island still has active volcanoes. The size of Hawaii Island continues to grow as a result of the ongoing eruptions. Related to volcanic building of the land mass are earthquakes. At approximately 4,028 square miles, Hawaii Island, also known as the Big Island, is larger than all the other islands combined. Hawaii Island was formed from the coalescence of five volcanoes-- Kohala, Mauna Kea, Hualalai, Mauna Loa, and Kilauea. These five dominant mountains create wind acceleration zones on the island(see Figure 1-2). 1-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction Effective Wind Speed for the Island of Hawaii (For Components and Cladding with Mean Roof Height not geater than 100ft) District Boundary Land use CONTOUR Major Road Agriculture ------ 90 Conservation 100 .J Rural .......... 110 •., .' ��\ ��-•:-•~~��� Urban 120 -- -130 140 150 160 _.. — 170 180 I I r I i �+$ N I ✓f 0 5 10 20 Miles I I i I 1 I I I I Figure 1-2. Wind contour map for the Island of Hawaii.The complex topography of the island creates acceleration and decelerations of a 105 mph basic design event windspeed as shown. As the geologically youngest island, Hawaii Island's landforms have not been weathered to the extent of the other islands. Thus rainfall runoff flows in narrow V-shaped stream valleys without broad floodplains or sheetflows in relatively undefined drainageways especially in the drier leeward areas. The relatively immature reef development and related lack of white sandy beaches is also characteristic of the youthful geologic age of this island. 1-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Introduction Located between 19 and 22 degrees north latitude at the northern edge of the tropical zone, Hawaii's mild salubrious climate is due in part to location within the tradewind zone. Hawaii's climate is notable for its low day-to-day and month-to-month variability. The annual variation in mean monthly temperatures is only about 9 degrees F for areas at sea level. While the climate is equable,the mountainous topography makes Hawaii Island one of the most spatially diverse anywhere. From 20 inches in leeward areas to 300 inches in the upper windward areas, this island experiences a range of moisture and temperature regimes exceeding that found across the breadth of a continent. The tropical conditions of the eastern Pacific are ideal for hurricane formation-- i.e., the warm ocean water near the equator (combined with the cyclonic spin) within 10-20 degrees north of the equator (see Figure 1-3). As the easternmost island in the State, Hawaii Island has a slightly higher probability of tropical cyclone landfall, but historically very few events have actually occurred. Figure 1-3. Map of Tropical Cyclones Formed Worldwide from 1985 to 20055 6 5 Image from Wikipedia Website,Retrieved October 5,2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Global tropical cyclone tracks-edit2.jpg 6 The points in the map show the locations of the storms at six-hourly intervals. 1-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Appendix A Chapter 1 —Appendix A. Summary Digest Description of Changes from 2005 to 2010 in the County of Hawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan — updated December 2010 Overall Reorganization and Reformatting of the 2010 Plan To accommodate greater detail on hazards and risk assessment, as well as to more clearly identify hazard mitigation activities and their specific impacts,the Hawaii County Multi- Hazard Mitigation Plan has been substantially reorganized, and now has separate chapters on each of the hazards. The number of hazards individually included in the plan has increased from 7 to 13, plus an additional chapter on emergency sheltering,which is a special consideration for island counties that cannot evacuate inland during hurricanes. The total number of chapters has increased from S to 21. In short, this plan is a near-total rewrite with the objective of greater clarity in addition to a major update of technical knowledge. The chapter on the Mitigation Planning process has been relocated to Chapter 2, providing better linkage to the Executive Summary and Introduction for background on the development of the plan for decision makers. The number of graphic and photographic exhibits has substantially increased, in order to provide better historical and technical exhibits for specific hazards, as well as illustrations documenting new and ongoing hazard mitigation projects and the results of risk and vulnerability analyses. Each hazard-specific chapter discusses previous/current mitigation efforts and future mitigation plan activities, so that specific recommendations are focused on each hazard. These recommendations are then compiled and prioritized in Chapter 19. It is anticipated that this new format will make the plan better enabled to accommodate future updates in knowledge and mitigation actions in the future, and allow for hazard- specific information to be exported to other planning efforts, such as community development plans,the Hawaii General Plan, and the State of Hawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan. Chapter Description of Updates/Revisions in the draft 2010 Plan Executive Summary The 2005 plan discussed the primary The current 2010 plan developed a more concise executive hazards,critical facility and population summary,and also summarizes some of the more significant vulnerabilities,the mitigation strategy improvement in hazard identification and mitigation tools. The and priorities are given,and an updated mitigation strategy and project priorities are updated. exhaustive listing of various mitigation The most vulnerable facilities and populations are identified. The actions is provided. detailed mitigation action listing is given later in Chapter 19. 1. Introduction The 2005 plan provides an explanation of The 2010 plan updates the introduction with updates on hazards the intent of the hazard mitigation plan, and the scope of the plan,as well as updated exhibits. and a discussion of the geographic profile of Hawaii County from a hazards vs.community exposure perspective. A l-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Appendix A 2. Mitigation Planning In the 2005 plan,discussed in the The mitigation planning effort included a major effort toward chapter on the planning process at the greater public outreach meetings and community workshops,and end. included a public opinion survey on disaster preparedness dealing with both individual and governmental preparedness and mitigation priorities. 3. Land Use and Development The 2005 plan introduction provided an Demographics and critical facility information has been updated, overview of Hawaii County geography, as well as the discussion of land use and development projections population,economic profile,land use, per the Hawaii General Plan. and projected growth. 4. High Wind Storms In the 2005 plan,a high wind history in In order to differentiate the risks due to seasonal storms versus Hawaii County is given. tropical cyclones(tropical storms and hurricanes),this separate chapter now examines the high wind event history and windspeed probabilities associated with seasonal climatology. This helps to emphasize that seasonal winds have no direct relationship to the much greater wind risk posed by hurricanes. 5. Tropical Cyclones In the 2005 plan,historical events are This chapter reflects the substantial improvement in the state of discussed,structural benchmark knowledge of the tropical cyclone hazard probabilities and the vulnerability dates are given,and a effect of island topography in producing areas with amplified summary of 2000-2001 research on windspeeds,new flood maps incorporating a hurricane flood probabilistic hurricane hazard analysis is insurance study,indications of a pilot study of hurricane shelter discussed. The needs for further work vulnerabilities,and new wind-resistant design and construction on hurricane hazard and topographic provisions in the new State Building Code(2009). wind speed-up are identified. 6. Landslides and Rock Falls The 2005 plan included a brief discussion This chapter additionally includes a discussion of the substantial on the various generic mechanisms for rockfalls generated by the 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake,and landslides and rockfalls in Hawaii. examines a 2009 slope hazard map developed for use in earthquake loss modeling.Recommendations for improving the landslide susceptibility maps are given for a mitigation planning project that is starting in 2010 with the University of Hawaii. 7. Earthquakes The 2005 provided a basic description of This chapter explains the fundamental seismological mechanisms seismicity of the island of Hawaii and the for earthquakes in Hawaii,which is unlike continental seismology. seismic hazard analysis basis for the The M6.7 October 15,2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake is described, Uniform Building Code(now particularly its effects on the Kawaihae Harbor. The modern discountinued). seismic hazard analysis used for the basis for the International Building Code is explained. A new study to map soil conditions affecting seismic ground motion is included. Structural vulnerabilities of Hawaii island construction is addressed in several new analysis of residential and critical facilities. New Enhanced Hawaii Data for the HAZUS MH MR4 model for earthquake loss estimation and planning has been developed. A 1-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Appendix A 8. Lava and VOG The 2005 plan included a discussion of This new chapter adds an entirely new section on VOG—Volcanic past eruptions and the basic lava hazard Gas Emissions,that was identified in public surveys as one the zones,along with recommended tools three major concerns(earthquake,hurricanes,and VOG for improved lava hazard mapping. mitigation). Additional information on past lava inundation events is included. The lava hazard zone map is used in GIS analysis to calculate the Average Annualized Loss(i.e.,the county's economic risk)due to property damage by lava inundation. There is an update on lava and VOG mitigation activities,including several ongoing projects. 9. Tsunamis In the 2005 plan,the fundamentals of Further historical data on tsunamis during the past 100 years is tsunami generation,local history, presented. Additional information on tsunami detection and warning,and the historical development warning is provided. A new tsunami inundation study using state- of current tsunami evacuation maps are of-the-art modeling has developed updated inundation limits to explained. use as the basis for updating the tsunami evacuation maps. A risk assessment of tsunami-prone communities is presented. Further work is identified,to included addressing tsunami risk in coastal flood zoning and the upcoming development of new Performance- Based Tsunami Engineering provisions for future building codes. 10. Floods The 2005 plan included a description of The phenomena leading to flooding are described in greater coastal and stream flooding hazard detail. The locations of Hawaii Dams are given for background areas,and the basis for FIRM maps are information leading to Chapter 11. Historical damaging flood explained. Areas of seasonally higher events are described in detail. The modern-day rainfall intensity rainfall are generally identified. map is introduced. Areas of flooding are described by district. NFIP exposure for Hawaii County is summarized. An analysis of repetitive loss and severe repetitive loss properties is given and mapped. Floodplain management activities of the County of Hawaii are described in detail,and proposed county regulatory update objectives are summarized. Future work is identified. 11. Dam Failures Early research work on dam break This is an entirely new chapter dealing with the technological modeling is described and the need for failure hazard of dam break inundation. A major effort in dam further work on inundation modeling is condition surveys and hazard identification,and inundation identified,due to the presence of 11 modeling has occurred in the years since the March 16,2006 earthern dams in Hawaii County. Kaloko Dam failure on Kauai. Regulatory requirements are described. Ongoing efforts of the USACoE,State,and County Civil Defense to create dam evacuation maps are discussed. 12. High Surf This is an entirely new chapter dealing with damaging high surf events and high waves due to hurricanes and tropical storms. 13. Coastal Erosion The 2005 plan was confined to discussion This entirely new chapter focuses on coastal erosion mechanisms of coastal escarpment erosion and and strategies. coastal landslides. A 1-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Appendix A 14. Droughts Droughts and drought impacts are Drought measurement and susceptibility indices are described in described,and the need for further detail. Significant historical drought event losses are reported. updates to include the Hawaii Dought Drought hazard areas are mapped. Drought monitoring tools are Committee is identified. described. Drought mitigation initiatives from the Hawaii County Drought Committee are reported. 15.Wildfires Hawaii County wildfire suppression This entirely new chapter adds information on wildfire history and resources are identified. losses,probabilistic wildfire hazard maps,and project initiatives from the Hawaii County Drought Committee. 16. HAZMAT This is an entirely new chapter on the potential technological hazards of stored hazardous chemical materials,to summarize the planning of the Local Emergency Preparedness Committee(LEPQ per Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 128D Environmental Response Law,and Chapter 128E Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. 17. Shelters This entirely new chapter identifies the presently available emergency public shelter facilities in the County,and maps these locations. A pilot study of structural and enclosure integrity of several shelter buildings is described,using a recently developed engineering assessment procedure of the Department of Accounting and General Services. New building regulations of the State Building Code for residential safe rooms and public building enhanced hurricane protection areas are described. Follow-up implementation recommendations for improving shelter safety are given. 18. Risk Assessment The 2005 plan Risk and Vulnerability This chapter adds a risk analysis of 80 critical facility buildings in Analysis chapter provided a very the County of Hawaii and expected losses for earthquakes and comprehensive overview of county hurricanes. Facility vulnerability rankings are given. A risk analysis critical facilities,and characteristics of of the University of Hawaii at Hilo campus buildings is given with the at-risk population. It indicated a high facility vulnerability rankings. Highway and bridge damage due to priority for hardening of critical facilities. the 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake are identified. Land Use data and Loss estimation was based on results population data are updated. Improvements to the HAZUS MH produced by Martin&Chock for the model capabilities are discussed,including the assembling of an State of Hawaii. The need for future Enhanced Data inventory of Hawaii County buildings. updates was indicated,stressing additional development of HAZUS capabilities and data improvements. 19. Mitigation Strategy The 2005 plan described the County's This chapter has been updated. The Mitigation Goals and mitigation goals and objectives, Objectives were updated, In that process,several items were mitigation actions by hazard,priorities, identified as emergency response activities rather than having any and project implementation actions. hazard mitigation effects,and these were removed. Mitigation Actions by hazard are identified. The priorities for hazard mitigation were updated. Implementation actions to address these priorities are organized in a clearer listing. A 1-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1:Appendix A 20. Plan Maintenance The 2005 planning process was Rather than just describe the need for plan maintenance and described. general tasks,this chapter was revised to provide specific actions and summary of specific ongoing hazard mitigation projects that will impact the next adoption of the mitigation plan.Thus,this provides a checklist of the resources expected for the plan maintenance taskings.This should ensure continuity and connectivity with ongoing and future work that should improve the next plan. 21. References This chapter has been updated to reference new material. Appendix A FEMA LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK A 1-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f LJ 2. Mitigation Planning Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning CHAPTER 2 - MITIGATION PLANNING 2.1 Planning Process The planning process engaged the many involved agencies and the public to increase aware- ness, facilitate input, and then to synthesize the information into a plan of action. The County Civil Defense Agency is the lead agency for all hazards planning in the County. For this initial effort, the Civil Defense enlisted the assistance of the Planning Department and Data Systems to coordinate the planning process. Although this plan is a culmination of the best efforts and the best available information at this time, the County recognizes that there are many areas for improvement and is committed to an ongoing process to update the plan with ever more public and agency participation. To compile the data for the initial plan, and this update, meetings were held with agencies whose functions related to hazards analysis (e.g., Hawaii Volcanoes Observatory) or critical facilities (e.g., HELCO, Fire,Police, Department of Public Works, Red Cross). The County's GIS system was the repository of the information. One of the goals of the planning process was to build the County's GIS capacity recognizing its importance not only for mitigation planning but also for emergency response. Public awareness and input was solicited that focused primarily on preparedness to respond to hazard events. Numerous public meetings were held throughout the County that provided a forum for discussion on hazard mitigation. �w L f� '• .,4 a Figure 2-1 A Typical Hazard Mitigation Planning Meeting 2-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Clzapter 2:Mitigation Planning 2.2 Plan Development Process The plan development process consisted of the following steps: 1. Mobilization and Scoping. From 2009, a FEMA PDM grant enabled the County to lay the groundwork for hazard mitigation planning by increasing agency and public awareness. In 2009,the Civil Defense Agency invited resource people from FEMA and the State and University of Hawaii to meet with several County agencies to discuss the approach and requirements for a hazard mitigation plan. This resulted in a schedule and strategy plan for performing the update. 2. Establishment of Working Committee. The Civil Defense Agency organized a working committee composed of representatives from its agency, Planning Department, Data Systems Department and two private consultants to prepare the Hawaii County Hazard Mitigation Plan. In lieu of relying on consultants to prepare the entire plan, the County deliberately chose to invest County personnel time to prepare the plan. Only by taking an active role in the overall preparation could County personnel become intimately educated in hazard mitigation, be committed to implementing the mitigation actions, and be able to update the plan. Beginning in the spring of 2009, the committee met to establish project parameters, develop a work plan, and determine the format for the plan. Early in the process, the committee also met with representatives from State Civil Defense to gain an understanding of how the various county plans were being developed, the kind of assistance that was available and what was expected from Hawaii County. These early sessions provided an opportunity to learn about the various hazard mitigation projects and activities that were already ongoing to incorporate into the plan. The committee met on a monthly basis to provide status updates and feedback on the work accomplished during the intervening time period. 3. Data Collection. In the process of preparing the plan, the County Plan utilizes a significant increase in GIS spatial analysis to compile, analyze, and illustrate available data in maps, developing needed additional data, and identifying the gaps to focus future efforts. The County recognizes GIS as a valuable tool for planning, response (E911 dispatch and Emergency Operating Center), and recovery. 4. Analysis. • Hazard Identification and Analysis. The working committee researched available documents and consulted with pertinent agencies and experts to synthesize the state of knowledge of the various natural hazards. Involvement by the Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee provided valuable input. The sources are referenced throughout the document in footnotes and listed in Chapter 21- References. • Risk and Vulnerability Analysis. Critical facilities and infrastructure were mapped in the GIS. Hazard zones were then overlaid on the critical facilities/infrastructure maps to high- light the assets at risk. A engineering-based risk analysis utilized HAZUS MH was performed to accurately determine the facility structural characteristics, calcalate the risk, and identify the measures needed to mitigate the risk. • Mitigation Strategies. The mitigation actions were derived from the hazard analysis and the risk and vulnerability analysis. Implementation of these actions required assignment of 2-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Clzapter 2:Mitigation Planning priorities, and details regarding who,when, and how much. 5. Plan Development. The data collection and analysis was synthesized in this Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan. Key stakeholder groups that have been involved or will be involved in the continuous hazard mitigation planning include: 1) frontline agencies involved in emergency and disaster response and recovery; 2) regulatory and funding agencies responsible for certain mitigation actions; 3) key businesses that are involved with sheltering, evacuation, or recovery; and 4)the general public. 6. Public Input. The County's recent update of the General Plan adopted by the County Council in February 2005 included a major revision to the policies relating to natural hazards. The previous policies addressed only flooding hazards. The revision broadened the policies to address multi-hazards. An initial draft of this hazard mitigation plan has been available for public review and comment on the State's hazard mitigation website since January 5,2010. 7. Verification, Refinement, and Public Outreach. With thoughts gathered together and organized in this Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan, the County will continue to hold interagency meetings and public workshops. For more grassroots involvement, the County has established a community outreach network to serve two functions: 1) to prepare communities to respond to emergencies and 2) to serve as a two- way communication conduit between the community and County officials.7 This communication network would function during non-emergency periods as well as emergency periods. The County's Department of Research and Development, together with a steering committee of key interagency representatives (e.g., police, fire, civil defense,public works,American Red Cross),will oversee the program. 2.2.1 Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee Meetings Attendees: State Dawn Johnson State Civil Defense Larry Kanda State Civil Defense Ann Ogata-Deal Hawaii CZM Program, Office of Planning Cott= Hunter Bishop Office of the Mayor Frecia Basilio Research&Development Cheryl Chan Data Systems Frank Demarco DPW(NFIP Coordinator) Ben Ishii DPW-Engineering Brian Kajikawa DPW-Building Division Christian Kay Planning Quince Mento HCDA Lisa Nahoopii Data Systems—GIS Noelani Whittington DPW 2-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning Coordinating Agencies/Organizations Darcy Bevens Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes George Curtis University of Hawaii at Hilo Don Thomas Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes,UH Hilo Gerald Fryer Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Peter Nicholson UH Manoa College of Engineering Cheryl Anderson UH Social Science Research Institute Gen Tamura FEMA Pacific Area Office Consultants Gary Chock Martin & Chock, Inc. Roy Takemoto PBR Hawaii Guest Speakers Kwok Fai Cheung UH Manoa School of Ocean Engineering Science and Technology Neal Fuiii Hawaii State Drought Council Jim Kauahikaua Scientist-in-Charge, TWO Ian Robertson University of Hawaii at Manoa College of Engineering 2.2.1.1 February 11, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Planning Process Evaluation to Review Goals and Objectives Agenda Items: • Discuss and evaluate planning process section and the monitoring and evaluation • Establish a new planning process,monitoring,update and evaluation process • Hazard and Risk Analysis Overview • Outreach Strategy Discussion Preparationefor following meeting • Review submitted strategy and outreach suggestions 2.2.1.2 March 5, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Discuss Public Participation and Community Education Process Agenda Items: • Discuss Public Outreach Related to the Plan Update Process • Discuss Public Outreach as Part of Plan Implementation. • and evaluate planning process section AND the monitoring and evaluation section • Establish a new planning process, monitoring, update and evaluation process to implement now • Identify who is going to document and implement the changes Preparation for following meeting • Review hazard identification and descriptions • Bring forward additional ongoing hazard studies 2-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning 2.2.1.3 April 2, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Hazard Identification and Profiling Agenda Items: • Develop final survey from review of an initial hardcopy beta distribution • Status Reports on Hazard Risk Identification and Mitigation Projects • Review and improve existing hazard descriptions • Identify who is providing new information and what the next steps should be Preparation for following meetin: • review vulnerability section in preparation for next meeting • locate and bring additional related studies to the next meeting 2.2.1.4 May 7, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Vulnerability Assessment/Development Trends Agenda Items: • Review beta test of the public survey website • Status Reports on Hazard Risk Identification and Mitigation Projects. Continuation from the April meeting on various studies recently completed, underway, or planned that advance the state of knowledge from the 2005 • P1an.Rcview and improve existing vulnerability assessment Preparation for following meeting • each invitee should identify areas that strengthen the island's mitigation efforts: regulations,personnel, funds, etc. 2.2.1.5 June 8, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Capability Assessment Agenda Items: • Discuss ongoing distribution of the public survey • Discuss distributed synopsis of suggested mitigation actions • The mitigation goals and objectives of the current plan was used as a framework to identify and discuss capability gaps. • Identify what the current plan says for hazard identification and mitigation and what remains to be done • identify who is responsible for documenting them Preparation fore ollowing rneetin: • review the entire strategy section and develop draft list of mitigation projects by hazard area per the discussion as well as any newly identified projects/objectives 2.2.1.6 August 17 and 20, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Review Risk Assessment of'County Critical Facilities Agenda Items: • Discuss the HAZUS MH risk assessment that evalauted the expected losses for each building within an inventory of 80 critical county facilities, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and site visits. Facilities that rank high based on the HAZUS analysis are to be designated for more detailed evaluation and development of recommended mitigation procedures. • Select two groups of buildings from the list with the highest economic and functional vulnerabilities for detailed engineering study and Benefit Cost Analysis of retrofits. 2-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning 2.2.1.7 August 31, 2009 Meeting Purpose: Overview of'Recommended Mitigation Actions Agenda Items: • review results of public survey • Mitigation Goals and Objectives. Summarize the discussions from the past meetings in terms of revisions to the 2005 goals/objectives/projects, as well as the candidate projects • brief group on prioritization methodology • FEMA PDM Project Applications for 2010 Preparation for following meeting • review the mitigation project listing and prepare comments for prioritizing 2.2.1.8 October 12, 2009 Meeting Purpose:All-Department Mitigation Strategy and Action Prioritization Agenda Items: • review and modify action list of projects • brief group on prioritization methodology • prioritize actions through closed polling • Document discussion Preparation for fbIlowing meeting • review the plan maintenance section and prepare comments/ideas for discussion 2.2.1.9 December 4, 2009 Meeting Purpose: All Department Draft Plan Status and Plan Maintenance Agenda Items: • Report on prioritized list of mitigation actions • Update on Hazard Mapping Development • Scope of new hazard mitigation projects • Strategy for plan maintenance 1 - 3 7- 1 L Figure 2-2 Tsunami Hazard Guest Speaker Dr. Kwok Fai Cheung 2-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning 2.2.2 Public Involvement 2.2.2.1 Public Meetings A series of public meetings across the county were conducted by Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency (HCDA), and additional focused workshops on hazards were conducted by the Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes, University of Hawaii at Hilo (CSAV). At these meetings and workshops, a survey form was distributed to gather feedback. a. HCDA and CSAV- Sponsored Meetings 2009-2010 • Community Meeting—Laupahoehoe High School—March 10, 2009 • After Dark in the Park—Kilauea Visitor's Center—March 17,2009 • After Dark in the Park—Kilauea Visitor's Center—March 24,2009 • Mauna Loa 2511i Anniversary Presentation—UT-4 Hilo Campus -March 28, 2009 • Mauna Loa 25t1i Anniversary Presentation — St. Jude's Church, Oceanview - March 28,2009 • Mauna Loa 25th Anniversary Presentation—Konawaena Elementary School Cafeteria —April 4, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor—Keaau High School—April 8, 2009 • Red Cross Advisory Board Meeting—Kailua—Kona—April 09, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Konawaena Elementary School Cafeteria April 7, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor—Kona Town Pavilion April 14, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor—Oceanview Center-April 21,2009 • South Kona Flood Study Meeting — Outrigger Keauhou Beach Resort — April 22, 2009 • Hilo Flood Study Meeting—Kress Building Hilo—April 23, 2009 • Earth and Ocean Fair—Keauhou Beach Resort—April 25, 2009 • North Kona Flood Study Meeting — Outrigger Keauhou Beach Resort — April 29, 2009 Community Meeting with the Mayor—Waikoloa Community Center—May 19' 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor—Waimea Elementary—September 23,2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor—Laupahoehoe School—Oct 5, 2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor—Imin Center—Oct 13,2009 • Community Meetings with the Mayor — Naalehu Comm Center — November 24, 2009 • Kau Rural Heath Meeting—Pahala—November 30,2009 • Post&Pier Retrofit Workshop-University of Hawaii Hilo December 5,2009 b. Public Symposia and Teacher Training Workshops on Natural Hazards (2010) CSAV will host a series of four public symposia and teacher training workshops that will address the major natural hazards occurring in Hawaii (Volcanic Eruptions, Earthquakes, Tsunami, and Hurricanes). The format of each workshop and symposium will consist of a morning set of presentations that will address various 2-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning aspects of the hazard: the "science of the hazard"; the impacts of the hazard on individuals; the impact of the hazard on the community and critical infrastructure; mitigation measures that individuals can take to reduce the threat of the hazards; mitigation and assistance measures that the government has taken or can take to reduce the threat to the community. The symposia will be free and open to the public. School teachers on the island will be offered an opportunity to attend the symposia and participate in follow-on workshops for professional training credit that will contribute to their advancement in their profession. Enrolled teachers will be required to attend the morning Public Symposium session and, after a noon break, will reconvene for the first of the follow-on workshop sessions. In this meeting, the experts who provided presentations to the morning session will participate in discussion sessions with the teachers to: answer more technical questions, provide guidance on available curricular materials relevant to the hazard, and assist teachers to develop ideas and concepts for incorporating hazards awareness in their lesson plans. Discussions with the domain experts will be followed by a group activity under the guidance of a master teacher in the refinement of lesson plans that contribute to their students' ability to meet current curricular standards for their grade level. These activities will conclude the first workshop. About two weeks later, the teachers will be required to attend a second workshop to provide feedback and discussion on the results of their use of the hazards-related lesson plan in the classroom. The second workshop will also incorporate a field trip and visit to a facility relevant to the hazard (e.g. a visit to the Kilauea summit and the Hawaiian Volcano Observatory) with a domain expert who will be able to discuss the scientific background of the field visit and the relevance of the facility to the hazard. The Public Symposia and Teacher Training program will be conducted in Hilo and Honolulu to target teachers on the Big Island and on Oahu; if resources permit, additional symposia will be conducted in Kona and a series of Symposia and Workshops will be offered on Maui. 2.2.2.2 The "Are We Ready?"presentation This presentation provides communities with the following information: • Description of various hazards on the Island ranging from earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, and the possibility of pandemic • Stories of the history of specific hazards on the Island (i.e. the Great Ka'u Earthquake) • Information on the Civil Defense warning system • Information on the four phases of a disaster response and recovery • Actions that people can take to better prepare themselves, their families, and communities for a disaster (i.e. developing and exercising a family evacuation plan, putting together an evacuation home survival kit, planning for risk and vulnerable groups) • Disaster preparedness trainings 2-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning • The Kamehameha School students are producing a DVD by doing the editing, voiceovers and providing the actors. The draft should be finished by late 2010 and the DVD will be furnished 2.2.2.3 HCDA Text Messaging The Hawaii Community Development Authority introduced text messaging on natural hazard warnings pushed to voluntary subscribing cell phones. Subscribers register at the Civil Defense website,where they may obtain other hazard information. 2.2.2.4 Hawaii Resident Hazard Survey A survey was developed for the residence of Hawaii County to assess their understanding of the potential natural hazards which they face, and to determine what their greatest concerns are and what they feel should be accomplished by county hazard mitigation planning. A copy of the survey is shown in Figure 2-1. 2-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency 920 Ululani St.,Hilo,HI 96720 7:45 AM-4:30 PM,Monday-Friday Phone 0808)935-0031 FAX NUMBER C808)935-6460 Hawaii Resident Surveyon Disaster Preparedness The County of Hawaii has experienced many severe natural disasters throughout history The island is uniquely exposed to all the major natural hazards due to its active volcanoes,young geological age,vast I and area and varied topography dominated by five mountains,and exposure to severe weather events. Some of these rarely occur but can be catastrophic;others seemingly happen almost every year to every decade. The County has a multi-hazard mitigation plan that has two main objectives:1)to protect people and structures from harm and destruction;and 2]to reduce or mitigate the losses and disruption of disaster response and recovery.Hazard mitigation planning is the process that analyzes a community's risk from natural hazards and implements actions to reduce risks. Besides consulting the best available scientific and engineering studies,Hawaii Civil Defense would like to find out more about your community's understanding of natural hazards and what you recommend we consider in preparing for disasters. We are seeking your input on this two-sided form that should take only a few minutes to complete. It can help us. improve our planning and preparedness strategy against natural disasters,and help us seek federal funding for mitigation actions with priority. we really appreciate your thoughts and input[ Which of the following natural hazards have adversely affected/damaged your present home or property in the past? ❑flooding high winds/storm damage ❑rockfall/landslide coastal erosion ❑earthquake high waves/stone surge ❑lava tsunami ❑wildfire ❑drought ❑vog damage ❑highway/bridge outage Has your health been affected by vog? ®Not significantly ora tolerable annoyance ®Yes,but I have not required medical attention Yes,and I have sought medical attention Yes;I might have to move to another area Select th a natural hazards that you think may affect you and your family or property most adversely in the futu re? ❑flooding ❑high winds/storm damage ❑rockfall/landslide ❑coastal erosion ❑earthquake ❑high waves/storm surge ❑lava ❑tsunami ❑wildfire ❑drought ❑vog damage ❑highway/btidge outage Was the risk of any of these hazards a factor when you selected the location of your home or place of employment? ❑flooding high winds/storm damage ❑rockfall/landslide coastal erosion ❑earthquake high waves/storm surge ❑lava tsunami wildfire drought ❑vog damage highway/bridge outage If none of the above hazards were a factor in your home or employment decisions,why not? ❑1 did not have enough information at thetime, ❑I was generally aware of the hazards,but they were just not but I would have probably considered it if I knew significant enough compared to other more immediate factors From what sources do you get information on natural hazards and the amount of risk? Are there any hazards that need to have more public information available? Do you have suggestions for other ways thatthe State or County could make hazard information more available to you? we need information to better understand yourconcerns; How many years have you lived on the Big Isle? Where do you live? Area rip Code: Do you U own your home U rent your home Is your residence a LJ single family house LJ apartment condominium/townhouse (pleasefiill out the reverse side of this page! When done,return the form to Civil Defense) Figure 2-1. Hawaii resident survey on disaster preparedness 2-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency Hawaii Resident Survey on Disaster Preparedness(Page 2) On an importance scale of H(high),M(medium),or L(low),which of these hazards are the most important for your personal planning/preparation? _flooding _high winds/storm damage _mckfall/landslide _coastal erosion earthquake _high waves/storm surge _lava _tsunami wildfire drought vog damage _highway/bridge outage In other volcanic areas outside the USA,some lava diversion has been done to protect communities. What is your opinion on whether lava diversion should be attempted to protect homes and property on the Big Island? LJ It should be tried whenever private property is It should be tried when there is a definite threat of lava threatened inundation to a large community It depends on whether it will work effectively and what U Do not try to interfere with nature;that is Just not right else will be damaged by diverting the lava;it's case by case I still doubt there's any way to divert lava,so it's probably a waste of time and effort;I need to know more about it What do you plan on doing that could most help you prepare or protect your family and home from the next disaster? Check If any of the following describe whether or not you will be able to strengthen your home for the next disaster; ❑It costs too much ❑The adds of being impacted are too remote to justify the cost ❑I can't find a contractor to do the work ❑I'm too busy;I'll just prepare if there's any warning ❑I don't really know what to do or how to do it ❑There isn't any way to stop the hazard and damage Let us know if you would like the State or County to assist you in any of the following ways: ❑A workshop to learn how you can strengthen your home against earthquakes and hurricanes ❑Public briefings In my area on the hazards that are the most Important for us to know ❑Have contractors trained on how to strengthen homes and post of list of the contractors willing to do the work H Prepare videos and guidebooks on how to Install earthquake retrofits and make them available to the public We need something else,like: What types of projects do you believe the government should try to fund in order to reduce the damage and disruption of natural hazards on the Big Island?(Rate these by an importance scale of H(high),M(medium),or L(low): _Retrofit and strengthen essential facilities such as hospitals _Retrofit the infrastructure,such as the harbors,airports,and highways and bridges,to make them more reliable _Work on improving the reliability of power and communications/warnings,and supply of essential goods _Improve safety in the schools and public shelters _Improve the way government facilities are built or located to resist tsunamis and storms _Improve on publically available maps and zonation that Identifies the risk of(and odds of having)these hazards _Improve the standards used in the construction of new buildings and homes and prevent or lessen damage _Allow grants,tax credits and/or insurance discounts for strengthening my home or place of business _Provide more public information an how to reduce damage and our losses,and what insurance is available _Work on the highways and county roadways to reduce the amount of rockfalls and landslide blockage _Work on flood control construction Work on dam and stream safety Check one of the following three if you agree with one of these other options: The County should look at doing something else,like: It's hard to know without costs.Just make sure the work is well-planned and cost-effective. Keep us informed. Do nothing more. It isn't worth spending more money on;you can't stop the hazard or reduce damage. Figure 2-1,cont..Hawaii resident survey on disaster preparedness The results of this survey indicated: • impact/concern. The top concern is earthquake. Vog and hurricane were relatively tied for second. The vog response illustrates how a new concern can arise, something that would not have appeared two years ago. Hurricane concern indicates the awareness of this hazard among Big Island residents even if the Big Island has not been hit. 2-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning • Choice of residence or employment. Lava hazard is the only significant hazard that residents consider in choice of residence or employment; however, from this response it is surmised that residents would generally choose price over risk. • Where they get information on hazards. Responders use the internet (e.g., USGS site)to get info, indicating a high degree of sophistication. • Hazards requiring more information. Responders want more information on vog, particularly the long-term effects. Although no information available on the long-term effects,this indicates that the plan should include a section on VOG. • Retrofit. Although cost is the major factor determining willingness to retrofit, the high response for more information indicates that a public education program could convince more people on the worthiness to spend the money. • How government can assist. Responders suggested educational workshops, guidebooks on strengthening home. Suggestions included considering webinars rather than attending meetings which tend to be poorly attended. • What County should be doing? Responders recognized that the County should be taking care of its own facilities, e.g., retrofit essential facilities and critical infrastructure; improve safety in schools and shelters; provide grants or tax credits for voluntary retrofits. A graphical sampling of the results is included below: Which of the following natural hazards have adversely affectedidamaged your present home or property in the past?(Can enter multiple selections) I earthquake 5704%(147) high winds 1 41.4%(106) storm damage _ vog damage 41.0%(105) flooding 23.4%(60) ' � I drought 17.6%(45) ' I highway/bridge outage 141%(36) i Wildfire 8.27(21) I high wavesJstormsurge 5.5%(14) coastal erosion 2.7:(7) lava 2.7%(7) tsunami 2.07(5) rockfallllandslide 12:(3) 0 20 40 60 30 106 120 140 16C 2-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning Has your health been affected by vog?(Only select one answer) _ Not significantly cr a tolerable annoyance _Yes,but I have not required medical attention 146% �t4� Yes and I have sought medical attention _Yes;I might have to prove to another area 2 Select the natural hazards that you think may affect you and your family or property most adversely in the futu re?(Can enter multiple selections) earthquake 79.6%{265] high winds J 58.4"e{T93] storm damage vogdamage 42.0 (140) flooding 23.2%(94) i drought 27.3%(91) i lava 26.1%[87] i highwayJbridge outage 24.9%(83] wildfire 2[7.4%(68] tsunami 13.8%(36) high waves lstorrn surge 7.2%(24] rockfallflandslide 4.5%(15) coastal erosion 4.5%(15) 0 50 100 150 200 250 36C 2-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning On an importance scale of H(high),M(medium),or L(low),which of these hazards are the most important for your personal planning/preparation? 250- zoo 150 �H 100 MM ML 50 0 � a T A 0 @ 0 O. N Was the risk of any of these hazards a factor when you selected the location of your home or place of employment?(Can enter multiple selections) 100 464%(83) so 40.2:(72) 37-4%(58) 33.5%(60) 60 - - 3.5 5a(42) 40 _ - 21.2%(38) 17.3%(31) 11-2%(20) 134%(24) / 11.2%(20) d/ 0 $ m s m 3 a3. 3 3'a 3 b m 2-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning If none of the above hazards were a factor in your home or employment decisions,why not? i d a amt have e�h ad—ban at ttm h— n w [d have proha. —Ge—auy aware of M the hmards.but they were just not signifc... What types of projects do you believe the government should try to fund in order to reduce the damage and disruption of natural hazards on the Big Island?(Rate these by an importance scale of H(high),M(medium),or L(low): 200- 15D M H 100 M M L 50 — — — — — — 0 5 o$ 5 d nm'R 8`n -<3 0-- 30 $ �e.a 3 7 �_ m �o mm 3Qo m a o o-ma ? $gym ;� _ �C3 mQ O,� �3 h ma m mom mgt 0^ _$• n�Q m m 2-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 2:Mitigation Planning Check If any of the following describe whether or not you will be able to strengthen your home for the next disaster: It costs too much 25.1%(6� 1 don't really knowwhat 234 1561 to do or how to do it There isn't any way to stop the hazard and damage 222 l The odds of being im pacted are too remote 190-4(43) to justify the cost I plan on 5.44(13) strengthening my home I'm too busy:I'll just prepare if 4.2%(10) there's any warning 1 can't find a contractor 17 k(4) to do the work 0 20 46 60 SD 2-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan i COUNTY OF HAWAII _# STATE OF HAWAII EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. CD-002 WHEREAS, the County of Hawai'i, in recognition of the fact that the natural island beauty of its volcanoes, beaches, forests and people come with certain issues i and hazards, the County of Hawai'i is committed to disaster preparedness and to i become a disaster resilient community; and j WHEREAS, in pursuit of this commitment, the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency, Department of Planning, and Data Systems Department, have been and will continue to develop the County's Hazard Mitigation Plan in conjunction with the State j i Civil Defense on the State Hazard Mitigation Plan as required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency(hereinafter"FEMA"); and WHEREAS, FEMA has required that a County Hazard Mitigation Plan be developed and adopted to qualify for federal disaster funding; and WHEREAS, it is anticipated that the process to develop the County's Hazard Mitigation Plan update completed in late 2010; and WHEREAS, pending adoption by the County Council, it is the purpose of this i Executive Order to direct that the County of Hawai'i shall continue to pursue and develop a County Hazard Mitigation Plan. NOW THEREFORE, I, William P. Kenoi, by the authority vested in me as Mayor of the County of Hawai'i, pursuant to Hawai'i County Charter Section 4-1, in order to i I i I I I establish the County of Hawai'i as a disaster resilient community, hereby orders as follows: 1. That the Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency shall be the lead agency, with the cooperation of the County of Hawai'i Department of Planning, County of Hawai'i Department of Public Works and County of Hawai'i Data Systems Department, to further develop and implement the County of Hawai'i Hazard Mitigation Plan. The Hawai'i County Civil Defense Agency shall further ensure coordination of government and community input into the plan. 2. The County of Hawai'i Hazard Mitigation Plan shall include the following elements: i • Identification of hazards • Risk and vulnerability analysis i • Mitigation strategies • Planning processes and procedures • FEMA compliance ("crosswalk") checklist This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the County of Hawaii, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person. DATED: Hilo, Hawai'i, APR 0 5 2010 , 2010. U6) i �_ l � --- t WILLIAM P. KENOI Mayor I APPROVED AS TO FORM AND LEGALITY: De put orpo ration Counsel Cou y of Hawaii i i -2- CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 3. Land Use and Development Chapter 3:Land Use and Development CHAPTER 3 - LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT 3.1 Population Hawaii Island's resident population according to the 2008 census totaled approximately 175,784, supplemented with approximately 16,907 visitors for a de facto population of ap- proximately 192,691 persons. Among the four counties, Hawaii County's resident and de facto population is second to City & County of Honolulu. In terms of percent change from 1990, Hawaii County's resident and de facto population grew the most among the four counties. The change in the resident population represented the second highest net immigration among the four counties; the City & County of Honolulu had 68,803 residents who move in between 1990 and 2007, compared with 55,467 in Hawaii County. The age distribution in this County is comparable to the other counties, with minors (under 18 years) comprising approximately one-fourth of the resident population, the working age (18 to 64 years) comprising approximately 60%, and the elderly residents (65 years and older) comprising roughly 14%. Hawaii County's residents have the lowest per capita income among the four counties at$29,702 in 2007. A significant proportion of the residents over age 5 do not speak English "very well" (6%). More than 18% of the residents speak a second language at home. Table 3-1. Hawaii County Demographic Protile Characteristic Hawaii County State Rank Among Counties Resident populations 175,784 1,288,198 2 %change,April 1,2000 to July 1,2008 18.2% 6.3% 2 De facto population 192,691 1,388,605 3 %change,April 1,2000 to July 1,2008 15.3% 3.8% 1 Resident population per sq mile,20009 36.9 188.6 4 Residents Q 8 years old,%10 22.5 22.1 2 Residents 18 to 64 years old,% 63.7 63.1 3 Residents 65 years and older,% 13.8 14.8 2 Persons>5 years old who do not speak English-very well"" 10,840 143,505 Population per household, 1980/1990/2000'2 3.09/2.86/2.75 Net migration 13 55,467 179,969 1 Personal income per capita,2007 29,702 j 39,242 j 4 8 Resident and de facto population from Hawaii County Data Book 2009,Table 1.4 9 Hawaii County Data Book 2009,Table 1.3 10 Age characteristics from Hawaii County Data Book 2009,Table 1.1 1 a 11 Hawaii County Data Book 2009,Table 1.17 12 Hawaii County Data Book 2009,Table 1.18 13 Hawaii County Data Book 2009,Table 1.23 3-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development 3.2 Economy Sugarcane was the dominant industry of this island for more than 120 years. As late as 1969, plantations located in Hamakua, Kohala, and Ka'u Districts contributed more than 37% of the State's sugar production. The process of downsizing and closing plantations began in the 1970s and culminated in the abandonment of sugarcane production on the island in 1996. Throughout the years of sugar's decline, there has been growth in the island's tourism sector that is based largely in the Kona and South Kohala Districts. Diversified agriculture has experienced a generally upward trend as it strives to replace the abandoned sugarcane fields. In the County of Hawaii approximately 1,184,599 acres or 46% of the total land area is situated within the State Land Use Agricultural district. Included in the district are lands with a high capacity or potential for agricultural use as well as those with very low potential for productive agricultural activity. Approximately 27% of the total acreage of the County (686,000 acres)are presently being used for agriculture. The structure of commercial agriculture in Hawaii County is in a state of continuing transition. While commercial agriculture was once dominated by sugar and ranching, trends indicate that a larger number of small independent farmers producing a wide variety of diversified commodities will play an increasingly important role in the future. Diversified agriculture is dominated by macadamia nuts, papaya, flowers, tropical and temperate vegetables, and specialty coffee grown in the unique summer rainfall below on the middle slopes of the Kona District. Ranching cattle makes use of the extensive open areas. Employment statistics for the Island of Hawaii, according to the 2002 census, are given in Table 3-2. Table 3-2. Employment statistics for Hawaii Island per the 2002 census Sales, Annual Number Number of shipments, payroll of 2002 NAiCS sector establishments receipts,51000 57000 employees Manufacturing 114 204,377 38,289 1,246 Wholesale trade 183 605,605 42,646 1,434 Retail trade 691 1,704,360 176,092 8,541 Information 65 N/A 25,646 712 Real estate&rental&leasing 239 278,016 55,840 1,766 Professional,scientific,&technical services 298 155,259 68,118 2,173 Administrative&support&waste management &remediation service 194 120,670 60,343 2,730 Educational services 29 6,178 1,913 120 Health care&social assistance 446 455,289 188,823 5,934 Arts,entertainment,&recreation 74 55,490 16,940 884 Accommodation&food services 350 747,901 210,356 10,595 Other services texcept public administration 266 103,296 28,745 1,387 3-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development 3.3 Land Use The passage of the Land Use Law in 1961 established the State Land Use Commission. It called for the classification of all lands in the State and authorized the adoption of rules of practice and procedures and regulations for land use within the various State land use districts. The four land use districts created by the State Land Use Commission provide the basic legal framework for land uses in the State of Hawaii. The Urban District is generally defined as lands in urban use with sufficient reserve to accommodate foreseeable growth. In the County of Hawaii this district is comprised of approximately 54,267 acres, or two per cent of the island's total land area. Rural Districts are defined as lands primarily comprised of small farms mixed with low density residential lots that have a minimum lot size of one-half acre under the State Land Use Law. Of the four districts, this is the smallest, with approximately 807 acres of the island's total land area. The Agricultural District includes lands with a high capacity for intensive cultivation as well as those with low capacity. The minimum lot size in this district under the State Land Use Law is one acre. The Agricultural District has the second greatest land area with approximately 1,184,599 acres or slightly over 46 per cent of the total land area of the island. Conservation Districts are primarily those lands in the existing forest and water reserve zones. This district has the largest land area with approximately 1,338,135 acres or 52 per cent of the total land area of the island. Land uses within the Urban Districts are administered exclusively by the counties. In the Ag- ricultural and Rural Districts,the State Land Use Commission establishes use regulations and the counties are responsible for their administration. The counties, however, may adopt more stringent controls than those imposed by the State within these two districts. Land use in the Conservation District is regulated by the State Board of Land and Natural Resources, except that the counties have concurrent permitting power within the Special Management Area near the coast. The counties have no land use control over Federal property, and the Hawaiian Homes Commission has the ultimate control over uses of the Hawaiian home lands leased to native Hawaiians. Within the County of Hawaii, the desirable future land use pattern is set forth by the General Plan Land Use Pattern Allocation Guide Map (LUPAG). The more detailed zoning must be consistent with the LUPAG. Lands designated Residential-Agriculture (RA) saw the largest percentage increase in acreage between the years 1989 and 2000 at 60 per cent, although the total acreage of RA zoned lands accounted for less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the total land area within the County. During the same period, Commercial zoned lands increased by 49 per cent, Multiple Family Residential zoned lands increased by 15 per cent and Industrial zoned lands increased by 14 per cent. Acreages of Open zoned lands fell by 0.6 per cent. Lands designated as Agricultural, excluding lands zoned Unplanned prior to the comprehen- sive revision to the Zoning Code in 1996, account for 77 per cent of all zoned lands within the County. 3-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development Legend —Major Road Land Use Class -Breakwater -Conservation -Extensive Agriculture .High Density Urban -Important Ag.Lands -Industrial - -Low Density Urban -Medium Density Urban -Open Area -Orchards -Ponds Resort Node -Resort -Rural Urban Expansion University Use o z.s s 10 15 zo ®Miles Figure 3-1. Land use for Hawaii County 3.3.1 General Plan Projections The following assumptions were the basis by which the County's General Plan was developed: • Agriculture Agricultural employment will increase significantly as former sugarcane lands are brought into production with import replacement, export and value added crops and products. Additional employment will be derived from expanding agrotourism enterprises. The expansion of the industry will be facilitated by the establishment of a new air cargo distribution center and post-harvest processing facilities that will allow for significant increases in the volume and types of products exported to the continental United States and foreign countries. Agricultural research and education will be enhanced. • Tourism The County will continue to pursue the development of a strong multi-market base for the visitor industry that includes direct oversea flights to Kona, growth of the cruise ship industry, strong resort-based employment centers and integrated product development for local products that can generate a healthy small business economic base. The County's visitor industry will continue to successfully grow and expand. Likewise, employment in the visitor industry and its related industries will continue to grow. 3-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development • Other Basic Industries There is tremendous potential for expansion in other industries such as aquaculture, astronomy, renewable energy, research and development, and special events such as cultural festivals and athletic events. Employment and population projections for the County of Hawaii were developed through the analysis of relationships between economic activity, employment, and population. The analytical approach used entails the forecasting of employment in basic industries and the relationship that changes in employment have upon population. Primary Income Generators are those industries that generate income from outside the County. They are assumed to be the foundation of the local economy and the key to the development of the island. Primary Income Generators include agriculture, tourism, the manufacturing of export products, and research and development. These Primary income Generators, in turn, "drive" the secondary industries, or those enterprises that service the Primary Income Generators or the local popu- lation and include wholesaling, retailing and services. The Primary Income Generators de- termine the long-run pattern of population and income growth for the County. Population projections developed for the General Plan assume that the visitor industry will grow at an annual rate of 1% (Series A) to 3% (Series C), compared to a historical growth rate of 1.45%between the years 1977 and 1998. The resulting resident population projection for the year 2020 ranges from 213,000 to 237,000, compared to 148,700 residents according to the 2000 census, an increase of 43%to 59%over 20 years. 3.4 Analysis The planning committee concluded that development has largely been a continuation of an overarching trend over the past 10 years but,unlike Honolulu in the past 5 years,having no dramatic "boom"economy.No great shift in population centers or economic centers has occurred. However, agriculture in the post-plantation era has become increasingly specialized per the various micro-climates on the island. Thus,Hawaii County is mostly characterized by the vulnerabilities of rural and residential communities. Hawaii Island is uniquely at risk to several natural hazards. Compared to the other counties in this State,the relative risks are as follows: • High Winds/Tropical Cyclones. Higher risk relative to the other counties due to the easternmost location,but fortuitously low historic events;more complex wind speed- up patterns due to five dominant mountains; • Lava Flows. Unique risk relative to other counties, as the only county with active volcanoes; isolation of rural communities is a threat; • VOG. Volcanic gas emissions have had significant impact on Hawaii County's specialty floral agriculture; • Earthquakes. Higher risk relative to the other counties;past earthquake-induced landslides have also impacted agricultural water supplies; • Tsunamis. Lower risk compared to the other counties due to post mitigation after historic events. Concern for hazard awareness of tourist population addressed by 3-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development evacuation signage,Hawaii County is the only county in Hawaii that posts tsunami evacuation signage. • Flooding. Comparable risk of flash flooding to other counties due to small drainage basins with steep-walled amphitheater-shaped valleys; high sheetflow flooding risk due to relatively youthful geological development of defined drainageways, especially in the leeward areas; comparable risk to other counties to storm waves. Reservoir Dam Failures pose heightened threats to the Waimea area. • Coastal Erosion. Of lesser concern is sandy beach erosion due to the geologically youthful age of this island. Instead, sea cliff erosion is of greater concern to control building too closely to cliff edges. • Droughts and Wildfires. Higher risk to droughts and wildfires relative to other counties due to more extensive rural settlements that rely on water catchments, dominant agricultural industry that relies on rainfall, and expansive open land area and strong winds that make wildfires difficult to fight. In this chapter, each of the above hazards will be profiled in terms of: • Description of the hazard; • Recurrence and severity; • Identification of hazard areas; • State of the art assessment such as capabilities to predict, adequacy of warning systems, accuracy of identifying vulnerable areas, data needs. 3.5 Critical Facilities Maps showing locations of all critical facilities throughout Hawaii Count are included in Figure 3-2 through Figure 3-6. 3-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County N AIH FMS NORTH KOHA111PI ESTA -A,�,. Map(4) w E HoIx,K.. $ KV a nTEa F. EA EMS A AA F<AULO WAIMEA POLICE STATION ELA POLICE STATroII INEA FIRE STATOa+ / HAWAIICOMMl1WTY H0.SRTALIA F~ NUUPAHODIOE HIGWHE SDUTH KOHALA EA6 VPAHOalOE VOLUMHA FIRE STATION ' ENOE POLICE STATION NORTH Hl0 PoLIGE STATION WAIKOIOAEMS Map(1) E MgUII1TERIlATItuIAl Aigli-.JRr Ate' INTFANATIOrvAL AIRPoRr H KAHA EMS NE'�r.EIE I/Gy--ILUA EMi`A KEA AnEPE KEAInK EMS �✓�HAYAI f,/' --E SrATpEAAOHI- dHaUAIDA EMU I�CLE SHE V ER EMU FIRe SrAN VE T10N�EYKCLE; EAUHOUKpN FIRE YrArOk yypp MOUIrtAIN ViI� • FU90N CBn IHOIUCOMM�'111TY MJSPRPlI ACRES VOLUNTEER FIRE$TATgNANN.WJ GA•LLONWATgtT CAPIARI!' I�AWgl1 L31E - PANOA EL ONAY/AEI 11TR - P. �- KONA IACGEMERF FT ON I FPIgAFWOE STATI ION �IgNAVNAU I--- — _-- Y yiKErIA i. Map(2) t . N(PNIALA FlRE s Arl- STATroN APMRATUS BWu>Ho(PAHALA FIRE STOTIONI 1 0 Emergency Center w�va ATION • ._ EHNE.AS • Fire Station KAU POL NMLEHUR DE LB1UFl ESST .-VEHICLE SHED * Police Station © Care Facility r Public School Airport 0 5 10 20 Miles EMS Major Road Street Figure 3-2. Critical facilities map of Hawaii island 3-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County (1) in N A W E S • Emergency Center R{� • Fire Station w .i * Police Station " ' © Care Facility Y Airport F�"F i + EMS Public School Major Road �.. Street L�:,T .�,MEDI,;LC- 1 I�nuKnHa Eo C'.JiE Faciurr lMLO ri9R) Cri,wLO MEgicALCFirt�tl- A y YWYLCJNG(NILO! �`t •i FIRE ATION HELICOPTER HA IAKEA NCE B.ILCINO( WA FIRE STATON CEjIFFI IHIL HILO IdL01J • HILO INTERNATIONAL GH CEMRPL EMS N ER• Ty r CEIJIRAL FIRE STATION WAREHOUSE ICENTRAL FIRE STATION CENTRPL FIREON gSEATCH OFRCE � I / / PU11 BUC SAFETY� NAROLANI II BUIIDIN'G A M PUBLIC SAFETY @ALONG B f�51LVa � IVIL 0 EFElJSE EMERGENCY OGEPATIONS CENTER I � KAUMANA FIRE STATION 1 J HAWAII COMA.COLLEGE UHH AT HILO AREA HIGH �I • WAIAKFA MITER WAIAKEAELEM 0.5 1 2 Miles _ILA NI FIRE STATION AFPARATUS 5HE0 KAWRILANI FIRE STATION / • +IGWAILANI EMS WMaKEA EHA Figure 3-3. Critical facilities map,Hilo area zoom 3-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County (2) 11 w o� la Care Facility Airport • Emergency Center + EMS • Fire Station Public School w Police Station Major Road i Streets f Lr N ME—FIRE STATION AND POLICE STATION IEAAU FIRE STATION AND POLICE STATION W E KEAAU POLICE STATION VEHICLE SHED I�AAU FIRE STATION VEHICLE EHED KE AADF�IAAU INTER S �APU EMS HAWPIIAN PARADISE PARK FIRE STATION MAWNIRN PARADISE PARK FIRE STATIgV VEHICLE SHED HAWNIAN ACRES VOLUNTEER FIRE STATION AND 2000 GALLON WATER•K .. .M(IWITNN VIEW r OA POLICE STATION PAHOAFIRESTATION FPHOA EMS PAHOA HIGH S�IE0A ELEM 0 1.25 2.5 5 Miles Figure 3-4. Critical facilities map,Puna area zoom 3-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County (3) KONA INTERNATIONAL AIRtiHT 0 1.25 2.5 5 Mile ICE STATION GENERATOR BULDING IKEALAKEIIE POLICE STATION, - s:. I. .LICE 5fATI0NIKEAIAKEHE-[ICE STNiIONI KEALAKEIE INTER KEUAKEHE HEM KEAI-WEHE HIGH W E 1KAILUAEMS T S AILI -KONA FIRE STATION �+ILUA-KONA SHE STATION BOAT SHED I la Care Facility KANAKAI -ALOA • Emergency Center • Fire Station Police Station 1 Airport EAU T EMS •KHO1KONA FIRE STATION ., Public School B 01DI14G1AN021HONACOMMUNNYHOSPITAL)- ... INFU40N CENTER IKONA COI—WY HOSPITAL) PSYCHIATRIC FACILITY(KONA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL) Major Road RADIATION ONCOLOGY(KONA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL) SPECIAL SERVICES BIMLDING(KCNA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL) Street KONAWAEN©HONAWAENA HIGH J , KONAWAENAELEM. - KONAWAENAEI-SR i r "FIITERPOLICESTATION KONRCIMCCENTER FIRESTATIOII KONACIVICCENTER FIRE STATION VEHICLE STORAGE SHED ��/ N GOD HOUEK MS EMS aj�. VI- * HOIIAUIIAU • NI H(rKFNA '� Figure 3-5. Critical facilities map,Kona area zoom 3-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development Critical Facilities in Hawaii County (4) © Care Facility • Emergency Center D N • Fire Station o+ * Police Station W E T Airport 4- EMS + ` S Public School •I� •, Major Road Street NORTH KONALA FIRE STATION t NORT H 11 FIRE STATION APPARATUS BUILgNG KOMKA POgOE STATION IKAWWU POLICE STATION) N I—Al , � HALEHOOL.H KUF■ HAMAIPJAKU-FSTATION '�_�-%.,J- HAMgrcVA HEfi LTH�FNTEq FlY IIOKAA FIRE 57910PJ i PPAUILO STATION ST ATIONIKAMUELAF I.VESTATIOIII . . L IMEA EIEM nNTER ■ NORTN NAWAII COMMUNITY HOSPITAL v P SOUTH KOHALAETAS wAIKOLOA , KOHALAt AST FIRE STATION 1 IMAUPIP LANI FIRE STATION)AND POLICE STAT- jwAlKO�oavls 0 25 5v 10 Miles T • �. . ., .. . . 116V11.A.��L Figure 3-6. Critical facilities map,Kohala area zoom 3.6 University of Hawaii The University of Hawaii System consists of ten University and Community College campuses. Two of these campuses are located in Hawaii County, UH Hilo and Hawaii Community College. Maps of these campuses are shown in Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8. 3-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development 1 Ic 1 MuWN AeeWRCee 1 1 aaa Ic1Amt 1 'a.o NU HALIVLA O 11 _ t rieuo � �pp�1 x�l E oYrl 1 I 1 1 1 1 YIRM1/YAIOY fOO4 l 1st 1 UNIVERSITY TOFF HHAAWAII j 0 MAIN �D O ENTRANCE Main Campus e O� 200 W.Kawili sweet O Y,e1 Hilo,1-11967204091 BUILDING ACRONYMS ADM Admilvsiretion Bltlg.l Cbancelleis OHlce seavi ASB Auxiliary Sees Bldg. BO Baelness Onee CAB CWlege of Agnculture. i Forestry"Net ural Resou' v ooxs•oa Management Bldg.(CAF �F'. �� 3 CC Campus Center D ;, CH Cdnege Hall s K Kanaka'ole Hall LIB Library — Il—`\jJlll Ls Ul s-d Ee ees - Aft-MID Mann.Campus - MS B Mande Science Bldg ❑ RB Portabes 86B Student Se—E dg. A TA Theatre y UCB University Classroom Bltlg. W W—artn Hall 320 A61Itl- 346 Business Educabon Bldg. Figure 3-7. UH Hilo Campus map 3-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 3:Land Use and Development BUILDING NUMBERS een xsa a r..ne.]cc �4sr°""'aPaeLy.'as .nag wr.we .��etes wag xs y 3e r\ y:KC�gurl N.s Bag�ean]]n �,PCC Ewnaa area Nda sP� `` �urcc o.��r,®�a�Ey3 3afin o �.mt4 EanyfnNM�rxl.Bon]05P nwtc Ebcr.ara Ektlm Cr1 r wCC�oan[ur A.E.Pao§NF i nl Bag J]BP �«KC a�i camP,rX,Lm.Mn�, E \ -mac Pors IgXCe ely x; CNEDRENS O O :uCC Aanryierselan BMiI.:]B CENIEN � bpnrnrl crXiNS slog x� ` a.M43,i,ex+5�rvac Dag.]Tg aNNING "^.mCC�C"�^ssim.Aam&ago.B+q.::re O OPEN P O timtC me LeamrgXCena�Bb9 3B0 rme4ATE pveiv,drrce I Conitrer�-e Pm wag� g •rUIS.OVy]90.Pm J1 e5g H,v ,Xnol:rLU&np un wa Ju F tdPPfNTm L�E°ms.eayW.3er Hm to OMN u bL.^HrA aH HM FwlXlee WEmanNr 9Xg:8l e rp.Bac w.i H n L'pweN Baum.Bbp]tll �xuuPx m MEN PRRKIN6 0 OPEN PoBNUG OPEN Mf PUINrNG OPEN vAPNINC .0011, C PINNINf Q �� �/V_gL'v. 4 Q� M SenbYNPt Lm Manono Campus 7LNf W.Kn-b S-1 KAWILISTREET � Figure 3-8. UH Hilo/Hawaii CC Manono Campus map 3-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 4. High Wind Storms Chapter 4:Hazard Analysis—High Wind Storms CHAPTER 4 - HIGH WIND STORMS 4.1 Description of Hazard Wind is one of the most costly property perils, causing more damage nationwide than earthquakes, freezing, or other natural perils. (IIPLR, 1994) In wind storms and especially hurricanes, windborne debris can be a major factor in causing damage. Flying objects such as tree limbs, outdoor furniture, signs, roofs, gravel, and loose building components from progressively failing adjacent buildings can impact the building envelope, creating openings that allow internal pressure to build within. The internal pressures add to the external pressures producing more severe pressures on the building components of the structure. (IIPLR, 1994) The roof then is subjected to tremendous internal pressure building from inside, together with the negative wind pressures lifting the roof from outside. The resulting combined forces may cause roof system failure if the roof has not been adequately designed and constructed. If the roof is breached, high winds and rain destroy the inside of the building. Winds in Hawaii originate from three main sources: trade winds, Kona winds, and hurricanes or tropical storms. Northeast trade winds are dominant throughout most of the year and generally range in velocity between 10 and 20 mph. However, trade winds of 40-60 mph occasionally occur for several days at a time when the sub-tropical high-pressure cell located in the central North Pacific Ocean intensifies. During the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 winter seasons, for example, strong and gusty trade winds of 40 to 50 mph lasted several days and inflicted damage to roof tops, tree limbs, and telephone equipment. The east-facing coastlines, as a result, are the windward coasts and most impacted by trade wind energy. Kona winds are southerly winds and occur as light and variable winds during summer months when trade wind circulation breaks down,but in winter they can be very strong when storm systems moving across the central North Pacific draw air from the south toward their low pressure troughs. Damaging Kona winds from storms generally occur during the winter and spring seasons and have reached velocities of 50 mph for several days on end. 4.1.1 Utilities Power distribution lines are susceptible to strong winds due to the relatively low design standards for older portions of the grid which may also have preexisting damage in the wood poles due to decay and termite attack. One of the most common impacts of a wind storm is the loss of electrical service to some communities. [A comprehensive discussion of the historic design criteria for electrical transmission and distribution systems in Hawaii County, and recent updates, is provided in Chapter 5.] 4.1.2 Trade Winds Trade winds are by far the most common winds over Hawaiian waters and play a major role in defining the climatology of the region. (Kodama 1998) These persistent winds, which blow from a NE to ENE direction, became known as trade winds long ago when clipper ships 4-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4:Hazard Analysis—High Wind Storms carrying cargo depended on the broad belt of Easterly winds encircling the globe in the subtropics for fast passage. High winds from trade winds, which blow 70% of the time (Kodama 1998), Kona winds (30% of the time), and rare winds from hurricanes and tropical storms passing through Hawaiian waters all affect the island of Hawaii. (Fletcher 2000) Tradewinds predominate from the northeast and generally range from 10 — 25 miles per hour, although occasional extreme events reach 40 - 50 miles per hour. North Pacific High pressure systems are responsible for the majority of the gusty trade wind episodes over Hawaiian waters, which commonly persist for several days before tapering off. Strong, gusty trade winds can cause problems for mariners. These strong trades blowing from the NE through East funnel through the major channels between the islands--Kauai, Kaiwi, Pailolo, Kalohi, and Alenuihaha Channels--at speeds 5-20 knots faster than the speeds over the open ocean. Mariners and beachgoers must exercise good judgment prior to entering the waters exposed to strong trades, especially in the major channels. 2:00 a.m.HST 2:00 p.m.HST • • • _ r— g_ %hafa"+�, • Mad Mautia Kea Huala Huslal r� 0 Mauna� 49a 'lau •IGlauea Example 6.0 rvrvn/svrviJ � � The winds during the day on l lawai'i Island vary in a consistent fashion.These examples show mean wind flows at 2:00 A.M.and 2:00 P.M.,based upon a 42-day sample from 50 portable automated weather stations.The results comply with meteorological predictions for the behavior of air abort a heated island in a trade wind flow. Figure 4-1. Typical diurnal wind patterns on Hawaii Island 4-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4:Hazard Analysis—High Wind Storms f n Nn.W>0,M09.Y41 Fv.FN..W.MI .n W M.9f4u1 q'.,F Y10,W :S IIU.pIY.I '•�° w� rpneal wry .v r Figure 4-2. Monthly wind roses for Hilo International Airport(shown for each quarter) 4-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4:Hazard Analysis—High Wind Storms 4.1.3 Kona Storms Kona winds occur as light and variable winds from the SW or SSW,most often during winter months when trade wind circulation diminishes, and as strong generally southerly winds when storm systems move across Hawaiian waters. Stormy Kona winds are most likely to occur when a low pressure center is located within 500 miles NW of the islands and has an unusually low central pressure, below 1000 millibars for the subtropics. Damaging Kona winds have reached velocities of 50 miles per hour for several days on end. The western or leeward sides of the islands, then, become windward in this case, as the predominant wind pattern is reversed. Kona storms generally form in the region bounded by 15° - 35°N and 175° E — 140° W and move erratically, though with a slow tendency toward the west. (Kodama 1998) These storms are persistent and can last up to two weeks. On land, effects of strong Kona winds can be very dramatic. It is not uncommon for trees to be uprooted, branches downed, and scores of roofs damaged. When reinforced by mountainous topography, downslope winds can increase and can be very destructive to land in low lying areas. During this time, considerable damage can be inflicted to boats caught in the open ocean or boats anchored in SW exposed anchorages. Coastal erosion can also result from the extended periods of heavy rain, strong surf and high winds. 4.1.4 Tropical cyclones: In the Central Pacific Ocean tropical cyclones are classified according to their strength as follows: • Hurricane: An intense tropical weather system with a well defined circulation and maximum sustained winds of 74 mph(64 knots) or higher. • Tropical Storm: An organized system of strong thunderstorms with a defined circulation and maximum sustained winds of 39 to 73 mph (34-63 knots). • Tropical Depression: An organized system of clouds and thunderstorms with defined circulation and maximum sustained winds of 38 mph(33 knots) or less. Historically, most tropical cyclones have passed the Hawaiian Islands to the south. Because they spin counter-clockwise in the Northern Hemisphere, east-facing coastlines in Hawaii receive the brunt of strong onshore winds as storms approach the islands,while the south and west coastlines feel onshore winds as the storms pass to the west. The highest wind speeds, however, may occur on the side opposite the storm approach, as downdrafts accelerate downslope as they descend over the mountainous terrain. Even so, coastlines facing the passing storms usually are adversely impacted by both wind and storm surge damage. History has shown that the islands do not have to take a direct landfall from a cyclone to sustain a high level of damage. Wind strength, storm radius of maximum winds, timing, and proximity, are important factors that control storm impact. 4.2 Significant Historical Events By far the most notable documented high wind event from a winter storm to affect Hawai'i County was that of January 1980, which caused damages of $42 million. (Disaster 4-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4:Hazard Analysis—High Wind Storms Declaration DR-613-HI) The loss on Hawaii Island was $11.7 million. Agriculture — macadamia, coffee, foliage and flower farms — had major losses. Maui was also declared a disaster area (Haraguchi, 1980).14 Other winter storms have caused much less, but more localized effects, with flooding the main problem. The flood insurance maps are intended to reflect the stream flooding from these events as well as coastal effects. 4.3 Probability of Occurrence According to the National Weather Service (NWS) (Heffner, 2002), the monthly counts of high wind events impacting the populated lower slopes and elevations of Hawaii County over a ten year period indicate the months of"winter" storms to be the most active. A high wind event by NWS definition includes sustained winds or frequent gusts of 40 mph or greater. For Hawaii County, 28 events were identified during the period January 1992 through Octo- ber 2002. The typical breakdown of events by month is: High Wind Events in Hawaii County:Jan. 1992-Oct. 2002 s �+ 6 LU W IOU 5 L m 4 0 0 3 L QJ C0 2 E L Z 1 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Month Figure 4-3. High Wind Events for Hawaii County by Month,January 1992 to October 2002 Thus, the average is a little over 0.2 such events per month, but for the "season" of occurrences (December through April), it averages 0.4 per month, island-wide. 4.4 Risk Assessment The distinction between the tropical cyclone hazard and high wind hazard is illustrated by the hazard curves for the Hawaiian Islands shown in Figure 4-4. The figure shows that the relatively low wind speeds that occur more frequently are more likely to be from non-tropical cyclonic winds while the relatively high but less frequent wind speeds are more likely to be 14 Haraguchi,Paul, 1980,`Storm of January 8- 10, 1980,State of Hawai'i,"DLNR,December 1980. 4-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4:Hazard Analysis—High Wind Storms caused by tropical cyclones. The transition is for peak gusts around 68 mph and an average return period of around 30 years,therefore just below hurricane strength. 160 140 Tropical Cyclone Events 120 c 100 E 80 Y Non-Tropical R Wind Events a. 60 40 20 0 10 100 1000 Return Period,Years Figure 4-4. Wind hazard curves for the Hawaiian Islands for Tropical Cyclone and Non-Tropical Winds There is no objective model that is used solely for the purpose of evaluating economic losses due to high wind events without regard to tropical cyclone occurrences. The future risk of such events is projected to be roughly equivalent to the historic losses of past events. 4.5 Mitigation Strategies 4.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts Hawaii design wind pressures have changed over the years in the building code. The Uniform Building Code (UBC) design windspeed was based on an analysis of Honolulu weather station data by H.C.S. Thom in 1968 without consideration of hurricane history. The UBC wind loadings have historically lagged the ASCE 7 standard with respect to hurricane hazard because almost all the UBC constituent states were not in hurricane regions (except for Hawaii,which was only recently recognized after Hurricane Iwa and Iniki). Table 4-1. Design Wind Pressures per UBC/IBC Code Years Building Code Years Design Wind Pressure at IOM height* IBC 2003 26 psf UBC 1991 to 1997 30 psf UBC 1982 to 1988 26.5 psf UBC 1958 to 1979 15 psf 4-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 4:Hazard Analysis—High Wind Storms *Based on component and cladding wall pressures,for an enclosed building,near the coastline,not near a comer of the building. The critical benchmark year identifying structures previously designed to an inadequate wind pressure would be 1985,the date of Hawaii's adoption of the 1982 UBC edition. 4.5.2 Future Plans Future mitigation plans for high wind storms will be discussed in the proceeding chapter on Hurricanes, as Hurricanes pose a much greater threat to loss of property, infrastructure, and life. 4-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 5. Tropical Cyclones Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones CHAPTER 5 - TROPICAL CYCLONES 5.1 Description of Hazard Tropical cyclones are storms that originate over a warm tropical ocean. When such a storm develops sustained winds (one minute average) over 74 miles per hour, it is classified as a hurricane.15 They are characterized by a large counterclockwise circulation of air and lower barometric pressure near the center. These actions produce the major hazards of hurricanes: high winds, high waves, storm surge, and heavy rain. These hazards cause flooding, salinization of water supplies, agricultural crop losses, erosion, loss of life, and damage to structures and infrastructure. The winds can affect all parts of an island and can be intensified by mountain ranges (orographic or topographic amplification). A good example was Hurricane Iwa in 1982; it was barely a Category 1 hurricane but winds in the Wahiawa area of Oahu equaled those in areas on Kaua'i, which was closest to the path of the storm. Meteorologists consider the notion that Mauna Loa and Mauna Kea "protect" Hawai'i Island from hurricanes to be unfounded. Waves and storm surges normally hit coasts ahead of high winds, as waves move faster than a hurricane advances. Locally intense rainfall may occur as the hurricane makes landfall.16 Thus hurricanes,though rare in Hawai'i, are complex hazards. 5.1.1 Coastal Wave/Surge Storm surge is the rise of water above sea level at the time of storm onset. The height of storm surge along the open coast depends on a number of factors, which include: (1) wind speed and associated barometric pressure, (2) depth of water or shoaling factor, (3) storm trajectory, and (4) speed of the storm. Coastal configuration in the form of estuaries or bays can cause a funneling or amplification effect. Coincidence with high tide will also increase surge height. Although the maximum surge usually affects only a relatively short length of coastline, combined storm surge and wave action may have damaging effects over the entire coastline facing a major storm center. Wind-driven waves on top of the storm surge pose a number of added problems. In Hawaii the wave run-up typically floods areas not reached by the surge itself. The scouring power of waves is considerable. The storm surge is the most dangerous part of a hurricane as pounding waves create very hazardous flood currents. About 90% of the deaths experienced in the past near the coast resulting from hurricanes are caused not by wind,but by storm surge. Stream flooding is also much worse inland during the storm surge because of backwater effects. 15 In the western Pacific,hurricanes are called"typhoons"; similar storms in the Indian Ocean are called"cy- clones". An organized system of clouds and thunderstorms with a defined circulation and maximum sus- tained winds of 38 mph or less is called a "tropical depression". An organized system of strong thunderstorms with a defined circulation and maximum sustained winds of 39 to 73 mph is called a"tropical storm". 16 Schroeder, Tom, 1993,"Hawaii Hurricanes: Their History, Causes, and Future," Office of State Planning, December 1993. 5-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones The duration of storm surge is usually relatively short,being dependent upon the elevation of the tide, which rises and falls twice daily in most coastal places and the speed of a storm's onset. In Hawaii, the high velocities of hurricane winds often produce wave heights higher than the maximum level of the prevailing high tide or of the surge itself. In studying the aftermath of Hurricane Iniki it was discovered by researchers at the Army Corps of Engineers and the University of Hawaii (Fletcher and others, 1994)that the greatest threat related to hurricane overwash in the Hawaiian Islands is due to water-level rise from wave forces rather than wind forces. This differs from the mainland where the wind in a hurricane is known to drive water against the coast and cause flooding, called wind set-up. During Iniki, the strongest component of the overwash was the result of large waves, called wave set-up. Wind set-up appeared to be relatively less important. Other factors leading to coastal overwash are the low atmospheric pressure, the tide stage, coastal topography, and the location relative to the eye of the hurricane. Overwash mitigation must be enacted prior to the event. This would include adequate building setbacks so that development does not occur in high hazard areas of the coastal zone, elevation of existing structures to recommended levels, break-way ground floor walls that permit overwash flooding without compromising an entire structure, and other coastal construction techniques designed to reduce flood damage. FEMA has incorporated hurricane inundation from model scenarios into a flood insurance study for all islands including Hawaii, as discussed in the section below. 5.1.1.1 Hurricane Flood Insurance Study for the Hawaiian Islands The Hurricane Flood Insurance Study for the Hawaiian Islands was conducted under FEMA contract number EMW-2003-CO-0046, RMTC/URS Task Order 013. Under this contract, RMTC/URS, a joint venture consisting of R.M. Towill, URS, Dewberry, TerraPoint, Airborne 1, and Sea Engineering, was tasked to evaluate and map the magnitude and extent of coastal hazards due to hurricanes for six Hawaiian Islands, divided into four counties: Kauai (Kauai County), Oahu (City and County of Honolulu), Molokai, Maui, Lanai (Maui County), and Hawaii (Hawaii County). Although the effective (i.e., past) FIRMs for each county have accounted for tsunami hazards, the hurricane flood hazard had not been previously separately evaluated in a comprehensive study throughout the islands. In general, the hurricane coastal hazard analysis was limited to the southern coast of each island. This is due to several factors, including the predominance of tsunami hazards and limited low-lying areas susceptible to hurricane hazards along the north shore of the islands. Table 5-1 provides a summary of study limits. 5-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Table 5-1. Summar•of Study Limits Island Western Limit Eastern Limit Reach Length (Miles) Hawaii Upotu Point Cape Kumukahi 193 Kauai Nohili Point Kuaehu Point 56 Lanai Katunalapau Manele 16 Maui Honokahua Bay Koali 69 Molokai Clio Point Cape Halaawa 54 Oahu Kaena Point Kawaihoa Point 60 Total: 448 Ksua� Dahu Molokai LanaiMaui Hawaii Figure 5-1. Extents of Hurricane storm surge inundation study Transects were laid-out within the study limits and representative placement was evaluated during the field reconnaissance performed from July 24th through August 6`h, 2007. The topographic base consisted of LiDAR collected under FEMA Task Orders 12 and 26. The LiDAR data were collected in the Fall of 2006, post-processed to bare earth and quality controlled to meet FEMA mapping standards. These data were assimilated together with the best available bathymetric datasets, including USACE hydrographic LiDAR, into high- resolution seamless digital elevation models. The hazard analysis considered the combination of storm surge and hurricane-induced wave hazards. This included independent analysis and/or modeling of storm surge, return frequency flood elevations, wave setup, overland wave hazards, and wave runup. The ADvanced CIRCulation model for coastal ocean hydrodynamics (ADCIRC) was selected to develop the stillwater elevations or storm surge for the study area. The Empirical Simulation 5-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Technique (EST), also developed by the USACE, was used to determine the stillwater frequency curves for the 10-, 2-, 1-, and 0.2-percent annual chance stillwater elevations. Deepwater wave conditions were determined using the Shore Protection Manual (SPM) prediction technique and limited fetch analyses were performed in harbor and sheltered areas. Wave setup was differentiated and evaluated for areas with and without fronting reefs. Areas of primary frontal dune were identified, delineated, and eroded. Overland wave propagation hazards were evaluated using the WHAFIS model. Wave obstructions were verified at representative transect locations by field reconnaissance. Wave run-up was evaluated using the RUNUP 2.0 and TAW methodologies, depending of the presence of reefs and local steepness of the bathymetry. Wave hazard analyses were conducted at FTS transect locations, in addition to more tightly- spaced"mapping transects." These additional transects were facilitated by the application of an integrated GIS toolset that automates repetitive modeling tasks, and enables a more detailed analysis than typical coastal FIS studies. Wave setup values were assigned to these transects according to analysis at adjacent FIS transects. Otherwise, the mapping transects were treated with the same overland wave propagation and wave runup assessments as the FTS transects. The coastal hazards determined from the above analyses were synthesized in the form of the standard FEMA special flood hazard boundaries for the Zone VE, Zone AE, Zone AO, and Zone X hazard areas. These are presented in the TSDN as workmaps produced at a scale of 1':500". The workmaps also include stillwater stations, topographic elevation contours, FIS and mapping transect locations, and the shoreline. Wave analysis for the 0.2% annual chance event was not included in the scope of the study. The 0.2% return frequency stillwater elevation was exceeded by cumulative flood elevation from the 1% stillwater elevation and wave setup, therefore, the boundary of the 0.2% annual chance event was not delineated. In steeper areas where mapping scale limits the gutter placement, the SFHAs are only identified by the position of the 100-yr flood boundary. Mapped Base Flood Elevations (BFEs) are considerably dependent to the topographic representation at each transect. As a result, localized variations in the topography at other locations may not be fully reflected in the mapped SFHAs and BFEs. A Technical Support Data Notebook (TSDN) was compiled for each county in the study area. Storm surge and return frequency elevation analyses were inclusive of all counties, and thus all materials pertaining to those analyses, including model input, output, and documentation are included in each county TSDN. The remainder of the data, including wave modeling, mapping, workmaps, topography, etc., are island and county specific. Therefore,these data are only presented in the appropriate countywide TSDN. Limitations of the study and need for evaluation prior to FIRM adoption: • There will need to be post-DFIRM modifications to the Flood Maps if tsunami inundation is to be any factor in zoning and construction requirements. 5-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones • Phase I: The first step is to compare the differences between the existing and new FIRM maps to determine where historic or the recently modeled tsunami hazard is greater. • Phase II: UHM SOEST mapping (by Kwok Fai Cheung) can produce 100-year and 500-year probabilisitic tsunami hazard maps to provide future local modifications to the DFIRMs. 5.1.2 High Winds The hazard from hurricane winds is far more extensive than the water hazard. Both ex- periencc and analyses indicate that certain locations will experience stronger winds. Hurricane winds, blowing from variable directions, will experience analogous variations. This orographic (or topographic) amplification is the reason a minimal hurricane such as Iwa can have significant wind effects. The NWS hurricane reports assume landfall at a flat Atlantic or Gulf coast state, and no amplification. Since wind forces increase proportionally to the wind speed squared, any amplification of the basic wind speed may significantly increase its effects. 5-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Table 5-2. Satlir Simpson Scale and damage potential Central Pressure Hurricane Sustained Fastest Peak Gust Approximate Mm of Sea level Mile Speed (over land) Storm Surge Damage Potential(with tropical Pacific amendments) Category mercury at 0 y�rtrd' mph mph Height(ft.) degrees C(32 Pressure degrees F) (inches) Tropical <40 mph <2 ft Virtually None. Some small dead limbs,ripe coconuts,and dead Depression (<64 1rrnMr) 0.61 m) <1008 <29.77 palm fi-ca ds m blown fia trees. Some(agile and tender green leaves (< blown firm trees such as papaya and Meshy broad leaf plants. 40-73 mph Some.Minor damage to buildings of light material. Moderate Tropical 2-3 ft damage to banana trees,papaya trees,and most fleshy crops. Large Storm 979-1007 28.91-29.74 (64- (0.61-0.91ni) dead limbs,ripe coconuts,many dead palm fronds,some green 117km/hr) leaves,and small branches blown fiam trees. Significant.Corrugated metal and plywood stripped from poorly constructed or termite-infested structures and may become airborne. Some damage to wood roofs.Major damage to banana trees,papaya 74-95 mph trees,and Ileshy crops. Some palm fronds tarn Hour the crowns of 1 980-992 28.94-29.30 (118-153 67-88 82-108 4-5 ft most types of paten trees,many ripe coconuts blown from coconut kmMr) (1.22-1.52m) palms. Some damage to poorly constructed signs.Wooden power poles tilt,some rotten power poles break,termite-weakened poles begin to snap. Low-lying coastal roads inundated,minor pier darnage,some small craft in exposed anchorage torn from moorings. Moderate. Considerable damage to structures made of light materials.Moderate damage to houses.Exposed banana trees and papaya trees totally destroyed,10%.-20%defoliation of trees and 96-110 mph shrubbcry. Many palm fronds crimped and bent through the clown 6-8 ft 2 965-979 28.50-28.91 (178-209 SS-I 10 108-13U f ococonut palms and several green fronds tipped hour palm trees; kin/hr) (1.83-2.44 in) some trees blown down.Weakened power poles snap.Considerable damage to piers;marinas flooded.Small craft in unprotected anchorages torn from moorings.Evacuation from some shoreline residences and low-lying areas required. Extensive.Extensive damage to houses mid small buildings;weakly constructed and termite-weakened house heavily datuaged or destroyed;buildings made of light materials destroyed;extensive damage to wooden structures.Major damage to shrubbery and trees; 111-131 9-12 ft up to 50%of palm fonds bent m blown off;numerous ripe and many 3 945-964 27'91 nnph 110-136 130-156 (274-3.66 green coconuts blown off coconut palms;crowns blown off of palm 28.47 (178-209 trees;up to 10%of coconut palms blown down;30%-5O% km/hr) m) defoliation of many trees and shrubs.Large trees blown dowm.Many wooden power poles broken or blown down;many secondary power lines downed.Air is frill of light projectiles and debris;poorly constructed signs blown down.Serious coastal flooding;larger structures near coast damaged by battering waves and floating debris. Extreme. Extreme structural damage;even well-built structures heavily damaged or destroyed;extensive damage to non-concrete failure of many roof structures,window frames and doors,especially unprotected,non-reinforced ones;well-built wooden and metal structures severely daniaged or destroyed.Shrubs and trees defoliated;up to 75%of palm fronds bent,twisted,or bloom off. 131-155 13-18 ft Many crowns stripped from paten trees;nunerous green and virtually 27.17- mph all ripe coconuts blo�nm from trees;severe damage to sugar cane; 4 920-944 P 136-16y 156-191 1296-5.4y 1 b 27.88 (210-249 large Gees blown down;bark stripped from trees;most standing trees km/hr) ui) are void of all but the largest branches(severely pruned),with remaining branches stubby in appearance;hunks and branches are sandblasted.Most wood poles downed/snapped;secondary and primary power lines downed.Air is full of large projectiles and debris.All signs blown down.Major damage to lower floors of stmctm-e,due to flooding and battering by waves and floating debris. Major erosion of beaches. Catastrophic. Building failures;extensive or total destruction to >155 mph norrcoricTete residences mid industrial buildings;devtxting damage >IS ft to roofs of buildings;total failure of non-concrete reinforced roofs. 5 <920 <27.17 (>250 (>5.49 on Severe damage to virtually all wooden poles;all secondary power km/hi) lines and most primary power lines downed.Small buildings overturned or blown away. 5.2 Significant Historical Events Little was recorded of hurricanes striking Hawaii before the last half of the 20th century. Since 1950, when adequate records began, eight hurricanes have affected the Hawaiian 5-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Islands and 12 others have posed a threat by their passage.17 The only documented hurricane before 1950 was the "Kohala Cyclone" of 1871 which was believed to be a minimal hurricane that affected Maui and Hawaii. The path of hurricanes can be quite variable and unpredictable as illustrated by Hurricane Iwa (see Figure 5-2). Table 5-3 below lists the significant hurricanes affecting the state of Hawaii since 1950 and Figure 5-3 shows the tracks of these hurricanes and tropical storms. Table 5-3. Significant Hurricanes Since 195018 Name Year Estimated Loss $ Effects Hiki 1950 200,000 flooding on Kauai Della 1957 high surf,Kaua i Nina 1957 100,000 high waves,Kauai Dot 1959 6,000,000 $150,000 on Oahu and Hawaii Fico 1978 180,000 East Hawaii Susan 1978 — Iwa 1982 312,000,000 Kauai and Oahu Iniki 1992 1,800,000,000 all islands 17 Haraguchi,Paul, 1984,"Hurricanes in Hawaii",report for U.S.Army Corps of Engineers,March 1984. 18 Hurricanes Dot,Iwa,and Tniki were the only storms that exhibited hurricane-force winds in the Hawaiian Islands;the others were rated as hurricanes by measurement from aircraft,away from land stations.Wave action from these storms may still affect the islands. 5-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones 25 06:00 Sep 12 959 mb Buoy 1 p 06:00 Nov 24 23:51 Nov 23 Kauai 969 mb 00:00+Oahu Sep 12 '"' Maui 18:29 Nov 23 945 mb e� 20 968 mb Hawaii Buoy 3 18:00 Sep 11 A 938 mb Z 12:00 Sep 11 N 940 mb Buoy 4 OBuoy 2 06:00 Sep 11 J 23:30 Nov 22 947 mb 964 mb 00:00 Sep 11 ` 948 mb 15 I 12:00 Sep 10 I 960 mb / 00:00 Sep 10 12:00 Sep 9 980 mb 992 mb / UTC 00:00 Sep 9,1992 / Iniki 996 mb UTC 00:00 Nov 20,1982 1000 mb Iwa 10170 165 160 155 150 Longitude(W) Figure 5-2. Track of Hurricane Iwa and Iniki(Cheung,K.F.2003) 1 1 1 Tracks of Central Pacific Hurricames from 1949 to 1998 I z Calegary 1 1 r Category 3 + Tr_^rw rds aldt F �hh e�lk AUGUST MEAN COOLER wh +4 7 UGEAN WATER<e*F 4AP4 4� � 4L1f4US1:KIEA�+ AUGUST MEAN WARMER DCEAN WATER>STF -46K i y;r i 7,f 1d0' 1'JG' 110' Figure 5-3. Historic Central Pacific hurricane tracks 5-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones 2Q Contra] Pacific Hurricane Occurrence n , All hurricanes Hurricanes?category 3 4 Month Figure 5-4. Central Pacific Hurricane Occurrences by month 5.3 Probability of Occurrence The Saffir-Simpson Scale classifies the potential severity of hurricanes. However, this scale may not fully address the risk for mountainous Pacific islands such as Hawaii. The Saffir- Simpson Scale was developed for flat coastal areas with a continental shelf where the winds over the land diminish relatively quickly accompanied by heavy rain. In Hawaii,the variable topography accelerates the winds in certain areas such that one area may be receiving wind speeds at a tropical storm level,while another area may be receiving hurricane-force winds. The number of tropical cyclones in the Central Pacific varies from none to ten annually, and few develop beyond the intensity of a tropical storm. The Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund (HHRF), originally established after Iniki induced insurance companies to drop coverage in Hawaii, produced several studies on the probability of this hazard (including Applied Research Associates, 2001).19 (Other studies by Peterka & Chock have been concerned with estimating hurricane effects through Monte Carlo simulation models and analysis of topographic effects.) 5.3.1 Probabilistic Hazard Analysis and Scenario Simulations Studies sponsored by the NASA Office of Earth Science and the HHRF have developed new models for estimating the long-term probabilities of Pacific hurricanes. As of 2002, a much improved methodology was used by Peterka in Windspeed Mapping of Hawaii and Pacific 19 Applied Research Associates(ARA),2001,"Hazard Mitigation Study for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund"(incorporates part of FEMA-sponsored Iniki Building Performance Report),December 2001. 5-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Insular States by Monte Carlo Simulation, to establish design hurricane windspeeds for individual islands reflecting their differential hazard. While Hawaii Island has not had a direct hit by a hurricane, the Peterka model sponsored by NASA indicates that Hawaii Island has a long-term hurricane hazard higher than the other islands (see Figure 5-5 and Table 5-4). However, the ASCE 7-2010 Standard accepts the ARA model which has approximately uniform wind hazard across all islands of the State (Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7). Topographic effects are reflected in the Hawaii State Building Code. The effective wind speed map of Figure 5-8 shows this effect of speed-up relative to a code design reference windspeed of 105 mph. 30 10 20 -170 -160 -150 -140 -130 -120 -110 -100 Figure 5-5. Eastern and Central Pacific Hurricane frequency map.Contours show number of times a hurricane (intensity>64 knots)passes within 75 Nmi per 10 years. (Peterka,2002) Table 5-4. Hurricane Winds peed vs.Recurrence Interval and Modern-Da•ASCE Design Speed, Peak Gust 10 m Peterka Peterka HHRF study Peterka Open Country Uhue Oahu Hawaii Average Hilo Exposure in mph 50-year 75 80 66 96 100-year 90 95 87 114 500-year 128 134 122 150 5.3.2 ASCE 7-10 The ASCE 7-10 standard will formally designate Hawaii as a Special Wind Region where the authorities having jurisdiction (State and Counties) shall establish the effects of topography on the basic wind speed. C6.5.4.1 Special Wind Regions. Although the wind speed map of Fig. 6-1 in ASCE 7 is valid for most regions of the country, there are special regions in which wind speed anomalies are known to exist. Winds blowing over mountain ranges or through gorges or 5-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones river valleys in these special regions can develop speeds that are substantially higher than the values indicated on the default map. The Hawaii State Building Code provides maps showing the net effect of such topography. 185 180 175 174 170 165 10 1 160 15.5 150 145 X43 140 135 130 Peak Gust 120 Windspeed 115 13 (mph) 110 10.5 100 ss 50 1 P51/ i 85 80 75 70 65 67 60 55 50 45 40 Governed Governed by Hurricanes 3o by slorms zs 20 15 10 5 0 10 100 1000 10000 Years Figure 5-6. Wind speed recurrence intervals for Hawaii(from ASCE 7-2010 Standard) '1'.4RLR C6-2 APPROXIMATE.RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WIND SPEEDS IN ASCE 7 10 AND SAFFIR/SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE Sat'15r/Simpson Sustained Wind Gust Wind Speed Over Gust Wind Speed Hurricane Speed Over Water" Water" Over Land` Category Mph (eu/s) mph (m/s) mph (eu/s) 1 74-95 33-43 87-111 39-50 81-105 36-47 2 96-110 44-49 112-129 51-58 106-121 48-54 3 111-134) 54-58 130-152 59-68 122-143 55-64 4 131-155 59-69 153-181 69-81 144-171 65-76 5 >155 >69 >181 >81.0 >171 >76 "I-minure average wind speed at 33 ft(0 m)above open water -.second rst wind.speed at 33 ft(10 m)above open water `3-second gust wind speed at 33 R f 1 m)above open ground in Exposwc Category C.This column has the same basis(avcragmg nme„heigh4 and exposure)as the basic wind spcud fiom Fig.6-1. Figure 5-7. ASCE 7-10 relationship between Saflir/Simpson category and wind speed 5-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Effective Wind Speed for the Island of Hawaii (For Components and Cladding with Mean Roof Height not geater than 100ft) District Boundary Land use CONTOUR Major Road 0 Agriculture ------ g0 Conservation 100 Rural ---------- 110 ••. .' �� ............' Urban —120 —_ -- -130 140 _ — ---150 —160 - _ �J _�• j r:.- --170 180 `-.1-: I r U I I / 1�1 l i i ...... I .1 N f � / 0 5 10 20 Mik+,. I I Figure 5-8. Effective wind speed map(mph)for Hawaii Island(Chock,2007) 5.4 Risk Assessment Average Annualized Loss (AAL) is an objective measure of future losses averaged on an annual basis. This information can be very useful in assessing the relative contributors to total natural hazard losses. Formula Expression: AAL=Y Li x Pi Li—Estimated Loss for Event i Pi—Annual Probability of Event i 5-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Description: Sum of the expected loss for each event (i.e., sum of the products of the estimated loss from each event and that event's rate of occurrence) A tool used to calculate AAL due to tropical cyclones is the HAZUS MH model. The wind speed recurrence intervals used by the HAZUS model are calculated based on the probability of tropical cyclone impacts, and high winds resulting from other effects (Kona Storms, high trade winds, etc.) are not specifically accounted for. Although the recurrence interval of these non-cyclonic wind storms is high, perhaps several storms per year, the magnitude of the winds and associated losses are generally small therefore it can be generally assumed that these storms will not contribute significantly to the AAL calculated for tropical cyclones. Based on a HAZUS AAL analysis incorporating Hawaii Construction Cost Data, tropical cyclone AAL is about $69 million in Hawaii County. The predominant contributor to loss is single-family residential construction. County Hawaii County Tropical Cyclone AAL $69 million per year The HAZUS model can also be used to determine probabilities of varying degrees of damage to site specific facilities. To determine AAL, HAZUS computes losses, Li, for seven earthquake scenario events with different return periods (1/exceedance probability): 10-year, 20-year, 50-year, 100-year, 200-year, 500-year, and 1000-year. The Probability versus Loss Curve is approximated through curve fitting, and the area under the fitted curve is integrated to obtain the AAL results. A risk assessment has been conducted for essential facilities in Hawaii County. From this analysis the facilities were ranked based on their expected losses and loss of functionality. 5.5 Mitigation Strategies 5.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts 5.5.1.1 Construction Standards As described in Chapter 4, the design vintage can be used as an indicator of a buildings susceptibility to wind damage. Design wind pressures, typical construction type (single or double wall), and use of hurricane uplift resistance can all be determined by the year built based on the corresponding version of the UBC or IBC in effect at the time. Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 provide statistics of the number of homes built under each version of the UBC and their probable uplift resistance. Most existing homes have no hurricane mitigation 5-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Table 5-5. Wood frame,double wall,residential construction statistics for Hawaii County Hawaii County(Double Wall Construction) Effective Date Year of UBC Hurricane Tie Requirement Number of Residences February 8,1962 1961 None 648 April 17,1968 1967 None 194 August 8,1972 1970 None 1416 41%Without Roof Strap February 25,1975 1973 None 1065 December 11,1978 1976 None 2600 January 19,1985 1982 None 5010 December,1993 1991 UBC Appendix Load Path 12126 59%With Roof Strap July,1999 1994 UBC Appendix Load Path 3759 Total= 26818 Table 5-6. Wood frame,single wall,residential construction statistics for Hawaii County Hawaii County (Single Wall Construction) Effective Date Year of UBC Hurricane Tie Requirement Number of Residences February 8, 1962 1961 None 8723 April 17, 1968 1967 None 2109 August 8, 1972 1970 None 2471 91%Without Roof Strap February 25,1975 1973 None 931 December 11, 1978 1976 None 1088 January 19, 1985 1982 None 1378 December, 1993 1991 UBC Appendix Load Path 1271 9%With Roof Strap July, 1999 1994 UBC Appendix Load Path 293 Total—1 18264 5.5.1.1.1 Windborne Debris Protection Hawaii is considered a windborne debris region per the ASCE 7 standard; this requires additional measures for basic windborne debris protection, and also special cases where even higher strength of enhanced glazing protection (such as health care and large assisted living facilities,public assembly, and essential and emergency response facilities) is further defined in the building code. In previous versions of ASCE 7 it was permitted, if the basic windborne debris protection was not provided, to design the building for the additional internal wind pressure resulting from window breakage. That internal pressure can raise the forces on structural and cladding components by as much as 100%higher (double). The current ASCE 7-05 does not allow for unprotected opening of buildings located within the windborne debris region, it simply states: 5-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Glazing in buildings located in wind-borne debris regions shall be protected with an impact resistant covering or be impact-resistant glazing according to the requirements specified in ASTM E1886 and ASTM E1996 or other approved test methods and performance criteria. The levels of impact resistance shall be a function of Missile Levels and Wind Zones specified in ASTM E1886 and ASTM E1996. EXCEPTIONS: 1. Glazing in Category Il, III, or IV buildings located over 60 ft (18.3 m) above the ground and over 30 ft (92 m) above aggregate surface roofs located within 1,500 ft (458 m) of the building shall be permitted to be unprotected. 2. Glazing in Category I buildings shall be permitted to be unprotected. The Hawaii State Building code allows for the construction of a safe room in residential construction in lieu of the windborne debris protection requirements. This essentially reinstates the previous versions of the ASCE 7 where unprotected glazing is allowed in a windborne debris region although, it must be considered as an opening when determining the enclosure classification. 5.5.1.2 Utilities Damaged or destroyed utility lines and facilities — including electricity, computer and satellite links, gas sewer, and water services — can cripple a region after a disaster. Power lines are often badly damaged or destroyed resulting in the loss of power for days, weeks or even months as in the case of Hurricane Iniki. In addition to basic modern household appliances being affected, public water supplies, water treatment and sewage facilities can also be impacted. Electric pumps cannot pump drinking water into an area without power. Disaster victims who do get water may have to boil it to eliminate waterborne pathogens introduced to the supply in breached areas. Electrical transmission and distribution lines have been particularly susceptible to failure in previous hurricanes, with 30% of the wooden power distribution poles and 26% of transmission poles on Kauai failing during Hurricane Iniki. This has resulted in periodic updates to the design criteria for these poles. The most recent design criteria were adopted by the State Public Utility Commission as Hawaii Administrative Rules 6-13, and are based on the 2002 National Electrical Safety Code which references the ASCE 7 wind load criteria. While this would an improvement to the local design standards it does not incorporate the latest Hawaii specific wind design criteria. It is recommended that the future mitigation project should further update the transmission and distribution line design criteria to incorporate the Hawaii specific wind design criteria and utilize the effective wind speed maps that account for topographical, directionality and local exposure. Procedures should be implemented to assure the adoption of the new standards so that when a power pole fails and is replaced, the replacement should meet the current standards. 5-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones 5.5.1.3 Wind Speed-Up and Structure Type Vulnerabilities Structures are designed to withstand specified wind forces in accordance with the prevailing building code. Wind design pressures have changed over the years in the Uniform Building Code (UBC), increasing from 15 psf(1958-79) to 26.5 psf(1982-88) to 30 psf(1991-97).20 Hawaii County did not adopt the 1982 UBC until 1985, thus any structures built prior to 1985 are designed to an inadequate wind pressure. Subsequent to Iniki (1992), Hawaii County required hurricane ties for single-family construction with the adoption of the 1991 UBC in 1993. To identify vulnerable single-family housing stock, the suggested benchmark year would be thus 1993. The local Hawaii County building code is based on the 1991 UBC and does not take into account topographically induced local wind acceleration which could produce significant directional sensitivity at a given site. The wind speed-up effects arc now reflected in the Hawaii State Building Code, which needs to be adopted by the County of Hawaii per Hawaii Revised Statute Chapter 107,Part II. 5.5.1.4 Critical Facilities Study An all-hazard screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii has been conducted and a HAZUS MH risk assessment model created to evaluate the expected losses for each building. Two facilities that rank high based on these analyses were evaluated in more detail such that recommended mitigation procedures were developed. A Benefit-Cost Analysis of the mitigation project construction funding was performed. This detailed evaluation will provide the information necessary to submit a PDM grant application for feasible retrofit project. 5.5.1.5 State Building Adoption/Requirements for Hurricane Resistance The 2006 International Building Code will soon be adopted by all Counties in the State of Hawaii through the recently developed State Building code, which each county must adopt by new state legislation after a grace period that is intended to allow development of any specific requirements a particular county may desire. The state building code is intended to ensure regular updates of the building codes and uniformity between the counties. One significant aspect of the adoption of the upcoming adoption of 2006 IBC statewide is the consideration of windborne debris protection for any glazing lower than 60 feet above the ground level in buildings located in a windborne debris region. Hawaii is considered a windborne debris region and consequently the IBC requires impact protection of the glazing. In lieu of glazing protection, the 2003 iBC allows any unprotected glazing in to be considered as openings and consequently the building must be designed for internal pressurization. This provision is omitted from the 2006 IBC for buildings in wind debris 20 "The 1982 to 1997 UBC values were predicated on an 80 mph basic fastest-mile windspeed, approximately equivalent to a 95 mph 3-second peak gust. The 3-second peak gust is the wind parameter now used in American Society of Civil Engineers 7 (ASCE-7),Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Struc- tures, which forms the basis for the International Building Code (IBC). The 3-second gust windspeed standard now established in the IBC is 105 mph statewide, which is slightly greater than the UBC- equivalent 95 mph 3-second gust. Hurricane Hazard Advisory from the Hawaii Multihazard Science Advisory Committee to the State Hazard Mitigation Forum,draft December 2002. 5-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones regions. However, risk analyses found that the benefits of providing windborne debris protection for all glazing did not exceed the costs for the relatively low hurricane hazard in Hawaii. Therefore, the state building code amendments to the 2006 IBC provide designers with flexibility in allowing Occupancy Category II buildings and some Occupancy Category ITT buildings (not healthcare or high occupancy facilities) to be designed with unprotected glazing provided they are designed for the internal pressurization. If a residential building is not provided with glazing protection then it must have a residential safe room installed which does have appropriate glazing protection and must satisfy other structural and non-structural criteria. Public hurricane shelters must also satisfy these criteria. Where used, debris protection for glazing may be in the form of a transparent protective film, on the exterior surface or between glazing layers in laminated glass. Alternatively, window shutters, precut removable plywood panels or another system may be used. Any protective film or other system must undergo testing based on ASTM E 1996 to verify the required level of protection. The University of Hawaii has recently started operation of a wind cannon capable of testing strengthened windows and other debris protective devices to the ASTM standard. This is intending to increase the local availability of products and ultimately reduce the cost of providing windbome debris protection to the glazed areas of a structure. Plywood Shutter Tests Because the HHRF plywood shutter design had not been tested against any of the three windborne debris standards discussed in Section 6.1.1, Applied Research Associates contracted with Dr. Timothy Reinhold of the Wind Load Test Facility at Clemson University to perform exploratory missile impact and pressure resistance tests on six HHRF storm panels. Although it was not feasible to conduct the cyclic loading tests specified in the ASTM standard, the tests did provide valuable information in the impact resistance and ultimate pressure resistance of the HHRF panels. The largest missile specified by ASTM, SBCCI, and the SFBC standards is a 9-pound 2x4 piece of lumber. The missile is projected at the test object using an air canon and strikes the test object end on, perpendicular to the surface. For residential buildings, the missile impact speed specified for regions with the highest design wind speeds in the US is 50 feet per second (34 mph) in all three standards. In order for a product to pass the test, the SFBC impact standard allows no penetration of the protective system while the SBCCI and ASTM standards do allow penetration, provided the hole is small enough to prevent a 3 inch sphere from passing through the hole. The SBCCI and ASTM standards include smaller (lighter) missiles in regions with lower design wind speeds. For gust speeds between 110 and 130 mph, the ASTM standard requires that shutters resist a 4.5-pound 2x4 at 40 feet per second (27 mph). Since Hawaii has a basic design wind speed of 105 mph (gust) in ASCE 7-98, the design speed falls just below the light missile standard. Consequently, impact protection systems for Hawaii would need at most according to current standards)to resist the impact of a 4.5-pound 2x4 traveling at 40 feet pet- second (27 mph). This impact momentum corresponds to that of a 9-pound 2x4 traveling at 20 feet per second(12 mph). All tests were conducted using a 9-pound 2x4. In addition to the straight-on missile impact tests, tests were also conducted with missiles impacting at an oblique angle of 45 degrees. 5-17 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones The test standards also include testing of the panel system for 9000 cycles of pressure fluctuations, of various magnitudes up to the design pressure, after the panel has been subjected to the missile impacts. The tests performed at Clemson University primarily focused on the missile impact portion of the test procedure. Additional tests were conducted where the panels were subjected to uniform wind pressures using air bags or a vacuum chamber. The bulk of these tests were performed to determine the pressure at which the panel would break or be sucked off the wall system. In these tests, the pressures were monotonically increased until failure occurred in the fastening system or to one of the bracing members. Two additional tests were performed using the 6-foot by 6-foot 8-inch sliding glass door protection system to determine the deflection as pressure was increased that pushed the panel against the opening. Two panels were tested for each thickness of plywood and for three sizes of openings (2-foot by 4-foot, 3-foot by 5-foot, and 6-foot by 6-foot 8-inches). Generally, the missile impacts caused localized punching shear failures and it was possible to impact a single panel with multiple missiles. The overall observation is that the shutter systems are adequate to provide protection from the 8-pound 2x4 missile traveling at 27 mph since the threshold for penetration is slightly higher than 24 mph with the 9-pound 2x4 missile. At 24 mph, localized damage to the cross members and indentation of the panel was the rule. There were a couple of instances where a 9-pound missile penetrated at 24 mph, however these were relatively rare. There was a marginal increase in resistance for the 5/8-inch thick sheathing as opposed to the 1/2-inch sheathing. The increase was generally on the order of 1 to 2 mph in missile speed for penetration. The 5/8-inch sheathing did seem to perform better than the 1/2-inch sheathing when subjected to the missile impacts at 45 degrees. The missile bounced off the 5/8-inch sheathing more often than for the 1/2-inch sheathing. In general, 9-pound missiles penetrated the panels at speeds between 25 and 28 mph. The performance of the panels subjected to oblique angle impacts seemed to depend to some extent on whether the missile impacted with the long edge (3-1/2 inch)oriented vertically or horizontally. Local damage to the lx') lumber used at the laps between the plywood sheets was common if impact occurred on the 1x3 and fasteners withdrew or the 1x3 split when the impact occurred near the W. The screws connecting the lx3s to the panels were fairly short and provided only minimal penetration into the plywood sheathing. In summary, the 1/2-inch and 5/8-inch shutters both clearly provide substantial protection from missile impacts associated with a 4.5-pound 2x4 missile and essentially are very close to completely rejecting impacts of an 8-pound 2x4 traveling at 40 feet per second (27 mph). Based on these test results, we conclude that the HHRF protective panels should be an adequate level of protection against windborne debris provided that they are properly constructed and installed. Pressure cycling tests should be conducted to ensure that the anchor design meets the full ASTM standard. Each test specimen is required to receive two such impacts followed by cyclic pressure loading similar to that experience under hurricane conditions. The glazing was required to resist the pressure loading with no crack forming longer than five inches through which air could pass or with no opening forming which a three-inch diameter sphere could pass. 5-18 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones 5.5.2 Future Plans Recommended future hurricane hazard mitigation projects are listed below: Project Description Status Adopt IBC 2006 per HRS 107 Part II; High Windspeed areas are now Not effective for new Identify high windspeed areas and mapped,and have been adopted in construction until county vulnerable structures the State Building Code(2009 adopts IBC 2006;can be used to evaluate risk to existing buildings Adapt HAZUS-MH or other hazard Incorporate Hawaii building Proposed Planning Project; modeling to Hawaii Island inventory and critical facilities into The HAZUS model now has the HAZUS MH wind risk model. a realistic building inventory Hurricanes will cause much higher for Hawaii and Maui,but it losses than earthquakes to residential needs to be converted to the buildings;vulnerable structures can building modeling scheme be identified with respect to high used for hurricane analysis. wind zones Emergency shelter evaluation;Harden Perform a 1-year study to identify Proposed Project; public schools for emergency shelters. and rank Hawaii building types that Then follow-up with the more There is a shortage of shelter buildings in could be deemed safer for hurricane detailed DAGS-standardized Hawaii County. Of the 14 hurricane resistance without exhaustive site structural evaluation shelters on the island,only four shelters investigations. Use this screening procedure for those public have been evaluated for safety by DAGS: criteria to determine the number of shelter facilities that have • Holualoa E.S. low vulnerability buildings available higher vulnerability,taking • Waikoloa E.S.bldg D for refuge in the private sector. This into account the revised net • Waikoloa E.S.bldg E could result in a decrease in the shelter demand. • Konawaena E.S. number of persons that would report Perform a comprehensive screening to a public shelter. evaluation of public hurricane shelters and private sector buildings for possible use for refuge Hawaii County All-Hazard Assessment of The three to four facilities with the Proposed Project: Hurricane Shelters highest-ranked losses will be taken This detailed evaluation will This project will conduct onsite building to a detailed evaluation using Benefit be identifying priority construction as-built data collection for the Cost Analysis of potential mitigation buildings and providing the remaining 10 hurricane shelter buildings, measures. information necessary to using the more detailed DAGS- submit PDM grant standardized structural evaluation applications for three to four procedure that follows the criteria retrofit projects. established by the legislature Hardening of Waiakea High School Gym Waiakea High School Gym is a Last proposed for FY09 PDM Window,Door&Enclosure Retrofitting designated hurricane shelter,but has grant. Application requires Possible Roof&Framing connection glass doors and glass louvers further investigation to define retrofitting.When re-roofing a critical precise scope and cost,as facility,provide extra protection from well as developing the BCA water damage,check and refasten the roof sheathing. 5-19 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•5:Hazard Analysis—Tropical Cyclones Project Description Status Hawaii Residential Safe Room Requirements for room construction NOAA and DBEDT features are given in the State sponsored research project to Building Code;effective by 2011 for develop and test wall those homes that do not provide assemblies rated for safe glazing windbome debris protection. room use. Hurricane Storm Surge Study(2008) Funded by FEMA for updating the Completed flood zones in the DFIRM on south and west coast Provide higher-grade poles for electrical PUC and utility to adopt use of Proposed Project distribution Hawaii topographic windspeeds for use with the National Electric Safety Code. Develop a Hurricane Loss Estimation . Expected hurricane risk levels Proposed Project: The Model(HLEM)software available for (i.e.,expected loss as a function of HLEM could provide Hawaii State and County planning return period)could be technically validated input on including state-of-the-art regionally- determined for a geocoded hurricane hazard and validated storm windfield modeling and building inventory database using vulnerability pertinent to tracking,topographic speedup modeling, the wind hazard analysis by State and County agencies. terrain category and building inventory Peterka combined with the Chock databases defined with detailed spatial topographic wind and building resolution,and regional building damage damage model. The Average and loss functions. State-of-the-art Annualized Losses due to could hurricane loss estimation requires be then calculated windstorms for regionally-validated storm windfield individual communities to modeling and tracking,topographic determine their risk relativity speedup modeling,terrain category and factors.This would allow an building inventory databases defined with objective ranking of hurricane risk detailed spatial resolution,and regional for regions or areas(such as building damage and loss functions. The census tract groupings),taking two NASA-sponsored projects have into account hurricane developed the core computational probabilities,site-specific wind components of what could be developed environment,and the building into Hurricane Loss Estimation Model inventory existent in each study (HLEM)software available for Hawaii region. State and County planning. Hurricane/MMS Upgrade for Hawaii Include the unique topographic wind USCOE-sponsored project for effects into the output of the model 2011 used as a tool for emergency response/evacuation decision- making,to allow identification of the topographically amplified wind speeds for any defined cyclone scenario. 5-20 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 6. Landslides and Rock Falls Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls CHAPTER 6 - LANDSLIDES AND ROCK FALLS 6.1 Description of Hazard Landslides are one of the natural processes of erosion resulting from mass transfer, the movement of material down the side of slopes under the influence of gravity. Mass transfer may also occur as falling, sliding or rolling of individual rocks or rock fragments,washing of loose materials by rain runoff and soil creep. Although gravity is the primary reason for landslides, other naturally occurring factors include: • Erosion by rivers or ocean waves creating over steepened slopes; • Rock and soil slopes that are weakened through saturation by heavy rain and runoff, • Stress created by earthquakes; • High winds uprooting trees along steep slopes. Human made causes of landslides may include grading, terrain cutting and filling and devel- opment on hillsides or excessive slopes. Landslides can occur on any sloping terrain given the right conditions of soil, moisture and the angle of slope. This ongoing process is generally slow and rarely noticeable. Occasionally landslides will occur in a spectacular rush or an abrupt collapse, often triggered by another natural hazard such as an earthquake or flooding. 6.1.1 Hazard Areas Areas that may be considered prone to landslides may include the following: • On existing old landslides • On or at the base of slopes • In or at the base of minor drainage hollows • At the base or top of an old fill slope • At the base or top of a steep cut slope • Developed hillsides where leach field septic systems are used.2t Roadcuts and other altered or excavated areas of slopes are particularly susceptible to debris flows and abrupt collapse. Several areas along the Hamakua Coast are chronic problem areas particularly during periods of heavy rainfall. In addition, the three major gulches Maulua, Laupahoehoe and Kaawalii, which are known for the "horseshoe" turns on State Highway 19, present rock fall problems. The rock fall problems arise during times of heavy rain as well as strong winds which sway the trees along the walls of the gulch back and forth and loosen the dirt and rocks underneath it. Homes that are built along the edge of the Hamakua coast cliffs are also susceptible to abrupt collapse particularly during times of heavy rainfall. These cliffs along the northeast coast of Mauna Kea range in height from 50 to 350 feet. The sea cliffs are eroded through a continu- ous process of wave action at the base of the cliff which cuts a notch and undermines the 21 USGS Fact Sheet FS-071-00 6-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls higher section of the cliff which eventually collapses and drops off. A photograph taken following a landslide caused by the Kiholo Bay earthquake is shown in Figure 6-1. r Figure 6-1. Massive coastal escarpment landslides into the ocean,Hamakua Coast (Photograph courtesy of Hawaii Civil Defense Agency) 6-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls Figure 6-2. Examples or earthquake-induced rock falls causing road hazard or closure 6.2 Significant Catastrophic Events Giant catastrophic slides have occurred around the major Hawaiian Islands thousands of years ago. At least 15 giant landslides have been identified by United States Geological Survey (USGS)marine scientist with the most recent occurring approximately 100,000 years ago off the Kona coast. Each of these slides has resulted in huge land losses to the islands and resulted in large waves that have carried rocks and sediments as high as 1000 feet above sea level. Although these giant landslides have the potential for enormous loss of life, property and resources, these events are infrequent in human terms, occurring perhaps once every few tens of thousands of years. (USGS,Volcano Watch, 1997) The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) suggests that we should not be overly concerned about the giant landslides because they are so infrequent (once every few tens of thousands of years) and because"we can do virtually nothing to mitigate such gigantic slides and tsunami- except to follow evacuation routes predetermined by Civil Defense and hope that the tsunami is not too high." (USGS Volcano Watch, 1997) "Worrying realistically means directing our limited resources to the hazardous events most likely to occur-the ones whose effects we now have the ability to mitigate through education and foresight." (USGS Volcano Watch, 1997) A significant landslide mentioned in historical times is a mudflow triggered by the largest earthquake in recorded history in April, 1868. The mudflow killed 31 people in Wood Valley in the Ka'u district. No other landslide event has been mentioned as resulting in any loss of life. 6-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls 6.3 Probability of Occurrence Landslides and rock falls typically occur as a result of another hazard or force of nature, and due to the multitude of forces that may cause landslides and rock falls assigning or calculating the return period of events of a destructive magnitude would be extremely difficult. However, it is possible to determine areas that have a higher potential of risk for such events as was done in a study was conducted by URS. In this study a conceptual level slope risk map was prepared, using an adaptation of the slope hazard methodology given in the FEMA 2007 HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual. The approach involved the interactions of three primary slope hazard input criteria simplified to low, medium and high hazard susceptibility, described below: Topography: A high resolution slope map of the entire island is composed of recent aerial, lidar and satellite 10m DEM topographic survey data from USGS and FEMA sources. Slope criteria are categorized as: 1. <20degreees (low hazard susceptibility) 2. <20-40 degrees (medium hazard susceptibility) 3. >40 degrees (high hazard susceptibility) Geologic groups: Soil and rock categories assigned based upon strength and susceptibility to landslide was derived from existing UDSA NCRS surface maps and USGS geologic maps. Adapted geologic group assignments for the Island of Hawaii include: 1. shallow rock, fresh volcanics (low hazard susceptibility) 2. clay surficial soils,weathered rock (medium hazard susceptibility) 3. weak soft soils, ash deposits, mapped historic slide talus (high hazard susceptibility) In addition, URS interpreted historic Hawaii DOT landslide locations, as medium hazard for locations with preliminary FHWA Rockfall Hazard Rating System (RHRS) of less than 200 and high hazard for locations with preliminary RHRS values greater than 200. 6-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls / l LOW MEDIUM HIGH x- N!"\.x,w, SLOPE HAZARDS . nw....... G-�--i- ttG�JJJ�� SURFICIAL GEOLOGY r c sn.Iio.xat �an�P..0 Awoy..bp.xl XISTORIG XAZAROS vw�x.ea.e ao.tuw.a.uu .bpx.ua ]xy.N.ua.YydN��Y - Grs.P..'...M X\ale hax+nui MMLD.iM\1MI�\� may.rsx x..�lml mmuwe. xmY Figure 6-3. Slope hazards and soil types on Hawaii Island Soil moisture: The HAZUS MH4 slope hazard methodology considers soil moisture as either wet or dry, with wet soils posing increased slope hazard. Soil moisture assignments are derived from recent NOAA rainfall mapping of the island since regional groundwater and soil moisture data is unavailable island wide. Areas receiving greater than 2000 mm annual precipitation are considered wet soil, corresponding largely to the windward side of the island. In addition, coastal areas below elevation 200' are considered wet due to potential groundwater seepage gradients from higher elevations, except in the and Kona coast areas. 6-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls oa.a u w p, ocean saiaw..aw.r coaem� a ®rw xa.a rTpxm•.,e Figure 6-4. Precipitation and groundwater condition on Hawaii Island • HAZUS-MH MR4 provides susceptibility categories combining slope angle, soil type and soil moisture in ten categories (I to X), with an assigned yield acceleration to each category. The combined susceptibility categories when mapped thus represent zones of potential landslide triggering under different levels of ground shaking. • The ten HAZUS risk zones were converted to polygon shape files and mapped to census blocks/tracts, with an interface to Geodatabase (NAD83) so that HAZUS SHAKEMAP runs will then interpret triggering criteria and assign a triggered or non triggered assessment for a given earthquake scenario, and then incorporate loss estimates with other HAZUS estimate modules. 6-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls —WK— K, 411 :Y �� � ..• r f F% Pacllle O.sen Figure 6-5. Landslide susceptibility map of Hawaii Island HAMS assigned landslide sucscepibility categories for the Island of Hawaii.This figures is a conglomerate of spatially assigned topography,geology and soilo mostures relationships with superimposed mapped historical landslides 6.4 Risk Assessment The random nature of landslide and rock fall events presents a difficult challenge in assessing the risk in relation to other hazards that occur at more probabilistic intervals. As discussed in the previous section the HAZUS Earthquake model incorporates potential losses due to landslides into its economic loss predictions. Currently there is no way of quantifying the total risk of landslides and rock falls due to other hazards such as heavy rain and coastal erosion, other than history. 6-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls 6.5 Mitigation Strategies 6.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts The State Department of Transportation tries to address the landslide and rock fall problems through their maintenance budget. The more chronic problem areas will require additional CIP (Capital Improvement Project) funding that has not been provided to date; although landslide events are a concern for our roadways, utilities and structures, and data is available regarding the frequency and severity of these events. Discussions with State and County highway maintenance agencies have yielded only anecdotal information regarding landslide problem areas. Rockfall protection projects have been conducted along stretches of Hawaii Belt Road. Figure 6-6 illustrates locations where historic landslides have impacted major roadways in Hawaii County. Legend Slope Hazards _ - Historic Landslides Other Roads Major Roads ORTH KONA NQRT KONI LIf }t\ ! souTH t HAMAKUA : SOU HILO y ORTH KONA ' SO KONA NORTH HILOi. � Y PUNA�J '1 OUTH KONA I Figure 6-6. Map of historic landslide locations impacting major roads Individual homeowners are attempting to address the problem of the collapse of the Hamakua Coast sea cliffs by reinforcing the cliff sides and anchoring their structures. Additional information is needed to assess these efforts and to determine adequate setbacks for future construction. 6-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 6:Hazard Analysis—Landslides and Rock Falls 6.5.2 Future Plans Improving the landslide susceptibility map: Project Description Status New UH study is to generate GIS maps are included,which To start in 2010,completion potential slope stability hazard could be used for prioritization of subsequent to this hazard maps which could be used to investigations as well as assessment mitigation plan update identify zones that may warrant tools for earthquake preparedness. further detailed evaluation during UH will take the URS'information project planning. from the landslide-potential map to develop 2nd generation maps that will identify priority criteria and critical areas for more detailed study(e.g.,road cuts and lifelines). • Subdivide the island into subtracts for slope hazards to allow practical use of more slope susceptibility categories giving greater resolution. Digital file sizes limited the island wide mapping to 3 slope angle categories. Resolution of the final mapping varies from layer to layer due to disparate data sources. The scale of the 17" x 22" map is 1:333,732. • Refine key slope areas, colluvium, debris flows and poor soils intersect w/boring data and shear strike measurements (field and from maps). • Refine soil wetness map with well and groundwater model data. • Incorporate final HDOT RHRS data. • Validate estimated generalized allowable slope angle relationship for local fractured/weathered basalts, soils, and ash with lab testing. • Incorporate more detailed offshore submarine slope modeling. • Incorporate more detailed USGS slope modeling with: • Simple rigid block deformation modeling(Newmark)using shallow friction behavior of basalts and andesites, ignoring soil strength. • Assigning spatial probability& susceptibility by event • Mapping of critical accelerations using Factor of Safety contours. • Consider inaccessible damages on very steep (>60degrees)high(>1000ft) cliffs at the North Kohala Ditch and general trends of landslide damage on leeward(west) slopes. 6-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 7. Earthquakes Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes CHAPTER 7 - EARTHQUAKES 7.1 Description of Hazard An earthquake is the sudden release of strain energy in the Earth's crust,resulting in waves of shaking that radiate outward from the earthquake source.22 The Earth's crust, which can be oceanic or continental, is the uppermost layer of the lithosphere23. Figure 7-1 illustrates the layers that compose the Earth including the crust and the lithosphere. The oceanic crust is approximately 3 to 6 miles thick while the continental crust is approximately 20 to 30 miles thick.24 When stresses in the crust exceed the strength of the rock, it breaks along lines of weakness (either a pre-existing or new fault plane) and results in earthquakes. The point where an earthquake starts is termed the focus or hypocenter and may be many kilometers deep within the earth. The point at the surface of the crust directly above the focus is called the earthquake epicenter. The distance between the hypocenter and the epicenter is termed the focal depth. In the case of underwater earthquakes, the focal depth is measured from the hypocenter to the surface of the oceanic crust. The severity of earthquakes is dependent on the energy released from the fault or epicenter. Other factors influencing the severity of an earthquake include: magnitude, proximity to the epicenter, depth of the epicenter, duration, soil characteristics, and type of ground motion. The effects of an earthquake can be felt far from the epicenter. C_ PZ Mantle Ma,ale con[iWYS doom to ouref Care V Qa[er O core of �ICa meta Solid rn:td :i Figure 7-1. Cutaway Showing Earth's Layers25 22 Pacific Disaster Center Website,Retrieved October 6,2009 from http://w-ww.pdc.org/iweb/earthquakes.]sp?subg=l zs The lithosphere constitutes the rigid outer layer of the planet.it includes the crust and the upper mantle. 24 Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia Website,Retrieved October 7,2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crust_%28 geology%29#cite_note-amonline-0 2'image from Solar Computer House Website,Retrieved October 7,2009 from tILtp://www.solcomhouse.com/geothennal.htm 7-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes Historically, the largest earthquakes in Hawaii have occurred at shallower depths, beneath the flanks of Kilauea, Mauna Loa and Hualalai Volcanoes. The flanks of these volcanoes adjust to the intrusions of magma into their adjacent rift zones by storing compressive stresses and occasionally releasing it in crustal earthquakes. The active fault surfaces for these large earthquakes is associated with a near-horizontal basal decollement separating the ancient oceanic crust from the emplaced volcanic pile, lying approximately 10 km beneath the Earth's surface. (A decollement is a tectonic surface that acts as a plane of detachment between two masses.) Examples of such crustal or decollement earthquakes occurred in 1975, the M7.2 (or greater) Kalapana earthquake beneath Kilauea's south flank, and in 1868, the largest earthquake in recorded Hawaiian history beneath the Ka`u district on Mauna Loa's southeast flank, estimated as a M7.9 earthquake. (Figure 7-2 by Klein, et al,2001). l HAWAII HISTORICAL EARTHQUAKES CRUSTAL 10/15/2006 • EARTHQUAKES M6.0 Z=18 r ' • M 7.0-7.9 1 /1885 PaClflC �� I�t. �Y�"",�. 8M6.1 18ti1 y M 6.5-6.9 OCBaIl MRA ,•4 ' /' 11/18/41- t • M 6.0-6.4 .M61 MA ,. 10/15/2006 n� r M62 Z MANTLE EARTHQUAKES M6.7 Z=39 , Ms2 =3s r< (Z>15) A HUALALAI ' �,1 ,®Hilo :one MAUNALOA NE P �•�" ;` : ', KILAUEAaStPkklooe r Q • � -Old 8155 3/28/1868 • . M s.a M 6.1,7U D . 5/31116771 /29175 M 6.3; M 7.2 4/22151 M 6.2 of 4/2/1868 0 30 km M7.9 Pacific Ocean Figure 7-2. Hawaii Historical Earthquakes and Inferred Rupture Zones of the Larger Events 7-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes Continuous 2800 Fundamental flexure models a) T=25 for plates under island loads Variable infill 2%00 23W n�„ 2300 b) ,T T=25 Broken plate 2800 Plate is broken, or so F weakened or thinned T,.-25 in the center, that it curves concave downward under the load. CO2 embrittlement Variable T 2800 enables deep seismicity. d) T,=25 (from A.B.Watts,Isostasy and flexure of the lithosphere, Cambridge Univ.press,2001) Figure 7-3. Fundamental flexural models for plates under island loads earthquake focal mechanisms: Center of lithosphere bending radial P-axis (deep P-axis radiant point) O tangential P-axis "flat"fault NW Mauna Kea Mauna Loa Kilauea SE volcanic edifice volcanic edifice 0 km M7.2 _ decollment 9-12 km O M6.0 (mixed P directions) (mixed P directions) neutral lane_ — — 20-22 km neutral plane ` (depth uncertain here) '.deep'Kilauea earthquake zone approx.elastic thickness 25^40 brokeno thin dplate— rr--- —>� km approx.maximum 60 km .................... � brittle earthquake depth maximum bending I sparse 20-55 km maximum bending and seismicity seismicity and seismicity Figure 7-4. Earthquake focal mechanisms in Hawaii The risks to property from earthquakes in the County of Hawaii are among the highest in the nation, with only San Francisco and San Jose, California having a greater annual loss per 7-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes million dollars of building value. Earthquake occurrence rates in the County of Hawaii are as high as that near the most hazardous fault areas on the mainland United States. The Island of Hawai'i experiences thousands of earthquakes every year although only a few of them are strong enough to be felt or cause minor to moderate damage. Most of these earthquakes are directly related to volcanic activity caused by magma moving below the earth's surface and are concentrated beneath the island's two most active volcanoes, Mauna Loa and Kilauea. These volcanic-related earthquakes can occur before or during eruptions, or as molten rock travels underground. A few of the earthquakes are less directly related to volcanic activity and may occur in zones of structural weakness at the base of the volcanoes or deep within the earth under any part of the island.`G The point where an earthquake originates is termed the focus or hypocenter and may be many kilometers deep within the earth. The point at the surface directly above the focus is called the earthquake epicenter. Strong earthquakes, while infrequent, may endanger people and property by shaking structures, causing ground cracks, ground settling and landslides. Strong earthquakes in Hawaii's past have destroyed buildings, water tanks and bridges and damaged roadways, water, sewer and utility lines. Soil and topographic conditions may exacerbate potential earthquake hazards where steep slopes and water saturated soils may be susceptible to mudflows or landslides. Large earthquakes may also generate tsunamis which provide little or no time for advanced warning.27 Damage caused by earthquakes can be classified as structural or nonstructural. The structural components of buildings are those that carry stress loads, including columns, beams, braces, floor, roof, load-bearing walls, and foundations. Nonstructural components include every other part of the building and its contents. Common non-structural components include ceilings, windows, office equipment, file cabinets, HVAC equipment, electrical equipment, furnishings, and lights. Nonstructural damage may cause personal injury, property damage, or loss of function often resulting in more significant damage than structural damage. Examples of hazardous nonstructural damage that have occurred in past earthquakes include broken glass, overturned tall and heavy cabinets, falling ceilings or overhead light fixtures, and ruptured piping. Earthquake ground shaking has three effects on nonstructural components: inertial or shaking effects on the nonstructural elements themselves, distortions imposed on nonstructural components when the building structure sways back and forth, and separation or pounding across separation joints between adjacent structures (see Figure 7-5). Building codes primarily address structural components.28 26 Heliker, 1990. 27 Ibid. 28 Wiss,Janney,Elstner Associates,Inc.,September 1994. Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage:A Practical Guide. FEMA 74(3rd ed.). 7-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes Earthquakes are generally measured by magnitude and intensity: • Magnitude. The Richter Scale measures magnitude by the relative size of the earthquake wave recorded on seismographs. Earthquakes below magnitude 3 are generally too small to be felt. Magnitude 5 earthquakes may be damaging while earthquakes of magnitude 7 or greater can cause widespread damage when located near population centers. • intensity. The Modified Mercalli Tntensity Scale (MMT) measures the intensity of earth- quakes by the effects of what people feel and observe and what kinds of structural damage that occur. The earthquake intensity will vary as a function of distance from the epicenter. MMI ranges from I which is faintly registered by instruments to XIT which is near total de- struction. OVERTURNING OF SLENDER OBJECTS SLIDING OF STOCKY OBJECTS UPLIFT: ;..... .... .. E e � °° GLASS OF . .... ..... ... ..... ...._, i ... ...... PARTITIONS GLASS R ......... ....... ......... ........ . .......... f� DEFORMED SHAPE BREAKAGE OF PIPING OR DUCTS MAY OCCUR AT OF BUILDING SEISMIC JOINTS DUE TO DIFFERENTIAL DISPLACEMENTS(SEPARATION AND POUNDING) DEFORMED SHAPE OF BUILDING Figure 7-5. Effects of Earthquakes on Nonstructural Cmnponents. Source: Wiss,Janney,Elstner Associates,inc.,September 1994. Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide. FEMA 74(3rd ed.). 7-5 Hawaii Counti,Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes 7.2 Significant Historic Events The USGS has compiled two catalogs of earthquakes for the Hawaiian Islands: a "modern" catalog of earthquakes registered by the seismic network maintained by the USGS HVO dat- ing from the fourth quarter of 1959, and an historical catalog of earthquakes dating back to 1823 based on instrumental amplitudes from the Honolulu Magnetic Observatory and HVO combined with published felt reports from newspaper articles and other sources as well un- published felt reports sent to HVO (Klein and Wright,USGS Published Paper 1623). The Island of Hawaii has experienced 13 damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater since 1868; several are shown in Figure 7-6. The largest of these occurred in 1868 in the Ka'u district on the southeast flank of Mauna Loa with an estimated magnitude of 7.5 to 8.0. Although the 1868 earthquake caused damage island-wide, the devastation was greatest in Ka'u where the earthquake triggered a mudflow killing 31 people and coastal subsidence generated a tsunami that destroyed several villages. Approximately 79 people were killed as a result of the earthquake of 1868 with most of the casualties resulting from the mudslide and the tsunami.29 �l 2006110115 1868mrA 1868/04/02 M6.7' M7 M7.9 f1 J 192910105 r ,95,IO6r21 - 187354126 M6.5• M8.9 M6.2' 1 1 L 1 97511 1/29' 1983/11118 1989x06+25 - M7 2 .�Lr M6.6 M6.1 Figure 7-6. Locations of damaging earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater for Hawaii island since 1868 (RMS,2006) 29 Heliker,C."Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii",U.S.Geological Survey, 1990. 7-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes The largest earthquake on the island during the 20`h century occurred on the south flank of Kilauea in 1975. This earthquake had a magnitude of 7.2 and caused coastal subsidence at Kalapana, generated a tsunami that killed 2 people in the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park, destroyed houses in the Ka'u district, sank fishing boats in Keauhou Bay within the North Kona district, and damaged boats and piers in Hilo,within the South Hilo district.30 A large earthquake, unrelated to volcanic activity, was located 25 miles beneath Honomu in the South Hilo district in 1973. This earthquake had a magnitude of 6.2 and caused$5.6 mil- lion worth of damage and injured 11 people.31 7.2.1 Kiholo Bay Earthquake The most recent major earthquakes in the State of Hawaii were the Magnitude 6.7 Kiholo Bay and Magnitude 6.0 Mahukona earthquakes that occurred on October 15, 2006 at 7:07am and 7:14 am respectively (Robertson et al, 2006; SERI, 2006; EERI et al, 2006). Both earthquakes were centered neat- the Kona coastline of Hawaii. A map of ground shaking intensity for the island is shown in Figure 7-7 (Adapted from USGS Shakemap downloads). The maps show that largest ground shaking for this earthquake was at the northern end of the island, but did not directly coincide with the epicenter of the earthquake. The largest ground motions were recorded at the towns of Waimea and Hawi. These areas had amplified ground motion due to softer soil conditions at these locations. The most heavily damaged buildings were concentrated in the Waimea and Hawi areas with some damage also in the Honokaa and Kona areas. There was very little damage at the south end of the island. The main October 15 Kiholo Bay earthquake probably reflected the long-term accumulation and release of lithospheric flexural stresses. The long-term stresses consist in part of stresses generated in the crust and mantle by the weight of the volcanic rock that composes the islands. Such deeper mantle earthquakes at approximately 30 to 40 km depth result from flexural fracture of the underlying lithosphere in long-term geologic response to the load of the island mass. This is one of the seismotectonic mechanisms for damaging (but not the largest) earthquakes in the Hawaiian islands. Past examples of such "mantle" earthquakes include the 1973 M6.2 Honomu (on the northeast coast of the island), the 1938 M7 Maui, and the 1871 M7 Lana`i earthquakes. 30 Heliker,C."Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii",U.S.Geological Survey, 1990. 31 Ibid. 7-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes Acceleromele stau0ns PGA Ix) -Majoi roads 2 4 5-8 WwL. 3-11 12-1S - 16-19 * -20-22 IJahuKona r48.00 `-+1:-.Kon oa6ay Pol ce Station -23-26 (:006,10/15 17'14:12.071 Walrma,Fim Staton -27-29 1.05 30-33 0.36 _34-37 Kifolo Bar M6 7D-, 110711 1�'0T4B.22i Hilo.Old Hospital Rio,USDA Lab 0.24 l 0.06 Hilo,L4�iv of Hawaii K1 U2.Kona.Fin,Station .06 .21 r Keal.akekue.Kcna Hospital Pahos,Fire Station 052 Honaunau,PO k 1 Pk,IND S- 0.1. 0.06 N _ - aha4'y Ka'u nosprtal 0.18 I D 3 6 12 16 24 3D Miles Figure 7-7. Peak ground accelerations resulting from the Oct.15,2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake 7.2.1.1 Performance of•the Kawaihae harhor One of the two major commercial ports on the island, the commercial port facility at Kawaihae Harbor consists of two pile-supported concrete piers, a 500-foot long Pier 1 and the 1500-foot long Pier 2, which is operationally divided into Piers 2, 2A, and 2B and a few warehouse and administrative buildings, and an asphalt paved shipping container yard. This facility was located less than 24 km (15 miles) from the epicenter of the Kiholo Bay Earthquake. 7-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes rig. l d� cv • Figure 7-8. Aerial image of Kawaihae Harbor Kawaihae Harbor sustained major damage from liquefaction and lateral spreading. Sand boils were observed throughout the harbor area. Much of the fill material under the shipping container handling yard consists of dredged fill. As this material liquefied, the resulting lateral spreading caused significant vertical settlement of the asphalt pavement, and lateral displacement of the pile supported concrete piers. Large areas of the asphalt yard, had settled up to approximately 6 inches. A series of cracks with widths ranging from approximately 1/4 inch to several inches were observed roughly aligned parallel with the shoreline. Cumulatively, these cracks displayed lateral spreading of 6 inches or more. Pier 1 displaced as much as 6 to 12 inches laterally towards the harbor. This movement indicates that the piles were moved and/or distressed by the lateral spreading of the liquefied soil beneath and landward of the pier. Port Damages The most pronounced damage at Kawaihae was the failure of 1950's era Pier 1. The 1950's era Pier 1 which includes a concrete bulkhead wall, tie rods, anchor block and surrounding structures experienced a significant amount of damage. Primary damage and displacements greater than 15 inches occurred to Pier 1. Visible damage to the pier structure included: • Longitudinal cracks in the bulkhead cap, concrete sheetpile and rock revetments. • Yielding and necking of the tie rods, but no breakage with 4-6 inches lateral translation and 12-15 inches movement in the rip rap at the north end of the pier. • Significant settlement behind the anchor block and in pavements. 7-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes Other areas experience small deformations (less than 2 inches) and more minor damage. Piers 2, 2A and mooring dolphins which are 1960's and 1990's era structures experienced only minor cracking or spalling and remain in service. Terminal yard pavements experienced settlement and cracking damage. Terminal shipping warehouses, the harbor masters office and grain silage building also experienced racking, masonry cracking and minor cladding damage. The fuel tank farm and cement silo experienced only minor cracking. Several electrical and water utilities were broken. The cement and grouted rip rap storm drainage channel also experienced minor cracking displacements,but remained serviceable. Elevation (k) -3D 20 Dense Fill ao Pier 1(typ) _ M L.L.W. Loose to Dense Loose Al — Natural Coral 10 Sand and Gravel Original Gro und Dredged Harbor Bottom 20 30 Dense Natural Coral Sand&Gravel aD — Variable Basalt Formation so — — — — — — _ 10%Slope — o Hard(fresh)Basalt l — — — — — — — _ — Figure 7-9. Interpreted subsurface profile of Pier 1 Site Response Study The subsurface geology of Kawaihae Harbor (i.e., loose coral deposits) is significantly different than geologies of the strong motion sites that recorded the Kiholo Bay earthquake, which are located on volcanic soil, ash, or rock. Estimate of surface ground motions at Kawaihae was between 0.3 and 0.6g, A site response analysis was performed based on an average shear wave velocity(Vs)profile. A total of nine Spectral-Analysis-of-Surface Waves (SASW) surveys lines were surveyed at Kawaihae Harbor. The results of the SASW surveys indicate fill and soil thickness of 40 to 90 ft over basalt. Low blow count SPT data in the coralline soils and observed liquefaction confirm that the upper 30 to 50 ft is code site class F. Liquefaction Studies Liquefaction is a soil behavior phenomenon where shear strength loss occurs due to the rapid build-up of excess pore-water pressure, which reduces effective stresses in the soil to zero. It is most commonly generated by strong earthquake ground shaking. In general, soils most susceptible to liquefaction are loose, saturated, uniformly graded sands containing little or no fines, such as dredged fills used to construct reclaimed landside areas of the harbor. Evidence of liquefaction was observed extensively at Kawaihae Harbor in the vicinity of Pier 1 and 2, in pavement areas at the pier structures, in the terminal yard area and within the waterfront storage warehouses. Sand boil emissions occurred through cracks in pavements, with associated settlements up to 7 inches, including shallow footings. Lateral displacements 7-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes up to 1S" were observed at Pier 1, the seawall revetment area between Pier 1 and 2, and as localized displacement within the sloping fills abutting the piers. Harbor Building Mitigation Measures With the evolution of building codes, the evaluation of seismic risk in the Hawaiian Islands has gone through substantial change in recent years. Many older buildings would not meet current code requirements for seismic resistance. Harbor buildings that are deemed essential should undergo a thorough existing conditions evaluation to determine potential seismic design and/or construction deficiencies. Wharf and Pier Mitigation Measures Older wharf and pier structures are typically constructed using non-prestressed vertical and battered piles. These piles typically do not have the ductility reinforcing and detailing normally required to resist seismic loads. Four options were identified to improve the lateral resisting system of the existing wharf structures,including: • Install a new independent lateral resisting system with new piles carrying all the lateral loads under the existing deck,tied together. • Install additional vertical piles to share vertical and horizontal loads with existing serviceable piles, again tied together. • Increase the vertical and lateral capacity of existing vertical piles by wrapping piles in fiber-reinforced polymer(FRP)jackets,with doweled and grouted connections. • Add continuous anchor blocks behind the wall with tie rods located perpendicular to the length of the wharf and at opposing 45 degree angles (one in each direction) to resist both transverse and longitudinal seismic loads. Geotechnical Foundation Mitigation Measures Seismic hazards in soils, usually liquefaction or related seismic deformations, can be mitigated using one or a combination of the following soil treatment or ground improvement methods: densification, improvement of drainage characteristics, cementing of the soils, or use of structural elements to resist seismic loads. Structural foundation mitigation for liquefaction can also be used with or in lieu of ground improvements. Piles and micropiles have proven effective against liquefaction hazards by transferring the building loads into non-liquefiable soils, so long as the large horizontal forces can be adequately carried by the piles. Piles and micropiles are not effective when they do not sufficiently extend into non-liquefiable soils or where lateral spread is possible, causing excessively large bending moments in the piles. Planning For each port which may serve as a sole lifeline to its supporting communities,FEMA recommends the following: • Advocate as a highest planning priority to adopt more current standards or codes. • Determine site seismicity and surface ground motions for each critical structure including potential performance, effects of liquefaction and pavement settlements. 7-11 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis-Earthquakes • Develop a seismic risk profile for the port infrastructure system inventory. • Allocate hazard mitigation program funding in compliance with eligibility requirements for FEMA assistance. 7.3 Probability of Occurrence Earthquake recurrence intervals have been estimated by Klein (1994) and Wyss Koyanagi (USGS Bulletin 2006, 1992) and range from 3 to 4.5 years for "large" earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 5.5; 29 to 44 years for"major" earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 7; and, 120 to 180 years for "great" earthquakes approaching a magnitude of 8. Figure 7-10 provides a visual distribution and magnitude of recent and historic earthquakes. 1EG" YS8° ia6° 22. Kauai Oahu 'diil•a.i Honolulu ��yYlo.lo+kr'&•i Lanai KahLi u z-,-,L! Hawaii U F.L.na K.-..i - 1925 H Iq 175-. 19$3 Norrh Pacific Ocean 95 -1051 1964 �t 9ti9 1 H66 C 3` tC0 ]Ixa u,xtws EXPLANATION 15 Qd 2006 r1�alt.aene a.<rat .. k.y s.e Eart*uakes1876-2U65 rear M" Dey Time Lac L-nj leaq M 0.3.99 yxRe 0.5 �§ 6a.5 ls. -z55.i a.0. 1689 p0. P3 0225 19. -iSS.i 7,r 4-4.99 1c71 4: r0 Oe 42 1946 09 71 (631 19.00 -155.60 4.0 5-5.99 1929 1h Ps 4711 19-7+7 -196-60 6_y 1978 0L 23 0B32 21.40 -156.06 6.B _8.99 1957 0.a as vutz 19.00. :-2 1,0 a.s 1951 N& 21 1057 19.dA -155.97 6.7 73 30 1941 14.35 -155.02 9 8.S 1975 11 �4 1 &7 14.]4 -155.riG 7.5 19,91 SL 1s 1613 19.43 -155.4" 1_ 4.1 ii Figure 7-10.History of Volcanic and Seismic Hazard Events 7-12 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes 7.3.1.1 Design Seismic Hazard The 2003 or 2006 International Building Code (IBC) defines seismic hazard using two series of maps indicating 0.2 second and 1.0 second spectral acceleration ordinates having a 2% probably of exceedance in 50 years with an implicit adjustment for a deterministic Maximum Considered Earthquake(MCE)within each seismic source zone. The applicable maps for the Hawaiian Islands are shown in Figure 7-11 for a rock site (Site Class B). The design spectral accelerations for a given site are 2/3rds of the MCE level shown in these maps. If required, the accelerations are modified,usually amplified, by the soil conditions underneath the site, if conditions other than rock exist. The IBC incorporates vastly improved seismic hazard mapping of Hawaii compared to previous standards, developed by the U.S. Geological Survey(USGS) and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee. 7-13 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes I.A Couloarltledt —YIS— 5U 50 q0 —gp —so- -40- -35— —30- -25- -20- -�5— 19 —1Q— 5 —ff— \ul�:n nlmm ruc 18" 16' 11.2 SEC SPECI RAL RESPONSE ACCELERATION(.5%OF CRI f ICAL DAMPING) C OnAQUr iutrrvnls, tr -1S0- -125- 4 0 -100- -90- /J• -75--60- f{ —50- -40- �. —30— —25— —1a- -$— t; —K— 2 —p W 18' 1.0 SEC SPECTRAL RESPONSE ACCELERATION(5%OF CRITICAL DAMPING) Figure 7-11.Maximum considered earthquake ground motion for the State of Hawaii of 0.2 and lA second spectral accelerations(5°/,damping,Site Class B) (ASCE,2005) Table 7-1 correlates the peak ground acceleration rates to the Modified Mercalli scale. 7-14 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes Table 7-1. Conversion of MMI to PGA Values S ecitic to Ilawaii32 Perceived Shaking Not Felt Weak Light Moderate Strong Very Severe Violent Extreme S trong Potential Damage None None None Very Light Light Moderate Moder- Heavy Very ate/Heavy Heavy Peak Acceleration V.2 3.2-8.1 8.1-13 13-20 20-32 32-51 51-80 80-128 >128 (%g) Peak Velocity(%g) 1.9 1.9-6.4 6.4-11 11-18 18-28 28-47 47-74 74-120 <120 Modified Mercalli r 11-111 IV V VI Vii Viii IX X Intensity(MMI) Documentation for current hazard maps is given in Seismic Hazard in Hawaii: High Rate of Large Earthquakes and Probabilistic Ground-Motion Maps, by Fred W. Klein, Arthur D. Frankel, Charles S. Mueller, Robert L. Wesson, and Paul G. Okubo, Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 479-498. June, 2001; USGS report 2724 published at http://Uubs.usgs.gov/imgp/2000/i-2724/. 7.3.1.2 Soil Conditions The seismic ground motion at a particular site can be significantly increased by weaker or "softer" soil conditions. Rock and soil conditions are categorized in the IBC by Site Classes A through F, sometimes referred to as Soil Types. Weaker soil indicates areas of greater potential hazard therefore Site Class should also be considered in individual building assessments. To be able to utilize the strong motion data recorded by the USGS Hawaiian strong motion network, knowledge of the subsurface site conditions beneath the USGS stations was required. The subsurface geology and, more important, the shear-wave velocity (Vs) structure beneath the USGS stations has been unknown to date. The information is invaluable to verify the appropriateness of the empirical ground motion attenuation models being used in the state hazard maps produced by USGS and in site-specific hazard analyses for engineering design. To obtain Vs information beneath the USGS strong motion sites, Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW) surveys were performed by the University of Texas, Austin, and URS Corporation in January 2008 (Wong et al. 2008). The SASW technique has been used to obtain Vs profiles at other USGS strong motion sites (e.g., Seattle, the Imperial Valley, and Los Angeles), and this technique has been well validated against other approaches, such as down-hole surveys (e.g., Wong and Silva 2006). The technique has been particularly useful in volcanic regimes where interbedded volcanic sequences can result in low-velocity zones (e.g.,Yucca Mountain and Los Alamos). The SASW methodology is a non-destructive and non-intrusive seismic method. It utilizes the dispersive nature of Rayleigh-type surface waves propagating through a layered material to estimate the shear-wave velocity profile of the material (Stokoe et al. 1994; Joh 1996). In this context, dispersion arises when surface-wave velocity varies with wavelength or 32 Based on Wyss&Koyanagi 1992 7-15 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes frequency. Dispersion in surface-wave velocity arises from the changing stiffness properties of the soil and rock layers with depth. Spectral analysis is used to separate the waves by frequency and wavelength to determine the experimental ("field") dispersion curve for the site. An analytical procedure is then used to theoretically match the field dispersion curve with a one-dimensional layered system of varying layer stiffness's and thicknesses. The one- dimensional Vs profile that generates a dispersion curve that matches the field dispersion curve is presented as the profile at the site. An active seismic source is required for the SASW surveys. In these surveys, one of the NSF's Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES) mobile vibrators, known as "Thumper," was used. Thumper has been designed to be a moderate- to high-frequency vibrator for use in seismic reflection and surface wave projects. The surveys took place from January 7 to 17, 2008 at 22 USGS strong motion sites. Several surveys were also performed at Kawaihae Harbor. The high PGA's recorded at the Waimea Station and the North Kohala Police Station are probably due to thin soil site amplification where a strong velocity contrast exists between the soil and underlying basalt. Based on the survey results, all of the 22 USGS strong motion sites are "soil" sites with VS30 values ranging from 442 ft/sec at the USDA Laboratory in Hilo (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program [NEHRP] site class E) to 1,812 ft/sec at the South Kohala Fire Station (NEHRP Q. Surprisingly, none of the strong motion sites had rock-like Vs30 values, even sites where basalt outcropped at the surface, such as at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. As demonstrated in the 2006 earthquake, where some strong motion stations recorded peak horizontal accelerations close to lg, site response effects can be significant on the Big Island. As part of FEMA-supported studies following the earthquake, a new 1:100,000-scale map of site conditions on the Big Island of Hawaii was produced. The mapping makes use of about 25 new SASW measurements (Wong et al., 2008) and 1:100,000-scale geologic mapping by Sherrod et al. (2007). An earlier 2006 site class map portrayed nearly all of the island as NEHRP site class B; however, based on about 20 SASW measurements in areas mapped as basalt, it is believed that most of the island should be mapped as NEHRP C or D. Vs30 estimates for these basalt sites ranged from 844 to 1,812 ft/sec, spanning NEHRP classes C and D. The median value for these Vs30 estimates is 1,304 ft/sec, with a log mean of 1,274 ft/sec and a standard deviation of 274 ft/sec. The sites cover a range of basaltic rock conditions as depicted on the geologic map, including lava flows, scoria cones, littoral deposits, spatter or tuff cones, cinder cones, and lava domes. Other geologic map unit groups for which only a few Vs30 estimates were made from SASW data include alluvium, ash/tephra, and artificial fill. These were assigned to map units NEHRP site class D, C to E, and C to E, respectively. Geologic deposits for which there is no quantitative velocity data and preliminary site class assignments have been made are sand dunes (D), landslide deposits (D), and glacial deposits (D). Other earthquake-induced ground failure hazards include liquefaction and landslide. Liquefaction occurs when loose granular soils below the water table temporarily lose strength due to excess pore water pressure build-up during prolonged strong earthquake ground shaking. Accordingly, higher potential would tend to occur at sites with these subsurface characteristics in regions of higher seismicity, since events of Richter magnitude 6 or greater with EPGA of greater than O.l Og are generally necessary to begin to induce liquefaction. 7-16 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes EMS PACIFIC OCEAN E29 N I .......... 11 24 Figure 7-12.URS soils classification Site Class V, Nor -)V,, S" A. Hard rock >5,000 ft/s NA NA B. Rock 2,500 to 5,000 fi/s NA NA C- Very dense soil and soft rock 1,200 to 2,500 ft/s >50 >2,000 psf D. Stiff soil 600 to 1,200 ft/s 15 to 50 1,000 to 2,000 psf E. Soft clay soil <600 ft/s <15 <1,000 psf Any profile-ith more than 10 ft of sail having th7following characteristics:-Plasticity index PT>20,-Moisture content w>40%,and- Undtained shear strength—su<500 psf I F. Soil,requiring site response analysis See Section 20.31 1 in accordance with Section 21.1 7-17 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes 7.3.1.3 Nonstructural Damage Assessment Surveys and possible incorporation into building codes must not be overlooked. 7.3.1.4 Susceptible Earthquake-Induced Ground Failure Areas More detailed maps based on soils are needed to identify earthquake-induced ground failure hazards such as liquefaction, landslide, and surface rupture. Liquefaction occurs when loose granular soils below the water table temporarily lose strength due to excess pore water pressure build-up during prolonged strong earthquake ground shaking. Accordingly, higher potential would tend to occur at sites with these subsurface characteristics in regions of higher seismicity, since events of Richter magnitude 6 or greater with EPGA of more than 0.1Og are generally necessary to induce liquefaction. There is further work needed to better define areas susceptible to liquefaction and landslides. Localized ground surface rupture may be found in closer proximity to the seismic source zone, but should not be viewed as extensions of subsurface seismic faults. 7.4 Risk Assessment Average Annualized Loss (AAL) of earthquake events is also computed using the HAZUS model. HAZUS computes losses for eight earthquake scenario events with different return periods: 100-year, 250-year, 500-year, 750-year, 1000-year, 1500-year, 2000-year, and 2500- year. Based on a HAZUS AAL analysis incorporating soil site factor mapping and Hawaii Construction Cost Data, earthquake AAL is about $65.1 million in Hawaii County. The predominant contributor to loss is the single-family residential construction. County Hawaii Earthquake AAL $65.1 million per year 7.5 Mitigation Strategies 7.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts As described in previous sections of this report, the design vintage can be used as an indicator of a buildings susceptibility to seismic damage. Seismic zonation under which the structure was designed and typical construction type (single or double wall) can be determined by the year built based on the corresponding version of the UBC or IBC in effect at the time. Table 7-2 and Table 7-3 provide statistics of the number of homes built under each version of the UBC, their design seismic zonation, and probable code compliance. Most existing homes are code deficient for seismic resistance. 7-18 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes Table 7-2. Statistics for double wall construction,seismic design level in Hawaii Count Hawaii County (Double Wall Construction) Effective Date Year of UBC Seismic Zonation Number of Buildings February 8, 1962 1961 Pre Code 648 3%No Seismic Design April 17, 1968 1967 Pre Code 194 August 8, 1972 1970 Zone 3 1416 February 25, 1975 1973 Zone 3 1065 December 11, 1978 1976 Zone 3 2600 83%Code Deficient January 19, 1985 1982 Zone 3 5010 December, 1993 1991 Zone 3 12126 14%Seismic July, 1999 1994 Zone 4 3759 Compliant Design Total— 26818 Table 7-3. Statistics for single wall construction,seismic design level in Hawaii County Hawaii County (Single Wall Construction) Effective Date Year of UBC Seismic Zonation Number of Buildings February 8, 1962 1961 Pre Code 8723 57Design mic April 17, 1968 1967 Pre Code 2109 August 8, 1972 1970 Zone 3 2471 February 25, 1975 1973 Zone 3 931 December 11, 1978 1976 Zone 3 1088 39%Code Deficient January 19, 1985 1982 Zone 3 1378 December, 1993 1991 Zone 3 1271 2%Seismic Compliant July, 1999 1994 Zone 4 293 Design Total= 18264 7.5.1.1 Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee The Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee (HSEAC) was founded in 1990 by the Hawaii State Civil Defense Agency (SCD) to bring together seismic expertise from the Hawaii scientific, engineering, and emergency management communities. HSEAC serves as a technical advisory committee to SCD for identifying and implementing seismic hazards mitigation programs. 7-19 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes HSEAC identified the need prepare for these earthquakes by developing an understanding and knowledge of potential losses - to humans, buildings, infrastructure, businesses - and potential needs - hospital beds, shelter, transportation and utilities, debris removal - in order to mitigate both short and long term losses. 7.5.1.2 Hawaii County Assessment of'Critical Facilities The project engineering team consisting of the University of Hawaii, Martin & Chock, and Miyasato Kuniyoshi has conducted an all-hazard rapid visual screening (RVS) of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii. This included emergency command and control facilities, emergency first responders (fire stations, ambulance and police facilities),hospitals and clinics, and the two major airports (KOA and ITO). A HAZUS MH risk assessment model has been used to evaluate the expected losses for each building, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and the RVS site visits. The vulnerability of a building can be measured by economic loss or by loss of functionality related to the extent of damage. Both of these risk measures have been analyzed for earthquake and hurricane hazards at an equivalent level of probability, so that an "apples to apples"comparison of effects was made possible. From the 80 buildings, a shorter candidate list of 32 structures that ranked highest in risk was first identified, and then building design and construction feature vulnerabilities were weighed in order to develop a list for review. In accordance with this FEMA project scope, two facility groups that ranked high based on the RVS and HAZUS analysis were designated by Hawaii County Civil Defense for more detailed evaluation and development of recommended mitigation procedures. A Benefit-Cost Analysis of the mitigation project construction funding was performed. This detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit a PDM grant application for retrofit of Kau Hospital, and prioritizes critical facilities most in need of future retrofits. 7.5.1.3 Structural Seismic Retrofit for Residential Post and Pier Homes A survey of 5') post and pier houses on the island of Hawaii was performed to determine the typical structural characteristics and variations in structural properties of these houses in the most vulnerable areas. The survey also investigated the extent of damage of these homes during the 2006 earthquakes along with any attempts to retrofit the houses at the time of survey. Based on this survey, a number of prototypical models of post and pier houses were analyzed for different levels of ground motion. A number of aspects of the houses were found to require retrofitting for even moderate levels of ground motion. From the analysis, three retrofit options were developed, with the applicability of each retrofit based on the location of the house and its structural properties. The retrofits are presented in a general format that can be applied to a wide range of houses without specific input from a structural engineer, except in special cases. Retrofit Option 1 is primarily a strengthening of connections using the existing post and pier foundation system, applicable in regions of low to moderate seismic hazard and for houses with moderate differential post heights. Retrofit Option 2 uses additional plywood shear walls between the ground and first 7-20 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes floor of a house to provide additional lateral strength and stiffness to the foundation system. This retrofit is applicable in all regions with most combinations of differential post height and other structural properties. Retrofit Option 3 uses masonry shear walls to provide additional lateral strength and stiffness. This option is applicable for any post and pier house, although in some extreme cases a structural engineer would need to be consulted if the properties of the house fall outside the range of properties considered in the report. 7.5.1.4 Kiholo Bay HAZUS model validation and inventory update The 15 October 2006 moment magnitude (M) 6.7 earthquake beneath Kiholo Bay was among the largest to have occurred in Hawaii since written records have been maintained. For many, the Kiholo Bay earthquake served as an introduction to the fact that Hawaii is seismically active, and it reminds us that Hawaii is exposed to significant seismic hazard. Although no deaths or serious injuries were reported, damage estimates exceeded $200 million, resulting in the declaration of a major disaster by the U.S. government (FEMA- 1664-DR-HI). Development of the HAZUS (Hazards U.S.) earthquake model began in 1992 and much of the methodology is based upon empirical observations from past damaging earthquake events. There is a critical national need to document the performance of loss estimation methodologies such as HAZUS and the 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake disaster provided a unique, but perishable opportunity to compare HAZUS-MH modeled results to those observed in the disaster. In addition, this was a relatively rare opportunity to test the model performance outside of California. The results of the validation study were also used to develop a recommended procedure for using HAZUS-MH in future events with the enhanced data to support FEMA and the State of Hawaii that addresses uncertainty and identifies the priority HAZUS-MH products. At the time of the 2006 earthquake, the State of Hawaii utilized HAZUS 99 runs with progressively more information during the first 10 hours of the quake. The runs included a 2000-vintage building inventory aggregated by census tract, developed under previous FEMA contracts for Hawaii and Maui counties. However, HAZUS 99 damage and losses far exceeded ground truthed data. FEMA, working with the USGS, obtained a rapid ShakeMap product that included ground shaking information from felt reports, as well as 12 dial-up strong ground motion stations that greatly enhanced the results of the HAZUS-MH model. FEMA completed a run using the HAZUS level 1 data and version 12 of ShakeMap on 17 October where the losses dropped to about $200M total ($30M structural). Accordingly, in this study, data improvements are made with the goal of enabling operational use of HAZUS- MH with the present-day enhanced dataset and ShakeMap, and discontinuing use of HAZUS 99. This study further enhanced the Hawaii and Maui County building stock by using residential and commercial property tax databases and several state government property databases, and conducted loss estimation at the detailed census block level rather than at the geographically large census tracts that characterize the Big Island. The project incorporated the unique Hawaii building types including the vulnerable post and pier single-wall construction type that statistically exhibited much higher damage levels than conventional wood-frame construction on slab-on-grade. 7-21 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes Enhanced shear-wave velocity measurements on the Big Island are incorporated into the ShakeMap product used in the analysis. Comparisons of observed versus modeled results show good correlation, including casualties, structural and non-structural economic losses, highway bridge impacts, and damage by building counts. The detailed validation study includes comparisons of modeled results to observed damage data collected from FEMA's Individual and Public Assistance programs and the ATC-20 process. The HAZUS Advanced Engineering Building Module (AEBM) technique was used to evaluate the modeled loss results for selected public buildings against the observed loss details of the disaster assistance worksheets. Table 7-4. Hawaii County comparison of W1 and MH SST Enhanced Data model run with ShakeMap vs.publicly documented damage counts HAZUS Damage Leve12 None Los5Ratio ON 59k 5%-25% 25%-50% 50%- 100% HAZUS MH Enhanced 39465 2910 128 2 0 Data Model- Estimated Number of W1 Homes FEMA IA counts for 39253 2989 18S 3 2 W1 .----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------'---------------°°°------------------- HAZUS MH Enhanced 11860 2613 293 3 0 Data Model- Estimated Number of MH Homes FE MAIAcountsfor 13828 820 113 2 MH HAZUS M H Enhanced 51325 5523 421 5 Data Model W1 and MH FEMA IA 53081 3809 298 8 ATC Tags 55265 1705(Green) 227(Yellow) 77(Red) {Limited Scope) ARC Survey I 54945 2009 280 40 7.5.1.5 Power Reliability Improvements Following the Kiholo Bay Earthquake, associated power system events led to island-wide blackouts for Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. (HECO) on Oahu and Maui Electric Company, Ltd. (MECO) on Maui, although there was little apparent seismic damage to the electric systems on either island. Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc. (HELCO) on the island of Hawaii maintained partial service with an isolated section, or"island" of generation and customer load in the Hilo area. Since this event, efforts have been made to improve the reliability of the power systems on all islands, with the primarily focus on the Island of Oahu where the effects of the blackout were greatest. 7-22 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7:Hazard Analysis—Earthquakes 7.5.2 Future Plans Project Description Status Adapt HAZUS-MH or other hazard New building inventory data for HAZUS MH new model for modeling to Hawaii Leland: Hawaii County will make HAZUS disaster planning ise ready for use Develop scenario training and MH be capable of producing in 2010 mitigation planning capahilities; earthquake damage maps and Implement operational use of reports at a much higher spatial HAZUS-MH for use by the Pacific resolution,based on the best Disaster Center,fbr immediate loss available building and soil data,and estimates during future it will perform analysis using earthquakes on Haivaii Island ShakeMap output from USGS. Update the HAZUS MH model to Compile detailed data on bridges in Proposed HSEAC Planning incorporate detailed data on State Hawaii County Project and County Bridges Update the HAZUS MH model and develop more accurate bridge Current loss models reflect default damage estimates for earthquake data that is incomplete and not up scenarios to date with present status Formulate priority rankings of higher vulnerability bridges not yet retrofitted Identify earthquake-induced ground failure area Public Symposia and Teacher Training Workshops on Natural Hazards(Jan.—May 20 10) CSAV hosts a series of four public symposia and teacher training workshops that address the major natural hazards occurring in Hawaii(Volcanic Eruptions,Earthquakes,Tsunami,and Hurricanes). Educational Outreach by USGS Hawaii Earthquake Fact Sheet Ongoing preparation Coastal Hazard Cards Ongoing distribution 7-23 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 8. Lava and VOG Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG CHAPTER 8 - LAVA FLOWS, VOLCANIC GAS, AND ASHFALL 8.1 Hazard Description 8.1.1 Lavallolcanoes The Island of Hawaii is composed of five volcanoes,two of which(Mauna Loa and Kilauea) have been very active in the past 100 years and pose the most immediate threat to life and property. A third volcano, Hualalai, last erupted in 1801 and has the potential to erupt again within our lifetime. Mauna Kea last erupted approximately 3,500 years ago. Kohala, considered extinct, is the oldest volcano on the island and last erupted approximately 60,000 years ago. Most of the eruptions of Hawaiian volcanoes are not explosive(therefore ash fall is not a ma- jor concern) and are characterized by relatively quiet outflow of very fluid lava. These erup- tions, however, can still be quite hazardous because they may be erupted in huge volumes, and on steeper slopes, the fluid lava can rapidly travel many miles from its source.33 Lava flows present potential threats to homes, infrastructure, natural and historic resources and entire communities. The areas exposed to the highest risk from lava flows are those situated downslope and in close proximity to the active rift zones of Mauna Loa and Kilauea. Steep slopes may allow lava flows to move quickly from the summit to the ocean in a matter of hours. Besides the direct threat of inundation, lava flows may also cut across a community's single roadway escape route limiting the amount of time available for evacuation. The following briefly profiles the volcanoes that pose potential hazards. • Mauna Loa, like most Hawaiian volcanoes, has a summit caldera and two radiating rift or fracture zones. Comprising approximately 50% of the island of Hawaii,Mauna Loa poses a lava hazard threat to the districts of South Hilo, Puna, Ka'u, South Kona,North Kona and South Kohala. Mauna Loa eruptions can occur at the summit, from vents on the southwest rift zone and the east rift zone and on the north and northwest flanks of the volcano. • Kilauea is one of the world's most active volcanoes and over 90% of its surface is covered by lava less than 1,100 years old. All of Kilauea's eruptions have occurred either at its summit, or along one of two rift zones that extend from the summit to the coastline on the east and southwest flanks of the volcanoes. Eruptions on the east flank of Kilauea are a threat to portions of the Puna district. Eruptions on the southwest flank of Kilauea are a threat to land within the Hawai'i Volcanoes National Park and the district of Ka'u. • Hualalai is much older than Kilauea and Mauna Loa and has not erupted since 1800-1801. Eruption activity on Hualalai has been far less frequent with 25% of the volcano covered by flows less than 1,000 years old. Hualalai has erupted near its summit, along the northwest and south-southeast rift zones and from vents on the north flank of the volcano. Eruptions on Hualalai threaten land within the North Kona district. 33 USGS Fact Sheet 074-97. 8-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG 8.1.2 VOG "VOG,"coined from "volcanic smog"but standing for"Volcanic Gas", is a term used by the public in Hawaii to describe hazy conditions caused by gaseous emissions from Kilauea volcano. Vog is created when Volcanic Gases (primarily oxides of sulfur, S02)react with sunlight, oxygen and moisture. The result includes sulphuric acid and other sulfates. VOG is made up of a mixture of gases and aerosols which makes it hard to study and potentially more dangerous than either on their own. The S02 gas in VOG is greater near the sources (Halema`uma`u and Pu`u `O`o vents). S02 levels are lessened further away or upwind from the vents. Vog mostly affects the Kona coast on the west side of the island of Hawaii,where the prevailing trade winds blow the vog to the southwest and southern winds then blow it north up the Kohala coast. The haze caused by vog may be heavy in West Hawaii, but the S02 levels are typically lower due to the geographic distance from the sources. One cannot judge the amount of S02 in the air or its danger to humans and plants by how heavy the vog appears, S02 levels can be high with only light vog. 11*61 a .r ,LL Figure 8-1. Volcanic Gas Emissions at Kilauea Volcano's Summit Vent on May,2009 8-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and i Figure 8-2. Aerial view - islartdofHawai`i VOG —Halema`uma`u Vent - of 1 wing circulation of prevailing winds, 1 Figure8-3. Aerial view of Hawai'i showing circulation of VOG_ Island of �Ianc�of Island o *� Kaho`olawcLan�:p' Moloka` Island of Hawaii ` �—Halema`mna`u Vent `'- under prevailing 34 Tmage taken from National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA)Earth Observatory Website, Retrieved on October 12, 009 from • 8-3 Hawaii County Multi-Bazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG 7;"N 16J`W 159"W 541W 154'W 152.:.* i Hawail (blg Island) Sulfur Dloxlde Mass(meMc tans) :: 15 3P Figure 8-4. Concentrations of SOz under prevailing winds in the Main Hawaiian Islands,April 30,200931 8.1.2.1 The Chemistry of,' and Reactions Occurring in, Kilauea's Vog Plumes The vog plumes from Kilauea contain a variety of compounds, at varying concentrations, that could have adverse impacts on the downwind communities and environment. There are three primary sources of volcanic gases from Kilauea: Halema'uma'u, at the summit of Kilauea, the "TEB Vent", located on the upper Kilauea East Rift Zone (KERZ), and the ocean entry along the Puna shoreline. The compositions of each are generally different, and the compositions can vary depending on local and temporal conditions. 8.1.2.1.1 Halema'uma'u The Halema'uma'u discharge contains carbon dioxide (CO2), water vapor (H20), sulfur dioxide (S02), sulfur trioxide (S03) and smaller amounts of hydrogen sulfide (HzS), hydrochloric acid (HO), and hydrofluoric acid (HF), as well as a number of trace gases. Although most of the gases discharged are the result of degassing of magma(within or below 35 Image taken from National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA)Earth Observatory Website, Retrieved on October 12,2009 from http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=8800 36 Image taken from National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA)Earth Observatory Website, Retrieved on October 12,2009 from http://eartliobservatoty.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=8706 8-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG the recently formed pit) there can also be contributions (of water vapor, hydrogen sulfide, and sulfur trioxide) from lower temperature hydrothermal systems that surround the magma conduit below and around Halema'uma'u. Soon after the gases discharge from the magma or the conduit surfaces, they begin to cool and undergo a variety of internal reactions and reactions with the atmosphere. While in the gas phase all the above compounds are transparent but, with cooling, sulfur trioxide will rapidly combine with water vapor(from the plume or the atmosphere) to form a sulfuric acid (H2SO4) aerosol. Under relatively dry conditions, the sulfuric acid aerosol can be distinguished by its bluish cast; when abundant water is present, a dense white plume is formed. HCl and HF will also condense onto solid particulates, if the latter are present, or form aerosol droplets by combining with condensing water vapor. Under dry atmospheric conditions, the plume will drift downwind and mix with the air column which will decrease the dew point in the discharge plume and the aerosol droplets will dehydrate and disperse. Under moist conditions, the plume will remain hydrated and the aerosols will remain much more visible. Mixing with air will also lead to reactions between atmospheric oxygen and the sulfur compounds sulfur dioxide and hydrogen sulfide. Sulfur dioxide is the more reactive of the two, with reported half-lives as short as a few tens of minutes to as long as several days depending on the chemical constituents in the air mass (e.g. urban air pollution, marine air), as well as the intensity of ultraviolet radiation. Given the absence of significant sulfur dioxide in the vog plume by the time it reaches Kona, it's likely that the half-life in the Hawaii air mass is no more than a few hours. The oxidation of any hydrogen sulfide present in the plume occurs at a much slower rate where the half-life of HZS in the atmosphere may be a day or more. The oxidation of sulfur dioxide will result in the formation of additional sulfur trioxide/sulfuric acid aerosol (because sulfur trioxide is extremely hygrosocopic, it will extract nearly any and all available water vapor from the atmosphere to form the acid aerosol) to contribute to the dry haze in the downwind plume. The oxidation process will continue until all of the sulfur dioxide is converted to sulfuric acid. Mixing of the plume with the atmosphere also brings the plume constituents into contact with ammonia that is derived from biogenic decay processes occurring in tropical soils. In the presence of water, ammonia (NH3) forms a weak base (NH40H) that will react very rapidly with the sulfuric acid aerosols to form ammonium sulfate [(NH4) 2SO41, and with the hydrochloric and hydrofluoric acids to form ammonium chloride (NH4C1) and ammonium fluoride (NH4F) respectively. Although these ammonia salts are not as hygroscopic as sulfur trioxide, they are sensitive to atmospheric moisture levels and the optical density of the plume will vary depending on the relative humidity in the ambient air. Whereas the non-reactive gas phase components of the plume (e.g. carbon dioxide) will gradually disperse, the aerosols are subject to both gravitational settling, through a process called dry deposition, as well as scrubbing from the atmosphere by rainfall. Although the aerosols can serve as a source of condensation nuclei for raindrop formation, some studies 8-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG have suggested that the plume may be providing an overabundance of nuclei that have inhibited drop growth resulting in a decline in rainfall rates in Ka'u and South Kona. The sulfur dioxide as well as the dry deposition of the plume aerosols can cause a variety of adverse impacts on the downwind environment and communities: 1) Sulfur dioxide and residual acid aerosols (that haven't reacted with ammonia) have been found to have broad detrimental impacts on non-native and agricultural crop biota. (There is some evidence that native plants have developed a degree of resistance to sulfur dioxide and/or the acid constituents in the plume.) The farming communities in Ka'u and HOVE have seen extensive defoliation and leaf damage to both edible crops as well as flowering and ornamental plants (tomatoes, lettuce, roses, protea, etc.). 2) The acid aerosols have been found to substantially lower the pH of rainfall. In locations with limited rainfall (e.g. HOVE) the combined effect of dry deposition of acid aerosols onto roofs, along with acid rainfall, substantially lowers the pH (becoming more acid) of domestic rainwater catchment systems. The likely consequences of the acidified domestic water are increased corrosion of the metallic constituents of both the roof and the plumbing equipment, as well as potential adverse health impacts from consuming the water (e.g. weakened dental enamel, poor uptake of dietary minerals). Increased acidity of the rainfall also has the potential to increase heavy metal exposure from leaching lead from paint (manufactured prior to 1978 when lead oxide was banned from paint) or plumbing systems that have used tin-lead alloys in their solder. The acid will likewise increase corrosion to any exposed metal along the path of the downwind plume including fencing, water lines, water tanks, farm equipment, etc. Even in relatively dry downwind areas, severe corrosion will generate significant economic losses. The most likely process driving the corrosion is dew formation rather than the infrequent rainfall: during the evening hours, as the dew point temperature is approached, the hygroscopic acid aerosols will form an extremely corrosive film, with pH as low as 1, on metallic surfaces. With daily replenishment of fresh acid from dry deposition, and nightly condensation of moisture it's reasonable to anticipate substantially more rapid deterioration of exposed metal surfaces than would occur in similar environments not exposed to the plume acids. A further effect of the increased loading of acid onto agricultural lands in the downwind areas will be accelerated leaching of minerals from the soil column. To date, this process has not been fully researched and, hence, it's difficult to offer an assessment of the long-term impacts of acidification of rainfall on the agriculture communities downwind of Kilauea. 3) The dry deposition of the acid aerosols and ammonia salts will increase the exposure of the downwind environment and communities to chloride, sulfate, and fluoride ions. Whereas moderate dietary intake of chloride and sulfate ion are relatively benign, fluoride ion is both an essential element, at low rates of intake, but can be extremely 8-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG toxic at excessive levels of consumption. Recent surveys of domestic catchment systems in the area of HOVE and Volcano have shown that plume constituents are contributing chloride, sulfate and fluoride ions to catchment waters. HOVE water samples showed the higher concentrations of these ions, by factors of four to ten above those of Volcano, and reflect a higher integrated exposure to plume deposition than did the Volcano community. (The higher rainfall rates and flow through the catchment systems in Volcano is also likely to contribute to the lower values there.) The median values of all ions for both communities were considerably lower than drinking water standards but some samples from both the HOVE and Volcano areas did show values that were substantially higher than the median values and were much closer to drinking water limits. Hence, significant changes in the plume discharge rates or in weather patterns could warrant further monitoring of the catchment systems. Of potentially greater concern is the deposition of fluoride salts onto forage crops. The scientific literature has documented a number of events where sheep, cattle, and horses have suffered significant losses as a result of both acute exposure as well as chronic exposure and accumulation of fluoride salts by grazing animals. Although there have been a few anecdotal reports of symptoms of fluorosis by some ranchers on the Big Island, further investigations will be necessary to determine whether the forage crops are accumulating sufficient fluoride to be of concern in the downwind communities. 8.1.2.1.2 TEB Vent and Pu'u O'o The TEB vent, located on the Kilauea East Rift Zone (KERZ), is discharging gases similar to those at Halema'uma'u, albeit at different relative concentrations. Due to the dynamics of gas release from magma, the relative amount of carbon dioxide to sulfur dioxide is lower at the TEB vent than at Halema'uma'u and the concentrations of HCl and HF are somewhat higher. This discharge is also likely to have lower amounts of sulfur trioxide and hydrogen sulfide than the summit discharge. The sulfur dioxide emission rates from TEB Vent have ranged as high as 2000 tonnes per day but currently are in the range of 1000 tonnes per day or somewhat less. The chemical processes occurring in the TEB plume, are in most respects, identical to those occurring in the Halema'uma'u plume but, because of the vent's location on the KERZ, the trajectory taken by the plume (during normal trade wind conditions) is substantially different from that of the former. Whereas the Halema'uma'u plume is often affected by the upslope winds generated by daytime heating of Mauna Loa's flanks, the TEB plume is far enough off-shore that it only rarely affects the south-east flank of Mauna Loa. However, the TEB plume has shown a history of becoming trapped in the eddy system on the southwest and western flank of Mauna Loa and has consistently affected air quality on the Kona side of the island since the initiation of the Pu'u O'o eruption in 1983. With the onset of the Halema'uma'u eruption, the addition of its plume to that of TEB has produced further deterioration in the Kona air quality. 8-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG Because the TEB plume has traversed a significantly longer trajectory on it's path to the Mauna Loa eddy system, nearly all the sulfur dioxide from the discharge has been oxidized to sulfate, and a higher proportion of the acid aerosols have been neutralized to ammonium salts,than has occurred in the Halema'uma'u plume during its trajectory across Ka'u and into the HOVE area. As a result, under trade wind conditions, the adverse effects of the TEB plume on the Kona community are likely to be more moderate than has been seen in Ka'u and HOVE. However, when southerly winds occur around the island, the TEB plume is carried across the upper Puna area and across into the Hilo area and surrounding communities. Under those conditions, the TEB plume carries abundant sulfur dioxide and acid aerosols. Due to the relative infrequency of these conditions, there's been little documented adverse affect beyond the nuisance effects of poor air quality. Under prolonged or frequent southerly winds, the more populous Hilo and Puna communities would likely experience similar, or even worse, impacts that have been documented in the Ka'u and HOVE communities. 8.1.2.1.3 Ocean Entry Plume The steam and gas plume generated when lava flows into the ocean has a substantially different composition from that of Halema'uma'u and TEB. Whereas in the latter, sulfur dioxide is a major contributor to the acid aerosols present in their plumes, the ocean entry plume contains only minor amounts of sulfur dioxide but much higher concentrations of hydrochloric acid. The latter is generated by the reactions occurring when seawater is boiled to near dryness by its interaction with the lava. The ocean entry plume is also rich in steam and aerosolized seawater, the hydrochloric acid tends to precipitate out more rapidly and, hence, poses a greater threat only in close proximity to the source and a much lesser threat further downwind. Further alleviating the potential for the ocean entry plume to adversely impact the community is that, under the more common trade wind conditions, the plume is driven offshore and over the ocean where most of the aerosols are precipitated out. Hence, the ocean entry plume is only of concern in the immediate vicinity of the shoreline and only during conditions that would bring the plume ashore. 8.1.2.2 Health Effects Tt appears that the levels of vog normally present do not produce acute symptoms although they may produce respiratory problems. Sulfur dioxide is irritating to the eyes, nose, throat and respiratory tract. Short-term exposure to elevated levels of SO2 may cause inflammation and irritation, resulting in burning of the eyes, coughing, difficulty in breathing and a feeling of chest tightness. "Sensitive groups" are children and those with pre-existing respiratory conditions such as asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, and chronic lung or heart disease. These people are especially sensitive to SO2 and may respond to very low levels in the air. Prolonged or repeated exposure to higher levels may increase the danger. Other common symptoms of vog exposure include the following: • Headaches • Breathing difficulties • Tncreased susceptibility to respiratory ailments • Watery eyes • Sore throat 8-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG 8.1.2.3 Effects on Plants Sulfur dioxide must enter leaf mesophyll tissue, through stomata (natural openings in leaf surfaces that regulate gas exchange), to cause plant injury. Once S02 enters the moist mesophyll tissue, it combines with water and is converted to sulfuric acid which burns plant tissue. The general effects of S02 exposure to plants may vary and depend upon plant species, age, and the S02 dosage; these effects may include: • reduced seed germination • enhanced susceptibility to other diseases • foliar necrosis (spots,blight) • epicuticular wax erosion • rupture of epidermis,plasmolysis • reduced chlorophyll content • increased membrane permeability of plant leaves • decreased plant growth(root length, shoot length,leaf numbers) • plant organ or entire plant death 8.1.3 Ashfall Large amounts of ash were deposited both up- and down-wind from the large explosive events of 1790 and 1924. By contrast, the 2008-ongoing Kilauea summit eruption has been persistently producing small amounts of ash punctuated by brief periods of increased production. HVO ash leachate analyses of samples collected near Halema'uma'u after explosive events in March and April found high levels of fluoride and some metals (cadmium, copper, lead, and chromium for example). These levels were elevated but not high enough to warrant immediate concern because of the low ash emission rate measured, even during explosive events. Substances like fluoride could be of concern downwind of any eruption if substantial accumulation occurs, either by increased ash deposition or by a significantly prolonged eruption. 8.2 Significant Historic Events The recorded history of volcanic activity in Hawaii begins with the arrival of the Christian missionaries in the early 1800's and those that are known from oral traditions of the Hawai- ians. Additional information on prehistoric eruptions is based on geologic mapping and dat- ing of old lava flows. 8.2.1 Mauna Loa Mauna Loa has had 33 historically recorded eruptions, most of which have occurred at the summit. Approximately 25% of the eruptions have started on the east-northeast rift zone and another 25% began in the southwest rift zone.37 During the period from 1832 to 1950, 37 Draft Lava Flow Hazard Mitigation Plan,2002 8-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG Mauna Loa averaged one eruption every 3.6 years.3s Since 1950, eruption activity on Mauna Loa has slowed considerably. The two eruptions since 1950 include a 1-day summit eruption in 1975 and a 3-week eruption on the northeast rift zone which advanced to within 4 miles of Hilo. Six eruptions from Mauna Loa have reached the ocean since 1859. The 1859 eruption on the northwest flank of Mauna Loa lasted approximately 300 days and reached the ocean north of Kiholo Bay in the North Kona district. Between 1868 and 1950, 5 lava flows have reached the ocean from eruptions on the southwest rift zone of Mauna Loa. These flows traveled quickly with 4 out of the 5 reaching the ocean in 3 to 48 hours.39 These flows entered the ocean in the South Kona and Ka'u districts. The eruption of 1950 destroyed the Ho'okena- mauka village in South Kona with the swiftly flowing lava traveling 14 miles in only 3 hours. Although the lava flow also crossed the area's only highway in two places, the residents of the village escaped unharmed.411 8.2.2 Kilauea Kilauea was almost continuously erupting at its summit caldera from the beginning of historic records up until 1924. Since 1955, most of the activity has occurred along the east rift zone. The latest eruption of the cast rift zone began in 1983 and is still ongoing as of the date of this report. The southwest rift zone has been less active with only 5 eruptions in the past 200 years; the latest was in 1974.41 April 1, 1955 (FEMA DR-32) Hawaii County experienced approximately$12.6 M in damages. About 1,580 hectares (3,900 acres) were covered by 108 million cubic meters (141 million cubic yards) of lava, mostly a'a. Of the covered land, about 450 hectares (1,100 acres) were under cultivation in the Kama'ili, Kehena, Ke'eke'e, Kau'eleau, and Kapoho areas. Approximately 10.1 km (6.3 miles) of public road were buried, as were many kilometers(miles) of cane-field roads. Iwasaki Camp, in Kama'ili near the upper big bend in the road to 'Opihikao, was overrun, but fortunately some of the houses and all personal belongings had been removed. Tragically, surviving remnants of the camp were destroyed on the last day of the eruption, May 26. In all,21 houses were overrun by 'a'a during the eruption January 21, 1960("1960 Kapoho Eruption of Kilauea Volcano Hawaii") (FEMA DR-96) The eruption of Kilauea ended on December 21, 1958; however the reservoir beneath the summit was filled with lava. Tine earthquakes were recorded near the summit of Kilauea and 38 Macdonald,G.A.,A.T. Abbott,F.L.Peterson,Volcanoes in the Sea(2d ed.),University of Hawaii Press, 1983. 39 Hetiker, 1990 40 USGS Fact Sheet 074-97 41 Heliker,1990. 8-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG on January 12, 1960, more than 1000 earthquakes were recorded north of Kapoho. On January 13, 1960, the volcano erupted, destroying the villages of Koa'e and Kapoho. Volcanic gases were also a significant health issue during this eruption. Figure 8-5. Photograph of 1960 eruption taken 10:00 am January 14,1960 May 18, 1990 (FEMA DR-864) Between 1983 and 1990, lava flow from the Kilauea volcano struck communities along its southern coast. This eruption is the volcanoes most destructive in the past 100 years. In 1990, it moved through the entire community of Kalapana.42 It has destroyed 210 homes, a visitor center at the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park, 8 miles of highways, and historical and archaeological sites. 8.3 Probability of Occurrence 8.3.1 Hazard Areas The U.S. Geological Survey has prepared maps showing volcanic hazard zones in Hawaii County. The "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii," 1990, authored by Christina Heliker and published by the U. S. Geological Survey, describes the lava flow haz- ard zone maps (see Figure 8-6) as follows: Maps showing volcanic hazard zones on the island of Hawaii were first prepared in 1974 by Donal Mullineaux and Donald Petersen of the U.S. Geological Survey and were revised in 1987. The current map divides the island into zones that are ranked from 1 through 9 based on the probability of coverage by lava flows. Other direct hazards from 42 USGS Fact Sheet 074-97 8-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG eruptions, such as tephra fallout and ground cracking and settling, are not specifically considered on this map; however, these hazards also tend to be greatest in the areas of highest hazard from lava flows. Hazard zones from lava flows are based chiefly on the location and frequency of both historic and prehistoric eruptions. The hazard zones also take into account the larger topographic features of the volcanoes that will affect the distribution of lava flows. Finally, any hazard assessment is based on the assumption that future eruptions will be similar to those in the past. Hazard zone boundaries are approximate. The change in the degree of hazard from one zone to the next is generally gradual rather than abrupt, and the change can occur over the distance of a mile or more. Within a single hazard zone, the severity of hazard may vary on a scale too fine to map. These variations may be the result of gradual changes that extend across the entire zone. For example, the hazard posed by lava flow decreases gradually as the distance from vents increases. There may be abrupt changes, however, in the relative hazard because of the local topography. For example, the hills behind Ninole stand high above the adjacent slopes of Mauna Loa and consequently are at a much lower risk from lava flows than the surrounding area, even though the entire area is included in a single zone. To determine the hazard differences within a single zone,more detailed studies are required. Table 8-1 provides the legend for the Lava Flow Hazard Zone Map. Zone 1 is the most haz- ardous area and includes the summits and the rift zones of Mauna Loa and Kilauea which have been the most active in historic time. Zone 2 includes those areas adjacent and down- slope of active rift zones. Zone 3 areas are gradually less hazardous than Zone 2 because of greater distance from the recently active vents and/or topographic conditions make it less likely to be covered by lava. Zone 4 includes all of Hualalai where the frequency of eruptions is lower than on Kilauea or Mauna Loa.43 It is anticipated that volcanic gases will also be a significant hazard during the next eruptions of Mauna Loa and Hualalai. 43 Hecker, 1990 8-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG Table 8-1. Legend for Lava Flow Hazard Zone Ma Hazard Zones for Lava Flows Percentage of area Percentage of area covered by lava since covered by lava in last Zone 1800 750 years Explanation Includes the summits and rift zones of Kilauea and Mauna Loa Zone 1 >25% >65% where vents have been repeatedly active in historic time. Zone 2 18-25% 25-75% Areas adjacent to and downslopc of active rift zones. Areas gradationally less hazardous than zone 2 because of greater distance from recently active vents and/or because the topography Zone 3 1-5% 15-75% makes it less likely that flows will cover these areas. Tncludes all of Hualalai,where the frequency of eruptions is lower Zone 4 approx.S% <15% than on Kilauea and Mauna Low.Flows typically cover large areas. Areas currently protected from lava flows by the topography of the Zone 5 none approx.50% volcano. Zone 6 none very little Same as Zone 5. Zone 7 none none 20%of this area covered by lava 3,500-5,000 years ago. Zone 8 none none Only a few percent of this area covered in the past 10,000 years. Zone 9 none none No eruption in this area for the last 60,000 years- 5 Volcanic Harud Zone -2 _3 4 Z 5 wry.. 6 �7 - -8 -9 Figure 8-6. Lava Flow Hazard Zone Map 8-13 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis-Lava and VOG Future large eruptions of Mauna Loa's southwest rift zone and Hualalai in Kona may evolve quickly and produce lava flows that travel up to tens of kilometers in a few hours or less, generally faster than velocities expected for typical flows at Kilauea. Radial vent eruptions on Mauna Loa's north and west flank occur outside the rift zones (e.g., 1859 eruption and 1877 submarine eruption) and could represent a greater problem than rift zone eruptions because of their potential to begin closer to or within developed areas. 8.4 Risk Assessment Lava risk can be assessed fairly easily, at any property where lava inundation occurs a total loss is assumed. Therefore if the theoretical recurrence interval of lava inundation at an area is known the annual loss (AAL) can be computed by multiplying the total value of the exposed properties by the annual probability of lava inundation. The results of this analysis are included in Table 8-2. The projected AAL for lava inundation is about$24 Million/year. Table 8-2. Lava inundation AAL of ftildmg Stuck in fi a d 7.. T-1 Di-ict 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 Fcpusore Vslue($) AAL ATI.R by Ttact 15001020100 Psp 1'n,WA_ 0% 0% 1, 0% ,0% 0% 0% 100% I, $ 530302,383 $ 1,051 0.0002"1� 150010?0200 Hik,Uppu W,iak,,F,,-t Rri,t 0%. 0%. D%. D% D% 0% 0% 10 D%. $ 232,(,OR,007 $ 470 0.0002% 15001020300 Ho:Pimco-Doa-ntown 0% 0% 100%. 0%. 0% 0% 0% D%. 0%. S 758,039,632 S 781052 0.1032% 150D102040D llilo:Villa Tranca-Kaiko'o 0'% 0% 100%, 01Y., 0"/" 0"/" 0% 0% 0"... $ 632,534,825 $ 652.572 0.1032'% 15001020500 Hilo:Uuivu itv-H..,kt, 0151) 0% 100 0%. D%. 0"/" 0151) 0% 0 S 1,386,852,7R1 $ 1,430,784 0.1032% 15001020600 Milo:K,kuL Pazmcwa 0"l) 0'% 100%, D% D"/" 0"/" 0'% 0'% 0%. S 1,176,770,100 $ 1,214,046 0.1032'% 150 0 102 0 70 1 Milo:Poomko W,,) 0"< 100':.. 01Y.. 01% 0"/" 0"<' 0"< 0':.. S 154,714,65() S 572,286 0.1032'% 15001020702 IIik,Kuvraibri 0%" 0"6 100'%. D"... D'%. 0'% 0"6 0'4) 0"... S 555,696,175 $ 573,299 0.1032'% L50U LO2D801 LIiW:Kukuau-Kvnn 0"<, W/, 100'5., 01Y.. D"/" 0"/" 0"<) w/, 01Y.. S 504970,475 $ 520,966 0.1032"/" 15001020802 Hik,Piihonua-Kxwx , 0.", 0'41 100".a (A D"/" 01% 0"," 0'% 0'S�. S 717,253,225 S 739,974 0.1032% 15001020900 Illlo:IIol.i 0"6 0'% 100"... D%, D"/" 0"/" 0'% 0'% 0%. S 568,778,950 $ 586,796 0.1032'% 1 500 1 021 00 1 Tower Ke,a 0% 01% 100% D% D% 0% 11 01% 0".a S 1,699,785,371 S 1,753,629 D.1032% 15001021002 Kctu,-Voktmo 0"," 0'41 100'% 0% 0% 01% 0"," 0'41 01% S 1,448,609,457 $ 1,444,497 0.1032% 15001021100 45% 45% 10% D% D% 0% 01% 01% 0% $ 1,082,017,600 $ 7,629.913 0.7052% 1 500 1 021 200 Ku'u 01% 501% 25% D% p"/" 25% 01% 01% 0% S 767,986,750 $ 778.265 0.1013% 1 5001 021 300 South Kons 0% 55% 45% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% S 658,165,575 $ 709,210 0.1078% 1 500 1 021 400 KeJbkkka-Czptsin Cook 01% 0",� I W% 0".0 0% 0% 0"1� 01% 0 11.o S 442,919,125 $ 456,949 0.1032% 1 Soo 10215(11 K.J.- 0-1� 0% W. 100% 11% (1% 0-1� 0% W. S 2,_535,736,450 S 274,707 00108% 1 5001 021 50 2 TT-LIsi 0°1� 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0°1� 0% S 609,567,725 S 66,037 0.0108% 15(101021503 K-,,0o,n KC1,,kck. 11% 0% 1(10% 0% 0% (1% 11% 0% 0% S 1422,217,132 S 1467,263 ()1032% 1 5001 021 601 Kzihm 0% 111, 100% 0% (N IN 0% 111 D% S 1,611,1(7,271 1 1,666,331 01032% 1 5001 021 60 2 Kahu1ui-Ks oAm 1u 01, 005" 0% 100% 0% 0% 0°6 0% 0% S 1,369,362,350 S 148,349 0.0108% 1 51101 021701 llaaW knkia 0-1� 0% IN 100% 0% 0% 0-1� 0% IN S 3,43`1,194,975 S 372,582 1101110% 1 51101 0 21 70 2 W,,, e,-Puu An I.1l 0% 111 111% D.. 0% 0% 0% X0°,� 111% S 1,270,321,125 S 135,013 0.01 IIC% 15001021X00 N-1,K.ho,, (1% 1)% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 111 100% S 717,133,107 S 5,176 0.000X% 1 51101 021 900 HLk, 0% 111 11% 0% 11% 11% 11% 1110% 0% $ 431 633,5011 $ 872 11110112% 1500102200(1 Paahau-P:tauilo 0% 0% 100% 259,500,950 $ 524 0.0003% 15001(123100 North Hilo (1% 11% 1110% (1% S _3,181,475 $ 449 11110113% Total $ 27,608,011,843 S 24,034,868 0.0871 8.5 Mitigation Strategies 8.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts The Hawaiian Volcano Observatory (HVO) is at the forefront in advancing our capabilities to address volcanic hazards. HVO was established in 1912 at the summit of Kilauea and has been operated continuously by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) since 1947. The HVO studies current geologic activity at Hawaii's volcanoes, past eruptions, earthquakes and other volcanic hazards. This information is utilized to provide timely warnings to local officials and the public, to assess long-term volcano hazards, and to make hazard-zone maps that help guide land-use planning decisions. Current eruptions are tracked by HVO scientists and the information provided on projected lava flow movements help public safety officials 8-14 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG determine the need for evacuation or other precautions.44 A current lava flow inundation map for Mauna Loa that identifies inundation areas is shown in Figure 8-7. In order to coordinate the efforts of HVO and other involved agencies, the "Lava Flow Hazard Mitigation Plan" (November 2002) identified several tools to improve planning and emergency response for lava flow hazards: • Probabilistic Hazard Maps. The HVO is continuing to work towards developing Probabilistic Lava Flow Hazard Maps for the Island of Hawaii, which will replace the existing Island of Hawaii Lava Hazard Zones 1-9. (See hqp://hvo.wr.us g s lzov/products/OF98794/OF987toe.html) Instead of boundaries designating whether lands are inside or outside a lava hazard zone, such maps would show gradational colors or patterns for increased or decreased hazard. The existing hazard zone maps have led to large jumps in insurance rates across narrow zone boundaries depending on what zone the property is in. With probabilities, insurance companies could, if they chose, apply a sliding scale of rates on the basis of probabilities, so that there would rarely be large rate differences across short distances. It is anticipated that the final product will be a single map showing generalized probabilities of lava flow inundation over a specific period of time. 44 USGS Fact Sheet 074-97 8-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG Z U S G S ram 77,1 1 SOUTH 0- KIPAHOEH E'_ • UT 11, Ho X 7L-O� gf! t7 + ........ ....... ,v "V Figure 8-7. Lava Flow Inundation Map 8-16 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG 8.5.1.1 Lava Directional Maps and near real time Modeling Capabilities Once an eruption is imminent, emergency managers would benefit from information forecasting possible lava flow direction as well as the size and speed of the flow. Combining predictive modeling results with GIS data and information, emergency managers will better be able to identify populations at risk and potential social and economic impacts. Towards this end, HVO is in the process of developing two related products: 'Lava shed Map,' which predicts the gravity-driven directional path using the hydrologic functions of GTS and a digital elevation model (DEM), and a 'Lava Flow Atlas,' which portrays the paths of known lava flows in the past. Together, the products will indicate the range of directions and possible paths that the lava from specified vents can be expected to take. Besides direction, a predictive model needs a range of size and speed of the flow. These estimates must be based on observations and measurements of past Hawaii lava flows and knowledge of the terrain, coupled with what is known of any precursory phenomena, such as earthquakes. HVO is currently compiling all available information on lava flow behavior during each post-1840 eruption in order to characterize these quantities. 8.5.1.2 Monitoring and Warning Capabilities Volcanic monitoring and surveillance are based on the movement of molten rock or magma and/or volcanic gas beneath a volcano that will precede any large eruption. HVO uses three primary techniques to detect magma and monitor its movements: 1. Monitoring of volcanic earthquakes. Any movement of magma requires it to push its way through the rocks of the earth's crust. This causes fracturing of rock, and movement along faults, resulting in earthquakes that can be detected at the earth's surface. Specific types of seismicity can be "mapped" to particular regions under the volcano allowing scientists to plot the passage of magma. 2. Monitoring of ground deformation. As the magma approaches the surface of the earth, and moves into the conduit below the vent of a volcano,the displacement of the surrounding rocks to make way for the magma causes the ground surface to move and the volcano to swell. This rising or swelling can then be used to assess the depth of the magma body and often give some idea of its volume. 3. Monitoring of'the chemistry of'volcanic gases. Magma deep in the earth contains gases dissolved in it. As the magma rises to shallow levels, these gases are released and, because they are mobile when compared to the sluggish liquid magma, they rise more rapidly to the surface and are discharged through gas vents. The composition and temperature of these gases give clues as to how close magma is to the surface. HVO aims to provide weeks to months warning guidance of potential eruptions at Mauna Loa and hours to days warning at Kilauea. Precursors before an eruption of Hualalai may last for hours to weeks, though this time period has not been tested because no eruption has occurred since monitoring was started on Hualalai. HVO has 65 seismic stations on the island of Hawaii to monitor volcanic earthquake activity. Moreover, HVO has scores of ground-movement monitoring stations, of which more than 20 are continuously reporting GPS systems, 11 are electronic borehole tilt-meters, and 4 arc electronic deep borehole strain-meters. All field instruments radio signals to HVO in real time for evaluation and interpretation. 8-17 Hawaii Countv Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG 8.5.2 Future Plans Project Description Status NOAA HYSPLIT Model tries to forecast SO2 Based on wind modeling of Being used in an evaluation hourly based on meteorological conditions and dispersion over the course trial at HCDA and USGS emission rates of the Halemaumau and Pu'u of each day. HVO. NOAA HYSPLIT O'o sources. modeling was initiated by John Rays of the National Park Service with Roland Draxier from NOAA.The current effort is a 2-yr cooperative agreement between HVO and UHM (Steve Businger).Tere are two other parts to the current gas dispersion study:a)UHM will develop a pilot near real- time gas emission rate monitoring deployment and b)HVO will install a dense SO2 and meteorological monitoring network to better understand near-vent gas dispersion. Develop probahilistic lava flow maps and One of the technical issues Preliminary 100-year% modeling: is in how to consider probability of inundation USGS is in the process of modernizing the lava overtopped prior flows that maps are being developed in become concealed by more 2009. Need to resolve under- inundation probabilistic maps. Based on recent flows. Otherwise, sampling of hazard before average recurrence intervals with a Poisson the map probabilities may releasing. Could either use probabilistic model. be too low. borings and/or simulation to refine. Enhanced interactive Lava Flow Modeling The model does not Received FEMA funding and Program FlowGo 11 compute a rate of advance under development: The The study will provide updated information to of the terminus of the flow. most likely candidate for use identify at-risk areas as a lava flow progresses, Land cover,roughness,are of this model is the upslope factors that are not a part of part of Mauna Loa. and assist in locating highest hazard areas as the present model flows approach. formulation,but which Computation based on cooling of lava and would be needed to be increase in viscosity as it moves down the slope considered in the model to within a lavashed.It estimates where the initial estimate a rate of flow. The flow is likely to go.There is a random model does not include parameter term that allows the flow to follow a build-up of deposited lava non-deterministic path,enabling a Monte Carlo affecting the path of approach. subsequent flows. Evaluate economic impacts and critical To be based on probabilistic The existing lava hazard zone infrastructure and facility vulnerability from lava hazard mapping under maps have been used to lava inundation development by HVO determine expected losses to residential construction in each district Community testing of pH and metal content in Conducted by CSAV at water catchment systems community workshops 8-18 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Hazard Analysis—Lava and VOG Conduct Public Meetings on VOG/SO2 and Conducted by CSAV at how to mitigate it's effects community workshops Study of vog mitigation effectiveness T. Removal technologies being tested II. Tests to be run A. Air conditioner A. Base case test: B. Dehumidifier 1) standard volume—20'or 40'container— C. Particulate filters/Electrostatic sealable Precipitator 2) source of S02;source of S03. Former would D. Fan with chemically treated fabric be simply a tank and regulator for sulfur filter dioxide;latter is a hot plate and pyrex glassware with concentrated sulfuric acid;fan for uniform The base case would give us most of the mixing;relative humidity instrument. information that we will need to make 3) sensor for SO2(electrochemical sensor with recommendations. We will undoubtedly get data output would be adequate);nephelometer questions on the rates of removal and the most for aerosol sulfuric acid(sulfur trioxide); appropriate size of the unit that the homeowner humidifier may want to purchase so running the Base Case 4) Run baseline to determine what the natural rate +1 test with two or three different size units of decay is in the container volume:inject would help us provide answers to those known volume of S02,or to a target SO2, questions. concentration;mix for uniformity(test run with electrochemical SO2 detector);track natural Base Case+2 would only be useful for the decay rate of 5O2. Run similar test with sulfur obsessives. It is quite likely that the largest trioxide while monitoring with nephelometer. effect of the fabric surface materials will be to 5) Under uniform conditions,inject SO2/SO3 and accelerate the removal rate at high run:air conditioning unit;dehumidifier;a concentrations. But,as removal proceeds,the particle filter/electrostatic precipitator;fan and fabric surface materials will likely give up some bicarbonate fabric particulate filter;and track of the SO2 that was taken up by the fabrics. rate of decline of SO2/5O3. For AC and (SO2 is kind of a sticky molecule and will dehumidifier will need to do additional runs attach itself to available surfaces—much like while operating a humidifier since the water vapor is taken up in fabrics.) The sulfur effectiveness of the method will depend on trioxide/sulfuric acid aerosols,once taken up on condensation of water on the chilling elements. the surfaces will probably not come back off at B. Base Case+1 a measurable rate. 1) Run 5)above using two or more levels of air flow in each device to determine what the relative increase in rate of removal can be effected with higher air capacity. C. Base Case+2 1) Run 4)&5)above with"domestic materials"in the container volume. The nature of the surfaces in the test volume will likely affect the natural rate of decline of the gases/aerosols. Can probably use hanging fabrics and carpeting as surrogates for furniture and drapes. 5-19 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Appendix A Where to Find Information about Vog, Sulfur Dioxide(S02), Particulates, and Volcanic Ash Hawaii Volcano Helpline On August 1,2008,the Hawai'i Department of Health announced the introduction of a toll-free phone helpline where the public can obtain up-to-date information on Vog and volcanic emissions.The toll-free number is: (866)767-5044. The helpline is staffed by trained professionals Monday-Friday from 5 AM to 5 PM,and on weekends from 9 AM to 5:30 PM. Recorded messages,updated daily,are accessible 7 days a week,24 hours a day(including holidays)and include information on daily S02 and particulate levels from monitoring stations on Hawai'i Island. Hawaii County Civil Defense(HCCD) Emissions from Kilauea Volcano Brochure provides information on sulfur dioxide emissions,vog,ash fall,protective health measures,and relevant contacts.The brochure was developed through a partnership between County,State,and Federal agencies,and the American Lung Association of Hawai'i. htty://co.hawaii.hi.us/ed/emissions brochure.pdf Kilauea Eruption Update Website includes link to the"Emissions from Kilauea Volcano"brochure,but primarily provides information on Kilauea's current eruption and frequently asked questions about lava flows. http://www.lavainfo.us/ United States Geoloeical Survey (USGS) Sulfur Dioxide,Vog,and Volcanic Ash:Frequently Asked Questions about Air Quality in Hawaii Recent(2008)detailed FAQ document covering a wide range of issues on S02,Vog,and Ash. Includes links to many other related websites and documents. httn://hvo.wr.usas.aov/hazards/F'AO S02-Vog-Ash/main.html Webcam of Halema'uma'u vent at Kilauea Summit Live Panorama of Halema'uma'u vent in Hawaii Volcanoes National Park. httv://hvo.wr.usgs.gov/cam3/ Hawaiian Volcano Observatory Website includes recent Kilauea eruption update and summary,information on volcanic hazards, and weekly Volcano Watch articles. Search the Volcano Watch archive for information about vog and volcanic gases. htty://hvo.wr.us g s.go v/ A8-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Appendix A Volcanic Air Pollution—A Hazard in Hawal'i Fact Sheet 169-97 Information about volcanic air pollution(vog)in Hawai'I(revised June 2000) http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs 169-97/ Volcanic Ash ...What It Can Do and How to Prevent Damage Website about ash—what it is and how to prevent or reduce its damaging effects. http://voleanoes.usgs ovg_/ash/ Volcanic Ash Fall--A"Hard Rain" of Abrasive Particles Fact Sheet 027-00 Information about ash and its potential health threats and hazards. httn://Dubs.usgs.gov/fs/fsO27-O0/ Hawaii Volcanoes National Park(HAVO) Current S02 Conditions–Kilauea Summit National Park Service:Nature and Science–Explore Air Website Map showing location of the Halema'uma'u and Pu'u'O'0 gas plumes in HAVO and S02 concentrations(ppm)at the Kilauea Visitor Center and Jaggar Museum. http://www.nature.nps.eov/air/webcams/parks/havoso2alert/havoalert.cfm Sulfur Dioxide(SO2)Advisory Program National Park Service:Nature and Science–Explore Air Website Overview of sulfur dioxide monitoring in HAVO and advisory levels,plus links to more information about volcanic gases,volcanic pollutions,and air quality in Hawaii. htty://www.nature.nns.gov/air/webeams/narks/havoso2alert/havoadvisories.cfm#AdvisoryLevel Criteria Air Quality Information National Park Service:Nature and Science–Explore Air Website General information about air quality in HAVO. http://www.nature.nos.gov/air/Permits/ARIS/havo/ Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) Frequently Asked Questions and Answers on Vog and Volcanic Emissions from Kilauea A six-page Q&A covering common questions and answers about Vog,monitoring,health effects,protective measures,and water catchment issues. httn://hawaii.gov/health/about/reports/vog aa.pdf Precautionary Measures for Elevated Sulfur Dioxide Levels on the Big Island Web page on sulfur dioxide(SO2)emissions from Kilauea Volcano,including links to Frequently Asked Questions about what S02 is,how it affects health,and how exposure can be minimized and recommendations by the American Lung Association. httt)://hawaii.gov/health/environmental/air/cab/cab precautions.html AS-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Appendix A Online Air Quality Data Maps showing air quality conditions in the Hawaiian islands. Data collected by HDOH real-time air quality monitoring network.Click on link to"On-line Air Quality Data".Includes S02, PM2.5,and H2S data on Hawai'i Island under link titled"Air Quality on Big Island",and just S02 data under link titled"S02 data on Big Island".Note that data is collected real time,but report on-line typically lags by about 2 hours. htty://hawaii.eov/health/enviror mental/air/cab/cab onlinedata/cab onlinedata intro.html Clean Air Branch(CAB) Website includes link to"Public Notification:Air Pollutant Exceedence on Big Island."This is a list by HDOH air monitoring location,of dates and specific levels recorded when there have been exceedences of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards(NAAQS). httv://Iiawaii.lzov/health/enviiomnental/air/cab/index.html Safe Drinking Water Branch(SDWB) Website includes information on a subsidized testing program for lead and copper in catchment systems that is available through the SDWB(lead or copper could be"leached"into catchments or related piping as a result of vog/acid rain impacts on roofs/gutters or piping that contain these metals).Website also includes link to other information on catchment testing and guidelines for safe construction and operation of catchments: httn://hawaii.gov/health/enviromnental/water/sdwb/raincatch/raincatch.html American Lung Association of Hawaii(ALA-H) Website provides information about vog—what it is and what to do about it and air quality in Hawaii. Links to other relevant sites. htt n://www.ala-hawaii.org/airgualitv.asn U.S.Environment Protection Agency Website EPA AIR NOW–Fine Particulates(2.5 micrometers and less)Air Quality Index for Hawaii. Indicates Good,Moderate,Unhealthy,etc."color-code"for Department of Health monitoring site locations,including Kona,Pahala,Mt.View,and Hilo.Also see health guidance messages associated with the color codes.Data includes"forecasted"condition regarding fine particulates for the next day. htti)://www.aimow.gov/ At home page,select"Hawaii"from drop down menu under banner headed"Local Air Quality Conditions and Forecasts". See condition/color code for particulate levels at various island locations.Click onto specific location city to see detail for that particular location and health message associated with level/color code at that location. S02-How Sulfur Dioxide Affects the Way We Live&Breathe Web page about S02—what it is,where it comes from,causes for concern,health and environmental impacts,and EPA's effort to reduce it. httn://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/so2/index.html AS-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 8:Appendix A International Volcanic Health Hazard Network(IVHHN) Website provides guidelines,databases,and publications on the health hazards of volcanic gas and ash. http://www.ivhhn.orc/ Hawaii Rainwater Catchment Systems (HRCS) Association Recommendations for Catchment Users Due to Increased Volcanic Activity Web page provides info on steps to take to minimize ash and debris in water catchment. httv://www.hawaiirain.orp-/news/index.phy UH Hilo,Center for the Study of Active Volcanoes. Website contains information on Coping with Vog from Halema'uma'u and links to information on Coping with Vog from Pu'uO'o,as well as Coping with Vog on Catchment Tanks. http://www.uhh.hawaii.edu/—nat haz/ Volcano School of Arts& Sciences,Volcano,Hawaii This website includes real-time data from S02 monitors at the charter school,as well as an S02 monitor located on 5`h Street in a nearby Volcano neighborhood.This school is located approximately 4 miles NE of the Halema'uma'u vent at the Kilauea Summit. httv://volcano-school.ora/ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) GOES-WEST satellite:a geostationary NOAA satellite used most often for weather tracking. Images are typically acquired every 15 minutes.The loop is posted by the Washington DC Volcanic Ash Advisory Center for the purpose of tracking emissions from Hawaii volcanoes. The imagery automatically switches from infrared at night to visual during the day.Recently,it has been useful for tracking volcanic gas emissions from Halema'uma'u,Pu'u'O'o,and the Waikupanaha ocean entry during the day and hot lava flows at night. http://www.ssd.noaa.gov/VAAC/kilauea/sloop-vis.html National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) MODIS satellite:a NASA satellite pair,Aqua and Terra,which passes over Hawaii twice a day. During daylight hours,the images are taken at about 11 am and 2 pm H.S..T.This imagery can be useful for tracking plumes,and can be viewed about 3-5 hours after acquisition at: http://rai)idfire.sci.ssfc.nasa.gov/subsets/?subset=AERONET Mauna Loa Sept.2008 AS-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 9. Tsunamis Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis CHAPTER 9 - TSUNAMIS 9.1 Description of Hazard A tsunami is a series of great waves most commonly caused by violent movement of the sea floor, usually a fault resulting in an earthquake, but also caused by nearshore or underwater landslides or volcanic eruptions. In contrast, regular ocean waves are generated from the wind. Tsunami are characterized by exceptional speed(up to 590 mph), long wave length(up to 120 miles), long period between successive crests (varying from 5 minutes to a few hours, generally 10 to 60 minutes), and low height in the open sea. Often the first wave of a tsunami may not be the largest. The danger from a tsunami can last for several hours after the arrival of the first wave. Sometimes a tsunami causes the water near the shore to recede, exposing the ocean floor. Tsunamis can be very large. At the shoreline, their height can be initially as great as 30 feet or more (100 feet in extreme cases), and they can move inland several hundred feet. Tsunamis can travel up rivers and streams that lead to the ocean. The speed of onset depends upon whether the tsunami is a distant tsunami or a local tsunami. Distant tsunamis result from earthquakes in Alaska, Japan, Chile, and other Pacific Rim loca- tions (see Figure 9-1). A warning is almost certain and ranges from three hours to 12 hours. Local tsunamis result from earthquakes or underwater landslides in the vicinity of the Hawai- ian Islands, most frequently near the south coast of this island with the probability much higher for the Ka'u-Puna districts than for South Kona. Adequate advance warning for local tsunamis is not presently technologically possible. Therefore, the public must be educated that the occurrence of strong ground shaking in a coastal area should be considered as a local tsunami"warning"and an immediate coastal evacuation should follow. 9-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis 140• 180• 10 —6 0- 1� r 40• J PAN I 5 n Fr—wc. oIr kro 1 I Z�M I f Arp�la • 9M I 7hr 6hr Shr .MiMrey Li/ �M "HAWAIIAN ISLANDS ! / 'Yfak�I. �� / •. Is p. _ t ` Fiji., `Semoon Is. 1 0[F / \ TohOi. *RO OrMWK Is t / I 2 \`� I Apr, I —"01 IOLUL� `tic M 96 f 40 N ZEALAND D r` � P ILO / b / q _ Map showing travel times(in hours)of tsunamis from the Pacific Ocean rim to Honolulu.The small stars indicate the approximate points of origin of some tsunamis that have affected Hawaii.The origins of the disastrous tsunamis of 1946 and 1960 are shown by the two larger stars. Figure 9-1. Travel Times for Distant Tsunamis. Source: Thomas,W."The Variety of Physical Environments among Pacific Islands,"in Man's Place in the Island Ecosystem(ed.by F.R.Fosberg),Bishop Museum Press,1965. 9-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis 9.2 Significant Historic Events Tsunamis are infrequent events but can be extremely destructive. Since 1812, 25 tsunamis have adversely impacted the Big Island. Of these, 22 were distant tsunamis and 3 were local tsunamis(see Figure 9-2 for historical events and run-up heights). Hawaii •,ter.. r w I twr a, drt•P In Ilw•IYn M W. Tsunamis . S,i,riaaforfa6iacYfAjRtnel[ -_ -SIP ,tea• Vs9 4W-4 t Zas :s of tan >amasR v.cs n•.R t� I s.M..0m. nms Sri {u"�s: - - " firer v„` •a +su rrmar r.0 3 0!2 - --- !'@R tar,Y a>Lft !E YlR UW@ lam S T]a Val ! �fF Am? UW [oa J�. � !2 •ate „+.� r ter; %WA faai�•isi Y.33 j •� 1We R tYF Yam Qd.WY 0-46 m ,tr! `a jai a.•i4T. \� '1Wiy,l:61,r11R/wra�cae�a'V�IF lMM•M rRrwrr, Irw n• �,islwpa U,wwpvwu a�•+w Na °-]9Gei� 'an yc ns�mr r�a" tre�ntr��.ir�►r.sr ��lw . 1904000-19700-e000 1W varp�sm•aatiro>rtrr as «t y. fits -0 QW-2 300 i•t -QW— s•+ti.ass 12.000 t•,1 co". D I 29- +�e..o.o= Mow~ UrOan nom• 1001 M.V4 CO r�-P I") 1{�I.1 1 1 0 lawn Figure 9-2. Historic Tsunamis of Hawaii island Source: Fletcher,C,B.Richmond,E.Grossman,A.Gibbs,Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone, Prepared in cooperation with University of Hawaii,State of Hawaii Office of Planning,and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,U.S.Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series 1-2761,2002. The most devastating tsunamis to hit the Island of Hawaii in this century occurred in 1946 and 1960. In both cases, the worst damage was inflicted on the northeastern coast of the island. The tsunami of 1946 originated in the Aleutian Islands, struck Hawaii without warning, and killed over 170 people, mainly at Laupahoehoe and Hilo where the wave heights averaged 30 feet. The maximum wave height was 55 feet at Pololu Valley on the northern tip of the island. The 1960 tsunami originated in Chile and advanced upon the island from the southeast; again, its effects were greatest at Hilo. The arrival time of this tsunami was correctly predicted, but many people failed to heed the warnings, and authorities evacuated an insufficient area of Hilo. As a result, 61 lives were lost as waves up to 35 feet high crashed 9-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis through homes. Whole city blocks were swept clean of all buildings, and 580 acres were flooded. $23 Million in damages were reported. The tsunamis of 1868 and 1975 were locally generated by earthquakes beneath the southern coast of the island. The 1868 waves destroyed several coastal villages in the Ka'u and Puna districts, most of which were never rebuilt. The 1975 tsunami claimed two lives and caused widespread damage along the Kalapana coast. Table 9-1. Tsunamis with Run-up of 2 meters or more:1812 to present Maximum height in Hawaii Deaths 1n Date Place of observation Source Meters Feel in Damage in Hawaii 1812:Dec.21 11 Hookena,Hawaii California 25 8 Hut flooded 1819:April 12 W.Hawaii Chile 20 7 Houses destroyed 1837:Nov.7 Hilo,Hawaii Chile 6.0 20 16 100 houses destroyed 1841:May 1T HIIO,HaWall Kamcnatka 4.6 15 - UI11(noWil 1860:Dec.1 Maliko Bay,Maui N.Pacific 2i 3.6 12 - Houses,wharf destroyed 1868:April 2 Keauhou Lancing,Hawaii Ka'u 13.7 45 47 Severe in Puna and Ka'u 1868:Aug.13 Hilo,Hawaii ChiJe 4.6 15 - Houses,bridges destroyed 1869:Aug.24 S.E.Puna S.Pack 2J 8.2 27 - Houses destroyed,roads washed out 1877:May 10 Hilo,Hawaii Chile 4.8 16 5 Severe in Hilo 1878:Jan.10 Mallko Bay,Maui N.Mololkal 21 3.6 12 - scattered flooding,N_Mail.N.Gahu 1896:June 15 Keauhou,Hawaii Japan 5.5 18 Houses,wharfs,stares destroyed 1903:Nov 29 Pelekunu.Molokai N.Molokai 4.5 15 Houses destroyed on Maui, railroad washed out on Oahu 1906:Aug.17 Maalaea,Maui Chile 3.6 12 Piers damaged 1919:CU.2 Hoopuloa,Hawaii S.Kona 4.3 14 bWhan damaged,car swept away 1922=Nov.11 Hilo,Hawaii Chile 21 7 Fishing boats swept away 1923-Feb-3 Hilo,Hawaii Kamchatka 6.1 20 1 $1,500,ODD 1933:March 2 Keauhou,Hawaii Japan 3.2 10 - Boathouses,walls deAroyed in Kona 1946:April 1 Wailkolu valley,Molokai Aleulian Islands 16.4 54 159 $26.004,000 1952:Nov.4 Kaena,Oahu Kamchatka 9.1 30 - $1.000,000 1957:Marco 9 Haena,Kaual Aleullan Islands 16.1 53 - $5,000,040 1960:Plat+22 Hilo,Hawaii Chile 14.5 34 61 $23.000,000 1964:`larch 27 Waimea Bay,Oahu Alaska 4.9 16 - $68.000 1975:N-)v 29 Keauhou Landing,Hawaii S.Puna 14.3 47 2 $1.500,000 1' Earnest tsunami forwhich ckfiimte rnformationemsts. 2' Probable source_ Source- George Paaras-Cmayarmis.Carafog qf Tsrmamis in the HnurwPr n Fsiands (U.S.Coast an4'Geo&4ic Sm ey.May 1969): Harold G.Loomis,Thv Inmaim gfNavember 29,075 pa Hmww (11auaiiListitute of Geophysics,December 1975),pp.1 and 10, D.C.Cox avd L hiocganjocal Tsunands and PbmiNe local Tsunawrs in Hawarr (ELTvml1Im itute of Geophysics,Report HEG 77-14, No=ber 1977);Doak C.Cox,Tsunami Casuaines and MonaLlly in Hrrtwn(University of Hamad,Euviravnamt Center,June 1987), p.34,-James F.Lander Find Pattrcia A_Lockrid2e,UWW Stares Tspenauds(1nc1?dmg Unired-fares Possessions)1696LI988, Publication 41-2,National Geophn sicalData Center,Aq"1989,pp.17-77,U_5.Geological Survey,Hawaiian Volcano Obwnatorv. records;Pacific Tsunami l'e'arning Center,records 9-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis 9.3 Probability of Occurrence 9.3.1.1 Distant Tsunamis Distant tsunami events occur with a roughly 7% probability in a year. Events with smaller waves have a higher probability than large waves (see Figure 9-3). Waves can strike all coasts and persist up to several hours. HBMTVS RECURRENCE PROBAB0.R % MLO TSUNAMIS SINCE 1832;COX,CURTIS 30 7S t € + j r I i i 1 1 LL p 0 15 _ w o o : I r i r 1 I 1 10 100 PR08AMMY,YEARS,RB01Hi UREATER IRAN G7 OBSERVED 11Y,Y17� Figure 9-3. Tsunami Height vs.Recurrence Probability for Hilo 9.3.1.2 Local Tsunami Local tsunami events occur with a roughly 2%probability in a year. A local tsunami will be of limited extent and duration. Near the seismic source, the waves may be 40 feet high but have a short period and diminish rapidly, as demonstrated by the 1975 Halape tsunami (Figure 9-4 shows the wave heights from the 1975 Halape tsunami as they traveled around the coast to North Kona). 9-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis TSUNAMI WAVE HEIGHTS, (Max.Wave) 20 South North DISTANT Combined historical distant tsunamis 15 h� � I w LL i = 10 � CAPT COOK w 2 KEAHOLE 5 � 1975 LOCAL i Southeast coast 0 45 So 55 80 as 70 75 80 COAST MILE Figure 9-4. 1975 Halape Local Tsunami Wave Heights vs.Distant Tsunami DATA FROM 1975 LOCAL TSUNAMI Runup Height and Time vs Distance 50 25 45 4 V � 20 0 HEIGHT / TIME �/ RUNUP 35 \ \ TIME, FEET 30 \ }� 15 MINUTES 25 \ // 20 \ 10 15i 10 x 5 / 0 0 80 60 40 20 5 0 2 20 40 60 80 DISTANCE FROM ORIGIN,MILES Figure 9-5. Run-up height vs.time and distance,data from 1975 local tsunami 9.3.2 Hazard Areas Two types of tsunami maps need to be distinguished: tsunami inundation and tsunami evacu- ation maps. Tsunami inundation maps show the historical or calculated limits of inundation in terms of the limits of inland inundation and the run-up height (for definition of terms, see 9-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis Figure 9-6).45 These inundation zones have been incorporated into the FIRM maps (V and VE zones) and guide land use and construction standards. The tsunami evacuation zones are derived from tsunami inundation maps, but are more conservative than the inundation snaps in that they encompass a broader area that are potentially at risk that should be evacuated and refer to readily identifiable physical landmarks such as roads where possible(see Figure 9-8). On the one hand,these evacuation zones should not be so broad as to jam evacuation capabil- ities; on the other hand,they should not be too narrow to risk injury or death. NOTE R MAY BE GREATER OR LESS THAN h , DO NOT CONFUSE. PRESENT WATER LEVEL/LINE MAY BE USED IN LIEU OF MSL, IF STATED. MAX MAX WATER LEVEL INTRUSION — -- ---—_ POINT h=HEIGHT OF T MEAN WAVE AT SHORELINE SEA LEVEL I R=RUNUP HEIGHT ABOVE MSL MSL 1 INUNDATION LIMIT Figure 9-6. Definition Sketch of Tsunami Inundation Terms The evacuation zone map applies to distant tsunamis, assuming worst case wave action from any probable source area. For local tsunamis, the arrival times are very short (typically min- utes), and the felt earthquake is likely to be the only warning that many residents will receive in advance of the first tsunami wave. Mitigation,therefore, depends primarily on public edu- cation for a swift and appropriate response from within the coastal communities. A new sys- tem is in place to alert police of a local tsunami generated from the southern coast of the island. This system senses sea level rise at six locations on this southern shoreline.46 It alerts the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center which immediately confirms the event by correlating it to an earthquake signal and advises the County Civil Defense (or the police after working hours). This system supplements the slower and less definitive earthquake-only local system currently in service. 45 Historical data on tsunamis is primarily scattered run-up values. Hilo is unique in having well-documented historical inundation lines for several tsunamis. Inundation for areas other than Hilo is the calculated"maxi- mum expectable inundation". 46 Walker,Daniel,"Local Tsunami Real-time Warning System,"Science of Tsunami Hazards,v.20,n. 1, 2002. 9-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis NOR KOHA HANIAKU 1 SOUTH KO HANIAKUA,` t SOUTH HILO ; HILO NoffnA NA SOUTH I H o NORTHHILO NORTH KO C� � � P A KMIZI; .� 1 Kahl A SOUTH KONA H KONA KAU Legend -Tsunami Evacuation Zones Major Road \ Other Roads i' 0 3 fi 72 78 24 Miles Figure 9-7. Tsunami evacuation zones Inset of Kailua-Kona Town 1 �4- t Tsunami Evacuation Area Major Roads Census Designated Places Figure 9-8. Tsunami evacuation zones,Kailua-Kona zoom 9-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis 9.3.2.1 Tsunami Inundation Zones i - on st shore 3 ..k�� � � • I• 1 ey ion e.a as 7o es Figure 9-9. Historical and Hypothetical tsunamis for inundation mapping Figure 9-10. Updated tsunami evacuation zone map locations being developed 9-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis Coastal floodplain boundaries shown on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) for the County of Hawaii are based on the 100-year Tsunami: wave elevation; runup elevations; known topographic characteristics; and, a depth of flooding by the incoming Tsunami wave of 4.0 feet. The 100-year Tsunami inundation boundaries were delineated using methods outlined in "Tsunami Inundation Prediction," by C. L. Brentschneider and P. G. Wybro, which was presented at the 15`x' International Conference on Coastal Engineering, Honolulu, HI, in July 1976. Since Hilo has one of the most complete historical inundation mappings, this data was compared with the Preliminary DFIRMs to verify whether the VE zone encompassed the furthest inland inundation limits. Surprisingly, the VE underzoned the historical inundation (see Figure 9-11). FEMA and the County are currently working to improve the Preliminary DFIRMS for the County of Hawaii, which will include a careful evaluation of the coastal high hazard areas in terms of combining the most protective inundation area from FEMA's 2008 Hurricane Flood Study for Hawaii County(refer to Section 10.4.1.3) and the current effective FIRMs' coastal high hazard areas. Historical Inundation vs Evacuation Zone vs FIRM Legend Study Area:Hilo [=IHiston-I nundation Zone streets ®FIRM 100 Year Entire area in Tsunami Evacuation Zone Figure 9-11.Comparison of Historical Tsunami Inundation to FIRM VE Zone for Hilo 9-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis 9.3.2.2 Evacuation Zone Maps Hawaii was the first state to develop tsunami evacuation maps. The tsunami evacuation maps were created in 1989-91 using one-dimensional numerical models.47 This approach used historical inundation records to infer the nearshore tsunami heights, which in turn provide the inundation limits through repeated calculations at transects perpendicular to the adjacent coastlines. However, the original inundation maps for Hawaii data on which these were based are no longer available. Technical advances enable a more rigorous approach using a two-dimensional model. The results of the 2-D model indicate that the existing evacuation lines may need to be moved further inland in certain areas. Additionally, the 2-D model could better define inland waterway embankment inundation which was not addressed by the 1-D model. However, because of the extensive cost to remap the entire evacuation zone, remapping is prioritized to recent coastal developments and densely populated areas. A new generation of tsunami evacuation zone maps is being prepared in 2009-2010, based on 2-D inundation modeling by the University of Hawaii, School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology(UH SOSET). The analysis uses 2-dimensional modeling with updated bathymetry and topographical data utilizing recent LIDAR topographical surveys, which provide a higher resolution of the shallow reef forms below sea level and shoreline above sea-level than previously available. The National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program requires 2D numerical modeling and credible worse-case scenarios when mapping tsunamis affecting Alaska, California, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii. The tsunami inundation and runup analysis performed by UH SOSET uses scenarios from tsunami-genic source regions along the Pacific Rim, see Figure 9-9. The methodology to meet this standard essentially uses the same 5 historical events (4 from Aleutian and one from Chile) used by the original tsunami map, but uses 2D methodology; also added hypothetical events assumed to be 2X the Great Sumatra Tsunami (beyond credible magnitudes), from other directions (west, e.g., Japan, and south Pacific, e.g., Marianas, and East Pacific, e.g., Cascadia), to test the model results. The hypothetical events do not appear to generate greater inundation than the historical suite of events due to directionality effects in the wave propagation. The 2-D modeling has been validated as producing good results when hindcasting historical inundation and runup data. The analysis has provided updated inundation zones around the island at locations indicated in Figure 9-10. Evacuation maps are soon to be updated in 2010 based on the results of this analysis. The inundation and run-up analysis is based on scenarios not on statistical probabilistic methods. An improved analysis would develop "Maximum credible inundation" maps based on probabilistic estimation. At some point, building code maps will need to incorporate tsunami inundation. Building designers need the tsunami inundation data to properly site and design structures against tsunami forces. 9.4 Risk Assessment Similar to the coastal flooding hazard an annualized loss can be estimated based on the exposure and the probabilistic tsunami inundation. 47 Curtis,George,D.,Hawaii Inundation/Evacuation Map Project,Final Report,Joint Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research,University of Hawaii,April 1991. 9-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis To describe tsunami-prone landscapes and community vulnerability to tsunamis on the Hawaiian coast, (USGS Scientific Investigations Report 2007-5208) used geographic- information-system (GIS) tools and publicly available geospatial data to create spatial overlays of hazard and socioeconomic data. Details on each of the socioeconomic datasets used in this analysis follow an overview of our analytical approach and the study area. Vulnerability calculations and comparisons are limited to the exposure and sensitivity of the urban footprint and certain assets, including developed land, populations (residential, employee, and tourists), economic assets and critical facilities. Exposure is defined as the amount of an asset (for example, the number of residents of a town) within a tsunami evacuation zone. Based on a spatial overlay of CDP (Census Designated Places) and tsunami-evacuation-zone data, there are 65 CDPs (hereafter called communities) in the State of Hawaii that contain tsunami-prone land. 13 of these are located in Hawaii County, these are shown in Figure 9-12. C otuity of Hawaii { xalu'ul.a 1 Kukuihacle Dmpahoehoe Puak5 Kalaoa Hilo Hax•aiian KAjJ na N H a w i L 1 Paradise Park ' 1 Hawaiian Holuuloa Beaches Kahnlu'u-Keauhou Captain Cook Mnamma-Napo op`o r T Nonh Pacific Oreav 0 10 iOM w Figure 9-12.Tsunami prone communities in the County of Hawaii To determine the number and type of residents in the tsunami-evacuation zones, USGS used block-level population counts and demographic data from the 2000 U.S. Census (U.S. Bureau of Census, 2001). Tax base is represented by current parcel values and is considered an attribute of community vulnerability because communities rely on property taxes for local services. Results of the GIS-based analysis are summarized by tsunami-evacuation zone and by CDP-based community. Figures summarizing these results are included below. 9-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis Aaruu1 off 0 0.8.73 Fe[oeomgeof 75-LOOT Developod Laud 0 p,4-0.7g AewLop2dLaud 6 SR-7455 m Tsunami- O 0.l-039 AT�ujiam- 6 25-49% Ewicualnii m OAl-la@9 Esacuudoo O 1-24% L)Rti LLrrr') . O Zone 0% rr,rr KUM6 d5 Lq_ Yn m A. w. A...L'1 m g...i'I f ,4 rx� q.,•�,L •+a � r w.e Pa r,f. w Numba ul 774-S.JJ6 NmWo 'ge or 75_mo c EleUgHLeul il 33]_773 Resweutsin 501.7404 1.7u31uill- L7 41:-:AL lsuuaLm- 27.4911 EitaCValiiu 1.44 L_5di 1.24% fj D W. 6 it �k iurr. 7 61...1'I uw R..., oLr uau. r.e. uva.rry. � wti, .+ r ur Uu NLUnbe-of 543-9==5 Peucfut3geof 75-IW �r11Qf03'Pe9 ?.09.re-: EopLOpe.ea in 50.74% Tsunami- L7 L"'-W 9LunamiF !D 25-1996 E4au�lioo7nue ° ° E1'owaLon a 1-24% + D lime * �4 as+fie >f� L r.t fr..f. ,•� l,..V,�h rnr Nr.r v # dr IV 110131"{0{of PbLUetllrrge❑f �?S=14G45 524=1RW: WWI A11V lo 30.741E Harl AJ7V u7 TaLwur]L- 7R L.S3l T+Ilnnnr�- ❑ 25 %'19;4 • 0 F.}a,'llr u"II 6 I- h,mc imiJime na ,ate 8....'1 � �� 9•..L'l � aa.,n. np`cr t Ar o If•L Pr..Y 9-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis TcteLPhmdVelu 4516M-4-9E Pe"n4eoff 75-1009, IL&6M-5 AM 'lbtal l'BM Value O 70-74% LmuSLUe mphonc] 334M-IMM (raiowoD? pdons)in c 25-49% in 7suoeoii- o IL-04K Tzuoomd-U�uadan o 1-'A4' Evacuation Zone 0 pone 0% aW— -, un �0 ra. U.—Pi ' " . i P3'� ]..Ii Y. Orv.• ;..140 `J Figure 9-13.Results of USGS tsunami vulnerability study 9.5 Mitigation Strategies 9.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts 9.5.1.1 Deep-ocean Assessnient and Reporting of Tsunainis (DART) When a tsunami event occurs, the first information available about the source of the tsunami is based only on the available seismic information for the earthquake event. As the tsunami wave propagates across the ocean and successively reaches the DART systems, these systems report sea level information measurements back to the Tsunami Warning Centers, where the information is processed to produce a new and more refined estimate of the tsunami source. The result is an increasingly accurate forecast of the tsunami that can be used to issue watches,warnings or evacuations. Over the past 20 years, NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory (PMEL) has identified the requirements of the tsunami measurement system through evolution in both technology and knowledge of deep ocean tsunami dynamics. The tsunami forecasting technology developed at PMEL is based on the integration of realtime measurements and modeling technologies, a well-tested approach used in most hazard forecast systems. Developed by PMEL and deployed operationally by NOAA's National Data Buoy Center (NDBC), DART is essential to fulfilling NOAA's national responsibility for tsunami hazard mitigation and warnings. Design: The first-generation DART design featured an automatic detection and reporting algorithm triggered by a threshold wave-height value. The DART II design incorporated two- way communications that enables tsunami data transmission on demand, independently of the automatic algorithm; this capability ensures the measurement and reporting of tsunamis with amplitude below the auto-reporting threshold. 9-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis ;C 75 N Station Ovurers • NDBC DART Australia 1-4 o Chile 4 • Indonesia r ` ,-- .. T /F140 N Thailand a • a •aa + � i • � �� 46 N 30 N R • • i � � ' 15 N E 457: - 0 fyny�9� a — — `►J� .a f � 30 S 40 E 80 E 80 E 900E 120 E 140E 980E 980 180 W 140 w 120 w 100 w 80 w 80 w 40 w 20 w 0 POE Figure 9-14. Locations of DART buoys 9.5.1.2 Tsunami Inundation Run-up Mapping A tsunami inundation and run-up analysis of the islands of Oahu and Hawaii was performed though the University of Hawaii, school of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology using scenarios from tsunami-genic source regions along the Pacific Rim. The analysis uses 2- dimensional modeling with updated topographical data utilizing recent LIDAR topographical surveys that provide a higher resolution of the shallow reef forms below sea level and shoreline above sea-level than previously available. The 2-D modeling has been validated as producing good results. The analysis has provided updated inundation zones around the island. Evacuation maps are soon to be updated based on the results of this analysis. The inundation and run-up analysis is based on scenarios not on statistical probabilistic methods. An improved analysis would develop "Maximum credible inundation"maps based on probabilistic data, although there is currently not sufficient historical tsunami data to develop such maps. 9.5.1.3 Perfbrmance Based Tsunami Engineering An experimental program by the University of Hawaii, Oregon State University and Princeton University is close to being concluded, having investigated tsunami bore formation, impact on structures, inundation and scouring. Design provisions for the structures located in inundation zones are currently being developed using the results of these studies. It is anticipated that there will be two design methodologies: a prescriptive methodology with a predefined water height and water velocity to characterize the tsunami hazard; and a site specific analysis method using calibrated analysis tools to determine the local tsunami inundation characteristics. 9-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mil gal on Plan Chapter 9:Hazard Analysis—Tsunamis 9.5.2 Future Plans Project Description Status Update tsunami evacuation neaps: The 2-D model is based on good Ongoing project: Any necessary Tsunami Inundation and Runup topographic data along the coastline evacuation zone changes would be Mapping: Analysis of the island of (e.g.,LIDAR)."Maximum credible done by Quince Mento of HCDA Hawaii based on scenarios from inundation"used to develop evacuation based on updated information from tsunami-genic source regions along maps UH SOEST the Pacific Rim. Big Island mapping focuses on 12 populated areas around the island. It was originally thought that the 2-D The present maps have historical tsunami Proposed Planning Project: There will modeled tsunami inundation maps inundation embedded,but the new need to be DFIRM modifications to would be incorporated into the FIRM DFIRMs do not. FEMA is addressing the Flood Maps if tsunami inundation maps as the VE zone. However, this issue in 2010 with a supplemental is to be any factor in zoning and FEMA originally determined the study to compare the differences construction requirements. Tsunami based coastal floodplain between the existing and new DFIRM Phase I: The DFIRM will be based on boundaries for the nation using a 1-D maps,and to produce maps using the the most protective of FEMA's 2008 model.Conceivably,FEMA will greater effect along the south and west hurricane study boundaries and the determine future changes to the coasts. current FIRM's coastal floodplain Tsunami based coastal floodplain boundary.The northeast coastline will boundaries using a 2-D model.The continue to reflect the current FIRM's DFIRM will include the most coastal floodplain boundary,which is protective ofFEMA's 2008 hurricane based on Tsunami indundation. study boundaries(refer to Section Phase II: UHM SOEST mapping(by 10.4.1.3)and the current FIRM Kwok Fai Cheung)can produce 100- coastal flood boundary. year and 500-year probabilistic tsunami hazard maps to provide future local modifications to the DFIRMs. Tsunami design guidelines for Update of the design provisions for Under development by University of buildings Sept 2010 guidelines for tsunami bore impact and Hawaii at Manua,Princeton,OSU, new and for evaluating existing inundation/scouring and Martin&Chock;for future buildings. adoption 9-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 10. Floods Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods CHAPTER 10 - FLOODS 10.1 Description of Hazard Floods are temporary inundation of land from excessive rainfall or wave action. Because flooding causes millions of dollars of damage each year, the federal government created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to assist those who suffer from flood disasters. Under the NFIP, each county has mapped flood hazard areas and established a permit system to regulate development within these flood hazard areas. The Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) include areas prone to rainfall flooding(A zones) and high waves (V zones). In this County, the permit system is set forth in Hawaii County Code Chapter 27. The NFTP man- dates federal insured banks to require purchasing of flood insurance as a condition for financ- ing the construction of buildings in flood plain areas, thereby shifting the primary burden for flood disaster relief to those who choose to live or conduct business in flood hazard areas.48 Although the NFIP has significantly mitigated flood damages, major flood problems exist in older areas developed prior to flood control regulations and building standards, in areas that are subject to flooding but not identified on the FIRMs, and areas with flood control improvements that are inadequate to contain or control larger floods by present standards. Direct economic losses from flooding result from soaking, dislocation and destruction of property as well as erosion and scouring from the velocity of the flow, and deposition of sediment and debris transported by the water. Dams can exacerbate flooding should they fail; hence, a dam safety program is also an integral part of flood control. In the past, flood control meant engineered structural solutions such as dams, levees, stream channelization, diversion channels, and other costly improvements. In spite of these improvements, flood damage continued to escalate. A broader approach to flood management that attempts to work with nature instead of trying to control the awesome forces of nature has evolved. The federal government's flood management program embraces these non-structural measures by encouraging regulatory measures that direct development away from flood prone areas (e.g., zoning and subdivision codes), requiring flood-proofing building standards where structures are located in flood prone areas (e.g., flood control and building codes), allowing federal disaster assistance funds to be used to buyout and restrict future development in flood-prone areas where such acquisition is more cost-effective than heightened structural flood control improvements, and allowing upgrades to damaged structural flood control improvements (e.g., bridges) to resize inadequate structures rather than strict"in kind"replacements. 10.1.1 Rainfall Flooding Four types of storms produce heavy rainfall: e Frontal storms. Frontal storms usually occur during the period from December through 48 For an overview of the National Flood Insurance Program in Hawaii,see State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources,National Flood Insurance Program in Hawaii,Circular C90, 1994. 10-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods March. They originate over the Pacific Ocean as a result of the intersection between polar and tropical Pacific air masses and move eastward over the islands. These storms reflect orographic influences and are accompanied by widespread precipitation(see Figure 10-1). Subtropical Cyclonic Storm Mid-latitude Cyclonic Storm 1075 L lots f\ 707o L roz5 99',0 1020 107 995 .'.5 1011.5 1015 X7005 H rOO5 1010 1000 ` H 1075 KONA STORM Hawafi� c 7011.5 1011.5 Heweri 7015 1010 7070 COLD FRONT 1071.5 780° 150` _ 170' `�•1�' 180° 150' 120' Kona storms are low-pressure areas(cyclones)of subrrop- between CMtober and April,mark the leading edges of ical origin that usually develop northwest of Hawaii in cold air masses associated with low-pressure systems winter and move slowly eastward,accompanied by south- moving north of the Islands in the prevailing westerlies. erly winds,from whose direction the storm derives its They bring widespread clouds,heavy rain,and occasional name,and by the clouds and rain that have made these thunderstorms.Vigorous fronts may be preceded by strong storms synonymous with bad weather in Hawaii.Kona southwest winds and followed by gusty northerly winds. storms vary in number from year to year.Some winters Kauai experiences as many as 20 cold fronts per year,but have had none,others five or more.Cold fronts,common generally only about half of them reach Hawaii Island. Figure 10-1. Kona Storms and Cold Fronts • Upper troughs. Upper troughs are low pressure storms over wide areas that cause heavy rain and strong winds. • Convective-type storms. Convective-type thunderstorms can occur at any time of the year. They are most common during periods of relatively high humidity and unstable air conditions. These storms cover comparatively small areas and result in high-intensity rainfall of short duration. • Hurricanes or tropical storms. Hurricanes and tropical storms cause heavy rains, strong winds, and high surf. Heavy rainfall creates three types of flooding: 1) channel overflow, 2) overland sheet flow, and 3)ponding of standing water in poorly drained low-lying areas. Channel overflow occurs when the carrying capacity of the channel is exceeded,which can be exacerbated by develop- ment changes within the drainage basin or clogging by debris or overgrown streambed vegetation. Overland sheet flow occurs primarily in areas with undefined drainage ways, such as Puna and the leeward side of the island (e.g., Kona, Waikoloa, and Kawaihae). Poorly drained low-lying areas are a problem when flooding occurs even when rainfall is not heavy. Intense rainfall may trigger "flash-floods"which provide little warning (less than six hours)before the affected area experiences flood conditions. Prolonged rainfall may result in an accumulation of water creating flooding conditions that last several days, or even weeks. Factors influencing flooding conditions include rainfall intensity and duration, topography, soil type, antecedent soil moisture, and ground cover. 10-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Flash floods are characterized by rapid rise in water level,high velocity, large amounts of de- bris, and concentration in stream beds that are often normally small or even dry. The major factors are the intensity and duration of rainfall, rain shed area, and steepness of the streambed. They can also be caused by a dam break. Flash floods typically carry large amounts of debris which increase the damage they do, and are very capable of undermining bridges and carrying away vehicles. There is a major public safety hazard from these events, as the National Weather Service (NWS) estimates that over 50% of the flash flood deaths in Hawaii involve vehicles. The records provided by Mr. Tom Heffner of NWS show that since 1959, when their records began, 30 deaths from flashfloods have occurred. They do not have the data by county, but assuming that this County had one fourth of the deaths, that averages one every six years. 10.1.2 Dams A dam is a barrier constructed across a watercourse for the purpose of detention (control), storage, or diversion of water. Detention dams retard and minimize the effects of flood runoff by storing the flood flow and releasing it at a rate that does not exceed the carrying capacity of the downstream channel. Storage dams impound water during periods of surplus supply for use during drought periods. Diversion dams provide hydraulic head for diverting water into ditches, canals, or other means of conveyance. These various types of dams are constructed for one or a combination of the following reasons: flood control;water source for domestic or irrigation use; recreation; and/or hydroelectric energy production. The volume of water impounded is measured in acre-feet referring to the number of acres of land that would be covered to a depth of one foot. A list of all dams on Hawaii County is provided below and mapped in Figure 10-2: 1. HA00026 Lalakea Reservoir 2. HA00051 Hawi No. 5 Reservoir 3. HA00027 E-13 Reservoir 4. HA00052 Kehena Reservoir 5. HA00040 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 6. HAO0122 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 2 7. HA00042 Puukapu Reservoir S. HA00123 Pint Pulehu Reset voir 9. HA00043 Puukapu Watershed Retarding Dam R-1 10. HA00131 Paauilo Reservoir 11. HA00049 Keaiwa Reservoir 12. HA00136 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 3 13. HA00050 Hawi No. 3 Reservoir 10-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods HAW I NO.5 RESERVOIR AIAWI 40.3 RESERVOIR M .. KEMENARESERVOIR n I "KEA RESERVOIR E13 RESERV WAIMER O R I RESERVOIR PUUKAPU RESERVOIR W4iKOLOA SD MG RESERVOIR pMAI�C'SO MG RESERVOIR 3 WAIKOLOA 50 MG RESERVOIR I Qp IN dol Dam Locations Legend ■ Dams KEAIWA Major Road O 3.757.5 15 2U 30 ®MIMB Figure 10-2.Map of dams on Hawaii Island See Chapter 1 1 for dam break inundation hazards. 10.2 Significant Historical Events The Historical Stream Flooding Map shown in Figure 10-3 provides a list of flooding events on the Big Island,by location and dates, since 1890. 10-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods HumRYi Da r !IM 41x9 eTYI MOSS Oulm .l Wrcra .w* 'a ■ ■a a i i 6[@ 6yrd sl,M l�io6s•Nrrrdrn i5F6 LW9i 9latt Mows 566 Jv 16-11 uYY•POO�p\'Nnl Wn IbB2 JYq r ID G%,a'leM lbrtllq 18LY JYSFFIO T'a J0.'n 1°R rb6drq!NFroirn Stream flooding 41pWYd�ew� F ��� Pa1M ut�e FY ItAerp ices xel n aM+rotlre ,aY 1y-8-9y1F1.n lbedry 5g{r,1Rr'.h FiM boEn3 in 0.e6 Ftaani 1998 rQra FleNlboarq "tau" i"Wv tltivtllrlA cm fe,a-,a BwxelLd6y BR4 brd Fbotlnp 14btlYBl pt iteeN¢1Fi11B �[CdWP am fa"+-a Fcodryy IM M, FbeRloo�.alp ltln ,a JW-rFlo nL.h roust§ ]I iw;:-1 FLyd.y 1981[,�I P-0 Fk°len lbe'FaW6�rIC'nlr• .4!d JR°5 i non lioy�rr rl•M 1n�1rR n � .1' IBR4[ia'Fbr6tp.IF-16'rsn ,9ro - 4•6 Meatp K ,4ri 0.e t6 FtnrYy Inc iBdA M i�r96 1po FrR'mn ,OhO liFrfiffi Ep.[unM NWrq 14q R-Ie I'MN14xdry 19p9 FboWq\47ft 196,IX1aJ�Q8 s1 taR Maar9 190 PK as-A 1°o�.g I9W pag4P?I W[r p9n tggat ,9aE.J 9,]E�Jxrs�.mmaraa.9 11Raa F�l.lae,tru lensy K'*R'v1°° - 5G— _. 9F0 dc19-za Fnae,9 ,9EO A e8 F l3u mm.5eaa9 11e�fvR fm}p\WRWn,66owr 4 1 1681 lag6-T F„rd.ry 1949 JyrB FYa6r9 Fax Ra t1.�11twanR NaLwR 2tii . --� IM f°r•1-t2 FWtlg Rna doe lop FW,29 FboDry 11aF fvaFaa+IrrRm 106"M. ,i1 FFbIl 119x1 F.q s,ryn.maq ��v, ,96T Ore.i.ra FNS1Yep 119'6]]qq ti8 fSrM1rma '� - ,099 1968 1 R•8.0 NF[rtr, HF gerly J" 'e w]YlalJea a aaa aeaa•w} '1Pa,�wr]WgrnnWlltiar ,066 Fa&d.-1 won' VYlau„teo� i96P Val 1'c.yY.a _ Hilo fRg1P oea.els..o�sol°.nlbnere Kagtoq � Nlla n,11YCl.nadw.m�- 1980 u11{iE FWt4rp Rw!�A fwrw ltxi 189"8ap'1 TMo= I N Hvin[ _ - usr rwy Z-,1 1rw#ud.r r.n 19 Nee]0 nTa u_b W 1 n tFrT Fryrn rm�p46 rNM 1068.J 814ETS Oxo P1a8N - urn h.n le-v rt�en.g allp.w.., 11918 par ld�Inlwo 6 Fn911MI n1. Fa Y.r iR rrvwq 19ffi Cc15 sb Yllbods■9o/r 6rm 1Pra aeF tea. '1940:s&4wle+eem+n Md IbeAtpptlp { `� 'i1R YrrS�l�r�ootlrq IM ran 19M I,L1M 1n11a+tls9EO.n Fam ' � •�i41s1r YsimM r.N.�R ''6[A MEfi�,M1:W&:1Cerrw,i f :L F4nnlNOtlrg yR'oh n.ury 1&F SOp 9F GW1:wk V Wet. 1+P�+nr rFra.w.p 10W dol a-0 F�5ro6, CwtblkYwn u bmmq ra-nin 1&•T Oc11c 5Tfentl r0.pupglpvy taF.a Sp ad'Y IYa� 194'+CC18e Y1{me � axe'ti'aFW imh 19ra..i 1 r,ucal ltw Rrony v waakerta � Fa+4 9..x+few ro.rl.°.o-1p'w.� r7 xmml 1960 X16 uVM lbaah4KRma R 1m.0 h1xn M1mary lo-�an re,u 1971 N,.5 vaeew<Wx„eaHWW�n.,.c r,lma __ �P°I1�q,rti1F'vv � ME4.zuM1lbearq Wneuvll oL J..R.-n erati,n,rr.y ml[N 19M sw MCWI C .n uyM1af•n 9 24Lr. 1 986 Sep 19 Fi•eh'+,otln9CW1 Coot b4rYkpwa sbro RW,a�.a•1vwa,g yr nn 1966 tyr 18 x1 aq}+I,.al pox lr'a.�l 1966 F.p 1fi l.o°Replyo,Yq\IF Ka+e M\'V rw B+F la-K Ci°�a•.�n�rend L.°kC allB ICYCJ,UIIt 119p s�8-d 1fM Rr5pn9 P5 Vin r4'r Y WA" 1�i �1-rlboepr b�tan 0-2008 kb[ 1194@ Sap rr T11%mwwt In " r6s6 br FN1]ootl aG - iR4RMP28.1'ma1r.ndr bR,otlr14 •618 Yn 1816 VPo p 2040-'1000 h,Ct 1944 x°16 4MWt91oM ryaW F n9 Wk ' 'Bd0 uar 19 F,rotleV {ppp-rs000�B! 'M JO 1i T8 E1trN BR2 Mp 15a h AOL70 belt[ TA 'BR6 Xw Ifi VT°rVM1RwUe9'n 10'n011 x, 6000-10.090[xl 'BB4 lew 8 F!#4nA IV m9 rR6 111 TS Oahe 1—T T6.000-12,4p9 Jgg[ r89p Jxl 1a�2 r?man0.unr 90'1W preT 12,404 6?9e •Rae srp 1d ror.vr rRd]Xw 1f�]�°nealp a V ten tkpan dfBd9 I1' Mao ranbd Inun xkxrn{irc M1raj E11111�1 �F }1i�wy� 1elro�h Mm�k diRl:Jyrge,Sk'F��1 Bro rw lgac NraVh'a�PoRab.28d'�pan'1 Almm,tc S H W nrzgM M ft—ding{WIJ 1m.,1,annual—W firrIl—? Figure 10-3. Historical Stream Flooding Events for Hawaii Island. Sotu'ce: Fletcher,C,B.Richmond,E.Grossman,A.Gibbs,Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone,Pre- pared in cooperation with University of Hawaii,State of Hawaii Office of Planning,and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,U.S.Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series I-2761,2002. FEMA DR-1398-HI November 2000 A severe flooding event occurred in November 1-2, 2000 from prolonged intense rainfall concentrated in two distinct areas, Waiakea and Kapapala (over 30 inches), with lesser rainfall in most of East Hawaii (5 to 25 inches). The resulting flood damage to homes,roads, bridges, businesses, and farms totaled in excess of $70 million, among the highest totals associated with flooding in the State's history. Four meteorological and topographic conditions simultaneously converged to cause the extreme nature of the storm: 1) the upslope topography of eastern Hawaii, 2) the location of a large upper level trough, 3) the pattern of southeasterly trade winds, and 4) the location of the remnants from tropical storm Paul. Although maximum 1-hour rainfall totals were not extreme (recurrence interval of 1 to 2 years, except for Kapapala Ranch and Hilo Airport gages at 5 to 10 years recurrence interval), the severity was in the prolonged nature of the storm with a recurrence interval for a 24-hour period equal to or in excess of 100 years at several rain gages. The recurrence interval for peak stream discharges determined from stream gage data ranged from 50 to 100 years for streams south of Wailuku River in the Waiakea area; the majority of remaining 10-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods streams in East Hawaii had recurrence intervals between 5 and 30 years.49 Governor Cayetano declared the island of Hawaii a disaster area and President Clinton declared Hawaii County a federal disaster area, which authorized federal assistance (FEMA DR-1398-HI). More than 1,131 Big Island flood victims registered for assistance through FEMA's toll-free tele-registration number.50 FEMA DR-1743-HI December 2007 A complex storm system developed in the northwest Pacific Ocean and moved southeast toward Hawaii on December 3, 2007. As the system moved southeast, the associated cold front intensified and approached the island chain from the west. Strong southwest winds ahead of the cold front were reported across Kauai and Oahu on the fourth and fifth. Lingering atmospheric instability behind a previous frontal system combined with warm, moist conditions ahead of the cold front lead to extremely heavy rains across the state with Maui and the Big Island receiving the heaviest rains between the sixth and the eighth of December. The storm weakened and drifted northeast toward the end of the period, but a surface trough remained across the state keeping conditions unsettled until roughly December 11. Widespread property damage was reported all across the state during this weather event. The approach of the front and the strong southwest flow prompted forecasters to issue high wind warnings for parts of Kauai and Oahu. As the front moved down the island chain, additional warnings were issued. Although winds were generally strong across the state, downslope zones of northeast Kauai, central Oahu, windward Oahu, and Molokai saw the highest gusts, in the 60-70 mph range. Very strong winds were also reported at the summits of Haleakala on Maui and the summits of Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa on the Big Island of approximately 70-80 mph. Maui and the Big Island experienced the heaviest rainfall during the event. Widespread flooding was common across portions of central and upcountry Maui. Flash flooding in the Waiohuli area of Maui swept a house from its foundation. Two day totals for the period ending at 8:00 am HST Thursday, December 6, 2007 were between ten and twelve inches at the Kapapala Ranch and Hawaii Volcanoes National Park Headquarters gauges. Up to two feet of water covered portions of Highway 1 1 in the Kau district of the Big Island. State wide totals for the same period ranged from one to six inches. Conditions on the summits of Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa deteriorated rapidly during the approach of the front on the fifth of December. High winds and snow showers created white- out conditions on the summits. Snow levels dropped down to around eleven thousand feet. Seven foot snow drifts and icing forced park rangers to shut down the Mauna Kea access road on the fifth. Conditions did not allow for the road to be reopened until the end of the storm period. 49 Data on the November 2000 flood cited in this paragraph are from Fontaine,R.and B.Hill,Streamflow and Erosion Response to Prolonged Intense Rainfall of November 1-2,2000,Island of Hawaii,Hawaii,U.S. Geological Survey,Water-Resources Investigations Report 02-4117,2002. 50 Hawaii Hazard Mitigation Forum website,http://www.mothemature-hawaii.com. 10-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Extensive property damage resulted from the event. Roofs were blown off of houses in downslope areas and downed power lines created widespread power outages. Estimates compiled from local authorities placed the damage cost for the event in the area of $3.4 million. 10.3 Probability of Occurrence The recurrence interval of a flood, or flood frequency, is the average time interval within which a flood of a given magnitude will be equaled or exceeded. Flood frequencies can be determined by plotting a graph of the size of all known floods for an area and determining how often floods of a particular size may occur, or gathering hydrologic and hydraulic data from streams and calculating probabilities through models. The FIRM maps identify a flood hazard area as the area that would be inundated by a 100-year flood, or a flood with a 1% chance of occurring annually. The 100-year flood, also referred to as the base flood, is a national standard adopted by the NFIP that represents a compromise between minor floods and the greatest flood likely to occur in a given area (see Figure 10-4). The FIRM maps delineate the 100-year flood zones for rainfall flooding, coastal flooding, shallow flooding, and distinguish areas where detailed studies have been conducted to determine base flood elevations. Special Flood Hazard Area, ti - —- --(1oo-Year Floodplain) Flood Fringe Floodway Flood Fringe Base Flood Elevation Not rnal Water Level --Sttpm Channel Special Flood Hazard Area is the area that has a 1%chance of being flooded in any given year(100-year floodplain). The 100-year flood is also referred to as the base flood. Floodway is the stream channel and that portion of the adjacent flood plain that must remain open to permit passage of the base flood with- out raising the water surface elevation by more than one foot. Flood Fringe is the area within the 100-year floodplain other than the floodway. Base Flood Elevation(BFE)is the elevation of the water surface resulting from a 100-year flood in reference to a defined datum. Figure 10-4. Flood Insurance Rate Map Terminology Data compiled over the last 50 years indicate that, on average, a damaging flood event occurs on the Big Island with a annual probability of 0.5%. 10-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods 10.3.1 Regional Hazards Annual rainfall on the island of Hawaii ranges between 300 inches on the slopes of Mauna Kea above Hilo, to below 10 and 20 inches in the and regions around Kawaihae and South Point. As expected, flooding is rather common on the wet, windward side of the island where high annual rainfall is the norm. Most of the flooding that has caused damage has been flash flooding during extreme rainfall events that bring about sheet flow between stream channels. In addition, the soils along the Hamakua Coast readily absorb precipitation - thereby facilitating mudslides and landslides. The Hilo and Puna areas are probably the most frequently flooded and hardest hit by flash floods on the Big island and perhaps in the State.51 Perhaps more surprising is the degree of flooding experienced by the more and regions of the Big Island. The Kohala and Kona districts have a long and active history of flooding largely due to flash flooding and intense storms. More recently, the South Kohala and Waikoloa areas have experienced intense flash flooding that has caused considerable damage.'` 51 Fletcher,C,B.Richmond,E.Grossman,A.Gibbs,Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone, Prepared in cooperation with University of Hawaii,State of Hawaii Office of Planning,and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,U.S.Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series 1-2761, 2002. 52 Ibid. 10-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods z-- �4 HAWAII 3_ •5 k - _ f' f{ t 5 . ll � }I ?III N .1.11-1.2G�2,C•1-2273.01-3.7a■�51-5,06�SA1-6.59 .1�1-1.d6�2.21-2L'�3.51-SA6■6.01-fi.50 0 1A1-1.60EI 2.11-20=I]1.01-1.50 6.51-7.00 ■1-fi1 AM[]2.61-2a9 1.51-SAD 7.01-7.50 0 1-81-20002.E1-&CO S01-5.967.51-8.00 Figure 10-5. 100-year return period 1 hour rainfall for Hawaii Island No district on the island is immune from rainfall flooding hazards. In some of the districts flood hazard areas are difficult to delineate due to the lack of defined drainage ways. The fol- lowing provides a summary profile for each district:53 • Puna. The climate of the Puna District varies considerably from the rocky shoreline to the rain forest areas in the upper elevation. Rainfall amounts are generally heavy and most of the district receives over 100 inches per year. The district is subject to heavy rainfall and there is record of severe flooding. Historically, flooding along the Belt Highway and the highway from Keaau to Pahoa had been the most prominent problems of the district. However, highway improvements have done much to alleviate the flooding on the roadways. Currently, the lack of development and the extremely permeable soils have helped to minimize major flooding and damage to life and property. However, as the amount of development increases within the district, flood problems will also increase. Furthermore, the conversion of land historically planted in 53 Hawaii County General Plan,2005. 10-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods sugar to other crops may increase runoff. In this regard, Soil and Water Conservation District conservation programs can help lessen the potential problem. Some of the flood hazard areas for the Puna district are difficult to delineate due to the lack of defined drainage ways. Recorded flood damage has mainly been caused by surface sheet flows that are likely to occur anywhere when heavy storms strike. Examples of this are found in Fern Forest, Eden Rock, Fern Acres, Orchidland, and Hawaiian Paradise Park. In addition to these subdivisions, flooding occurs in certain areas of Pahoa. Other areas, such as Hawaiian Acres, may be more defined. The flooding below Mt. View may be the result of diversion of the Mt. View watershed into some of the substandard subdivisions. Systems that incorporate diversion channels to intercept sheet flows and main channels to transport the flows away or through the area have been proposed for the communities of Kcaau and Pahoa. Along the Kcaau-Pahoa Road, the State Department of Transportation (DOT)has installed culverts to facilitate the movement of water and minimize overtopping of the road in certain sections. In addition, the DOT plans to replace those culverts that are ineffective or inadequate. Drainage systems incorporating the use of diversion channels to collect and transport surface flows safely through the area are also proposed for Mt. View. A portion of this system has been constructed. • South Hilo. The South Hilo District is divided into two watershed study areas divided by the Wailuku River. North of the river, the coastline has abrupt cliffs 30 to 80 feet high that are broken by deep stream channels. Flooding problems in this area are primarily caused by runoff from former sugar cane fields situated above the communities situated closer to the coast. South of the Wailuku River is a relatively flat plain that extends towards High- way 11 with slopes gradually increasing in southerly and westerly directions. Development in the upper section of the Waiakca Stream Watershed has been susceptible to flooding. Two recent studies by NRCS examine the problem areas of the Waiakea and Wailuku-Alenaio watersheds.54 With the Wailuku.River as a dividing line,the South Hilo district can be separated into two watershed study areas. To the north of the river, the coastline has abrupt cliffs 30 to 80 feet high that are broken by deep stream channels. Usable land areas have a ground slope of six to twelve per cent. Above the 4,000 foot elevation,the stream channels diminish in number and depth and have all but disappeared above the 7,000 foot elevation. Flooding problems in this area are primarily caused by local water runoff from former sugar cane fields situated above the communities. South of the Wailuku River is a relatively flat plain of less than one per cent slope that extends towards Highway 11. Above Highway 11, the slope steepens to approximately six to twelve per cent. Stream channels are poorly defined and disappear at elevations above 2,500 feet. 54 Natural Resources Conservation Service,The Waiakea Stream Preliminary Investigation report, November, 1999;NRCS,The Wailuku-Alenaio Watershed Reinvestigation report, December, 1999(identified a new flood diversion alternative that could provide 100-year flood protection to development on the south side of Kaumana Drive in the vicinity of Akolea Road and Chong Street). 10-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Waiakea Until recently, the existing drainage system was the result of uncoordinated development. Lacking a comprehensive plan, property owners have constructed and installed drainage facilities to protect their own interests. In many instances, these facilities have seriously concentrated flows and aggravated situations downstream. Many proposals of the "Hilo Drainage and Flood Control Report" have been completed in the Waiakea area reducing the flooding problems. Many culverts in upper Waiakea are inadequate. Roadside ditches, though small in cross- sectional area, are aided by the highly porous ground and are fairly effective even during heavy storms. One of the most serious problems faced by County maintenance crews is the frequent washout of cinder-gravel shoulders along road pavements. Another problem is the accumulation of vegetation growth and debris in waterways,which causes overflow. The Waiakea Stream Preliminary Investigation report prepared by Natural Resources Conservation Service in November, 1999 identified the channel constrictions at the Hoaka, Kupulau, and Kawailani bridges as a major factor in the flooding of the Waiakea Stream Watershed. Several recommendations in the report suggests an increase in the level of maintenance for the Waiakea stream channel, reconstruction of the three bridges to handle the 100-year flood, installation of a flood levee above the properties along Kupulau Road, and Stream channel improvements to manage the volume of a 100-year flood. In the lower Waiakea area, storm damage is minimal due to the effectiveness of the Wailoa and Waiakea-Uka Flood Control Projects. The Waiakea coastal area is subject to tsunami and hurricane storm surge inundation and has suffered considerable loss to life and property from tsunami activity. Kaumana-Ainako-Wailuku River Kaumana's drainage system consists of roadside ditches, culverts, and narrow channels. Except for the Ainako Avenue area, all of upper Kaumana's storm water runoff is discharged either through the Waipahoehoe or the Alenaio Streams. The Chong Street Diversion No. 3 and the Wailuku-Alenaio Diversion No. 4 along Akolea Road serves to reduce flooding in the lower areas and the Ainako Avenue sections. The Wailuku-Alenaio Watershed Reinvestigation report prepared by Natural Resources Conservation Service in December, 1999 identified a new flood diversion alternative for the watershed. The alternative will control stormwater in Waipahoehoe and Kaluiiki Streams and could provide 100-year flood protection to communities on the south side of Kaumana Drive in the vicinity of Akolea Road and Chong Street. The County has requested the Natural Resources Conservation Service's assistance to further plan and implement the new alternative. The drainage system in the Ainako-Wailuku River area is comprised of box culverts that pass the discharge of the Ainako River across Kokea, Koula, and Kapaa Streets. The residential areas bordering the Wailuku River have a system of collection ditches. Except during very intense storms,there are few problems in the area. Hilo Urban Area Between tsunamis and runoff from higher elevations, the commercial district has displayed amazing recuperative abilities. Prior to the completion of the Waiolama Canal in 1924 and 10-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods the Ponahawai Storm Drain System in 1926, this area was a virtual "sea" during heavy rain. The construction of the canal and the storm drain system has since provided some degree of protection for the area. The Alenaio Stream Flood Control Project, completed in 1998, begins just below Kapiolani Street and ends below Kilauea Avenue with an earthen levee leading into the Waiolama Canal. The project consists of three flood walls, a 1,790-foot rectangular concrete-lined channel, a 200-foot concrete entrance transition, and an 830-foot earthen levee. The project also included the reconstruction of four bridges located at Kapiolani, Ululani,Kinoole Streets, and Kilauea Avenue. The Alenaio Flood Control project mitigated much of the flooding that occurred in the Alenaio flood plain. Except for the northern section of the business district, all of downtown Hilo falls within the Wailoa River basin and within the area tributary to the Alenaio Stream. The State Department of Transportation (DOT) has indicated that there are periodic shifts of beach material along the Hilo bay front shoreline. in addition, occasional storm events will close the roads at bay front due to storm surge. A study detailing the level of storm surge and the periodic shifts of beach material is needed before a solution can be developed. The shoreline areas south of the Wailuku River are subject to damage from tsunami and hurricane storm surge inundation. Paukaa, Papaikou, Pepeekeo, Honomu, Hakalau; these communities have no serious flood problems although Honomu and Papaikou have experienced minor flooding. These result from runoff from the areas above the communities. • North Hilo. The district is characterized by an average ground slope of approximately 10 per cent with scores of deep intermittent and perennial streams. Other than runoff from former cane lands, there is little record of flooding in urban areas. Each community is in close proximity to one or more gulches that carry flows from the upper watershed areas. The key to flood control within the district is to collect and divert surface runoff to the gulches. In addition, soil conservation practices are highly recommended. The flood hazard areas are extremely difficult to delineate. High intensity storms can produce localized flooding in almost any area. The only definite flood hazard area is Laupahoehoe School. The community of Ookala has not experienced heavy flooding although there are minor problems due to surface waters from the former cane fields above the town. There is no record of any flooding within the community of Ninole. The existing flood control system provided by the plantation is adequate. The community of Laupahoehoe has not experienced any extreme flood flows. However, there will be a need to supply flood protection for the community since Laupahoehoe School, which is located just to the south of the urban center, has experienced some flooding. Water flows from the former cane fields, when the natural vegetation does not form a complete cover. 10-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods The community of Papaaloa has not experienced any serious flooding problems. With the projected expansion of the community, there will be a need to provide flood protection for the area. • Hamakua. The Hamakua District can be divided into two major watershed areas. The northern watershed, which affects the Waipio Valley area, extends upward into the Kohala Mountains. The second watershed extends to the peak of Mauna Kea and affects the communities of Kukuihaele,Honokaa,Paauhau,Paauilo, and Kukaiau. The majority of the flood damage in this area is felt by the State or the County through damage to improvements within former cane fields,roads, ditches, and bridges. Streams originating above and flowing through Honokaa have caused flooding in the town. The existing culverts within the town also do not have adequate capacity to handle volume flows. The communities of Paauhau and Kukaiau have not been subject to any high flood flows in the past and the only recommended flood prevention measures would be the construction of diversion channels above the communities to divert water from former sugar cane fields and into the surrounding gulches. Occasional flooding along the Hawaii Belt Road between Ahualoa and Waimea occurs when rainwater comes down from the pastures and overtops the road. Although there are no mitigation measures planned at this time, road improvements have alleviated some of the flooding and improved sheet flow. Localized drainage problems exist within the limits of Paauilo. These problems are caused by allowing surface waters to collect from large areas within the town and flow down narrow roadways. The problems could be eliminated if this water was intercepted and transported to the gulches for disposal. • North Kohala. The North Kohala district is subject to occasional heavy rainfall that creates heavy runoff. Streams collect water from the upper watershed and convey most flows safely through the urban centers. Although the gulches are generally smaller than those on the Hamakua coast, they have adequate capacity to handle storm flows. Other than damage to highway culverts, there is no record of any flood damage to structures. There are areas, however, which are subject to flooding problems. These include the town of Hawi which has experienced surface sheet flows concentrating along the highway within the town, the highway and road culverts at Lipoa Gulch, and Halelua and Pueka gulches. The community of Kapaau has problems similar to those of Hawi. The existing highway culverts are inadequate to handle peak flood flows and have caused minor flooding problems in the past. On each side of the highway, the Makapala area is relatively flat and is susceptible to flooding by the Niulii and Waikani Streams. The solution to the flood control and drainage problems of this district lies in the practice of proper soil conservation in agricultural lands and forest areas to help reduce and retard 10-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods surface water and sediment runoff. In addition, there are the improvements to natural channels to increase their capacity. The North Kohala district has recorded runup from tsunami and hurricane storm surge activity. Areas subject to inundation include Pololu Valley, Upolu Point Airport, and the Mahukona Harbor areas. • South Kohala. The South Kohala district can be divided into two separate watershed areas. The Waimea Village watershed extends into the Kohala Mountains. Heavy rainfall occurs in these mountains and several intermittent streams flow through the Waimea area. Upon reaching the Waimea plains, these streams turn to the west and flow toward Kawaihae across the extremely permeable lava flows of Mauna Kea. The Waikoloa stream has caused flooding within the town of Waimea during high intensity storms when waters overflow due to sharp stream bends and generally inadequate flow-carrying capacities. In addition, there is some flooding concern around the area abutting the Kawaihae road. The second watershed area above the Kawaihae to Anaehoomalu shoreline extends from the coast to the peaks of Mauna Kea to Mauna Loa. The area is semi-arid with few well- defined channels and infrequent stream flows. High intensity storms have caused flooding along the Queen Kaahumanu Highway from Kawaihae to Puako, and at Puako. These storms are very infrequent and tend to create flash floods. High flows have been experienced in the Hapuna Beach and Spencer Beach Park areas due to the flash floods. The Puako Beach lots have also been subject to flooding. During the evening of September 8, 1996, heavy rains generated a flash flood along Auwaiakeakua Stream. The floodwaters overtopped the existing drainage ways causing damage to private properties, particularly the Fairway Terrace Condominium at Waikoloa Village, County roads and drainage facilities. In 1997, construction was completed on the Parker Ranch drainage improvements. The improvements diverted the Kamuela and Lanimaumau Streams toward open pasture lands. Flooding has done substantial damage to the residential subdivision at the Mauna Kea Beach Resort. To mitigate the flooding, the developer has constructed flood control measures off site and the State Department of Transportation intends to install three sets of new culverts on site. The State Department of Transportation also intends to realign and replace Waiaka Road. An added threat to the coastal areas results from fire that leaves the upper slope areas with limited ground cover and thus more susceptible to flooding. • North Kona. The North Kona district can be divided into two watershed areas. The area north of Keahole Point and the summit of Hualalai have very low rainfall and runoff. Rainfall for this area reaches a maximum average of 40 inches per year, but most of the area receives less than 20 inches per year. The soils in the area are extremely permeable and there is no record of hazardous flooding in this area. The southern area, extending southward from Keahole Point, contains most of the urban development and is subject to increasing hazards from floodwater damages as land is more intensively utilized. The area is characterized by dry vegetative growth along the coastal 10-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods areas and thick tropical vegetation in the upper forest reserves. The ground slope is steep, averaging approximately 15 per cent. The steep slopes, shallow soils, frequent high intensity rains, and the lack of well-defined drainageways make many areas in the North Kona district susceptible to flooding and overland flows. Flash floods,primarily from overflows of the Keopu/Hienaloli, Waiaha, Kaumalumalu and the Holualoa/Horseshoe Bend drainage ways, have been identified by the Natural Resources Conservation Service's "North Kona Flood Plain Management Study." Flood water and sediment damage occurs along the entire coffee belt with the Kainaliu, Holualoa and Kailua village areas experiencing the heaviest damage. • South Kona. Being geographically young, there are few well-defined drainage ways in the district. Overland and stream flows are rare and can only be detected when the rainfall intensity exceeds the rate of infiltration. The district is subject to sudden high intensity rainstorms that can strike anywhere and cause localized flooding. Flood prone areas have been identified by the Natural Resources Conservation Service's "South Kona Flood Hazard Analyses." Coffee and other agricultural lands are subject to erosional damage and roads and culverts are sometimes damaged by high flows and sediment deposition. The Sunset Coffee Mill Flood Prevention Project has provided substantial relief in the Napoopoo area. There are also records of minor flooding from Kiilae, South Keokea, Honaunau and Wailapa Streams. In general, an area within 150 feet of the stream channels can be considered subject to flooding. Other areas with records of minor flooding include the areas along the Belt Highway in the area of the 1950 lava flows and at Hookena Road. • Ka'u. The Ka'u district can be divided into three separate regions. The northeastern region is dominated by the Ka'u desert. The average annual rainfall here is approximately 20 inches. There are few defined stream channels, none of which are perennial. The soils are very shallow, covering rough lava flows that are extremely permeable. The southwestern region that extends westerly from the South Point Road is characterized by moderate slopes, extremely permeable soils, and relatively young lava flows. The median annual rainfall varies from less than 20 inches at South Point to 75 inches at the 5,000-foot elevation. There is little evidence of stream flow within this region and no record of damage from flood flows other than the flooding of roads within the Hawaiian Ocean View Estates subdivision. The central region contains the communities of Pahala, Naalehu, and Waiohinu. There are several streams within the region, none of which are perennial. Flood flows occur when the soils are saturated and rainfall intensity exceeds the rate of infiltration. Storm runoff descends steep slopes behind the communities and causes flooding and deposition of sediment and debris in the communities. 10-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods There are three existing flood control measures in this district. A flood water channel and debris basin in Naalehu was completed in 1965 with additional improvements and modifications completed in 1969 and 1982. The second project is within the town of Pahala and consists of diversion channels in the former sugar cane fields above the town and the improvement of Paauau Stream. The third project is within the town of Waiohinu. It is designed to collect flows from the watershed areas and transport them around Waiohinu for disposal in the rock land area. This project has been implemented, but needs additional improvements. Although major flooding within the communities has been addressed, flash flooding along the Hawaii Belt Road still occurs. The Piikea, Keaiwa, Paauau, Punaluu, Hilea, Kawaa, and Honuapo streams often exceed the capacity of the existing bridges and culverts and flood the roadway. This temporarily closes the road and effectively cuts off this district from the Puna, Hilo and Kona districts. However, in the Piikea ford area, the State DOT completed the construction of a new Piikea bridge in 1998. In addition to the bridge, improvements to the Piikea ford are proposed with the construction of three large box culverts. At the Paauau stream, there are plans for the construction of a new bridge. There are also plans for the replacement of the Ninole bridge located just past Pur luu. A new culvert is proposed in the Kawaa flats region. 10.3.1.1 NFIP Flood Insurance Profile for Hawaii County Insurance Overview As of D3/31/2 00 9 Community: HAWAII COUNTY' State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY CID: 155166 overview I occupancy I Zone I Preil FIRM Total by Community Group Flood Insurance Total Number of Policies: 4,277 Total Number of Policies: 0 Total Premiums: $2,64605 Total Premiums: $0 Insurance in Force: $820215,800 Insurance in Force: $0 Total Number of Closed Paid Losses: 407 Total Number of Closed Paid Losses: 0 $of Closed Paid Losses: $/,U33,H32 $of Closed Paid Losses: $0 Post Firm Minus Rated Policies Manufactured Homes Total Number of Minus Rated Policies: 9 Total Number of Policies: 0 A Zone Minus Rated Policies, 5 Total Number of Closed Paid Losses: 0 V Zone Minus Rated Policies: 4 $of Closed Paid Losses: $0 ICC 1316 Total Number of ICC Closed Paid Losses: 0 Number of Properties by Community: 0 $of ICC Cll Paid Losses SO Substantial Damage Losses Number of Substant al Damage Closed Paid Losses. 17 10-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Insurance Zone As of 03/3112009 Community: HAWAII COUNTY' State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY CID 155168 overview I occupancy I Zone I PrelPost FIRM Number of Policies in Insurance In Closed Paid S of Closed Adjustment Force Premium Force Losses Paid Losses Expense A01-30& AE Zones 1,243 $569,380 $196,299,300 59 S1.0-Q6,794 85 $37,30631 AZones 119 S176,265 $24,782,300. 37 S522,776.88527,855.42 AO Zones 14 $10,469 $3,408,600 7 $216,00157 $5,779.00_ AH Zones 14 $9,771 $3,250;400 3 $31,90126 _ S1,650_00 AR Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 A99 Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $000 V01-30& VE Zones 727 $969;880 $116,243,000 134 $2,335,640.21 S88,079-86 V Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 D Zones 11 $14,533 $2,525,000 10 $23,46611, S2,00000 .8 CS XZone _ �_ Standard 15521 $677,783 $279,441,200 50 51,559,8493 _1 541,518.5'1 Preferred 628 S218,814 $194,266,000 17 $348,848.01 S20,42664 Total 4,277 $2,646,895. $820,21580n 317 56,135,275_00 $224,613,00 Insurance Occupancy As of 03131/2009 Community: HAWAII COUNTY' State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY CID: 15516E Overview I Occupancy I Zone Pre/Post FIRM Number of Policies in Insurance in Closed Paid S of Closed Adjustment Force Premium Force Losses Paid Losses Expense Single Family 122.`_ $1,053,784 $321,043,600 209 $4.021,381 69 $127,021 65 2-4 Family 250 $182,591 $56046,900 _ 40 $609,30634 $30,710.00 AII Other Residential 2.604 $857,178 $364,100,400 95 $1,202,837.97 541,328.36 Non Residential 198 $552,942 $79,024,900 63 $1_,200,30571 $54,325.731 Total 4,277 $2 646 895 5820,215 B00 4071 $7 033 829.00 i $253 384.00 Policies In Insurance in Number of Closed $of Closed Paid Adjustment Force Premium Force Paid Losses Losses Expense Condo 2,880 $1,054,102 $426,516,300 91 $1,45'1,045.21 5568'13.31 Non Condo 1,397 $1,592,793 $393,699,500 316 $5,582,786.50 $'196572:6 Total 41277 i$2,646,895 $820,215,800 407 $7,033,831001 _ S25338500 10-17 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Insurance Pre/Post FIRM As of 03/31/2009 Community: HAWAII COUNTY' State: HAWAII County: HAWAII COUNTY CID: 155166 overview I Occupancy I Zone I Pre/Post FIRM Pre-FIRM Number of Policies In Insurance in Closed Paid $of Closed Adjustment Force I Premium Force I Losses Paid Losses Expense A01-30& AE Zones _ 1,055 $506,882 $144,966,700 49 $933,960.50 $32,541.31 A Zones 82 $108,669 $16,124,000 33 $454,390.17 $15,780.42 AO Zones I 4 $5,692830,100 7 $216,001.57 $5,779.00 AH Zones _ 3 $4,479 $733,200 2 $16715.09 $1,050.00 AR Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 A99 Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $000 $0.00 V01-30& VE Zones 698 $858,617 $107,986,200 128 $2,129,686.94 $84,504.86 V Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 D Zones 4 $5,783 $1,011,000 9 $23,085.10 $1,910.00 B.C& X Zone 1,386 $488,204 $250,249,600 44 $1,179,005.64 $33,339.12 Standard 1,176 $416,230 $189,954,600 40 $1,094,521.57 $29,347.64 Preferred 210 $71974 $60,295,000 4 $84,484.07 $3991.48 Grand Total 1 3,2321 S11,978,32 - $521,900,800 272. $4,952,842.00 $174,903.00 Post-FIRM Number of Policies in Insurance in Closed Paid S of Closed Adjustment Force Premium Force Losses Paid Losses Expense A01-30& AE Zones 188 $62,498 $51,332,600 10 $162,834.35 $4,765.00 A Zones 37 $67,596 $8,658,3001 4 $68,386.71 $12,075.00 AO Zones 10 $4,777 $2,578,500 1 0 $0.00 $0.00 AH Zones 11 $5,292 $2,51 200 1 $15186.17 $600.00 AR Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 A99 Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 V01-30& VE Zones 29 $111,263 $8,256,800 6 $205,953.27 $3,575.00 V Zones 0 $0 $0 0 $0.00 $0.00 D Zones 7 $8,750 $1,514,000 0 $0.00 $0.00 B.C& X Zone 763 $408,393 $223,457,600 23 $729,691.68 $28,606.03 Standard 345 $261,553 $89,486,600 10 $465,327.74 $12170.87 Preferred 418 $146840 $133,971,000 13 $264363.94 $16435.16 Grand Total J 1,045 $668,569 J $298,315,000 44 $1,182,050.00 $49,621.00 10.3.1.2 Repetitive Loss Properties Per FEMA, counties are encouraged to develop plans that address the mitigation of target repetitive loss properties, as insured properties may be eligible for Flood Mitigation Assistance and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HGMP) Funds, in order to reduce the number of repetitive claims against the NFIP. Refer to Figures 10-6 through 10-8. 10-18 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods First, a check was made of whether all structures on the NFIP Claims list would still be considered repetitive losses, i.e., having 2 or more losses of more than $1,000 within a ten- year period.All properties on the list met these criteria. Refer to Table 10-1. Second, a check was made of whether any of the properties would fall under the TCC (Increased Cost of Compliance) coverage funding criteria, i.e., two or more substantial damage losses in the past ten years, with each loss being 25% or more of the market value of the structure per occurrence. None of the losses would have qualified for this additional coverage. Third, FEMA's national Severe Repetitive Loss Strategy criteria was used to identify structures with higher priority for mitigation, i.e., insured structures with four or more losses, and structures with 2 or more losses where cumulative payments have exceeded the property value. Nineteen of the 50 properties met the criteria to be classified as target repetitive loss structures. It may be recommendable to determine whether there are any insured properties adjacent to these 19 target repetitive loss structures that should be considered in any specifically proposed mitigation action. The list includes the cumulative property values of these 19 structures (about$52AM). Then, the NFIP Claims list was sorted using the above criteria and whether they are currently insured and by descending total cumulative claim amount, and given a ranking ordinal from 1 to 50. Nearly all the repetitive loss structures are located at coastal sites. All but one of the target 19 properties is pre-FIRM. All repetitive loss properties have been mapped with specific identification of those residential properties falling within the FEMA target criteria. Eight properties (ordinals 12 to 19), have made claims in the past meeting the target criteria, but are not currently insured. Five properties (ordinals 7 to 11) are currently insured under Special Direct Facility(SDF). With regards to mitigation, then acting administrator Robert Shea of FEMA's Federal Insurance Mitigation Administration testified to Congress as follows in 2001: "A factor to be considered in offering assistance to the owners of these target properties — whether they choose to move out of the flood plain or to improve their properties—is how to treat those who refuse such an offer. Most people living in these high-risk areas are looking for help to alleviate their plight. However, there will be those who, for various reasons, are reluctant to move. This approach to addressing repetitive loss properties will receive public acceptance only if it is voluntary, and it will be important to provide an insurance consequence to the decision not to accept an offer of assistance. Alternatives proposed have included denying further insurance coverage, requiring that full actuarial rates be paid for future coverage, and substantially increasing deductibles to have those who refuse to move shoulder a greater portion of their cost of recovery. It is our belief that shifting more of the financial burden to the property owner is a more effective incentive than the denial of insurance." Accordingly, it appears that uninsured properties with higher losses (those in the gray portion of the list, ordinals 12 to 19) would not be targeted for mitigation, as there would be no insurance consequence to the decision not to accept an offer of insurance. There may be good reason to examine these cases to determine why they are not continuing under 10-19 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods coverage, as part of an annual repetitive loss area outreach project. (Flood insurance could have lapsed after repayment of a disaster assistance loan.) In addition, examination of the NFIP repetitive loss data indicates that there are numerous typographical corrections, mostly relating to Hawaii location addressing, which should be reported to the Corrections Clearing House at ISO. Repetitive Loss Properties • CRS* Target for Mitigation Criteria* *Number indicates miti-ation rank,see table Other Roads Major Roads Total Losses Paid $3,860,982 Flood Zone 100 Year - 500 Year X OUTH KOHALA, HAMAK SOUTH HILO NORTH KONA NORTH HILO PUNA � OUTH KONA x Figure 10-6. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map,County View 10-20 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods �r 1 1 31 49 10 • �I I :a _t 1 I scurH Hi_� 4 48 25 14 5 Repetitive Loss Properties 27 • CRS Target for Mitigation Criteria Other Roads Major Roads 24 Flood Zone 100 Year -500 Year X Figure 10-7. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map,Hilo zoom 10-21 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods 17 r 409 /r 39 Repetitive Loss Properties NORTH KONA r • CRS 1S Target for Mitigation Criteria Other Roads $ Major Roads '22 Flood Zone "; 6 100 Year - 500 Year 1523 - X29 - i 194 1q 3 6 441 r Figure 10-5. Flooding Repetitive Losses Map,Kona zoom 10-22 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis-Flonds Table 10-1. Repetitive loss property list and ranking ��„� All ok $311 ., ;=+?5.1 So ;=,?5.1 ;=+?5.1 131161 _ "LET 9 Y $19,,sa�$x3,6 3$vas6a$466,,61 $631nn $1.1.- x1115,1 $. rn 15+1 ;142..1 91. 41661.. 416.,4x4 n.aa.Yn1.ISI 4153,1. 41.5mn1'1 Y5?2.. $1.1,1.9 Y. 11.1,1.9$95,319 $196,61. $n1- 141,614 Yla S]]YS_'$1,.12166 43.11,.x41 7S-112 All DP c3 $5,031 151,984 Y. 156196,$1,-411 + $2,15 855=v g. gss o=r$1,114+35 Sv,,ov ale 7S-112 All DP A! _ $11.14 $44991 14918 Y,9,9o4$1,174,384 f1 4,'14,321 All $]SS So g3+sal$34541 fl toa yc 114494331 8153,151 813,638 816x3¢fx9.e]5$1,x38,644 E14787 871 KINa :� 14 8x19534 Y. $259,530 - -- SI 141314 $1465.3 $+1,515$13441= �_ 1153,¢85 $111,892$35,393$244,185 _ + $vas+ $I=3.535 863,1 as$146,7=3 + ie $35A $I x3.998$x],G9x$151,494 ANH .. .� ;531 $1..... $. $13.5.2 z3'1 239E ie Ea oo 84 123,114$x3]Ia - -- 82836 $11147 $1 415543 4 141 141 INIT 11171-6111 All 11 - 11 11711 NIRT1 11- 111_ ba eo IS 415,5+5 815.515 I. A E 11 $138,5,3[$7 11 IS8$155,411 + + $ 000 181 431 $11135 893,106 1117117 - $]x149 YI3,I�4$95,6]9 ;21„93 $IS 342 gu 814342 .+ 6 4 4 M 1I 7_'-"-", $186,333 - 115,311 446Sx 861.431 ye,4.q..4 $3x654 $835 3,1,425 I IA I ALINA IT HI 917. YEE I, 4464,436 414.554 4. E41114 $1111 $3x134 $1 $38134 +.111 11 1AILU1 KINA 11 11711 11161.5 INILE 111 13:833 ;4191 $33,115 NI - GIL7 s148s44 $15,6]1 $14142$3x,113 A 11711 .� $1.RS0 ;19,153 $. $IV,153 G- - 111p44 - IL III $. 44131 2 911 111 1 All HOTEL n. oar ;13,]59,9,2 $296x.3$1x99,$399,19] $195,44. S6x,341 55,341 161,152 GI $151392 $62454 1891 $63146 117 711111 All 11 IND 41 1AILIA 1 + $1+9,44. $61,194 S. $61711 41 N.IRD oR �e $171444 - $11LI44 115,535$43x35 All 11 117+ .� ;50.00 ;I-2,003 81]131$34135 i_ $344,44. 811164 $I U.3uu$x1..64 Il oa .. ;o ;o g2ILL$z�444 4x43,13 41x.6]] $12,6]] �. 5611.. $6,415 151x5 s12�44 + $1=5,444 $11,]15 $. $11]85 + �e Y35o,o0o Y9,IO3 Y7ns $915.1 "UTH 171 IAIYIN IR 11 1-1 A's 1 5441.. $8,5+1 $383 $1914 HIL, P'fe Hloee - $1,]35 $o $4]35 ' ;11�0o g�s25 g. g�s1v 34 S4 SI,111 811432 L15 A HAILTST IT IHILI HI 91721 ND 8219 Ysp24 g4 $sox, S4 40 $4 5+.655 84655 [$ pE�es3x ol9 uz p iez 4 E 14531,531 10-23 Hawaii County Multi-Hccard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods 10.4 Mitigation Strategies 10.4.1 Previous/Current Efforts Description of adoption and enforcement of floodplain management requirements, including regulatory and inspection practices in Special Flood Hazard Areas: The County of Hawaii implements the FEMA/NFIP regulations through Hawaii County Code (HCC) Chapter 27 - Floodplain Management (attached). Chapter 27 was adopted on May 5, 1982 and was last updated on November 30, 2007. Implementation and enforcement of HCC Chapter 27 typically occurs during: review of subdivision proposals (HCC Chapter 23),building permits (HCC Chapter 8), grading/grubbing permits (HCC Chapter 10); and/or, public or private complaints. HCC Chapter 27 includes variance process from Chapter 27's requirements, which includes very specific criteria for reviewing, recording, reporting and appealing a variance. HCC Chapter 27's enforcement provisions include: right of entry; notice of violation and/or administrative order process; injunctive relief through the circuit court of the third district, State of Hawaii, or United States District Court, State of Hawaii; criminal enforcement, where violations constitute a misdemeanor and are subject to a fine of $1,000/day for each day of none compliance and/or one year imprisonment; and, removal of floodplain encroachment/obstruction notices, and/or removal of encroachment/obstruction by County at the violator's expense. See the appendix at the end of this chapter. Description of community assistance and monitoring activities: Assistance includes, in part, the following activities: participating in the NFIP so the community has access to flood insurance, and Federal disaster relief/low interest loans; maintaining and providing information/assistance on FEMA's Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM), Flood Insurance Studies and letter of map changes; requiring, reviewing and maintaining FEMA's Elevation Certificates for structures built within FEMA's Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA); providing review of subdivision proposals and related construction plans,building permits, grading/grubbing permits,which all relate to improvements proposed within FEMA's SFHA; providing FEMA flood zone determinations to the public, governmental agencies, lending institutions and realtors; Participating in FEMA's Community Rating System, which is a program to reduce flood insurance rates based on the County doing certain floodplain management activities; updating FEMA's FIRMS through detailed flood studies; receiving and as appropriate, responding to complaints related to activities with floodplains; providing review of variances and appeals, as provided in HCC Chapter 27; and, providing educational literature, presentations, website information and sponsoring training. Monitoring compliance with HCC Chapter 27 is accomplished, in part, by: requiring FEMA Elevation Certificates (pre and post construction submittals), which help assures buildings within SFHA are constructed in compliance with HCC Chapter 27; reviewing applications for subdivisions and related construction plans, building permits and grading/grubbing permits for compliance with HCC Chapter 27; responding to complaints and taking appropriate actions to correct noncompliance. Reviewing, approving, preparing, submitting to FEMA and maintaining Letter of Map Changes,which are used to update FEMA's FIRMS. 10-24 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods 10.4.1.1 County of'Hawaii Flood Studies The County is currently doing flood studies (map updates) in the following areas: Puna, Hilo, North and South Kona. There are several privately funded flood studies ongoing in the Kona, Hilo and Waimea. See the County of Hawaii Flood Studies in Table 10-2. Table 10-2. County of Hawaii Flood Study list County of Hawaii Flood Studies Prepared on October 12,2009 Estimated FEMA Case FEMA Panel Completion Identifier TMK No. Flooding Source No. Engineer Start Date Status/Remarks Date DHHL Lalamllo Housing,Phase 5-5-001:077 09-09-2407R Keanuimano& 0164 D Anson Murayama, 7/17/00 91 Withdrew CLOMR Jan-10 2 Waikoloa Streams Community due to possible change in Q Planning&Engr value based on CLOMR Inc Case No.95-09-154R. Waiakea Trio Area 3A Various 09-09-2120P Waiakea Trio 3A 0870 C,0830 C Cary Korea,Belt 1/26/09 Formerly Case No,09-09- Dec-09 &0890 C Collins 0862P.9/11/09 FEMA requests information. Kailua Gardens Subdivision 7-5-010:088 and 09-09-1818R Hlenal i 0713 D Mr.Geoffery 5/19/09 6/19/09 FEMA requested Dec-09 089 Drainageway Casburn,with more Information. CMF Engineering, Inc. Waipahaehoe Trio 2-5-006:152 09-09-1789P Walpahaehoe Stream 0859D Paul Nash,Atlas 5/18/09 6/17/09 FEMA requested Feb-10 Trio En r more information. Greenwell Family Flood Study 8-1-004:001,045, 09-09-1820P South Kona 0939 C and Mr.Ty Dempsey, 5/19/09 7/6/09 FEMA requested Jan-10 052,053,054, Watercourse#1 and 0943 C with Lyon Assoc. information. 055,070,074, Watercourse#2 075 Kawailani Street Bridge 09-09-1608P Waiakea Stream and 0880 C,0890 C Wesley R. 12/20/07 LOMR Issued&Effective Done Replacement Waiakea Tributary Sag—&Assoc. 2/16/10 N..2 Hilo Medical Center Parking Lot 2-3-032001 09-09-1400P Unnamed Trib to 0880C Alex Kalawe, 4/2/09 Recently combined With Jan-1a Walluku River Engineering Case No.09-09-1398P Partners,Inc. Alnako Stream Flood Zone Various 09-09-1398P Alnako Stream 0880C Cary Kando,Belt 4/6/09 5/13/09 FEMA requested Jan-10 Drainage Basin Collins information. Kona Coffe and Tea Company 7-5-017:031 & 09-09-0036R Waiaha Drainageway 0713D Ty Dempsey, 7/08 CLOMR-3/24/09 letter Flood Channel 045 Lyon Assoc. from FEMA requesting data within 90-days. North Kona Flood Study 7-5,7-6&7-7 None Waiaha,Horseshoe 713D,7140, Berry Muranaka, 12/11/2008 Completing topographic May-10 Bend,Halualaa, 926 E&927D Metcalf& mapping within 30-days. Kaumalumalu Eddy/AECOM watercourses. South Kona Flood Study Phase 1 8-4 None Watercourses 13-20 1166C&1167C Michael Wang, 6/24/2008 Completed preliminary Flood Nav-09 Army Corps of study.Ready to submit to Engine— County. South Kona Flood Study Phase 11 8-1,8-2,8-3,8-4, None Watercourses 1-12 91 Michael Wang, 6/24/2003 Working an developing Jul-10 8-5,8-6 and 21-23 944C,1155C, Army Corps of topographic maps 11570,11580, Engineers 1159C,1169C& 1407C Puna Flood Study 1-6,1-7,1-8,1-9 None To be determined None printed Jay Stone, 12/19/2006 Completed hydrology and May-10 Oceanic H droullc analysis. Keopu-Hlenaloli Flood Study 7-5 None Keopu and Hienaloli 0712C,713D& Derrick Elfalan, 11/20/2007 Preliminary flood study May-10 Watercourses 714C Oceanic c ompleted.Continuing to refine flood boundaries (hydraulics study). County of Hawaii's flood control levees certification project: Levees that are not properly constructed and regularly maintained, inspected and certified have the potential to create significant community disruption and considerable cost in flood insurance,repairing and replacing flood damaged structures. Consequently, on November 2, 2007, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) notified the County of Hawaii that the County's levees (refer to Table 2)require certification in accordance with Code of Federal Regulation Title 44 Section 65.10 (44 CFR 65.10). FEMA's April 2007 "Fact Sheet — Meeting the Criteria for Accrediting Levees on Flood Maps"is a good resource on FEMA's levee certification process. 10-25 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods The County needs to certify the four levees listed in Table 10-3, which includes Waiakea Stream Levee 11 (refer to Figure 1), Alenaio Stream Levees 12 and 20 (refer to Figure 2) and Paauau Stream Levee(refer to Figure 3). Table 10-3. List and Status of Levees FEMA Levee USACE PAL Flood Source Levee Owner Object ID Levee? Status 1 No A Kamuela Stream Parker Ranch 2 No A Lanimaumau Stream Parker Ranch 9 Yes B Keopu Drainageway County of Hawaii I I Yes B Waiakea Stream County of Hawaii 12 Yes B Alenaio Stream County of Hawaii 20 Yes A Alenaio Stream County of Hawaii 21 Yes B Keao u Drainageway County of Hawaii (1) Yes B I Paauau Stream I County of Hawaii USACE—United State Arm Corps of Engineers PAL—Previously Accredited Levee B—Received a USACE acceptable maintenance level rating in a recent inspection review. A—Levees not in the USAGE program with no approved maintenance review for FEMA. 0 -Levees subject to this CDBG funding request (1)—Levee not originally listed in FEMA November 2,2007,letter. Given the time needed to comply with 44 CFR 65.10, FEMA issued its March 16, 2007, Procedure Memorandum No. 43 (PM No. 43), which establishes a process that gives communities additional time to acquire and assemble the necessary levee certification documentation. In accordance with PM No. 43, the County of Hawaii entered into a PAL Agreement with FEMA on January 29,2008. 10-26 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Site Location ti Levee No. 20 _ r //yy Jt �y l Levees not certified 100-Yr Flood(1%) Inundation Area �t 1 Levee No. 12 2009 Community Development Grant ti County of Hawaii Department of Public Works Engineering Division � Figure 1 -Alenaio Stream (Levees 12 & 20) Note:Inundation areas are estimates only. 10-27 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Levees not certified 1 o Flood Inundation j Area ' ^4 4o e y ow � R-__ __ _ __ ♦• Zone AE z Z cA Levee No. 11 1 Zane X � B 0 ,N00 X00 ,Sa sa C �{ ]11 Site Location 2009 Community Development Grant County of Hawaii Department of Public Works Engineering Division Figure 2 -Waiakea Stream(Levees 11) Note:Inundation areas are estimates only. 10-28 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods ! f _ I,I Levees not certified 100-Yr(1%)Flood i' Inundation Area Levees � � s Site Location .w 2009 Community Development Grant County of Hawaii Department of Public Works Engineering Division 1 � ` • , Figure 3—Paauau Stream(Levee) Note:Inundation areas are estimates onlv. 10-29 Hawaii County,Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Currently, the areas landward of County's levees are mapped as "X Zones" on FEMA's Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM). Areas designated as "X Zones" are not considered by FEMA as being subject to 100-year (1%) flood inundation. Mortgaged structures located within "X Zones" are not required to have flood insurance under National Flood Insurance Program (NFTP), or the flood insurance premium is greatly reduced. If the levees are not certified in accordance with the PAL Agreement and 44 CFR 65.10, the area landward of the levees will be remapped on the FIRM as "A Zone" Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA). Areas designated as "A Zone" SFHA are considered by FEMA as being subject to 100-year(1%) flood inundation. Any mortgaged structure located within an "A Zone" SFHA is required to have NFIP flood insurance. The annual premium for NFIP flood insurance can be in the thousands of dollars. If the County's levees are not certified, Table 10-4 presents an estimate of the acres of inundation (64 aces) and number of parcels (175 parcels) potentially affected (Refer to Figures 1, 2 and 3 for: the location of the levees; flood sources; estimated 100-year (1%) flood inundation areas landward of the levees; and,potentially affected parcels). Table 10-4. Estimated Inundation Area and Number of Parcels Potentially Affected if Levees are not Certified FEMA Levee Tnundation Area, Object ID Flood Source acres(i) No.of Parcel'" 11 Waiakea Stream 12 10 12&20 Alenaio Stream 43 133 --- Paauau Stream 9 32 Total 64 acres 175 parcels (1) Based on the inundation areas shown on Figures 1,2 and 3. The USACE has the expertise to prepare the certification documentation requested by FEMA. As part of the USACE Interagency and International Support Authority, the County entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the USACE, on October 1, 2008. Under the October 1 MOA, the USACE will assist the County in acquiring, assembling and submitting the necessary levee certification documentation to FEMA for Alenaio Stream (PAL Levee Nos. 12 & 20), Waiakea Stream (PAL Levee No. 11) and Paauau Stream (no PAL no. assigned). See Table 10-5. Table 10-5. USACE October 1 MOA Com ensation Allocation FEMA Levee Flood Source HUD Funds County Funds Total Funds Object ID (10%) (90%) 11 Waiakea Stream $ 27,500 $ 247,500 $ 275,000 12&20 Alenaio Stream 14,500 130,500 $ 145,000 --- Paauau Stream 14,500 130,500 $ 145,000 Total $ 56,500 $ 508,500 $ 565,000 10.4.1.2 Accuracy and Completeness ofFlood Zone Mapping Many known flood-prone areas have minimal FIRM coverage (e.g., upper Puna). Some FIRM maps do not completely include all flood areas, as evidenced by the November 2000 flooding (e.g., FIRM maps for Hilo). FEMA and the County are working to digitize the FTRMs, which should be completed by late 2010 or early 2011. Figure 10-9 shows those 10-30 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods areas that have not been mapped, the mapped areas that have been digitized by FEMA, the mapped areas that FEMA did not digitize but which the County has recently digitized. Figure 10-10 compares the information on a digitized preliminary DFIRM to the paper FIRM maps, illustrating that alignment checking and correction are a part of that process. Legend FIRM not printed,minimal tsunami inundation zone(per FEMA) FIRM not printed,area all in Zone X FIRM Printed LOMR(Letter of Map Revision)pending on a portion of panel Figure 10-9. FIRM Coverage. 10-31 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis-Floods Rioode Reel M2071 °� KSTDKTA o� Keakea Point o --A ZONE VE uRC Q . (mo(� o 0 0 IIHIKAI STREET AEHALA ST" Op e o b Puhi&Y + R oD9Fq KEOKEA AOs I bq Fy A.ARAHE RDA AE 022 SST RE F7A ZONE AE �5 19 CCE is i xm h a ZONE VE Kuhfo Boy 20 M206 ' 2 V i QLO�i ,g Zo 17 r ZONE AE- 1 ZONE VE ""i- aT ' i {.py��Iyyir��/ JE Ilfl nJE P � C aJE JE Paper Map FIRM showing base flood elevations R E E F K—kea PC �9 T` Slav :a Rnn Pt7f, Kignnka Raywry tCeaukaha '- . .,� •'..' 12D , tLa IY`j,Vt Liapit) t {r Digitized firm w/out BFE, but showing relationship to parcels and topographic features. Figure 10-10.Comparison of Paper vs.Preliminary Digitized FIRM Draft,showing alignment issue being resolved. 10.4.1.3 Hurricane Flood-Insurance Study for the Hawaiian Islands The Hurricane Flood Insurance Study for the Hawaiian islands was conducted under FEMA contract number EMW-2003-CO-0046, RMTC/URS Task Order 013. Under this contract, RMTC/URS, a joint venture consisting of R.M. Towill, URS, Dewberry, TerraPoint, Airborne 1, and Sea Engineering, was tasked to evaluate and map the magnitude and extent of coastal hazards due to hurricanes for six Hawaiian Islands, divided into four counties: Kauai (Kauai County), Oahu (City and County of Honolulu), Molokai, Maui, Lanai (Maui 10-32 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods County), and Hawaii (Hawaii County). Although the effective (i.e., past) FIRMs for each county have accounted for tsunami hazards, the hurricane flood hazard had not been previously separately evaluated in a comprehensive study throughout the islands. Tn general, the hurricane coastal hazard analysis was limited to the southern coast of each island. This is due to several factors, including the predominance of tsunami hazards and limited low-lying areas susceptible to hurricane hazards along the north shore of the islands. Table 5-1 provides a summary of study limits. Table 10-6. Summary of Study Limits Island Western Limit Eastern Limit Reach Length (Miles) Hawaii Upolu Point Cape Kutnukahi 193 Kauai Nohili Point Kuaehu Point 56 Lanai Kaumalapau Manele 16 Maui Hon okahuaBay Koali 69 Molokai Ilio Point Cape Halaawa 54 Oahu Kaena Point Kawaihoa Point 60 Total: 448 r� Keus� J� LanaiMaui t Haw@ ii Figure 10-11. Extents of Hurricane storm surge inundation study Transacts were laid-out within the study limits and representative placement was evaluated during the field reconnaissance performed from July 24th through August 6th, 2007. The topographic base consisted of LiDAR collected under FEMA Task Orders 12 and 26. The LiDAR data were collected in the Fall of 2006, post-processed to bare earth and quality 10-33 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods controlled to meet FEMA mapping standards. These data were assimilated together with the best available bathymetric datasets, including USACE hydrographic LiDAR, into high- resolution seamless digital elevation models. The hazard analysis considered the combination of storm surge and hurricane-induced wave hazards. This included independent analysis and/or modeling of storm surge, return frequency flood elevations, wave setup, overland wave hazards, and wave runup. The ADvanced CIRCulation model for coastal ocean hydrodynamics (ADCIRC) was selected to develop the stillwater elevations or storm surge for the study area. The Empirical Simulation Technique (EST), also developed by the USACE, was used to determine the stillwater frequency curves for the 10-, 2-, 1-, and 0.2-percent annual chance stillwater elevations. Deepwater wave conditions were determined using the Shore Protection Manual (SPM) prediction technique and limited fetch analyses were performed in harbor and sheltered areas. Wave setup was differentiated and evaluated for areas with and without fronting reefs. Areas of primary frontal dune were identified, delineated, and eroded. Overland wave propagation hazards were evaluated using the WHAFIS model. Wave obstructions were verified at representative transect locations by field reconnaissance. Wave run-up was evaluated using the RUNUP 2.0 and TAW methodologies, depending of the presence of reefs and local steepness of the bathymetry. Wave hazard analyses were conducted at FIS transect locations, in addition to more tightly- spaced"mapping transacts." These additional transacts were facilitated by the application of an integrated GIS toolset that automates repetitive modeling tasks, and enables a more detailed analysis than typical coastal FIS studies. Wave setup values were assigned to these transects according to analysis at adjacent FTS transects. Otherwise, the mapping transects were treated with the same overland wave propagation and wave runup assessments as the FIS transects. The coastal hazards determined from the above analyses were synthesized in the form of the standard FEMA special flood hazard boundaries for the Zone VE, Zone AE, Zone AO, and Zone X hazard areas. These are presented in the TSDN as workmaps produced at a scale of 1':500". The workmaps also include stillwater stations, topographic elevation contours, FIS and mapping transect locations, and the shoreline. Wave analysis for the 0.2%annual chance event was not included in the scope of the study. The 0.2% return frequency stillwater elevation was exceeded by cumulative flood elevation from the 1% stillwater elevation and wave setup, therefore, the boundary of the 0.2% annual chance event was not delineated. To steeper areas where mapping scale limits the gutter placement, the SFHAs are only identified by the position of the 100-yr flood boundary. Mapped Base Flood Elevations (BFEs) are considerably dependent to the topographic representation at each transect. As a result, localized variations in the topography at other locations may not be fully reflected in the mapped SFHAs and BFEs. A Technical Support Data Notebook (TSDN) was compiled for each county in the study area. Storm surge and return frequency elevation analyses were inclusive of all counties, and thus all materials pertaining to those analyses, including model input, output, and documentation are included in each county TSDN. The remainder of the data, including wave modeling, mapping, workmaps, topography, etc., are island and county specific. Therefore,these data are only presented in the appropriate countywide TSDN. 10-34 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Limitations of the study being addressed prior to FIRM adoption: • Modifications to the Flood Maps to include tsunami inundation as a factor in zoning and construction requirements. • Phase I: The first step presently underway is comparing the differences between the existing and new FIRM maps to determine where historic or the recently modeled tsunami hazard is greater. • Phase II: UHM SOEST mapping (by the Kwok Fai Cheung Group) could produce 100-year and 500-year probabilistic tsunami hazard maps to provide future local modifications to the DFIRMs. 10.4.1.4 Adequacy of Managing Existing Flood Problems and New Development with Watershed Planning and Drainage Standards The current comprehensive drainage plan for the County is the"Drainage Master Plan for the County of Hawaii" prepared over 30 years ago in 1971. This plan needs to be updated to incorporate new studies and to provide a watershed perspective in managing floods using both structural and non-structural methods. This plan would be the basis to prioritize CIP projects and to initiate regulatory changes. FEMA has funded an Area Development Plan for Existing and Future Development project to investigate: County regulations and policies for new development to provide community outreach in regards to protection/precaution measures. Floodplain management and land use regulatory integration scope of work includes examining regulatory integration of grading ordinance (HCC chapter 10), flood control code (chapter 27), subdivision code(chapter 23), and zoning code (chapter 25): Reduction of flood hazards through regulary measures(recommended revisions to hcc chapters 10,23,25& 27) DESCRIPTION: This project will recommend new regulatory measures to the Hawaii County Code that would reduce flood hazards, including hazards caused by dams and levees within the County of Hawaii. Proposed regulatory measures will focus on Chapter 10, Erosion & Sedimentation, Chapter 27, Flood Plain Management, Chapter 23. Subdivisions and Chapter 25, Zoning. Recommendations to other Chapters of the Hawaii County Code may be made as may be appropriate. We are focusing on the four chapters for the following: Chapter 10, Erosion & Sedimentation Control: Any land disturbance activity has the potential of causing flood hazards or aggravating existing flood hazards to surrounding properties and the environment. There is a need to improve enforcement as well as to increase the use of mitigating measures and/or best management practices that would minimize erosion, sedimentation impacts during land disturbance activities that would create flood hazards. Major recommendations are anticipated as this Chapter has not had any major changes since its adoption in November 1975. 10-35 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods Chapter 27, Flood Plain Management: This Chapter focuses on establishing building code and infrastructure requirements that would minimize flood damages based on hazards identified by the FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps. Recommendations may also address uncertainties inherent with the FEMA maps and measures to reduce flood hazards for non- compliant structures in special flood hazard areas. Because substantial changes to this Chapter were made in November 2007, major revisions are not anticipated. Chapter 23, Subdivisions: This chapter needs to be revised to reflect current requirements for subdivisions that are within special flood hazard areas. Upgrading of current drainage improvement requirements will also be considered. Chapter 25, Zoning: Like Chapter 23, upgrading of drainage improvement requirements will be a consideration. However, its applicability to the various types of zoning within Hawaii County and/or development restrictions within special flood hazard areas, watersheds, forests and other similar areas will a major issue of consideration. Because it is the responsibility of the implementing agency to develop legislative proposals, identification of pros and cons of each recommendation including any economic impacts, implementation measures and/or any legal issues or constraints is an essential part of this project. 10.4.1.5 Flood Forecasting In recent years, the NWS has installed more telemetered rain gauges to aid in flood prediction. Two Doppler radars on this island provide rainfall intensity in quantitative graphic form. A corps of human observers is also maintained to report significant events. Warnings for specific areas are broadcast via normal and special radio/TV forecasts and by special County Civil Defense announcements as well as over the NOAA Weather Radio. Thus, short-term mitigation is being addressed. The problem of vehicles being driven across flooding streams must be met by road hazard signs and public education for hunters and others using remote roads. 10.4.1.6 Pacific Services Center Flood Response Tool The Hawai'i Flood Response Tool is an ongoing project to develop a geographic information system (GIS)-based application to provide enhanced flood response in Hawai'i. The application will centralize access to diverse weather and stream flow data from various locations and sources to allow for timely analysis and response. This software, which is being developed for local emergency managers, will provide an improved operational picture for flood response activities by automatically logging disparate real-time and near real-time observation data and text products via the Internet. The information will be displayed along with historical and baseline data in an-easy to-interpret format utilizing GIS. This rapid access to new data streams should provide a more realistic picture of on-the-ground conditions and reduce data compilation time. More information on the Hawai'i Flood Response Tool is available at nos.csc.psegnoaa. og_v. 10-36 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods 10.4.2 Future Plans Project Description Status Modernize FIRM maps with local amendments See http://k�is.hawaiinfip.org,/that On Dec. 12,2008 and Feb.26,2009,FEMA FEMA has revised the DFIRM's and Flood Also included a re-evaluation of issued Preliminary Digital Flood Insurance Insurance Study based on hurricane flooding the Puukapu Watershed of the Rate Maps(91 panels)for Hawaii County hazard. Waimea area (Pre-DIRMs).On April 21,2009,FEMA These FIS maps do not include historic tsunami held its Pre-DIRMs flood hazard mapping inundation data. The next step is to compare the community coordination meeting with the differences between the existing and new FIRM County.On April 22,in Kona,and April 23, maps to determine where historic or the recently in Hilo,FEMA and the County held public modeled tsunami inundation hazard is greater. meetings on the Pre-DIRMs. On June 30,2009,the County sent a letter to FEMA indicating,until the Pre-DFTRMs are revised to acceptable standards,the County will continue using the County's current floodplain management records to make land use and building permit issuance decisions. On July 7,2009,FEMA acknowledge the County's June 30 letter and accepted the County's support in preparing improved digital presentations of the riverine flood zones.On Sept.28,2009,FEMA approved a $71,300 Cooperative Technical Partners grant to assist in improving the riverine flood zones on the DFIRMs.FEMA will continue to improve the DFIRMs coastal high hazard areas by combining the more protective inundation areas from either FEMA's 2008 hurricane flood study for the County of Hawaii(refer to Section 10.4.1.3)and the current effective FIRMS'coastal high hazard areas. Participate in the Community Rating System Results in reduction in flood Project requires documentation effort and insurance premiums analysis of repetitive loss properties Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the US Hawaiian http://hdsc.new.noas.gov/hdsc/pfds NOAA release May 2009 Islands Includes:precipitation frequency estimates for durations from 5-minutes through 60 days,for return periods of 1-year through 1000 years. Develop policies for repetitive loss structures Policy may or may not make This depends on an analysis of repetitive loss economic sense from a Benefit properties Cost Analysis Area Development Plan for Existing and Future Floodplain management and land Ongoing project scope: Recommend Development use regulatory integration scope of revisions to the Department of Public Works This project proposes to refine regulations and work includes examining for Chapters 10 and 27;and recommend policies for new development and provide regulatory integration of grading revisions to the Planning Department for community outreach in regards to ordinance(HCC chap 10),flood Chapters 23 and 25 and develop new protection/precaution measures. Context Sensitive control code(chap 27), regulatory measures to reduce flood hazards Solutions methodology will be used to identify a subdivision code(chap 23),and within the County of Hawaii and to earn comprehensive programmatic approach to mitigate zoning code(chap 25) FEMA Community Rating System(CRS) the risks to existing and future developments. The points for the County of Hawai'i. study also proposes to identify and prioritize floodplain mapping,develop policies for unprotected subdivisions,and coordinate disaster preparedness planning for floods. Develop rainfall and streamflow gauging system Internet accessible tool to view NOAA PSC developing prototype suitable to flood monitoring real-time rainfall and streamflow application for emergency managers data 10-37 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10:Hazard Analysis—Floods 10.4.2.1 Community Rating System The National Flood Insurance Program's (NFIP) Community Rating System (CRS) is a voluntary incentive program that recognizes and encourages community floodplain management activities that exceed the minimum NFTP requirements. As a result, flood insurance premium rates are discounted to reflect the reduced flood risk resulting from the community actions meeting the three goals of the CRS: 1. Reduce flood losses; 2. Facilitate accurate insurance rating; and 3. Promote the awareness of flood insurance. For CRS participating communities, flood insurance premium rates are discounted in increments of 5%; i.e., a Class 1 community would receive a 45%premium discount,while a Class 9 community would receive a 5% discount (a Class 10 is not participating in the CRS and receives no discount). The CRS classes for local communities are based on 18 creditable activities, organized under four categories: 1. Public Information, 2. Mapping and Regulations, 3. Flood Damage Reduction, and 4. Flood Preparedness. The table below shows the credit points earned, classification awarded, and premium reductions given for communities in the NFTP CRS. Credit Points Class Premium Reduction Premium Reduction SFHA* Non-SFHA** 4,500+ 0 45% 10% 4,000-4, 40% 10% 3,500-3, 0 35% 10% 3,000-3, ® 30% 10% 2,500-2, � 25% 10% 2,000-2, © 20% 10% 1,500-1, 0 15% 5% 1,000— 1,499 ® 10% 5% 500-99 5% 5% 0—499 10 0 0 *Special Flood Hazard Area **Preferred Risk Policies are available only in B,C,and X Zones for properties that are shown to have a minimal risk of flood damage.The Preferred Risk Policy does not receive premium rate credits under the CRS because it already has a lower premium than other policies.The CRS credit for AR and A99 Zones are based on non-Special Flood Hazard Areas(non-SFHAs)(B,C,and X Zones).Credits are:classes 1-6, 10%and classes 7-9,5%.Premium reductions are subject to change. 10-38 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix Chapter 27 FLOODPL.AIN MANAGEMENT Article 1.Authorization. Section 27-1. Statutory authority. Section 27-2. Findings of fact. Section 27-3. Purpose. Section 27-4. Scope and methods. Article 2.General Provisions. Section 27-5. Applicabilily. Section 27-6. Basis. Section 27-7. Compliance. Section 27-8. Other laws and regulations. Section 27-9. Interirretation. Section 27-10_ Warning and disclaimer of liability. Section 27-11. Severability• Section 27-12. Definitions. Section 27-13_ Nonconfotming structures. Article 3.Administration. Section 27-14. Director of public works approval. Section 27-15. Designation of the floodplain administrator. Section 27-16. Duties and responsibilities of the floodplain administrator. Article J.Standards. Section 27-17. Certification standards. Section 27-18. Standards i'or construction. Section 27-19. Standards for utililies. Section 27-20. Standards for subdivisions and outer development-,. Section 27-21. Standards for manufactured(tomes. Section 27-22. Standards for lloodways. Section 27-23, Standards for coastal high hazard areas. Section 27-24. Standards for general floodplain. Section 27-25. Standards for improvements adjacent to drainage facilities. Section 27-26. Slorm drainagc standards. Article 5.Variances and Appeals. Section 27-27. Criteria for variances. Section 27-2X. Application for variance. Section 27-29. Review of variance applications. Section 27-30. Recording and reporting of variances. Section 27-31. Appeals. j SUPP 5 (1-2008) 10A-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix Article 6.Enforcement. Section 27-32. Right to enter. Section 27-33. Notico of violation. Section 27-34. Administrative order. Section 27-35. Injunctive relief. Section 27-36. Criminal enforecment. Section 27-37. Removal of encroachment andior obstruction notices. Section 27-38. Removal by County.costs. I� 10A-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT 27-1 Chapter 27 FLOODPi.AIN MANAGEgfEN r Article 1.Authorization, Section 27-1. Statutory authority_ This chapter is enacted pursuant to the U.S.National Flood Insurance.pct of 1968(Public Laws 90-416 and 91-152), as amended, and the U-S. Flood Disaslcr Protection Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-234), as amended. in addition. the Legislature of the State of llawai'i has in Ilawai'i Revised Statutes 46-1.5(5). 46-1.5(14),46-11,46-11.5,and 46-12 conferred upon the various counties the authority to adopt regulations designed to promote the public health,safety,and general welfare of its citizenry (1993,Ord.No,93-78,see.3;Am.2007,Ord,No,07-169,sec.3.) Section 27-2. Findings of fuel. (a) The flood hazard areas of the County of Hawaii are subject to periodic inundation which results in loss of life and property, health and safety hazards, disruption of commerce and governmental services, extraordinary public expenditures for flood protection and relief and impairment of the tax base,all of which adversely affect the public health,safety and general welfare. (b) These flood losses me caused by the cumulative effect of obstructions in areas of special flood hazards which increase flood heights and velocities and,when inadequately anchored,cause damage to uses in other areas.Lases that are inadaqualcly floodproofcd,clovated.or otherwise protected Vrom flood damage also contribute to the flood loss. (1993.Ord_No.93-76,sec.3.) Section 27-3. Purpose. I[is[lie purpose of iltis chapter to promote the public healft safety,and general welfare,and it)minimize public and private losses due to flood conditions in specific areas by provisions designed: (a) To protect human life and health: (b) To minimize expenditure of public money for costly flood control prgiccts; (c) To minimize the need for rescue and relief efforts associated with flooding and generally undertaken at the expense of the general public; (d) To minimize prolonged business interruptions; (c) To minimize damage to public facilities and utilities such as water and gas mains.electric,telephone and sewer lines,streets and bridges located in areas of special flood hazard: (f) To help maintain a stable tax base by providing for the sound use and development of areas of special flood hazard so as to minimize future flood blight areas; (g) To assist in notifying potential buyers that properly is in an area ofspecial flood hazard;and (h) To ensure that those who occupy areas of special flood hazard assume responsibility for their actions. (1993,Ord.No.93-76,sce.3.) Section 27-4. Scope and methods. In order to accompll4h its purposes,this chapter Includes methods and provlslom;for: (a) Restricting or prohibiting uses which are dangerous to health..safety.and property due to water or erosion hazards,or which result in damaging increases in erosion or flood heights or velocities: (b) Requiring that uses vulnerable to fluods,including lacilitics which serve such uses,be protected against Rood damage at the time of-initial construction; 27-1 SUPP 5 (1-2008) 1 0A-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix §27-4 IIAWAI'I COUNTY CODE (e) Controlling the alteration of natural floodplains,stream channels,and natural protective hanier:s,which help accommodate or channel llexrd walers; (d) Controlling fill.grading,dredging,and other dcvclopment which may increase flood damage;and (e) Preventing or regulating the construction of flood barriers which will unnaturally divert flood waters or which may increase flood hazards in other areas. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3.) Article 2.General Provisions. Section 27-5. Applicability. (a) Ills chapter shall apply to all areas of special flood hazards identified by the Federal Emergency Management Agony in a scientific and engineering report entitled "Flood insurance Study," dalcd April 2,2004, with accompanying Flood Insurance Rate Maps and all future changes, revisions and amendments to these documents, and shall apply to all areas bordering identified special flood hazard areas,and all other areas outside the idcntificd special flood hazard areas encompassing and adjacent to a river,stream, stormwater channel,outtall area, or other inland water or drainage facility determined by the director of public works to be subject to flood hazards.'Thc special flood hazard areas are as follows: (1) Hoodway fringe-Zones AL.All,and AO. (2) Floodway. (3) Coastal high hazard(tsunami)-Zones V and VF._ (4) General floodplain-Zone A. (5) Land adjacent to drainage facilities,and Zone A99. (b) This chapter shall not apply lo: (l) Any building permit lawfully issued prior to May 5,1982 or building permit application property filed and accepted for review prior to May 5, 1982 provided that approval was obtained without any significant changes in plaits or specifications made after May 5,1952. (2) Roadway and site improvements for subdivisions for which tentative approval had been granted prior to May 5, 1982 and where roadway and site improvement construction and grading plans had received all necessary agency approvals by May 5,1982. (3) Camtvals,l'u`aus,fairs,and camping tents of a temporary nature which are not in a floodway. (4) Nonfenwd,at grade outdoor swimming pools. (5) Signs which are not in a floodway. (6) Domolilion, (1993,Ord.No,93-78,sec.3;Am.2001,Ord.No.01-108,sec.1;Am.2007,Ord,No.07-169,sec.4.) Section 27-6. Basis. The areas of special flood hazard identified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the Flood Insurance Study dated April 2, 2004, along with all subsequent revisions and amendments, and the Flood Insurance Rate Maps, dated April 2.2004, May 16, 1994,July 16, 1990,and September 16, 1988, and all fulure changes,revisions.and amcndmcnts to these documents,arc hereby adopted and declared to be a part of this chapter.the Flood Insurance Study and Flood Insurance Rale\gaps,and all future changes,revisions,and amendments to these documents,are on file at the Aupuni Center,DepMmem of Public Works, 101 Pauahi Strucl.Suite 7,Hilo,Hawaii 96720. (1993,Ord,No.93-78,sec.3;Am.1994,Ord.No.94-74,sec.3;Am.1995.Ord.No.95-86,sec.3;Am.2007. Ord.No.07-169,sec.5.) SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-2 1 0A-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT 27-7 Section 27-7. Compliance. No structure or land shall hereafter be constructer) located.extended, converted,or altered without full compliance with the terms of this chapter and other applicable regulations.The terms of this chapter shall be enforced by the standards set forth in article 6. (1993,turd.No.93-78,sec.3.) Section 27-8. Other laws and regulations. All construction and improvements subject to this chapter shall comply with other applicable laws and regulations including,but not limited to,the zoning,building,electricity,plumbing,subdivision,erosion and sedimentation control chapters of the Hawaii County Code,and the storm drainage standards,October 1970 edition,or later revisions,of the County of Hawaii.This chapter,designed to reduce flood losses,shall talc precedence over any less restrictive,conflicting laws,ordinances.and regulations.Thus chapter is not intended to mpeal, abrogate, or impair any existing casements. covenants,or deed restriction.However,where this chapter and another c:haptcr,casement,covenant,or dead restriction conflict or overlap,whichever imposes the more stringent restrictions shall prevail. In the event of a conflict between this chapter and the National Flood Insurancc Program and Related Regulations(NFIP),as amended,file more restrictive provision will govern. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec_3;Am.2007,Ord No.07-169,sec,0.) Section 27-9. interpretation. In the interpretation and application of this chapter,all provisions shall be: (a) Considered as minimum requirements; (b) Liberally construed in favor of the County afHawai'i:and (c) Dcemed neither to limit nor repeal any other powers granted to the County of Hawaii under State of Ilawai`i statutes. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3.) Section 27-10. Warning and disclaimer of liability. The degree of flood protection required by this chapter is considered reasonable for regulatory purposes and is based on scientific and engineering considerations.Larger floods can and will occur on rare occasions. Flood heights may be increased by man-made or natural causes.This chapter does not imply that land outside the areas of special flood hazards and areas of llood-related erasion hazards,or uses permiucd within such areas will be free from flooding or flood damages. This chapter shall not creale liabibty on the part of the County of Hawaii, any officer or employee thereof, or the Federal insurance Administration, Federal Emergency U--magcment Agency, for anv flood damages drat result from reliance on ilus chapter or anv administrative decision lawfully madethereundcr. (1993,Ord,Nu.93-78,sec.3.) Section 27-11. Severablldty. 'lltis chapter and the various parts thereof are hereby declared to be severable.Should any section of this chapter b,:declared by the courts to be unconstitutional or invalid,such decision shall not affect the validity of the chapter as a whole, or any portion thereof other than the section so declared to be unconstitutional or imand. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,scc.3.) 27-3 SUPP,5 (1-2008) 1 0A-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix §27-12 IIAW AI'l COUNTY CODE Section 27-12. Definitions. Unless specifically dcftned below,words nr phrases used in this chapter shall be interpreted so as to give them the meaning they have in common usage and to give this chapter its most reasonable application. "Accessory use"means a use which is incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the parcel of land on which it is located. "Appeal" means a request for a review of the floodplain adminisirator's interpretation of any provision of this chapter or denial of a request for a variance. "Area of shallow flooding"means a designated AU or All tone on the Flood Insurance state blap (1-MI).'Ilie base flood depths range from one to three feet;a clearly defmal channel does not exist: the path of flooding is unpredictable and indeterminate: and velocity flow may he evident. Such flooding is characterized by ponding or sheet flow. "BackfUl"means the placement of 511 material within a specified depression,hole or excavation pit below the surrounding adjacent ground level as a means of improving floodwater conveyance or to reslore the land to the natural contours existing prior to excavation. "Base flood"means the flood having a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year(also called the"one-hundred-year flood"). "Base flood elevation"means the water surface elevation of the base flood. "Basement" mean.%any area of the building having its flour subgrade(below ground level)on all sides. "Breakaway walls" are any type of walls, whether solid or lattice. and whether constructed of concrete,masonry,wood,metal,plastic nr any other suitable building material which is not part of the structural support of the building and which is designed to break away under abnormally high tides or wave action without causing any damage to the structural integrity of the building on which they are used or any buildings to which they night be carried by floodwaters.A breakaway wall shall have a safe design loading resistance of not less than ten and no more than twenty pounds per square foot.Use of breakaway walls must be certified by a Gccnscd structural engineer or architect and shall meet the following conditions: (1) Breakaway wall collapse shall result from a water load less than that which would occur during the base flood;and (2) 'lime elevated portion of the building shall not incur any structural damage due to the effects of wind and water loads acting simultaneously in the event of the base flood. "Buffer zones"are areas bordering and within 50 feet of special flood hazard areas with base flood elevations, depth numbers spccified in feet on the FIRNI or other areas that have boon studied and identified with base flood elevations or depth numbers. 'icomtal high hazard area'-See"Zone V"and Zone VL." "Development"means any man-made change to improved or unimproved real estate,including bill not limited to buildings or other structures,mining, dredging, tilling,grading,paving,excavation or drilling operations or storage of equipment or materials. "Drainage fadlity"-See"Watercourse." "Encroachment" means the advance or infringement of uses, plant growth, fill, excavation, buildings,permanent structures or development into a floodplain which may impede or alter the flow capacity of a floodplain_ "Existing manufactured home park or subdivision' means a manufactured home park or subdivision for which the construction of facilities for servicing the lots on which the manufactured homes are to he affixed(including,at a minimum.the installation of utilities,the construction of shreds, and either final site grading or the pouring of concn:le pads)is completed before May 5,1982. SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-4 1 0A-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 1'LOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-12 "Fill"iS the placement of fill material at a ipocified location to bring die ground surface up to a desired elevation. "Fill material"can he natural sand,dirt.soil or rock.For the purposes of floodplain management, fill material may include concrete, cement,soil cement, brick, or similar material as approved on a case-try-case basis. "Flood elevation determination"means a determination by the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the water surface elevations of the bash flood,that is,the flood level that has a one percent or greater chance of occurrence in any given year. -Flood elevation study"or"flood study"moans an examination, evaluation,and determination of flood hazards and, if appropriate, corresponding water surface elevations, or an examination, evaluation and dotern ination of flood-rolated erosion hazards. "Hood,flooding,or floodwater"means: (1) A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of normally dry land areas from: (A) The overflow of inland or tidal waters: (l3) 'the unusual and rapid accumulation of runoff or surface waters from any source which arc approximately caused by flooding as defined in paragraph(A)(ii)of this definition and are akin to a river of water on the surfaces of normally dry land areas,as when earth is carried by a current of water and deposited along the path of the current:and (2) The collapse or subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or other body of water as a result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding anticipated cyclical levels or suddenly caused by an unusually high water level in a natural body of water,accompanied by a severe start.or by an unanticipated force of nature,such as flash flood or an abnormal tidal Surge,or by some similarly unusual and unforeseeable event which results in flooding as defined in paragraph (1)(A) of this definition. "Flood Insurance Rate Xtap(11RIM)" means the official map on which the Federal Lmergency, Management Agency has delineated both the areas of special flood hazards and the risk premium zones applicable to the community. "Rood Insurance Study" means the official report provided by the federal Emergency Management Agency that includes flood profiles,the Flood Insurance Rate Map.and the water surface clevafion of the base flood. "Flood protection system" means those physical structural works for which funds have been authorized. appropriated, and expended and which have been constructed specifically to modify flooding in order to reduce the extent of the area within a community subject to a "special flood hazard"and the extent of the depths of associated flooding.Such a system typically includes hurricane tidal harriers, dams reservoirs,levees, or dikes.These specialized flood modifying works are those constructed to conform with sound engineering standards. "Floodplain administrator"is the individual appointed to administe7 and enforce the floodplain management regulations.'this person shall be the director ofpublic works of the County of Ifawai`i or the director's duly authorized representative who shall be a currently licensed professional engineer in the Stale of Hawaii. "lloodplain management"means the operation of an overall program of corrective and preventive measures for reducing flood damage,including but not limited to emergency preparedness plans,flood control works and lloodplain management regulations. 27-5 SUPP s (1-2008) 1 0A-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix §27-12 MW.AI'l COUNTY CODE "Floodpluin management regulations-means zoning ordinances,subdivision regulations,building codes,hcallh regulations,and special purpose ordinances(such as a floodplain ordinance or an erosion and sedimentation control nrdinanec)and other applications of police power. The term doscribes such state or local regulations,in any combination thereof.which provide standards for the purpose of flood damage prevention and reduction. "Floodplain or flood-prone area"means any land area susceptible to being inundated by water from any sourze(sev definition of"fluodirtg"). "Iloodproofing" means any combination of structural and nonstructural additions, changes, or adjustments to structures which reduce or eliminate flood damage to real estate or improved real property.water and sanitary facilities,xtruclures,and their contents. "Hoodway fringe" is the areas of a floodplain on either side of the designated floodway where encroachment may be permitted. "floodway" or"regulatory floodway"meats the channel of a river or other watercourse and the adjacent land areas that most be reserved in order to discharge the base flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface elevation. "Fraud and victimization"related to article 5,variances,of this chapter means that the variance granted must not cause fraud on or victimization of the public.In examining this requirement, the director of public works will consider the fact that ever' newly constructed structure adds to government responsibilities and remains a part of the community for filly to one hundred years. Structures that are permitted to be constructed below the base flood elevation are subject during all those years to increased risk of damage from floods,wimile future owners of the structure(s)and the community as a whole are subject to all the costs, inconvenience, danger, and suflating that those increased flood damages bring.in addition,future owners may purchase the sinmcture(s),unaware that it is subject to pmenlial flood damage, and the structure(s) call be insured only at very high flood insurance rates. "Freeboard"means a factor of safely usually expressed in feet above a flood level for purposes of floodplain management. "Freeboard" tends to compensate for the many unknown factors that could contribute to flood heights greater than the height calculated for a selected size flood and floodway conditions.such as wave action,bridge openings.and the hydrological effect of urbanization of the watershed- "Functionally dependent use means a use which cannot perform its intended purpose unless it is located or carried out in close proximity to water, The, term includes only docking facilities, port facilities that arc necessary for the loading and unloading of cargo or passengers,and strip building and ship repair facilities,but does not include long-term storage or related manufacturing facihtics_ "General floodplain"-Sue"Zone A." "Hardship"as related to article 5,variances,of this chapter means the hanIsi ip that would result from a failure to grant the requested variance.The director of public works requirus that the variance be exceptional,unusual,and peculiar to the property involved.Meru economic or financial hardship alone is not exceptional.Inconvenience,aesthetic considerations,physical disabilities,personal preferences, or the disapproval of one's neighbont likewise cannot as a rule,qualify as exceptional hardships.All of these problems can he resolved through other means,without granting a variance.'11tis is so even if the allctrtativc means are more expensive or complicated than building with a variance.or if they require the property owner to put the parcel to a different use than originally intended,or to build clsewhere. "Highest adjacent grade" means the highest natural elevation of lire ground surface prior to construction next to the proposed walls of a structure. "Ifistoric structure"means any structure that is: (1) Listed individually in the National Register of llistoric Places(a listing maintained by the Department of Interior)or preliminarily determined by the Sceretary of the Interior as meeting the requirements for individual listing on the National Register. SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-6 10A-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix T'LOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-12 (2) Cati fied or preliminarily determined by the Secretary of the Interior as contributing to the historical significance of a rcgislcrcd historic district or a district preliminarily dcturmincd by the Secretary of'lhe Interior to qualify as a rcgislcrcd historic district.. (3) Individually listed on a Slate of Ilawai'i inventory of historic places where the historic preservation program has been approved by the Secretary of the interior;or (4) Individually listed on a local inventory of historic places in communities with historic preservation programs that have been certified either, (A) By an approved Stale program as determined by the Secretary ofthe Interior,or (B) Diractly by the Sccrctary of the Interior in states without approved programs. `Lcvice'means a man-made structure,usually an earthen embankment designed and constructed in accordance with sound engineering practices to contain control. or divert the flow of water so as to provide protection from temporary flooding, "Levee system" means a flood protection system which consists of a levee, or levees, and associated stmetures, such as closure and drainage devices, which are constructed and operatud in accord with sound engineering practices. "Lowest floor" means the lowest floor of the lowest enclosed area (including basement). An unfinished or flood resistant enclosure.usable solely for parking of vehicles.building access,or storage in an area other than a basement area is not considered a building's lowest floor provided that such enclosure is not built so as to render the structure in violation of the applicable noncicvation design requirements of this chapter. `Manufactured home-means a structure,transportable in one or more sections,which is built on a permanent chassis and is designed flor use with or without a permanent foundation when attached to the required utilities. 'lhe lerm "manufactured home"includes a "mobile home' but does not include a "recreational vehicle." "Manufactured home park or subdivision"means a parcel(or contiguous parcels)of land divided into two or more manufactured home lots for rent or sale. "Market value."For the purposes of determining substantial improvement,market value pertains only to the structure in question.It does not pertain to the land,landscaping,or detached accessory structures on the property.For determining substantial improvement.the value of the land must always be subttactcd.Acceptable estimates of market value can be obtained from the following sources: (1) Independent appraisals by a professional appraiser licensed by file State. (2) Property appraisals used for tax assessment purposes by 1ha County department of finance,real property lax office. (3) The value of buildings taken from National Flood Insurallec Program claims data. This value shall be used as a screening tool to identify those structures where the substantial improvement ratio is less than forty percent or greater than sixty percent. "Mean sea level" means, for purposes of the National Flood Insurance Program. the National Gcodclic Vertical Datum of 1929 or other datum, to which hasc flood elevations shown on a community's Flood Insurance[fate Map are referenced. "Minimum necessarv"related to article 5,variances,of this chapter mcam the minimum necessary to afford relief to the applicant of a variance with a minimum deviation from the requirements of this chapter.in the case of variances to an elevation requiroment,this means the director of public works need not grant permission for the applicant to build al grade,for example,or even to whatever elevation the applicant proposes,but only that level that the director of public works believes will bout provide relief and preserve the integrity of this chapter. "New construction"for floodplain management purposes,means structures for which the-start of construction"comtnenced on or alter May i. 1982,and includes any subsequent improvements to such structures. 27.7 SUPP 5 (1-2008) 1 0A-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix §27-12 MW:AI't COUNTY CODE "New manufactured home park or subdivision"means a manufactured home park or subdivision for which the construction of facilities f'or servicing the lots on which the manufactured(tomes are to he affixed(including at a minimum.the installation of utilities,the construction of streets,and either final site grrading or the pouring of concrete pads)is completed on or after May 5,1982. "Obstruction"includes but is not funned to any darn.wall, wharf;embankment,levee,dike,(rile. abutment,protection,excavation,channcfization,bridge_conduit,culvert,building,wire.fence, rock, gravel,refuse, fill, structure, vegetation, or other material in, along, across. or projecting into any walemourse which may alter,impede, retard, or change the direction and/or velocity of the flow of water,or due to its location,its propensity to snare or collect debris carried by the flow of water or its likelihood of being carried downstream- "Ono-hundred-year flood" means a flood which has a one pet"nt annual probability of being equaled or exceeded.11 is identical to the"base flood," "Ono-hundred-year floodplain" means any area of land susceptible to being inundated by water from any source generated by the one-hundred-year flood. `Primary frontal dune" means a continuous or nearly continuous mound or ridge of sand with relatively steep seaward and landward slopes immediately landward and adjacent to the beach and subject to crnsion and overtopping from high tides and waves during major coastal storms.The inland limit of the primary frontal dune occurs at the point where there is a distinct change from a relatively mild slope. "Principal structure"means a structure used for the principal use of the property as distinguished from an accessory use. "Recreational vchield"means a vehicle which is: (1) Bud on a single chassis: (2) Pour hundred square feet or less when measured at the largest horizontal projection; (3) Designed to be self-propelled or permanently lovable by a light duty truck:and (4) Designed primarily not for use as a permanent dwelling but as temporary living quarters forrecrcadonal,camping,travel,or seasonal use. "Regulatory floodway"means the channel of a river or other watercourse and the adjacent land areas flint must be reserved in order to discharge the base flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface elevation. "Repetitive loss structure-means home or business that was damaged by flood two times in the past ten vears, where the cost of fully repairing the flood damage to the building, on Cite average, equaled or exceeded hventy-five percent of its market value at the time of each flood. "Riverine" means relating to, formed by, or resembling a aver(including tributaries), stream, brook,etc. "Sand dunes"means naturally occurring accumulations of sand in ridges or mounds landward of the beach. "Sheer flow aura"-Sec••arcs of shallow Ilooding." "Special flood hazard area"means an area having special flood or flood-related erosion hazards. and shown on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps as Zones A,AO,AE,A99,AK VF or V. "Start of construction"includes substantial improvement and other proposed new development and means the dale the building permit was issued, provided the act" start of construction. repair, reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, placement, or other improvement was within one hundred- eighty days from the date of the permit.'The actual start means either rite foal placement of permanent construction of a structure on a site,such as the pouting of slab or footings.the installation of piles,the construction of columns, or any work beyond the stage of excavation; or the placement oh a SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-8 1 OA-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix T'LOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-12 manufactured home on a foundation.Permanent construction does not include land preparation,such as clearing.grading and filling;nor does it include the installation of streets and/or walkways:nor does it include excavation for a basement, (outings,piers,or foundations,or the erection of temporary forms; nor does it include the installation on the property of accessory buildings.such as garages or sheds not occupied as dwelling units or not part of the main structure.For a substantial improvement,the actual start of construction means the first alteration of any wall,coiling,floor.or other structural pail of a building,whether or not that alteration affects the external dimensions of*the building. "State`tream fire State of l lawai`i. -Structure" moans a walled and motod building, including a gas or liquid storage lank, that is principally above ground,as well as a manufactured home. "Substantial damage"means damage of any origin sustained by a structure whereby file cost of restoring the structure to its before damaged condition would equal ur exceed fifty percent of the market value of the structure before the damage occurred. "Substantial improvement." For the purposes of this chapter, the determination of whelhcr any improvements constitute substantial improvements is applicable only to structures built prior to May 9, 1982 or buildings constructed after May 5.1982 which were not within a special flood hazard area at the time of issuing the building permiL "Substantial improvement" means any repair,reconstruction. rehabilitation.addition,or other proposed new development of a structure,the cost of which equals or exceeds Cully percent of the market value of the structure before the -start of construction" of the improvement which shall be die stint of all costs of all such work performed in the previous ten years including the cost of the current work being considered.The value of the structure including previous ten year improvements,shall be certified by a contractor,engineer,or architect licensed by the State and the property owner as may be required on a form provided by the County. 11tis term includes structures which have incurred"substantial damage,"regardless of the actual repair work performed. The term does not,however,include either: (1) Any project for improvement of a structure to correct existing violations of stale or local health,sanitary,or safety coda specifications which have been identified by the local code enforcement oOicial and which are the minimum necessary to assure safe living conditions;or (2) Any alteration of a `historic structure;' provided that the alteration will not proclnde,the tructure's continued designation as a"historic structure." "Variance"means a grant ofrehof from the roquu•ements of this chapter which permits construction in a manner that would otherwise be prohibited by this chapter. "Violation"means the failure of a structure or other development to be Cully compliant with the community's floodplain management regulations. A structure or other development without the elevation certificate,other certifications,or other evidence of compliance with this chapter is presumed to be in violation until such time as that documentation is providcd- "Water surface elevation"means the height,in relation to the National geodetic Vertical Datum at' 1929. (or other datum, when: specified) of floods of various magnitudes and frequencies in the floodplairis of coastal or riverine areas. "Watercourse" means a lake, river, creek. stream, wash, arroyo,channel. or other topographic feature on or over which water;flow at least periodically.Watercourse includes specifically designated arias in which substantial damage may occur. -Zone A"is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the one hundred-year floodplains that are determined in the hood Insurance Study by approximate methods. Because detailed hydraulic analyses are not performed for such areas,base flood elevations or depths have not been determined within this zone. "'Zone A99"is the special flood hazard area where enough progress has been made on a protective system,such as dikes,dams,and levees, to consider it complete tar insurance rating purposes.Base flood elevations have not been determined for areas designated as Zone A99, "Zone AG"is the special flood hazard area that corresponds In the one hundred-year floodplains that are determined in the Hood Insurance Study by detailed methods.Whole-fool base flood elevations 27-9 SUPP,5 (1-2008) 10A-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix §27-12 HAWAII COUNTY CODE derived from the detailed hydraulic analyses have been determined at selected intervals within this zone. "7onc AH" is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the areas of one-hundred-year shallow flooding(usually areas of ponding) where average depths are between one and three feel. Miole-foot base flood elevations derived from the detailed hydraulic analyses have been determined at selected intervals within this zonc. "Zone AO" is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the areas of ono-hundred-year shallow flooding(usually sheet flow on sloping terrain)where average depths are between one and three feet. Average whole-foot depths derived fiam the detailed hvdraulic analvsCR have been determined within this zonc. "Zone D"corresponds to unstudied areas where flood hazards are undetermined.but possible. '•Zone V" is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the one hundred-year coastal floodplains extending from offshore to the inland limit of a primary frontal dune along an open coast and any other area subject to high velocity wave action from storms or seismic sources,ll is an arca subject to high velocity waters, including coastal and tidal inundation or tsunamis. Base flood elevations have not been determined for areas designated as Zone V. -Zone VF." is the special flood hazard area that corresponds to the one hundred-year coastal lloodplains extending firm offshore to the inland limit of•a priman,liontal dune along an open coast and any other ara subjecl to high velocity wave action from storms or seismic sources.11 is an arca subject to]sigh velocity waters, including coastal and tidal inundation or tsunamis. Whole-fool base flood elevations derived from the detailed hydraulic analyses have been determined at selected intervals within this zone. "Zone\(shaded)"are areas of moderate flood hazard corresponding to areas of the five-hundred- year floodplain,areas of one-hundred-year flooding where average depths are less than one foot,areas of one-hundrtd-year flooding where the contributing drainage area is I.ss than one square mile,and areas protected from the one-hundred-year flood by levcos. 'Zone N(unshaded)"are areas of*minimal flood hazard corresponding to areas outside of the five- hundred-year floodplain.Base flood elevations or depths have not been determined for Lone X. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3:Am.1997,Ord.No.97-116,sec l;Am.2001,Ord.No.01-108,sues.1 and 9; Am.2007,Ord.No.07-169,scc.7.) Section 27-13. Nonconforming structures. Any nonconforming structure existing on clay 5,1982 or made nonconforming by a change in the special flood hazard area may continue,subject to the following conditions: (a) Any repair,reconstruction,improvement,or addition to a nonconforming structure.if it is considercd to be substantial improvement,shall comply with the applicable standards of this chapter. (b) All relocated structures shall comply with the applicable standards of this chapter. (c) Substantial improvement of a damaged,dcstroyod,or demolished structure located in a lloodway shall not be allowed unless a variance from the flood requirements is obtained. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,scc.3:Am.1997,Ord,No.97-116,sec.2.) Article 3.Administration. Section 27-14. Director of public works approval. No building permit, certificate of occupancy, or grading permit shall be issued, no structure shall be occupied,and no development or subdivision shall be approved without the approval of die director of public works with respect to compliance with the provisions of this chapter. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3:Am.2001,Ord,No.01-10R,sec.1;Am.2007.Ord.No.07-169.sec.R,) SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-10 1 0A-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter'10 Appendix FLOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-15 Section 27-15. Designation of the tloodplain administrator. The dinclor of public works of-the County of Hawaii is hereby appointed to administer,implement,and enforce this chapter in accord with the provisions of this chapter. (1993.Ord No.93-78,sec.3;Am.2001,Ord.No.01-108,sec.1,) Section 27-16. Duties and responsibilities of the Iloodplain administrator. The lloodplain administralnr, with the cooperation and assistance of other County departments, shall administer this chapter.'llre duties and responsibilities of the floodplain administrator shall include.but not be limited to: (a) PenrdI review. (1) All building pamtils,certificates of occupancy,grading permits, and development or subdivision proposals shall be reviewed to determine whether lire requnCmen(s of this chapter have been satisfied; (2) All other development permits referred by other governmental departments and agencies shall be reviewed for consistency with the mquirement_a of this chapter, (3) All permits and proposals shall be reviewed to determine that the proposed building %td is reasonably safe from flooding; (4) For proposed building sites in flood-prone areas where special flood hazard areas have not been defined,water surface elevations have not been provided,and there is insufficient data to identify the floodway or coastal high hazard areas but the flood plain administrator has determined that there are verifiable physical indications that such hazards are present,all new construction improvements to repetitive loss structures and substantial irnprovcmcnts(including the placement of manufactured homes)shall be: (A) Designed and adequately anchored to prevent flotation,collapse,or lateral movement: (Il) Constructed offlood-resistant materials; (C) Constructed by methods and practices that minimize flood damage:and (D) Constructed with electrical, heating, ventilation, plumbing, and air conditioning equipment and other service facilities (hal are designed and or located so as to prevent water from entering or accumulating within the components during conditions of flooding; (E) Be reviewed to assure that all necessary permits have beun received from those governmental agencies from which approval is required by Federal or State law,including section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,33 U.S.C.1334; (F) New and replacement utilities shall comply with the requirements of section 27-19;and (5) All permits shall be reviewed to dow mine that the proposed dcvclopment when combined with all other existing and anticipated development will not increase lie water surface elevation of the base flood at any point. (b) Ittforrnation to be maintained. (1) The Flood Insurance Study and Flood insuranou Rate Maps for thn County of Hawaili; (2) The certification of lowesl floor elevation: (3) The certification of flu odproofine for spaces below the base flood elevation, (4) line certification oflinal pad elevation where a site is filled above the base flood elevation; (5) The certification that an encroachment in the floodwav will not result in anv increase in flood levels during base flood discharge;and (6) 'the certification of elevation and structural support for structures In the coastal high hazard area. (c) Interpretation ofmaps. The director of public works shall make interpmIafions where nceded,as to the exact location of the boundaries of the areas of special flood hazards (rur axampte, whcr: there appears to be a conflict between a mapped boundary and actual field conditions). A person contesting the location of the boundary shall be given a reasonable opportunity to appeal the interpretation as provided in article 5. 27-11 SUPP 5 (1-2008) 1 0A-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix §27-16 IIAWAI't Cl)U1VTY CODE (d) Change in base flood elevations. Whenever base flood elevations increase or decrease or'result in a mappable alteration of the boundaries of any special flood hazard area,as a result of physical changes affecting flooding conditions, as soon as practical. but no later than six months aflor the date such information becomes available. the floodplain administrator shall notify the Federal Lmergency Management Agency of the changes by submitting technical or scientific data through the Letter of Map Revision process. Such a submission is necessary so that upon confirmation of those physical changes affecting flooding conditions,risk premium rates and floodplain management requirements will be based upon current data. (e) Use of other base flood data.When base flood elevation data has not been provided in accordance with section 27-6, the floodplain administrator shall obtain, review, and reasonably utilize any base flood elevation and floodway data available from a federal or State agency, or other source, in order to administer article 4.Anv such information shall be submitted to the County of Ilawaiti for adoption. (f) Whenever a watercourse is to be altered or relocated: (1) Require that the flood carving capacity of the altered or relocated portion of said watercourse is maintained: (2) For riverine situations, notify die State of llawai`i department of land and natural resources (commission an water resource management) and all adjacent property owners, prior to such alteration or relocation of a watercourse, and submit evidence of such notification to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. (3) Whenever a proposed alteration or relocation occurs that would significantly change the base flood elevation or result in a mappable alteration of the boundaries of anv special flood hazard area, technical and scientific data through the Conditional Letter of Map Revision(CLOMR) shall be submitted to and approved by the Federal L•me>Qency Management Agency.Such a submission is necessary so that upon completion of those physical changes affecting flooding conditions, risk premium rates and floodplain management requirements will he based upon current data.Work to be performed under an approved Conditional Lefler of Map Revision(CLOMR)shall be subject to the following: (A) Work shall not begin any on-site development affecting or impacting the floodplain until an approved Conditional i.etter of Map Revision is received from the Federal Emergency Management Agency: (B) Within sixty days of receiving final approval from director of public works for the completion of the alteration or relocation of a watercourse, the request for a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR),and all other information required by the 1-crier of Map Revision(i OMR)process shall be submitted to the flood plain administrator_ (g) Take action to remedy violations of this chapter as specified in article 6. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3;Ant.3001,Ord.No.01-108,sec.1;Am 2007,Ord.No.07-169,sec.9.) Article 4.Standards. Section 27-17. Certification standards. Pre-construction and post-construction certification of elevafion and floodproofing of new constructions, improvements to repetitive loss structures,development,and substantial improvements within areas of special flood hazards and buffer zones slmll be submitted to the director of public works and shall he maintained its a matter of public record. (a) Pre-construction certification. Requirements for approval of the building permit shall include the following items,as applicable, and any additional items as required by the director of public works to promote public welfare and safety; (1) Certification of building plans.Each set of building plans shall be wrtilied by a structural engineer or architect,currently licensed in the State ofllawai`i,to be in compliance with the requirements of this chapter. SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-12 1 0A-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix 1'LOODPLAIN MANAGEMLTtT §27-17 (2) Elevation certification on building plans.Tlw elevation of the lowest floor shall be certified on each set of the building plans by a civil engineer or land surveyor currently licensed in the State of Hawai•i. (3) Special flood hazards area certification. the County of Ilawai'i -Special P1ood Hazard Area Certification" form, as amended, shall be completed and certified by a structural engineer or architect currently licensed in the State of Hawaii. The completed "Special Flood Hazard Certification"shall be submitted 1or approval with the building plans, (4) Iloodproofing certification. For all new nonresidential construction and substantial improvement with enclosed areas below the base flood elevation.the Federal Fmcrgcncy Management Agency "Floodproofing Certificate"form,as amended shall be completed and certified by an engineer or architect currently licensed in the State of Ilawai`i and shall be submitted for approval with the building plans. The director of public works may require additional information regarding the floodproofing design from the permit applicant and the applicant shall provide it.'lhe information required may include the design data and calculations used in the lloodprooling design,a detailed flood elevatiun study, a drainage report, and other information as determined necessary by the director of public works to establish compliance with the provisions of thus chapter and to promote public welfare and safety. (b) Post-construction certification.Requirements for approval of the certificate of occupancy shall include the following items,as applicable.and any additional items as required by the director of public works(o promote public welfare and safety: (1) Elevation certification. 7'lie Federal Emergency Management Agency"Elevation Certificate," as amended,shall he completed and certified by a land surveyor.civil engineer.or architect currently licensed in the State of Ilawai'i and submitted for approval with the application for the certificate of occupancy. The information certified within the"Llevation Certificate" shall be based on actual construction. (2) Compliance with other requirements of this chapter. (1993,Ord.No.93-79,scc_3;Am.2001-Ord No.M-10R,sec.1;Ain,2007,Ord.No.07-169,sec.1Q) Section 27-18. Standards ror construction. Standards for construction within areas of special flood hazards and buffer zones am established as follows: (a) Anchoring. (1) Now construction,improvements to repetitive loss structures,and substantial improvements shall be adequately anclimcd to resist flotation,collapse or lateral movement of the structuro resulting from hydrodynamic and hydrostatic loads,including the effects of buoyancy. (2) All manufactured homes,including mobile homes,shall meet all standards for structures. (b) Construction materials and methods. (1) New construction,improvements to repetitive loss structures,and substantial improvcmont shall be constructed with materials and utility equipment resistant to flood damage. (2) New construction.improvements to repetitive loss structures,and substantial improvement shall be constructed using methods and practices that minimize flood damage. (3) New construction,improvements to repetitive loss structures,and substantial improvement shall he designed and constructed with electrical, heating, ventilation, plumbing. air-conditioning equipment,and other service facilities including, but not limited to, furnaces,heat pumps, water heaters, washers, dryers, elevator lift equipment, electrical junction boxes,circuit breaker boxes. and food freezers located above the base flood elevation plus any required freeboard (4) Within Zones V and '�T, new construction, improvements to rcpetitivc loss structures, and substantial improvements shall comply with the standards of seolion 27-23. 27-13 SUPP,5 (1-2008) 1 0A-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix §27-18 MWAI't COUNTY CODE (5) Rcercational vehicles placed on sites within Zones AH and AF,on the FIRM shall be elevated and anchored or be on the site for less than one hundred eighty consecutive days or be fully licensed and highway ready- ic) Encroachments. (1) Within a floodway, encroachments(including fill),new construction,improvements to repetitive loss structures, substantial improvements, and other developments, shall he prohibited unless certified by a professional civil engineer licensed in the Slate of Hawaii,with supporting data,that the encroachment will not cause any increase in base flood elevations during the occurrence of the base flood discharge. (?) Require, until a regulaloty floodway is designated, that no new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures,substantial improvements,or other development(including fill),shall be permitted within Zones AL on the MRAL unless demonstrated that the cumulative effect of the proposed development, when combined with all other existing and anticipated development, will not increase the water surface elevation of the base flood A any point. (3) Within all tones ofspecial flood hazurds,but not including floodways,filling which would resrdl in the blockage or impediment of flow and/or induce or aggravate flooding shall be prohibited unless certified by a professional civil engineer licensed in the State of Hawaii,with supporting data,that the encroachment will not cause any increase in base flood elevations during the occurrence of the base flood discharge. (4) Within floodway fringe areas, filling to elevate the lowest floor of a nonresidential structure may only he permitted where the structure: (A) is floodproofcd so that below the base flood elevation plus any requirod freeboard the structure is watertight with walls substantially impermeable to the passage of water,and (13) Has structural components capable of msisting hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads and the effects ol'buoyancy. (5) In Zones V and VE.filling shall be prohibited. (d) Elevation and floodprouling. (1) Within Zones rti and AIL (A) For rasidmtial new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements,the lowest floor shall be cicvalad to or above the base flood cicvafion plus a fivoboard of at least one foot. (II) For nomesidential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and subslantal improvements,the lowest floor shall be elevated or Iloodproafed to or above the base flood elevation plus a freeboard of at least one foot_ if the lowest floor is below the base flood elevation plus the required fieeboard,then the structure together with attendant utilih and sanitary facilities shall be designed constructed,and certified by a currently licensed professional engineer or architect in the State of Hawai`i such that: (i) The suuetvrc is watertight below the base flood elevation plus the rcgtircd freeboard_ (ii) 'Me walls are substantially impermeable to the passage ofwater. (iii)71ic structural components are capable of resisting hydrostatic and hvdmdynamic loads and the effects of buoyancy. (C) Within Zone AH,new construction,improvements to repetitive loss structures,and substantial improvement shall be required to provide adequate drainage paths around structures on slopes to guide floodwaters around and away from proposed structures. (I)) Fully enclosed areas below the lowest floor that are useable solely for parking of vehicles, building access,or storage in an area other than a basement and which are subject to flooding, shall be designed to automatically equalize hydrostatic flood forces on exterior walls by SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-14 10A-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix T'LOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-18 allowing for the entry and exit of floodwaters. Designs for tnceting this requirement must either be certified by a currently licensed prolcssional engineer or architect or meet or exceed the following criteria: A minimum of two openings having a Iota)net area of nol less than one square inch for every square foot of enclosed area subject to flooding shall be provided. Bach opening must he on different sides of the enclosed area. The bottom of all openings shall be no higher than one foot above grade. Openings may he equipped with screens, louvers, valves,or other coverings or devices provided that they permit the automatic entry and exit of floodwaters. (2) Within:,one AO: (A) For residential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structums, and substantial improvements,the lowest floor shall be elevated above the highest adiacent grade at least one fool above the depth number specified in feet on the FIRK or at least three feet if no depth number is specified. (B) For nonresidential new construction, improvement% to refidi ivc loss structures, and substantial improvements,the lowest floor shall be elevated or completely floudproofed above the highest adjacent grade at least one foot above the depth number specified in feet on the RRNI, or at least three feet if no depth number is specified. if the lowest floor is to be completely floodprooled, then a currently licensed prolcssional engineer or architect in the State of Hawaii shall develop and/or review structural design.spceificalions and plans far construction and shall certify that the design and methods of construction are in accordance with accepted standards of practice for the stricture together with attendant utility and sanitary facilities such that, (i) The structure is watertight below the referenced flood elevation. (ii) the walls are substantially impermeable to the passage ofivater. (iii)Tlic structural components are capable of'resisting hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads and the effects of buoyancy. (C) New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement: shall be required to provide adequate drainage paths around structures on slopes to guide floodwaters around and away from proposed structures. (3) Within Zones V and Vli_ New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall comply with the standards of section 27-23. (4) Within Zone A: New cormiruction, improvements to repetitive loss structures. and substantial improvement shall comply with the standards of%eetion 27-23_ (5) Buffer zones: Areas bordering and within fifty feet of a special flood hazard areas with base flood elevations.depth numbers specified in feel on the FMX1 or other areas that have been studied and identified with base flood elevatioms or depth nurnbets'. (A) For residential new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements,the lowest floor shall be elevated to the borderine base flood elevation or depth number plus a freeboard of at least one foot. V (A) For nonresidential new uonstruction, improvements to repetitive loss structurtis, and substantial improvements,the lowest floor shall he elevated or floodproofed to the bordering base flood elevation or depth number plus a reeboard of at[cast one foot. If the lowest floor is below the bordering baso flood elevation or depth number plus the required freeboard,then a currently licensed professional engineer or architect in the State of liawaN shall develop endior review structural design,specifications and plans for construction and shall certify that the design and methods of construction are in accordance with accepted standards of practice for the structure together with attendant utility and sanitary facilities such that: (i) The structure is watertight below the bordering base flood elevation or depth number plus the required freeboard. 27-15 SUPP 5 (1-2008) 1 OA-17 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix §27-18 IIAWAI't CC)UN rr CODE (ii) The walls arc substantially impermeable to the passage ofwaler. (iii) The structural component,;arc capable of resisting hydrostatic and hvdmdynamic loads and the cffccls nl-buoyancv- (C) New construction.improvements to repetitive loss structures_and substantial improvements. shall be required to provide a drainage path around and away from proposed structures. (D) When topographical or ground elevation data,submitted by a civil engineer or land surveyor currently licensed in the State of Hawai=i.shows that the proposed building site is higher than the elevation requirements of paragraph 27-18(d)(5)(A)and 27-18(d)(5)(13), the flood plain regulations of this chapter shall not be applicable. (c) Certification requirements. All new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement within.areas of special flood hazard and buffer zones shall be certified as required by the standards of section 27-17, (1993.Ord.No.93-78.sea 3:Am.1997,Ord,No.97-116,sec.3;Am.2007,Ord,No.07-169,sec.11.) Section 27-19. Standards for utilities. (a) New and replacement water supply and sanitary sewage systems shall be designed to minimize or eliminate infiltration of flood waters into the system and discharge from systems into flood waters. (b) On-sire cesspools and septic svAcims shall be located to avoid impairment to them or contamination from them during flooding_ (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sea 3.) Section 27-20. Standards for subdivisions and other developments. (a) All subdivisions and other developments within am:as of special flood hazards and flood prone areas where special flood hazard areas have not been dcl3ned,realer surface elevations have nut been provided, and there is insufficient data to identify the floodway or coastal high hazird areas but there are verifiable physical indications that such hazards are present as determined by the flood plain administrator.shall: (1) Be consistent with the need to minimize flood damage; (2) Have public utilities and facilities, such as sewer,gas,electrical,and water systems.located and constructed to minimize flood damage.and (3) Have adequate drainage provided to reduce cxpnsum to flood damage. (b) All subdivision and other development applications shall identify the areas of special flood hazards and basc flood elevations on the proposed site.if such information is not provided by The Flood Insurance Ratc Maps,the director of public works may request and the applicant shall provide such information. (e) Finally approved subdivision plats for subdivisions within areas of special flood hazards shall provide basc flood elevations within the lots. (d) All new subdivision proposals and other proposed developments within areas designated as Gone A or a flood prone area where special flood hazard areas have not been defined.water surface elevations have not been provided,and there is insufficient data to identify the floodway or coastal]high hazard areas but die flood plain administrator has determined that there arc verifiable physical indications [lint such hazards arc present shall comply with the following: (1) Be reviewed to assure that all necessary permits have been received from those governmental agencies from which approval is required by Fuleral or State law,including section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.33 U.S.C.1334; (2) For all proposed developments and/or subdivisions greater than either fifty lots or five acres,the developer and/or subdivider shall include base flood elevation data within their proposal. (3) Comply with the requirements of section 27-24. SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-16 1 0A-18 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter'10 Appendix FLOODPLAfN MANAGEMENT §27-20 (e) All developments requiring a site drainage plan under section 25-2-72(3)shall submit such a plan for review and approval by the director of public works. The site drainage plan shall comply with sections 27-20(a)and(h)and section 27-24,and shall include a storm water disposal system to contain run-off caused by the proposed development,within the site boundaries.up to the expected one-hour.ten year storm event,as shown in the department of public works"Storm Drainage Standards." dated October 1970,or any approved revision.unless those standards specify a greater recurrence interval. The amount of expected runoff shall be calculated according to the department of public works "Storm Drainage Standards," dated October 1970, or any approved revision, or by any nationally-recognized method meeting with the approval of the director of public works, Runoff calculations shal I include the effects of all impmvcmcnts. (f) Stonn water shall be disposed into drywells.infiltration basins,or other approved infiltration methods. Ibe development shall not alter the general drainage pattern above or behm die development. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3;Am.2001,Ord.No.01-108,sec.1;Am.2007,Ord.No.07-169,sec.12.) Section 27-21. Standards for manufactured homes. Alanufactured homes that are placed or substantially improved on sites outside of a manufactured home park or subdivision. in a now manufactured home park or subdivision, in an expansion to an existing manufactured home park or subdivision,or in an existing manufactured home park or subdivision on which a manufactured home has incurred"substantial damage"as the result ofa flood shall: (a) Within'Zones AL or Alf,be elevated so that either: (1) The lowest floor of the manufactured home is at or above the base flood elevation,or (2) The manufactured home chassis is supported by reinforced piers or other foundation elements of at least equivalent stronglh that are no less than thirty-six inches in height above grade and be securely anchored to an adequately anchored foundation system to resist flotation, collapse, and lateral movement. (b) Within Zone AO,be elevated such that the lowest floor of the manufactured[tome is elevated at least as high as the depth number specified in feet on the FIRM, or at least two feel if no depth number is specified and be securely anchored to an adequately anchored foundation system to resist flotation collapse,and lateral movement. (e) Within Zone A,comply with the standards orsection 27-24. (d) Within Zones V or VL,comply with the standards of section 27-23. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3.) Section 27-22. Standards for Iloodways. The floodway identilicd on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps and located within areas of spocial flood hazard is the watercourse reserved to discharge the base flood,Since the floodway is an extremely hazardous area due to the velocity of floodwaters which carry debris, potential projectiles, and erosion potential. site following provisions apply: (a) Encroachments,including fill,new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures,substantial improvement,and other now development shall be prohibited unless ecrtificalion and supporting data is provided by a licensed professional engineer or architect demonstrating that the encroachment will not cause any increase in base flood elevations doling the occurrence of the base flood discharge. (b) If an encroachment within a floodway is allowed under the conditions of paragraph 27-22(a), all new construction.improvements to repetitive loss structures,substantial improvement and other proposed new development shall comply with all applicable flood hazard reduction provisions established in this chapter. 27-17 SUPP 5 (1-2008) 1 OA-19 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix §27-22 IIAwnl'I COUNTY CODE (c) The following uses,not involving fill,shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to establish that the use does not cause any increase in hale flood elevations: (1) Public and private outdoor nonstructural rccrcalional lacililios,lawn_garden,and play areas: (2) Agricultural uses,including farm.grazing,pasture,and outdoor plant nurseries:and (3) Drainage'improvements,such as channels and stream crossings. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3:Am.2007,Ord.No.07-169,see.13.) Section 27-23. Standards for coastal high hazard areas. Coastal high hazard areas,more commonly known as tsunami inundation areas,are identified as'Lone V or Zone VE on the Hood hisurance Rate Maps.Within coastal high hazard areas,the following standards shall apply: (a) .411 new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements in a coastal high hazard area shall be constructed with materials and utility equipment resistant to flood damage and using methods and practices that minimize flood damage. (b) New construction, improvements In repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvement shall be elevated on adequately anchored pilings or columns and securely anchored to such pilings or columns so that the lowest horizontal portion of the structural mcmbent of the lowest floor,excluding the pilings and columns, is elevated to or above the base flood level. The pile or column foundation and structure attached t=ft)shall be anchored to resist flotation,collapse,and lateral movement due to the etTecls of- wind and water loads acting simultaneously on all building components.the wind and water loading values shall each have a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. (c) New construction-improvements to repetitive loss structures,and other development shall be located on the landward side of the reach of mean high tide. (d) New construction,improvements to repetitive loss structural,and substantial improvement shall have the enclosed space,if any,below the lowest floor Gee of obstructions and constructed with breakaway walls as defined in section 27-12. Such enclosed space shall not be used for human habitation and will be useable solely for parking of vehicles, building access, or storage. Machinery and equipment which service the building.such as fumaces,air conditioners,heat pumps.hot water heaters,washers.dryers, elevator lift equipment,electrical junction and circuit boxes,and food freezers are not permitted in such enclosed spaces. The unclosed space must only ire achieved wilh breakaway walls. open wood latticework,or insect screening intended to collapse under wind and water loads without causing collapse, displacement,or other structural damage to the elevated portion of the building or supporting foundation system. A breakaway wall shall have a design safe loading resistance of not less than tan and no more than twenty pounds per square foot. Ilse of breakaway walls which exceed a design safe loading resistance of twenty pounds per square foot may be purmitted only if a licensed professional structural engineer certifies that the design proposed meets the following conditions: (1) Breakaway war collapse shall result from a water load less than that which would occur dining the base Bond;and (2) The elevated portion of the building and supporting foundation system shall not be subject to collapse,displacement.or other structural damage due to the effects of wind and water loads acting simultaneously on all building components (structural and nonstructural). lvlaximum wind and water loading values to be used in this determination shall each have a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year(uric-hundred-year mean recurrence interval). (e) Pill shall not be used. (f) Man-made alteration of sand dunes which would increase potential flood damage is prohibited. (g) All new conslruclinm improvemenL% to repetitive loss structures, development and substantial improvement within coastal high hazard areas shall be certified as required by section 27-17. SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-18 1 0A-20 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-23 (h) Recreational vchiclos placed on site within Zones V and XrE on the FiRM shall be elevated and anchored or be on the site for less than one hundred eighty consecutive days or be fully licensed and highway ready. (1993.Ord.No.93-78,sec.3;Am.2007.Ord.No.07-169,sec.14.) Seellon 27-24. Standards for general floodplain. Tlic general floodplain,identified as Zone A on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps,are areas of special flood hazards for which detailed engineering studies are not performed by the federal Emergency ivlanagement Agency to determine the base flood elevations and to identify,the floodways, (a) To determine base flood elevations and the locations of floodways within the gencral floodplain The director of public works may obtain, review. and reasonably utilize any base flood elevation and floodway data available from a Federal, Slate, or other sourer, including informatiun requrstrd of a permit applicant. (b) Development or subdivision proposals shall conform with the requirements of section 27-20. (c) The following information shall be provided by a permit applicant to the director of public works to evaluate the proposed construction or improvement site within a general floodplain area: (1) Project location and silo plan showing dimensions. (2) Relationship to floodwav and floodway fringes as determined by flood elevation study. (3) Contour map showing the topography of existing ground based on elevation refervrice marks on flood maps.The scale and contours are to be appropriate to the work in question. (4) Existing and proposed base flood elevations. (5) Existing and proposed floodproofing and flood control measures. The director of public works may waive informational requirements il'the director of public works has sufficient information to make an evaluation and determination regarding flood elevation or may request further information,including a detailed flood elevation study and a drainage report,to evaluate flood risks and determine the applicability of flood construction and development standards. (d) Now construction, improvements to repetitive lass structures,and substantial improvements within the general floodplain shall satisfy the requirements set forth for Zones AE. All,AU_or VE as is determined to be applicable by the director of public works based on base flood information and floodway data obtained through subsections 27-24(a)and 27-24(b). (c) All new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, development, and substantial imprm+ement within die general floodplain shall be certified as required by section 27-17. (f) All manufactured homes shall be elevated and anchored to resist flotation collapse,or lateral movement- (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3;Am.2001.Ord.No.01-108,sec.);Am.2007,Ord.No.07-169,sec.15.) Section 27-25, Standards for improvements adjacent.to drainage facilities, New construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, and substantial improvements proposed adjacent to drainage facilities outside of the special flood hazard areas identified on the ITood Insurance Rate Maps shall be subject to review and approval of the director of public works. (a) Upon request by the director of public works, further information concerning base flood elevation, floodways, surface water runoff. existing and proposed drainage patterns, and other information, including a detailed flood elevation study, drainage report, and findings and opinions by a licensed profbssional civil engineer,shall be provided to evaluate potential flooding. (b) The director of public works shall determine the applicability of the various development and construction standards provided in this chapter based upon information available from a Federal,State,or other source,including information provided by the permit applicant. (c) A drainage facility shall not be modified,constructed, lined,or altered in am•way to accommodate the improvement without the approval of the director of public works. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3;Am.2001.Ord.No.01-108,sec.1;Am.2007,Ord.No.07-169,sec.16.) 27-19 SUPP 5 (1-2008) 1 0A-21 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix §27-26 IIAW AI'[COUNTY CODE Section 27-26. Storm drainage standards. The department of public works,County of Hawai`i's"Storm Drainage Standard,"October 1970 edition, or lutes(revision,is incorporated into and made a part of this chapter.These standards have been prepared to guide County engineers and personnel,engineers for subdivision and other developers,consultants employed by tlx:department of public works.and other interested parties in the general features required for the design of storm drainage facilities, preparation of flood hazard studies, and other related work in the County of Hawaii. (1993,Ord-No.93.78,sec.3;Arm.2007,Ord.No.07-169,sec.17.) Article 5.Variances and Appeals. Section 27-27. Criteria for variances. A variance from this chapter may be issued by the director of public works only upon the applicant matting the variance criteria of this section. The variance criterion sot forth in this section are based on the general principle of zoning law that variances pertain to a piece of property and arc not personal in nature. ,4 properly issued variance is granted for a parcel of propurly with physical characteristics so unusual that complying with the requirements of this chapter would create an exceptional hardship to the applicant or the surrounding property ownem. the characteristics must be unique to The property and not be shared by adjacent parcels. The unique characteristic must pertain to the land itself, not to the structure, its inhabitants,or the property owners. It is the duty of the County of Ilawai`i to help protect its citizens from flooding. 'this need is so compelling and the implications of the cost of insuring a structure built below flood level are so serious that variances from the flood elevation or from other requirements or this chapter are quite rare. The variancc guidelines are detailed and contain multiple provisions that must be met before a variance can be properly granted.The following criterion are designed to screen out those situations in which alternatives other than a variance are more appropriate: (a) Generally-variances may be issued for new construction,improvements to repetitive loss structures, substantial improvement•and other proposed new development to be erected on a lot of one-half acre or less in size contiguous to and surrounded by lots with existing structures constructed below the base flood level,providing that the procedures of articles 3 and 4 of this chapter have been fully considered. As the lot size increases beyond one-half acre,the technical justification required for issuing the variance increases_ (b) Variances shall not be issued within any designated floodway if any increase in flood levels during the base flood discharge would result. (c) Variances shall only be issued upon: (1) A showing of good and sufficient cause.Under[his criterion,the applicant must demonstrate that the variance request is for land which has physical characteristics so unusual that complying to flood requirements will create exceptional hardship to llte applicant or surrounding landowners.Thc unique characteristic must pertain to the land itself and not the structure,its inhabitants,or the properly owner. Under this criterion, only exceptional instances should arise where Cite physical oharacteristics of properties create a hardship sufficient to justify granting a variance.Even in a fairly common situation where an undeveloped lot is surrounded by properties with structures built at grade and/or below flood levels, a variance cannot be justified since an applicant can erect the concerned structure on pilings,etc.; (2) A determination that failure to grant the variance would result in exceptional"hardship°(as defined in section 27-12)to the applicant,Under this criterion.the hardship that would result from failure to grant a requested variance must be exceptional, unusual, and peculiar to the property involved. Economic or financial hardship alone is not exceptional. Inconvenience, aesthotic considerations,physical disabilities,personal preferences.or the disapproval of one's ncighburs cannot,generally,qualify as exceptional hardship.Under this criterion,for example, SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-20 1 OA-22 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix FLOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-27 a member ofa household has a physical disability and wants a variance:to build the dwelling at grade or at a lower level for access purposes.A variance should not be issued because the owner can cnnslruet a ramp or elevator to meet flood requirements.Elevation will allow the infirm or persons with disabilities to be evacuated in the early stage of flooding,and,if there is insufficient warning or help in evacuating that person,then,in all likelihood,he can survive the flood by simply remaining in the home safely above the levels of floodwaters: (3) A determination that the variance is the"minimum necessary"(as defined in section 27-12), considering the flood hazard,to afford relief Under this criterion,the variance that is granted should be for the minimum deviation from the flood requirements that will still alleviate the hardship.In the case of variance to an elevation requirement, this does not mean approval to build at grade level or to whatever elevation an applicant proposes,but rather to a level that the director of public works determines will provide relief and preserve the integrity of the flood ordinance:and (4) A determination that the granting of a variance will not result in increased Flood heights_ additional threats to public safety, extraordinary public expense, create nuisances, cause `fraud or victimization"(as defined in section 27-12)of the public,or conflict with existing local laws or ordinances.Under this criterion,an applicant must demonstrate that flood levels will not be raised above the base flood elevations. (d) Variance% may be issued for new construction, improvements to repetitive loss structures, substantial improvement, and other proposed new development necessary for the conduct of a "functionally dependent use" (as defined in section 27-12) provided that the provisions of paragraphs 27-27(a)through 27-27(c)are satisfied and that the structure or other dcvelopmeni is protected by methods that minimize flood damages during the base flood and create no additional threats to public safety, (c) Variances may be issued for the repair or rehabilitalion of historic structures upon a determination that lire proposed repair or rehabilitation will not preclude the structure's continued designation as a historic structure and the variance is the minimum necessary_ to preserve the historic character and design of the structure. (f) Variances may be issued for improvement of a structure to correct existing violations of State or local health,sanitary,or safety code specifications which have been idcnlilicd by the local code enforcement official and which are the minimum necessary to assure safe living conditions. (g) Variances may be approved with conditions.Such conditions may include: (1) Modification of the construction or substantial improvement,including the sewer and water facilities. (2) Limitations on periods of use and operation. (3) Imposition of operational conlrols,sureties,and deed restrictions. (4) Requirements for construction of channels, dikes, ditches,swales, levees, and other flood- protective measures- (5) Floodproofing measures designed consistent with the regulatory flood elevation, flood velocities, hvdrostatic and hvdrodvnamic forces, and other factors associated with the base flood. (G) Other conditions as may he required by the director nfpublic works to promote public welfare and safety. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3;Am.2001,Or&No.01-108,sec.1:Am.2007,Gird.No.07-169.sec.18.) Section 27-28. Application I'ar variance. An application for a variance shall be submitted to the director of public works,signed and stamped by a licensed professional engineer or architect, and shall include three sets of documents with the following information as may be applicable: 27-21 SUPP 5 (1-2008) 1 0A-23 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter'10 Appendix §27-28 MWAI1 COUNTY CODE (a) Plans and specifications showing the site and location:dimensions of all property lines and topographic elevation of the lot;existing and proposed structures and impmvcmcn(s, fill.storage area;locations and elevations of existing and proposcd strcols and utilities;floodproofing measures:relationship of the site to the location of the flood boundary:floodway:and the existing and proposed flood control measures and improvements. (b) Cross-sections and profile of the area and the regulatory flood elevation and profile based on cicvation reference marks on flood maps. (c) hood study and drainage report in areas where a study and report have not been reviewed and accepted by the County of Hawaii. (d) mscriplion of surrounding properties and existing structures and uses and the effect of the regulatory flood on them caused by'the valiance. (e) Evaluation and supporting information for the variance with respect to the factors lobe considered by the director of public works as listed in paragraphs 27-27(a)through 27-27(f). (t) An agreement that a covenant will be inserted in the decd and other conveyance documents of the property and recorded with the bureau of conveyances of the Stale of Ilawai'i,stating that the property is located in a flood hazard area subject to flooding and flood damage;that a flood hazard variance to construct a structure below the base flood elevation will result in increased flood insurance rates and increases flood risks to life and properly; that the properly owners will not file any lawsuit or action against the County ofHawai'i for costs or damages or any claim:that the property owners will indcmnifv and hold)harmless the County of flawai'i from liability when such loss,damage,injury,or death results due to any flood hazard variance and flooding of the property;and that upon approval of the variance,the covenants shall be fully executed and proof of recording with the bureau of conveyances shall be submitted to llhc dirculor of public works prior to the issuance of a building permit. (g) Such other information as may be relevant and requested by the du•ector of public works. (1993,Ord.No.93.78,sec.3:Am.2001,Ord.No.01-108,sec.I;Am.2007,Ord.No.U7-169.sec.19.) Section 27-29. Review orvar)ance applications. The director of public works shall review variance applications and shall consider all technical evaluations,relevant factors,standards specified in other sections of this chapter.and: (a) The danger that materials may be swept onto other lands to the injury of others; (b) '17te danger of life and property due to flooding or erosion damage; (e) The susceptibility of the proposed facility and its contorts to flood damage and the effect of such damage on the existing individual owner and future owners of the property; (d) The importance of the services provided by the proposed facility to the community; (c) The necessity to the facility of a waterfront location,when:applicable; (f) 1-he availability of alternative locations for the proposed use which are not subject to flooding or erosion damage; (g) Thu compatibility of the proposed use with existing and anticipated development; (h) The relationship of the proposed use to the comprehensive plan and Iloodplain management program.if airy,for that area; (i) The safety of access to the property,in time of flood for ordinary and emergency vehicles; 0) The expected heights.velocity,duration,rate of rise,and sediment transport of the flood waters expected at the site;and (k) 'Ilhe costs of providing governmental services during and after flood conditions,including maintenance and repair of public utilities and facilities such as sewer.gas,electrical.and water system,and streets and bridges. (1) Upon consideration of the factors of paragraphs 27-29(a) through 27-29(k) and the purposes of this chapter,the director of public works may attach such conditions to the granting of variances as it deems necessary to further the purposes of this chapter. (1993,Ord-No.93-78,sec_3;Am.2001,Ord_No-01-108,sec_1.) SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-22 1 OA-24 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 10 Appendix T'LOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-30 Section 27-30. Recording and reporting ot'variances. (a) Any applicant to whom a variance is granted shall be given written notice over the signature of The director of public works that: (1) The issuance of a variance to construct a structure at elevations balow the base flood level will result in increased premium rates for flood insurance up to amounts as high as$25 for$100 of insurance coverage; (2) Such construction below the base flood level increases risks to life and property;and (3) A copy of the notice shall be recorded with the State of Hawaii bureau of conveyances and shall be recorded in a manner so that it appears in the chain oftitle of the affected parcel of land. (h) A record of all variance actions,including justifications for issuance of any variance and written notices, shall be maintained by the director of public works.A report of the variances issued shall be included in the biennial report submitted to The federal Lmergency Management Agency, (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3;Am.2001,Ord.No,01-108,sec.1;Am.2007,Ord.No.07-169,sec.211,) Section 2731. Appeals. The circuit court of the third circuit,County of IlawaN. Stale of llawaN shall hear and decide appeals when it is alleged that there is an error in any requirement,decision,or determination made by the floodplain admitdslrator in the administration or enforcement of this chapter. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3.) Article 6.Enforcement. Section 27-32. Right to enter. Authorized representatives of the County of Hawaii arc empowered to enter and inspect properties,both public and private, for the purposes of investigating compliance with the provisions of this chapter, The representatives shall,upon request,provide proper identification and state the purpose of the investigation. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3.) Section 27-33. Notice of violation. Whenever any person,firm.or corporation violates any provision of this chapter,the director of public works shall serve, either through certified mail or try' hand delivery, a notice of violation to the parties responsible for the violation. (a) The notice of'violation shall identify the violation and require the responsible party to correct the violation and comply with applicable requirements of tliis chapter, (b) The notice ofviolation shall include at least the following information: (1) 'fhe date of the notice; (2) The name and address of the person served with the notice; (3) The tar'key number of the properly where the violation has been identified; (4) The section number of the chapter or other law which has been violated; (5) The nature of the violation; (6) The corrective meastues required to comply with this chapter: (7) The deadline date for compliance with the notice. (1993,Ord.No,93-78.sec.3,.Am,2001,Ord.No.01-108,sec.I,) Section 27-34. Administrative order. (a) In lieu of or in addition to section 27-33,if the director of public works determines that any person,firm. or corporation is not complying with the requirements of this chapter or a notice of violation for a violation of this chapter,the director of public works may have the party responsible for the violation served,by certified mail or delivory,with an order pursuant to this section 27-23 SUPP,5 (1-2008) 10A-25 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix §27-34 MWAI't COUNTY CODE (b) The order may require the party responsible for the violation to do am or all of the following: (1) Correcl the violation within the time specified in the order; (2) Pay a civi) fine of not Icss than 5500 and not more than $1,000 in the manner,at the place,and before the dale specified in the order. (3) Pay a civil fine of not less than$300 per day and not more than 51,000 per day for each day that the violation persists,in tie manner and at the time and place specified in the order. (c) The order shall become final thirty days from the date of service utdess Ilse party served requests a hearing under chapter 91, ilawai'i Revised Statutes.If a hearing is requested,no fine shall be imposed except upon completion of the hearing. In determining the amount of the fine, the director of public works shall consider the seriousness of the violations, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements.the economic impact of the fine on the violator.and such other considerations that have a beating on the amount of the fine. (d) '17te director of public works may institute a civil action in anv court of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of any order issued pursuant to this section- Where the civil action has been instituted to enforce the civil fine imposed by said order,the director of public works need only show that the notice of violation and order were served,that a civil fine was imposed.the amount of the civil fine imposed, and that the tine has not been paid. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3;Am.2001,Ord.No.01-108,sec.l;Am.2007,Ord.No.07-169,soc.21.) Section 27-35. Injunctive relief. Whenever a person,firm.or corporation has violated or continues to violate the provisions of this chapter, notice of violation,or administrative order issued relevant to this article,the County of Hawaii may petition the circuit court of the third district,Stale of Hawai'i,or rte United Stales District Court. Slate of Hawaii, through the County of Ilawai`i's corporation counsel,for the issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction, as appropriate,which restrains or compels the specific performance of the provisions of this chapter,notice of violation,or administrative order.Such outer action as appropriate for legal and/or equitable relief may also be sought by the County of Hawaii. A petition for injunctive relief nocd not he filed as a prerequisilo to taking any other action against a user. (1993,Ord.No.93-78,sec.3.) Section 27-36. Criminal enforcement. A violation of the requin:menls of this chapter shall constitute a misdemeanor.Any person violating the provisions of this chapter shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of x1.000 or by, imprisonment not exceeding one year,or both,except that in cases where such offense shall continue after due notice,each day's continuance of the same shall constitute a separate offense. (1993,Ord.No,93.78,sec,3,) Section 27-37. Removal of encroachment and/or obstruction notices. In addition to any other section,if any encroaclunent and/or obstruction exists,under,over or through any portion of a drainaocway,Iloodway. twee system or watercourse within the County and the eneroachmcni and/or obstruction is observed. or a complaint made to the department of public works of the County of Ilawai'i, then the department of public works shall investigate and forthwith,give notice to the owner to remove the encroachment and/or obstruction in the manner provided in Ibis article- (1997,Ord.97-128,see.1;Ann,2(107,Ord.No.07-169.sec.22.) SUPP 5 (1-2008) 27-24 1 0A-26 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-10 Appendix T'LOODPLAiN MANAGEMENT §27-38 Section 27-38. Removal by County;costs. If the encroachment and/or obstruction is not removed or its removal is not commenced and diligently prosecuted prior to the expiration of thirty days alter mailing of notice,the department of public works may proceed to remove the encroachment anther obstruction by itself or contract for its removal.All costs incurred in ilia course of removing the encroachment and/or obstruction shall be paid by owner and the County may institute an action to recover costs and expcnsLx for removal o1'the encroachment and/or obstruction.The County may also place a lien against the encroaching and/or obstructing parcel for any uncollected costs. (1997.Ord.97-128.sec.1.) 27-25 SUPP 5 (1-2008) 10A-27 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f w. 11. Dam Failures Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures CHAPTER 11 - DAM FAILURES 11.1 Description of Hazard The severity of flooding caused by dam breaks has been analyzed by modeling by the Pacific Disaster Center and the US Army Corps of Engineers. Although no known dam break events have occurred on Hawaii Island, the potential damage is significant enough to merit prevention and disaster preparation. Dam failure can result from: prolonged periods of rainfall; inadequate spillway capacity; internal erosion resulting in structural failure; improper maintenance; improper design; negligent operation; failure of upstream dams on the same watercourse; landslides into reservoirs which may cause surges resulting in overtopping; high winds which can cause significant wave action resulting in substantial erosion; and earthquakes,which cause longitudinal cracks and weaken the entire structure. Hawaii County has 13 dams, all of which are earth dams.55 Most dams in Hawaii are old earthen berm reservoirs built during the plantation era originally for irrigation purposes. Of these dams, DLNR has rated two on this island to be "high" hazard based on the extent of potential downstream losses to residential/ commercial structures or agricultural crops (see Figure 11-1). A NASA-funded study applied a model to estimate flood losses.56 The report classified the inundated area into three risk zones: the zone of severe flooding corresponds to the region where flood depths are sufficient to cause severe structural damage or loss of life; the zone of probable damage corresponding to the region that is expected to be flooded to a depth of at least one foot; and the maximum possible flood extent. Because of the short duration of such flooding events from a dam break, coupled with the unknown reliability of the model, it would not seem practical to use the model for real time response. The value of the modeling is to assess priority for preventive monitoring and maintenance rather than to incorporate the results into the FIRM'S where it would be used for permitting and insurance purposes. 55 Goosby,S.,Chatman,A.,Michaud,J.,Kerper,D.,Dam Break Inundation Study for the State of Hawaii, Prepared for the State of Hawaii's Department of Land and Natural Resources,ASCE 2008 56 Johnson,C.and J.Michaud.Dam Failure Inundation Mapping Project,NASA Contract No.NASW-99044, January 15,2003. 11-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures c � 0 Critical Dams Dams Figure 11-1. Dam Inventory and Rating Following the 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake some damage occurred to dams and irrigation ditches in the Waimea-Kamuela area where recorded peak ground acceleration exceeded 1.0g (soil depths are greater in that region than along the rocky coast nearest the epicenter). At least two dams experienced cracks along their crests, while at least two others showed clear evidence of incipient slope failure on their embankments. The Pacific Disaster Center performed dam break simulations for Hawaii County Civil Defense. Two dams located above Waimea were drained after excessive seepage and "water boils" were observed five days following the earthquakes. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources had in place post-earthquake dam inspection procedures. The Hawaii Dam Safety Guidelines: Seismic Analysis & Post-Earthquake Inspections (Brandes, 2004) call for inspections of dams within 75 miles of the source of an earthquake of magnitude between 6 and 7. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers undertook these comprehensive inspections. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provided Hawaii State Civil Defense (HSCD) with completed documentation concerning the Statewide Dam Visual Conditions Survey in response to the Kiholo Bay Earthquake on October 15, 2006. Documentation includes electronic field inspection reports with corresponding photographs for 86 dams inspected by USACE between October 30 and November 8, 2006. HSCD asked Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) to develop a map viewer application to allow authorized users to view the documentation provided by USACE. PDC created (and will maintain) a password-protected map viewer that hosts and displays USACE data for persons authorized by HSCD to access 11-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures it. This map viewer is based on PDC's Hawaii Hazards and Vulnerabilities Atlas, which was also used as the foundation for the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Map Viewer and other PDC-developed applications. In addition to the existing functionality contained within these viewers, the Dam Status Map Viewer includes "hot links" to "State of Hawaii DLNR Dam Safety Inspection Sheets" for each dam as well as to site graphics as available. A list of all dams on the Island of Hawaii is included below. 1. HA00026 Lalakea Reservoir 2. HA00051 Hawi No. 5 Reservoir 3. HA00027 E-13 Reservoir 4. HA00052 Kehena Reservoir 5. HA00040 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 6. HA00122 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 2 7. HA00042 Puukapu Reservoir S. HA00123 Puu Pulehu Reservoir 9. HA00043 Puukapu Watershed Retarding Dam R-1 10. HA00131 Paauilo Reservoir 1 l. HA00049 Keaiwa Reservoir 12. HA00136 Waikoloa 50 MG Reservoir 3 13. HA00050 Hawi No. 3 Reservoir 11.2 Significant Historic Events and Lessons Learned There is no record of any major dam failures on the Island of Hawaii resulting in significant loss of property or life. However, as discussed previously several dams showed signs of damage following the Oct. 2006 Kiholo Bay earthquake. On March 14, 2006, just before dawn, Ka Loko Dam on the island of Kauai breached sending nearly 400 million gallons of water (weighing 1.6 million tons) from the Ka Loko Reservoir into Kilauea Bay, taking trees, cars,buildings, and seven human lives with it. According to Godbey's independent civil investigation of the Ka Loko Dam failure, the breach of the dam can be attributed several possible conditions and practices. Among these conditions and practices are inadequate inspection of the dams by the State of Hawaii, non- permitted grading operations at the dam site by the owner, inadequate maintenance of the dam by the owner, and non-enforcement of regulations by the County of Kaua`i.57 57 Godbey,Robert,Report of the Independent Civil Investigation of the March 14,2006 Breach of Ka Loko Dam, 1,January 2007 11-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures Kilauea Pt.Nat. Wildlife Ref. WWI 3. A Makapili Roc kolea Kauapea Beach •� �� Kilauea Bay OVA� State H9hw y Is ••II PA,;FIT;+, ; •.' r ,� WAIAKALUA I '- RESEF%'-IIR -,q� RESERVOIR 0 1 - ., _ 'mad � ..� � IIII• , •. � %Y . � •� X11 rFi,ighway 56 Road '` l -01 eservoir Stream Ditches oWes i Lor. i C FE_ER.; 1Fr P2 03 04 05 nc h equals 0.50 miles �'•� SOURCES:NOA/t USOS.ST EOFHMO AI;NNnCHU,9..S Nt.4-A, _ a / ' ` PREPaREC.—I.—HUREnN S—T—S INC.12— Figure 11-2 Shaded Relief of Ka Loko Dam and Vicinity,Island of Kaua`i58 5'Godbey,Robert,Report of the Independent Civil Investigation of the March 14, 2006 Breach of Ka Loko Dam, 1,January 2007 11-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures NO r Figure 11-3 Ka Loko Dam Breach,Island of Kauai-9 - Yl Jt Y. YYti •- �✓.- Figure 11-4 Ka Loko Dam Breach,Island of Kaua`i6O 59 Godbey,Robert,Report of the Independent Civil Investigation of the March 14,2006 Breach of Ka Loko Dam, 1,January 2007 11-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures Figure 11-5 Houses Amid Debris from Ka Loko Dam Failure,Island of Kaua`i61 Figure 11-6 Road Infrastructure Damage from Ka Loko Dam Failure,Island of Kaua'i62 60 Image Retrieved Wikipedia Website October 26,2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kaloko breach.j pg 61 Image courtesy of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources(DLNR),Star Bulleting Website, Retrieved October 26,2009 from http://archives.starbulletin.com/2006/03/15/news/stor101.html 11-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis-Dam Failures 11.3 Probability of Occurrence Given the increased monitoring procedures enacted following the breach of the Ka Loko Dam on Kauai, the probability of a dam failure anywhere in the state of Hawaii has been significantly reduced. A major dam failure is a very rare event for which there is no defined recurrence interval. However, the potential does exist during an extreme rainfall event, or major earthquake at any unmaintaincd or under maintained location. 11.4 Risk Assessment After the failure of the Kaloko Dam, the DNLR Dam Safety Division initiated a project to study the potential inundation areas downstream of all 135 registered dams in Hawaii. The failure scenarios considered were: • Sunny day failure with dry downstream conditions • Failure occurs when dam is at maximum capacity • Failure occurs by piping failure halfway up the dam face • Spillways and dam outlet works are inoperable at the time of the breach The water flow from the dam failure scenarios was modeled to determine maps of the inundation area, maximum water depth, maximum flow velocity and time of inundation at each dam. The various impacts of the dam break were considered for each dam, including: • Impact to the population by the number of people potentially impacted downstream • Impact to transportation including water depth and speed at bridges and road crossings • Impact to buildings based on replacement cost value • Impact to critical facilities including schools, hospitals, fire and police stations, government buildings, airports/seaports, shelters The results of this study could be used to infer some type of expected annual loss based on a probability of a particular dam's failure, however, these probabilities very small and ideally zero if proper monitoring and maintenance is provided. The intention of this study was prioritize critical areas, and to provide a reasonable assessment of risk, not to determine annual expected losses for comparison with other hazards. 11.5 Mitigation Strategies 11.5.1 General 11.5.1.1 National Dam Inspection Act The National Dam inspection Act (NDIA) of 1972 as expressed in Public Law 92-367 authorized for the first time the federal regulation of privately own dams. Per the NDIA, the United Sates Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) were authorized to inventory and inspect privately owned dams in the United States. The NDIA provided funding for the Honolulu 62 Image courtesy of Casey and Cyndi Riemer from Jack Harter Helicopters,Retrieved from Star Bulletin-, Website on October 26,2009 from http://archives.starbulletin.com/2006/03/15/news/stoKyOl.html 11-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures Army Corps of Engineers and the State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) to complete an inventory of dams in the State of Hawaii and perform inspections of 53 high-hazard private dams between 1977 and 1981.63 11.5.1.2 National Dam Safety Program Act The purpose of the National Dam Safety Program Act (NDSPA) of 2000, as expressed in Section 215(a) of Public Law 104-303, is to "reduce the risks to life and property from dam failure in the United States through the establishment and maintenance of an effective national dam safety program to bring together the expertise and resources of the federal and non-federal communities in achieving national dam safety hazard reduction." The State assistance program is intended to help States bring the necessary resources to bear on inspection, classification, and emergency planning for dam safety. Public Law 104-303 provides for the assistance program described below. For a State to be eligible for primary assistance under the National Dam Safety Program, the state dam safety program must be working toward meeting the following criteria, as listed in Public Law 104-303: • The authority to review and approve plans and specifications to construct, enlarge, modify,remove, and abandon dams; • The authority to perform periodic inspections during dam construction to ensure compliance with approved plans and specifications; • A requirement that state approval be given on completion of dam construction and before operation of the dam; • The authority to require or perform the inspection at least once every 5 years of all dams and reservoirs that would pose a significant threat to human life and property in case of failure to determine the continued safety of the dams and reservoirs, and a procedure for more detailed and frequent safety inspections; • A requirement that all inspections be performed under the supervision of a state- registered professional engineer with experience in dam design and construction; • The authority to issue notices, when appropriate, to require owners of dams to perform necessary maintenance or remedial work, revise operating procedures, or take other actions, including breaching dams when necessary; • Regulations for carrying out the legislation of the state; 63 Office of History,United Sates Army Corps of Engineers,The Federal Role in Water Resources Management„Washington,D.C., 1896, 12p 11-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures • The provision for funds to ensure timely repairs or other changes to or removal of a darn to protect human life and property, and if the owner of the dam does not take the action described above,to take appropriate action as expeditiously as possible; • A system of emergency procedures to be used if a dam fails or if the failure of a dam is imminent; and • An identification of each dam whose failure could be reasonably expected to endanger human life, the maximum area that could be flooded if the dam failed, and public facilities that would be affected by the flooding. 11.5.1.3 State ofHawai`i Dam Safety Act The State of Hawaii Dam Safety Act was started in 1987 where the rules, statues, and Hawaii Administrative Rules were set up by the Department of Land and Natural Resources (HAR, Title 13, Subtitle 7, Chapter 190, Dams and Reservoirs). A majority of existing dams were built by private plantation owners in the early 1900's for irrigation and not flood control; there were no standards at that time. According to the Hawaii National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Certified Floodplain manager (CFM), during that historical period, when the embankments were built, workers had carts filled with rocks that were pulled by horse or mule, which then ran back and forth over the embankment to provide some compaction. The Department of Land and Natural Resources(DLNR) Engineering Branch administers the Hawaii Dam Safety Act The DLNR reviews and approves plans and specifications for the construction of new dams or for the enlargement, alteration, repair, or removal of existing dams. Any individual or entity seeking to construct, alter, or remove an existing dam must fill out the "Application For Approval Of Plans And Specifications For Construction, Enlargement, Repair, Alteration, Or Removal Of Dam" with the DLNR Engineering Branch, Dam Safety Section. 11.5.2 Previous/Current Efforts 11.5.2.1 United States Army Corps of Engineers Statewide Dam Visual Conditions Survey Following the 2006 failure of the Ka Loko dam in the island of Kauai, the State of Hawaii DLNR in coordination with the Corps conducted emergency visual inspections of dams on the islands of Kauai, Oahu, Molokai, Maui, and Hawaii. The purpose of the inspections was to assess whether there existed any imminent danger to life and property based on the dam and/or reservoir conditions at the time of the inspection. DLNR determined that this broad-based visual inspections were sufficient basis for the State of Hawaii to contact dam owners for follow-up investigations and potential remedial and/or mitigatory actions. All statewide inspections pertaining to this initiative are consolidated into a report titled "Statewide Dam Visual Conditions Survey for the islands of Maui, Oahu, Hawaii, and Molokai and re-inspections on the island of Kauai" dated June 23,2006. 11-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures The dam inspections consisted of the visual only examination or condition survey of the regulated dam structures, including abutments, spillways, outlet facilities, and reservoir. The visual assessments yielded conditions ratings that ranged according to the following: • Satisfactory: Dam is expected to fulfill its intended function. • Fair: Dam is expected to fulfill its intended function but maintenance is recommended. • Poor: Dam may not fulfill its intended function and maintenance/repairs are necessary. • Unsatisfactory: Dam is not expected to fulfill its intended function and repair, replacement, of modification is necessary. • Unknown: Dam is not visible, not accessible, not inspected, or unable to determine the condition rating based on the observation taken. Besides the rating, the report includes recommendations for each facility if any. Typical recommendations vary from the removal of vegetation to facilitate future inspections to the requirement of owners to make immediate repair actions to restore the integrity of the facility. A total of thirteen dams were inspected in the County of Hawaii. Full summary reports of these inspections can be found at http://www6.hawaii.)4ov/dlnr/reports/dam-inspections/. 11.5.2.2 Pacific Disaster Center Dam Failure Inundation Map Project In 2009, the State of Hawaii DLNR and the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) engaged in an effort to generate Dam Failure Inundation Maps for all one-hundred-thirty-five (135) registered dams in the State of Hawaii. Besides the inundation maps, the project aims at providing basic damage assessment and social-economical vulnerability assessment. The inundation maps for this project were produced using MIKE software—one of the industry standards for simulating flow and water level,water quality and sediment transport in rivers, floodplains, irrigation canals,reservoirs, and other inland bodies of water. All three available modules of the MIKE Modeling Suite were used to substantiate the results of the analyses: MIKE 11 for one-dimensional dynamic modeling of river, channel, and reservoir hydraulics; MIKE 21 for two-dimensional free surface flow models; and MIKE FLOOD for the integration of a series of dams within one single model. For illustration purposes, inundation maps for the same dam based on the two- and three-dimensional modeling capabilities of MIKE 1 1 and MIKE 21 are shown in Figure 1 1-7. Similarly, Figure 1 1- illustrates a single model of a series of dams using MIKE FLOOD. The following failure scenarios and assumptions were use to assure conservatism in the preparation of the maps: 11-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures • Failure occurs during a sunny day with dry downstream conditions • Failure occurs when dam is at its maximum capacity • Failure occurs by piping failure halfway up the face of the dam • Spillways and dam outlets are inoperable at the time of the breach In addition to the dam failure inundation maps, the study will provide individual dam assessment reports with the following information: • Total maximum water depth • Time of maximum water depth • Time to first inundation • Depth at first inundation • Water velocity. • Impact to population including number of people potentially impacted downstream • Impact to transportation including water depth and velocity at bridges and road crossings • Impact to building infrastructure and replacement cost value • Impact to critical facilities (schools, hospitals, fire and police stations, government buildings, airports/seaports, and shelters) As of the third trimester of 2009, PDC has completed the dam failure inundation maps and individual assessment reports for all one-hundred-thirty-five (135) dams. In 2010, DLNR evaluated and approved these maps and reports for release to County of Hawaii Civil Defense, for official use only. The Hawaii County Police Department, responsible for evacuation procedures, utilized the reference dam inundation maps to develop potential dam break evacuation maps. An example map for the Waimea area(and downstream) is shown in Figure 11-9. It is expected that the documents will be released to the public in early 2011. 11-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures NO RNI.- L i �# '. s Figure 11-7.Comparison of One-Dimensional(MIKE 11)&Two-Dimensional(MIKE 21)Dam Failure Modeling64 RESERVOIR- �. AEPOALUA RESERVOIR AEPOKOLU f;ESERVOIR f AEPOEFIAR SERVOIR 1 MIKE • • Figure 11-8.Serial Dam Failure Modeling using MIKE FLOOD 61 64 Goosby,Stanley,Chatman,Andrea,Michaud,Jene,and Kerper,Dale,Dam Break Inundation Study for the State of Hawaii,American Society of Civil Engineers(ASCE)Conference Proceedings,2008,312,40p 65 Goosby,Stanley,Chatman,Andrea,Michaud,Jene,and Kerper,Dale,Dam Break Inundation Study for the State of Hawaii,American Society of Civil Engineers(ASCE)Conference Proceedings,2008,312,40p 11-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Aualyus—Dam Failures �ACD I I I C N I S A ST E R Sunny Day Piping Failure of Waikoloa#2 Reservoir(H1001 36)at 61.9 million gallons A CENNTT ER Mil 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.4 3 r. Miles 0.125 0.25 0.25 0.5 1 Fire Stations Dams j Public Schools Evacuation Zone QPolice Stations - .. Perennial Streams * Emergency Shelters Imagery:(c)Quick Bird 2009 Senes dam failure scenario considers Mat Waikoloa#2 fails by piping This product depicts downstream flood and rows into Me lower dams which fail by overtopping. potential using Me DMI MIKE 21 model. June 30,2010 Figure 11-9 An example map of the Waimea area(and downstream) utilizing reference dam inundation maps to develop potential dam break evacuation maps. I I-13 Hawaii Cnun4,.Wu1fi-Hazard Mitigating Plan Chapter 11:Hazard Analysis—Dam Failures 11.5.3 Future Plans Project Description Status Dam&Reservoir Safety DLNR Evaluation; DWS repair of Kibolo Drafting of Dam Safety Guidelines USCOE dam break intmdation study Bay earthquake damage Permitting requirements for new dam of 11 dams statewide completed; at Waikoloa construction PDC study of"sunny day"dam DLNR Engineering Certification of compliance that owners break inundation for 138 dams Division is completing meet Phase I operation and maintenance statewide completed;dam break Phase I Detailed Visual recommendations and have an emergency evacuation maps being finalized in Inspections,and action plan. December 2010 by Hawaii County updating the state dam Civil Defense Agency inventory C-122. 11-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r e�-KT'Nc f 12. High Surf Chapter 12:Hazard Analysis—High Surf CHAPTER 12 - HIGH SURF 12.1 Description of Hazard High waves that inundate coastal areas are generated by strong winds or seismic events. The seismic-type wave is called a tsunami and covered in Chapter 9, on page 9-1. Damaging wind-generated waves occur from distant storms in the Northern and Southern Hemisphere, tropical storms, hurricanes, and localized Kona storms (see Figure 12-1).North-facing shores receive annual North Pacific swells in winter ranging from 10 to 20 feet. Usually damage- causing events from north swells are over 20 feet. Larger northeast trade waves are typically 2 to 4 feet; however, well-developed trade swells produce high waves of 6 to 8 feet that have caused damage. South-facing shores are exposed to Kona storms and southern swells, which have caused damage at heights of only 4 to 6 feet. Tropical storms and hurricanes affect any and all shorelines especially during summer and fall with damaging high waves of 10 to 30 feet. Hawaii b as WE!to 1651 Apr A,5.6 H a Hpn-.. aemxn Damaging high Upola Point waves* and 1 JanI,I 1990 Feb B-9 Rou Kohala 1e96 Fee s-+2x39 n high waves due ) WaiplO 993 9.91110 HFamen � 1596 Fee fbl]8-12nNNE _ s.H.owmaN,in Hm _t r +996 N.s 6 24 fi H awes,avrsaq. to hurricanes 1986 JenbJ+96-, nNCwall Kawalhae'WaTM Islantlwlde high wages _ ! oec 15- +919 29 High wvrc 1011—2129 an Hns Nov zl2t Hph— .1 10]6 Feb 9-1""euA 1015 H.vts iihw 1918.1.111-1a'o"_ 1010 J-11-16 Hlghsess Ioee Ma.1-11 Hier— zer. Keahole _ Hilo Onekahakaha 1902 11 N hH - 993�1s1eHF.me..W WastCwst/Kona Polnf _ = Beach 1954 Nw2B 11 % 1969 Jan 23 Illpn Fe sunveta6hwAn....... 19x9 F b1s elvn sun.r:99 c.eu Kaa- 1a68 e 20 Hl or au" Konona ,969.1", Hlgncunalm.l.uear 0 20mi 1x11 Jane".h wn Magic ' 1012 0.5596-]0 Son Sands - 5919 Ja.6-11lgh wneM9[eas1 P a Ka Iln ,915- I— ni9n sun.l Me9lc sn..aa Basco BCaCh {� 0 20km A.9H-16 Kp SYn 1996 Feb 6 Hsh Burt 11"ee.it Oplhikao 1066 Fab 22 Hqe iwt Nenr—I Beach Lakes and reservoirs 19e1 Ja.9-19 rW., Kefapana Kaimu 0-20001eet ,9925e.1+HMU.rty131.1 Jun zs-�" 25s r(t! South Puna Coast 2000-4000 feet rtam.n9m.nauer Sx+Bll',10-120 - 1912 1.16 Hlgn.udul 40006000 feel ,\:. 1962 au9 Is H"waves ec.ml 6000-8000 feel `~,� Kau :M N«e,110"-01 'Il—u.ream 8000-10.000 feel _ 1� 1919 Aug 11-M Su1251, Isar Jd 25 I" ane Kapet 10.000-12,0001ae1 1620 Ju11929nwH 1666 Jul ZZ-b 10.19n ISO 1 Coast � � liar,Jul l Il 6 wd low A°a'+-6 over 12,000 feel lees Hlen sun I9a5 Ju12510-1 sn sun +gas o6c�a1 1965 Jul d 1065 S..S0.Hqn cu0 H82 Sop Is H Q Urban areas 19re M., n,,,nyn 3ml 196e Ju 22-z3 eqn wd /,�, 1966 Aup 46; r —Hlghwaya 1969 Jrn e-11 n M.dazlertr:...e Streams 1M JW 10-20 Hph wri 1992 S.F 1 LIW —Canals ' S Int +9w] .9n.12-1sn H Hurricane TS Tropical storm 10 K Height 01 wri(teal) z-1s n 'Does not include high waves due 19 tsunamis c' Figure 12-1. Storm Wave Directions and Events for Hawaii Island Large wind-generated waves can also cause storm surges (or overwash). A storm surge is a rise in the water level caused by wind forces driving water against the coast (wind set-up) or 12-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 12:Hazard Analysis—High Surf by wave forces (wave set-up). If the surge occurs at high tide, water height is even greater. The water rise enables the storm waves to reach further inland with the associated scouring and erosion caused by the wave forces. In studying the aftermath of Hurricane Iniki, the Corps of Engineers determined that wave set-up was the stronger component than wind set- up,unlike the mainland coastal areas.66 12.2 Significant Historic Events Hurricane Estelle illustrates an example of Hawaii County's susceptibility to wind and wave setup, as well as storm events. On July 22, 1986, the eye of Estelle passed over 100 miles south of Hawaii County. In addition to the high spring tide, high waves generated from Estelle, crashed on the shores of the Big Island. From available reports regarding Hurricane Estelle, major damage in Hawaii occurred at the Vacationland area. The high waves washed away 5 beachfront homes and severely damaged dozens of others. According to records at the Hawaii County Planning Department, 18 houses suffered minor damage that totaled $42,500. In addition, 12 houses had major damage that totaled $194,000 and 7 houses were completely destroyed with an estimated property damage of $160,883. 12.3 Probability of Occurrence High surf events occur quite frequently on all coasts of Hawaii County; however events which actually cause damage to property are far less common. The FIRM coastal zone flood classifications give probabilities of coastal flooding in zones that may be impacted by episodes of high surf as shown in Table 12-1. Although the coastal flood zones were not developed exclusively to address the impacts high surf (development of these zones is discussed in Chapters 9 and 10) they do provide a conservative delineation of areas that may be at risk. Table 12-1. FIRM Coastal flood zone classifications ZONE DESCRIPTION Coastal areas with a 1%or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard associated with storm F V waves.These areas have a 26%chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage.No base flood elevations are shown within these zones. Coastal areas with a 1%or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard associated with storm VE,VI -30 waves.These areas have a 26%chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage.Base flood elevations derived from detailed analyses are shown at selected intervals within these zones. 66 Fletcher,C,B.Richmond,E.Grossman,A.Gibbs,Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone, Prepared in cooperation with University of Hawaii,State of Hawaii Office of Planning,and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,U.S.Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series I-2761, 2002.,p. 17. 12-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 12:Hazard Analysis—High Surf 12.4 Risk Assessment The economic risk associated with the impacts of high surf is encompassed within the loss prediction and risk assessment of the flooding Hazard. 12.5 Mitigation Strategies Mitigation strategies to address the impacts of high surf are encompassed within the mitigation strategies of hurricane(storm surge), flooding, and tsunami hazards, since all of these will produce similar and likely larger impacts then high surf alone. 12-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 13. Coastal Erosion Chapter 13:Hazard Analysis—Coastal Erosion CHAPTER 13 - COASTAL EROSION 13.1 Description of Hazard Beach erosion and coastal erosion are not the same,but they are related. Beach erosion is a reduction in the amount of sand a particular beach has. On a global level, sea level rise causes beach erosion. But beaches also erode(and expand)on a seasonal basis. Beaches get sand from both the ocean and the land. Larger waves move sand from the coastal sand dunes off into the ocean. This raises the seafloor, flattens the overall profile of the beach, and,therefore, causes waves to break further offshore. This, in turn,minimizes the waves'impact on coastal lands. Beaches recover from these seasonal shifts when the waves move the sand back onto the beach and the winds blow the deposited sand into dunes. These dunes will store the land-based sand until the next large wave event. Initial shore prof lie. —width— Shnrelirre profile after retreat. �eaas trap OnYW. in wid&W W ldlh— Aneach undergoing net longierm sweat will *nainlain its natural width. Inital shore praflie. -- 6e:idr wldlh Snswuq Stloreline profile after retreat. &1.VCh kj Ss awKu:Ua any rotas u1&Nw*ia(taa11 Bench loss eventually nccurs in trorit r)f a seHwall trrr a t}eaCh experiencirxl net InrHyerm retreat. Figure 13-1. The impacts of stabilization on shoreline retreat and beach loss 13-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 13:Hazard Analysis—Coastal Erosion Coastal erosion occurs when the beach migrates toward the land in order to compensate for beach erosion as it tries to maintain a constant supply of sand(see the right side of the photo). If sand is not available to a beach, such as when a wall is built to protect the land,the land is stabilized,however beach erosion will occur(see left side of photo). � i Unstabilized - Stabilized - land lost beach lost beach preserved land preserved Figure 13-2. Effects of beach stabilization Photo courtesy of Charles Fletcher Installing a seawall or revetment(i.e.,hardening a shoreline) interferes with the natural cycle of beach erosion. Rather than pulling sand from a landward supply in order to promote waves breaking further off-shore during the seasonal high wave period, the seawall or revetment prevents this natural phenomena from occurring. Thus,the land itself begins to erode. Therefore, it is tragically ironic seawalls or revetments have been installed to prevent coastal erosion, but their very presence exacerbates the very problem they were supposed to resolve. (Source: Fletcher, Charles, Eric Grossman, Bruce Richmond. Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone. 2000.) 13.2 Significant Historical Events Due to the youthful geographic age of Hawaii Island, sandy beaches are fairly uncommon; instead rocks or cliffs line most shores. 13.3 Probability of Occurrence Sandy beaches are dynamic sedimentary systems that naturally experience phases of erosion and accretion that operate over a range of time intervals. Frequent short-term changes are seasonal - erosion mostly occurs in seasons when storms that generate erosional wave regimes are more frequent. Rapid erosional episodes may also be produced by high- magnitude storms, such as tropical cyclones or intense low pressure systems. The degree of erosion that occurs within a particular erosional phase can be highly variable, and this 13-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 13:Hazard Analysis—Coastal Erosion likewise is linked to the magnitude and frequency of storms that impact on the coast. For example, during a 100 year high magnitude storm, waves may erode several meters into the foredune that sits well behind the normally active zone of accretion and erosion. Also, several lower-magnitude storms that occur in quick succession can produce a similar degree of erosion because the intervening periods are too short for constructive swell waves to push a significant amount of sediment back to the shoreline. The accretion of sand on beaches occurs during the more quiescent seasons when average swell waves deliver sediment back to the shoreline. Beach accretion, however, is generally a much slower process than beach erosion. For example, it may take several years for a beach to return to its pre-storm condition after one major storm or several smaller storms in quick succession. 13.4 Risk Assessment Since this is not a major hazard in Hawaii County,no method of assessing the economic risk due to coastal erosion has been utilized for this plan. Of greater concern than coastal erosion in Hawaii County is the potential for sea-cliff erosion. Homes perched upon these cliffs may be at risk if significant erosion does occur. There is no established recurrence interval for such events and early warning signs would allow ample time to mitigate any catastrophic failures. 13.5 Mitigation Strategies Below are several potential coastal mitigation measures that have been applied with varying degrees of success in other coastal regions. In the event that mitigation becomes necessary in Hawaii County the validity of each of these measures should be assessed in greater detail. 13.5.1 Revise the Shoreline Setbacks The intent of shoreline setbacks is to establish a coastal-hazard buffer zone to protect beach- front development from coastal erosion. Adequate setbacks allow the natural erosion and accretion cycles to occur and help maintain lateral beach access. Furthermore, setbacks provide open space for the enjoyment of the natural shoreline environment. A 40-foot shoreline setback has been often inadequate because they are not determined by historical site-specific rates of coastal erosion. Coastal-erosion hazard maps could be used to establish rate-based building setbacks. Setbacks would be site-specific in order to reflect the nature of coastal erosion. These setbacks would also incorporate the proposed style of development. Construction-style considerations would include the size and expected lifetime of the planned structure. Larger, immovable buildings and those with lifetimes of more than 50 years would have deeper setbacks than small,movable structures. 13-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 13:Hazard Analysis—Coastal Erosion 13.5.2 Utilize Inter-agency communication Better cooperation between State Parks and the Counties' Parks and Recreation should be sought since these departments maintain many of our beach parks. In addition, discussions should be enhanced with the State Department of Transportation (DOT), because some highway facilities are threatened or will soon be threatened by coastal erosion. In most cases, state highway facilities are the major or only thoroughfare between regions. Proactive planning of new highway construction, widening, and realignment could reduce the threat of coastal erosion and beach loss by anticipating future shoreline trends. 13.5.3 Increase Public Awareness Coastal erosion is largely promulgated by the activities of humankind. Increasing public awareness of the importance of seasonal beach erosion, and how their activities can exacerbate coastal erosion,becomes extremely important. 13.5.4 Promote Research Projects Projects that focus on coastal processes can lead to improved erosion management. Further research, along with beach monitoring, is necessary to increase our understanding of coastal and marine science and to insure effective and efficient management of the coastal zone. 13-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f • 14. Droughts Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts CHAPTER 14 - DROUGHTS 14.1 Description of Hazard 14.1.1 Defining and Measuring Drought Drought can be defined in relative or absolute terms. Relative drought is determined by the fluctuations about average local conditions. Absolute drought refers to a single uniform level. Relative drought recognizes that the severity of drought impact varies according to the adaptations and vulnerability of natural and social systems relative to prevailing normal conditions. Absolute drought is used primarily by researchers interested in large drought- impacted areas. Relative drought is useful to examine drought conditions on this island. Much of the information presented in this section was drawn from portions of a statewide drought study(the"Hawaii Drought Plan") applicable to the Island of Hawai'i.67 Drought differs from other natural hazards in three significant ways. First, a drought's onset and end are difficult to determine since the effects accumulate slowly and may linger even after the apparent termination of an episode. Second,the absence of a precise and universally accepted definition adds to the confusion about whether a drought exists, and if it does, the degree of severity. Third,unlike most other natural hazards, drought impacts are less obvious and are spread over a larger geographic area. These characteristics have hindered the development of accurate,reliable, and timely estimates of drought severity and effects. Of the several indicators used to measure drought, the most common is rainfall. A dense network of rain gauges, and long term collected, collated, and published data provide an excellent record of historic rainfall patterns and spatial variations on each Hawaiian Island. There are two popular drought indices. The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) was not appropriate for Hawaii and it was decided that the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) should be used as an initial drought index for the state. The Standardized Precipitation Index (SPT) was developed by Thomas McKee at Colorado State for use as a drought monitoring tool and has been embraced by agencies such as the National Drought Mitigation Center and the Western Regional Climatic Center. The beauty of this index is its simplicity because it uses only monthly rainfall as its input. This simplicity also makes it ideal for use in Hawaii, where there is a relatively dense network of rain gages. In comparison, the Palmer Drought Severity Index(PSDI),which is in widespread use across the Mainland U.S., is much more complex and requires temperature and soil moisture as additional data inputs. These types of additional data are either sparse or non-existent in Hawaii. Furthermore, the PDSI is more applicable to broad climatic areas and is not suited for representing conditions in the small-scale climatic zones of the Hawaiian Islands. 67 Wilson Okamoto Corp."Hawaii Drought Plan".Prepared for the State of Hawaii,Department of Land and Natural Resources,February 2005 14-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts Because the SPI values are normalized, the wide range of rainfall conditions across Hawaii can be assessed on an equal basis. Furthermore, SPI values can be generated for multiple time scales. This is extremely useful for monitoring purposes because drought affects the various sectors over a wide range of time scales. Finally, since the SPI uses standard statistical principles, it can also be used to monitor other data such as stream flow, reservoir levels, and ground water levels. Table 14-1 is an example of a drought classification scheme based on SPI. Table 14-1. Drought Classification Based On SPI SPI Values Designation Time in Category 0.00 to-0.99 Mild Drought 34.1% -1.00 to-1.49 Moderate Drought 9.2% -1.50 to-1.99 Severe Drought 4.4% -2.00 or less Extreme Drought 2.3% The Honolulu Forecast Office (HFO) of the National Weather Service (NWS) has tailored the SPI software for use in Hawaii. At present, 59 sites have been selected as part of the SPI monitoring network. These sites are separated into two groups called the "quick-look sites" and the "standard sites". The "quick-look sites" use data from selected real-time reporting stations that comprise HFO's flash flood monitoring network. Only 16 out of 69 real-time reporting stations are available for use in SPI calculations due to the fact that most of these locations have short periods of record that can result in risky statistical inferences. The main benefit of the "quick-look site" is that the data are available immediately after the end of a month so that SPI values can quickly be determined. The "standard sites" are selected locations from the NWS Cooperative Observer network. Rainfall readings at these sites are taken manually and submitted via mail after the end of the month to the NWS Pacific Region Headquarters for preliminary quality control. The monthly data for the "standard sites" are intercepted at this point and forwarded to HFO for SPI calculations. The SPI method is designed to be flexible in terms of drought duration specified by users. Short-term drought duration (e.g., 3 months) may be important for agricultural practices while long-term duration (e.g., one year or longer) may be vital for water supply management interests. Here, 3-month and 12-month are considered. If 3-month events are desired, a moving average time series is constructed by summing the first three monthly totals. Next precipitations for months 2, 3, and 4 are summed and then precipitations for months 3, 4, and 5 are summed and so on. The resulting time series is then used to compute the 3-month SPI. The 12-month SPI can be obtained in the same manner. The flexibility of multiple SPI time values makes this index attractive because drought affects various sectors across a wide range of time scales. 14.1.2 Causes of Drought Droughts have been postulated to correspond with the global-scale oceanic-atmospheric phenomenon known as ENSO (El Nino-Southern Oscillation). El Nino is the anomalous warming of the eastern equatorial Pacific sea surface. The Southern Oscillation is the seesaw in atmosphere between the eastern and western equatorial Pacific. Various studies have found some correlations but the predictive capabilities for drought events are still in the 14-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts developing stages. To complicate matters, global warming climate changes due to increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other radiation-absorbing gases may change the frequency, intensity, duration, and pattern of droughts. 14.1.3 Impacts of Drought Droughts diminish drinking water supplies, cause agricultural losses, and increase the incidence of wildfires. This island is particularly vulnerable to droughts due to pervasive water catchment systems, reliance on diversified agriculture, and expansive pasture and woodland areas susceptible to wildfires. 14.2 Significant Historic Events Droughts have affected the Hawaiian Islands throughout its history. Farmers, cattle ranchers, and individuals who rely on catchment water systems and surface stream diversions are the communities most immediately affected by drought. Areas susceptible to wildland fires are more vulnerable during very dry conditions, and incidences of wildland fire have increased considerably throughout the State. Droughts have impacted almost every island in Hawaii with the most severe events occurring in the past 15 years associated with the El Nino phenomenon. During the El Nino years, droughts occurred during the winter-spring period. For example, in January 1998, the National Weather Service's network of 73 rain gauges throughout the State did not record a single above-normal rainfall, with 36 gages recording less than 25 percent (%) of the norm (NWS Honolulu Forecast Office). The 0.14 inches of rain recorded for the city of Hilo is the lowest monthly total ever observed for any month since records have been kept. Normal January average rainfall for Hilo is 9.88 inches. Parts of the island of Hawaii continued to receive less than 10% of the normal rainfall until May 1998. Drought conditions will continue to affect Hawaii's environment, but the extent of drought and the respective consequences will probably increase in severity. Severe drought conditions may result in crisis-level shortages in water supplies for human consumption, agricultural irrigation, and fire suppression for severe wildland fire hazards. Crop damage and cattle losses have been major concerns during periods of severe drought, resulting in the implementation of both voluntary and mandatory water- conservation measures. The most recent drought of 1998 to 2003 has wreaked havoc on the farmers and ranchers of Hawaii, especially those on the southeastern end of the State. Ranchers are grass farmers whose cattle suffer from decreased grazing areas during drought conditions. The recent drought left the State of Hawaii with reduced cattle carrying capacity, lower calf production, and lower weaning weights, resulting in an enormous loss of revenue. The consequences of this economic impact are compounded by the additional costs to ranchers for supplemental feed and minerals required to sustain the animals during these periods. The economic impacts of drought on Hawaii's cattle industry (i.e., estimated drought-related loss) for 1999 and 2000 have been evaluated. increased cattle mortality and reduced calving rates led to a direct loss in the total number of marketable cattle. The average live weight for 14-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts all marketed cattle in 1999 decreased by about 10% resulting in decreased revenue. In addition to realized financial losses, overall cattle inventory was reduced by lower calving rates and selloff of mature cattle due to the unavailability of inexpensive feed or forage. This inventory reduction will contribute to economic losses for several years following drought resolution. Cattle loss due to death increased by 4% and weaned weights were lower by 89 lbs/head in 1999. The dollar losses are as follows: Drought-Related Impact 1999 Estimated Revenue Loss ($) Reduced wean weight $3,291,241 Reduced calf crop $687,940 Increased mortality $2,495,750 Total: $6,474,931 The total financial loss for the year 2000 in the same areas of cattle-related impacts shown in the above table is estimated at$9,078,360. Most severe droughts on record in Hawaii have occurred during the years associated with El Niflo — 1982/1983 and 1997/1998. According to the Pacific El Niflo-Southern Oscillation Application Center,the dry conditions, in general, have been associated with persistent zones of high-pressure systems throughout the islands. This feature related to El Nino is typical in the tropical Pacific. Table 14-2 summarizes the history of severe droughts. Ongoing Drought Conditions 2008—Present: Drought conditions on Hawaii Island was given its first ever D4 (drought-exceptional) designation in March 2010. West Hawaii rain gages showed that April 2010 rainfall was 50% or less. Similarly, January—April 2010 total rainfall was also 50% or less for the majority of rain gages around the island. October 2009—April 2010 wet-season rainfall was the driest in 30 years of record;ranchers reported the worst drought conditions ever. Hawaii Department of Research and Development reported that in the Kona/Kau districts, the production of coffee and macadamia nuts were down. The floriculture industry had problems with irrigation water supply. In May 2010, DLNR Division of Forestry and Wildlife closed four areas in the Mauna Kea Forest Reserve from the Hilo side of Pohakuloa/Waikahaula to Pun Kemole due to extremely dry conditions. There have been livestock deaths reported in Kawaihae. Parker Ranch is actively managing pastures due to drought by moving herds. In response to the drought conditions, Parker Ranch is culling as needed. Kona coffee farmers are suffering from drought conditions. Coffee trees need steady rainfall beginning from the flowering period in order to produce fruit/berries. For proper growth, coffee tress need 1 inch of rainfall per week. Impacts include the loss of 1/3 of coffee trees and entire harvested coffee crop refused by roaster due to poor berry conditions. Farmers who have access to water are irrigating intensively. Producers that have no county water use rainfall catchments systems. These producers have to pay for water deliveries, which is a financial hardship. Additional drought impacts include feral animals 14-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts (pigs) entering producers' fields and orchards destroying crops and damaging irrigation systems. Commission on Water Resource Management issued a press release asking residents and businesses to conserve water and asked people to be aware of increased risk of wildfire due to these drought conditions. Governor Lingle also sent a memo to all State departments asking for water conservation inside and outdoors of State facilities. CWRM's role is to coordinate any drought assistance efforts in the State and to assist counties to prepare and respond to drought. USDA Farm Service Agency reported that on July 14, 2010, the USDA Secretary designated the four counties in Hawaii as disaster areas due to drought. The disaster designation triggers several FSA assistance and loan programs. FSA regular loan program interest rate is lower than the emergency loan interest rate. There are several disaster assistance programs that producers can apply for. These include Supplemental Disaster Assistance Payment Program (SURE), Livestock Forage Disaster Assistance Program (LFP), Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP) Emergency Livestock Assistance Program (ELAP), Tree Assistance Program (TAP), Non-insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP), Farm Loan Program (FLP), Reimbursement Transportation Cost Program (RTCP), and Emergency Conservation Program (ECP). There is a new FSA program called the Reimbursement Transportation Program, which can reimburse producers' transportation costs for their feed, fertilizer, etc. There is $2.6M available under this program for Hawaii and other U.S. Territories. 14-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts Table 14-2. Historic Drought in the Hawaiian Islands Year Areas Remarks 1901 North Hawaii Severe drought,destructive forest fires. 1905 Kona,Hawaii Serious drought and forest fires. 1908 Hawaii and Maui Serious drought. 1912 Kohala,Hawaii Serious drought and severe sugarcane crop damage for ttvo years. 1952 Kauai Long,severe dry spell. 19.53 Hawaii,Kauai,Maui, Water rationing on Maui;water tanks in Kona almost empty;867 head of and Oahu cattle died;pineapple production on Molokai reduced by 30%;rainfall in the 1962 Hawaii and Maui State declared disaster for islands ofHawaii and Maui;crop damage,cattle deaths,and severe fire hazards;losses totaled$200,000. 196.5 Hawaii State water emergency declared;losses totaled$400,000. 1971 Hawaii and Maui Irrigation and domestic water users sharply curtailed. 1975 Kauai and Oahu Worst drought for sugar plantations in 15 years. 1977- Hawaii and Maui State declared disaster for islands ofHawaii and Maui. 1980- Hawaii and Maui State declared disaster;heavy agricultural and cattle losses;damages totaling 1981 at least$ 1.4 million. 1983- Hawaii E1Nitio effect State declared disaster;crop production reduced by 80%in 1985 Waimea/Kamuela area;$96,000 spent for drought reliefprojects. 1996 Hawaii,Maui,and Declared drought emergency;heavy damages to agriculture and cattle Molokai industries;losses totaling at least$49.4 million. 1998 Hawaii and Maui State declared drought emergency for Maui;County declared emergency for Hawaii due to water shortages. 2000- Hawaii,Maui, Counties declare drought emergencies;Governor proclaims statewide drought 2002 Molokai,Oahu,Kauai emergency,Secretary of Agriculture designates all Counties as primary 2003 Hawaii,Maui, Secretary ofAgriculture designates all Counties as primary disaster areas due Molokai,Oahu,Kauai to drought(2003);Governor proclaims statewide drought emergency. 2008- Statewide The first tune that D3(drought-extreme)had covered such a large area Present (percentage)ofthe State.The current drought is worse than the 2000-2002 drought. 14.3 Probability of Occurrence 14.3.1 Hazard Areas The impacts of drought can be categorized as economic, environmental, or social. Economic impacts can be observed as costs and losses to agricultural producers, costs and losses to livestock producers, and loss to the recreation and tourism industry. Environmental impacts can be categorized into damage to plant species, damage to animal species, and hydrological effects. Social impacts can be categorized as either health related, reduced quality of life and changes in lifestyle related, or even in increased conflicts regarding water use. Drought impact assessments begin by identifying direct consequences of the drought, such as reduced crop yields, livestock losses, and reservoir depletion. The risk of drought impact on the three sectors within the County of Hawaii is similar in terms of spatial variation. Most of the areas of concern are on the western side of the island, coinciding with low rainfall zones. What differs between each sector is the stage (moderate, 14-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts severe, or extreme) where drought risk may produce the most significant impacts. For the water supply sector, all stages produce significant risk on the western side of the island. The southern part of the island is also vulnerable to drought risk. The potential risk to this sector is clearly illustrated by applying the 12-month SPI. I ...:::....... water service Area Reservoirs Low Rain ::•...::::' ____= Medum Raub 140 Rain ..... -:C: Census Pop.Per Sq.We O.U27-0,126 0.705-2M72.34 Land Use DsW cis Agric t-L(A) j Conservation(C) y Rural(R) Urban(U) A 0 U 70 30 40 Mies w Figure 14-1. Drought Vulnerability to the water supply sector in the County of Hawaii In terms of the agriculture and commerce sector, again the western side of the island is at most risk, but the severe drought stage seems to coincide best with low rainfall areas on the west and southwest ends of the island, where various kinds of agricultural activities thrive. The use of a 3-month SPI shows well the potential risk to this sector. 14-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts i FGEM Uk"Systems '�l�: _ Far�nrtidl SVBarns 1 � �Alajcx Rosd5 i 1. '. ' IRa5-@fYUifS LSiVD Rgnculture Areas 1 how Rainfall Mednfrn RaInfafi `J High Rainfall No Data � hive Agneu flare Areas - Low Rarnfall Medium Ranfag r —1.High Rainfall No Data - I 0 1f 21 30 40 Miles E Figure 14-2. Drought Vulnerability to the agriculture sector in the County of Hawaii For the Pahoa area, droughts begin most frequently in July and December. For the Kea'au ar- ea, droughts begin most frequently in April-July and October-December. At the upper eleva- tions near the Volcanoes National Park, droughts begin most frequently in October-January, April, or June-July. Thus, island-wide droughts may begin any time of the year, and rainy pe- riods can end droughts any time of the year. This island is prone to the most intense droughts in the State. For frequency, the most drought-prone areas are the leeward areas such as South Kona and North Kohala. Current drought conditions are monitored nation-wide under a federal program involving several agencies,which produce a coded map. Tt currently shows portions of the leeward side of the island to be in an "extreme drought" condition, affecting both agriculture and water systems (see Figure 14-3). 14-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts August 18, 2009 U.S. Drought Vaid7amEST Hawaii Oro tCvndifrans f'eresnf Area) None D0-M 01-04 LU4N F � Curt 30-0 70.0 51.4 329 3.1 O.D LasMeek 121 87.9 55.4 33-9 3-1 OD p9i�120[•?r a71 3 Months Ago 02 9g.8 43.4 23.2 0.0 0.0 �05Q5QIIE map} SYart oY GaendarYear 21.1 78.E 5110 33-7 7-8 0.0 start of Water Year 1.6 98A 78.1 36.0 12.3 9.0 7 3!j7!2112 maps Dne Year Aga, 1-8 98A 5110 33.5 7-8 0.0 �MI9QCC2 map} BD D f ■t2 CrwgnL-sahame ::1 oraL]r--rfcder-e oa DrWgMt-Ercepucnar ::2 oraL]r--sevtrE- The Drnf:ght ritor facuses an bfoad-scale eondlliom. USDA Local conditraots may vary. See accompanvog text suraraarj, ���� for roreca.st statements. �". 4+Yny.urw`+u�,:..-. I$ Releaser!Thursday,August 20, 2009 http:!ldrought.unl.eduIdm Au froi:Laut'a Edwards, Western Regional Gfftnate GenrK Figure 14-3. Federal Drought Monitoring Map For wildfires, the State Division of Forestry and Wildlife (DOFAW) has the responsibility for the prevention and suppression of wildfires on State land and to cooperate with local agencies for the protection of wildlands on non-State land.68 To carry out this responsibility, DOFAW has identified areas where it has primary responsibility and would respond automatically, areas where it could respond mutually with other firefighting agencies upon request, and areas totally out of its jurisdiction but where DOFAW could nevertheless respond under specific conditions (e.g., extreme threats to public safety, local resources fully committed, extreme fire behavior). 14.4 Risk Assessment Currently there is no measure in place to quantify the potential economic impacts due to drought and corresponding wildfire events besides historical data. 68 Hawaii Revised Statutes,chapter 185(Land Fire Protection Law). 14-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts 14.5 Mitigation Strategies 14.5.1 Previous/Current Efforts Tt is known that a dry winter and possibly a dry spring in Hawaii usually follow the onset of El Nino. Given that the return period of El Nino is approximately three to five years, it would be useful to conduct a study to better anticipate drought patterns and severity in the future once an El Nino is developing. A similar study can be conducted for the La Nina events. None of the many rainfall-enhancement techniques tried have proven successful in practice. Better knowledge is needed on appropriate mitigation measures such as reservoir sizing that factors drought conditions, longer irrigation ditches, drought-resistant crops, low rainfall cul- tivation/tillage practices, changing planting to better areas during droughts, and designated emergency common areas to move cattle.69 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), with support from other agencies, maintains a drought mitigation center which assists states in developing drought mitigation plans. Hawaii is developing their plan under the State Water Commission. Crop insurance is available for mac nuts and some other primary local crops through the Co- operative Extension Service (CES), a program of the USDA and the University of Hawaii. This organization also provides information on drought-resistant plants and tillage. This section on droughts and wildfires would need to be updated in the future with findings from the ongoing study by the Hawaii Drought Committee.70 This study will identify drought and wildfire hazard areas and suggest mitigation actions. 69 Dr.A.D.Wall,Horticulturist,personal communication,October 2003. 70 Wilson Okamoto Corporation,County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategies(Draft),prepared for the Ha- waii Drought Committee and State of Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management,September 29, 2004. 14-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts 14.5.2 Future Plans Drought Mitigation Goals: • Expand current network of rain gages to improve rainfall monitoring. • Develop a framework to coordinate drought response between agencies. • Enhance current monitoring of ground- and surface-water levels. • Establish alert procedures for declining water level conditions. • Establish conservation programs to reduce water consumption. • Establish contingency water-hauling programs for livestock. • Seek authorization and funding for development of new water supply sources. • Identify areas at risk to drought and plan for regional response actions and strategies. • Develop additional storage and/or alternative sources of water supply. • Develop and implement drought-related public awareness programs. • Develop incentive programs for drought resistant practices. Project Description Status Drought/Wildland Fire Mitigation Plan County of Hawaii Unfunded Drought Mitigation Strategy 2004 Update Drought Monitor website; Maintenance Ongoing Update of Hawaii Rainfall Atlas:University of Hawaii,March 2012. Improvements to old plantation irrigation $30M Received partial FEMA system tunnels and ditches:Lower Hamakua funding Ditch System Renovations/improvements to old plantation $3M Proposed Project irrigation system tunnels and ditches:Kau Sugar System Reactivation Improvements to old plantation irrigation $26M Proposed Project system tunnels and ditches and new Kauahi reservoir:Waimea Improvements to the Kohala Ditch Irrigation Proposed Project: Post-earthquake repair Aqueduct Improvements to old plantation Ditch lining and/or closed completed irrigation transmission system. piping work still needs to L be done i Renovate and Reactivate old abandoned $2.5M Proposed Project plantation wells in Pahala Renovate and Reativate old Hamakua $100,000 Proposed Project Slaughterhouse well for non-potable agricultural use in Honokaa/Hamakua Construct new wells,surface water Investigation diversions,storage and transmission lines in priority areas Irrigating wisely: Promote better irrigation $100,000 Proposed Project practices and water management. Agricultural Water System for Kona, $25M in planning Honomalino: Provide a reliable source of water for agriculture and fire fighting assistance. Evaluate vulnerability ofCounty water $1M Completed si,stems and water trucking ca aci 14-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 14:Hazard Analysis—Droughts Project Description Status Emergency Community Water Stations: Improve access to community water stations and develop additional stations for persons on catchment in priority areas. Dam&Reservoir Improvements Pun Waaivaa Reservoir Note:other post- Completed earthquake repairs are currently heing done%onapleted on HDWS, DHHL,and HDOA reservoirs Develop wells,storage,and construct $20M for 177 ranch lots This project is underway transmission systems for Puukapu encompassing 10,000 and will be completed acres Development and extension of domestic $10M Completed water transmission system for Kawaihae Extension of domestic water transmission Well,pump and tank system for Oceanview being completed;water spigot stations aDevelop wells,storage,and construct Needs planning study Need to establish Z. transmission systems for Puna improvement district to � finance this project. Makalei Water System Improvements: $5M Proposed 4-yr Project 3 Develop additional wells and reservoirs as well as upgrade the transmission system in the area from Keahole to Kailua-Kona for agricultural users. Various Water System Improvements within $50M Proposed 15-yr Project the County of Hawaii: Develop additional sources,storage facilities,as well as upgrade the transmission and distribution systems in high priority areas. 14-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 A6r f 15. Wildfires Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires CHAPTER 15 - WILDFIRES 15.1 Description of Hazard Wildfires are becoming known as "wildland" fires, defined as any uncontrolled non- structural fire in a wild area. On this island, wildfires range from moderate size grass fires on ranch land to major scrub ohia fires in the Volcanos National Park. Approximately 1.6 million of the island's 2.6 million acre land area is listed as forested while a large but unstated amount is in pasture and brush; areas on the mountains above the tree line are bare. The County fire department handles most of the fires, sometimes with assistance from the forestry division of the State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR), Federal, and landowner crews. Occasionally,there are extensive fires in the National Park which have required fire crews flown in from the mainland to extinguish them. For wildfire and rural use, the Fire Department is equipped with ten tank trucks deployed around the island which have a total capacity of 13,850 gallons. In addition, they have ac- quired two special "brush" trucks for wildfire use. They operate a rescue helicopter and an ambulance helicopter which can dump water when necessary. When more air support is needed small and medium size private helos are hired. The National Guard maintains five large helos (Blackhawks) in Hilo which have water bucket kits and have occasionally been hired from the State (the Guard is a State agency). In addition to DLNR support, federal firefighters may be available from their station in the National Park, National Park crews (Park Rangers), and the Army's Pohakuloa Training Area. The Park and Pohakuloa occupy about 8% of the land area of the island. In coordination with Civil Defense, drought and other fire-hazard conditions are constantly monitored and actions such as burning bans and closures are instituted when needed. The public is informed of these restrictions by radio announcements and newspaper notices. New tools, such as satellite observation of burns, are being examined. 15.2 Significant Historic Events The County Fire Department reported 897 "fire-related incidents" in 2006, these include structural fires, the number of wildfires alone was not available. However, DLNR has reported in the past (in the State Data Book) that 70 to 80 wildfires occurred on this island annually. The 2007 Annual Wildfire Summary for the State of Hawaii is shown in Table 15-1. This data is not separated per county. 15-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires Table 15-1. State of Hawaii annual wildfire summar•re ort Annual Wildfire Summary Report Calendar Year:2007 Total Acres Protected:3,360,000 Acres Burned By Cause: Cause No. I Acres Lightning 1 0.1 Campfire 5 40.1 Smoking 1 2,291 Debris burning 1 1 53.9 Arson 21 6,728.50 Equipment 9 255.6 Railroads 0 0 Children 0 0 Miscellaneous 99 20,222.30 TOTAL: 147 29,591.50 Acres burned by Size Class: Size Class No. Acres Class A-0.25 acres or less 36 7.1 Class B-0.26 to 9 acres 60 132.3 Class C- 10 to 99 acres 23 784 Class D- 100 to 299 acres 10 760 Class E-300 to 999 acres 81 3,228.10 Class F- 1000 to 4999 acres 9 18,180 Class G-5000 acres or more: 1 6,500 TOTAL 147 29,591.50 In August 2005, nearly 5,000 people were ordered to evacuate their homes and the only road connecting Waikoloa to the rest of the Big Island was closed as a brush fire blazed out of control. The fire charred more than 25,000 acres along the Kohala Coast on the west side of the island. Puako and Waialea have had a history of fire events that threatened life and property. A fire in 1987 consumed three houses and damaged several others. A fire in July, 2007 burned 25 acres adjacent to the entrance road into Puako. On October 28, 2007, nine fires were set in the Puako/Kawaihae/Waikoloa area. The community was evacuated as the largest of these fires, in excess of 1,000 acres, approached within a '/4 -mile of Puako Beach Drive. Only a fortuitous shift in wind prevented a huge loss of property (estimated value in excess of$500 million). Those people who refused to evacuate were also at risk. South Kona was recently reminded that upland wildfire is a significant threat. It took weeks for firefighters to extinguish the 1800 acre wildfire which began at Kealakekua Ranch on December 27, 2009. Grasses ignited by lightning were fueled by mature 'ohi'a and koa trees, hard woods which can burn for weeks. These long burning fuels and rhizomous grasses that can smolder and carry fire underground made the fire extremely challenging to put out. The rugged terrain at the 4,400-foot elevation where the fire broke out, along with lack of access to water, abundant fuel sources, dry conditions, and warm weather causing smoldering to reignite all combined to create difficult and hazardous conditions for the dozens of firefighter who worked 24-hour shifts to battle the blaze and protect the community. Smoke from the fire, trapped by Kona's temperature inversion layer, created health hazards for fire fighters and the entire South Kona community. 15-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires r r i I - s Figure 15-1. 2009-2010 Upland fire in South Kona. Photo Courtesy ofdodyFergerstrom. i� Figure 15.2. Smoke from 2009 Kealakekua upland fire spread throughout South Kona. Photo Courtesv of'JesseAcosta,DLNR-DOFAW 15-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires 15.3 Probability of Occurrence From the Hawaii County Drought Plan, for the environment, public health and safety sector, the 3-month drought interval does not coincide with historical wildfire burn areas. That is, there appears to be no clear overlap between high drought frequency percentages and past wildland fire locations. However,the moderate stage for the 12-month interval in conjunction with the vulnerability analysis for this sector provides the best representation of risk, as areas of relatively high drought frequency coincide with past wildfire burn areas. c - U L.agend * Wildfire historic[turn Areas f Li ---•-- Communities Al Risk :: 2F Low Rainfall Medium Rainfall High Rainfall Reservoirs G Major Roads State Lard Use Aistricls ::''':: Agricullure(Al _ Corservatian(C) Rural(R) _I)rhan(LI) 1 11 2Q 30 40 Miles Figure 15-3. Drought Vulnerability to the environment,public health,and safety sector 15.4 Community Wildfire Protection Plans Community Wildfire Protection Plans (CWPP) arc being developed by the Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization (HWMO) with guidance and support from community members, decision makers, and local/state agencies concerned about fire issues. The Hawaii County Fire Department, the Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency, the National Park Service, and the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources were primary partners in developing plans for Kau and South Kona, Ocean View, and Hawaii Volcanoes National Park. The CWPP planning boundaries are the same as the wildland-urban interface (WUI) at-risk areas, which include surrounding lands to ensure adequate protection of WUI areas. 15-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires The goals and objectives of this plan follow the intent and requirements of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA) — HR 1904, which describes a CWPP as a fire mitigation and planning tool for an at-risk community that: A. Ts developed within the context of the collaborative agreements and the guidance established by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council and agreed to by the applicable local government, local fire department, and State Agency responsible for forest management, in consultation with interested parties and the Federal land management agencies managing land in the vicinity of the at-risk community. B. Identifies and prioritizes areas for hazardous fuel reduction treatments and recommends the types and methods of treatment on Federal and non-Federal land that will protect one or more at-risk communities and essential infrastructure. C. Recommends measures to reduce structural ignitability throughout the at-risk community.71 Plans address elements of fire protection, hazard assessment, wildfire mitigation priorities, and community outreach and education. The process engaged a diversity of agencies and individuals concerned with the at-risk area, following the guidelines and requirements of federal programs such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Pre-Disaster Mitigation program and the National Fire Plan(NFP). The CWPP is non-regulatory and cooperative in nature. The plan provides (1) a foundation for increased communication, coordination and collaboration among agencies and the public, (2) identification and prioritization of areas for hazardous fuel reduction projects and wildfire mitigation actions, and (3) assistance meeting federal and state planning requirements and qualifying for assistance programs.72 The CWPP works in conjunction with other County and State plans and programs including but not limited to: County of Hawaii: Ka'u Community Development Plan 73 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 74 County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategies 75 Ka`u to South Kona Water Master Plan 76 Kona Community Development Plan 71 Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003—HR 1904.US Federal Register. 72.Adapted from Linn County Community Wildfire Protection Plan,ECONorwest,September,2007. 73 Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003—HR 1904.US Federal Register. 74 Community Planning and Hazard Risk:The Kau Community Development Plan.County of Hawaii Planning Department. 75 County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategies,2004. 76 Kau Hawaii.Everything Ka u. 15-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires State of Hawaii: State Drought Plan and the County Drought Mitigation Strategies 77 State of Hawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 78 15.4.1 Multiple-Agency Agreements The federal, state, and local fire agencies of the Big Island have organized into the Big Island Wildfire Coordinating Group (BIWCG). Members include: • National Park Service • U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service • U.S. Army • Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Forestry and Wildlife • Hawaii County Civil Defense • Hawaii Fire Department • Department of Transportation-Airports Division, Hawaii District • Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization • Firewise BIWCG was established to further inter-agency cooperation, communications and coordination, and to implement directions and standards for incident management activities. BIWCG coordinates the programs of the participating wildland fire agencies on the big island of Hawaii and provides a forum for leadership, cooperation and the exchange of information.79 It also improves procedures to rapidly provide the most effective response to wildfires in the island. In coordination with Civil Defense, drought and other fire-hazard conditions are constantly monitored and actions such as burning bans and closures are instituted when needed. The public is informed of these restrictions by radio announcements and newspaper notices.80 15.4.2 Planning Process 15.4.2.1 CWPP Process and Methods The process of developing a CWPP helps to clarify and refine priorities for the protection of life, property, and critical infrastructure in the wildland-urban interface areas. Local residents, landowners, fire suppression agencies, and community leaders have participated in valuable discussions regarding wildfire history, resources at risk, areas of concern, and priority mitigation actions. 17 State Drought Plan and the County Drought Mitigation Strategies. 78 State of Hawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan,2007 79 Big Wand Wildfire Coordinating Group so Community Planning and Hazard Risk:The Kau Community Development Plan. 15-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires The methods used to create this CWPP followed the guidelines established for the HFRA, which requires the following actions during the planning process: • Step 1- Convene Decision Makers • Step 2-Involve Federal Agencies • Step 3a-Involve State and Local Agencies • Step 3b-Engage Interested parties This CWPP also followed the guidelines and satisfies the requirements of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Pre-Disaster Mitigation program and the National Fire Plan(NFP). 15.4.2.2 Decisions Makers Table 15-2.Decision-Makers for the Community Wildfire Protection Plan Requirement Agency or Organization Local Fire Chief Hawaii County Fire Department Local/County Government Hawaii County Civil Defense Department State Forestry Agency Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Forestry and Wildlife 15.4.2.3 Federal Agencies The federal agencies involved in managing the land and fires are: • National Park Service • US Army • US Fish and Wildlife Service 15.4.2.4 State and Local Agencies The state/local agencies that have jurisdictional responsibilities are: • Hawai`i County Fire Department • Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Forestry and Wildlife 15.4.2.5 Interested Parties/Affiliation (if any) The parties from our community that have shown interest in forest/fire management and have been involved in the CWPP are: • Community Development Plan Committee Hawaii County • Large Landowners • Local Associations and Organizations Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization, Big Island Wildfire Coordinating Group,Discovery Harbour Community Association • Private Citizens,Public At Large 15-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires HWMO is facilitating continued dialogue between residents and agencies regarding wildfire issues, and intends to posts the plan on its website for public use. The State Division of Forestry and Wildlife (DOFAW) has the responsibility for the prevention and suppression of wildfires on State land and to cooperate with local agencies for the protection of wildlands on non-State land." To carry out this responsibility, DOFAW has identified areas where it has primary responsibility and would respond automatically, ar- eas where it could respond mutually with other firefighting agencies upon request, and areas totally out of its jurisdiction but where DOFAW could nevertheless respond under specific conditions (e.g., extreme threats to public safety, local resources fully committed, extreme fire behavior). Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization, in cooperation with the Big island Wildfire Coordinating Group, will provide technical support, identify and coordinate funding, and serve as a centralized resource for wildfire risk reduction efforts. Together, representatives will prioritize and recommend funding for projects, document the successes and lessons learned from those projects, and evaluate and update the CWPP as needed. 15.4.2.6 Community Concerns In addition to prioritizing resources to protect, community and agency representatives developed a list of concerns regarding wildfire issues. They are listed below in order of priority: 1. Insufficient water infrastructure to adequately and quickly suppress wildfires, including dip tanks. 2. Inadequate fire suppression and support resources, such as rapid and on-site mapping capabilities and GPS technologies,vehicles,water tankers. 3. Regional and local planning and development standards that do not currently require community and subdivision designs to consider and/or mitigate fire risk: a. Landscaping and structural designs, materials, and placement often promote (or do not mitigate) fire risk; and b. Roads and highways are not always constructed with wide shoulders, fire lanes, emergency ingress/egress, or fuel mitigation in mind. 4. Fuel loading along roadsides, in community open areas, around and between individual homes and farms: a. Fuels breaks or areas of fuel reduction are desired around communities where possible and appropriate; b. Fuel reduction along roadsides, around houses and business, on large private property parcels, and in vacant lots is needed; and c. Need to develop and/or enforce community provisions that require fire fuels reduction on developed/undeveloped properties and by permanent/absentee landowners. 81 Hawaii Revised Statutes,chapter 185(Land Fire Protection Law). 15-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires 5. Lack of public awareness of the wildfire threat, to include lack of appropriate awareness by elected officials, planning agencies, large land owners, land managers, scientists, and homeowners (especially absentee owners)regarding: a. Fire history and fire hazards; b. Fire-mitigating landscaping techniques; c. Importance of mitigation; d. Fuels management tools and methods; and e. Common human-caused fire starts, such as roadside ignitions, fireworks, catalytic converters, green-waste dumping, and arsonists. 6. Need to increase/integrate communication (protocols, equipment, pre- and post- fire planning)between state, federal, and county agencies,particularly to maximize initial attack capabilities and to utilize specialized wildland expertise and training for wildfire situations. 7. Need to reduce and/or control invasive species that possess inherent fire or ignition properties, e.g. ignite easily and/or carry fire easily. 8. Arson-- It is not well known whether there is amnesty for reporting, nor what civil liabilities and penalties exist for arsonists. 9. Lack of emergency access staging areas and safety zones/areas within subdivisions for evacuation purposes. 10. Inadequate community egress and firefighting vehicle ingress during a wildfire a. Need to identify evacuation routes/roads within subdivisions; and b. Need to educate community about evacuation protocols. 15.5 Risk Assessment 15.5.1 Purpose and Methods The purpose of the community risk assessment is to: • Provide site-specific information to the community to promote wildfire awareness; • Help identify and prioritize areas for treatment; and • Determine the highest priority uses for available financial and human resources. The methods for the community wildfire risk assessment followed the guidelines established for the HFRA,which requires the following actions: • Step 4-Establish a Community Base Map • Step 5a-Develop a Community Risk Assessment • Step 5b-Identify Overall Community Priorities 15.5.2 Communities at Risk from Wildfires,Island of Hawaii The communities at risk from wildfires on the Island of Hawaii assessment made by the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Forestry and Wildlife, was mapped in 2005. Community priorities were based on the updated hazard rankings and overall risk assessment(Table 15-2. above)and fire history(Figure 15.4). 15-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires COMMUNITIES AT RISK FROM WILDFIRES `°a°'A°a Island of Hawaii -VILA,RAN(1. 1'1 AI IIVI / III.1 I I I i1Ln1uLA PSTA'IF3_ IrrK\I\ KAWAWAE NAPUNNMAUNAKEA W DAY t • \I li it �I\III: lr-,W DI Rom— Alto SUDDIVBIONS \I\I MAUNA IANI W'AIKOIAA\'lllAff, WANK IIU ZONE -- 1 ZONE I ••'•"I:II�I I II HL'ALLLANLUrID .PIIII ANAIIVIL ,_ ZO. .I'S' x:IV1Ar, p60R19 �WARUII' 1'I I N 1A\1.1A 14 � !VIII �RA1.\l!1 - AI VV1 Rlll\KI I[l\ � KAI I'ARAI)LtiF I+AYC� ��AILVA-IWNA x.I. ,ONE 2.' 1BA-WARAN 64 AI ill KI'I.W I AA-1 'LONE 4 ri F'uixlil -JgA hurl K.11\Vl li ry [�AI.AKI KIA >I ---- ,PAIIVA. II VII I.i\ .APIAIA I�� III II. \(111\\fl ZONE 3 �drY �ii i�yl_ KI ncsA HMO NAU A ,fxor�uwu t._ aiwu r'_al.l ray' o,/ _ tuACKUCi>3 sunnnlsluss i!jj `V ILALAPANAl IM�LOLO� Q''v.� Fire Risk Community Zonin¢ PAI AIA Community and Risk Rating IIONDMAIJND 1=High PIINALW] O Nudium NAWAMN OCFAti,� NAALEVR VIEW FSTA7154 N ImcoY-BIr x @"I W' F `oL ill I.x•I � Figure 15.4.Communities at Risk from Wildfires,Island of Hawaii.DLNR DOFAW 2005. n '4- T r T . Figure 15.5.Local firefighters discuss hazards and fire history patterns revealed through mapping. Photo Courtesy:HWMO 15-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires 15.6 Mitigation Strategies 15.6.1 Hazard Priorities 15.6.1.1 Purpose and Methods Priority action items have been developed from a number of sources, including input from community and agency participants in the planning process, noted deficiencies in local firefighting capabilities, and issues identified through the risk assessment. These actions address the following goals: 1. Enhance wildfire response capabilities. 2. Reduce risk and hazards through pro-active wildfire mitigation, including: • Increasing stakeholder knowledge about wildfire risk through education and • outreach; • Encouraging the treatment of structural ignitability; • Prioritizing fuel reduction projects; and • Increasing opportunities for collaboration and coordination to implement wildfire mitigation projects. 3. Address the list of community concerns. These priority action items follow the guidelines for HFRA,which requires: • Step 6a-Community Hazard Reduction Priorities • Priority Actions(General) • Hazardous Fuels Reduction • Step 6b-Recommendations to Reduce Structural Ignitability 15.6.1.2 Priority Actions Action items addressing wildfire issues are listed below, in order of priority: 1. Install pre-staged static water and helicopter dip tanks. 2. Acquire adequate resources for first responders: a. Appropriate technology resources for mapping at each fire station and on location; b. and c. Water tanker/tenders (minimum 2000 gallon tanker/tender with high wheel base for off-highway capabilities). 3. Wise development in fire prone areas. Create development standards and implement community planning that requires the mitigation of wildfire risks at the regional, community/subdivision,roads/highways, and individual structure levels. 4. Reduce fuel load and/or appropriately convert fuels along road sides, in community open areas, around individual homes: a. Appropriate conversion would include transition to vegetation with low ignition potential and low ability to carry fire, especially native plants. This can be accomplished through installing/establishing living fuel breaks. b. Reduce fuels through well-managed grazing, mechanical reduction, herbicide, or combinations of all treatments. 15-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires c. Encourage/educate large landowners to reduce fuels on private property. d. Identify opportunities to assist vulnerable populations (elderly, disabled) in creating defensible space around homes and property. e. Develop and or enforce fuels mitigation requirements within communities (to include developed and vacant lots,permanent resident and absentee landowners). 5. Continue fire prevention education and outreach, including arson prevention education: a. Hold community workshops; b. Implement the fire danger rating system; c. Provide individual home and neighborhood assessments; d. Increase public service announcements during high fire hazard periods; and e. Develop wildland fire materials for youth and implement educational programs in local schools. 6. Increase communication capabilities between state, federal, and county agencies, particularly to maximize initial attack capabilities in wildfire events: a. Integrate current and future communication equipment utilized by federal, state, and county fire suppression personnel to increase effective firefighting response. b. Develop protocols for multi-agency involvement to utilize available specialized wildland fire expertise and equipment/resources. 7. Reduce and/or control invasive species that increase fire risk and, where appropriate, convert to vegetation as described in priority number three. S. Advocate for increased penalties for arson and some level of amnesty for reporting fire. 9. Develop emergency staging areas and safety zones within communities and promote awareness of such areas within the community, including holding mock disaster drills. 10. Create/improve secondary access roads for those communities with only one means of ingress/egress; identify evacuation routes within subdivisions, especially in neighborhoods where secondary access roads are not available. 15-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires Well-managed grazing and other fuels management practices (mechanical / chemical / combination) reduce the risk of wildfire in WUI areas. Sporadic or no fuels management creates high risk. Unmanaged grasses (above left) are found along roads in areas with little to no grazing, including neighborhoods. At times, these fuels can reach 8-12 feet, posing considerable risk of roadside ignition. Note the differences in fuel in above right photo: pasture in foreground has active grazing; areas in background are not currently grazed and are at a higher risk of wildfire occurrence. 15.6.1.3 Reducing Structural Ignitahility Individuals and community associations can reduce structural ignitability throughout their community by taking the following measures recommended by the Firewise program as outlined below. However, due to the abundance of native vegetation, it is highly recommended that individuals and communities conduct a simple native vegetation assessment and/or consult with appropriate biologists or foresters before clearing trees and significant amounts of vegetation that may be important to protect. • Create a buffer zone of defensible space around a property of at least 30 feet or to the property line if the house has less than 30 feet of yard. Remove flammable vegetation and combustible growth within 30 feet of the house. Where there is native habitat, please consult with a biologist or forester first. • Prune tree limbs 6— 10 feet above the ground. • Space trees and shrubs ten feet apart in the yard. • Make sure that plants closest to the house are low-lying. • Whenever possible use fire-resistant Native Hawaiian species. Succulent plants are also good choices for converting fire fuels into Firewise landscaping. • Routinely remove dead leaves and other organic matter from the yard. • Sweep and/or clean gutters, eaves, and roofs regularly to prevent the build-up of leaves and other matter. • Use fire-resistant building materials for the roof, siding, and decks, such as metal, stucco, tile,brick, and cement. • Install firebrand-proof ceiling vents to prevent structure fires caused by wind-blown firebrands. 15-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires 15.6.2 Future Plans Project Description Status Drought/Wildland Fire Mitigation Plan County of Hawaii Drought Being updated pending funding Mitigation Strategy 2004 Identify wildfire hazard areas: See GIS maps in Drought Completed. Risk and Vulnerability Assessment and GIS Mapping Project,UHSOEST and SSRI,2003 Wildland Fire Mitigation Resource Core resource inventory Periodic updates needed every Mapping and Inventory Program: Continue completed 18 months. Hawaii Wildfire the development and maintenance of a GTS Management Organization does map and database to identify the location, these updates;HWMO is also type,and contact information for various working on a portable version widland fire protection resources. for first responders Install pre-staged static water and Multiple Agencies:federal, Cooperative Funding$828,000; helicopter dip tanks state,county,and private 2011-2013 Reduce and/or convert fuel load along Multiple Agencies:county Cooperative Funding$850,000; roadsides,community open areas,and 2010-2014 individual homes and lots Create development standards and conduct Multiple Agencies:county Cooperative Funding$150,000; community planning that requires the and state for outreach,any needed impact mitigation of wildfire risks studies and education Increase mapping technologies and Multiple Agencies:federal, Cooperative funding: $100,000; capabilities for fire agencies state,county,and private 2010-2013 Install street signage identifying evacuation Multiple Agencies:federal, Cooperative Funding$50,000; routes state,county,and private 2010-2014 Develop emergency staging areas within Multiple agencies:private Cooperative Funding$33,000 communities,promoting awareness of such for planning and outreach; areas within the community,including 2010-2012 holding mock disaster drills Reduce,control,and or convert invasive Multiple Agencies:federal, Cooperative Funding; species state,county,and private $1,500,000 includes maintenance,grazing,and conversion projects;2008- 2012 Continue fire prevention education and Multiple agencies:federal, Cooperative Funding$30,000; outreach,including arson prevention state,county,and private 2010-2014 education Increase effective integrated Multiple agencies Cooperative Funding$150,000; communication and initial attack protocol 2010-2014 between federal,state,and county fire suppression agencies Establish and maintain firebreaks around $2.2M Long-terml5-yr proposed roads and communities in North and South project Kohala districts(includes the Kawaihae, Waikoloa,and Waimea communities) Mitigate wildfire threat along strategic $500,000 2-year project Wildfire mitigation for the corridors in the Puako Forest to reduce the Ladder fuels along these forest is an element in the threat of a catastrophic crown fire that corridors will be removed. South Kohala Community could destroy the forest and homes as well Development Plan,which was as threaten nearby resort complexes. adopted by ordinance by Hawaii County in 2008. 15-14 Hawaii Couno,Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 15:Hazard Analysis—Wildfires Project Description Status Install dry hydrants and develop static $10,000/site in high hazard Proposed Project water sources: The water source/dry wildland fire districts hydrant will allow fire trucks to refill their water tanks when fighting forest and grassland fires in the Hamakua area. Remote Weather Montoring:Establish and $85,000;intellisense 5-yr proposed project maintenance Remote Automated Weather telemetry system under This project partially completed Stations in the districts of North Kohala, development by UH with 3 new RAWS stations in South Kohala,Kau,Kona,and Mauna Kea. S.Kohala&Kona Use of prescribed burns to reduce fuel loads $1.1M annually for 500- 15-yr proposed project in fire prone areas of Hawaii County: Use acres;DOFAW prescribed burns in fine prone areas Note that the proposed active including the communities of Waimea, may be in conflict where Kawaihae,Puako,Waikoloa,Pun Analrulu, there are native forests and Kailua-Kona. Roadside fuel management: Develop and Proposed Project maintain a roadside fuel management program along an identified corridor of Highway 190,South Kohala/North Kona. Agricultural practices to mitigate wildland Needs a tax break incentive Continue to investigate and fires in communities and subdivisions: expand agricultural practices to mitigate wildfire impacts by using livestock grazing in open pastures as a fuel management tool. 15-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f AA 16. HAZMAT Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT CHAPTER 16 - HAZMAT 16.1 History The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act or SARA became law in 1986 (PL 99- 499). A major SARA provision is Title III, or SARA Title 111, also referred to as Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). EPCRA established guidelines for Federal, State and local governments, and industry regarding emergency planning and providing communities with information on hazardous chemicals within their jurisdiction. The Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act became law in 1993 (HRS 128E), and promulgated SARA Title ITT in the State of Hawaii. The State Department of Health Office of Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response is responsible for implementing Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapters 128D (Environmental Response Law) and 128E, Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act. Chapter 128D, HRS, Environmental Response Law, Section 7, HRS mandates that a State List of Sites be published annually listing the sites with potential or known hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants. The DOH Hawaii SRP List of Priority Sites shows 464 sites with potential or known hazardous substance or petroleum contamination. The Hawaii SRP List of Priority Sites is sorted in order of Island, Locality, the Program Area, and the Facility/Site Name. The site Status and Potential Hazard are also identified for each Facility/Site. Chapter 128E, HRS, Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, governs the threshold quantities of hazardous chemical material subject to inventory, reporting, and emergency response plans required to be filed by the facility owner/operator. The Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (HEPCRA) requires that facilities must report annually on hazardous substances stored on their premises if the amounts stored exceed specified threshold planning quantities. HEPCRA requires that an owner or operator of a facility that stores, uses, or manufactures above defined thresholds, any hazardous substance, or extremely hazardous substance, is required to file a notification of such"Tier II"activity, and to pay a filing fee. A Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission (HSERC) was formed and each of the four counties in Hawaii was designated as an emergency planning district. A Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) was established in each county. Functions of the LEPC include preparing a hazardous material emergency response plan, reviewing the plan annually, evaluating resources to mitigate an emergency, receiving emergency response notifications, and receiving and processing requests for information from the general public. 16.2 Organization of the State and Local Emergency Planning Committee The Hawaii state emergency response commission, is placed within the Department of Health for administrative purposes and to carry out the requirements of HRS 128-E. The 16-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT commission shall consist of the following members, who shall be appointed by the governor as provided in section 26-34: (1) The director of health; (2) The chairperson of the board of agriculture; (3) The adjutant general; (4) The director of labor and industrial relations; (5) The chairperson of the board of land and natural resources; (6) The director of the office of environmental quality control; (7) The director of business, economic development, and tourism; (8) The director of transportation; (9) The dean of the University of Hawaii school of public health or the dean of the University of Hawaii school of medicine, as determined by the governor; (10) The director of the environmental center of the University of Hawaii; (11) One representative from each committee designated by the mayor of each respective county; and (12) Other persons appointed by the governor to meet the minimum requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. Federal: USCINCPAC Private: Brewer Environmental Chevron Healthcare Association of Hawaii Tesoro Hawaii American Red Cross Hawaiian Electric Hawaii Agricultural Research Center The Local Committee shall be composed of at least one person from each of the following groups: (1) Elected state and county officials; (2) Law enforcement, first aid, health, environmental, hospital, and transportation personnel; (3) Firefighting personnel; (4) Civil defense and emergency management personnel; (5) Broadcast and print media personnel; (6) Community groups not affiliated with emergency service groups; (7) Owners and operators of facilities subject to the requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986; and (8) Other groups recommended by the mayor and appointed by the commission. 16-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT The Local Emergency Planning Committee is to take appropriate actions to ensure the preparation, implementation, and annual update and review of the local emergency response plan required by this chapter and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. The local emergency response plans shall include, but not be limited to, the following: (A) Identification of each facility subject to the requirements of section 303 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §11003 and within the emergency planning district; identification of routes likely to be used for the transportation of substances on the list of extremely hazardous substances; and identification of additional facilities contributing or subjected to additional risk due to their proximity to facilities subject to the requirements of this section, such as hospitals or natural gas facilities; (B) Methods and procedures to be followed by facility owners and operators and local emergency and medical personnel in responding to any release of these substances; (C) Designation of a community emergency coordinator and facility emergency coordinators,who shall make determinations necessary to implement the plan; (D) Procedures providing reliable, effective, and timely notification by facility emergency coordinators and the community emergency coordinator to persons designated in the emergency plan, and the public, that a release has occurred, consistent with the notification requirements of this chapter and section 304 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. §11004; (E) Methods for determining the occurrence of a release, and the area or population likely to be affected by the release; (F) A description of emergency equipment and facilities in the county and at each facility in the county subject to the requirements of this section, and the identification of the persons responsible for the equipment and facilities; (G) Evacuation plans, including provisions for precautionary evacuation and alternate traffic routes; (H) Training programs, including schedules for training of local emergency response and medical personnel; and (1) Methods and schedules for exercising the emergency plan; (3) Request additional information from the facilities, if necessary, to develop emergency response plans; 16-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT (4) Submit local emergency response plans to the commission for review, and to other affected agencies upon request; (5) Report to the commission on alleged violations of this chapter; (6) Prepare reports, recommendations, and other information related to the implementation of this chapter, as requested by the commission; (7) Have the primary responsibility for receiving, processing, and managing hazardous chemical information forms and data, trade secrets, and public information requests pursuant to this chapter; (8) Accept and deposit into the state treasury any grants, gifts, or other funds received for the purpose of carrying out this chapter; and (9) Evaluate the need for resources necessary to develop, implement, and exercise the emergency plan, and make recommendations with respect to additional resources that may be required and the means for providing these additional resources. 16.3 Environmental Response Law The list of Hawai'i Sites Eligible Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) shows there are currently three sites on Oahu listed on EPA's CERCLA National Priority List (NPL) for cleanup. Ten Hawaii County sites that may be eligible for possible listing under CERCLA are presented below and managed by the HEER Office Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection (PA/SI) Program Remedial Project Managers (RPMs). Locality Facility Site Name Hakalau Hakalau Air Strip Pahala Kau Sugar Company(Hawaiian Agricultural Company) Kau Sugar Mill Paauhau Hamakua Sugar Company, Inc. Paauhau Seed Dipping Plant Paauilo Paauilo Seed Dipping Plant Paauilo Seed Dipping Plant Pepeekeo Pepeekeo Airstrip Paauilo Hamakua Mill Company Paauilo Sugar Mill Hakalau Mauna Kea Agribusiness Company Lands Hakalau Seed Dipping Plant Paauhau Paauhau Sugar Plantation Paauhau Sugar Mill Papaikou Papaikou Sugar Mill Waipunalei Hamakua Sugar Company Waipunalei Seed Dipping Plant The Department of Health Hawaii State Response Program List of Priority Sites presents all Hawaii sites identified for potential or known non-emergency response actions managed by the HEER Office Site Discovery, Assessment, and Remediation Section Remedial Project Managers (RPMs). Sites are categorized as a potential hazard when sampling data indicate that contaminant concentrations exceed Hawaii Environmental Action Levels. The list 16-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT includes 469 sites statewide that are managed within the HEER Office. The DOH Hawai'i SRP Priority List of Sites shows 83 sites on the Big Island with potential or known hazardous substance or petroleum contamination. Three sites were determined to require No Further Action (NFA). HEER Office Remedial Project Managers (RPMs) continue active oversight on 70 assessment and response actions. Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Hazard Hamakua Sugar Managed With Haina State Company, Inc- Haina Ongoing Assessment Institutional Sugar Mill Controls Hakalau PA/SI Hakalau Air Strip Inactive Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hakalau PA/SI Hakalau Sugar Ongoing Response Hazard Plantation Undetermined Hamakua State Agent Orange Ongoing Assessment Hazard Application Undetermined Hilo Brownfields Hilo Rubbish Dump Inactive Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hilo Brownfields Kanoelehua Industrial Ongoing Assessment Hazard Warehouse Undetermined Hilo State 187 Silva Street Ongoing Response Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Alamo Rent A Car, Hilo Ongoing Assessment Hazard International Airport Undetermined Hilo State Aloha Petroleum Hilo Ongoing Assessment Hazard Bulk Plant Undetermined Hazard Hilo State Bayside Chevron Ongoing Assessment Managed With Service Institutional Controls Hilo State Big Island Asphalt Co Ongoing Response Hazard Inc Present Equilon Enterprises Hazard Hilo State LLC-Hilo Terminal Ongoing Assessment Undetermined (Shell Oil Co) Hazard Hilo State Haaheo Elementary Inactive Response Managed With School Institutional Controls Hazard Hilo State Hatada Bakery Ongoing Response Managed With (Former) Institutional Controls Hilo State Hawaii Cane Products Ongoing Assessment Hazard Plant-Waiakea Pond Present Hilo State Hawaii Pest Control Ongoing Response Hazard Undetermined Hilo State HELCO Pipeline Ongoing Assessment Hazard Release Hualani Hilo Undetermined 16-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Hilo State Hilo Airport Aloha Ongoing Assessment Hazard Airlines jet fuel spill Undetermined Hazard Hilo State Hilo Arsenic Ongoing Response Managed With Engineering Controls Hilo State Hilo Bay Front Soccer Ongoing Assessment Hazard Field Undetermined Hazard Hilo State Hilo Judiciary Center Ongoing Assessment Managed With Project Engineering Controls Hilo State Hilo Quality Washerette Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Hilo Terminal 666 Ongoing Assessment Hazard Kalanianaole Avenue Undetermined Hilo State Hilo Wood Treating,Inc. Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Kawailani Central Office Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hilo State Larry's Waiakea Chevron Ongoing Response Hazard Undeten-pined Hilo State Stationers Corporation of Ongoing Assessment Hazard Hawaii Undetermined Hazard Hilo State Tank 19 Ongoing Assessment Managed With Institutional Controls Tesoro Hawaii Hazard Hilo State Corporation Terminal Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Department-595 Kalanianaole Tesoro Hawaii Hazard Hilo State Corporation Terminal Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Department-607 Kalanianaole Tesoro Hawaii Hazard Hilo State Corporation Terminal Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Department-701 Kalanianaole UH Hilo Pacific Hazard Hilo State Aquaculture and Ocean Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Resources Center Hilo State University of Hawaii-Hilo Ongoing Assessment Hazard Auto Shop Undetermined Hilo State Wailoa Small Boat Ongoing Assessment Hazard Harbor Undetermined Hilo State Western Auto Hydraulic Ongoing Assessment Hazard Oil Undetermined 16-6 Hawaii Count),Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Wood Protection Hazard Hilo State Company(HPM Building Ongoing Assessment Undetermined supply) Hilo State Young Brothers,Pier 2, Ongoing Assessment Hazard Hilo Undetermined Honokaa State DOH Honokaa Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Honokaa State Hamakua Sugar Company Ongoing Assessment Hazard Inc-Honokaa Airstrip Undetermined Hamakua Sugar Company Hazard Honokaa State Inc-Kawela Pesticide Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Mixing Area Hamakua Sugar Company Hazard Honokaa State Inc-Paauhau Seed Cane Ongoing Assessment Undetermine Dipping Plant Honokaa Medical Center Hazard Present Honokaa State Wastewater Treatment Inactive Assessment Plant Hazard Kailua-Kona State Big Island Honda NFA Response Managed With Mercedes Dealership Institutional Controls Hawaii Petroleum-Kona Hazard Kailua-Kona State Branch(Kona Warehouse Ongoing Assessment Undetermined &Cardlock) Honokohau Industrial Hazard Kailua-Kona State Park-Lower Boat Park Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Soil Contamination Hazard Kailua-Kona State Kona Village Resort NFA Response Managed With Institutional Controls Hazard Kailua-Kona State Snow White Linen, Ongoing Assessment Managed With Former Engineering Controls Kamuela State Kamuela Baseyard Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Kamuela State Waimea Quarry Ongoing Response Hazard Undetermined TOSCO Corporation- No Hazard Kawaihae State Kawaihae Terminal NFA Assessment #0317 Keaau Brownfields Keaau Middle School Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hazard Keaau State Keaau Hotel Site Inactive Response Managed With Engineering Controls Keaau State Keaau Pahoa Road 118 Inactive Response Hazard Present Acre Parcel 16-7 Hawaii Count),Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Keaau State Keaau Triangle Lot Ongoing Response Hazard Present Keaau State Puna Sugar Mill Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hazard Kealakekua State Kona Community Ongoing Assessment Managed With Hospital(Kona Hospital) Engineering Controls Keaulrou State Keauhou Mechanics Yard Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Kohala Former Meridian Hawaii Hazard Coast State Resort Transportation Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Facility Kukaiau State Kukaiau pump system Ongoing Assessment Hazard releases Undetermined Hamakua Sugar Hazard Laupahoehoe State Company,Inc-Papaaloa Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Pesticide Mixing Area Hazard Mauna Kea State Canada France Hawaii Inactive Response Managed With Telescope Observatory Engineering Controls Naalehu Brownfields Residential Property 95- Ongoing Assessment Hazard 5579 O ukea Street Undetermined Hazard 95-5572 Mamalahoa Managed With Naalehu State Highway Ongoing Assessment Engineering Controls Hawaii Petroleum Hazard Naalehu State Distributors,Inc 200 Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Gallon Fuel Spill Ookala Brownfields Ookala Gym and Ball Ongoing Assessment Hazard Park Undetermined Hamakua Sugar Hazard Paauhau PA/ST Company,Inc-Paauhau Ongoing Response Undetermined Sugar Mill Hamakua Sugar Hazard Paauilo PA/SI Company,Inc-Paauilo Inactive Assessment Undetermined Seed Dipping Plant Hamakua Sugar Hazard Paauilo PA/SI Company,Inc-Paauilo Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Sugar Mill Hamakua Sugar Hazard Paauilo State Company,Inc-Ookala Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Fuel Station Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Hazard Paauilo State Association Research Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Station-Paauilo Paauilo State Mauna Kea Ranch Inactive Assessment Hazard Overspill Spillage Undetermined 16-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT Locality Program Facility/Site Name Site Program Potential Area Status Action Hazard and Controls in Place Pahala PA/SI Kau Sugar Mill Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hazard Pahala State ML Macadamia Orchards, Ongoing Response Managed With LP(Kau Div) Engineering Controls Papaikou PA/SI Hamakua Sugar Ongoing Assessment Hazard Company,Inc-Pa aikou Undetermined Pepeekeo PA/SI Pepeekeo Airstrip Inactive Response Hazard Undetermined Pepeekeo State Black Oil and Drum Sites Ongoing Response Hazard Present Hilo Coast Power Hazard Pepeekeo State Company Diesel Fuel Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Storage Tank Petroleum Impacted Soil Hazard Present Pepeekeo State Downslope of Former Ongoing Response HCPC Maintenance Garage South Kona State Kamehameha Schools Ongoing Response Hazard Present Estoy Property Hawaii Volcanoes Hazard Volcano State National Park Ongoing Assessment Undetermined Aboveground Storage Tank Waimea State Waimea Chevron Food Ongoing Assessment Hazard Mart Undetermined Waimea State Waimea Landfill Ongoing Assessment Hazard Undetermined Hamakua Sugar Hazard Waipunalei PA/SI Company,Inc- Ongoing Assessment Managed With Waipunalei Institutional 16-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT RESPONSE PROGRAM EMERGENCY REPONSE NOTIFICATIONS LIST The Hawaii State Response Program Release Notification Log presented in this section shows a listing of all chemical and petroleum release notifications received by the HEER Office emergency response team during the fiscal year. The Release Notification Log is sorted in order of Locality, and the Case Name. Locality Case Name Incident Substance Media Hilo Hawaii Petroleum, Inc. Hilo While loading a boat,tanker Diesel Fuel Ocean Pier#3 truck's suction hose vibrated loose and released diesel onto the pier and into Hilo Bay Hilo HELCO Generating Station: In preparation for painting, Fuel Oil Soil Hill/Kanoelehua hydroblasting caused a small hole, releasing oil;oil contained within a sub-berm made;berm has earthen bottom.Oil collected via vacuum truck and being burned in the generating units. Hilo Hilo Bay Boat Ramp Release of 200 Gals of Diesel Fuel Ocean Diesel into Wailua River from Hilo Bay Boat Ramp Hilo Hilo Harbor Diesel release due to Diesel Fuel Ocean unknown Reasons Hilo Pole Mount Transformer Transformer Failure Ergon HyVolt II Soil 13946 Insulating Oil Hilo Pole Mount Transformer Rust decayed transformer HYVOLT II Soil 24275 release Hilo Pole Mount Transformer Release from Transformer HYVOLT II Soil 3613 due to transport Hilo Yandah Services Hilo Bay 125 gal diesel tote fell out of Diesel Fuel Ocean Diesel truck making turn. 15-20 gal diesel ran into Hilo Bay Kailua-Kona HELCO Generating Station: Overfill of Oil Water Diesel Fuel Soil Keahole Separator Kailua-Kona Kailua Kona Alleged High Caller alleging 5 R/hr None Air Radiation Readings readings Kawaihae Harbor Kawaihae Harbor Unknown Unknown Sheen Sheen Ocean Sheen Upolo Hamakua HWY 19 Release from truck fuel tank Diesel Fuel Asphalt 16-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT 16.4 Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act The Hawaii State Legislature enacted an update to Hawaii Revised Statutes 128 (D- environmental response law and E- Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act), clarifying and affecting the threshold quantities of hazardous chemical material subject to inventory,reporting, and emergency response plans by the facility owner/operator. RELATING TO THE HAWAII EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO KNOW ACT. BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF HAWAII: SECTION 1. The purpose of this Act is to clarify the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act reporting requirements. SECTION 2. Section 128E-6, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is amended by amending subsection (a)to read as follows: "(a) The owner or operator of a facility in the [fie] state that stores,uses, or manufactures any hazardous substance shall comply with the following requirements: (1) Each owner or operator of a facility in the [ ] state shall comply with the emergency planning and notification requirements of sections 302 and 303 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 [U.S.C;. §s"002"d 4 4 003 ] United States Code sections 11002 and 11003,if an extremely hazardous substance is present at the facility in an amount in excess of the threshold planning quantity established for the substance; (2) Each owner or operator of a facility in this [fie] state that is required to prepare or have available a material safety data sheet for a hazardous chemical under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended, 15 [T T�651] United States Code Section 651 ct seq., and regulations promulgated under that Act, for[R4- , , ]: All hazardous substances, except for extremely hazardous substances,present at the facility in amounts not less than ten thousand pounds; and B� All extremely hazardous substances present at the facility in amounts not less than five hundred pounds, or the threshold planning quantity for that substance, whichever is less, shall comply with the following reporting requirements: [(A4] (i) Complete a chemical list by March 1 of each year and submit material safety data sheets not more than thirty days after a request; [{R)] ii Complete the state chemical inventory form by March 1 of each year;provided that a Tier II list shall be used until a state form is available; Submit facility diagrams and location area maps by March 1 of each year, and update the maps annually as needed; and [(B3 ] iv Submit emergency response plans required under state or federal law. 16-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Hazard Analysis—HAZMAT The [ ] documents required in [ ] clauses i through ["] iv shall be submitted by March 1 of each year to the commission, the respective committee, and the respective fire department [ ]; (3) Each owner or operator of a facility in this [fie] state that is subject to [Seetien] Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 [14A.G. §1 United States Code Section 11023 shall comply with the toxic chemical release form requirements of[seetia ] Section 323 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 by July 1 of each year; and (4) Each owner or operator of a facility in this [fie] state covered under[seetie ] Section 304 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 [ ,] United States Code Section 11004, shall comply with the notification requirements of[seetia ] Section 304 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, and section 128E-7, if a release of an extremely hazardous substance occurs from the facility." SECTION 3. Statutory material to be repealed is bracketed and stricken. New statutory material is underscored. SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon approval. 16-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Appendix A—LEPC Bylaws HAWAII COUNTY LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE BYLAWS Article I. Name and Location Section 1. The name of this body shall be the Hawaii County Local Emergency Planning Committee, hereinafter referred to as the Committee. Section 2_ Tbp rnmmittee shall be located in Hilo, Hawaii. The mailing address for the Committee shall be Hawaii County Local Emergency Plan- ning Committee, c/o Hawaii State Department of Health, 1582 Kamehameha Avenue, Hilo, Hawaii 96720. Section 3. The Mayor of Hawaii County, hereinafter referred to as the Mayor, may change the principal office location within Hawaii County. Article II. Purposes and Responsibilities Section 1. The purposes of this Committee are to develop and maintain a hazardous materials emergency response plan in compliance with the Emer- gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) for Hawaii County, hereinafter referred to as the Plan. Section 2. The duties of this Committee are as follows: A. To review the Plan annually, and to revise it, as may be necessary. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. 911003(a)] B. To evaluate the need for resources to de- velop, implement, and exercise the Plan, and to make recommendations with respect to additional resources that may be re- auired and the means for providing such additional resources. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. 511003(b)] 16-A1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Appendix A—LEPC Bylaws C. To receive follow-up emergency notifica- tions for Hawaii County. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. §11004(c)] D. To organize and to maintain all EPCRA data that is reported to the Committee. This includes, but is not limited to, the Tier Two forms, material safety data sheets, facility site maps, and written notifica- tions of releases. E. To reply to all public inquiries regarding EPCRA information and the Plan. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. §11022(e) (3) ; [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. §11044(a)] E. To publish annually in the local newspa- per(s) the availability and location of Tier Two Inventory Forms, material safety data sheets. and the Flan. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. 511044(4)] Section 3. The Hawaii County Civil Defense will be empowered by the Committee to implement the Plan under emergency conditions. Article IIl. Membership Section 1. The original list of members was submitted by the Mayor of Hawaii County to the Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission (HSERC) Subsequent changes in the membership will be made by written notice from the Chairperson of the Committee to the Chairperson of the HSERC. Section 2. Each member shall be entitled to one (1) vote at annual or special meetings. All voting members shall be entitled to receive ap- propriate publications, attend meetings, and shall be entitled to participate in all other activities accrued by members. Section 3. Currently designated members of the Committee are listed in Attachment 1. 16-A2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Appendix A—LEPC Bylaws Article IV. Officers Section 1, The Committee shall elect a Chairperson and a Vice Chairperson from its membership. [Auth. 42 U.S.C.A. 4110011c) ) Section 2. The Chairperson shall serve as Coordinator, or designate another member to do so. [Imp. 42 U.S.C.A. §11001(c) ] Section 3. The Chairperson: shall preside over all gener- al meetings, exercise general supervision over the affairs of the Committee, and ap- point a Chair for each sub-committee as may be established. Section 4. If the Chairperson is absent, or if the posi- tion should become vacant by unforeseen cir- cumstances, the Vice Chairperson shall preside over the affairs of the Committee. Article V. Meetings Section 1. Meetings of the Committee shall be held at least annually at a time and place to be determined by the Chairperson. Notice of the meetings shall be sent by mail to all members at least ten (10) days prior to the meeting. A written agenda shall accompany all meeting notices. Section 2. A quorum of the voting members or their pre- designated alternates shall be present to conduct business. Section 3, Special meetings of the Committee may be held at the call of the Chairperson. Section 4. The meeting agenda will be posted at the County Clerk's Office six (o) calendar days before each meeting. Article VI. Sub-Committees Section 1. There shall be four (4) standing Sub- Committees: 16-A3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-16:Appendix A—LEPC Bylaws A. The responsibilities of the Planning Sub- Committee shall include, but not be limited to: 1. Developing and maintaining the Plan. 2. Updating the resource list for the response and mitigation of a hazardous material incident. B. The responsibilities of the Community Awareness/Right-to-Know Sub-Committee shall include, but not be limited to: 1. Establishing guidance for public educa- tion and communication with the news media. 2. Promoting EPCRA awareness in the com- munity. 3. Requesting and maintaining information required by EPCRA. 4. Processing all requests from the public for EPCRA information. Fees for duplicating records shall be levied in accordance with Hawaii State rules. C. The responsibilities of the Legislative Sub-Committee shall include, but not be limited to: 1. Evaluating present laws and ordinances regarding hazardous materials. 2. Proposing legislation concerning haz- ardous materials releases. D. The responsibilities of the Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis Sub- Committee shall include, but not be limited to: 1. Collect and maintain Tier Two Forms as submitted by facilities. 16-A4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Appendix A—LEPC Bylaws 2. Creating a risk map and defining vul- nerability zones around facilities. 3.Identifying vulnerable facilities within the vulnerable zone. Section 2. Each Sub-Committee shall have two Co-Chairs appointed by the Chairperson. Section 3. Members of each Sub-Committee shall be ap- pointed by the Chairperson. The current Sub- Committee members are listed in Attachment 2. Section 4. The Chairperson can appoint members of the Committee to special Sub-Committees or groups as needed. Article VII. Rules of Order Section 1. in all matters not otherwise prescribed herein_, procedure shall be governed by Robert's Rules of Order. Article VIII. Amendments Section 1. These bylaws may be amended or repealed by a majority vote of the members. ADOPTED (Date) (Chairperson) 16-A5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Appendix B—LEPC Members Hawaii County Local Emergency Planning Committee w c/o Me wei'I Dlslrfct Health Offlcn 1582 Kamehamehe Avanua Hilo, Howal'i 88720 December 6,2009 To: Mr.Laurence K.Lau,Chair Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission Department of Health 919 Ala Moans Boulevard,51°Floor Honolulu,Hawaii 96814 From: Henry G.Silva,HSERC Commissioner Hawaii County LEPC c/o Hawaii District Health Office 1582 Kamehameha Avenue I Pilo,Hawaii 96720 Subject;Hawaii County L.E.P.0 Committee Aloba Mr.Laurence K.Lau, On December 3,2009;the Hawaii County L.E.P.0 met and voted,to update its membership.These submitted names,will replace any existing voting tilembers or appointment to the Hawaii County LEPC. I lenry G.Silva- Chairman,Hawaii County L.E.P.0 John Bowen- Vice Chairman,Hawaii County L.E.P.C.. Jason Armstrong- Media Tracy Aruga- Hospital-Hilo Medical Center Hunter Bishop- County of Hawaii,Mayor's Office Newton Inouye- State of Hawaii,District Health Office Gerald Kosaki- County of Hawaii,Fire Dept.Special Operations Kaipo Parish- County of Hawaii,Fire Dept.HAZMAT John Pcard- State of Hawaii,HEER Office 16-B I Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 16:Appendix B—LEPC Members Barry Periatt- County of Hawaii,Civil Defense John Jack Roney- Citizen Member Paul Smith- Hamakun Encrgy Partners Elton Sugamuma- State of Hawaii,D.O.T Harbors Larry Weber- County of Hawaii,Police Dept. Reviewed and approved by, William P.Kenoi Mayor,County of Hawaii Submitted by. Henry G.Silva Chairman,Hawaii County LEPC 16-B2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r e�-KT'Nc f 17. Shelters Chapter 17:Shelters CHAPTER 17 - SHELTERS 17.1 Public Emergency Shelters Hawaii is vulnerable to a wide-range of emergencies and disasters ranging from hurricanes, earthquakes, rockfalls, tsunamis, and floods. Hurricanes, above all others, are clearly the most dangerous and capable of inflicting enormous damage and loss of life. Hurricanes provide the greatest challenge to Civil Defense and emergency management agencies at all levels of government. In Hawaii, residents and visitors cannot move away from a storm, as they do on the U.S. mainland,to reduce the life-threatening effects of a hurricane. They must remain in-place and have immediately available hurricane resistant homes, businesses, hotels, public shelters, etc., in which to seek refuge. In that regard, government in Hawaii has a more difficult responsibility to provide for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. Two important aspects of this responsibility as it pertains to the hurricane hazard is the adoption of building codes that afford hurricane protection to both public and private sector property, and the provision of sufficient, reasonably provisioned hurricane resistant public shelters and identification of reasonably hurricane-resistant buildings that can function as refuges during the storm. A list of all facilities currently used as emergency shelters in Hawaii County is given below. North Kohala District Kohala High and Elementary [S] • Building X Kohala Intermediate [S] South Kohala District Waikoloa Elementary [S] Waimea Elementary [S] • Building J • Building B • Building C • Building E • Building F • Building G • Building L Waimea Intermediate Waimea State Office Building North Kona District Holualoa Elementary Kahakai Elementary [S] • Cafeteria • Building A • Building B • Building D • Building F 17-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Kealakehe Elementary [S] • Building B • Building C • Building D • Building E • Building F • Building G Kealakehe High [S/P] • Building C • Building V • Building D • Building E • Building H • Building G • Building M Kealakehe Intermediate [S] • Building C • Building F • Building D • Building H • Building G South Kona District Honaunau Elementary • Building F Hookena Elementary • Building D Konawaena High [S/P] • Building C • Building S • Building D • Building E • Building G • Building F • Building O Kau District Kau High and Pahala Elementary [S/P] • Building I • Building N • Building Q Pahala Elem School • Building F • Building M • Building I • Building Q 17-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Hamakua District Honokaa High and Intermediate [S/P] • Building N • Building T • Building X • Building A Kalanianaole Elementary [S/P] • Building A • Building I • Building J • Building H Laupahohoe • Building A-main South Hilo District E B de Silva Elementary • Building F Hilo Union School • Building H Hilo High [S/P] • Building G • Building R • Building S • Building L • Building C 1 • Building C2 • Building Q • Building A • Building BB Hilo Intermediate [S] • Building D • Building L Kaumana Elementary [S] • Building C • Building E • Building F Waiakea Elementary [S] • Building A • Building B • Building C • Building D • Building F • Building G • Building H • Building 1 17-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Waiakea High [S/P] • Building G • Building D • Building C • Building M • Building U • Building R • Building B • Building E • Building F • Building H • Building Q Waiakea Intermediate [S] • Building M • Building D • Building I Waiakea Waena Elementary Puna District Keonepoko Elementary [S] • Cafeteria • Building E • Building F • Building G • Building H Keaau Elementary • Cafeteria • Building I • Building O • Building T • Building D Keaau High [S/P] • Building C • Building G • Building E • Building I • Building O Keaau Middle [S/P] • Cafeteria • Building M • Building K Mountain View Elementary [S] • Cafeteria • Building D • Building I • Building G 17-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Pahoa Elementary [S] • Building A Pahoa High and Intermediate [S/P] • Building Q • Building H • Building S • Building T • Building U Legend: [S] = Special Needs+General Population [P] =Pet Friendly+General Population [S/P] = Special Needs+Pet Friendly+General Population Facilities designated to serve as Special Needs Shelters provide limited support to persons with special health needs. Special health needs evacuees must either be capable of taking care of their own needs or be accompanied by a caregiver. Pet Friendly Shelters are co-located with some general population shelters. Household pets entering a pet friendly shelter must be caged for safety and owners should provide water and food for their pets. 17-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Kohala High&Intt.,Kohala Elementary H 1-TH-�'I.F P—lat'.o't'—7 �Honokae High&Intermediate Waimea State Offices&Courthouse Waimea Eleman ary&Intermediate I SOUTH KOHA Population=1 184 NORTH 1111 Population=1720 i Hilo IntermediateHilo High 1 SOUTH HILO Waiakea High Kealakehe ElementaryKealakehe High Pop44ation=4741 ilva Elementary Kealakehe Intermediat NORTH TH KONA 7CC Kahakai Eleme*/ pularion=34024 Keaau MiddleKeaau High **Holualoa Elementary Mountain View Elementary Konawaena High * Keonepoko Elementary 1 Pahoa High&Imermedia ahoa. emary �e Honaunau Elementary PUNA Population=42591 Hookena Elementary 11 SOUTH KONA Population=11414 _ I KAU I` Population=7050 y.Kau High and Pahala Elementary A Legend * Emergency Shelters G — Major Road 0 4 8 116 24 32 Miles Figure 17-1. Nfap of shelter locations on Hawaii island 17.1.1 Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classification Evaluations of 29 buildings throughout the Hawaiian Islands were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Accounting and General Services (DAGS), Division of Public Works, Scope of Services and Procedure for Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classification. The primary objective of these evaluations were to identify whether the structures substantially meets the wind load criteria for a Shelter rating of Type B or better. The evaluations also identify recommendations for any further incremental structural or nonstructural retrofits to achieve substantial compliance with Shelter Types B,A, and EHPA,where economically feasible. 17-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Shelter Assessment Procedures and Design Standards for New Shelters Type B Shelter Type A Shelter Shelter with an EHPA Essential Facility with COOP Structural capacity expressed in peak gust wind speeds calculated at the strength level [i.e., Vx 4(L.F. x1) = Vx�(1.6 x1.15)] Strength Capacity>108 Strength Capacity>130 Strength Capacity>156 Strength Capacity>190 mph peak gust mph peak gust mph peak gust mph peak gust Main Wind Force Resisting System Load Criteria for LRFD Evaluation by Method 2 Analytical Procedure, ASCE 7-05 80 minimum peak gust 95 minimum mph peak 115 minimum mph peak 140 mph or greater peak basic wind speed V gust basic wind speed V gust basic wind speed V gust basic wind speed V Load factor of 1.6 Load factor of 1.6 Load factor of 1.6 Load factor of 1.6 Importance Factor I of Importance Factor I of Importance Factor I of Importance Factor I of 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 On Oahu,Exposure, On Oahu,Exposure, On Oahu,Exposure, Directionality of 1.0 Directionality and Directionality and Directionality and On Oahu,Exposure,and Topographic factors per Topographic factors per Topographic factors per Topographic factors per Honolulu Building Code; Honolulu Building Code; Honolulu Building Code; Honolulu Building Code; otherwise per ASCE 7-05 otherwise per ASCE 7- otherwise per ASCE 7- otherwise per ASCE 7-05 Gust Effect Factor of 0.85 05 05 may be used Gust Effect Factor of Gust Effect Factor of Gust Effect Factor of 0.85 Evaluate Design for 0.85 may be used 0.85 may be used may be used interior pressure Evaluate Design for Evaluate Design for Evaluate Design for interior pressure interior pressure interior pressure Wall and Glazing Windborne Debris Resistance Criteria Walls and Glazing to Walls and Glazing must Walls and Glazing must Walls and Glazing must resist ASTM E1996-05 resist ASTM E1996-05 resist ASTM E1996-05 resist ASTM E1996-05 Level A Level C Level D Level E 2g steel balls at 130 fps 4.5 lb.2 X 4 @ 40 fps 9 lb. 2 X 4 4,50 fps(34 9 lb.2 X 4(�80 fps(55 (90 mph) (27 mph) mph) mph) Positive and Negative Positive and Negative Positive and Negative Positive and Negative Pressure shall be Pressure shall be Pressure shall be Pressure shall be determined for the bldg determined for the bldg determined for the bldg determined for the bldg enclosure glazing and enclosure glazing and enclosure glazing and enclosure glazing and door door elements door elements door elements elements Shelter Type B Shelter Type A Enhanced Hurricane Essential Facilities Protection Area necessary for COG and Shelter COOP provides structural provides structural provides capacity for provides capacity for 190 capacity for 108 mph capacity for 130 mph 155 mph(upper mph(upper Category 4 (upper Category 1 (upper Category 2 Category 3 hurricanes) hurricanes) hurricanes) hurricanes) 17-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Saffir-Simpson Storm Categories and Shelter Classes a 8 F a F _J Ly4 Categry 2 u Category 1 B2 9D 98 146 114 122 13D 138 146 154 162 170 178 186 194 3-Second Peak Gust Windspeed Strength Capacity Four school buildings in Hawaii County which were evaluated according to this procedure. The results for each of these evaluations are as follows. 17-1-1-1 Holualoa Elementary School- Cafetorium Building 7 - y J ' SaflFrSimpson Storm Categories and Shelter Classes Exis-ing'PPArdcws :�etrofittedInhcows ai5thgNMV RS $ PartWlv Erabsed M — Categary 1 u Category 2 U Category 3 Cate gory d W Existing 4letal goof Existing kptal Roof {Based on Best Available Dalai if Joan Veritioation Eased on,'roec Speed C Hill B2 D2 102 -12 122 122 142 152 162 172 102 192 3-Second Peak Gust Winds pee d Strength Capacity 17-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Building A would classify as a Type B hurricane shelter in its existing condition. Essentially, a Type B hurricane shelter is possible because the exterior doors and windows, exterior dormer louvers, and interior doors are all estimated to be capable of providing protection for an ASTM-E-1996 Level A missile. The analysis of the standing seam metal roof indicates that the roof panels are not adequate to resist the wind uplift pressures required for a Type A hurricane shelter. Nonetheless, given that the peak gust wind velocity associated with the capacity of the standing seam metal roof (120-mph) is close at hand with the upper bound peak gust wind velocity required for a Type A hurricane shelter (130-mph), it is recommended that a more in depth analysis be made based on the specific properties of the standing seam metal roof used in Building A. Upon verification that the standing seam metal roof is capable of resisting the wind pressures required for a Type A hurricane shelter, it would be necessary to retrofit the multi-purpose dining hall exterior windows and dormer openings so that an ASTM-E-1996 level C missile protection is provided inconformity with such shelter designation. The interior doors in the multi purpose dining hall would not have to be upgraded to resist an ASTM-E-1996 Level C. While retrofits to the exterior windows and dormer openings in the multi purpose dining hall are required to attain a Type A or better shelter qualification, the main-wind-resisting-system and other secondary structural components are theoretically capable resisting wind loads that correspond to an EHPA type shelter. The analysis of the main-wind-force-resisting-system and secondary structural components suggests that the capacity of Building A to resist hurricane wind loads is most likely governed by the capacity of the steel tapered columns that form part of the interior gable rigid frames. This value of velocity corresponds to a very high Category 4 hurricane and almost borderline Category 5 hurricane. It is important to note that an enclosed condition was not evaluated or considered in the recommendations because in order to prevent pressurization of the interior spaces (including the eave cavity and ceiling plenum) it would be required to seal off all window and vent openings temporarily or permanently. Since Building A is a naturally ventilated building, it would be necessary to condition the interior spaces mechanically— a very costly retrofit. Therefore, prevention of interior pressurization is considered economically impractical. A summary of the retrofits recommended above,based on Shelter Type, is as follows: • All Types: Remove or mitigate the possible debris sources indicated in this report. • Type A Shelter: Upon verification that the standing seam metal roof is adequate for the wind loads required for a Type A Shelter(based on project specific data),provide impact protection for all exterior windows and dormer openings at the multi-purpose dining hall (ASTM-E-1996 Level C Missile or better. 17-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 17.1.1.2 Waikoloa Elementary School- Classroom Building D i i SaffiL-Sim�srr�SLRaLrn Calu-�uli�s a�ld Sh�ltu� Classes F n'colc vu-•nm ',•ncax and 6ocr � � m Category 1 Category C#te -0 Ca#egory 4 0 CUnefR Str u o UMI capaolty Pussibla Partial) Enclosed'- vaoaci 82 a2 142 112 22 132 142 162 162 972 182 15? 3Scuond Perak Gust VVindspccd Strength Capacity Classroom Building D in its current condition complies with the strength capacity wind load requirements of a Type B hurricane shelter, and although unrated openings and impact protection exist it can safely be assumed that the existing openings and protection devices meet the wind load requirements for this shelter type and the required missile impact level A. However, some structural deficiencies were noticed during the inspection. The items listed below require attention to assure compliance: • Although the structural analysis determined that the uplift capacity of the hip girder truss just meets the requirements of a Type B shelter, the missing uplift connector is considered a structural flaw and should be retrofitted. This can be accomplished by installing uplift connectors per Figure 13, or equivalent method(minimum capacity of 1000 lbs. each), at the top and bottom chords of each hip-girder truss to setback- girder at each truss connection. • Install remedial uplift connectors at the hip truss connections to the setback girders, anywhere improper installation is noticed. Provide the missing fasteners at all other improperly installed connectors,particularly at the hip truss connections to the bottom 17-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters chord bearing points. Other retrofits and/or documentation are required to comply with the criteria of a Type A hurricane shelter. • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type B classification • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 115 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level C protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements In addition to retrofits that must be made to Building D, architectural requirements must be considered as well. The Summary of Recommended Criteria and Guidelines for Hurricane Shelter Classifications require that Type EHPA hurricane shelters have a restroom within the shelter area. Although the restrooms are contained within Building D, they are not accessible through interior openings of all other designated shelter areas within the building. • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type A and Type B classification • Install a deployable protective screen enclosure or similar device around the building to allow a safe access corridor to the restrooms. The screen must be pressure rated for design wind speeds of 140 mph or greater and missile level D impact rated or higher • Since most structural elements begin to approach or exceed their allowable load capacity under partially enclosed conditions at around the minimum acceptable wind speeds for Type EHPA shelters, the wind loads can be reduced by creating enclosed conditions. To accomplish this all fixed louvers must be closed by some method during storm events or operable louvers installed. These and all other openings must be pressure rated for design wind speeds of 140 mph or greater and missile level D impact rated or higher. • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 140 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level D protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements 17.1.1.3 Waikoloa Elementary School- Classroom Building E 17-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Saffir-Simpson Storm Categories and ShelterClasses Probable CL Tent Window and Do � y T Category 7 category 2 -9 Category 3 Category 4 Current Stn sibeStn.c-u-A Fartial E�closedl ^aoaci.•+Erdasec 82 92 122 112 122 132 127 152 162 172 1 192 3-Second Peak Gust ltirindspeed Strength Capacity Classroom Building E in its current condition complies with the strength capacity wind load requirements of a Type B hurricane shelter, and although unrated openings and impact protection exist it can safely be assumed that the existing openings and protection devices meet the wind load requirements for this shelter type and the required missile impact level A. However, some structural deficiencies were noticed during the inspection. The items listed below require attention to assure full compliance: • Repair or replace any damaged existing opening protections. • Missing uplift connectors are considered a structural flaw and should be retrofitted. This can be accomplished by installing uplift connectors, or equivalent method (minimum capacity of 1000 lbs. each), at the top and bottom chords of each hip- girder truss to setback-girder at each truss connection. • Install remedial uplift connectors at the hip truss connections to the setback girders anywhere improper installation is noticed. Provide the missing fasteners at all other improperly installed connectors,particularly at the hip truss connections to the bottom chord bearing points. Other retrofits and/or documentation are required to comply with the criteria of a Type A hurricane shelter. • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type B classification • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 115 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level C protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements In addition to retrofits that must be made to Building E, architectural requirements must be considered as well. The Suinrnary of Recommended Criteria and Guidelines for Hurricane Shelter Classifications require that Type EHPA hurricane shelters have a restroom within the shelter area. Although the restrooms are contained within Building E, and themselves could be considered shelter areas, they are not accessible through interior openings of other designated shelter areas within the building 17-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-17:Shelters • Complete all retrofits listed above required for Type A and Type B classification • Install a deployable protective screen enclosure or similar device around the building to allow a safe access corridor to the restrooms. The screen must be pressure rated for design windspeeds of 140 mph or greater and missile level D impact rated or higher • Since most structural elements begin to approach or exceed their allowable load capacity under partially enclosed conditions at around the minimum acceptable windspeeds for Type EHPA shelters, the wind loads can be reduced by creating enclosed conditions. To accomplish this all fixed louvers must be closed by some method during storm events or operable louvers installed. These and all other openings must be pressure rated for design windspeeds of 140 mph or greater and missile level D impact rated or higher. • Provide retrofits so that all openings (doors, windows, and louvers) meet ASTM E 1886 and ASTM E 1996 test standards for 140 mph design wind pressures and missile impact level D protection or better, or provide documentation of any existing openings that may be claimed to meet these performance requirements. 17.1.1.4 Konawaena Elementary School- Cafetorium Building C Ads— x SaffirSimpson Storm Categories and Shelter Classes E st ng Wincow Fetroftled Windows Existing M'NFRS jjjjjf � �III III n Cable Open ng S Donner Ope-ing= {Partially Eridused'i m ,m, CAegoryI Categary2 Categay3 .6 Categoryd m n ExistngG Metal Roof at Sneher reaS Based an PDject C-cedic 1 ta' a2 92 102 112 122 132 "142 152 1$2 172 132 192 3-Seeon d Peak Gust Windspeed Strength Capacity Building C would classify as a Type B hurricane shelter in its existing condition. Essentially, a Type B hurricane shelter is possible because the exterior doors and windows, interior doors, 17-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters and gable openings in all the shelter-designated areas are estimated to be capable of providing protection for an ASTM-E-1996 Level A missile. If it desired to achieve a Type A hurricane shelter, it would be necessary to retrofit the windows and gable openings in all the shelter-designated areas so that an ASTM-E-1996 level C missile protection is provided in conformity with such shelter designation. The interior doors between the kitchen and the multi-purpose dining hall would not have to be upgraded to resist an ASTM-E-1996 Level C missile. The analysis made based on the specific properties of the standing seam metal roof indicates that the roof panels over the shelter-designated areas are adequate to resist the wind uplift pressures required for an EHPA Type hurricane shelter in Building C. It would be necessary to retrofit the windows and gable openings in all the shelter-designated areas so that an ASTM-E-1996 level D missile protection is provided in conformity with an EHPA shelter designation. The MWFRS and other secondary structural components are theoretically capable resisting wind loads that correspond to an EHPA type shelter. The capacity of Building C to resist hurricane wind loads is most likely governed by the capacity of the web verticals in the trusses over the multi-purpose dining hall. It was found that these truss elements are capable of resisting wind pressures corresponding to a peak gust wind speed at the strength level of 155-mph for the partially enclosed condition. It is important to note that an enclosed condition was not evaluated or considered, since Building C is a naturally ventilated building. Therefore, prevention of interior pressurization is considered economically impractical. A summary of the retrofits recommended above,based on Shelter Type, is as follows: • All Types: Provide and enclosure to protect exterior propane storage tank from windborne debris. • All Types: Verify, and if necessary provide, adequate anchorage of mechanical ventilation units in roof above kitchen. • All Types: Provide adequate bracing for the framing of the lay-in acoustic tile and gypsum board ceilings as they constitute a falling hazard in their existing condition. • Type A Shelter: Provide impact protection for all exterior- windows and gable openings in all the shelter-designated areas (ASTM-E-1996 Level C Missile or better). • EHPA Type Shelter: Provide impact protection for all exterior windows and gable openings in all the shelter-designated areas (ASTM-E-1996 Level D Missile or better). In addition to these recommendations, it is advised that portions of two other buildings in the school—Buildings B and E—be considered as potential candidates for hurricane shelters. 17-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 17.2 Private Hurricane Shelters As a future mitigation project the criteria used to evaluate existing public emergency shelters can be adapted for application to privately owned facilities. This evaluation procedure would be particularly relevant in Hawaii due to the large tourist resorts and hotels that may need to be utilized as emergency shelters in the event of a hurricane or other disaster. 17.3 Safe Rooms The State Building Code has adopted provisions that allow Residential Safe rooms in lieu of fulfilling the windborne debris protection requirements of the IBC. An excerpt of this section taken from the Hawaii State Building code is as follows: 17-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters goebon Ul 02 Hawaii m4ldandal s.afa room. Chapter 4 is amended by addino Section 422 to read as follows — SECTION 422 Hawaii] midential safe roorn 4221 Performance-based design criteria. The residential safe room shall meet the rnimmum performance $pecificatigns of Section$-422.'x.1 through 422.9. - 4221.1 Intent and suuge. The intent of the residential safe room it tp toMp&-a* provide an enhanced protection.area tuSly.enclQaed.within a dweiling or within an accessory structure to a rewdence, which is drsiuned and constructed lowithstand the wind pressures.,windbome debris impacts,_and other resiufrernents of tht section — - -- 4221.2 Alternative standards. I- Manufactured safe MgM des4 ns suls'ect to approval A manufactured safe morn or safe ro-gm kit may be subs tiiuted if documeoatton is su�M ttratl and approved by the building offoial. The safe room steal#tae engineered,tested, and manufactured to meet or exceed the criteria of this section. 2. FEMA in-rsldence shelter deslsans permitted. It shall be permissible to buiid FEMA ln-Residence Shelters of up to 64 square feet of ftoor area with walls up to 81 t long a are b ilt m gowrigange woh o3nstmcticr Beta rs o' FEMA 314 4222 Site cri#ariar. Rtsidei iaf safe rooms shall nsat be constW Wed within areas sugect to stream 000aino, poasial flooding or dam tallure mumat;tnn min an of She fotnwing3E, 1 FEW Sppci4a,F120 Hazard Areas (SFHA) sabig:1 ty, r @tnfall runoff ffooe ing or sWea n Qr jggbjgading, Cmtal.Zones "Y or 1 drys fled in ,� In Urdu{ if (Fl Rm) issuled by FEMA fot flood PIain maroaement nurmsea, in which the #toad Hazard are tides. stows surge, wsyea, tovnemis, or a combination of these hazards 3 Areas subieet to dam tailure inundation as determined by the Department of Land and Wural Resources. 4223 Maximum GGGtl ncj. The safe loom is per Fnitled t she used fur a mg a6murr gmjpjpgm-V haserl on y least 15 square fe-e! ptr p�fsqn with a miaximum cf 6 22mnA in a rogm 91 up to 128 s;uaT f @t of floor area. 422.4 PmAslcjas for azlltnn. The room shall ho an raMq-Arringing dgor and an tmod�proteded o_perabigwi2o2w suOable b a mreanb of alernative exitinu+i i ar+ umeruency 17-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 42 2.5 D es ig n for dead IWt wires rain and irn act loads. 4225.1 Structural inteadx criteria. 1. The residential safe room shall be built w4h a complete structural s stern and a complete load path for vellcal and lateral loads caused by grgvft and wind- 2--The building that the residential."fe room.is in shaH be assumed to Ise destroyed e town and shall not be taken as affering any protective shielding to the safe roam gnclosure, 3. The ceiliQ2=9jure amcf-Wal shall be ca abte of su ortin a superlrrmposed.debris load of the full weight,t of any building floors_and_ roof above, but not leis than 125 psf. C The residential safe room enctoNLe shall becaoable of sirnuftaneousl resisting lateral and uplift wind pressures corresponding to a 160 migh 3r §&cond peak g ust determined in accordynce with ASC5—7 Minimum Deshan La ds for Buildings and Other Structures calculat using load and importance Factors of 1-2,- he site ex osure factor shall be based on "x�os9re C_ Th�t.factor and the directionality.[actor shall be taken as 0.85. ToDgMiphic wind am lificafort caused by mountainous terrain shall be considered in accordance with the buildina cads_ Internal pressure shad be determined in accordance with ASCE -7. 5. The residenhai safe room shall be anchored to a foundation system capable of res tating the above Inaldirxt qandJtians, 422.5.2 Windborm debris impact arc tecUort cif tau lid Ing enclosure almsnts. The entire enclosure of the safe room indud ing al!waifs. ce?in s and in s fixed or o (able windowE, pnd all entry doors into the safe room. shalt meet!2fi exceN. Level D reau ireme ri ts of AS TM E 1998 (Table x{22 5-1]. Any wall or ceiling penetration arieater than 4 SQVare inches shall be considered an oyeflsrtg ._.._,_._..:. Exception: Electeical outlet box-ft and interior fighting svvitc+ies not penetrating mprrn 2•_5-inches into the interior wall surface and a #lumbinQ piping orconduit not Greater than 1,5-inch in diameter shall be exempted from this mquirement. .3 Cyclic Rre3sure logging of Illazing and Rrateefive gyaterns IMp a_L�rotectw systems shall meet the ASTM g IM Syckc pressure re4uirerrierrt for the loading given in Table 422-5-1. 17-17 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters Table 4225.1 —Wind borne Debris ProteO On a r?O CYC Im Pressure Criteria for Residential Same Roams A5TM E ErwAugure Wait Ceilirw, aria 1996 Dehris Innr C alic Air Pressure Mssiie Debris Missile Size Irma t Testirp- rnaximum inward Level Speed and maximum o Pa_ tiny pressures D 2 x 4 weichirto 9. 50 ft_^,'sec. or 35 Pst inward ib. *1-0.25 fb, av-1 at least 34 +45 1st outrlrard with ruin Ienuth 8 ft. mph 4!-4-ioiph 422.6 Ventilation. The resFden#ia- safe room shall be natural#y ventilated to alloy the enclosure to have 9DDFoxirn&Iy one.alr change every. twci houra, This !foment ma be satisfied by 12 sq care inches of venting er a u ant. There shall beat least two apefable vents. the vents shall be crotected by,a cowltnc or&ar covice that shall bs impa:.t tested to paMly with ASTM E 1996 Level D. Alternatively. the room stall be oyaivakdt:a determine I the oaeninns are qf s ffic"e t area to constitute an open oripaftallvsno d condition as def+ried in ASCE 7. 422.7 Communications. Th residential safe room shall be equipped with a phone line and t,ebphone that does no rely on a separate eiecidcal Dower outiet. Altemattyely. a wireless telephone shall to permitted to rely on an Unlnterruptible Power SMIy (UPS) battery device. 422.8 Construction docurrm Construction documents for the residential safe room shall be directiy.prepared by a Hawaii k;ensed professional structural emineer. 422.9 Special inspection. The constriction or hstaljgpn,qtjh@ residential safe room shall be verified for conformance to the drawings in accordance with Chatter 97_ 422.10 Notification. The owner of the safe room shall not' the state department of defense and county civil defense agency of the proueWs Fax map key or olobal positioning system coordinates. 17-18 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 17.4 Enhanced Hurricane Protection Areas Section 423, Design Criteria for Enhanced Hurricane Protection Areas (EHPA), follows the criteria developed under Act 5, Disaster Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, this criteria is applicable to new buildings utilized as shelters and those health-care facilities that should be capable of self-sheltering. Section Ui03 State-and Countv,owned oubitc hi oh ocauyancy buildings -design Vriteria# r enhanced hurricane rv%ction areas. Chapter 4 is amended by adding Section 423 to read as follows: SECTION 423 State-a rid County-Owned public high occupj2cX buildinas -design criteria,for on han cog hurricane urotectlon.area s 423.1 Intent. The purpose of this section is to establish minimum life safety des+-an criteria for enhanced hurrican a protection areas;n high occupartcy Mate- and county-awned buildinm occupied during hurricanes of up to Saffllr Simpson}Category 3. 423.2 Scope. This section shall ayoiy to state; and county-owned buildings which are of Occupancy Cat"m III and IV defined by Tabte 1 QU,5 and g Lhe fQiIgBjng s ealic occupancies: 1. Enclosed and parbally enclosed structures whose 13dmary occu anc is public assembly with an occupant load greatgr than 3Da. 2. HeaRh care facilities with an orckpant load of 50 or more resident patients, but not having surgery or emergency treatment facilities. 3.Any other state- and couO -owned enciosed or partially enclosed bulldin with an occupant load greater than 5,000 4. Hosaitals_and-other heatth_ Ca re facilities having surgery or.emerge rwcy treatment facilities. Exception. Facilities located within flood zone V and tto a A than are designated by the owner to be evacuated during hurricane waminas deaiared by_the National Weather Service, shall not b$su4ject to these requirements. 423.3 Site ctiteTia. 17-19 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 423.3.1 Flood and tsunami zones.CMDIV with ASCE 24-05, Ftgod Resistant deslan and Construcliort, based on provisions for Occuparrgy Category 1. Roar siab an grade shall be 1 5 foot abcwc thip ba fIRgiALavol gf Ihe county's flood hazard mat), or at higher elevation as determined by a modefing mobodalM that 2rldiM the maximum envelope and depth of inundotion including the combined effects grrn 5u a slnd wave a I n with revved tp a =ory 3 hurricane. 2. Locale outside of V and Cogralal A g d_zonee unless justified by site- sipecCc analysis or designed for vertical evacuation its accordance vVth a method approved by the building officio.- When a bui dina within a V or Coastal A fb d one is a roved the bnttom�af the lowest strugtuMl framing member of arm elevateI_flrst floor space shat!be 2 feet above the base flood elevatioon of fhe roe 's flood hazard man.,or at hic her elevation as determined by a modeling m2thgdglggy that predicts the maximum envelope AnA d th of inundation 1 nclud k)g the combined effects at storm surge and wave actions)Math resew to a Cate-gory 3 hurricane. 3. Locate outside of tsunami evacuation zones unless ustOod by site-specific rnaabmis or dgr�igned forverticai eyilgjaggo in accordance cairn a meth ad approved by the bui Wing offigial. 423,3.E F-m*MeMX vehicle access. Provide at least one route f r h' ie access_ Ihe piortion of the erne err rnc,ls within the site shall be above the 100-year hood elevation. 423.13 Landes in and utility laydownimpsethazards. Landscapina around the bLJ I d Rg shall be desi reed to p rovide Stan a ra#ion su!!hcierlt to maintain emergency vehidc a ose in the event of mature tree blowdown. Trees shall not 1Merfere with tl,e funcboriing of overh ead or tiIity lines, nor cause la goown orfafltrip impact hazard to the buildings envelope a utility fines. 423.3.4 Adlace nt bulldir# , The buftrm shall not be located within 1id0(]feet of env hazardous material facilities defined by Table 1604.5. Unanchored I' ht-framed portabie 11ructures shall be not Perm ined within 300 feet or.the 001dIng. 423.4 Enhanced hurricane jR rotectlon area prog ram re uirements. 423.4.1 Applicable net area. At least fr4y porcent of the net square feet of a facl lity shaft be constructed to a ualdy as an enhanoed h Lj rricare Rrotection area. The net floor area shat be determined by subtragUng frorn the gross sg uare feet the floor area of excluded spaces,extedorwalls calumny fixed or movable ob ects. eoui me t or othoi features that under probable cnrtiditioras cannot be emoved or stored during use as a storm sh�ltor. - 17-20 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 423.4.2 Excluded spaces. Spaces such as maChanical rooms, electrical rooms. storage Mooms`athe an-d-cmwl spaces, sf}atl not be cansidared as net floor area yerMitted to be occu Ned cudMLa ham ne_ 423.4.3 DccuipancV capacity. The occuoano calalrhv shall be determined by dividing the, net ma f the enhanDed hurrican ejorotect ion area by 1S 6goare feet net floor area gmr wson. 423.4.4 Toilets and hand wash Irm facllatrfes. Provide a minimum of l toilet per 50 enhanced hurricpne protection area occuparts and a minimum ;2f 1 sink.per 140 enhanced hurricane oroleclion area c uv nts, as determined in accordance with Sectlof 423.4,E located within 3h a-per meter ot Ine enh4ance[I hurricanxprotgction area. These required toWand hand-wasnion facilities are not in addition to those raguired for normal occupancy and shall iSe included in th wor I tore count. --- 423.4.5 Accmbility_VWlrtere the refuse occupancy accommodates M2.Ep lhlon 50 i3ersons, provide an ADA,accessible route to a sheker aroa at each facility with a mi0imttm of 1 wheelchair scace for iovery 200 enhanced hurricane protection area occupants determine ire goeor42nce with Section 423.4.3. 423_5 Des.ion wind, rain,and Impact loads. 423.5.1 Structural design criteria. The building main vOnd farce misting system and structural compQUents shall be desig ned per ASiCE 7 for a 11A rr_ph jjjj a mum peak 3-second gust design speed with a toad factor of 1.5, and an importance factor for Occupancy Category lN. Topographic and directionality factors shall be the site-specific values determined per Appendix W. Design for interior pressure shalf be based on the largest opening in any ex#error facade or rock(swrface, 423.5.2 Windbome debrts missile impact for building enclosure elements. Extenor glazIng and clazed o enin s louvers roof openings and doors r ihall be provided with windbome debris impact resistance or protection $ystems conforming to AETM E1996 Level D. i.e.. 9 Ib. 2 X 4 0- 50 fps mt?h1. - - 423.5.3 Cyclic erasure leadino of irneact resistivealazino or yOndborne impact Protective systems. Resistance to the calculated maximum inward and o!AMgLd pcessure shall be designed to conform to ASTM E1996-95. 42.3.5.4 Windows. All unprotected window assem lies and theif anchoring systems shall be desi ned and installed#o meet the wind load and missile irmpaCl Griteraa of this section. 17-21 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 423.6.6 Window profcctIve IVIUM& Windows may bo pr.pv ded►ogh pe►ma ere ordeyI gyable_pf-itectiue systems rovideo the protective system is designed and instated t meet the Wnd load and missile impact critoria and CCmpllejely cpvefs the Mndow assembly 5,nd anchodrig system. 423.5.6 doors.All exleriar and Interior doors subiect to aossitft win# exposure ar missile impact shall have doors, frames, anchoring devices, an vision p2ne Is dasignod and installed to resist the wind load and miaai1a impact criteria or-such doors, frames, anchoring devices, and vision yaneN shall be p.ro+rided_with impaclprotective systems deli nee and installed to resist_the wind lostanO.m[mile impact.crite-da of thi p ie . 4215-71 Extaffor envelom The txyiiding endosure, rncioding walEs,.rao€s_, glazed pjppnJMjqj s and daa($sia11 not be riafatect r penetrated by Mnabome debfrs, as determined k)y WmpI nce with ASTM Et996-45 Lever C. 423.5.5 Psraptts. Parap@t$ tl�all satis(v the wind 1pad and missile tfnp�ct urtterie cif the exterior envelope. 4215.9 i`tao% 423.5.9.1 Roof enenIngs, Roof openings {e.g., HVAC fans, usts s.kyiights .s#�all_be provided with protection for the wind load gnd rnissile impact criteria of Sections 423.5.2 and 423.5.3 4215.9.2 Fiiah wind root coverintas. Roof coverinas shall bo sped and dsigrted according to the latest A$TM Stapdard$_fpr NO wind uplift fob 423-5.9.3 Roof dralnaae_ Rucfs s# AI ha%re adeguft sJoVS. drains and overnow drains or ecutaaerc rjed so accomrncdate 100-year hourly rmir V rates in accordance w h @Ctlan t$1 1.f, but no t less tk MZ-nChms 2M I)qur for 6 conthuous hours- - 423.6 Ventilation 423.6.1 Mechanical ventilation. Mechanical ventilation as reavind m arcardance with the International Me anical Code. Air intakes and exhausts shalt De esqr;ed and installed jo meet the wind load and missile irnpact criteria of SeCOOM 421,52 and 423,5,3. 423.6.2 HVAC egLsipMment an crag@. HVAC eQuiornent rn_ on rxtafs and anchoring systems 2ha11 be deW bed and installed to rneq!the A rid load crgor a. E2of g2enings ftr of-mourited HVAC equipment 4hat$havig a ]�- in;h-high gum deMened lro pm vertl the entry of ran tnrater 17-22 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 423.7 Standby electricals stem ca abll . PmvwJe a staVty erneraency electrical rawer system j►ef Ctxaoter 27 and NFPA 70 Article 700 Emt�gency SWems and Article 701 Legally-Required Standby Svstems..which shall have the ca patNl_ty of beim connected to an ern erg4ency oenerstor or other temporary_power scums. The emergency system capabildius sh,1ll include_ 1. An emerciency Rahtina system: 2. liluminated exit si-lrss, 3. Fire protection systems, fire alarm systems and fire sixinider sprinkler systems: and 4. Minimum mechanical ventilation for healthtsafety puf1poses. 423.7.1 Emergency aeneralgr. When ernemency generetors are pre- installed. the faciliy housing the eneraltor_permanent or portable. shalt be an enclosed area designed to protect the!oenerstors from wind and missile impact. Generators hardeniyd by the m_anufadLIrer ip Mhstand thg area's deaign wind and missile impact crFlertia stall be exempt from the enclosed area cniena repuireMent. 423.6 Quality assuranc 4_23.8.1 Wormation ¢n construction dcH;Alments. Q roruch an D Vr_Tl @.lj;_�ll include rles.iian +feria, fire occupancy rapac' it We la han hurricane protective area, and Proiect Saecifcaabons shall include opening protection d&Wws. Floor plans shall iridicate all enhanced humcarm Mtectiop area oorbcns of the tagLrty and exLtirio routes there from The la#rtud_e_a_n_d fan i de coordinates of the buildin Fhali he mcorded on the Cflns!►Uction documer Ks 423.8.2 Special inspactlon in addit ion tc the rVauuements of IZhaaier s;)ecal i-tspectig s shill hncl 3t ieasl dw €c_allcw.-3-:L�yslems a-ld components= 1. Reaf irla+-giriq an#roof framing c m+octiorws_ 2 ytiiaii connections to roof and in:)or dia:)hragrns and tamiN. 3 Rcaf rid fioQr r stems includir c cadeurtors dM s iAr. and boundary elements. 4. VerO".l,windfor 8is>i g s stems, Mludirpg breOW Irarnes.njWnent frames a& shear walls: Windforce-resijt;na sywem rnnnectians_to ft faundatipn:and B. Fat4cabon and nstallation of systems or components reguired to meet try irrlppta-pni4tonoo !pgyr*rn!?rit-* of$.ction liar-,1;. lrxce tiorr, Fabrt #on of-manufactured systems or=mponer+ts thai hayo a_igael lndj2ff2M comiglAnc*wit?, the wirwd4oad and imC_act reuyance teats erode. —- 17-23 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 423-8.3 Quality aseumme plan. A constructign quality assurance grcgram shall to ir7cluded 1r1 the uur►W_LfutivR dvcurnents and shait include: t_Tje jMaterials, systems, components and work+eguired to have special inspection or testing the buildirm cftiat or by there is erect cast n professional responsible for each Portion of the work 2_The type and wdea of ea do s ecia# inspection 3_Tba type and extent cf each test: 4.Additional re uiremB f rs ial ins on or for nd resistenoe� and 5. For each ty.2e of a jal in gpeOiqn, idenrtricattan as to Whelba it will ce pgntinuars sarjal iorarectian at periadia.glWjal inspectian. Q -4 Pear review. Goostruchon documents shall to independently reviewed by a Hawaii licensed structural eng ineer, A written o iniorr re p2ft of cornjOigr ll be submitted to State Civil Defense. the building otdel. and the owner. 23A Ma 1 Mona nce. The bul Idin g s#all be periodi cali inspected eve three bears and rrt igt�xned by the owner to ensure sOucturat jnteari!r and aompllance with this section. A_ report of fnspRction shall be fumished to the State CIvl I I7ef n _ 423.10 ComolianCe re-cprtlification when altered deteriorated.<r dampged. Alterations shall be reviewed by a Hawaii-liognsed strucural engineer to determine whether an y alterations would cause a violate n pt M cbon Detoriorati9n or-damage to any comoorent„of the bukling Khali require an evaluation by a Hawaii-licensed structural end neerto determine repairs necepAU to mainlairl compliance with this_sectioD! (Eff (Ruth: HR3 §107-29) (Imp: HRS §§107-24, 10T-25) 17-24 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 17:Shelters 17.5 Future Mitigation Plans Recommended future hazard mitigation projects for shelter facilities are listed below: Project Description Status Emergency shelter evaluation;Harden Perform a 1-year study to identify Proposed Project; public schools.for emergency shelters. and rank Hawaii building types that Then follow-up with the more There is a shortage of shelter buildings in could be deemed safer for hurricane detailed DAGS-standardized Hawaii County. Of the 14 hurricane resistance without exhaustive site structural evaluation shelters on the island,only four shelters investigations. Use this screening procedure for those public have been evaluated for safety by DAGS: criteria to determine the number of shelter facilities that have • Holualoa E.S. low vulnerability buildings available higher vulnerability,taking • Waikoloa E.S.bldg D for refuge in the private sector. This into account the revised net • Waikoloa E.S.bldg E could result in a decrease in the shelter demand. • Konawaena E.S. number of persons that would report Perform a comprehensive screening to a public shelter. evaluation of public hurricane shelters and private sector buildings for possible use for refuge Hawaii County All-Hazard Assessment of The three to four facilities with the Proposed Project: Hurricane Shelters highest-ranked losses will be taken This detailed evaluation will This project will conduct onsite building to a detailed evaluation using Benefit be identifying priority construction as-built data collection for the Cost Analysis of potential mitigation buildings and providing the remaining 10 hurricane shelter buildings, measures. information necessary to using the more detailed DAGS- submit PDM grant standardized structural evaluation applications for three to four procedure that follows the criteria retrofit projects. established by the legislature Hardening of'Waiakea High School Gvm Waiakea High School Gym is a Last proposed for FY09 PDM Window,Door&Enclosure Retrofitting designated hurricane shelter,but has grant. Application requires Possible Roof&Framing connection glass doors and glass louvers further investigation to define retrofitting.When re-roofing a critical precise scope and cost,as facility,provide extra protection from well as developing the BCA water damage,check and refasten the roof sheathing. Hawaii Residential Safe Room Requirements for room construction NOAA and DBEDT features are given in the State sponsored research project to Building Code;effective by 2011 for develop and test wall those homes that do not provide assemblies rated for safe glazing windborne debris protection room use. 17-25 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 18. Risk Assessment Chapter 18:Risk Assessment CHAPTER 18 - RISK ASSESSMENT In assessing vulnerability to various hazards,there are four categories of concern: • Emergency response capabilities. What are the components of an effective emergency response system for all hazards and how adequate and resilient are these facilities'? • Lifeline facilities. What are the critical lifelines to provide for our basic needs and do we need to relocate or fortify any of these facilities to withstand hazard risks? • Recovery capabilities. What facilities arc necessary to facilitate recovery after a disaster and how adequate are these facilities'? • Special at risk populations or areas. What special populations or areas require particular attention during emergencies for evacuation or to contain potential secondary hazards? This chapter inventories the facilities, populations, or areas in each of the above categories, and assesses their risk to hazards. 18.1 Emergency Response Facilities and Capabilities The County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan is the basis for the County's emergency response programs to promptly implement a fully coordinated response and measured appli- cation of resources when disaster threatens or occurs.12 Although fully functional, the plan needs review and updating since it is over ten years from the last revision. 18.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is the command center during a civil emergency. In a major emergency, numerous agencies must carry out the many different functions needed in an emergency swiftly and well. Many of these functions are interdependent; one agency cannot do its job well without information from another-agency. The EOC activates at different levels depending on the emergency. For minor emergencies, activation would not go beyond the Civil Defense staff working with the Fire and Police de- partments, and operational decision making may transition to an incident command center at the scene as the emergency situation becomes clearer. For advance readiness for what may become a full emergency(e.g., issuance of a"watch"), limited activation of other agencies for the EOC is necessary to coordinate and support more complex field operations. A full disaster requires mobilization of the entire organization shown in Figure 18-1 to carry out and coordinate warning, evacuation,police, fire, rescue and ambulance services, mass care, damage assessment, debris clearance, health, medical and sanitation services, public works, radiological protection and any other service required to protect public health and safety. 82 County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan, 1989. 18-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment COUNTY OF HAWAII DISASTER RESPONSE ORGANIZATION MAYOR STATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR CIVIL DEFENSE STATE CIVIL.DEFENSE ........I HAWAII CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY ........ AMERICAN RED CROSS POLICE FLRE-RESCUE PU3LIC[7;ORKS HEALTH AND MASS CARE LrtnrMS &ENGINEERING MEDICAL PUBLIC WELFARE POLICE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF DIST.HEALTH BRANCH( HS) DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTL EN-F DEPARTh4ENr PUBLIC WGRSS OFFICE(DOH) WATER SUPPLY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS COOPERATING AGENCIES COUNTY DEPARTMENTS STATE DISTRICT AND AND AGENCIES BRANCH OFFICES Hawaii Electric Light Co. EBS Station Verimn AmatewRadio Club Dept of Civil Service Dept o£Accountmg&Gen Services Gas Co_ StiuguPlantawm Assoc_ Dept of Finance Dept of Agmuhme Civil AirPaanl Medical Groups Planing Department Dept of Sus_&Ecoa Deuv. SoylGut Scouts Civic&Service Groups Dept of Liquor Control Dept of Cam.&Coo Affaus Religious Grw4is Coast Guard Reserve Dept of Parks and Recreation Dept of Conti Charitable Organizations Coast GuardAmiliny Dept ofReseawh& Dept ofDefmse Too Bus Companies Salvation Army Development Dept of Education Frataoal Groups News Media Corporation Counsel Dept of Hawn Hama Lands Business&Professional Radio&Television Mass Transit Dept of Labor&Indus.ReL Associations Broadcasting Stations Office of Aging Dept of Land&Natival Res_ Labor Unions Trade Associations Other County Agencies Dept of Taxation YMCA-YWCA-YBA Hotel Resorts (As needed) Dept of Transportation Civic and Service Groups VisitorindosnyB) University of Hawaii Nursing Associations Private Schools Office of Coo Protection Other Figure 18-1. Emergency Response Organization Source:County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan The County's EOC is located in the Civil Defense office which is part of the Hawaii Public Safety Complex on Kapiolani Street in Hilo. The facility is designed to have self-sufficient enclosed live-in capacity for 75 persons for two weeks and is equipped with the following: • Communications radio and telephone links to the rest of the County and the State; • Warning systems controls; • Meeting area capacity of 50 persons to accommodate the team; • Information such as maps, contact information, departmental plans and SOPS; • 24-hour personal accommodations (e.g.,restrooms, shower, food preparation area); • Standby water and power(i.e., 2 emergency generators and associated fuel storage); • Designed for radiation protection factor(PF) of at least 100. The EOC is not in the tsunami evacuation zone, flood hazard zone, or high-risk lava hazard zone(Lava Hazard Zone 1 or 2). 18-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Should the EOC become inoperable for any reason, there is a mobile command post that is ready as the alternate EOC. There is also a backup facility in Kona at the Department of Pub- lic Works' baseyard. 18.1.2 Emergency Shelters Shelters are a place of refuge for residents and visitors in anticipation of a hazard event and after the event as necessary. These shelters are primarily public facilities consisting of schools, parks, community centers and office buildings that have capacity to accommodate large numbers of people and are assumed to be basically structurally sound to withstand hurricanes (many of these facilities have not been evaluated for structural adequacy). This section evaluates adequacy in terms of location/capacity, structural integrity, and staffing. 18.1.2.1 Location and Capacity The current Civil Defense shelter inventory island wide is listed and illustrated in Chapter 17. Shelter needs depend on the hazard. For tsunamis, shelters are needed only for residents and visitors in the tsunami evacuation zone. Similarly, for lava flow hazards, shelters are needed only for residents in the lava inundation area. In contrast, shelter needs for hurricanes are widespread. For planning purposes, therefore, meeting the needs for hurricane shelter will ensure adequate shelter needs for all other hazards. A Hurricane Emergency Sheltering Plan developed by the State Civil Defense in 1998 utilized behavioral analyses studies to determine the amount of shelter space government must be capable of providing for evacuees in public facilities."' Information obtained from the Oahu behavioral analyses provided information about likely evacuation rates, i.e., the percentage of the population that will evacuate in response to advisories from local officials, and the evacuation destinations-- i.e., the percentages of evacuees who would seek shelter in public facilities, as compared to homes of relatives and friends, hotels and other destinations. Based on the data collected, the State's sheltering plan utilized the following averages to determine public sheltering needs: • Average percentage of people leaving their homes for another location: • Weak Storm-60 percent Strong Storm-90 percent • Average percentage of those leaving their homes who will go to public shelters: • All Storms-35 percent Applying these guidelines to determine the resident shelter needs for strong storms in Hawaii County, the greatest deficiencies are in North Kona, followed by South Hilo, Puna, and South Kohala (see Table 18-1). The total shortfall based on the stated assumptions is 9,100 spaces. The only districts which have excess capacity arc North Hilo and Hamakua. 83 State of Hawaii,Department of Defense,State Civil Defense Division,Hurricane Emergency Sheltering Plan,December 1998. 18-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Table 18-1. Resident Shelter Needs b y District District Est.Population" Shelter S aces Needs86 Deficient s7 N.Kohala 6,038 1,590 1,902 312 S.Kohala 13,131 2,920 4,136 1,216 N.Kona 28,543 5,275 8,991 3,716 S.Kona 8,589 2,225 2,706 481 Ka'u 5,827 1,175 1,836 661 Puna 31,335 8,435 9,871 1,436 S.Hilo 47,386 13,100 14,927 1,827 N.Hilo 1,720 640 542 -98 Hamakua 6,108 2,375 1,924 -451 Totals 148,677 37,735 46,835 9,100 It should be noted that these figures are for the resident population only and do not address our visitor needs. Hotels need to be prepared to self-shelter their guests. As an incentive, liability coverage for private shelters, as outlined in Hawaii Revised Statutes section 128-19, is available to those facilities that create suitable guest shelter space. A coordinated program needs to be in place to assist hotel and resort managers to identify hurricane-resistant space and to train staff. For cruise ship passengers, the County needs to coordinate with various hotels or identify public shelter spaces to accommodate these passengers. 84 Hawaii County Data Book 2000 85 Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency 86 Calculated from[Population]x[People Leaving Their Homes(.90)]x[People Leaving Home That Will Go to Shelters(.35)]. 87 Calculated from[Needs]-[Shelter Space]. 18-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Kohala High&IntAerKohala Elernerdary H 1TH-�1 1.F �Honokae High&Intermediate Waimea State Offices&Courthouse Waimea Element ry$interinediate I SOUTH KOHA Population=1 184 NORTH 1111 Population=1720 i Hilo IntermediateHilo High 1 SOUTH HILO M& Waiakea High Kealakehe ElementaryKealakehe High Pop44ation=4741 ilva Elementary Kealakehe hirermediat NORTH KONA 7CC Kahakai Elemer/POpulanon=34024 Keaau MiddleKeaau High **Holualoa Elementary Mountain View Elementary Konawaena High * Keonepoko Elementary 1 Pahoa High&Imermedia ahoa. entary �e Honaunau Elementary PUNA Population=42591 Hookena Elementary 11 SOUTH KONA Population=11414 _ I KAU I` Population=7050 y.Kau High and Pahala Elementary ' A Legend * Emergency Shelters G — Major Road 0 4 8 116 24 32 Miles Figure 18-2. Nfap of shelter locations on Hawaii island 18.1.2.2 Structural Evaluation Ideally, all shelters should be hurricane-resistant in that the roof, walls, and windows will withstand hurricane forces. Although these shelters do not meet all of the guidelines established for evaluating hurricane-resistant facilities, they are the best that are available at the moment. No facility can be completely "hurricane-proof' and facility managers will be instructed to take precautions which will minimize the potential danger to shelter occupants. Known deficiencies will be addressed as part of an overall mitigation program to identify cost-effective retrofit projects that will improve the safety and capacity of the available shelters. A number of the shelters/centers are situated within lava hazard zone 2, including the Hawai- ian Ocean View Estates Community Center in the Ka'u District, the Keonopoko Elementary School complex in Puna, the Pahoa High and Intermediate School complex in Puna, the Pahoa Neighborhood Center in Puna and the Ho'okena Elementary School in South Kona. The Hawaii Volcanoes National Park Visitor Center, designated as a center, is situated in lava hazard zone 3. 18-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.2.3 Staffing Future updates to this plan should evaluate staffing needs as the number of shelters increase. 18.1.3 Police Stations The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Police Depart- ment during disaster response and recovery phases as follows: Evacuation • Direct and control traffic flow into and out of restricted disaster areas, and ensure open trafficways for all emergency and lifesaving services;protect life and property. • Assist in disseminating warning information. • Direct evacuation of the public from threatened areas. • Provide for security of vacated homes and facilities. • Establish and man roadblocks and barricades as required; deny entry into restricted areas. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Provide the department's operations control and emergency communications and activate emergency procedures. • Transmit vital information and requests for assistance from field units to the Civil De- fense EOC by timely spot and situation reports; keep field units currently informed. • Maintain interagency communication, coordination and support to facilitate operations as established by CD procedures. • Assist with conducting radiological monitoring and reporting as required. • Post-disaster • Survey, assess and report estimated disaster-related damages, losses and relief needs to the Civil Defense EOC on a continuing basis, especially during the initial stages. • Perform other tasks related to the situation as may be directed by appropriate authority. At a hurricane or tsunami watch, all off-duty and volunteer officers report to their respective main station. There are eight main district police stations around the island along with four substations and ten mini police stations (see Figure 18-4). Central dispatch facilities are located in the Hilo station. There are approximately 350 officers assigned to the various stations with an island-wide average of approximately 2.5 officers per 1,000 residents. None of the main stations are located in the tsunami evacuation zone. Two of the substations are unavoidably located in the lava hazard zone 2 (Pahoa,Hawaiian Ocean View). 18-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment H sq�y. H H H P P P ro v 1 H ❑ County Base Yard LHU Hospital Q Police District Station Q Police Substation • Asset located in Volcanic Major Roads Hazard Zone 2 Figure 18-3. Map of Police Stations,DPW Baseyards,and Hospitals 18.1.4 Fire and EMS Stations The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Fire Department during disaster response and recovery phases as follows: • Fire-fighting,rescue, emergency medical • Direct and control fire hazard reduction, fire fighting, search and rescue operations to save life and property and to maintain or restore lifeline services and facilities. • Operate the department's Communication Control Center to facilitate the direction and control of all Fire-Rescue forces and operations "round the clock" shifts. • Provide ambulance and emergency medical services. • Assist in damage control. 18-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment • Evacuation • Assist in disseminating warning information and evacuating public. • Coordinate use of vehicles from other agencies for ambulatory and evacuation needs. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Transmit vital information and requests to the Civil Defense EOC by timely spot and situation reports;keep field units informed. • Assist in dispatching health and medical personnel to areas where their services are re- quired. • Request on-scene augmentation as soon as the need is anticipated. • Initiate and maintain interagency communication, coordination and cooperation to facilitate operations. • Conduct radiological monitoring and reporting as required. • Post-disaster • Survey, assess and report to the Civil Defense EOC estimated disaster-related damage, losses and relief needs. • Perform other tasks as may be required by the situation or directed by appropriate authority. There are fourteen regular fire stations around the island along with eighteen volunteer fire stations and two federal fire stations (see Figure 18-4). Centralized dispatch facilities are located in the Central Fire Station in Hilo. There are approximately 281 fire fighters assigned to the county fire stations around the island augmented by approximately 309 volunteer fire fighters. EMS (emergency medical service), rescue, and hazard materials teams are located at the following stations: 18-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment F F F' F F -.. F F F F F F F F + Fire Station F + EMS Hazmat Rescue Asset located within Tsunami Evacuation Zone � Rescue&EMS • Asset located within Volcanic Hazard Zone 2 • Asset within FIRM 100 Year or 500 Year Flood Zone 0 Fire Volunteer Station Figure 18-4. Map of Fire Stations • EMS-- all County fire stations (as distinguished from volunteer and federal stations) have EMS capability, except Waiakea and Laupahoehoe; • Ocean and/or helicopter rescue--Waiakea, South Kohala(helicopter only), Kailua; • Hazardous materials response team-- Kaumana. A response team is needed for West Ha- waii. None of the fire stations are located within the flood or tsunami evacuation zones. Two sta- tions are unavoidably located in lava flow hazard zone 2: Pahoa, Hawaiian Ocean View(vol- unteer). 18-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mit gal on Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment A study conducted in 1993 evaluated the seismic risks of fire stations." This study evaluated the structural conditions and non-structural hazards that could disrupt operational emergency services. Typical non-structural hazards include: garage doors that may bind if the support- ing structure experiences significant permanent racking and may consequently prevent fire fighting and rescue equipment from responding to an emergency; poorly anchored propane tanks that may roll over, rupture supply lines, cause uncontrolled releases of propane, and start fires; and unsecured batteries for emergency power generation which can fall, rupture, and cause a loss of power supply for emergency communication equipment. In addition, the desktop and console communications equipment and computers housed in the communications bunker at Hilo Central Fire Station must be secured to prevent falling. Since this equipment functions as the central dispatch and command center, damage to this equipment would jeopardize emergency response throughout the County. The study evaluated the structural conditions of four fire stations in more detail. Structural improvements were found to be necessary for each of these stations. Similar detailed structural evaluations need to be performed for the other stations. Overall, because of the high seismic risk in this County, and the age of the majority of the fire stations, the study rated the emergency preparedness of these essential facilities as poor. Hardening these essential facilities and mitigating non-structural hazards should be a high priority. 18.1.5 Department of Public Works Baseyards The County Department of Public Works carries out an important role during and after emer- gencies. The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Depart- ment of Public Works as follows: • Lifeline infrastructure repair and debris clearance • Direct and control overall public works and engineering operations to maximize the sav- ing of life and property and maintenance or restoration of lifeline services and facilities. • Direct and control emergency debris clearance, hazard removal and repair of vital facili- ties. • Isolate damaged sewer mains, disinfect raw sewage spills, restore service on priority ba- sis and decontaminate polluted areas in coordination with the District Health Office. • Assist in providing emergency transportation, emergency power and illumination. • Assist in search and rescue operations in conjunction with debris clearance and other public works functions. • Construct emergency fallout shelters, or improve existing shelters, in accordance with plans for expedient public shelter construction during a period of national emergency. • Evacuation • Provide assistance to the Police Department in establishing roadblocks or other traffic and crowd controls. 88 Wiss,Janney,Elstner Associates,Inc.,June 1993. Potential Seismic Hazards and Emergency Response Pre- paredness of Essential Fire Stations and Hospitals i the County of Hawaii. Prepared for the State of Hawaii Office of Civil Defense and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board. 18-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment • Assist with warning and evacuation of department personnel and the public. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Provide the required liaison in the Civil Defense EOC with appropriate "round-the- clock" shifts. • Assist in damage control. Transmit vital information and requests to the Civil Defense EOC by timely spot and sit- uation reports;keep field teams informed. • Initiate and maintain interagency communication, coordination and cooperation with all Public Works engineering centers,base yards and work teams to facilitate operations. • Conduct radiological and other hazardous material monitoring and response as required ensuring the safety of the work crews. • Post-disaster • Prepare mass burial sites in coordination with the District Health Officer. • Assess disaster-related damage and operational requirements; report estimates to Hawaii Civil Defense EOC. • Assume other responsibilities as may be required by the situation or directed by compe- tent authority. The Department of Public Works has eight base yards which serve as their operational, storage and maintenance centers (see Figure 18-3). These base yards are situated in Kurtistown, Hilo, Honokaa, Waimea, Hawi, Honalo, Captain Cook and Waiohinu. None of these base yards are situated in areas highly susceptible to natural hazards. 18.1.6 Hospitals There are five hospitals on the island with emergency medical and intensive care facilities (see Figure 18-3). Because of the expansiveness of this island, it is important and fortunate that the State hospital system is able to subsidize the hospitals in the outlying rural districts. A 1993 study evaluated the seismic risk of hospitals.89 The study found that non-structural hazards at all the hospitals were severe. Typical non-structural hazards include: poorly se- cured emergency power generators; unsecured hot water heaters, boilers, and piping that jeopardize sterilization, kitchen, and laundry services; and unsecured laboratory equipment, medical supply cabinets, pharmaceuticals, toxic chemicals, patient records, x-ray equipment, hung ceilings, corridor lighting, sprinkler lines, and propane tanks. The study conducted a detailed structural evaluation only of the Kona Hospital. Similar evaluations should be done of all hospitals. The findings of the Kona Hospital indicate the level of concern and urgency to ensure that these essential facilities are able to remain functional after a major earthquake. 89 Wiss,Janney,Elstner Associates,Tnc.,June 1993. Potential Seismic Hazards and Emergency Response Pre- paredness of Essential Fire Stations and Hospitals in the County of Hawaii. Prepared for the State of Hawaii Office of Civil Defense and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board. 18-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment For the Kona Hospital, the study found that the Kona Hospital has several structural features reminiscent of the Olive View Hospital in California that contributed to its severe damage and partial collapse in the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake. These features of the Kona Hospital include: discontinuous shear wall along the west side which creates a partial soft story effect; irregular layout of shear walls at the ground floor which may lead to significant torsional response of the building; and the lack of adequate shear reinforcing bars in the columns where they are restrained by the concrete slab-on-grade that may lead to brittle failure of these columns. A structural engineer conducted a post-Kiholo Bay assessment to evaluate the safety of the facility and assured hospital personnel that the building was operable. This was followed by a more detailed review of seismic adequacy, preformed by the Hawaii Health Systems Corporation. 18.1.7 Hawaii County All Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities This project consisted of conducting an all-hazard rapid visual screening (RVS) of approximately 70 to 80 critical facilities in the County of Hawaii,including: • emergency operations center • 10 fire stations • 13 ambulance facilities • 10 police stations • 6 hospitals and clinics • Hilo and Kona airport facilities The project engineering team lead by the University of Hawaii conducted an all-hazard rapid visual screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii. FEMA 154 procedures were followed for the seismic evaluation, while similar procedures developed by Martin & Chock, Inc., for SCD were used for hurricane evaluation. A HAZUS MH risk assessment model has been used to evaluate the expected losses for each building due to earthquake, hurricane and flooding, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and the site visits. Complete vulnerability rankings lists of all facilities studied are included in Table 18-2 through Table 18-4. Two facility groups that ranked worst based on the site observations and HAZUS analysis were designated for more detailed Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) evaluation and development of recommended mitigation procedures. This detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit a PDM grant applications for the most needed retrofit project, and prioritize the most vulnerable critical facility buildings for future retrofits. The vulnerability of a building can be measured by economic loss or by loss of functionality related to the extent of damage. Both of these risk measures for earthquake and hurricane hazards were analyzed at an equivalent level of probability, so that an "apples to apples" comparison of effects for each building was possible. Both of these risk measures were analyzed for earthquake and hurricane hazards at an equivalent level of probability (750- to 1000 year RP). 18-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Total aggregated losses for each event are given below: • Hurricane Event Total Losses—Essential Facilities $48,000,000 • Hurricane Event Total Losses—General Building Stock $7,138,000,000 • Earthquake Scenario Total Losses—Essential Facilities $117,000,000 • Earthquake Scenario Total Losses -General Building Stock $4,243,000,000 From the results of these analyses a short list of the critical facilities with the highest economic losses or greatest loss of functionality (most severely damaged) was created for review by county officials. This list is included below: Group Kaiwalani Fine Station,Honokaa Fie Station,North Kohata Fire Retrofits ptimatily consist of installing a Station,and the Central Fie Station Dispatch Office complete load path for hurricane wind uplift Group B Kona Civic Center Fire Station,Kona Civic Center Police Station, Work primarily consist of seisnric Keaau Fire Station,Keaau Police Station,and Laupaliochoe Police retrofits of masonry and concrete, Station(LPS) except LPS Goup C Kohata Hospital Scisuric and Hunicanc retrofits Group D Kau Hospital Hurricane and some Seisnric retrofits From the short list of highest expected loss facilities, Group B plus the Central Fire Station Dispatch Office and Kau Hospital were selected by HCDA for detailed Benefit Cost Analysis. Ka'u Hospital in Pahala, Hawaii, provides long-term care and acute care, obstetrics, emergency room, ambulance, and outpatient services. It is an essential facility for the southern Hawaii County districts of Puna, Kau, and South Kona. It is located in the Kau District of the County of Hawaii, the region of highest seismic hazard in the state, highest concentration of volcanic gas emissions, and is subject to hurricanes and windstorms since Hawaii is a hurricane and windborne debris hazard region. Built in 1968, its as-built condition predates modern requirements for seismic bracing of nonstructural elements and protection against windborne debris impacting windows. A common gas produced during the nearby Hawaiian eruptions just to the east that is potentially harmful to human health is sulfur dioxide. Exposure to gases can endanger those with heart and respiratory ailments. The Kau Hospital Hurricane and Seismic Retrofit project was developed as a result of the Hawaii County All-Hazards Assessment of Critical Facilities investigation that was conducted in 2008-2009. After a preliminary engineering design and cost estimate, a Benefit-Cost Analysis was performed to evaluate the mitigation project because the analysis indicated high vulnerability to seismic and hurricane hazards.. This same detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit the full PDM grant application to FEMA. Type of mitigation activity proposed: Non-structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings and Facilities: Modifications to the non- structural elements of an existing isolated hospital facility to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage, protect patients, and ensure continuity of operations. Non-structural retrofits include bracing of building ceilings to prevent earthquake damage, protection against windborne debris breaching of the enclosure, and protection of ventilation systems, 18-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment enhancement of the ventilation system to include better indoor air quality, and the abatement of hazardous material. This is a multi-hazard retrofit in which the State of Hawaii's contribution is the retrofit of the ventilation system to mitigate against harmful volcanic gas emissions and abatement of some indoor hazardous material. The Federal share contribution is for seismic bracing of the ceiling grid in essential facility areas, removal of an incinerator stack that is a potential seismic falling hazard, and mitigation against hurricane and windstorms through protection against windborne debris impacts on windows and rooftop mechanical systems and anchorage of nearby ancillary structures on site that would otherwise be large debris sources. Matching funds will come from two sources, both expenditures of the Hawaii Health System Corporation: 1) Final design and construction documents for the retrofits prepared by a structural engineer, and 2) a Capital Improvement Project for Kau Hospital to provided enhanced supply air handling system to mitigate against Volcanic Gas (VOG), ceiling asbestos abatement, and the replacement of vulnerable jalousie louver windows for improved hurricane resistance and better control of the interior air environment. In past VOG episodes, patients have needed to be relocated to other hospitals because of lack of sufficient air pre- conditioning to eliminate sulfur dioxide and other VOG particulates. According to Hawaii Volcano Observatory 2008 estimates, Kilauea Volcano emits 2,300 tons of sulfur dioxide per day. The project was determined by the FEMA BCA tool to have over $4 million in benefits over 25 years accrued from building loss protection, contents loss prevention, and functionality protection to enable continuity of operations during hurricane and earthquake disasters. The Benefit Cost Ratio is expected to be 6.67. Thus, the combination of the proposed FEMA PDM retrofits with the state's already planned air handling and enclosure retrofits will mitigate against hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic gas hazards. 18-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-2. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic earthquake event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Earthquake Probabilistic Senario(750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario(1000 year return Vulnerability List period) period) atetl atetl5 $toss %Loss -1 FEMA Budding n st% $Loss %Loss Building eufld ing Na me escrlptton Es%r- Score vel st.$LOSS J-Rank L k nk TVPe k k T ute CareFacility/Hilo Medical Cente C-FaClllty 39.7%$33,431,818 and a37 VPD 33 C2M eMC 8.3% $7,020,915 ant a45 56 CECBM VBUR Building 1 and 2/Kona Community HOSpit CareFacility 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 13 CIL MC 26.4% $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Hale HO'ola Hamakua CareFacility 40.8% $7,481,502 3 32 D 0.9 EMIL LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL Hawaii Public SafeNR,ildwg A EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 D 05 C2L LC 6.3% $688,116 1S S1 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety Bnlldln g B EmergencyCtr, 46.39/6 $5,001,817 5 26 D 1 C2L LC 6.39/6 $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFaci lily 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D 4N/A W2 MC 20.2% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kohala Hospital CareFacility 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 D DJ RM11L PC 21.2% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Psychiatric Facility/Kona Community Ho CareFacility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C2L MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Extended Care Facility/Hilo Medical Ce CareFacility 39.9% $3,021,799 9 36 D O.7 EMIL PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL VAOUtpatient Clinic/Hilo Medical Cent CareFacility 49.5% $2,887,890 10 22 D 1.9 RM2L LS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Special Services Building/Kona Communl CareFacility 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21L MC 26.4% $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Kona Police Statfon(Kealakehe Police St Po11ce5tat1on 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 CIL MC 14.59% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Central FireStation FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C21- PC 6.39% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Hale HOOla/Hilo Medical Center C-Fac111ty 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM11L LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL M-tenance Building/Hilo Med-1 Cent CareFacility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 ❑ 1.7 RM2L PC 8.1% $393,177 2S 46 48 MECBL METAL Maintenance Office/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 50.3% $1,735,545 16 201 DI 03 I W2 PCI 2.9%1 $99,795 461 621 39 WMUH2 BUR Keaau Fire Station-d Poli ce Stati on P01i-S-ion 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 EMIL PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Kea..Fire Station-d POl i ce Stati on FireStation 76.556 $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 EMIL PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL La-dry BUi ldi ng/H i 10 M edi ca l Center Care Facility 49.59% $1,349,815 19 23 D OJ RM21- LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Kaumana Fire Station FireStation 66.3% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM11- PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL Ko na Cl vi c Center PO l i ce Sta ti o n Po l i-Station 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM11L PC 26.7% $368,258 28 2S 25 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center C-Fac111ty 40.7% $1,110,051 22 33 D 1.7 RM11L LS 35.4% $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua Police Station Police5tation 59.7%1 $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 CIL PC 35.5% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D O7 CIL PC 31.6% $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Central Fire Station Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 01 2 61 S3 LS 15.1%1 $375,567 271 381 53 SP BM METAL Kau Police Station(Naalehu Police Stati Po1ice5tat1on 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 EMIL LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Hospital CareFacility 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C2L PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Kawailani FireStation FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D 1J RM1L PC 4.2% $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Hawaiian OCean View Estates Fire Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Waimea Fire Station FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM2L LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 14 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSFI METAL Waimea Police5tation(Kamuela Police St Po11ce5tation 34.7%1 $622,439 32 42 D 1.7 RM1L LC 28.6% $512,443 20 24 24 MECBL BUR Keauh0u-Kona FireStation FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM1L LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 341 31 D1 2.61 53 PC 4.8%1 $29,510 581 SS 57 SPMBS METAL Kau Fire Station(Pahala Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 3S 9 D 1,7 RM11L LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus BUllding(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna tani Fi FireStation 22.9% $424,027 37 51 D 1.2 EMIL LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Naalehu EMS CareFacility 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 14 Wl PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSFI METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 EMIL LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 C2L MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Radiation Oncology/Kona Community HOSp CareFacility 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 1979% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH11 METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 S7 ❑ 4.2 RM11L HC 19.4% $327,845 31 34 34 MECBL METAL Pahoa Flre Station FireStation 32.7%j $2S9,41SI 43 4411 D1 1.4 Wl LS1 8.1%j $64,151 501 481 43 WSFI METAL Pahoa Police Station P011Ce5tati0n 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 W1 PC 14.6% $55,572 53 39 33 WSFI METAL Waiakea Fire Station Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kawailani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D 2.6 53 MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSFI METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 Wl PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSFI METAL Infusion Center/Kona Community HOSpita Care Facility 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 43 w LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 8 WSFI METAL Hawal is n Pa ra d l s e P a r k Fire Sta ti on Fire Station 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 w PC 4.7% $13,897 63 S7 4S WSFI METAL Kau P011ce Station Generator Building IN Po11-Station 73.3% $151,733 SO 10 D 2.2 RM11L LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBL METAL North Kohala Police Station(Kapaau Poli Po11ce5tation 132% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 EMIL LS 212% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Waiakea Fire Station Fire Station 84% $142,615 52 631 D 1 4.2 RM11i HCI 2.6% $43,780 351 63 64 MECBL METAL La upa hoehoe P,1,ce St,ti on(N-h Hi I,P Po11ce5tat1on 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 WI PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSFI METAL Kea..Fire Station Vehicle Sh ed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 53 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau Police Station Vehicle Shed P011Ce5-1- 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSFI METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSFI METAL Naalehu Fire Station Vehi Cle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSFI METAL Kona Police Station Generator Building( Po11ce5tat1on 31.S% $54,837 S8 45 D 2.2 EMIL LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Central Fire Station Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 50 D 1.7 EMIL LS 6.8% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Acres Volunteer Fire Station a n FireStation 1 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl LS 20.7%11 $57,180 52 31 26 WSFI METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61j 59 D 6.3 Wl LS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSFI METAL taupah-!,-Volunteer Flre Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 S4 D 3.9 Wl PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSFI METAL La upahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 ❑ 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSFI METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station Vehlcl e 5 Police5tation 15.5% $24,020 64 S8 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSFI METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 6S 65 D 4.3 Wl LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSFI METAL North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus BUil FireStation 3.2% $5,522 66 65 D 1.4 WE L5 47.1% $51,316 48 11 9 WSFI METAL 18-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-3. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic earthquake event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Earthquake Probabilistic Senario(750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario(1000 year return Vulnerability List period) period) atetl atetl5 $toss %Loss Soll FEMA euilding n st% $toss %Loss Building eufld ing Na me escrlptton Es%rLr, Score vel st.$LOSS Uses Ra nk Kona Civic Center Fire Sttion FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 as 24 Rank1 TyPD 0.7 Ty C1L Le PC 31.6% $381,596 Ra 26 Ra 18 17 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus Brij ldjng(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Waiakea Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 844% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.8% $29,510 58 55 57 SPMRS METAL Kona Civic Center Police Station Police5tation 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 17 RM1L PC 267% $368,258 28 25 25 MECBL METAL Kawailani Fjre Station FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D 12 RM1L PC 4.2% $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Station a rd Police Station Po1ice5tat1on 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 02 RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Station a rd Police Station FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 07 RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Hawajian Ocean Vjew Estates Fire Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kau Fire Station(Pahala Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 D 1.7 RM1L LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Police5tation Generator RUilding(N Police5tation 73.3% $151,733 50 10 D 2.2 RM1L ITS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECRL METAL Kau Police Station(Naalehu Police Stati Police5tation 73.3% $986,266 26 10 ❑ 22 RM1L ITS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECRL METAL Pahoa Police Station Po11-5tat1on 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 Wl PC 14.6% $55,572 53 39 33 WSFI METAL Ka u ma na Fire Station FireStation 66.3% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM1L PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL Central FireStation FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -O.S C2L PC 6.3% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Hamakua PoIlceStation PoIlceStation 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 ❑ -0.7 C1L PC 35.S% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Hawajian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 Wl PC 4.7% $13,897 63 57 45 WSFI METAL Hawajian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 Wl PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSFI METAL Keaau Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau Police Station Vehicle5hed Police5tation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSFI METAL Maintenance Office/Hilo Medical Center Ca reFa,;l i ty 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D 0.5 W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Kohala Hospital C-Fa„Illy 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 ❑ 07 RM1L PC 21.2% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL VACUtpatient Clinic/Hilo M edl,al Cent C-Fa„Ilty 49.S% $2,887,890 10 22 D 1.9 RM2L ITS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Laundry Building/Hilo Medical Center C-Facility 49.5%1 $1,349,815 19 23 D 0.7 RM2L LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 511 MECBL BUR Hale HOOla/Hilo Medical Center C-Facility 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 17 RM1L ITS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Kawai lani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 251 DI 2 61 53 MCI 3.5%1 $14,672 62 60 48 WSFI METAL Hawa ii Public Safety BUi Id,ng B EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 5 26 D 1 C2L LC 6.3% $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety BrildingA EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 D D3 C2L LC 6.3% $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center C-Facility 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSFI METAL Buildingland2/Kona Community H,,pit C-F-Lity 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 13 C1L MC 26.4% $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Psychiatric Facility/Kona Community Ho C-Fa,jlity 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C21F MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Special Services euilding/Kona Communl C-Facility 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C2L MC 264% $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Hale Ho'ola Hamakua C-Facility 40.8%1 $7,481,502 3 32 D DA RM1L ITS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 151 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center C-F-Illy 40.79/6 $1,110,051 22 33 D 12 RM1L LS 35.49/6 $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation Hdir.pter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,7091 4SI 34 DI 2.61 S31 ITS 4.8%1 $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Central Flre Station Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 ITS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Extended Care Facj li[y/Hilo Medical Ce C-Facdjty 39.9% $3,021,799 9 36 D O.7 RM1L PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL Acute Care Facility/Hilo Medical Cente C-Facdjty 39.7%$33,431,818 1 37 D 33 C2M MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBM BUR Maintenance Building/Hilo Medical Cent C-Facility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 12 RM2L PC 8.1% $393,177 25 46 48 MECBL METAL Keauhou-Kona FireStation FireStation 37.656 $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM1L LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Waimea FireStation FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D DA RM21- LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBLI SPM Naalehu EMS C-F-lily 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 1.4 Wl PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSFI METAL Waimea PoIlceStation(Kamuela Police St PoIlceStation 34.7% $622,439 321 42 ❑ 12 RM11L LC 28.6% $512,443 20 241 24 MECBL BUR Kona PoIlce Station(Kealakehe Police St PoIlceStation 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 ❑ 2.2 C1L MC 14.5%1 $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Pahoa Fire Station FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 D 1.4 Wl LS 8.1% $64,151 50 48 43 WSFI METAL Kona Police Station Generator RUilding( Police5tation 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM1L LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR North Hawaii Community Hospital C-Facility 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 20.2% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Infusion Cen ter/Kona Community H-ILL, C-F-Iily 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 43 Wl LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 8 WSFI METAL Naalehu Fire Station Vehicle5hed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSFI METAL Radiation Oncology/Kona Community HOSp Car,F,,lllty 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL Central Flre Station Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 50 D 1.7 RM1L ITS 6.9% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna Lani Fi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 ❑ 12 RM1L ITS 162% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Waikoloa FireStation Fire Station 224% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 RM1L ITS 162% $269,018 35 36 37 MECRL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cent, Emergency Ctr 22.09/6 $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 C2L MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Laupahoehoe Volunteer Fjre Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 54 D 3.9 Wl PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSFI METAL La upahoehoe Police Station(North Hilo P Police5tation 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 Wl PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSFI METAL Hawaiian Acres Volunteer Flre Station a n FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl ITS 20.7% $57,180 52 31 26 WSFI METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 57 D 4.2 RM1L HC 19.4% $327,845 31 34 34 MECBLI METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station VehlcleS Po1ice5tat1on 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSFI METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61 59 ❑ 63 Wl ITS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSFI METAL Honokaa Fire Station FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSFI METAL North Kohala Police Station(Kapaau Poll Police5tation 13.2% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM1L LS 21.2% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Kau Hospital Ca reFa,)lty 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 1 .S C2L PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 63 D 4.2 RM1L HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Laupahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 ❑ 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSFI METAL North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus BUi, FireStation 3.2% $5,522 66 65 D 1.4 Wl LS 47.1% $81,316 48 11 9 WSFI METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 Wl IS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSFI I METAL 18-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-4. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic hurricane event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Earthquake Probabilistic Senario(750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario(1000 year return Vulnerability List period) period) atetl atetl5 $Loss %Loss -1 FEMA Budding n st% $LOSS %Loss 9ullding eufld ing Na me escrlptton Es%r- Score vel st.$LOSS J-Rank Building land 2/Kona COmmunitV HOSpit CareFacllirV 45.6%512,336,068 Rant Ran29 TvPeB 13 TV CIL Le MC 26.4% $7,149,901 Rant Ra 26 27 CECBL TSPM Fscute Care Facility/Hilo Medical Cente CareFacility 39.7%533,431,818 1 37 D 33 C2M MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBM BUR Hale HO'ola Hamakua CareFacility 40.8% $7,481,502 3 32 D 0.9 RM11L LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFacility 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 202% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kau Hospital CareFacility 12.39% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C21- PC 33.19/6 $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Psychiatric Facility/Kona Community HO CareFacility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3J C21L MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Special Services Building/Kona COmmuni CareFacility 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21L MC 26.4% $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Kohala Hospital CareFacility 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 D 0.7 RM11L PC 21.2% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Kona Police Station(Kealakehe Police St Po11ce5tat1on 33.9% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 CIL MC 14.5% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center CareFacility 40.7% $1,110,051 22 33 D 1.7 RM1L LS 35.4% $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Extended Care Facility/Hilo Medical Ce CareFacility 39.8% $3,021,799 9 36 ❑ 0.7 RM1L PC 112% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL VAOUtpatient Clinic/Hilo M edical Cent CareFacility 49.59% $2,887,890 10 22 D 19 RM21- LS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Naalehu EMS CareFacility 36.09% $397,626 38 41 D 1.4 Wl PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSFI METAL Hawaiian Cc-View Estates Flre Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 ] 12 SPMBS METAL Hawaii Public Safety BUildingA EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 ❑ 03 C2L LC 6.3% $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety BUildwgB EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 S 261 DI 11 C2L LCI 6.3% $681,583 161 S11 54 MECBL BUR Hamakua Police Station Po11ce5tat1on 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 CIL PC 35.S% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Waimea FireStation FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM21- LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM La upahoehoe Police Station(NOrth Hilo P Po11ce5tation 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 W1 PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSFI METAL Waimea Police Station(Kamuela Police St Po1ice5tat1on 34J9% $622,439 32 42 D 13 RM11- LC 28.69% $512,443 20 24 24 MECBL BUR Keauhou-Kona Fire Station FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 ❑ 1.2 RM11L LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL La upahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 D 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSFI METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSF11 METAL Kau Police Station(Naalehu Police Stati Po11ce5tation 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 RM11L LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Maintenance Building/Hilo Medical Cent CareFacility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 1.7 RM2L PC 8.1% $393,177 25 461 48 MECBL METAL Kona Civi c Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D 0.7 CIL PC 31.6% $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Central Fire Station Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Kona Civi c Center Police Station Po11ce5tat1on 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM11L PC 26.7% $368,258 28 25 25 MECBL METAL Hale HOOla/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 48.S% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM1L LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus Bull ding(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2-361 $273,710 421 57 D 4.2 RM11L HC 194% $327,845 31 34 341 MECBL METAL Infusion Center/Kona Community Hospita CareFacility 272% $187,975 48 47 B 43 W1 LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 8 WSFI METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna lani Fi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 D 12 RM1L LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Radiation Oncology/Kona Community HOSp CareFacility 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 S2 D 1.8 RM11L LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSFI METAL North Kohala Police Station(Kapaau Pali Po11ce5tation 13.2% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM11L LS 21.2% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Kau ma na FireStation FireStation 66.356 $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM1L PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 WI LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSFI METAL Central FireStation FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C21- PC 6.39% $215,300 401 531 57 CECBLI BUR Laundry Building/Hilo M edical Center CareFacility 49.59% $1,349,815 19 23 D 03 RM21- LC 7.99% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Naalehu Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 481 D1 4.41 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSFI METAL Kau Fire Station(Pahala Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 ❑ 1.7 RM11L LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL La upahoehoe Volunteer Flre Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 S4 D 3.9 Wl PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSFI METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station VehicleS Po11ce5tation 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSFI METAL Maintenance Office/Hilo Medical Center Care Facility 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D as W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Civil Defense Emerg...VOperatlOns Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 CIL MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus BUil FireStation 3.2% $5,522 661 65 D 1.4 W1 LS 47.1% $81,316 48 11 9 WSFI METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.S% $30,922 61 S9 D 63 W11 LAI 39.9%1 $79,794 49 131 11 WSF11 METAL Pahoa Fire Station FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 D 1.4 Wl LS 8.1% $64,151 50 48 43 WSFI METAL Kau Police Station Generator RUilding(N Police5tation 73.3% $151,733 SO 101 DI 22 RM1L LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBL METAL Hawaiian A,-Volunteer Fire Station a n FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl LS 207% $57,180 52 31 26 WSFI METAL Pahoa Police Station Po1ice5tat1on 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 Wi PC 14.69/6 $55,572 53 39 33 WSFI METAL Kawailani FireStation FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D iJ RM1L PC 4.29/6 $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 63 D 4.2 RM11L HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Stationand Police Station PollceStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 S D 0.7 RM11L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire S tationand Police Station FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM11L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Waiakea Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.S%l $29,510 581 SSI 57 SPMBS METAL Waiakea Fire Station Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 ❑ 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kona Police Station Generator Building( Po11ce5tation 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM1L LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D&7R PC 4J% $16,349 61 57 45 WSFI METAL Kawailani Flre Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSFI METAL Hawa iian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 ❑ PC 4.7% $13,897 63 S7 45 WSFI METAL Central Fire Station Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 SO D LS 6.9% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Station Vehicle Shed Fire Station 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau Police Station Vehicl a Shed Police5tation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSFI METAL 18-17 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-5. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic hurricane event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Earthquake Probabilistic Senario(750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario(1000 year return Vulnerability List period) period) atetl atetl5 $toss %Loss -1 FEMA euilding n st.% $toss %Loss 9ullding eufld ing Na me escrlptton Es%r- Score vel st.$LOSS U-Rank La upahoehoe Police Sta tion(NOrth Hi 1,P PollceStatlon 19.1% $131,983 as 53 Ran54 TyPD 1.4 Ty Wl Le PC 83.9% $578,948 Ra 19 aaak1 1 TWSFl METAL Laupahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 D 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSF1 METAL Laupahoehoe Volunteer Fire Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 S4 D 3.9 Wl PC ]6.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSF1 METAL Naalehu EMS C-Facility 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 14 Wl PC 692% $763,653 13 4 4 WSF1 METAL Naalehu Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSFl METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station Vehi,I,S Police5tation 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSF1 METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSF1 METAL nfusion Cen ter/Kona Community Hospita CareFacillty 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 4.3 Wl LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 a WSF1 METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 Wl LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSF1 METAL North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus BUil FireStation 32% $5,522 66 65 D 14 Wl LS 47.1% $51,316 48 11 9 WSF1 METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61 59 ❑ 63 Wl LS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSFl METAL Hawaiian Ocean View Estates FireStation FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kau Fire St.-nApparatus BUilding(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Hamakua Pollee Station Police5tation 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 C1L PC 35.5% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Hale HO'ola Hamakua CareFacillty 40.8% $7,481,502 3 32 D DO RM1L LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center CareFacillty 40.7% $1,110,051 22 331 D 1.71 RM1L LS 35.4% $965,139 10 161 14 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D 0.7 C1L PC 31.6% $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Kau Hospital C-Facility 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C21- PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Keauhou-Kona Fire Station FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM1L LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Kau Polce Station(Naalehu Police Stati Po1ice5tat1on 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 RM1L LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Sta tion(Pahala Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 ❑ 1.7 RM1L LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau PoIlce Station Generator BUllding(N Police5tation 73.3% $151,733 50 10 D 2.2 RM1L LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBLI METAL Waimea Fire Station FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM21L LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM Waimea Police Station(Kamuela Police St Po11ce5tation 34,7%1 $622,439 321 42 D1 1.7 RM11L LCI 28,6%1 $512,443 201 24 24 MECBL BUR Kona Civic Center Po1ice5tation Po11ce5tation 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM1L PC 26.7% $368,258 28 251 25 MECBL METAL Hawai ian ACres Volunteer Fire Station a n FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl LS 20.7% $57,180 52 31 26 WSFl METAL Buildingland2/Kona Community HOSpit C-Facility 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 13 C1L MC 26.4% $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Psychiatric Facility/Kona COmmdnl ty HO C-Facility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C21L MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Special Services Building/Kona COmmuni CareFacillty 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21L MC 26.4% $1,619,632 ] 28 2] CECBL METAL Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center CareFacillty 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSP1 METAL North Kohala Police Station(Kapaau Poli Po11ce5tation 132% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM11L LS 212% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Kohala Hospital CareFacillty 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 D 0.7 RM1L PC 212% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Pahoa Police Station Po11ce5tation 66.7% $253,180 44 12 DI 4.41 Wl PC 14.6-/61 $55,572 53 39 33 WSFl METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 57 D 4.2 RM11L HC 19.4% $327,845 31 341 34 MECBL METAL Radiation oncology/Kona Community HOSp CareFacillty 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFacillty 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 20.2% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna La ni Pi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 D 1.2 RM11L LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 RM1L LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Kona Police Station(Kealakehe Police St Po11ce5tation 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 C1L MC 14.5% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Maintenance Office/W,Medical Center Ca reFaci l i ty 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D 03 W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Kaumana Fire Station FireStation 66.39% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM11- PC 13.99% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL VA tpOti en[Clinic/H I I o M ed i ca l Cen t Care Facillty 49.5% $2,887,890 10 22 ❑1 10 RM21L LS 13.9%1 $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Pahoa Flre Station FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 ❑ 1.4 Wl LS 8.1% $64,1S11 50 481 43 WSF1 METAL Extended Care Facility/Hilo Medical Ce CareFacillty 39.8% $3,021,799 9 36 D 0.7 RM11L PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 Wl PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 Wl PC 4.7% $13,897 63 57 45 WSFl METAL Kona Police Station Generator Building( Po11ce5tat1on 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM11- LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Maintenance Building/Hilo Medical Cent C-Facility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 1.7 RM2L PC 8.1% $393,177 25 46 48 MECBL METAL Hale HOOla/Hilo Medical Center CareFacillty 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM1L LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Kawailani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D 2.6 S3 MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSF1 METAL Laundry Building/Hilo Medical Center CareFacillty 49.5% $1,349,815 19 23 DI 071 RM2L LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Central Fire Station Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 S9 SO D 17 RM1L LS 6.8% $13,045 641 SO 52 MECBL METAL Central FireStation Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Hawaii Public Safety BUildingA EmergencyCtr 46.39/6 $5,049,757 4 26 D 03 C2L LC 6.39/6 $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety BUildingB EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 S 26 D 1 C2L LC 6.3% $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR Acute Care Facility/Hilo Medical Cente CareFacillty 39.7%$33,431,818 1 37 D 33 C2MI MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBMI BUR Central FireStation FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C21L PC 6.3% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Waiakea FireStation Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.8% $29,510 58 SS 57 SPMBS METAL Waiakea Fire Station Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 ❑ 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kawailani FireStation Fire Station 76.5% $845,0361 28 51 DI 1.7 RM1L PCI 4.2%1 $45,950 541 59 60 MECBL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 T5D 4.6 C2L MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Keaau Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 2.6 S3 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau Police Station Vehicle Shed Police5tation 53.2% $128,379 54 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSF1 METAL Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 4.2 RM1L HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Stationand Police Station Police5tation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 0.] RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Stationand Police Station FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 0.7 RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL is-is Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.8 University of Hawaii Study As part of the State of Hawaii hazard mitigation plan the vulnerability of all buildings within the University of Hawaii system were assessed. Average annual losses were computed for hurricane, earthquake, and flood hazards on each campus. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 18-5 and Figure 18-6. More detailed site specific modeling was conducted to rank each building on each campus in terms of the expected losses and loss of functionality due to probabilistic earthquake, hurricane, and flood scenarios. For simplicity, the buildings of both the UH Hilo and Hawaii CC campuses were included in one rank list, this list is shown in Table 18-6. CUH Man❑a Honolulu CC Leeward CC KapiolaniCC,$398,539,4% ■H❑naluiucc $352,869 $202,502 Windward CC oLeewar❑CC 5% 3% $144,233 Kauai CC 2% $139,564 OKapl❑lanl CC 2% mWlnd—d CC - Maui CC NKWal Cc $219,670 ■Maul CC 3% netherF-11Ne5 Wd Genera'F-IrNes ■UHHiimHavaii CC Other Facilities and General Facilities $994.084 14% UH Manoa $3,545,826 51% HUH Hilo/Hawaii CC $1,075,816 16% Annual Losses All Hazards, All Buildings Figure 18-5. University of Hawaii AAL losses per campus UH Hilo&Hawaii Community College-Annual Losses $50,000;5% 169,378 16% •Hurricane •Earthquake Flood Figure 18-6. Annual losses per hazard for UH Hilo and Hawaii CC 18-19 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-6. Vulnerability r nking of UH Hilo and Hawaii CC facilities UH Hilo&Hawaii CC-Building Vulnerability List Total Number of Campus Buildings- 132 00-year Hurricane Event Vulnerability Loss o Loss of Modeled $Loss Risk Functi Modeled $Loss Risk Functionality Building Buildin $Loss Percentile (NUm. Iding$Loss Percentile (Num.of Days) UHH-LEARNING RESOURCES CENTER $ 8,376,291 >95% 82 $ 3,374,601 >95% 28 UHH-UCB $ 7,765,196 >95% 190 $ 2,759,306 >95% 28 UHH-WENTWORTH HALL $ 7,041,499 >95% >90 $ 975,155 90-95% 44 UHH-THEATER $ 6,559,633 >95% >90 $ 900,880 90-95% 28 UHH-LIFE SCIENCE COMPLEX $ 6,194,326 >95% >90 $ 1,024,260 90-95% 57 UHH-BUS ED/COMPUTER CTR $ 5,476,613 >95% >90 $ 794,824 85-90% 44 o UHH-HALE KAUANOE-DORM II $ 4,992,235 90-95% >90 $ 1,330,454 90-95% 31 o UHH-CAMPUS CENTER BUILDING $ 4,948,361 90-95% >90 $ 1,758,364 >95% 28 v UHH-BUSINESS OFFICE $ 4,554,295 90-95% >90 $ 1,244,384 90-95% 57 0 UHH-KANAKA'OLE HALL(EKH) $ 4,339,733 90-95% 82 $ 2,023,685 >95% 31 z UHH-HALE KEHAU DORMITORY $ 3,754,989 90-95% 41 $ 611,100 80-85% 80 m HAW CC-CAFETERIA $ 3,496,075 90-95% >90 $ 736,298 85-90% 57 BANK OF HAWAII BLDG DOWNTOWN HILO $ 3,276,531 90-95% >90 $ 679,581 80-85% 49 UHH-HALE KANILEHUA DORMITORY $ 2,181,045 85-90% >90 $ 1,398,069 90-95% 131 Kukahauula Institute of Astronomy $ 1,811,419 80-85% 22 $ 3,342,365 >95% 47 UHHilo Musuem and Astronomy Building $ 1,699,836 80-85% 22 $ 4,577,015 >95% 100 Panaewa-Covered Equine Arena $ 191,714 1501/ 21 $ 933,623 90-95% 280 UHH-STUDENT SERVICES $ 3,244,905 85-90% >90 $ 472,289 70-75% 28 UHH-MARINE SCIENCE BUILDING $ 3,031,175 85-900A >90 $ 661,690 80-85% 57 >, HAW CC-TRADE&INDUS/LABS $ 1,481,454 80-850A >90 $ 591,631 80-85% 100 HAW CC-TRADE&INDUS/LABS $ 1,481,454 80-85% >90 $ 591,631 80-85% 100 c HAW CC-CARPENTRY SHOP B $ 1,411,915 80-85% >90 $ 548,605 75-80% 100 HAW CC-Agricultural Mechanics&Biology Lab $ 1,074,382 70-75% >90 $ 429,064 70-75% 100 3 HAW CC-Learning Center&IT Support $ 1,074,382 70-75% >90 $ 429,064 70-75% 100 c HAW CC-Auxilary Services Shops $ 1,002,664 70-75% >90 $ 389,589 60-701/ 100 HAW CC-Administration&Student Services $ 821,766 70-75% >90 $ 181,186 50-60% 31 UHH-HALE IKENA,B $ 386,633 50-60% >90 $ 606,652 80-851/ 322 m HAW CC-CAS,ART LABS $ 217,403 1501/ 57 $ 236,740 50-60% 211 = Fish Hatchery Greenhouse $ 490,991 50-60% 39 $ 697,833 85-90% 129 Pearl Hatchery Greenhouse $ 490,991 50-60% 39 $ 697,833 85-901/ 129 HAW CC-OCET&Financial Aid $ 75,389 150% 22 $ 247,113 50-60% 239 Based on the results of this analysis a more specific assessment of the highest ranked buildings can be conducted to determine the benefit/cost ratio of any potential retrofits. 18.1.9 Warning Sirens and Evacuation System Sudden-onset hazards such as earthquakes and local tsunamis occur with little or no warning. For most other hazards, an effective warning system requires a reliable forecasting system. The County relies on the following sources for forecasting of the various hazards: • Tsunami-- The Federal Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC), based on Oahu, provides capable warning for distant tsunamis. Figure 18-7 illustrates the warning procedure. The system has never missed warning of a damaging tsunami since its beginning in 1947, but has caused a number of unneeded evacuations. 18-20 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment POSSIBLE TSUNAMI -•450mph y 0-0 TIDE GAUGE �0 }D 7Mf7f� GROUND WAVE SEISMOGRAPH 5m" EARTHOVAKE � CHECK S REPORTS DES IS REPORTS OUT MAG?77 6 PTWC IN W/ETA WATCH 3 5mm. NO ■ ESS IGNORE lnl 7 DECISION YES CIVIL EVAC- ? TSUNAMI? DEFENSE UATION NO 3hr CANCEL SIRENS WATCH Tsunami Warning System Flow Chart HOW DOES THE TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM WORK? When a significant earthqualae(1)occurs in the Pacific,it is detected(2)at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center(PTWC)in Ewa Beach,Oahu. Five geophysicists man the Center around the clock. If the magnitude I'3)is greater than 7,the epicenter is located. If the epicenter is in an area lilzely to cause a tsunami,a tsunami warning{a is sent to nearby coasts and a tsunami watch is set for areas with a travel time more than three hours away. Messages are sent to tide observers for a report on the first wave,(S)and telemetered water level gages are checlaed. In addition,the earthquahe's moment is calculated. The geophysicists(S)quickly review the earthquake and sea level data and historical information to decide if a warning is needed for areas currently under a watch condition. If hazardous waves are predicted(7),the warning is sent to emergency officials across the Pacific at least three hours ahead of the first wave (the speed of the waves has been pre-calculated for all areas). People can then be cleared from all coastal areas(S)that might be hit by the waves. I Red numbers correspond to numbers on the Tsunami Warning 5ystem Flow Chart Figure 18-7. Pacific Tsunami Warning System • Flooding(rainfall, high waves) and Hurricanes--National Weather Service Forecast Office (NWS) • Lava flow--Hawaiian Volcano Observatory,U.S. Geological Survey The warnings from the PTWC and NWS are issued as a "watch" and/or a "warning" to the County Civil Defense Agency. The Civil Defense activates the sirens to alert people to seek further information from the ra- dio or TV. The Civil Defense transmits warnings to the public through the Emergency Alert System, which consists of simultaneous broadcasts over all radio and television stations. An 18-21 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment effective public education program ensures a calm, organized, and efficient response to the warnings. The County currently has 68 sirens and 12 simulators in operation around the island. Simula- tors provide a signal to manned stations where personnel are utilized to disperse the warning, these are shown in Figure 18-9. Sirens have an effective average range of one-half mile. Sirens are critical for populated coastal areas for tsunami warnings. Figure 18-8 shows the deficiencies in the coverage of coastal areas. I • p • • ,t:' • t. - Civil Defense Sirens with 1/2 Mile Buffer Figure 18-8. Civil Defense Warning Sirens and Evacuation Routes 18-22 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Hawaii Hilo• Honokohau §�Old Kona Airport 1�Pahoehoe 1•Kahaluu Ka oho • Ahalagui Pohoiki §6 Napoopoo Opihikau Honaunau Keahou Apua Halape Kaaha . AL A oil Milolii Punaluu Honuapo 0; -Cellular Runup Detector • Satellite Runup Detector �-Sea Level Gauge Figure 18-9. Site locations for Cellular Run-up Detectors(CRD's),Satellite Run-up Detectors(SRD's),and Pacific Tsunami Warning Center sea level gauges Police, fire and other emergency vehicles equipped with siren and PA equipment will sound and broadcast warnings in areas to be evacuated,particularly in affected areas not covered by the CD sirens or in radio reception "dead spots". The Civil Air Patrol, County, military and private helicopters provide warnings to isolated areas. 18.1.10 Critical Lifeline Infrastructure Facilities A community's infrastructure provides services, utilities and linkages which allow society to function. The term"lifelines" is commonly used for this infrastructure and can be defined as systems or networks which provide for the circulation of people, goods, services and information,upon which health, safety, comfort and economic activity depends. Lifelines are the means whereby a community supports its day to day activities and include mechanisms used to respond to emergencies. During and after hazard events, the Big Island's 'lifelines' are vulnerable to disruption and/or damage. These systems are often large, complex and interdependent. Failure of one system (or part of it) causes repercussions in other systems and therefore increases a community's vulnerability further. For example, the vulnerability of the Port of Hilo, a transportation component, could affect the entire island's energy and transportation system since all propane, diesel, gasoline, and fuel oil for the island is supplied through this one location with no alternate. When stored fuel is used up, 18-23 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1s:Risk Assessment transportation would falter first; eventually, the electrical supply for the island would be reduced to geothermal (about 20% of the usual total) and hydro power (less than 5%). Most water and sewage systems would halt as would most communication systems. This section will assess the vulnerability for the following lifelines: • Transportation systems -- harbors, airports, roads and bridges, buses, automobile rental agencies • Energy systems--electrical/fuel, gas • Communication systems -- telecommunication networks, cell phone sites, radio transmitters • Water systems-- County water system • Wastewater systems --County sewerage system 18.1.10.1 Transportation 18.1.10.1.1 Harbors Hawaii island has two deep-draft harbors with port facilities that enable large ships to dock and unload: Hilo Port and Kawaihae Port (see Figure 18-10). For island communities, the resilience of port facilities is crucial to efficient post-disaster recovery since this is the entry point for bulk supplies and heavy equipment. 18-24 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 'l 1 [l Harbor © Airport Asset within Tsunami Evacuation &100 or 500 Year Flood Zone Major Roads Figure 18-10. Harbors and Airports The Hilo and Kawaihae Ports compare as follows: Table 18-7. Hilo and Kawaihae Port Facilities Hilo Kawaihae Wharf length 2700 1600 Cargo embarked(tons annually) 1,500,000 1,000,000 Storage(1000 sf) 122 23 -sheds -open 680 427 Passengers 3000(in a day) 200 if needed(no terminal) Fuel handling all types very limited Relative vulnerability -tsunami more less -hurricane less more Earthquake/Liquefaction more more 18-25 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment While the basic cargo capability of both ports is redundant, Kawaihae does not handle passengers nor large amounts of fuel. Some basic fuel manifolds were installed at Kawaihae several years ago but capped off for future use.90 One gasoline supplier(Union/Costco) does use one intake to supply their service station. Most of the fuel tanks at the harbor are supplied by trucks from Hilo, and have a capacity of 814,000 gallons which is about a 60 days' supply for the current users. Both ports are subject to tsunami and hurricane surge. However, it is very unlikely that both ports would be severely damaged by the same event, but probable that both could receive some damage, one more than the other. The harbor master does not know of any specific hardening methods nor of any such plans by the State DOT. Passenger ships can simply be diverted from this island while any in port upon a tsunami warning will put to sea and can then proceed to an undamaged port. In case of a tsunami or hurricane threat, any passengers unable to board in time for sailing will be kept on their busses and sent to shelters specified by Civil Defense. For information on the Port of Kawaihae, and the damage it suffered during the Oct. 2006, Kiholo Bay Earthquake, see Section 7.2.1.1. 18.1.10.1.2 Airports and Landing Strips Hawaii Island has four public airports-- two primary commercial airports with the ability to receive large carriers (Hilo and Kona International Airports) and two smaller airports (Waimea-Kohala and Upolu Airports). Upolu Airport is not heavily used for passenger or cargo. None of the airports are located in a tsunami evacuation zone, flood zone, or high-hazard lava flow zone. The terminals are not considered satisfactory for hurricane sheltering. They would depend on tout- busses to move people to Civil Defense-specified shelters. The Hilo terminal and related functions can run for 47 hours at full capacity (78 at 50%) from the fuel with the emergency generator. The FAA tower,which is separate, can operate at full capacity for at least three days around the clock, and possibly for 12 days. In an emergency, the basic control functions of the tower can be handled by portable radio equipment from any location in the airport area. In addition to the main 10,000 ft. runway, Hilo has a second runway 5600 ft long which easily handles inter island airliners. The Kona airport has similar backup capabilities, except for having just one runway of 11,000 ft and handles more passengers (1.3 million vs. 800 thousand enplaned for Hilo). The Waimea-Kohala airport has minimal passenger capability but with a 5600 ft runway can handle interisland aircraft if needed. There are numerous military and civil heliports around the island. The National Guard has six large (12 passenger) helicopters at Hilo, which the Governor can make available for emergency use and can fly to Oahu nonstop. The County has two smaller ones, and the tour industry has over 20; none can go as far as Oahu without refueling. 90 Ian Birnie,Harbor master,personal communications,September 2003. 18-26 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment The Army has an airport at Pohakuloa training area, with a runway 3600 ft long. It is of little value for supply or evacuation due to the remote location and short runway combined with the elevation of 6000 ft. Airline fuel is loaded only in Honolulu. Fuel for smaller aircraft and helicopters could become a problem when tank trucks are emptied if the storage tanks are unable to refill them. There are about eight small (ranch and crop duster) airstrips around the island. Civil Defense has a map of them, as they are no longer shown on aviation maps. 18.1.10.1.3 Roads and Bridges The major arterial highway system circles the island with a mix of State and County jurisdic- tion (see Figure 18-11). However, during emergency evacuations, the County police control all State highways or County roads, assisted by the Department of Public Work's pre-planned barricade system. Barricade locations are shown in the tsunami evacuation maps. If a bridge or crossing on a State highway is damaged or threatened, the County will respond during the emergency to determine whether to close and to designate alternate bypass routes. During the recovery phase, the State and County cooperate in clearing and restoring roads around the is- land. 18-27 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Pik Source: CeIISUS BUI-CaU PDC(Pacific Disaster Center) County of Hawaii • Bridges Accuracy: Roads USGS Quad Major Roads Figure 18-11. Roads and Bridges Roads and bridges may be (and have been) affected completely by stream flooding,tsunamis, earthquakes, and landslides. The 7.2 magnitude Halape earthquake in 1975 not only damaged roads in the Volcano area but caused landslides that affected the highway at Laupahoehoe and Honomu.91 The heavy rain and flooding in November 2001 completely blocked a major road in Hilo and the only highway through Ka'u. The tsunami of 1946 ruined the railroad bridges at Wailuku River and Kolekole stream(the railroad right-of-way is now highway 19). Several bridges on this coast are now being reinforced against earthquake damage which may also make them more resistant to tsunami or hurricane storm surge. Ali'i Drive in Kailua is susceptible to these hazards but there are alternate routes. Figure 18-11 identifies the bridges on the major roads. Future updates to this plan will identify road segments and bridges that are within the VE zone (at risk to tsunami and hurricane surge), the bridges that have been or are programmed for reinforcement, and the highway segments that have experienced past closure from landslides with no alternate routes. Key repairs were made after the 2001 flood to bridges that have required repetitive repairs. 91 USGS 18-28 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment The 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake had a relatively minor impact on the roads and bridges in Hawaii County. Although rock and soil slides in cuts above roadways were numerous, damage to road embankments and pavements was less prevalent, with a few exceptions (Figure 18-12). The most dramatic of these was the collapse of half of the roadway at Mile 35 on Highway 19 near Pa`auilo,resulting in the closure of one lane of traffic (Figure 18-13). This was caused by failure of a 20-foot high embankment and rock wing wall on the approach to a concrete girder bridge. The cast-in-situ concrete girder bridge is supported on rock wall abutments. The bridge suffered no damage but the adjacent embankment failed. The wing wall consisted of mortared rock and was approximately 14 inches thick. Because of the lack of redundancy in the highway system on the Island of Hawaii, road closures due to rockfalls, landslides or embankment slope instability can have a significant effect on emergency response and economic recovery efforts. For a number of hours after the earthquakes, the area of North Kohala, including the town of Hawi, was cut off from the rest of the island because of road closures on Highways 250 and 270, the only access roads to this region. Fortunately, the rockfalls and landslides caused by these earthquakes could be cleared relatively easily, and all roadways on the Island of Hawaii were open to at least one-lane traffic within two days of the earthquakes. 18-29 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment ���i. .ice •.-� Figure 18-12. Road damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake 1 r Figure 18-13. Bridge embankment Damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake Tn many districts a scarcity of access roads creates a problem should lava flows, storms or earthquakes, sever these roads. For example, Highways 11 and 190 are the primary roads in Kona and they are sub-parallel to the coast and vulnerable to the lava hazard. Only a second- ary road provides access to the ocean in South Kona where the lava flow hazard is highest. This and other more minor roads may be essential in the evacuation of people to the ocean. Future updates to this plan will identify critical road segments that require hardening or an emergency bypass. 18-30 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.11 Energy Systems 18.1.11.1 Electrical/Feel The Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc. (HELCO) operates the electrical system on this is- land. The electrical system consists of power generating plants, substations, and transmission lines (see Figure 18-14). HELCO power plants are located at Keahole,North Kona, Waimea, South Kohala, Waiakea Peninsula and Kanoclehua, South Hilo, and Keaau, Puna. Generating plants rely on petroleum to produce 75% of the power, with the balance generated from renewable sources such as geothermal, hydroelectric, and wind. Should the supply of petroleum become a problem, HELCO has fuel storage to generate power from oil for an average 30 days, per a PUC requirement. The fuel tanks are at the Hilo base and located out of flood,tsunami, and lava hazard zones. All major transmission lines are overhead. 18-31 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment ® Electric Substations Figure 18-14. Electrical Substations One generation station (Waiakea) is in a tsunami/hurricane flood zone. This is not a signifi- cant problem since its capacity is only 15 MW and adequate generation is available in safer locations. The major risk(in addition to fuel supply) is damage to transmission lines by hurri- cane winds, possible earthquake shaking or lava flow. Two transmission lines to the Kona side run along the Saddle Road and are in or near lava flow zone 2, from Mauna Loa. HELCO has a modem remote switching system, as well as a remote sensing and control dispatch system, to work around limited damage areas or resolve and restore service, but lacks generation capacity on the Kona side. If that side of the island is isolated, only 25% of normal usage can be supplied.92 92 Personal communication with Jay Ignacio,HELCO. 18-32 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.11.2 Gas Propane gas is widely used on the Island of Hawaii. Public Utilities Commision regulates 67 miles of gas mains and service lines on the Big Island. These lines serve approximately 1,600 customers and are located mainly in Hilo. In addition, approximately 9,300 customers throughout the county are provided gas service by tank or cylinder. The Public Utilities Commission does not regulate this type of service. Major liquid propane gas substations on the island of Hawaii are located in Hilo, Kailua-Kona, Waimea, and Ka'u. 18.1.12 Communication Systems The basic communication system for the island is the Verizon(formerly Hawaiian Telephone Co.) wire, standard and optical cable connections. The County has an extensive radio repeater and microwave-linked system which serves the police and fire department mobile units via VHF frequencies (see Figure 18-15). VHF frequencies are limited to line-of-sight contact. Hawaiian Electric has a private radio, microwave, and leased phone line system which has some interconnection with the County system. The television cable company (Time-Warner) provides video service around the island which includes high speed data service supplying Internet service for homes and offices. 18-33 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment I.A A 50 1 / :y Microwave Only As set located in volcanic y Hazard Zone 2 Asset within FIRM 100 or Repeater Only 500Year Flood Zone Asset located within Volcanic Repeater & Microwave 41 HazardZone 1 Figure 1S-15. Communication Systems. Two primary cellular phone networks serve the island: AT&T and Verizon. Coverage is nec- essarily concentrated in populated areas and some highways. It is important to note that the cellular network depends on the land line phone system for interconnections and cannot func- tion without working telephone service. Interisland phone service is now provided exclusively by underwater optical fiber cable. The State has a digital microwave link. There is no interisland satellite service. Figure 18-16 shows the cables in place as of 1996. While cables have broken from hurricane surge (Hurricane Iwa, at Makaha, Oahu), it appears that there is ample redundancy in the present cable array. Telephone (including cell phones), emergency services radios, and interisland communica- tions are vulnerable not only to long-term power failure (Verizon says most exchanges will 18-34 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment last only a day on their battery power but diesel service will last 72 hours 93) but especially to hurricane, earthquake, and in a few locations, tsunami, lava flow, and landslide damage. In Hurricane Iwa, five undersea cables near the Oahu coast were broken. In Hurricane Iniki, all communications were lost until one portable radio channel was put in use. Even when radio amateurs were able to set up temporary antennas and communicate, lack of telephone connection remained a major problem of having communications with all vital locations. The Civil Defense EOC includes radio systems for amateur and Civil Air Patrol use, as well as police and fire. It has backup propane generators and tanks for at least four days of service, but may be extended to two weeks. For new telecommunication towers, the Planning Department requires the submittal of "Building plans for the tower, certified by a licensed structural engineer, verifying that the tower, together with the initial antennas and other equipment proposed to be installed thereon,will have a hard survivability for sustained winds of one hundred miles per hour.-94 Communication Networks, January 1996 Kauai \ \ \\ �♦O'ahu \ ` \ C ♦\ ------ ♦[ � r 1 Maui GTE fiber optic ------ --r GTE microwave r i Distance Education �\ % Skybridge ------ \ t HITS State digital microwave k I-net fiber ------ Figure 18-16. Communications Network. Source:Juvik,S.&J.Juvik,Attas of Hawaii,University of Hawaii Press,1998,p.274 93 Personal communication with Duane Miyashiro,Manager,Verizon. 94 Hawaii County Code section 25-2-74. 18-35 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.13 Water Systems Domestic water systems on this island include the County water system, private water systems (e.g., Waikoloa), and individual water catchments. Besides domestic uses, water is essential for fire fighting. Since the County water system serves a majority of the island's population and would be relied upon by non-County users during emergencies, the resilience of the County's system is the focus of disaster mitigation. The County water system consists of source, storage, and transmission facilities (transmission lines and booster pump stations). The GIS inventory of the water system facilities is in progress. The Department of Water Supply facilities are generally at small direct risk from most haz- ards other than possible leaks after an earthquake. The primary problem would be electrical supply for the pumps. More than half of the water supply is pumped, with a few small systems gravity fed(i.e.,Waimea, Honomu). None of the pump stations have backup diesels. The Department estimates that, with typical water use, their tank storage would last only a day or two.9' Water can always be trucked to areas without a functioning system. Water hauling trucks are available from the following sources: • Fire Department: ten tankers of 750 to 3500 gallon capacity, totaling 13,850 gallons, located around the island; • National Guard: four 500 gallon tankers at Hilo; • Private water haulers: There are 29 PUC-licensed trucks hauling water; most are based in Puna or Hilo. Their-capacity ranges from 2500 to 7500 gallons, with an average of---4000 gallons. Their total capacity is 1,206,000 gallons.96 Thus, the totals are 43 tank trucks and 1,221,850 gallons. Most Department of Water Supply reservoirs would normally be depleted within two days if no electricity is available for pump- ing, though there are a few gravity-fed sources such as Waimea and Honomu that could be utilized to fill tankers. However, the trucks would be dispersed by Civil Defense to serve household locations in the damaged areas rather than being used to try to refill tanks or reser- voirs, if any were available. 95 Personal communication with Glenn Al una,Engineer,Department of Water Supply. 96 Hawaii County Civil Defense,data tables. 18-36 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.14 Wastewater Systems On this island, the predominant method of wastewater disposal is onsite individual wastewater systems (i.e., cesspools or septic systems). The County sewerage system serves approximately 30% of the resident population. The priority area to sewer is the coastal areas to prevent cesspool seepage to the nearshore coastal waters. The County presently operates six sewerage systems: Hilo, Papaikou, Kulaimano, Kapehu, Kailua-Kona, and Keauhou (see Figure 18-17). During tsunamis, hurricanes, or earthquakes, disaster mitigation focuses on preventing leakage from the sewerage system. During the recovery phase, the operation of the system is not critical since portable toilets and facilities with onsite disposal are available. 18-37 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment akuea Hmstd.R Homesteatl Kaup Kulaimano System 3 w `- N mina R Kute� gno Nom Kulaimano Section in Detail a n � MR µ� WiP ` W:P 12 8 e eek Pepe ekro St. _ W .Source: _ y County of Hawaii Accuracy: N Parcel Layer Legend 'a ServicePointST ^••••FormST Parcels o ManholeST GrawtyST • OischargePointST OuttaIIST —LateralST —TreatmentST Figure 18-17. County Wastewater System. 18-38 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment The 1946 tsunami filled Hilo Bay with sewage which took weeks to flush out. Hilo's waste- water treatment plant has been relocated out of the tsunami zone. All other County treatment plants are outside the VE flood zone. However, 16 out of the 18 sewage pump stations appear to be in hazard zones. it would take careful mapping and site visits to determine with certain- ty whether such stations are at risk. All treatment plants and pump stations are designed to withstand earthquakes. All treatment plants and pump stations have standby diesel or propane generators in case of electrical failure. 18.1.15 Recovery Facilities and Capabilities Recovery involves all activities needed to provide emergency services and resumption of at least temporary normal services such as water, electricity, food distribution, and basic trans- portation. As with other aspects, these responsibilities fall under the umbrella of the County Civil Defense and are carried out by County departments,private agencies, and businesses. 18.1.16 Debris Management Removal and disposal of debris will clearly be a major problem. The island of KauaTs experience after the hurricanes showed what an extensive problem debris was, and how important its removal, storage, and disposal- temporarily or long term- is to recovery.97 Hawaii County's problem is intensified compared to the 1946 and 1960 tsunami debris clearance due to the closure of all sugar plantations. Machinery and experienced manpower from the plantations was a major factor in clean-up after those disasters.98 Hawaii County does not have a public curbside solid waste collection system. Instead, resi- dents dispose their solid waste at transfer stations located at 21 existing sites, and businesses hire private contractors who collect and dispose the waste at the landfills. The County trans- ports the solid waste from the transfer stations to two landfills: in Hilo and Puuanahulu (see Figure 18-18). Based on the existing reliance on residents to transport their solid waste to designated sites, the County's Disaster Debris Action Manual99 emphasizes the need to educate the public and businesses on post-disaster solid waste disposal practices (particularly the need to separate recyclables) and pre-arranged contracts with private contractors for emergency debris clearance and collection. None of the landfill or transfer station sites are within the flood or tsunami inundation zone. 97 For the State report on the problems and recommendations on this task,after Hurricane'Iniki,see Hawaii Disaster Debris Management Plan,prepared by IT Corporation(prime contractor)for State of Hawaii Department of Health and Civil Defense Agency,June 2000. 98 Personal and newspaper accounts at the Pacific Tsunami Museum describe the contributions of the planta- tions and the unions to recovery after tsunamis. 99 Harding ESE,County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual,prepared for the County of Hawaii, December 18,2001. 18-39 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment T '> T T T T � T ; T T T T T T T T 0 LANDFILL TRANSFER STATION TDSR TRANSFER STATION Figure 18-18. Landfills,Transfer Stations,and TDSRs. Because of the limited remaining capacity at the Hilo Landfill, a major disaster will likely overwhelm the capacity. The Hilo Landfill has an estimated remaining capacity of 400,000 cubic yards. The Puuanahulu Landfill has a remaining capacity of 14,000,000 cubic yards. The estimated generation of hurricane debris from a Category 4 storm is about 1,600,000 cu- bic yards for the South Hilo district, and about 1,800,000 cubic yards for the combined Kona and Kohala districts. The strategy, therefore, is to minimize the amount to be landfilled and thereby minimize the hauling costs from Hilo to Puuanahulu. A tentative list of priorities for debris clearing,which Civil Defense will determine according to the situation,is as follows: 1. Life Safety 2. Communications 3. Essential roadways; access 18-40 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 4. Water 5. Electricity 6. Fuel (for emergency generators; emergency and recovery vehicles) 7. Airports 8. Barge docks (including fuel manifolds). The Disaster Debris Action Manual addressed the following: • Debris Estimation. The Action Manual used spreadsheet models to estimate the quantities and composition of disaster debris generated by a hurricane, flood event, or tsunami. It did not estimate debris generation for earthquakes. A HAZUS run of the 04/02/1868 Ka'u Earthquake on the current day building inventory of Hawaii County produced debris generation of 1.27 tons. The hurricane table considers both with and without heavy rains - a factor overlooked in the hurricane studies done for Kaua'i and Oahu. • Temporary Debris Storage and Reduction (TDSR) Sites. Since the existing transfer stations will not be sufficient to handle disaster debris, TDSR sites are pre-identified areas to temporarily dispose debris. The Action Manual identified seven of the transfer stations that are large (10 acres or more) and/or have significant contiguous areas that are available for expanding to TDSR sites: Kalapana, Keaau, Waiohinu, Keei, Kailua, Waimea, and Hilo. Hilo site is in the quarry area adjacent to the landfill. The Puuanahulu Landfill has an area set aside in the landfill plan for TDSR use. A typical material processing flow for a TDSR site is shown in Figure 18-19. 18-41 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment DNSITE r--->OFrUTE Compostebles Air Curtain Indnemuw Grieenwasle Public Midable I Plc[-up of ; Herdwrwds Gtind Boilers �r Segregate r—� Metals and j -_ Markel Applonces On of QR Densty Island Mboad Aggregate Debris Mi'n'd Crush Read Base btaterias Clean Shred Landfill 'Gave Wood Nows Resoun:e Reuse — —A_* Rcusahles dmr - 'ge -- O[xn�gah-d Boxes Rausabtxt Prows for 491 S Household Trenspon Rncyc.ah:os Racyclalws - Plastic Sheeting Residues and Dis:ards Ldntlnl: Bulky Wastes i Density - Woody C8D Density _ ' Bdiers- Figure 18-19. Typical Material Process Concept for TDSR Site. Source: Harding ESE,County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual,December 18,2001. 18-42 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-IS:Risk Assessment A typical site plan is shown in Figure 18-20. ---------------------- -e. pro'essoa Rr:j_&O O.D- -1 5 Acm Wandy Ddw;s Scrap'hood 0.7 Acre Storage 0 7.4cre C&D ..... ........... Oebris G",r.Elebri, 0.4 Ac- Metal G'."' 0.5 Arre W451V Debris 0.8 Acre ................ 0.r A- A. --------- d 4 Az.. To Mar.,(els or Landfill Gafa Hcuse,'Offica Allow for quzjing 3pacc Access Road Site 1-unctions Key 1. Green Waste Data 2 Mixed C&D Program Area 6.6 Acres 3 Reusaues&Recyclable& 209E Circulation 1.3 4 Bulky Wastes Buffer 0.7 Public and Disposer Access Roads .......... ► Petirnaler Road 1.4 Perimeter Service Road ToU TDSR 10.0 Arm♦ Figure 18-20. TDSR Conceptual Site Plan. Source: Hat-ding ESE,County of Hawaii Disaster Debt-is Action Manual,December 18,2001. 18-43 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment There is a problem, however, in that some of these areas are private property and use agreements have not yet been negotiated. 44 CFR 10.8 (c) Statutory exclusions. The following actions are statutorily excluded from NEPA and the preparation of environmental impact statements and environmental assessments by section 316 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act(Stafford Act), as amended, 42 U.S.C- 5159,- 1. Action taken or assistance provided under sections 402,403,407, or 502 of the Stafford Act; and 2. Action taken or assistance provided under section 406 of the Stafford Act that has the effect of restoring facilities as they existed before a major disaster or emergency Actions falling within the bounds of these Statutory Exclusions are exempt from NEPA, including all NEPA review and documentation. These actions must, however, still comply with all applicable environmental laws and Executive Orders. For section 402, General Federal Assistance For section 403, Essential Assistance For section 406, Repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of a facility damaged or destroyed. These 406 funded activities must take place on the same site as the damaged facility, and conform substantially to the pre-existing condition. Also, the proposed facility must conform substantially to the pre-existing footprint and location on the site of the pre- existing damaged facility. Alternate or improved projects not meeting the above criteria do not fall within the STATEX,and require NEPA review For section 407, Debris removal For section 502,Federal emergency assistance • Response Protocols. The Action Manual specified best management practices for various types of wastes (e.g., green waste, metal, mixed debris, woody C&C debris, asphalt roofing, putrescible wastes). Although cleanup of private property is the responsibility of the owners, curbside pickup for a specified time period may be eligible for FEMA funding. Civil Defense would instruct residents and businesses to separate disaster debris and set these materials out at curbside during debris collection sweeps for a green waste collection sweep, metals debris collection sweep, and mixed debris collection sweep (mixed debris, woody C&C, roofing, gypsum, plastic sheeting, aggregate and rubble, household furnishings and belongings). Residents and businesses shall be instructed to not set out the following materials: household rubbish (take to transfer stations); hazardous waste (hold for organized collection events or handled by private contractors under contract to the business); putrescible waste (take to transfer stations); dead animals (special instructions). For public roadways and facilities, green waste cleared from roadways and public facilities should be kept separate from other debris for collection and removal to designated temporary storage sites. Mobile chippers should be used to chip the tree limbs, brush and leaves at the time of collection and the chips transported to and stored at designated temporary storage sites. County parks may be suitable for temporary storage sites. Tree 18-44 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment trunks and stumps should be transported to TDSR sites for processing through a tub grinder or, if of millable timber quality, for possible reuse. Building debris and personal property debris encountered on public property should be diverted to TDSR sites for processing and land filling. Debris consisting of utility poles and lines, and utility devices should be handled by the utility companies. • Inventory of Contractors and Equipment. The Action Manual compiled an initial inventory of equipment in public ownership and list of potential contractors and their equipment. The contractors' equipment, however, is not listed in the Action Manual, nor is the availability of the Hawai'i National Guard or the Army. The Guard will certainly be called upon for personnel to aid in debris removal. It is planned that much of the clearance will be done under the Department of Public Works. • Contract Management. The Action Manual provides references for model contracts (time and materials, lump sum, or unit price contracts); • Public Education Programs. Hazard mitigation public education programs should include proper handling of disaster debris. The Action Manual provides references for examples of public communication materials. A debris hotline should also be established during the Increased Readiness,Response, and Recovery Phases. Update and follow-up action requirements include: • Update debris estimation with earthquake estimates, using modeling such as HAZUS provided the modeling has been validated against historic events and local conditions, and refine the estimates provided with any updated methodology; • Annual civil defense training should include the response actions specified in the Action Manual (section 5.0 entitled Action Steps for Response to a Disaster Event); • Develop a TDSR site in Puna; coordinate agreements with private owners for TDSRs on private land; determine applicability of environmental assessments for emergency, temporary uses such as TDSRs; • Maintain the resource inventory (e.g., contact list of contractors and equipment) to keep it updated; • Update the information specified in the Action Manual, such as estimates of remaining capacity of disposal facilities; availability and capacities of biomass burners; lists of equipment in public ownership; changes in land uses and access of potential TDSR sites and surrounding lands; • Periodically review boilerplate contracts for debris management services. 18.1.17 Economic Assets The following types of economic assets facilitate post-disaster recovery: • Survival and building supplies. Retail outlets that sell food, bottled water, blankets, clothes, matches, toilet paper, building materials, fuel, pumps, and other basic items will be a resource to the community; 18-45 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment • Financial institutions. To purchase needed supplies, residents and businesses may need access to cash or arrange loans; • Businesses. Returning to normal operations as quickly as possible will avert massive unemployment. Mitigation measures include educating and providing assistance as necessary for businesses to obtain business interruption insurance to minimize post- disaster business failures. Future updates to this plan will include GIS inventories of these assets. 18.2 Special at Risk Populations and Areas 18.2.1 At Risk Populations Certain segments of the population require special attention for hazard education efforts to build their readiness capability or during a hazard event for evacuation assistance. These population segments include: • Young and elderly--require special hazard education and evacuation assistance; • Non-English speakers--require special hazard education; • Persons with disabilities-- require special hazard education and evacuation assistance for the sensory,mental, and physically impaired; • Lower income-- requires special hazard education to implement readiness measures and may require assistance during recovery phase. • Visitor--lack knowledge of hazards and warning systems loo The concentrations of these special populations are as follows: • Relatively high percentage of youngsters (<18 years old) • Puna District-- several communities (e.g., Ainaloa, Fern Acres, Nanawale Estates, Orchidland Estates,Hawaiian Beaches) • Pahala and Naalehu in the Ka'u District; • Waikoloa and Waimea in the South Kohala District. 100 Preparing the tourism sector(and other transient populations).for disaster in Hawai'i County,Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited(NZ)&the University of Hawaii Manoa, February 2004 18-46 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment • Relatively high percentage of elderly(60+years old) • South and North Hilo Districts-- several communities (e.g., Honomu, Papaikou, Paukaa, Wainaku,Laupahoehoe); • Pahoa in the Puna District; • Honokaa in the Hamakua District; • Keauhou in the North Kona District; • Pahala in the Ka'u District. • Places with more than 1,000 disabled persons(excluding employment disabilities): • Hilo in the South Hilo District; • Kailua and Holualoa in the North Kona District; • Hawaiian Paradise Park, Hawaiian Beaches, and Volcano in the Puna District; • Waimea in the North Kohala District. • Highest percentage of public assistance as an indicator of lower income: • Puna District; • Ka'u District. • Highest numbers of persons who do not speak English well or not at all: • Hilo and Pepeekeo in South Hilo District • Keaau,Hawaiian Paradise Park,Pahoa in Puna District Kailua and Holualoa in North Kona District • Waimea and Waikoloa Village in South Kohala District • Captain Cook in South Kona District 18.2.2 Buildings,Residences and Remote Off-Grid Settlement Areas The location of residential areas is important for evacuation and shelter planning. The value of buildings at risk indicates whether special measures are warranted to reduce vulnerability. As of December 2009, there were approximately 132,555 lots in this County of which 59,249 were zoned for residential use. Table 18-8 summarizes the number of residential lots and total building values entirely or partially located within the tsunami evacuation zone, special flood hazard zone, or lava hazard zone 1 or 2. 18-47 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-8. Vulnerabilit•Analysis of Residential Areas1"' Islandwide Special Flood Tsunami Lava Hazard Hazard Zone Evacuation Zone 1 or 2 Zone Total Lots 132,555 6,300 33,124 Residential Lots 59,249 1,618 2,668 5,752 %Total Lots 44.7% 1.2% 2.0% 4.3% Total Building $22,997M $1,321M $1,391M $1,448M Value of Residential Lots 18.2.3 Hotels and Resorts Hotels and resorts pose special concerns for the safety of visitors, with most of the major facilities located in the tsunami evacuation zone. Since public shelters do not have capacity to accommodate all visitors, the hotels and resorts would be relied upon for in-place sheltering. Future planning will strive to have each major hotel and resort has an emergency plan approved by Civil Defense to ensure a trained staff and appropriate shelter capabilities. An updated database of hotels and resorts would track the status of emergency plans and contact information to communicate as necessary with the resort before, during, or after a disaster. 18.2.4 Schools,Day Care Centers, and Nursing Homes If evacuation is necessary during school hours, the location of all day care centers and schools from pre-schools to university, public and private, is critical to control traffic flow. For daycare centers, pre-schools and elementary schools, significant traffic will be incoming for parents to pick up their children, as well as outgoing. Nursing homes will require emergency response plans to ensure sheltering, evacuation, supply of emergency provisions, and back-up systems to sustain vital medical equipment. 18.2.5 Parks and Shopping Centers Parks and shopping centers are a concern since large numbers of people may be at these facilities and may not be aware of warnings. Future planning will ensure that managers of major shopping centers have emergency plans. Federal, State, and County park personnel participate in the EOC to ensure proper warnings and evacuation of these facilities, as necessary. Park buildings and shopping centers may also serve as shelters. Park grounds may serve as potential temporary storage areas for green waste or other debris. 101 Based on 2008 County Tax Appraiser data 18-48 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.2.6 Hazardous Materials Sites Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) are potential secondary hazards if released into the environment by a hazard event, or if it is potentially explosive from the heat of a lava flow or wildfire. HAZMAT carriers may cause spills in accidents caused by flooding or earthquake. HAZMAT transported through pipelines may leak as a result of earthquakes. HAZMAT releases pose short- and long-term toxicological threats to humans and to terrestrial and aquatic plants and wildlife. Toxic materials affect people through one of three processes: inhalation,ingestion, or direct contact with skin. The State Department of Health requires the registration of storage sites for hazardous materials and notification to the Fire Department. The Department of Health maintains a database on these storage sites. Future updates to this plan will include a map produced from the County's GIS database. 18.3 Relationship of Land Use Growth Trends to Hazard Areas 18.3.1 Growth Trends The County of Hawaii encompasses the entire island of Hawaii which consists of 4,028.2 square miles, larger than all of the other Hawaiian Islands combined. While the largest in size, Hawaii County also enjoys the lowest population density in the state at approximately 37 persons per square mile which compares to a statewide average of approximately 189 persons per square mile.102 The census registered 148,677 residents in the year 2000, a 24 per cent increase over the 1990 resident population. The County General Plan revision anticipates that the resident population will continue to grow and projects annual growth rates ranging from 1.95 per cent to 2.1 percent till the year 2020. Projected estimates for 2020 indicate an island resident population of 217,718, or an increase of 46 per cent over the estimated 2000 population of 148,677.103 The low population density is reflected in the broad land use patterns established within the county. The State Land Use Law established four basic land use categories within the state in 1961. These categories arc described by the County General Plan revision as follows: "The Urban District is generally defined as lands in urban use with sufficient reserve to accommodate foreseeable growth. In the County of Hawaii this district is comprised of approximately 55,989 acres or two per cent of the island's total land area. Rural Districts are defined as lands primarily comprised of small farms mixed with low density residential lots that have a minimum lot size of one-half acre under the State Land Use Law. Of the four districts, this is the smallest, with approximately 1,005 acres of the island's total land area. The Agricultural District includes lands with a high capacity for intensive cultivation as well as those with low capacity. The minimum lot size in this district under the State Land Use Law is one acre. The Agricultural District has the second greatest land area with approximately 1,184,599 acres or slightly under 46 per cent of the total land area of the 102 County of Hawaii,Department of Research and Development,Data Book,2008. 103 County of Hawaii,Planning Department. General Plan,2005. 18-49 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment island. Conservation Districts are primarily those lands in the existing forest and water reserve zones. This district has the largest land area with approximately 1,339,770 acres or 52 per cent of the total land area of the island."104 The state land use district acreages are broken down by judicial district below. Table 18-9. State Land Use Districts Acreage(as of Jul•2007) District Agricultural Conservation Rural Urban Total Pima 175,064 138,538 140 6,431 320,173 South Hilo 71,858 168,462 18 12,622 252,960 North Hilo 53,644 120,073 78 582 174,377 Hamal ua 162,769 236,315 14 1,042 400,140 North Kohala 64,740 12,641 20 2,435 79,836 South Kohala 150,163 15,366 183 10,728 176,440 Not Kona 159,149 186,244 519 19,496 365,408 South Kona 110,796 35,041 33 815 146,685 Ka'u 232,855 427,090 - 1,838 661,783 Total 1,181,038 1,339,770 1,005 55,989 2,577,802 The existing land use pattern in the County has its origins in the historical agricultural based economy which was the predominant industry for most of the past 100 years. These patterns have been modified by the more recent emergence of the visitor industry which is now the predominant economic engine for the County. The Puna District, with a population of 31,335 in 2000, had the highest growth rate in the County for the ten year period from 1990-2000 at 50.8 per cent. The district is primarily rural and agricultural in nature with the major agricultural businesses being the growing of macadamia nuts, flowers, foliage, papaya, bananas, tropical fruits and vegetables. The high growth rate in the district can be attributed to the availability of relatively cheap land that was developed in the 1950's and 60's into thousands of non-conforming residential-sized lots that lack the basic infrastructure found in current subdivision standards. Nevertheless, construction of single-family dwellings within these non-conforming subdivisions has increased as the district serves as a bedroom community to the Hilo area. Many of these existing non-conforming parcels in the southeastern end of the Puna district are situated within lava hazard zones 1 and 2 which have the greatest risk of possible inundation. Flooding during heavy rains is also an ongoing concern within the district. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes to the established land use pattern over the next several years. The South Hilo district had a population of 47,386 in 2000 which represented approximately 32 per cent of the total population for Hawaii Island. The City of Hilo is the largest population center on the island with the main offices of the county government, branch offices of federal and state agencies located there. The island's major deep draft harbor and 104 County of Hawaii,Planning Department. General Plan,200.5. 18-50 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment international airport are also located in Hilo. In addition to industrial, commercial and social service activities, the University of Hawaii at Hilo and Hawaii Community College and affiliated research programs play an important role in Hilo's economy. The entire City of Hilo, south of the Wailuku River is situated within lava hazard zone 3. Low lying coastal areas are within the tsunami inundation zone and evacuation areas. Sections of the city are also subject to flooding during periods of heavy rain. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes to the established land use pattern over the next several years. The North Hilo and Hamakua Districts are two rural agricultural districts that are undergoing significant socio-economic changes. The two districts experienced the loss of their two remaining sugar operations during the 1990's which resulted in the loss of 1,200 jobs and approximately 43,500 acres of cane production. Eucalyptus trees have been planted on a portion of the former sugar acreage but much of the area remains unutilized. The 2000 population in the Hamakua District was 6,108 while the North Hilo population was 1,720. The majority of these residents reside in former plantation communities that are scattered along the Mamalahoa Highway. Many of the remaining residents are employed outside of the region either in resort related jobs in the neighboring South Kohala District or other jobs in South Hilo. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The North Kohala District is another rural agricultural district that was formerly reliant on the sugar industry. Ranching, macadamia nut production, and nursery production are the principal agricultural activities currently operating in the district. The 2000 population in North Kohala was 6,038 with many of them employed in resort related jobs in neighboring South Kohala. Although a major landowner in the North Kohala district, obtained rezoning of approximately 15 acres of land in 1993 for the development of a 200 to 240-unit lodge hotel at Mahukona, no activity towards the development of the lodge hotel has occurred to date. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The South Kohala District contains a diverse mix of agriculture in the Waimea region as well as one of the world's premiere resort destinations along the coast. With a population of 13, 131 in 2000, the South Kohala district had the second highest growth rate in the County during the period between 1990-2000 at 43.7 percent. The Waimea region contains the most extensive truck farming area in the County growing vegetables, fruits, flowers and foliage. Most of the lands in South Kohala, between the farms of Waimea and the resorts on the coast, are used for cattle ranching. Nevertheless, the visitor industry is the major economic force in the district. There are three major resort nodes that have been developed by Mauna Kea Properties, Mauna Lani Resort, and the Waikoloa Land Company. These resort nodes include hotels, condominiums, single family residential subdivisions, golf courses and commercial centers. The number of hotel rooms within these three resort nodes totals over 3,250. The district is also served by major transportation facilities which include Kawaihae Harbor, Waimea-Kohala airport and major highway systems linking the communities of Waimea, Waikoloa Village and Kawaihae. The Waimea community is experiencing growth pressures with proposals for expanded residential growth by the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands and Parker Ranch,the major land owner in the district. 18-51 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment The North Kona District, with a population of 28,543 in 2000, includes Kailua-Kona which is considered to be the center of government, commercial and industrial activities in West Hawaii. The primary employment generator in the district is tourism with visitor accommodations and facilities extending from the Keauhou-Kona Resort at the southern end of the district to the Hualalai Resort and Kona Village Resort at the northern end. These visitor accommodations include world class destination resorts with a full range of amenities as well as resort condominium units, timeshare units and stand alone hotels. Currently there are approximately 4,000 visitor accommodations in the North Kona district which accounts for over 45 per cent of the total on the island. The major agricultural activities within the district include coffee, macadamia nut, avocado and ranching. Major infrastructure facilities serving the district include the Honokohau Small Boat Harbor, Keahole Airport and the Kailua pier. North Kona is facing major growth pressures including additional resort, commercial, industrial and residential development throughout the district. The South Kona district is another rural agricultural district that had a population of 8,589 in 2000. The major economic activity in the district is agriculture with coffee, macadamia nut, avocado and ranching leading the way. Many South Kona residents are employed in the visitor industry in the adjacent North Kona District. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The Ka'u district is another rural agricultural district that is undergoing a socio-economic transition after closing of the Ka'u Sugar Company in 1996. The population in the district totaled 5,827 in 2000. The major economic activity in the district remains agriculture with macadamia nuts and ranching leading the way. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The County Planning Department is in the process of developing a GTS spatial growth model that would be a useful tool to evaluate growth trends in relation to hazard areas. 18.3.2 Land Use Tools The County General Plan, first adopted by ordinance on December 15, 1971 and most recently updated in 2005, provides the foundation for a comprehensive planning program for the County of Hawaii. This program, consisting of three interrelated parts, is depicted in Figure 18-8 and described in the County General Plan Revision as follows: The General Plan represents the first level and encompasses long-range goals,policies, standards, and courses of action for the entire County. The General Plan also provides the legal basis for all of the other elements of the County's planning structure. As such,the General Plan is the highest order, or 'umbrella' plan. It establishes the outer limits or boundaries within which the County must operate. The second level consists of short and middle range plans that further define the long-range goals and policies of the General Plan. These plans are related to specific regions or districts (Hilo, Kona, Kohala, Ka'u, etc.), functions (recreation, agriculture, drainage, highways, etc.), and specific areas within a region(Kailua Kona,Downtown Hilo,etc.). 18-52 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment The third level consists of specific mechanisms to implement the two higher levels of the planning hierarchy. These include the Zoning and Subdivision Codes and both the operating and capital improvement program budgets.105 GENERAL PLAN Functional Plan Community Ievelopment Plan Area Improvement Plan P aeeotiori Wild Hilo L10wntown Pere opm¢nT Plan Sewerog¢Jprainoge K-0ne Historic Sites K.hala piluo Vilingt besign Plan Etc. Etc_ € c. Land Use Development Operating Budget Capita!Improvements Program Codes �Clp) Zon-ng Subdivision Other Codes rated Regulotions Figure l S-21. County of Hawaii Land Use Planning System The Hazard Mitigation Plan is a functional plan that is part of the second level of the County's comprehensive planning program described above. As such, the hazard mitigation objectives, strategies and implementing actions need to be consistent with the broader goals, policies, standards and courses of action contained in the General Plan. Working within the framework of the comprehensive planning program, implementing mechanisms that will be utilized to address the mitigation objectives include the Zoning and Subdivision Codes, the Operating and Capital Improvement Program Budgets and other County ordinances. The County General Plan recognizes that certain areas susceptible to natural hazards may need to be kept open and not utilized for buildings, structures or other economic development purposes. These areas may be designated as Conservation or Open in the County General Plan, Land Use Pattern Allocation Guide Map. Within the County Zoning Code, the "Open" district applies to areas generally intended for open type uses although it does permit golf courses, with a use permit, some recreational facilities, and various public and utility-type facilities. There is currently no County zoning district that calls for land to be preserved in a largely natural state. As such the General Plan Revision is proposing a new policy to "Amend the Zoning Code to create a category for lands that should be kept in a largely natural state, but that may not be in the Conservation District, such as certain important view planes, buffer areas, and very steep slopes." 105 County of Hawaii,Planning Department. General Plan,200.5. 15-53 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Existing mechanisms within the General Plan and Zoning Code allow the County to direct new development proposals away from known natural hazard locations. Areas that are already developed or have existing land use entitlements for future development present a significantly more difficult and complex challenge for achieving hazard mitigation objectives. Areas that are subjected to repetitive losses or have experienced total devastation may be targeted for public acquisition and relocation. Short of acquisition and relocation the County can utilize tools such as Cluster Plan Development or Planned Unit Development measures that encourage developers to restrict development on certain portions of their property due to flooding (or other natural hazard conditions) in exchange for allowing higher densities or other code deviations for the remainder of their property. 18.3.3 Loss Estimation and Hazard Ranking The relative severity of the various hazards can be measured by the estimated losses. Expected losses when expressed in dollars do not include loss of lives. The components of loss estimates usually include: structural loss (structure replacement value x percent damage), contents loss (content replacement value x percent damage), and functional loss (functional downtime costs+displacement time costs).106 One estimate developed for the State of Hawaii, which focused only on structural property loss, concluded that the most severe losses for the County of Hawaii are earthquake, hurricane, lava flow, flood, and tsunami in that order (see Table 18-10). Compared to the other counties, Hawaii County had the highest earthquake losses, second highest hurricane losses, and the only county with lava flow losses. Table 18-10. Relative Hazard Severity of Major Hazards Based on Average Annual Loss Estates Hazard AAL Hunicane $69 million Earthquake $65.1 million Lava Flow $24 million Flood $0.5 million Tsunami $0.25 million Source: Martin&Chock,Inc.,2009. Average Annualized Loss Estimates for Hazards in the County of Hawaii Updates to this plan have refined the loss estimates, using the HAZUS model. HAZUS involves two steps: analysis of the specific risk, then application of the analysis to the area. Extensive data bases are provided for these purposes. The programs can be used at three levels: a basic level with default inputs, a second level with more specific inputs, and a third, very expert and detailed level with most defaults replaced by local inputs where allowable. 106 FEMA,State and Location Mitigation Planning How-To Guide: Understanding Your Risks,chapter 4. 18-54 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment HAZUS was first developed for earthquakes and was made available to State Civil Defense as HAZUS 99. A more recent version called HAZUS-MH (for multi-hazard) has been provided which includes wind and flooding modules. Through a series of studies beginning in 2000, the State of Hawaii Civil Defense extensively revised the HAZUS-99 inventory information for Hawaii and Maui Counties to account for code adoption and enforcement policy histories of each county, Hawaii building construction types, the number and locations of specific building types, geospatial centroids of population centers, as well as Hawaii construction costs. Ground motion calculations in HAZUS-99 were significantly enhanced by State Civil Defense by using a Hawaii-specific ground motion attenuation model. Soil amplification effects were incorporated into HAZUS-99 using a NEHRP site class map for the island of Hawaii prepared by URS in 2004. The implementation and testing of each of these parameters was carried out under the technical supervision of the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee (HSEAC). In 2004-2005, further studies were conducted to quantify loss reductions and the mitigation effectiveness of seismic retrofit, code adoption and enforcement policies. A more recent study completed by Martin & Chock in 2009 incorporated a modern-day equivalent of Level 3 Hawaii and Maui County building inventories, and updated the hazard and modeling improvements completed by State Civil Defense into the latest HAZUS-MH platform. The study also used the observed impacts associated with the recent Hawaii Kiholo Bay earthquake disaster of 2006 to validate the model results produced by the enhanced HAZUS earthquake loss estimation tool. A summary of the loss estimation procedure for each hazard is as follows: • Flood - census tracts/blocks overlaid with flood maps, such as FIRM. But, note that the tsunami portion of such maps is based on all possible tsunamis and any one event will affect less property. The State is presently in the process of updating the FIRM's. By 2010, HAZUS will be available for this use and can include probability. • Hurricane - a HAZUS hurricane model has been developed, tested, and validated against Hurricane 'Iniki on Kauai. This model is available for use on Hawaii Island. • Lava flow - predictive data are now available from the Hawaii Volcano Observatory (HVO) which can be used with GIS layers to make probability estimates of losses. A more simple, "first cut"would use the published lava hazard zones. • Windstorms and high waves (except hurricanes) and landslides are not considered a significant enough loss risk to require a formal evaluation. The repetitive losses presently cataloged for these events can provide estimates of future losses. • Earthquake - as noted above, HAZUS is used for loss predictions and was originally developed for earthquakes. The default HAZUS data has been updated and enhanced based on data collected from the tax appraiser's database to more accurately reflect the building exposure in Hawaii County. • Landslides - there appears to be no methodology in place to predict the loss from such events as the massive coastal slide at Waipunalei ten years ago. 18-55 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment • Tsunamis - existing models and data can provide probable (usually maximum expectable) inundation for a tsunami of any magnitude from any direction. Unfortunately, there is no valid prediction of the probability of such an event. (See tsunami section for discussion of this question). For estimation purposes, a "100 year" event is usually used, as in flood work. This actually means simply a 1% annual chance of occupancy. A worst case tsunami, based on earthquakes from each of the four common source areas, can then be run in a model and inundation overlaid on census block data for loss estimation. When available and in use, the HAZUS flood module can use this information as an input and provide estimations more automatically. Focusing only on property losses may not provide a reliable ranking of hazards. Future up- dates of this plan may attempt a broader analysis. For hazard ranking analysis purposes, the models such as HAZUS will focus on the anticipated maximum likely event rather than the worst case. 18-56 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A Preparing the tourism sector (and other transient populations' for a disaster in Hawai'i Introduction World wide,tourists flock to areas of natural beauty which are often also sites prone to natural hazards,such as coastal zones,river valleys,forests and mountains, RaWai'i County is no exception with its white and black sand beaches,and Volcano National Park,with its active lava flows enticing thousands of visitors to the Big Island each year. Managing the tourists that visit the Tsland in the event of a disaster is of paramount importance if risk to life and negative impacts on the tourism industry are to be minimised. Problems with managing tourists in a disaster There has been a considerable effort over the last few decades to increase awareness of the general populace about natural hazards in Hawaii. Tourists(and other transientpopulations)however,remain a difficult group to assess in terms of understanding their level of knowledge of hazards and possible actions they may take in the event of a disaster, This group is also difficult to target with hazard education program because of its transient nature and language differences. As an example, research on improving the effectiveness of warnings systems has frequently highlighted the difficulty of preparing transient populations to respond appropriately to warnings(Drabek 1994, 1996). Due to these reasons,tourists should be regarded as part of the`at-risk population' in a natural disaster. The expanding tourist industry in Hawaii means that the tourist population is increasingly exposed to disasters. Particular vulnerabilities result from; ■ unfamiliarity of surroundings ■ lack of knowledge of local hazards ■ language barriers ■ transient movement in remote areas ■ difficulty in educating Hazard education and warning systems Arange of education programs(e.g.brochures,articles,signs)are traditionally used for educating people about natural hazards generally with the aim of increasing individual,business and household preparedness. Warning systems are used to war people of imminent threat in the event of a disaster.Although these approaches may be acceptable for the general populace,they may not be ideal when putting in place measures to protect tourists,and the tourism economy. Education Hazard education can be considered from two perspectives: fmitute of Geclagical&Afuelear Sciences Limited(W)&the University of Hawaii—Manoa Prapaing he hansm sector(8 othertranstent populations)for a disaster in Hawaii County February 2004 Als-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A 1)education of tourists about hazards and how to respond during a disaster 2)education and capacity building of the tourism sector to manage and respond to a natural disaster. The former is discussed below,the latter later in this paper as the most effective form of education for the tourism sector. Effective education about hazards specifically alined at tourists is difficult to achieve due largely to the transient nature of tourists and language barriers. If tourists were able to gain a clear understanding of the potential hazards in Hawai'i,the warning systems,and how to respond to these,there would be less reliance on other parties (most likely tourism personnel)to assist. However,reaching tourists with this type of information is unlikely to be successful so other strategies,such as focussing on tourism firms and personnel,need to be considered.Discussing and showing tourists potential natural hazards is not generally favoured by the tourist industry;the exception is warnings about problems they are likely encounter such as sea urchins or property theft from their car_ The perception from tourism personnel has been that if tourists are told that an area is disaster prone it would deter people from visiting the area,and result in a downturn in business. In contrast,interviews held with visitors[(Drabek 1996)]have shown that there is an expectation for competent disaster preparedness from managers and governrnent,and that failure in an event of a disaster would be remembered as a negative experience that could cause the loss of future revenue and lives. From this we can deduce that it is better not to spend too much effort telling tourists about potential natural hazards,but to make sure that tourism firms and personnel are educated and trained how to respond in the event of a disaster, Warning systems Having tourists respond correctly to warning systems is crucial to minimize the loss of life_ Response to warning systems is not always that expected by those giving the warning-a problem likely to be exemplified when tourists are involved(given the unfamiliar surroundings they may find themselves in). A number of factors tell us why people would react in an unexpected manner to a warning,and these can be applied to the tourist population: • warning content and style • level of perceived personal risk • ability to confirm a warning message ■ receiver(e.g.tourist)characteristics Although the content and style of a warning system can be controlled,it is bard to understand and interpret how a receiver may react to the warning system. When dealing with tourists who are likely to be unfamiliar with local warning systems,it is even more difficult to predict their response actions. 2 Ins6'tute of Geological&Nuclear Sdenoes Limited(N4 8 the tlraversity of Hawaii—Manoa Fmpanny die tourism sector(&Aer transient pop ufatiom)for a disaster in Hawaii County February 2004 Alg-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A Developing a fail safe warning process is complex due to the diversity and number of sources and the difficulty in reaching diverse groups. The range of sources creates potential problems in the design and implementation of warning systems. Another issue identified is the potential adverse impact of false alarms on the tourism sector and resultant impact on the effectiveness of future warning response.Again, training tourism personnel on how to respond to warnings and keep tourists safe has been identified as an effective way of improving warning response effectiveness. Education programs and warning systems appear to be the two most common approaches aimed directly at tourists to educate them about natural hazards and warn of impending danger. The effectiveness of these approaches however can be questioned as there is more likely to be more success in directly approaching tourism Ems and working with tourism personnel on how to keep tourists safe in the event of a disaster. Who is responsible for the tourist? Expecting tourists to take the time to find out about hazards while they are on vacation is unrealistic. A 2001 Washington State Tsunami Survey confirmed this when results showed that tsunami hazard maps in survey communities had been seen by 62%of residents but only 19%of visitors. Of those surveyed,28%of residents and 46%of visitors were unaware of the tsunami warning system(Johnston et al 2002) Because of this,education and warning systems(discussed above)are unlikely to be the primary means to ensure tourists are kept safe in a disaster. Such findings reinforce the need for Civil Defense to work closely with tourism firms and personnel before a disaster occurs in order to ensure they understand the hazards in their area and how best to respond in the event of a disaster. Roles and responsibilities of tourism personnel need to be identified and expectations clarified- Understanding the tourism sector Given that most tourism ventures are privately owned firms,there is a need to establish relationships with these business owners and convey the importance of emergency planning for their staff(tourism personnel)and clients(tourists). Tierney (200 1)discusses how private firms are"less than enthusiastic about emergency preparedness"so bringing this idea to fruition will not be easy. Research has shown that a number of factors can influence a private firm's disaster preparedness such as size and age of the business;whether there is national head office for multiple local offices;and type of business. Except for the size of the business(where it has been shown that the larger the organisation the better prepared they are),other factors remain inconclusive and contradictory in terms of their influence on a firm's emergency preparedness and willingness to participate in emergency planning. Gamble(2000),found that the impacts of and the recovery from Hurricane Floyd were greatest to small tourism facilities. This may indicate that smaller firms do not 3 Institute of Geological&NuclearSaences Limited(N71&the Ut7hRisW ofHawdi—Manoa Prepaing the tourism sector(&other transient populations)for a disasterin Hawaii Colezty February 2004 A18-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A have the time and resources to commit to preparedness,which will make it difficult to engage them in any training program. Important lessons for the tourism sector in Hawai'i can be drawn from the experience of the two hurricanes that struck Hawaii in recent years:tourist resources can recover quickly from disasters if their base appeal is not significantly compromised, when the island infrastructure is again functioning and an strong program is needed to publicize the recovery to agencies and potential tourists who may have an image of the island being devastated_ .Hawai'i of course is very reliant upon its natural environment to entice tourists and if this remains sustained in the event of a disaster then tourists will continue to come to Hawai'i. However,it is important to emphasize the restoration of the infrastructure that supports tourists(from hotel beds and food to accessible transport routes)as well as the resident population. A significant event similar to that on Kauai (Iwa;Iniki), affecting this island,could impact severely on such infrastructure and restrict the number of tourists to the Island. The importance of tourism personnel training Engaging and educating tourism firms(particularly small firms)and training tourism personnel are critical factors to reduce loss of life to tourists in the event of a disaster. Drabek carried out two studies that highlighted this issue. Drabek's 1994 study looked at 185 tourist companies and their level of evacuation preparedness,and in 1996 Drabek studied 800 transients including 520 tourists who had experienced evacuation during a disaster. The most significant lessons learned by tourism personnel that had been involved in a natural disaster were: • Plan appropriate protective actions • Resist threat denial • Debunk the panic myth(a myth that the public panics when wamed of disaster) • Have one person in charge • Jmprove employee and customer communication • Plan to provide customer sheltering • Anticipate the needs of special populations • Provide records protection • Recognise family priorities • Structure media relationships(This is a major issue as there have been cases of exaggeration and misinformation presented from the media. This can have adverse impacts on current and future tourism business) Key findings of the 1996 study of tourists who experienced evacuation in a disaster found: • that policies and procedures to evacuate tourists were adhoc • tourists in disasters were frequently critical of whom they perceived to be responsible(e.g,hotel owners) 4 lnsh'tute of Geological&Nuclea'Sdences Limited(N4&the University of Hawaii-Mama Preparing the tourism sector(&othertmansient popufations)for a dsasterin Hawaii County Felwuary2004 Alg-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A ■ investment and public/private interagency partnerships in emergency management are essential In a 2002 a`Survey of Residents Sentiments on Tourism in Hawaii'(DBEDT)was earned out that highlighted a number of key issues that could assist with future tourism planning and management. Although not focussed on tourism personnel,the results from a number of the questions can be used to assist with understanding how to manage tourism in Hawaii County: o Many residents of Hawai'i were more likely to favor tourism growth than oppose it,with support for main growth areas to be Hilo and East Hawaii,especially Volcano. This could be indicative of future growth areas for tourism and acceptance of tourism by residents. • Do not assume that`visitor industry jobs'are`hotel jobs'as only 45%of those surveyed agreed they were,therefore highlighting that a number of other sectors (unidentified)involved tourism personnel. • There has been increasing support for government to improve infrastructure in tourist areas. This finding may indicate support for future emergency management program such as shelters and escape routes. Improving the resilience of the tourism sector To ensure that the tourism sector remains resilient in the event of disaster,Hawai'i Civil Defense needs to maintain their dialog with tourism firms and personnel and assistthem to integrate emergency preparedness into their core activities. A training needs analysis could be carried out to assess tourism personnel's understanding of hazard risk,emergency planning issues,levels of personnel training, barriers to implementing mitigation and ways to overcome negative impacts of false alarms. A training needs analysis will help with developing appropriate personnel training for emergency management functions.This analysis should: 1. Determine what groups will be involved 2. Specify everyone's roles 3, Define decisiort-making procedures 4. Ensure effective co-ordination among the organizations involved 5. Define communication procedures 6. Ensure resources are sufficient and available Although there is a financial cost associated with training,benefits will be that tourism personnel are better prepared and able to respond more effectively in the 5 Insb'tute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences limited(NZ)&the U4wisity of Hawaii—Mama Preparing the tourism sector(&other transient populations)for a disaster in Hawaii County February 2004 Als-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A event of a natural hazard. This could prevent loss of life and reduce business losses at both a local and State level. A training needs analysis could also: • create a checklist for onsite analysis of operating conditions of tourism environments for tourism firms to"self-check"their procedures • identify,in conjunction with tourism personnel,ongoing training programs that will suit their needs and schedules • considerpublic education programs that are specifically targeted at the tourist(e.g, different languages,short simple messages)Public education effectiveness can be increased by repeating the same message in varying formats such as brochures, signs,and in a variety of languages and locations. • form agreements with tourism firms or tourist body as to who is responsible for tourists in a disaster(tools to encourage tourism firms to undertake emergency planning can be via the use of non-regulatory methods(e.g.education/workshops) and/or regulatory mandates set by the State). Conclusion Targeting tourists as a means to teach them about hazards in Hawai'i may prove futile,with the exception of short,simple,repetitive messages(such as tsunami signs at the beach)_ Organizational buy-in from tourism firms and training of tourism personnel are two key issues that need addressing. To reduce risk to the tourism sector,Civil Defense needs to work closely with this group to: • encourage tourism firms(especially small firms)to put preparedness measures in place prior to an event occurring,and • train tourism personnel how to respond during a disaster with the aim of keeping tourists safe • have media relations in place to avoid negative portrayal of hazard events(i.e. instead work with these media so that`success'stories are portrayed). 6 lnsbkute of Geological&NuclexSaences Limited(N4&the University of Hawaii—Manoa Preparing the tourism sector(&other irament popubtions)for a dsasterh Hawaii County February 2004 A18-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A References and reading list Ballantyne,M.,Paton,D.,Johnston,D.,Kozach,M.,and Daly,M.,2000. Information on volcanic and earthquake hazards: The impact on awareness and preparation. Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited Science Report#2000/2. Wellington, New Zealand. Drabek,T.E. 1994, Disaster Evacuation and the Tourist Industry.Boulder,BO:University of Colorado,Institute of Behavioral Science,Program on Environment and Behaviour. USA. Drabek,T.E. 1996. Disaster Evacuation Behavior:Tourists and other Transients.Boulder, BO:University of Colorado,institute of Behavioral Science,Program on Environment and Behaviour.USA. Gamble,D.W.2000.Field evaluation of Hurricane damage to water resources,tourism infrastructure,and emergency response of San Salvador,Bahamas. Boulder Natural Hazards Center,Quick Response Report#124. USA. Gerrard,J.1994. Report on the 23,December Kaikouraflood,Jim Gerard,MPRangiora. Parliament House,Wellington,New Zealand. Handmer,J.2000.Are flood warnings futile? Risk communications in emergencies. The Australasian Journal of Disasters and Tranrna Studies 2002-2. Australia. Hawaii Department of Business,Economic Development and Tourism and the Hawaii Tourism Authority. 2003. `2002 Survey of Resident Sentiments on Tourism in Hawaii'. Market Trends Pacific Inc.,John M. Knox&Associates Inc. Hawaii,USA_ "Hurricane Iwa,Hawaii,November 23,1982",National Research Council, 1983 Johnston,D.2002-Results of the August-September 2001 Washington State Tsunami Survey_ Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited. Science Report#2002/17. Wellington,New Zealand, Krausse,G.2000. `There's a big vvind coming':a profile of survival and the culture of response after Hurricane Mitch on Isla Guanaja,Honduras. Boulder Natural Hazards Center,Quick Response Report#123.USA. National disaster Survey Report,Hunicane Iniki NOAAINWS,April 1993 Ward,R.,Paton,D.,Johnston,D,and Becker,J.,2003.Whakapapa Ski Field,lahar warning system,Ruapehu:A review of training issues. Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited. Science Report#2003/7_Wellington.New Zealand, Tierney,K.J,Lindell,M.K.,and Perry R.W. 2001_ Facing the Unexpected=Disaster Preparedness and Response m the United States_ USA. 7 Insi'tute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences limited(NZ)&the University of Nawad-Ntanoa Preparing the tourism sector(8,other transie4populagons)for a drsasterin Hawah County February 2004 A18-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 i AL r f 19. Mitigation Strategy Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy CHAPTER 19 - MITIGATION STRATEGY 19.1 Mitigation Goals and Objectives To become a"disaster-resilient"community,the mitigation goals and objectives are as follows: 1. Goal: Continually strive to improve the state of the art for the identification of hazard areas,prediction capabilities, and warning systems. Objectives: 1.1. Prepare GIS maps for all hazards with the best available information and formulate a strategy to maintain/upgrade the data. 1.2. Improve applicability of modeling systems to Hawaii Island conditions for hazard mapping,mitigation planning, and scenario training purposes. 1.3. Improve flood prediction and field-monitoring systems. 1.4. Establish a warning system that is cognizant of warning siren gaps that require supplemental field warning, which strives to fill those gaps based on population, that is routinely tested and maintained, and that educates the public on proper response. 1.5. Establish a rigorous reporting system after each major event to document the extent and cause of damage, lessons learned, and actions required to improve hazard mitigation, preparedness,response, or recovery. 2. Goal: Control future development and retrofit existing structures within hazard areas to minimize losses. 2.1. Update the building code to cost-effectively resist earthquake, hurricane, and flood susceptibility. 2.2. Periodically review the effectiveness of current land-use-related plans, codes, and standards to control future development within hazard areas. 2.3. Develop incentives, such as tax deductions and insurance discounts, to encourage retrofitting of existing structures to resist earthquake,hurricane, and flood susceptibility. 3. Goal: Ensure that all emergency response critical facilities and communication systems remain operational during hazard events. 3.1. Harden all essential emergency facilities and communication systems to withstand earthquake and hurricane forces (Ensure road access to hospitals remains clear and that all hospitals have helicopter access,no emergency facilities should be located in the 100- year flood-prone areas). 4. Goal: Ensure that all lifeline infrastructures are able to withstand hazard events or have contingency plans to quickly recover after a disaster. 4.1. Harden ports and airports to enable post-disaster operations. 4.2. Harden major highway segments that have no alternate bypass to withstand earthquake and 100-year floods as well as rockfalls/landslide closure. 4.3. Harden fuel storage facilities and ensure distribution network to critical facilities. 4.4. Reduce vulnerability of electrical system to all hazards. 4.5. Develop water systems that resist damage to all hazards and contingency plans to truck water. 19-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy 5. Goal: Provide adequate pre- and post-disaster emergency shelters to accommodate residents and visitors. 5.1. Identify and harden selected shelters to withstand hurricane. 5.2. Establish a standardized due diligence procedure for qualifying a building for private self-sheltering. 6. Goal: Develop a level of awareness among the general public and businesses, particularly the visitor industry, that results in calm and efficient evacuations, self- sufficient survival skills, and willingness to abide by preventive or property protection requirements. 6.1. Develop a broad-based public information program that utilizes a diversity of communication media. 6.2. Develop special public information programs targeted to vulnerable populations. 6.3. Develop a community-based network that double-functions as the Community Emergency Response Team and provides input into mitigation planning. 7. Goal: Minimize post-disaster recovery disruption by developing systems for efficient clean-up, documentation of damage and injury, and processing of appropriate aid to rebuild businesses and the economy. 7.1. Educate businesses on business interruption planning. S. Goal: Protect natural and cultural resources to the extent practicable that buffer hazards or have significant value. 19.2 Mitigation Actions by Hazard Type This section summarizes applicable mitigation actions by the hazard type. Mitigation actions can be grouped into six broad categories:'07 • Prevention. Government administrative and regulatory actions or processes that influence the way land and buildings are developed and built (e.g., planning and zoning, building codes, drainage standards). • Property Protection. Actions that involve the modification of existing structures to protect them from a hazard, or removal from the hazard area (e.g., acquisition, elevation, relocation, structural retrofits, storm shutters, shatter-resistant glass). • Public Education and Awareness. Actions to inform and educate citizens, elected officials, and property owners about the hazards and potential ways to mitigate them (e.g., outreach projects, real estate disclosure, hazard information fairs, school-age and adult education programs). • Natural Resource Protection. Actions that minimize hazard losses while also preserving or restoring the functions of natural systems (e.g., erosion control, stream restoration, watershed management,wetland restoration and preservation). 107 FEMA,Developing the Mitigation Plan:Identifying Mitigation Actions and Implementation Strategies, State and Local Mitigation Planning How-To Guide 43,April 2003. 19-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy • Emergency Services. Actions that protect people and property during and immediately after a disaster or hazard event (e.g., warning systems, emergency response services, protection of critical facilities). • Structural Projects. Actions that involve the construction of structures to reduce the impact of a hazard(e.g., dams,levees, flood walls, seawalls, diversion ditches). 19.2.1 Hurricanes and Wind Storms Mitigation actions include improving emergency services and protecting property through enhanced structural integrity: • Warning Systems. Warning has improved with the use of weather satellites, weather buoys, and tracking aircraft, but it is not possible to predict, more than a very few hours ahead,just where in the islands the main force of a hurricane will impact. Hurricane Iniki exemplified the sudden unpredictable track of a hurricane. However, the intensity of a storm approaching the islands is known before it makes landfall and thus the effects may be anticipated. Although the position of a storm refers to its center (the "eye"), hazardous wind, rain, and surf can extend 200 miles from the center. Therefore advance warning and preparation for a hurricane must consider the potential periphery effects. All cyclonic storms in this part of the ocean are carefully monitored by the Central Pacific Hurricane Center, which is established at the National Weather Service forecast office in Honolulu at the start of the "hurricane season" on June 1. "Warning" is actually provided in several stages: advisories of tropical depressions (incipient storms); warning of tropical storms (winds less that 74 mph); hurricane watch (hurricane within 36 hours) and hurricane warning (hurricane conditions - winds over 73 mph expected within 24 hours). [Note:74 mph—64 knots, sometimes used in reports]. • Hurricane Shelters. Sheltering and preparation in Hawaii is primarily the responsibility of residents themselves, since major evacuation as is done in the Gulf and Atlantic coasts is obviously impractical. Adequate public shelters capable of withstanding hurricane-force winds are limited; they can hold 80% of the population who will seek shelter,by State Civil Defense standards. These standards expect only 35% of the population to seek public shelters. Most of the shelters shown are schools and some are marginal for this purpose but are the best refuge available. Homeowner's preparations are vital and have been publicized in print by the UH Social Science Research Institute (SSRI)10x and are repeated by Civil Defense via the media during a hurricane watch. However, evacuation of coastal areas threatened by storm surge is done in an ad hoc fashion by using the tsunami evacuation maps. These maps have some validity for this purpose in areas such as Kailua-Kona, (although they may be too small) but may encompass too large an area such as in Hilo, where some buildings in the zone are more important as shelters. There is a paradox in hurricane evacuation- it is important not to expose people to wind hazards while avoiding the flooding hazard. • Structural Integrity. Structural integrity has only been tested on this island by winter storms (winds over 40 mph; Chapter 4). In areas with frequent hurricanes, such as Guam, the most vulnerable structures are damaged or removed by prior events. Since we have been lucky enough to not have such experience, a high percentage of homes and also commercial 108 Social Science Research Institute,UH,"Hurricanes in Hawaii:What Are The Risks of Damage?", undated. 19-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy buildings will be lost when a hurricane moves through parts of the island. It has been esti- mated that 38% of homes will be heavily damaged and an equal number will suffer minor damage from an Iniki-strength hurricane striking any island.109 State Civil Defense has published a guide on strengthening houses to minimize losses."0 Adopting and enforcing a building code with adequate wind load requirements is the primary mitigation tool for structures. The code requirements for wind pressure have increased by a factor of 2:1 since 1958 as the Uniform Building Code changed. The current level is based on a 95 mph peak gust, is applicable to commercial structures only and was adopted by the County in 1993. Prior to 1993, the County had no specific code requirements related to wind forces for residences. The code implemented in 1993 (the 1991 UBC) requires roof-to-wall uplift ties. The most important action the County can take other than code revision is to ensure that public buildings, shelters, and other vital facilities meet the code requirements. The FEMA 1993 report is an excellent manual on structural lessons from Iniki while the ARA 2001 report covers implementation of these factors in detail."' The 2006 IBC significantly improves the wind design requirements of the 1991 UBC, therefore its adoption in the county of Hawaii is of the utmost importance. • Infrastructure lifelines. Harden exposed communication and electrical systems. Consider underground installation for new development and in strategic existing areas. 19.2.2 Earthquakes Hawaii County is believed to be exposed to the highest seismic hazard in the State. In approximately the past 50 years, the County has experienced at least eight earthquakes with a Richter Magnitude of 6.0 or greater, and the geological structure of the island is believed to be capable of generating even larger earthquakes. Moreover,because the vast majority of structures in the County were designed and constructed before adoption of the 1976 Uniform Building Code (UBC), which is the earliest UBC edition whose seismic design requirements are similar to the 1991 UBC, many of these structures most likely do not conform to the minimum seismic design requirements adopted by other high seismic risk regions of the United States. Mitigation actions include preventive measures and emergency services improvements: • Identification of Vulnerable Structures and Areas. Refine the applicability of the HAZUS model to Hawaii Island to assess earthquake risks and identify appropriate mitigation actions. The findings of a recent study prepared for the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee 109 Schroeder,Tom, 1993,"Hawai'i Hurricanes:Their History,Causes,and Future,"Office of State Planning, December 1993. 110 Hawai'i State Civil Defense, 1997,"Construction Guide:On Strengthening Houses Against Hurricanes and Earthquakes,May 1997. 111 Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA), 1993,`Building Performance:Hurricane Iniki in Ha- wai'i",January 1993,Federal Insurance Agency,Washington,D.C.;Applied Research Associates(ARA),2001, "Hazard Mitigation Study for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund"(incorporates part of FEMA-sponsored Iniki Building Performance Report),December 2001. 19-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy that focused on Maui and Hawaii County needs to be examined and follow-up actions implemented such as incorporation of appropriate changes to the building code.112 • Hardening Critical Facilities. A 2009 study conducted a seismic evaluation of essential fire stations and hospitals. The findings of that study need to be fully implemented. Similar evaluations need to be made of the communication systems and fuel tanks. • USGS and HVO has tools such as ShakcCast that can be used for post-earthquake potential damage assessment of discrete building inventories, using HAZUS damage relationships applied to individual buildings that have detailed construction input. 19.2.3 Tsunamis Mitigation actions improve emergency services,protect property, and provide public education: • Warning. Warning in time for evacuation is, of course, the key to the public safety aspect of tsunami mitigation. There are two distinct warning scenarios for this island: for a distant tsunami source such as Alaska where three hours notice for evacuation is possible, and for a local tsunami where a few minutes, if any, warning can be provided. The distant tsunami warning is provided by a well developed and capable Federal system (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, PTWC), based on Oahu and covering the Pacific Ocean area. A local tsunami is an unusual event, but the source is most likely to be near the southern coastal areas of this island. The wave may travel faster than a feasible warning but fortunately the wave height diminishes fairly rapidly with distance. The primary warning is simply feeling the earthquake, coupled with education on the response. The new system which senses water rise at six locations on the Kona-Kau shoreline is now operational. It alerts the warning center which immediately confirms the event by an earthquake signal and advises County Civil Defense (or the police, after working hours). This system supplements the slower and less definite earthquake-only local system that was in service since 1978. • Evacuation. Evacuation zones have been developed and used. These zones are based on a combination of historical data where available and numerical modeling, to produce maximum expectable inundation limits. County Civil Defense then uses these data to provide a map with zones related to physical features where possible and always mauka of or at the inundation limit. These zones apply to distant tsunamis only and are published in the front of the telephone directory. Because of the short warning time for a local tsunami, referring to published zones for this island is not considered feasible and so the public is advised to quickly move inland from the shore. Thirty five sirens around the island are operated by the County to alert the public to a tsunami warning,with specific information broadcast from Civil Defense via the emergency alert system (EAS) radio stations. Short-term sheltering is provided as well as bus evacuation of schools in risk areas. Civil Defense, in conjunction with other County, State, and Federal agencies has developed thorough plans for response to a warning.11' These plans and procedures cover matters from roadblocks to school evacuation and arc reviewed in periodic exercises with responsible agencies but which do not involve the 112 Martin&Chock,Inc.,Earthquake Loss Estimation/Mitigation Project,prepared with funding from the Hawaii Coastal Zone Management Program,December 2003. 113 County of Hawai'i,Emergency Procedures,Civil Defense Agency,2000(draft revision in process 2003). 19-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy public. These warning and evacuation operations were most recently publicly tested in 1994 by evacuation for a tsunami which turned out to be non-hazardous. • Public Education. The Disaster Preparedness pages of the telephone directory (provided by Civil Defense) are a basis for education of the public and are usually referred to in other safety material. The State provides a recent tsunami safety video which is shown on television and to various groups; it emphasizes checking the phone book pages to see if you are in an evacuation zone. The Pacific Tsunami Museum in Hilo has a primary mission of public education and awareness and safety and has exhibits on warning and response. The monthly siren test includes an EAS message about public response, on all radio stations. • Structural Integrity. The Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM), which used much of the same data as the inundation/evacuation work, are an aid to minimize risk to structures, along with County planning and building restrictions. The FIRM is considered more reliable for tsunamis than for stream flooding,but is known to also have some questionable areas in this regard. The County permitting process considers both public and structural safety in its regulations. The FEMA flood insurance program is a significant force in limiting home construction and design in probable inundation areas. The mortgage lenders are especially careful in this regard. Thus, in recent years, exposure has become more limited in scope. A detailed engineering publication which deals specifically with structural design to resist tsunamis is available to building code, permitting, and architecture users, is available.14 The report was prepared for FEMA and coordinated with Tsunami Technical Advisory Committee and the University of Hawaii. Much of it applies to all exposed structures, not just residential. A recent, less technical report describes procedures to improve the tsunami resilience of communities.115 It is primarily oriented toward the mainland coast although the California zonation example they describe was performed here. • Recovery of Critical Facilities. Recovery may be the most difficult to plan because of the unpredictability of the nature and extent of the damage. For example, major damage to harbor facilities, interrupting the fuel supply, can result in loss of part of the electrical supply and thus of water and sewage. Other islands may (or may not) compete for recovery support, compounding the problem for this island. The Department of Transportation has recovery plans which are supplemented with current GIS layers in other portions of this report. 19.2.4 Rainfall Flooding and High Waves Of the major natural hazards, flooding occurs most frequently. Mitigation measures include preventive land use measures, warning systems and public education, flood control structural projects,repetitive loss buyout programs, and natural resource protection programs. • Land use measures. Preventive land use measures rely on accurate flood zone identification. The existing Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) does not cover all flood-prone areas and require updating for areas that are covered. Recognizing the cost to modernize the FIRM island wide, mitigation actions will prioritize the modernization effort. When updating, 114"Design and Construction Standards for Residential Construction in Tsunami-prone Areas in Hawaii",Dames and Moore,Honolulu and Washington,D.C.,January 1980. 115 "Designing for Tsunamis",National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Steering Committee,NOAA,March 1991. 19-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy tsunami and hurricane surge inundation limits and base flood elevations require verification with modeling and historical data. The zoning and flood control code use the FIRM as the basis to avoid exposure or apply special flood-proofing standards. Repetitive loss programs need to be incorporated into the flood control and land use systems to buyout and prevent future construction in such areas. Current drainage standards, which are based on 10-year storms,need to be reevaluated to better account for cumulative upslope development. • Warning and public education systems. The National Weather Service has installed tele- metered rain gages to aid in flood prediction and wave buoys for high waves. Two Doppler radars on this island provide rainfall intensity in quantitative graphic form. NWS's system needs to be supplemented with an improved field reporting system and stream gauging sys- tem related to rainfall gages to better predict flash flooding and to extend flood warnings to areas that NWS's system cannot monitor. Warnings for specific areas are broadcast via nor- mal and special radio/TV forecasts and by special County Civil Defense announcements, as well as over the NOAA Weather Radio (for airplanes and boats). Public education needs to be improved to address the problem of vehicles being driven across flooding streams-- road hazard signs need to be quickly erected along highways, and hunters and residences in re- mote areas should be educated. For high waves, the most effective action is the closure of beaches and coastal roads. • Flood control structural and nonstructural projects. Flood control channels have long been established on this island; however, with increased urbanization some channels have been overloaded and need or have received enlargement or rerouting. The recent upgrade of Alenaio Stream in Hilo is a good example. As part of the cost-benefit for such projects, nonstructural alternatives need to be examined such as better watershed management. To reduce coastal damage to high waves, improvements to the seawall system in Hilo and Kailua-Kona have been discussed, but there are no firm plans. There is a tradeoff between the cost of expensive structural improvements and the cost of more frequent and extensive cleanup. 19.2.5 Lava Flows Mitigation actions include preventive measures such as zoning, emergency services improve- ments such as warning systems based on improved predictive mapping, and limited structural protection measures. • Identification of hazard areas. The Hawaiian Volcanoes Observatory(HVO),part of the U.S. Geological Survey, has developed very capable methodology and systems for predicting eruptions in a timely manner, and evaluating the probable lava flow hazard areas. All historical lava flows have been well mapped, and zonation depicted showing the chances of more lava flow for all parts of the island. In recent years, improved mapping programs have moved away from the discrete zonation boundaries to indicate more realistic probabilities for hazard areas and transition regions. Lava shed programs, analogous to water flooding maps, are under development. Planning, zoning, and insurance factors now mitigate against unwarranted development in high hazard areas. • Warning systems. HVO, in conjunction with Civil Defense and other County agencies, is on standby to provide warning and evacuation when an eruption occurs. Though most lava flows have been slow enough to allow easy evacuation and even removal of some structures, 19-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy an eruption from Mauna Loa toward Kona can (and has) required rapid response in that area as communities may be both threatened and escape routes cut. • Structural protection. One lava diversion dike has been constructed. On Mauna Loa, it pro- tects the government's long term atmospheric observatory on the mountain. (This diversion dike built upslope of the NOAA climate monitoring facility on Mauna Loa has not yet been tested.) Ad hoc diversions using bulldozers, bombs, and water spray have been tried in the past, with varied and generally minimal results. See Chapter 2 for a report on the public option survey that included questions about attitudes regarding the possible use of lava diversion techniques. 19.2.6 Droughts and Wildfire The mitigation actions for drought are primarily structural and non-structural programs to withstand droughts (since rain-enhancing measures have proven ineffective). Wildfire mitiga- tion includes preventive land use measures, improved hazard identification, and critical facilities development. • Identification of hazard areas. For high hazard areas, appropriate conditions to zoning and subdivision applications need to be developed, such as requiring fire-resistive materials or maintenance of fire breaks. • Critical facilities and training. Potential water sources to fight wildfires need to be invento- ried. Roads that may be closed by wildfires and lava flows need to be identified and bypass routes or other contingencies planned. in addition to recently acquiring brush trucks, the County Fire Department sponsored 45 volunteer firefighters (from rural areas) to participate in the Firewise Community Development Workshop and helped establish the Big Island Wildfire Coordination Group. This group is expected to improve procedures to rapidly provide the most effective response to wildfires in the island. • Structural and nonstructural projects. Mitigation measures practiced or recommended by agriculturists include ample reservoirs, longer irrigation ditches, drought-resistant crops in certain areas, low rainfall cultivation/tillage practices, changing planting to better areas dur- ing droughts, and moving cattle. More usage of catchment reservoirs can help growers get through dry periods without crop loss. The National Resource Conservation Service provides technical assistance with establishing ponds and reservoirs, and may also provide grants. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), with support from other agencies, maintains a drought mitigation center which assists states in developing drought mitigation plans. The County will defer to the plan being developed by the State Water Commission. Crop insurance is available for Mac nuts and some other primary local crops through the Cooperative Extension Service, a program of the USDA and the University of Hawaii. This organization also provides information on drought-resistant plants and tillage. 19.2.7 Landslides and Sea Cliff Erosion Mitigation actions include structural protection measures and preventive land use controls. • Structural projects. The major problem with landslides is road closure. Heavy rainfall or earthquakes could cause the landslide. Structural slope stabilization along highways is ex- pensive,but is often the best long-term solution. 19-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy • Preventive land use measures. Existing shoreline setback regulations require a minimum of 40' setback from the certified shoreline. Whether this 40' provides adequate buffer relative to the rate of sea cliff erosion such as in the Hamakua area requires further study. Based on the findings, the shoreline setback requirement should be adjusted accordingly for these areas. 19.3 Priority Criteria Mitigation actions were selected for implementation based on community acceptance criteria referred to as the STAPLEE criteria (Social, Technical, Administrative, Political, Legal, Eco- nomic, and Environmental) and then prioritized.'16 The STAPLEE evaluation criteria analyze the appropriateness of alternative mitigation actions by considering the following questions: • Social • Will the proposed action adversely affect one segment of the population? • Is the proposed action culturally insensitive? • Technical • Is the proposed action technically feasible? • Is the proposed action a long-term solution or a short-term"band-aid"'? • Are there secondary effects resulting from the proposed action? • Administrative • Does the proposed action require additional staffing? • Does the proposed action require additional training? • Does the proposed action require ongoing maintenance? • Political • Is the proposed action controversial? • Does the proposed action require legislative approval? • Does the proposed action affect multiple stakeholders and have they all had an opportunity to be involved'? • Legal • Does the County have jurisdiction to implement the proposed action? • Are new laws required to implement the proposed action? • Are liability risks involved with the proposed action? • Economic • What are the costs involved to implement the project? • Is the proposed action eligible for outside funding? • Is the burden of the choice of funding borne by those who benefit? • Is a more detailed cost-benefit analysis warranted? • Environmental 116 Priority-setting methodology from FEMA,How-To Guide 43:Developing The Mitigation Plan;Identifying Mitigation Actions And Implementing Strategies,FEMA No.386-3,April 2003. 19-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy • Does the proposed action protect or restore the environment? • Does the proposed action have potentially negative effects on the environment'? • Is an EA or EIS required? The selected actions that passed the STAPLEE criteria were then prioritized using the following criteria: • Critical to public health or safety. Actions that significantly improve emergency services. • Hazard severity. Actions that mitigate priority hazards based on loss estimation analyses. • Ease of'implementation. Actions that have negligible cost and/or require minimal effort. • Multi-objective. Actions that meet multiple objectives(e.g., flood control project that provides recreational benefits) or address multiple hazards. • Time. Actions that can be quickly accomplished. Once the easy actions are done then the more difficult actions can be focused upon. • Post-disaster mitigation. Actions that may be more appropriate for post-disaster imple- mentation when there is the political will and access to post-disaster assistance funding. 19.4 Implementation Plan Table identifies the actions to achieve the mitigation objectives. The actions are sorted into the following categories: • Administrative actions not requiring major funding; • Ongoing funded studies that need to be incorporated into future updates of this plan; • Actions requiring funding. Evaluation,Ranking, and Approval of Mitigation Projects The County of Hawaii Civil Defense Agency will establish a special committee to evaluate, screen, and prioritize eligible hazard mitigation projects submitted by county government agencies and private nonprofit agencies. The county committee will use a scoring system that emphasizes projects that addresses repetitive losses, high risk to public safety, cost-effective, State and local priorities, and environmentally and technically sound. Committee members will be selected from the following organizations (note: The Administrator of the County Civil Defense Agency will act as chair of the committee): • Fire Department • Police Department • Office of the Mayor • Data Systems Management • Department of Environmental Management • Department of Planning • Department of Public Works 19-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy • Department of Research and Development • Department of Water Supply • University of Hawaii at Hilo According to State mitigation priorities, all of the four counties will receive equal priority for the following natural hazards because all jurisdictions are vulnerable: hurricane and high winds, floods, drought, wild land fire, landslides, coastal erosion, and tsunamis. The County of Hawaii will receive top priority for projects involving lava flow and VOG. Priorities (in order) for earthquake projects are: (1) County of Hawaii; (2) County of Maui; (3) City and County of Honolulu; and(4) County of Kauai. The County and State will use FEMA's cost benefit models to include HAZUS-MH. Also, EPA standards and State Historical Preservation Guidelines will supplement the cost-effectiveness review of each project. State Civil Defense has trained appropriate county personnel in the cost benefit models. Also, the State Mitigation Forum will be developing a program to better assess potential losses especially with wind events. This will involve windspeed maps for all counties and a customized hurricane simulation model with geocoded building inventory, user-defined damage functions, and other variables into a GIS-based hurricane loss estimation software package. All mitigation projects must also meet all appropriate Federal, State, and county laws and regulations. The Committee scored and ranked each project. The State Civil Defense Mitigation staff will provide technical assistance to the applicants in the preparation of the applications, cost-benefit analysis to include training, and acquisition of environmental data. In the past, staff members have personally visited potential applicants and explained the application process and requirements. This effective practice will be continued. Priorities for Hazard Miti ag tion The following are the County priorities regarding hazard mitigation projects: 1. Hardening and Retrofitting of Critical Facilities Conduct all hazard evaluations and develop cost-effective retrofits for priority facilities including: • hurricane shelters and schools, hospitals, fire stations, and police stations, airports Hilo and Kawaihae harbors and fuel storage facilities • key County bridges and plan alternative transportation routes, power plants, water systems, communications sites, sewage treatment plants, and other facilities/buildings providing critical services 2. Upgrading of County Building Codes in accordance with Hawaii Revised Statues Chapter 107, State Building Code and Design Standards 3. Mapping/Assessments/Studies 19-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy Analysis of high hazard areas and studies to develop mitigation measures: • perform screening evaluations of alternative facilities to augment public shelters to address shelter shortfall • investigate and document effectiveness of VOG mitigation techniques and incorporate in public awareness meetings • Update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate current bridge status and adapt HAZUS MH with enhanced building information data for hurricane loss estimation and identification of vulnerable structures Develop mapping of all major natural hazards: • flood map modernization with incorporation of both hurricane flood and tsunami inundation into DFIRM's • updated tsunami evacuation maps • earthquake ground failure hazard maps • probabilistic lava inundation maps • probabilistic tsunami inundation maps • dam inundation evacuation maps • landslide and slope stability hazard maps • LIDAR-based remapping of streams 4. Wildfire Prevention (firebreak establishment and fire mitigation resource inventory) 5. Drought Mitigation by improvements to irrigation aqueduct, reservoirs, and water management 6. Policy for Repetitive Flood Loss Properties 7. Develop natural hazard mitigation criteria policies for county facility site selection and design S. Public Awareness/Education, with additional focus on implementation of Multi-Hazard Mitigation Techniques and VOG • Incentives for Homeowners and Business to retrofit vulnerable structures: To further support this type of outreach,the following actions are still needed: • an expedited permit process if the homeowner uses the standard recommended plans; • working with insurance companies to get homeowners insurance credits for implementing these retrofits; • need to expand the Expert System to add the hurricane mitigation techniques that were previously developed for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund's Loss Mitigation Grant Program. • Retrofit training,videos, displays, and demonstration/pilot retrofit projects • Multi-hazard public information website consolidating GIS mapping products for hazards &zoning 9. Mitigation of Erosion/Land/Rock Slides in residential areas and highways. (Highways have greater priority) 19-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy 19.5 Discussion on Past Implementation Actions The 2005 hazard mitigation plan had a high proportion of implementation actions that were actually emergency response rather than hazard mitigation. Hazard Mitigation excludes emergency response actions after disaster has occurred: • Hazard Mitigation is action taken before a disaster to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and their property from hazards and their effects. • Emergency Operational Plans (EOP) exist with the objective to heighten preparedness and establish plans and responsibilities for responding to and recovering from the occurrence of a natural disaster. Thus, emergency response system improvements belong in the EOP accounting of resource and needs,rather than in a hazard mitigation plan. Thus, with the priorities for hazard mitigation updated, it was recognized that many of the 2005 plan actions were not actually hazard mitigation at all; it was decided that the 2010 Hazard Mitigation Plan should be exactly that, and rather than be forced to continue past misunderstandings because of"precedent,' should utilize more clarity of purpose and formulate implementation actions based on their current merits. This aligns better with the fact that the entire hazard mitigation plan has been re-written as discussed in Chapter 1 Appendix A. "To accommodate greater detail in hazard and risk assessment, as well as to more clearly identify hazard mitigation activities and their specific impacts, the Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan has been substantially reorganized... In short, this plan is a near-total re-write with the objective of greater clarity in addition to a major update of technical knowledge." The following table (former 2005 Plan Table 4-1) tracks the status of the past implementation actions,now superseded. I.D.No. Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Status 1.0 Administrative actions not requiring major funding: 1.1 Review the General Plan natural hazard policies All hazards Planning Being continued in current plan in light of this mitigation plan and American Planning Association suggested policies 1.2 Review the feasibility to adopt the 2003 Inter- Hurricane,Earthquake Department of In current plan to update with 2006 national Building Code Public Works IBC 1.3 Update tsunami evacuation maps Tsunami Data Systems w/ Being completed in current plan Civil Defense 1.4 Develop relocation policies for repetitive loss All hazards Civil Defense w/ Repetitive loss structure mitigation structures Public Works may be addressed other than by condemnation/relocation,which is cost-prohibitive,see current plan 1.5 Work with hotels,cruise ship industry,nursing Hurricane,Earthquake, Civil Defense This is an emergency operations homes,schools,hospitals,and shopping centers Tsunami action to develop emergency response plans 1.6 Study feasibility of participating in the Community Flooding Public Works Being completed in current plan Rating System 1.7 Study feasibility of including nonstructural earth- Earthquake Public Works Being incorporated in building code quake damage prevention into building code update per current plan 19-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy I.D.No. Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Status 1.8 Identify hardening projects to implement 1993 Earthquake,Hurricane Civil Defense,with Project modernized in current plan seismic evaluation study of fire stations and Public Works,Fire, to reference 2009 seismic evaluation hospitals and Hospitals of current facilities 1.9 Explore with utilities feasibility of underground Hurricane,Earthquake, Civil Defense,with Continued into current plan power lines Tsunami Planning&utilities 1.10 Conduct hazard loss estimation study,incorpo- All hazards Civil Defense Performed in current plan's Hawaii rate cost-benefit methodology as a factor in priori- County all-hazard assessment of tizing projects critical facilities 1.11 Develop routine training program for disaster All hazards Civil Defense This is not a hazard mitigation action response and recovery 1.12 Evaluate warning sirens coverage All hazards Civil Defense Completed by HCDA 1.13 Develop a formal post-event reporting system All hazards Civil Defense This is not a hazard mitigation action and information clearinghouse 1.14 Evaluate disaster-level search&rescue capa- All hazards Civil Defense,w/ This is not a hazard mitigation action bilities Fire,Police,DPW 1.15 Evaluate vulnerability of County water systems Hurricane,Earthquake Dept of Water Made a more generalized action to and water trucking capacity Supply,w/Civil improve water resources Defense 1.16 Evaluate waterless wastewater disposal options Hurricane,Earthquake Dept of Environ- This is no longer a DEM project mental Mgt 1.17 Implement Disaster Debris Action Manual Hurricane,Earthquake, Dept of Environ- This is a post-disaster emergency Tsunami,Flood mental Mgt operation action rather than hazard mitigation 1.18 Develop post-disaster transit plan Hurricane,Earthquake, Mass Transit This is a post-disaster emergency Tsunami,Flood Agency,w/Civil operation action rather than hazard Defense mitigation 1.19 Update debris estimation Hurricane,Earthquake, Dept of Environ- This is a post-disaster emergency Tsunami,Flood mental Mgt operation action rather than hazard mitigation 1.20 Coordinate TDSR sites Hurricane,Earthquake, Dept of Environ- This is a post-disaster emergency Tsunami,Flood mental Mgt operation action rather than hazard mitigation 1.21 Maintain list of debris management contractors Hurricane,Earthquake, Dept of Environ- This is a post-disaster emergency and update boilerplate contracts Tsunami,Flood mental Mgt operation action rather than hazard mitigation 2.0 Ongoing funded studies that need to be incorporated into future updates of this plan 2.1 Emergency shelter evaluation Hurricane Army COE Continued in current plan 2.2 GIS mapping of hotels,church shelters,hazard- Hurricane,Earthquake, Data Systems Made a more generalized GIS Multi- ous waste sites Tsunami,Flooding Hazard Information One-Stop website 2.3 Develop probalistic lava flow maps and modeling Lava flow Hawaii Volcanoes Continued in current plan Observatory 2.4 Organize public awareness and preparedness All hazards Civil Defense w/ Continued in current plan,however, program,including CERTs,through Project Research& Project Kumiai no longer exists Kumiai,also include public education on pet care Development, Planning 2.5 Update Emergency Operations Plan All hazards Civil Defense This is obviously an emergency operation action rather than hazard mitigation 2.6 Implement State Drought Plan Drought Civil Defense,with Continued in current plan Fire and DWS 2.7 Identify wildfire hazard areas Wildfire State Drought Identified in the current plan Council,with Civil Defense&Fire 19-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy I.D.No. Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Status 2.8 Adapt HAZUS-M or other hazard modeling to Hurricane,Earthquake, State Civil Defense Continued in the current plan, Hawaii Island Flood actions made more hazard-specific 3.0 Actions requiring funding 3.1 Harden public schools for emergency shelters Hurricane,Flooding, Dept of Acctg and Continued in the current plan Tsunami Gen Services (DAGS) 3.2 Modernize FIRM maps in accordance with priority Flood,Hurricane, Dept of Public Continuing towards completion in mutually established between County and DLNR Tsunami Works the current plan 3.3 Identify high windspeed areas and vulnerable Hurricane,Earthquake Civil Defense w/ Continue in the current plan structures Public Works 3.4 Identify earthquake-induced ground failure areas Earthquake Civil Defense w/ Continued in the current plan Public Works 3.5 Explore incentives for existing homeowners and Hurricane,Earthquake, Department of Continued in the current plan businesses to retrofit their structures,and Flooding Public Works participate in building fairs to publicize 3.6 Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Tsunami,Hurricane, Dept of Trans- Continued in the current plan Kawaihae Harbors Earthquake portation 3.7 Study hardening and evacuation requirements for Hurricane,Earthquake Dept of Trans- Incorporated in Hawaii County all- Hilo and Kona Airports portation hazard assessment of critical facilities in this plan 3.8 Study hardening,floodproofing,and bypass All hazards Dept of Public Continued in the current plan alternatives for major highways Works 3.9 Study hardening requirements for fuel storage Hurricane,Earthquake, Civil Defense,with Continued in the current plan and distribution to critical facilities Tsunami fuel providers 3.10 Develop rainfall and streamflow gaging system Flooding USGS Continued in the current plan suitable to flood monitoring 3.11 Develop technology and training system for effi- All hazards Civil Defense This is an emergency operations cient field monitoring of in-progress event action 3.12 Identify landslide and coastal erosion hazard Landslides Civil Defense w/ Continued in the current plan areas and mitigation actions Dept of Trans- portation,Public Works 3.13 Upgrade and coordinate emergency com- All hazards Civil Defense, w/ This is an emergency operations munication system Fire,Police, action military,ham operators,wired and wireless operators 3.14 Study hardening requirements for electrical Hurricane HELCO Continued in the current plan system 3.15 Upgrade EOC's GIS and communication systems All hazards Civil Defense This is an emergency operations action 3.16 Develop scenario training and mitigation planning All hazards Civil Defense Continued in the current plan capabilities 3.17 Prepare multi-objective open space plan All hazards Planning Discontinued except as a focused wildfire mitigation action 19-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy 19.6 Present Implementation Actions Note:Italics indicate projects similar to a 2005 plan action. Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Required Funding Priority Budget Source Administrative actions not requiring major funding: Update the building code from the 1991 UBC to the Hurricane, Department of minimal County High 2006 IBC with its structural and nonstructural earthquake Earthquake Public Works damage prevention into the building code Update tsunami evacuation maps:Tsunami Tsunami Data Systems w/ minimal State High Inundation and Runup Mapping: Analysis of the island of Civil Defense Hawaii based on scenarios from tsunami-genic source regions along the Pacific Rim. Big Island mapping focuses on 13 populated areas around the island. Identify hardening projects to implement 2009 seismic Earthquake, Civil Defense,with minimal County High evaluation study of critical facilities Hurricane Public Works,Fire, and Hospitals Modernize FIRM maps.Investigate the differences Flood,Hurri- Dept of Public FEMA,State, High between the existing and new DFIRM maps and adapt cane,Tsunami Works County maps so that tsunami inundation is included along the south and west coasts Identify earthquake-induced ground failure areas Earthquake Civil Defense w/ $100,000 FEMA,State, High Public Works County Study hardening requirements for fuel storage and Hurricane, Civil Defense,with $50,000 Homeland High distribution to critical facilities Earthquake, fuel providers Security, Tsunami FEMA,County Develop policies and procedures for establishing site $50,000 specific hazard mitigation design criteria for critical facilities Review the General Plan natural hazard policies in All hazards Planning minimal County Medium light of this mitigation plan and American Planning Association suggested policies Develop policies for repetitive loss structures and All hazards Civil Defense w/ minimal County Medium high hazard watersheds Public Works Participate in the Community Rating System Flooding Public Works minimal County Medium Conduct hazard loss estimation studies;incorpo- All hazards Civil Defense minimal County Medium rate cost-benefit methodology as a factor in priori- tizing projects Evaluate warning sirens coverage All hazards Civil Defense minimal County Medium Develop scenario training and mitigation planning capa- All hazards Civil Defense to be determined FEMA,County Medium bilities Develop a GIS-based Multi-Hazard Information"One-Stop' All hazards Civil Defense/PDC TBD County Medium website Ongoing funded studies that need to be incorporated into future updates of this plan: Develop probabilistic lava flow maps and modeling Lava flow Hawaii Volcanoes budgeted else- USGS High Observatory where Organize public awareness and preparedness VOG and all Civil Defense w/ budgeted else- FEMA,County High program,including mitigation techniques and hazards Research& where retrofit training Development, Planning Develop Dam Evacuation Maps Flood FEMA/PDC Medium Adopt tsunami design provisions for buildings(to be Tsunami Medium released in Sept 2010)for new and for evaluating existing buildings.) 19-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy Project Description Hazards Lead Agency Required Funding Priority Budget Source Implement State Drought Plan;improve water Drought Civil Defense,with budgeted else- DLNR Medium resources Fire and DWS where Identify wildfire hazard areas,maintain fire breaks Wildfire State Drought budgeted else- FEMA,State Medium Council,with Civil where Defense&Fire Actions requiring funding: Perform a comprehensive screening evaluation of private Hurricane $125,000 High sector candidate building types for possible hurricane refuge use Emergency shelter evaluation:All-Hazard Assessment Hurricane $125,000 High of Hurricane Shelters&Identify Effective Retrofits Harden public schools for emergency shelters Hurricane, Dept of Accounting Included in FEMA,State, High Flooding,Tsu- and Gen Services State's mitigation County nami (DAGS),DOE plan Study hardening,flood proofing,and bypass All hazards Dept of Public $125,000 FEMA,State, High alternatives for county bridges Works County Update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate data on State Earthquake $125,000 High and County Bridges Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Tsunami,Hurri- State Dept of Trans- included in State Homeland High Kawaihae Harbors cane,Earth- portation plan Security, quake FEMA,State Study hardening requirements for fuel storage Tsunami,Hurri- Civil Defense $75,000 Homeland High cane,Earth- Security, quake FEMA,State Identify earthquake-induced ground failure areas Earthquake High Investigate effectiveness of VOG mitigation techniques VOG Medium Identify high windspeed Hurricane, Civil Defense w/ $150,000 FEMA,State, Medium vulnerable structures;adapt HAZUS MH for hurricane Earthquake Public Works County analysis Testing of the seismic and wind performance of single wall Hurricane, Civil Defense w/ Medium construction Earthquake Public Works Explore incentives for existing homeowners and Hurricane, Department of $125,000 County Medium businesses to retrofit their structures Earthquake, Public Works w/ Flooding Civil Defense Develop rainfall and stream flow gauging system Flooding USGS,NOAA,PSC USGS,State, Medium suitable to flood monitoring County Identify landslide and coastal erosion hazard areas Landslides Civil Defense w/ DOT study done, FEMA,State, Medium and mitigation actions Dept of Trans- $50,000 for County portation,Public coastal cliffs Works New UH study is to generate potential slope stability Landslides Medium hazard maps which could be used to identify zones that may warrant further detailed evaluation Study hardening requirements for electrical system Hurricane HELCO to be determined HELCO Medium Explore with utilities feasibility of underground Hurricane, Civil Defense,with to be determined County shared Medium power lines Earthquake, Planning&utilities w/utilities Tsunami 19-17 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING PRIORITIZATION RESULTS INDICATED)OCTOBER 12,2009 PAGE 1 Type Project Cost/Status H, M, or L? Policy atural hazard policies for the General Plan&Community Development Plan Coordination/ Medium y Integration Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Kona Airports SDOT Planning Project Low d Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Kawaihae Harbors SDOT Planning Project High i =d Study hardening, f/oodproofing, and bypass alternatives for major highway SDOT Planning Project Medium R M Study hardening requirements for fuel storage and distribution to critical Planning Project High LL facilities Study hardening requirements for electricals stems HECO Planning Project Medium Hawaii County All-Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities Retrofits of fire, Kau Hospital Retrofit is High M police, medical, airports. the first _ 2 Update the building code from the 1991 UBC to the 2006 IBC Required per HRS 107 High 3 Incentives for homeowners and businesses to retrofit their structures Outreach Project Medium mLL Testing of the Seismic and Wind Performance of Single Wall Construction $250K Medium Water Conservation and Watershed Management Education Low Build demonstration earthquake and hurricane retrofits to example homes Medium z Create Hazard Retrofit Training Course at Hawaii Community College Medium M c Create Hazard Retrofit Training Shop Course for High Schools Low c Add Mitigation Displays at Libraries (hardcopy and digital) Medium .r Home retrofit construction performed by Boy Scouts Low = Produce Do-it-yourself retrofit training videos Medium m E Conduct Public Meetings on VOG/S02 and how to mitigate it's effects High a E Conduct Public Meetings for Persons with S ecial Needs Medium QU Visitor Industry Disaster Preparation &Training Medium U) M Disaster Mitigation Planning Service for Communities Performed by High School Low V Students Multi-Hazard Information GIS Ma in Public Website PDC Medium Install seismometers in Middle Schools for educational awareness purposes Low Identify high windspeed areas and vulnerable structures; Planning Project Medium Adapt HAZUS-MH for use with hurricane hazard to Hawaii Count $150K Perform a comprehensive screening evaluation of private sector candidate $125K High L building types for possible hurricane refuge use :3 Emergency shelter evaluation:All-Hazard Assessment of Hurricane Shelters $125K High _ & Identify Effective Retrofits Hardening of Waiakea High School G m $322K-HMGP High Identif earth uake-induced round failure areas Planning Project High w LU Update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate data on State and County $125K High Brid es Update tsunami evacuation maps for 13 priority areas UH Ongoing High R UHM SOEST to produce 100-year and 500-year tsunami hazard maps Planning Project Medium y Adopt tsunami design provisions for buildings (to be released in Sept 2010) Adopt in Building Code Medium ~ for new and for evaluating existing buildings.) Investigate the differences between the existing and new DFIRM maps, and Upcoming FEMA High adapt maps so that tsunami inundation hazard is included along the south project(2010) and west coasts °o Develop rainfall and streamflow gauging system suitable to flood monitoring PSC Tool Medium Develop Dam Evacuation Maps FEMA/PDC Project Medium Develop policies for repetitive loss structures Policy/HazMitPlan Medium Note:Italics indicates project called for in the 2005 County of Hawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-18 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING PRIORITIZATION RESULTS INDICATED)OCTOBER 12,2009 PAGE 2 Type Project Cost/Status H, M, or L? Area Development Plan for Existing and Future Development&CRS Ongoing @ DPW Medium (ongoing) LIDAR-based remappLn_q of stream beds list by NRCS RC&D See Area Development Medium °- Use non-uniform return periods for floodplains Plan Low V Control development with region-specific ordinances in high hazard or Medium W E unknown hazard watersheds Z c Evaluate applicability of FEMA flood proofing mitigation for Hawaii homes Low W Evaluate feasibility of absor tion approach to floodplain management Low Evaluate use of retention structures for high slope areas Medium Wildland Fire Mitigation Resource Mapping and Inventory Program HWMO updating High Establish and maintain firebreaks around roads and communities in North $2.2M/15-yr: Puako High and South Kohala districts; Mitigate wildfire threat along strategic corridors in only for$500K the Puako Forest annually/2-yr Change county zoning code to establish setbacks for a larger interface between urban Policy needs detail Low and natural areas for wildfire mitigation Requiring all applicants for subdivision approvals to complete a wildfire hazard Low miti ation Ian Install dry hydrants and develop static water sources $10,000/site Medium Establish Remote Automated Weather Stations $85K/5-yr. Low Prescribed burns to reduce fuel loads in fire prone areas(not for native forest areas, $1.1 M/yr. for 15-yrs Low also not eligible for FEMA grant funding) Iv Roadside fuel management program along an identified corridor of Highway Needs Budget&Scope Medium 190, South Kohala/North Kona definition Renovations/improvements to old plantation irrigation system tunnels and $3 M Medium ditches: Kau Sugar System Reactivation not eligible for FEMA rant = Improvements to old plantation irrigation system tunnels and ditches and new $26M Medium y Kauahi reservoir:Waimea not eligible for FEMA rant MImprovements to the Kohala Ditch Irrigation Aqueduct(install lining and ? High o piping) o Renovate and Reactivate old abandoned plantation wells in Pahala $2.5M Medium Renovate and Reactivate old Hamakua Slaughterhouse well for non-potable $100K Medium agricultural use in Honokaa/Hamakua(not eligible for FEMA grant) Construct new wells,surface water diversions,storage and transmission lines in Needs Planning/ Low priority areas investigation Promote better irrigation practices and water mans ement. $100K High Agricultural Water System for Kona, Honomalino: Provide water for $25M Medium agriculture and fire fighting assistance. not eligible for FEMA rant In planning Poohoohoo Reservoir Relining and pipeline $250K High Develop wells, storage, and construct transmission systems for Puna Needs Planning/ Low Scope definition Makalei Water System Improvements $5M/4-yrs Low Various Water System Improvements within the County of Hawaii $50M/15-yrs Low N Identify landslide and coastal erosion hazard areas and mitigation actions Planning Project Medium R New UH study is to generate potential slope stability hazard maps which Project starting Medium J could be used to identify zones that may warrant further detailed evaluation Investigate Effectiveness of VOG Mitigation Techniques High Develop Natural Hazard Mitigation Criteria Policies for County Facility Siting Medium z and Design y O Investigate Vulnerability of County Bridges and Plan Alternative Routes High 19-19 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Project Description Status Review the General Plan and Community Development Plan natural hazard Develop Natural Hazard d o policies in light of this mitigation plan update Mitigation Criteria Policies — a w. for County Facility Siting a and Design wN Conduct hazard loss estimation study;incorporate cost-benefit methodology as Proposed Planning Project: HAZUS MH model for disaster = N c a factor in prioritizing projects;Adapt HAZUS-MH or other hazard modeling to Building inventory planning to be ready for m Hawaii Island: improvements now need adoption in 2009;it should a o s c New building inventory data for Hawaii County makes HAZUS MH capable of conversion for use for replace the model currently CL a producing earthquake damage maps and reports at a much higher spatial hurricane loss estimation used by Pacific Disaster @ a resolution,based on the best available building and soil data,and it will perform Center in post-disaster lass FL @ analysis using ShakeMap output from USGS. estimation. N Hawaii County All-Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities Kau Hospital Hurricane and The detailed evaluation has d This project conducted onsite all-hazard rapid visual screening and building Seismic Retrofits identified priority buildings and construction as-built data collection for the EOC,10 fire stations,10 police providing the information ii stations,13 ambulance facilities,6 hospital/medical clinics,and the two major necessary to submit a PDM airports(KOA and ITO). HAZUS MH was been used to evaluate the expected grant application for Kau 3 losses for each facility. Hospital. w Study hardening and evacuation requirements for Hilo and Kona Airports See above Study hardening requirements for Hilo and Kawaihae Harbors SDOT Harbors Division .o=' jurisdiction d Study hardening,floodproofing,and bypass alternatives for major highways Needs further scope definition Proposed Planning Project c Study hardening requirements for fuel storage and distribution to critical Needs further scope definition Proposed Planning Project N facilities d H Study hardening requirements for electrical systems;Explore with utilities Needs further scope definition Proposed Planning Project a feasibility of underground power lines Change county zoning code to establish setbacks for a larger interface between Proposed Policy = urban and natural areas for wildfire mitigation c N N Update the building code from the 1991 UBC to the 2006 IBC Required by HRS 107 Part II County Deadline for as Also Include nonstructural earthquake damage prevention in the building code adoption will be in 2011 C U 2 Go to Page 1 3 m Go to Page 2 Nnte.'Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. Cnunty nfHawaii Multi-Hazard_Mitigation Plan 19-20 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strate,� HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Project Description Status Explore incentives for existing homeowners and businesses to retrofit their FEMA-funded HMGP project To further support this type of structures: completed;in publication from outreach,the following actions Investigation of Post and Pier Earthquake Damage and Development of UHM along with development are still needed: Incremental Retrofits for Hawaii Single-Family Residences of Expert System user 1. an expedited permit process This study has conducted building surveys of representative cases of post and interface by UHH,providing if the homeowner uses the pier homes,performed analysis of prototypical structures based on the as-built pre-engineered retrofits that standard recommended plans; data,and developed simple seismic retrofit schemes. have been rendered in 2. working with insurance guidelines and drawings that companies to get homeowners — a contractor can use without ,�, extensive engineering design. insurance credits for implementing these retrofits; c 3. need to expand the Expert o System to add the hurricane is mitigation techniques that were rn previously developed for the 2 Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund's U) Loss Mitigation Grant Program. Testing of the Seismic and Wind Performance of Single Wall Construction The project above only Proposed 1-year Project Establish the actual performance of single wall construction when subjected to deals with the post&pier major(M>7)earthquakes and hurricanes foundation;this project Develop more reliable design features for retrofit procedures would evaluate retrofit Incorporate improved modeling of this building type in HAZUS MH improvements to the single wall and roof system for earthquakes and hurricanes Water Conservation and Watershed Management Education: Mitigate the Proposed Project effects of drought by increasing the public's awareness of water conservation and watershed management. Build demonstration earthquake and hurricane retrofits to example homes Proposed Project s Create Hazard Retrofit Training Course at Hawaii Community College Proposed Project m Create Hazard Retrofit Training Shop Course for High Schools Proposed Project 0 O Add Mitigation Displays(hardcopy and digital)at Libraries Proposed Project Home retrofit construction performed by Boy Scouts Proposed Project s IL Produce Do-it-yourself retrofit training videos Proposed Project Note.-Italics indicates project called for in the 2005 County nfHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-21 Hawaii Couruy Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strate,U HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Project Description Status Conduct Public Meetings on VOG and how to mitigate it's effects Supplement with studies to Proposed Project document the rate of removal(efficacy)of the various proposed VOG mitigation techniques Hazard Information GIS Mapping Public Website: Parcel-based one-stop multi- Proposed Project,Some of the The architecture would be to allow a client to enter a TMK,an address,or a ZIP hazard lookup;the website maps may not yet have been code,and then be able to bring up a sequence of maps relevant to that location. must be easily and reliably developed;it would be If the TMK or address was entered,then that location would be flagged or maintained. advisable to consult with highlighted,on each map;if a ZIP code is entered,then the ZIP code area respective domain experts on covered would be highlighted. For each hazard,the client would be able to the types of information that bring up maps for each threat associated with the hazard. The client could then can be provided and the level click through to additional information on:what structures are most vulnerable of effort that would be required to the threat;how to mitigate for that particular threat;and links to additional to be both useful and cost- information on the threat. effective for this effort. Hazard Information GIS Mapping Public Website: Hazard Threat Primary Products Secondary Products/links Storm Sure Coastal Inundation Maps Design guidelines/standards for construction in coastal inundation zones Hurricane High Winds Wind Acceleration Maps Guidance on mitigation for high winds Flash Flooding FIRM Maps Guidance on flood-proofing dwellings Ground Acceleration Earthquake Ground Acceleration traps Guidance on earthquake retrofits for structural upgrades;Non-structural Earthquake Soil amplification/liquefaction maps mitigation measures;hnfo on structures most at risk Liquifaction Liquifaction Map, Structural guidance for liquefaction area, Volcanic Eruption Lava flow Lava flow risk maps HVO web,ite Vog Vog risk map(to be developed) Vog chemistry and types of threats(catchment,respiratory,corrosion) Ash and tephra fall Risk map of ashfall IVHHN web site(http://www.ivhhn.og/) Maps of ash deposits from known eruptions(Kilauea) Tsunami Coastal Flooding Inundation and Evacuation Maps Design guidelines/standards for coil suuctioil in inundation zones Guidance on locally-generated tsunami Flashflooding Water and FIRM Maps Flood-proofing residential dwellings debris flow Wildland fires Range and forest fire Long-term Rainfall/drought potential Drought assessment maps maps;Map of historical tires on each (htip://)x-ww.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/expert assessment/drought_as: island need to be developed) t.shtml Conduct Public Meetings for Persons with Special Needs Proposed Project Nnte.-Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. Cnuntl,nfHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-22 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Project Description Status Visitor Industry Disaster Preparation&Training Proposed Project Disaster Mitigation Planning Service for Communities Performed by High Proposed Project School Students Install seismometers in Middle Schools for educational awareness purposes Proposed Project Go to Page 1 Go to Page 2 Nnte.-Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. Cnunty nfHawaii Multi-Hazard_Mitigation Plan 19-23 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Mitigation Actions for Hurricane and Wind Events Project Description Status Identify high windspeed areas and vulnerable High Windspeed areas are now mapped,and Not effective for new construction until county structures have been adopted in the State Building Code adopts IBC 2006;can be used to evaluate risk to existing buildings Adapt HAZUS-MH or other hazard modeling to Hawaii Incorporate Hawaii building inventory and critical Proposed Planning Project;The HAZUS Island facilities into the HAZUS MH wind risk model. model now has a realistic building inventory Hurricanes will cause much higher losses than for Hawaii and Maui,but it needs to be earthquakes to residential buildings;vulnerable converted to the building modeling scheme structures can be identified with respect to high used for hurricane analysis. wind zones Emergency shelter evaluation;Harden public schools There is a shortage of shelter buildings in Hawaii Proposed Project; for emergency shelters. Of the 14 hurricane shelters County. Perform a 1-year study to identify and Then follow-up with the more detailed DAGS- on the island,only 4 have been evaluated by DAGS: rank Hawaii building types that could be standardized structural evaluation procedure for • Holualoa E.S. deemed safer for hurricane resistance without those public shelter facilities that have higher • Waikoloa E.S.bldg D exhaustive site investigations. Use this vulnerability. • Waikoloa E.S.bldg E screening criteria to determine the number of • Konawaena E.S. low vulnerability buildings available for refuge Perform a comprehensive screening evaluation of in the private sector. This could result in a public hurricane shelters and private sector buildings decrease in the number of persons that would for possible use for refuge report to a public shelter. Hawaii County All-Hazard Assessment of Hurricane This project would conduct onsite building Proposed Project: Shelters:Perform detailed evaluations similar to what construction as-built data collection for the This detailed evaluation will be identifying was done for Hawaii County critical facilities remaining 10 hurricane shelter buildings, priority buildings and providing the information using the more detailed DAGS-standardized necessary to submit PDM grant applications for structural evaluation procedure that follows three to four retrofit projects. the criteria established by the legislature. The three to four facilities with the highest-ranked losses will be taken to a detailed evaluation using Benefit Cost Analysis of potential mitigation measures. Hardening ofWaiakea High School Gym Waiakea High School Gym is a designated Last proposed for FY09 PDM grant; reapplied Window,Door& Enclosure Retrofitting hurricane shelter,but has glass doors and glass under HGMP. Application requires further Possible Roof&Framing connection retrofitting louvers investigation to define precise scope and cost, as well as developing the BCA Go to Page 1 Go to Page 2 Nnte.-Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. County nfHawaii Multi-Hazard_Mitigation Plan 19-24 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Mitigation Actions for Earthquake Events Project Description Status Identify earthquake-induced ground failure areas Proposed Planning Project Adapt HAZUS-MH or other hazard modeling to Hawaii New building inventory data for Hawaii County will make HAZUS MH new model for disaster Island,Develop scenario training and mitigation HAZUS MH be capable of producing earthquake damage planning will be ready for use in 2009 planning capabilities maps and reports at a much higher spatial resolution, for update of the PDC Earthquake based on the best available building and soil data,and it Scenario Atlas will perform analysis using ShakeMap output from USGS. Update the HAZUS MH model to incorporate detailed Compile detailed data on bridges in Hawaii County Proposed HSEAC Planning Project data on State and County Bridges Update the HAZUS MH model and develop more accurate bridge damage estimates for earthquake Current loss models reflect default data that is scenarios incomplete and not up to date with present status that Formulate priority rankings of higher vulnerability bridges includes bridges that have been seismically retrofitted not yet retrofitted Go to Page 1 Go to Page 2 Nnte.-Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. County nfHawaii Multi-Hazard_Mitigation Plan 19-25 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Mitigation Actions for Lava/VOG Project Description Status NOAH HYSPLIT Model tries to forecast S02 hourly based Based on wind modeling of dipersion over the course of Being used in an evaluation trial at on meteorological conditions and emission rates of the each day. HCDA and USGS HVO. Halemaumau and Pu'u O'o sources. Develop probabilistic lava flow maps and modeling: One of the technical issues is in how to consider Preliminary 100-year%probability of USGS is in the process of modernizing the lava inundation overtopped prior flows that become concealed by more inundation maps are being developed probabilistic maps. Based on average recurrence intervals recent flows. Otherwise,the map probabilities may be in 2009. Need to resolve under- with a poisson probabilistic model. too law. sampling of hazard before releasing. Could either use borings and/or simulation to refine. Enhanced Interactive Lava Flow Modeling Program FlowGo The model does not compute a rate of advance of the Received FEMA funding and under II terminus of the flow. Land cover roughness,are factors development: The most likely The study will provide updated information to identify at-risk that are not a part of the present model formulation,but candidate for use of this model is the areas as a lava flow progresses,and assist in locating which would be needed to be considered in the model to upslope part of Mauna Loa. highest hazard areas as flows approach. estimate a rate of flow. The model does not include build-up of deposited lava affecting the path of subsequent flows. Evaluate economic impacts and critical infrastructure and To be based on probabilistic lava hazard mapping under The existing lava hazard zone maps facility vulnerability from lava inundation development by HVO have been used to determine expected losses to residential construction in each district Community testing of pH and metal content in water Conducted by CSAV at community workshops catchments stems Go to Page 1 Go to Page 2 Nnte.-Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. Cnunty nfHawaii Multi-Hazard_Mitigation Plan 19-26 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING PRIORITIZATION RESULTS INDICATED)OCTOBER 12,2009 PAGE 1 Mitigation Actions for Tsunamis Project Description Status Update tsunami evacuation maps: The 2-D model is based on good topographic data along Ongoing project: Any necessary Tsunami Inundation and Runup Mapping: Analysis of the the coastline(e.g.,LIDAR). "Maximum credible evacuation zone changes would be island of Hawaii based on scenarios from tsunami-genic inundation"used to develop evacuation maps done by Quince Mento of HCDA based source regions along the Pacific Rim. Big Island mapping on updated information from UH focuses on 13 populated areas around the island. SOEST Need to note significant discrepancy with new FIRM maps. It The present maps have historical tsunami inundation Proposed Planning Project: There will was originally thought that the 2-D modeled tsunami embedded,but the new DFIRMS do not. FEMA is need to be post-DFIRM modifications to inundation maps would be incorporated into the FIRM maps addressing this issue in 2010 with a payload study to the Flood Maps if tsunami inundation is as the VE zone. However,FEMA is using a standard 1-D compare the differences between the existing and new to be any factor in zoning and model nationwide and would not allow exceptions. DFIRM maps,and to produce maps using the greater construction requirements. effect along the south and west coasts. Phase I: The first step is to compare the differences between the existing and new FIRM maps to determine where historic or the recently modeled tsunami hazard is greater. Phase II: UHM SOEST mapping(by Kwok Fai Cheung)can produce 100- year and 500-year probabilisitic tsunami hazard maps to provide future local modifications to the DFIRMs. Tsunami design guidelines for buildings Update of the design provisions for tsunami bore impact Under development by University of Sept 2010 guidelines for new and for evaluating existing and inundation/scouring Hawaii at Manoa,Princeton,OSU,and buildings. Martin&Chock;for future adoption Go to Page 1 Go to Page 2 Note.-Italics indicates project called for in the 2005 County ofHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-27 Hawaii County Hulti-Hazard Mitigatimr Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Mitigation Actions for Flooding Description Status Modernize FIRM maps with local amendments See http:gis.hawaiinfip.org/fhat Existing maps include historic tsunami FEMA has revised the DFIRM's and Flood Insurance Also included a re-evaluation of the inundation,but the new hurricane flood Study based on hurricane flooding hazard. Puukapu Watershed of the Waimea area study maps do not account for this These FIS maps do not include historic tsunami hazard. FEMA is addressing this issue in inundation data. The next step is to compare the 2010 with a payload study to compare the Project differences between the existing and new FIRM maps to differences between the existing and new determine where historic or the recently modeled tsunami DFIRM maps,and to produce maps using inundation hazard is greater. the greater effect along the south and west coasts. Area Development Plan for Existing and Future Floodplain management and land use Ongoing project scope: Recommend Development regulatory integration scope of work revisions to the Department of Public This project proposes to refine regulations and policies for includes examining regulatory integration Works for Chapters 10 and 27;and new development and provide community outreach in of grading ordinance(HCC chap 10), recommend revisions to the Planning regards to protection/precaution measures. Context flood control code(chap 27),subdivision Department for Chapters 23 and 25 and Sensitive Solutions methodology will be used to identify a code(chap 23),and zoning code(chap develop new regulatory measures to comprehensive programmatic approach to mitigate the 25) reduce flood hazards within the County of risks to existing and future developments. The study also Hawaii and to earn FEMA Community proposes to identify and prioritize floodplain mapping, Rating System(CRS)points for the develop policies for unprotected subdivisions,and County of Hawai'i. coordinate disaster preparedness planning for floods. Develop rainfall and streamflow gaging system suitable to Internet accessible tool to view real-time NOAA PSC developing prototype flood monitoring rainfall and streamflow data application for emergency managers Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the US Hawaiian Islands http://hdsc.new.noas.gov/hdsc/pfds NOAA release May 2009 Inlcudes:precipitation frequency estimates for durations from 5-minutes through 60 days,for return periods of 1- year through 1000 years. Feasibility of participating in the Community Rating Results in reduction in flood insurance Project requires documentation effort and System premiums analysis of repetitive loss properties Go to Pane 1 Go to Pane 2 Note.'Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. County gfHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-28 Hawaii Cnurny Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Mitigation Actions for Flooding Description Status Develop policies for repetitive loss structures Policy may or may not make economic This depends on an analysis of repetitive sense from a Benefit Cost Analysis loss properties Dam&Reservoir Safety DLNR and USCOE Evaluation; DWS repair of Kiholo Bay earthquake Drafting of Dam Safety Guidelines USCOE dam break inundation study of 11 damage at Waikoloa Permitting requirements for new dam construction dams statewide;PDC study of"sunny DLNR Engineering Division is completing Project Certification of compliance that owners meet Phase I day"dam break inundation for 138 dams Phase I Detailed Visual Inspections,and operation and maintenance recommendations and have statewide;dam break evacuation maps to updating the state dam inventory C-122. an emergency action plan. be developed by PDC for FEMA LIDAR-based remapping of stream beds(list by NRCS Proposed Project c RC&D v'R Use non-uniform return periods for flood plains Proposed Project d - Control development with region-specific ordinances in Proposed Project £m w d high hazard or unknown hazard watersheds o = o c, Evaluate applicability of FEMA floodproofing mitigation for Proposed Project —�°� Hawaii homes > £ Evaluate feasibility of absorption approach to floodplain Proposed Project d W c rn management is o aNi ° Evaluate use of retention structures for high slope areas Proposed Project ZUIY r= a Go to Pane 1 Go to Pane 2 Note.'Italics indicates project called.fin-in the 2005 County gfHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-29 Hawaii Cnurny Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Mitigation Actions for Drought and Wildfire Events Description Status Drought/Wildland Fire Mitigation Plan County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategy Being updated 2004 Identify wildfire hazard areas: See GIS maps in Drought Risk and Completed. Vulnerability Assessment and GIS Mapping Project Project,UHSOEST and SSRI,2003 Wildland Fire Mitigation Resource Mapping and Core resource inventory completed Periodic updates needed every 18 Inventory Program: Continue the development and months. Hawaii Wildfire Management maintenance of a GIS map and database to identify Organization does these updates; the location,type,and contact information for HWMO is also working on a portable various widland fire protection resources. version for first responders—due December 2009. Establish and maintain firebreaks around roads and $2.21M Long-term 1 5-yr proposed project communities in North and South Kohala districts (includes the Kawaihae,Waikoloa,and Waimea LL communities M Mitigate wildfire threat along strategic corridors in $500,000 2-year project Wildfire mitigation for the forest is an the Puako Forest to reduce the threat of a Ladder fuels along these corridors will be element in the South Kohala catastrophic crown fire that could destroy the forest removed. Community Development Plan,which and homes as well as threaten nearby resort was adopted by ordinance by Hawaii complexes. County in 2008. Install dry hydrants and develop static water $10,000/site in high hazard wildland fire Proposed Project sources: The water source/dry hydrant will allow districts fire trucks to refill their water tanks when fighting forest and grassland fires in the Hamakua area. Remote Weather Montoring:Establish and $85,000;Intellisense telemetry system under 5-yr proposed project maintenance Remote Automated Weather Stations development by UH This project partially completed with 3 in the districts of North Kohala,South Kohala,Kau, new RAWS stations in S.Kohala& Kona,and Mauna Kea. Kona Go to Page 1 Go to Page 2 Note.'Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. County ofHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-30 Hawaii Cnurny Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Description Status Use of prescribed burns to reduce fuel loads in fire $1.1 M annually for 500-acres;DOFAW 15-yr proposed project prone areas of Hawaii County: Use prescribed Note that the proposed active may be in conflict burns in fire prone areas including the communities where there are native forests of Waimea,Kawaihae,Puako,Waikoloa,Puu Anahulu,and Kailua-Kona. Project Roadside fuel management: Develop and maintain Proposed Project a roadside fuel management program along an identified corridor of Highway 190,South Kohala/North Kona. Agricultural practices to mitigate wildland fires in Needs a tax break incentive communities and subdivisions:Continue to investigate and expand agricultural practices to mitigate wildfire impacts by using livestock grazing in open pastures as a fuel management tool. This plan should be completed before final When developing these elements,the following subdivision approval is granted.These plans should standards should be considered: recommend specific measures for reducing wildfire • National Fire Protection(NFPA)document hazard in the interface areas between the 1141,Standard for Fire Protection subdivision and any range/open lands or forests Infrastructure for Land Development in and in any open areas within the subdivision. Suburban and Rural Areas, • National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)document 1144:Standard for Reducing Structure Ignition Hazards from Wildland fire,and • Criteria which delineate when and how new subdivisions will be required to install di tanks. Improvements to old plantation irrigation system $30M Received partial FEMA funding tunnels and ditches:Lower Hamakua Ditch System Renovations/improvements to old plantation $3M Proposed Project m irrigation system tunnels and ditches:Kau Sugar System Reactivation Improvements to old plantation irrigation system $261V Proposed Project °1 tunnels and ditches and new Kauahi reservoir: a Waimea Go to Pao.1 Go to Page 2 Note.'Italics indicates project called for in the 2005. County gfHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-31 Hawaii Cnurny Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Description Status Improvements to the Kohala Ditch Irrigation Proposed Project Aqueduct Improvements to old plantation irrigation transmission system: Ditch lining and/or closed piping work still needs to be done Renovate and Reactivate old abandoned plantation $2.51V Proposed Project Project wells in Pahala Renovate and Reativate old Hamakua $100,000 Proposed Project Slaughterhouse well for non-potable agricultural use in Honokaa/Hamakua Construct new wells,surface water diversions, Investigation storage and transmission lines in priority areas Irrigating wisely: Promote better irrigation practices $100,000 Proposed Project and water management. Agricultural Water System for Kona,Honomalino: $25M In planning Provide a reliable source of water for agriculture and fire fighting assistance. Evaluate vulnerability of County water systems and $1 M Completed water trucking capacity: Emergency Community Water Stations: Improve access to community water stations and develop additional stations for persons on catchment in priority areas. Dam&Reservoir Improvements Puu Waawaa Reservoir Completed; Note:post-earthquake repairs are $250K for Poohoohoo Reservoir Relining and currently being done%ompleted on pipeline HDWS, DHHL,and HDOA reservoirs Develop wells,storage,and construct transmission $20M for 177 ranch lots encompassing 10,000 This project is underway and will be systems for Puuka u acres completed Development and extension of domestic water $10M Completed a transmissions stem for Kawaihae CL Extension of domestic water transmission system Well,pump and tank being y for Oceanview completed;water spigot stations Develop wells,storage,and construct transmission Needs planning study Need to establish improvement systems for Puna district to finance this project. Go to Paae 1 Go to Paae 2 Note.'Italics indicates project called for in the 2005 County gfHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-32 Hawaii Cnurny Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING OCTOBER 12,2009 Description Status Makalei Water System Improvements: Develop $5M Proposed 4-yr Project additional wells and reservoirs as well as upgrade the transmission system in the area from Keahole to Kailua-Kona foragricultural users. Various Water System Improvements within the $50M Proposed 15-yr Project Project County of Hawaii: Develop additional sources, storage facilities,as well as upgrade the transmission and distribution systems in high priority areas. Go to Page 1 Go to Page 2 Note.'Italics indicates project called.fin-in the 2005. County ofHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-33 Hawaii Cnurny Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Stratq, HAWAII COUNTY PROJECT/PROPOSAL SUMMARY LISTING PRIORITIZATION RESULTS INDICATED)OCTOBER 12,2009 PAGE 1 Mitigation Actions for Landslides and Rockfalls,and Coastal Escarpment Erosion Project Description Status Identify landslide and coastal erosion hazard areas and DOT study of rock-fall vulnerability on state highways mitigation actions New UH study is to generate potential slope stability GIS maps are included,which could be used for To start in 2009,completion subsequent hazard maps which could be used to identify zones that prioritization of investigations as well as assessment to this hazard mitigation plan update may warrant further detailed evaluation during project tools for earthquake preparedness planning. Project to incorporate landslide risk loss estimation into A URS approach involved the interactions of three Under Development with completion in HAZUS. Earthquake analysis would identify slope failure primary slope hazard input criteria simplified to low, 2009;but needs further calibration and regions. medium and high hazard susceptibility. Three criteria: validation topography,geology,moisture content Go to Pao.1 Go to Page 2 Note.'Italics indicates project called for in the 2005 County ofHawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 19-34 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigatimr Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy Appendix Hazard Mitigation Project ••• - of 1 1 Agency/Organization: Hawaii Health Systems Jurisdiction: County of Hawaii Corporation,a public benefit corporation of the State of Hawaii ;the nation's fourth largest public hospitals stem Project Title: Hurricane and Seismic Retrofit of Contact Person: Warren Okaba ashi Kau Hospital, Island of Hawaii Phone: 808 974-4773 email: wokabayashi@hhsc.org Project Physical Address:1 Kamani Street, Pahala, Hawaii 96777 Project TMK: 19° 11' 59.76" N 155°28' 18.90"W Natural Hazard(s)to be Mitigated(check hazard[s]that apply): ❑Drought ❑Erosion ❑Flood MHurricane, High Winds ❑Landslide ESeismic ❑Tsunami olcano/Lava Flow ❑Wildfire ❑Other(specify): HAZMAT Meets Criteria for Environmental/Historical Preservation Long Range Solution(+15 years): Soundness: ❑ No 0 Yes ❑ No Yes If Yes,# ears: 25 Is Project Currently Listed in the State Multi Hazard Mitigation Plan and/or Applicable County Multi Hazard Mitigation Plan? State Plan: ❑ No Yes Count Plan: ❑ No Yes Applying For check all that apply): HMGP E PDM E State Mitigation Plan Project List Estimated TOTAL Cost of Project:$600,000 Project Period(duration): Estimated Federal Share of Project:$450,000 Estimated Non-Federal Share of Project:$150,000 Estimated Value of Structure or Facility:$8,640,000 Estimated Value of Structure's Contents:$4,320,000 Source(s)of Non-Federal Cost Match:State of Hawaii Hawaii Health Systems Corporation Project Description (use additional pages if necessary): Non-structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings and Facilities.Modifications to the non-structural elements of an existing isolated hospital facility to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage,protect patients,and ensure continuity of operations. Non-structural retrofits include: • Install exterior mounted roll-down storm shutters for windborne debris protection of windows • provide seismic bracing of existing ceilings in essential facility areas , • removal of an incinerator stack that is a potential falling hazard,and • mitigation against hurricane and windstorms through protection against windborne debris impacts on rooftop mechanical systems and • anchorage of nearby ancillary structures on site that would otherwise be large debris sources.. This is a multi-hazard retrofit in which the State of Hawaii's contribution is • the retrofit of the ventilation system to mitigate against harmful volcanic gas emissions and • abatement of some indoor hazardous ceiling material. With these retrofits,the capability for continuity of operations during hurricanes and earthquakes is improved. Kau Hospital is the only hospital serving the southern part of the County of Hawaii;the nearest alternate hospital is over 60 miles away. The Hawaii County All-Hazards Assessment of Critical Facilities identified this 1968 facility as having a higher priority for hazard mitigation from a comprehensive risk analysis of 80 critical buildings in Hawaii County. $600,000 Cost(Design and Construction)are itemized as follows: Window Protection against Windborne Debris $287,000 Ancillary Structure Anchorage for Wind $5,000 Rooftop Equipment Protection against Windborne Debris $65,000 Incinerator Demolition to Remove Falling Hazard $80,000 Ceiling Seismic Bracing $163,000 The Benefit Cost Analysis Tool Version 4.5.5 indicates a 25-year Benefit of$4.001 M; Benefit Cost Ratio of 6.67 A19-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy Appendix Today's Date: September 30, 2009 (Revised November 2009) Considerations Comments Community Acceptance Yes Social Adversely Affects Segments of No the Population Technical Feasibility Yes Technical Long-Term Solution Yes Secondary Impacts No Staffing Yes Administrative Funding Allocated Cost-match of$130,000 letter of certification available Maintenance/Operations Minimal long-term maintenance costs are included in the BCA Political Support Yes,high level support Political Plan Proponent Hawaii Health Systems Corporation Public Support Yes Authority Yes Legal Action Subject to Legal No Challenge Extensive benefit to ensuring continuity of critical Economic Benefit services provided by this hospital during hurricanes and earthquakes Cost of Action $520k total project cost,fed share=$390,000(75%of total) Contributes to Economic Goals Yes Outside Funding Required State of Hawaii has appropriated for its required 25% cost-match Affects Land/Water Bodies No Affects Endangered Species No Environmental Affects Hazardous Materials No and Waste Sites Consistent w/Community Yes Environmental Goals Consistent w/Federal Laws Yes Community Profile The Ka'u district is a rural agricultural district. Per the Hawaii County General Plan (2005), Ka'u district has high percentages of special needs and vulnerable populations (youth under <18, elderly 60+years, public assistance). These populations tend to be disproportionately impacted by natural hazard events, and may require special consideration when preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a disaster. Communities in Ka'u district are at risk from a number of hazards including hazard events such as earthquakes, tsunamis, lava flows and hurricanes, and chronic hazards such as volcanic gas emissions. How the proposed activity relates to the FEMA-approved mitigation plan: The first priority for implementation of the Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan is the hardening and retrofitting of critical facilities, i.e., those providing critical services such as hospitals. How the proposed activity relates to the State's FEMA-approved mitigation plan: Per the State of Hawaii Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 7 Mitigation Strategy, "Hospitals, fire stations, police stations, and other facilities statewide have been determined to be critical. Hawai'i County is also subject to hurricane and coastal flooding hazards. A comprehensive engineering screening of vulnerability of critical facilities would be of considerable benefit by A19-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy Appendix evaluating building performance and prioritizing the need for retrofit." The proposed PDM project is the result of that strategic process of selecting the most vulnerable critical facilities and developing the most cost-effective retrofits to enable improved functionality during a disaster. The Kau Hospital Hurricane and Seismic Retrofit project was developed as a result of a Hawaii County All-Hazards Assessment of Critical Facilities investigation that was conducted in 2008- 2009. The project engineering team lead by the University of Hawaii conducted an all-hazard rapid visual screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii. This included emergency command and control facilities, emergency first responders (fire stations, ambulance and police facilities), hospitals and clinics, and the two major airports (KOA and ITO). The assessment comprised approximately 80 buildings. A HAZUS MH risk assessment model has been used to evaluate the expected losses for each building, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and the site visits. The vulnerability of a building can be measured by economic loss or by loss of functionality related to the extent of damage. Both of these risk measures for earthquake and hurricane hazards were analyzed at an equivalent level of probability, so that an "apples to apples" comparison of effects for each building was possible. From the HAZUS MH analysis of all critical facility buildings in the study, we first identified a shorter candidate list of 32 structures that ranked higher in risk. Then building design and construction feature vulnerabilities were explicitly reviewed in order to determine, from the nine best mitigation candidates, the two higher-ranked facilities that were designated by Hawaii Civil Defense Agency for more detailed evaluation and development of recommended mitigation. After a preliminary engineering design and cost estimate, a Benefit-Cost Analysis was performed to evaluate the mitigation project because the analysis indicated high vulnerability to seismic and hurricane hazards.. This same detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit the full PDM grant application to FEMA. Type of mitigation activity proposed: Non-structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings and Facilities. Modifications to the non- structural elements of an existing isolated hospital facility to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage, protect patients, and ensure continuity of operations. Non-structural retrofits include bracing of building ceilings to prevent earthquake damage, protection against windborne debris breaching of the enclosure, and protection of ventilation systems, enhancement of the ventilation system to include better indoor air quality, and the abatement of hazardous material. Ka'u Hospital in Pahala, Hawaii, provides long-term care and acute care, obstetrics, emergency room, ambulance, and outpatient services. It is an essential facility for the southern Hawaii County districts of Puna, Kau, and South Kona. It is located in the Kau District of the County of Hawaii, the region of highest seismic hazard in the state, highest concentration of volcanic gas emissions, and is subject to hurricanes and windstorms since Hawaii is a hurricane and windborne debris hazard region. Built in 1968, its as-built condition predates modern A19-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 19:Mitigation Strategy Appendix requirements for seismic bracing of nonstructural elements and protection against windborne debris impacting windows. A common gas produced during the nearby Hawaiian eruptions just to the east that is potentially harmful to human health is sulfur dioxide. Exposure to gases can endanger those with heart and respiratory ailments. This is a multi-hazard retrofit in which the State of Hawaii's contribution is the retrofit of the ventilation system to mitigate against harmful volcanic gas emissions and abatement of some indoor hazardous material. The Federal share contribution is for seismic bracing of the ceiling grid in essential facility areas, removal of an incinerator stack that is a potential seismic falling hazard, and mitigation against hurricane and windstorms through protection against windborne debris impacts on windows and rooftop mechanical systems and anchorage of nearby ancillary structures on site that would otherwise be large debris sources. Matching funds will come from two sources, both expenditures of the Hawaii Health System Corporation: 1) Final design and construction documents for the retrofits prepared by a structural engineer, and 2) a Capital Improvement Project for Kau Hospital to provided enhanced supply air handling system to mitigate against Volcanic Gas (VOG), ceiling asbestos abatement, and the replacement of vulnerable jalousie louver windows for improved hurricane resistance and better control of the interior air environment. In past VOG episodes, patients have needed to be relocated to other hospitals because of lack of sufficient air pre-conditioning to eliminate sulfur dioxide and other VOG particulates. According to Hawaii Volcano Observatory 2008 estimates, Kilauea Volcano emits 2,300 tons of sulfur dioxide per day. The project was determined by the FEMA BCA tool to have over $4 million in benefits over 25 years accrued from building loss protection, contents loss prevention, and functionality protection to enable continuity of operations during hurricane and earthquake disasters. The Benefit Cost Ratio is expected to be 6.67. Thus,the combination of the proposed FEMA PDM retrofits with the state's already planned air handling and enclosure retrofits will mitigate against hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic gas hazards. A19-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 0 20. Plan Update Procedures Chapter•20:Plan Update Procedures CHAPTER 20 - PLAN UPDATE PROCEDURES 20.1 Plan Update Procedures Tn recognition of the need for establishing a formal process for hazard mitigation planning and preparedness within the County's operational structure, the County will initiate an approach to ensure that this plan is kept updated and pertinent actions are incorporated in other plans as applicable. Rather than just describe the need for plan maintenance and general tasks, this chapter was revised to provide specific actions and summary of specific ongoing hazard mitigation projects that will impact the next adoption of the mitigation plan. Thus, this provides a checklist of the resources expected for the plan maintenance taskings. This should ensure continuity and connectivity with ongoing and future work that should improve the next plan. This chapter now includes a checklist of presently ongoing or future hazard mitigation projects which should be explicitly monitored for future implementation into the plan: The plan will be monitored and updated according to the following procedures to maintain a reliable compendium of the latest information and a compass to keep the County pointed toward the disaster-resilient goals of this plan: 1. Continuing Role of the Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee: Within the County government itself, the County will continue to convene the Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee that will be responsible for monitoring, evaluating and updating the plan. The Planning Committee will include representatives from each County agency or department having hazard mitigation responsibilities. The Planning Committee will meet on a semi- annual basis with State Civil Defense to ensure that the monitoring, evaluation and updating tasks are being carried out. This enhanced communication will enable the various agencies to gain a comprehensive view of the County's hazard mitigation activities and a better understanding of the interrelationship of their actions. The semi-annual reports will enable the Planning Committee to participate in an annual workshop which will serve as an evaluation tool measuring the progress that has been made toward achieving the objectives of the plan. 2. The department and agency representatives will also prepare an annual briefing with the Mayor's office, possibly in conjunction with a joint county workshop /meeting of the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee of State Civil Defense. The Planning Committee will prepare an annual report by September of every year and present it to the Mayor. The annual report will: 1) evaluate progress on meeting the mitigation objectives set forth in Section of this plan; 2) indicate the status of the projects in the checklist; 3) identify priority projects for the upcoming year by potential funding source; 4) propose a work-plan for advancing new priority projects during the year assigning responsibilities and identifying target deadlines; 5) identify and list future revisions to the mitigation plan; and 6) highlight other plans that should incorporate hazard mitigation treasures. The Committee will finalize the report by the end of the calendar year, to provide timely input to the County's capital improvement and operational budget process. Tnformation from this annual report of hazard mitigation activities will be incorporated into Civil Defense's section of the Hawaii County Annual Report. 20-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 20:Plan Update Procedures 3. By March of 2012 and 2014, the County's Civil Defense Agency will prepare a list of necessary revisions to the mitigation plan based on the annual reports and input from the Planning Committee. The Civil Defense Agency will prepare final revisions by June, in time for any last minute changes to the County's budget necessitated by a plan revision. 4. SCD plans to team to conduct regular annual briefings with County Civil Defense, in order to stay updated on funding opportunities and requirements of NOAA and FEMA. The Plan Maintenance and Update Strategy checklist of Hawaii County hazard mitigation projects to be monitored for the future implementation into the plan: Mitigation Project Entity in Responsible Charge Estimated Completion of Technical Work Lava Flow Modeling Flow-Go II Don Thomas,University of Hawaii 2011 at Hilo Area Development Plan for Flood Galen Kuba,County of Hawaii 2011 Ordinance and Policy Revisions DPW Landslide Hazard Mapping;UH will Peter Nicholson,University of 2011 develop maps that will identify priority Hawaii at Manna criteria and critical areas for more detailed study(e.g.,road cuts and lifelines). Tsunami evacuation map updates based on Hawaii County Civil Defense December 2010 revised inundation model by Kwok Fai Cheung,University of Hawaii at Manoa (inundation maps completed) Dam Break evacuation maps Pacific Disaster Center December 2010 All-Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities University of Hawaii Social Science Completed September 2010 Statewide Research Institute Hurricane,Seismic,VOG,and Hazmat Hawaii Health System Corporation, 2012 abatement retrofits at Ka'u Hospital Hawaii State Civil Defense Post&Pier Retrofit Expert Don Thomas,University of Hawaii Fall,2010 Tool at Hilo Use HAZUS MH MR4 with Hawaii Pacific Disaster Center Fall,2010 Enhanced Data;discontinue HAZUS 99 Update the Building Code to the 2006 County of Hawaii Department of 2012 deadline;bill to adapt International Building Code using the Public Works currently in county council Hawaii State Building Code as mandated by hearings HRS§107 Part IT Harden public school emergency shelters. Department of Accounting& 2012 Holualoa E.S. • Waikoloa E.S.Bldg D General Services,Hawaii State • Waikoloa E.S.Bldg E Civil Defense • Konawaena E.S. 20-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•20:Plan Update Procedures Mitigation Project Entity in Responsible Charge Estimated Completion of Technical Work New DFTRM's to be based on the most protective of FEMA's 2008 hurricane study FEMA,County Hawaii 2011 boundaries and the current FTRM's coastal Department of Public Works floodplain boundary.The northeast coastline will continue to reflect the current FIRM'S coastal floodplain boundary,which is based on Tsunami indundation. Iimprove the riverine flood zones on the FEMA,County of Hawaii 2011 DFTRMs Department of Public Works Other anticipated work in the next 1 to 4 years includes: • Public awareness community-based workshops and symposia where public input is gathered while providing specific hazard, risk, and mitigation information. Hawaii County agencies regularly have several such public meetings every month, supported by coordinated efforts of the Hawaii Volcano Observatory and University of Hawaii • Public Symposia and Teacher Training Workshops on Natural Hazards (2010) CSAV will host a series of four public symposia and teacher training workshops that will address the major natural hazards occurring in Hawaii (Volcanic Eruptions, Earthquakes, Tsunami, and Hurricanes). The format of each workshop and symposium will consist of a morning set of presentations that will address various aspects of the hazard: the "science of the hazard"; the impacts of the hazard on individuals; the impact of the hazard on the community and critical infrastructure; mitigation measures that individuals can take to reduce the threat of the hazards; mitigation and assistance measures that the government has taken or can take to reduce the threat to the community. The symposia will be free and open to the public. School teachers on the island will be offered an opportunity to attend the symposia and participate in follow-on workshops for professional training credit that will contribute to their advancement in their profession. Enrolled teachers will be required to attend the morning Public Symposium session and, after a noon break, will reconvene for the first of the follow-on workshop sessions. In this meeting, the experts who provided presentations to the morning session will participate in discussion sessions with the teachers to: answer more technical questions, provide guidance on available curricular materials relevant to the hazard, and assist teachers to develop ideas and concepts for incorporating hazards awareness in their lesson plans. Discussions with the domain experts will be followed by a group activity under the guidance of a master teacher in the refinement of lesson plans that contribute to their students' ability to meet current curricular standards for their grade level. These activities will conclude the first workshop. About two weeks later, the teachers will be required to attend a second workshop to provide feedback and discussion on the results of their use of the hazards- related lesson plan in the classroom. The second workshop will also incorporate a field trip and visit to a facility relevant to the hazard(e.g. a visit to the Kilauea summit and the 20-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter•20:Plan Update Procedures Hawaiian Volcano Observatory) with a domain expert who will be able to discuss the scientific background of the field visit and the relevance of the facility to the hazard. The Public Symposia and Teacher Training program will be conducted in Hilo and Honolulu to target teachers on the Big Island and on Oahu; if resources permit, additional symposia will be conducted in Kona and a series of Symposia and Workshops will be offered on Maui. Further assessment of the public comments received during the public survey on disaster preparedness to identify needs Continuing project nomination opportunities for funding Within the County government itself, the County will continue to convene the Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee that will be responsible for monitoring, evaluating and updating the plan. The Planning Committee will include representatives from each County agency or department having hazard mitigation responsibilities. The Planning Committee will meet on a semi-annual basis with State Civil Defense to ensure that the monitoring, evaluation and updating tasks are being carried out. The department and agency representatives will also prepare an annual briefing with the Mayor's office, possibly in conjunction with a joint county workshop / meeting of the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee of State Civil Defense. The Planning Committee will prepare an annual report by September of every year and present it to the Mayor. The annual report will: 1) evaluate progress on meeting the mitigation objectives set forth in Section of this plan; 2) indicate the status of the projects in the checklist; 3) identify priority projects for the upcoming year by potential funding source; 4) propose a work-plan for advancing new priority projects during the year assigning responsibilities and identifying target deadlines; 5) identify and list future revisions to the mitigation plan; and 6)highlight other plans that should incorporate hazard mitigation measures. Involvement of State Civil Defense to inform on funding opportunities and FEMA requirements Update of the State Civil Defense hazard mitigation public website(2001) As an aid to the Planning Committee, notes relating to FEMA conditions and rules for funding of hazard mitigation projects are included in the following section. 20-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 22-Plan Update Prncedurer NOTES ON FEMA FUNDING OF PROJECTS: The following list provides examples of activities that are not eligible for HNIA funding: ♦Projects that do not reduce the risk to people,homes,neighborhoods,structures,or infrastructure; ♦Projects that are dependent on another phase of a project(s)in order to be effective and/or feasible; ♦Projects for which actual physical work such as groundbreaking,demolition,or construction of a raised foundation has occurred prior to award. ♦Projects constricting new buildings or facilities with the exception of sale room construction and SRL mitigation reconstruction; ♦Projects that create revolving loan funds; ♦Activities required as a result of negligence or intentional actions,or the reimbursement of legal obligations such as those imposed by a legal settlement,court order,or State law; ♦Activities on Federal lands or associated with facilities owned by another Federal entity; ♦Major flood control projects related to the construction,demolition,or repair of dams,dikes,levees,floodwalls,seawalls,groins, jetties,breakwaters,and erosion projects related to beach nourishment or re-nourishment; ♦Projects for hazardous fuels reduction in excess of 2 miles from structures; ♦Projects that address unmet needs from a disaster that are not related to mitigation; ♦Retrofitting facilities primarily used for religious purposes,such as places of worship(or other projects that solely benefit religious organizations). ♦Projects that only address man-made hazards; ♦Projects that address operation,deferred or future maintenance,repairs,or replacement(without a change in the level of protection provided)of existing structures,facilities,or infrastructure(e.g.,dredging,debris removal,replacement of obsolete utility systems, bridges,and facility repair/rehabilitation); ♦Projects to do the following: •Landscaping for ornamentation(trees,shrubs,etc); •Site remediation of hazardous materials(with the exception eligible activities such as,the abatement of asbestos and/or lead- based paint and the removal of household hazardous wastes to an approved landfill); •Water quality infrastructure; •Address ecological or agricultural issues; •Protection of the environment and/or watersheds; •Forest management; •Prescribed burning or clear-cutting; •Creation and maintenance of fire breaks,access roads,or staging areas;and •Irrigation systems; 20-5 Hawaii Cnurziy.I9ulii-Hazard Mitigatinrr Plan Chapter 20:Plan Update Prncedurer ♦Mapping,flood studies,and planning activities,such as plan revisions/amendments or risk assessments,when they do not result in a FEMA-approved hazard mitigation plan; ♦Studies not directly related to the design and implementation of a proposed mitigation project;and ♦Preparedness measures and response equipment(e.g.,response training,electronic evacuation road signs,interoperable communications equipment). The following activities are not eligible as stand-alone activities but are eligible only when included as a functional component of eligible mitigation activities: ♦For HMGP and PDM generators and/or related equipment purchases(e.g.,generator hook-ups)when the generator directly relates to the hazards being mitigated and is part of a project(the 5%initiative allows for the stand-alone purchase of generators); ♦Real property or easements purchases required for the completion of an eligible mitigation project.For safe room projects,no real property or casement purchase is eligible;and ♦Studies that are integral to the development and implementation of a mitigation project,including hydrologic and hydraulic, engineering,or drainage studies. Mitigation Projects Eligible for FEMA Grant Funding under one or more of the five HMA programs: ♦Property Acquisition and Structure Demolition–The acquisition of an existing at-risk structure and,typically,the underlying land,and conversion of the land to open space through the demolition of the structure. ♦Property Acquisition and Structure Relocation–The physical relocation of an existing structure to an area outside of a hazard-prone area,such as the Special Flood Hazard Area(SFHA)or a regulatory erosion zone and,typically,the acquisition of the underlying land. The property must be deed-restricted in perpetuity to open space uses to restore and/or conserve the natural floodplain functions. ♦Structure Elevation–Physically raising an existing structure to an elevation at or above the Base Flood Elevation(BFE)or higher if required by FEMA or local ordinance. ♦Mitigation Reconstruction–The construction of an improved,elevated building on the same site where an existing building and/or foundation has been partially or completely demolished or destroyed.Mitigation reconstruction is only permitted if traditional structure elevation cannot be implemented and for structures outside of the regulatory floodway or coastal high hazard area. ♦Dry Floodproofing–Techniques applied to keep structures dry by sealing the structure to keep floodwaters out. •Dry Floodproofing of Historic Residential Structures is permissible only when other techniques that would mitigate to the BFE would cause the structure to lose its status. •Dry Floodproofing of Non-residential Structures must be performed in accordance with NFIP Technical Bulletin 3-93,Non-Residential Floodproofing—Requirements and Certification,and the requirements pertaining to dry floodproofing of nonresidential structures found in 44 CFR Parts 60.3(b)(5)and(c)(4). 20-6 Hawaii Cnurriy A9ulii-Hazard Mitigatinrr Plan Chapter 22:Plan Update Prncedurer ♦Minor Localized Flood Reduction Projects—These projects may include the installation or modification of culverts and floodgates,minor floodwall systems that generally protect an individual structure or facility,storm water management activities such as creating retention and detention basins,and the upgrade of culverts to bridges. ♦Structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings—Modifications to the structural elements of a building to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage and to protect inhabitants. ♦Non-structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings and Facilities—Modifications to the non-structural elements of a building or facility to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage and to protect inhabitants. ♦Safe Room Construction—Safe room construction projects are designed to provide immediate live safety protection for people in public and private structures from severe wind events,including hurricanes.This type of project includes retrofits of existing facilities or new safe room construction projects. ♦Infrastructure Retrofit—Measures to reduce risk to existing utility systems,roads,and bridges. ♦Soil Stabilization—Projects to reduce risk to structures or infrastructure from erosion and landslides,including installing geo-textiles,sod stabilization,installing vegetative buffer strips,preserving mature vegetation,decreasing slope angles,and stabilizing with rip rap and other means of slope anchoring. ♦Wildfire Mitigation—Projects to mitigate the risk to at-risk structures and associated loss of life from the threat of future wildfire through: •Defensible Space for Wildfire—Projects creating perimeters around homes,structures,and critical facilities through the removal or reduction of flammable vegetation. •Application of Ignition-resistant Construction—Projects that apply ignition-resistant techniques and/or non-combustible materials on new and existing homes,structures,and critical facilities. •Hazardous Fuels Reduction—Projects that remove vegetative fuels proximate to the at-risk structure that,if ignited,pose significant threat to human life and property,especially critical facilities.. ♦Post-Disaster Code Enforcement—Projects designed to support the post-disaster rebuilding effort by ensuring that sufficient expertise is on hand to ensure appropriate codes and standards,including NFIP local ordinance requirements,are utilized and enforced. ♦S%Initiative Projects—These HMGP projects provide an opportunity to fund mitigation actions that are consistent with the goals and objectives of the State and local Hazard Mitigation Plans Activities that might be funded under the 5%Initiative include: ♦The use,evaluation,and application of new,unproven mitigation techniques,technologies,methods,procedures,or products; ♦Equipment and systems for the purpose of warning citizens of impending hazards; ♦Purchase of generators or related equipment,such as generator hook-ups; ♦Hazard identification or mapping and related equipment for the implementation ofmitigation activities; ♦Geographic Information System(GIS)software,hardware,and data acquisition whose primary aim is mitigation; ♦Public awareness or education campaigns about mitigation;and ♦Evaluation of model building codes in support of future adoption and/or implementation. 20-7 Hawaii Cnurriy A9ulii-Hazard Mitigatinrr Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f LJ 21. References Chapter 21:References CHAPTER 21 - REFERENCES 1. Applied Research Associates(ARA), "Hazard Mitigation Study for the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund" (incorporates part of FEMA-sponsored iniki Building Performance Report),December 2001. 2. Cheung, Kwok Fai, "Status Report: Evaluation of Tsunami Evacuation Maps for Hawaii", University of Hawaii,November 2002. 3. Cheung, K. F., et al. "Modeling of Storm-induced Coastal Flooding for Emergency Management,"Ocean Engineering 30 (2003) 1353-1386. 4. County of Hawaii, Emergency Operations Plan, 1989. 5. Cox,Doak, "Hurricane Iwa and Coastal Flood Hazard Estimation in Hawai'i," Environmental Center,University of Hawai'i SR:0032,January 1983. 6. Curtis, George, D., Hawaii Inundation/Evacuation Map Project,Final Report,Joint Institute for Marine and Atmospheric Research,University of Hawaii,April 1991. 7. Fletcher, C,B. Richmond, E. Grossman,A. Gibbs,Atlas of Natural Hazards in the Hawaiian Coastal Zone,Prepared in cooperation with University of Hawaii, State of Hawaii Office of Planning, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Service Geologic Investigations Series 1-2761,2002. 8. Giambelluca, T.W., et al. "Drought in Hawai'i". Prepared for the State of Hawai'i, Department of Land and Natural Resources, Report R88. December 1991. 9. Giambelluca, T.W., et al. Rainfall Atlas of Hawaii. Prepared for Department of Land and Natural Resources,Report R76,June 1986. 10. Haraguchi, P., Hurricanes in Hawaii,prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1984. 1 l. Haraguchi, Paul, 1980, "Storm of January 8 - 10, 1980, State of Hawai'i,"DLNR, December 1980. 12. Harding ESE, County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual,prepared for the County of Hawaii, December 18, 2001. 13. Hawaii Hazard Mitigation Forum website,http://www.mothemature-hawaii.com 14. Hawaii Multihazard Science Advisory Council(MSAC). Hurricane Hazard Advisory from the Hawaii MSAC to the State Hazard Mitigation Forum, 2002. 15. Hawaii Multihazard Science Advisory Council(MSAC). Earthquake Hazard Advisory from the Hawaii MSAC to the State Hazard Mitigation Forum, 2002. 16. Hawaii Multihazard Science Advisory Council(MSAC). Lava Inundation Hazard Advisory from the Hawaii MSAC to the State Hazard Mitigation Forum,2002. 17. Heliker, C. "Volcanic and Seismic Hazards on the Island of Hawaii",U.S. Geological Survey, 1990. 21-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 21:References 18. Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited(NZ) &the University of Hawaii at Manoa, "Methodology for Hazard Ranking for Hawaii County,"October 2003. 19. IT Corporation(prime contractor),Hawaii Disaster Debris Management Plan. Prepared for Office of Solid Waste Management, Department of Health and Civil Defense Agency, Department of Defense,June 2000. 20. Johnson, C. and J. Michaud. Dam Failure Inundation Mapping Project,NASA Contract No.NASW-99044, January 15,2003. 21. Juvik, S. and J. Juvik,Atlas of Hawaii(3d ed.),University of Hawaii Press, 1998. 22. Macdonald, G.A.,A. T. Abbott,F.L. Peterson, Volcanoes in the Sea(2d ed.), University of Hawaii Press, 1983. 23. Martin&Chock, Inc.,Average Annualized Loss Estimates for Hazards in the State of Hawaii, Prepared for the Multi-Hazard Science and Technical Advisory Committee to the Statewide Hazard Mitigation Forum,2003. 24. Martin&Chock, Inc. "HAZUS-MH, Summary of Issues and Comments Relating to Applications in the Pacific Region for Earthquake,Flood, and Hurricane Loss Estimation",Hawai'i HAZUS Training and Proposed User Group Attendees,January 2004, compiled June 2, 2004,Version 1.0, including FEMA replies as of May 17, 2004. 25. Schroeder, Tom, 1993,"Hawai'i Hurricanes: Their History, Causes, and Future,"Office of State Planning,December 1993. 26. SSFM, Inc., Hawaii Island Flood Hazard Mitigation Plan, Prepared for the County of Hawaii Planning Department with a FEMA flood mitigation planning grant, 2003. 27. State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources,National Flood Insurance Program in Hawaii, Circular C90, 1994. 28. Thomas,W. "The Variety of Physical Environments among Pacific Islands,"in Man's Place in the Island Ecosystem (ed.by F.R. Fosberg),Bishop Museum Press, 1965. 29. U.S. Department of Agriculture,Natural Resources Conservation Set-vice, The Waiakea Stream Preliminary Investigation report,November, 1999. 30. U.S. Department of Agriculture,Natural Resources Conservation Set-vice, The Wailuku-Alenaio Watershed Reinvestigation report, December, 1999. 31. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA), Excerpt from letter to JIMAR/UH; original not presently available, 1987. 32. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA),Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses, State and Local Mitigation Planning How- To Guide,Version 1.0,August 2001. 33. Walker,Daniel, "Local Tsunami Real-time Warning System," Science of Tsunami Hazards,v. 20,n. 1,2002. 34. Wentworth, C. "Principles of Stream erosion in Hawaii"in Journal of Geology,v. XXXVI, n. 5, July-August 1928. 21-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 21:References 35. Wilson Okamoto Corporation, County of Hawaii Drought Mitigation Strategies(Draft), prepared for the Hawaii Drought Committee and State of Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management, September 29, 2004. 36. Wiss,Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc., June 1993. Potential Seismic Hazards and Emergency Response Preparedness of Essential Fire Stations and Hospitals in the County of Hawaii. Prepared for the State of Hawaii Office of Civil Defense and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board. 37. Wiss,Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc., September 1994. Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide. FEMA 74 (3rd ed.). 38. ASCE-TCLEE (American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering), 1998. "Seismic Guidelines for Ports",ASCE-TCLEE Monograph No. 12 (S. Werner, editor), ASCE Press, Reston VA. 39. Geolabs, Inc.,2007. "Liquefaction evaluation of Kawaihae Harbor,"damage assessment report to the State of Hawaii Harbors Division,Honolulu,HI. 40. Sea Engineering, Inc. 2006. "Kawaihae Harbor Earthquake Damage Dive Survey Report",prepared for Miyasato Kuniyoshi Engineers, LLC,Honolulu,Hi. 41. UFC (Unified Facilities Criteria),2005. "Design: Piers and Wharves". Standard 4-152- 01. United States Department of Defense,Washington,DC. 42. University of Hawaii, 2006. "Reconnaissance Following the October 15th, 2006 Earthquakes on the Island of Hawaii", Research Report UHM/CEE 106-07, October 26, 2006,Manoa,HI. 43. URS Group,Inc., 2007. "Port Facility Analysis of Kawaihae Harbor and Seismic Hazard Mitigation Guidelines for Pacific Island Ports",prepared for FEMA Hazard Mitigation Technical Assistance Program, FEMA 1664-DR-HI, Oakland, CA. 21-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f LJ 22. Glossary Chapter 22:Glossary CHAPTER 22 - GLOSSARY Adverse Consequences-Negative impacts that may result from failure. The primary concerns are loss of human life, economic loss (including property damage),lifeline disruption, and environmental impact. Annualized Benefits and Costs- The value of benefits and costs based on the probability the benefit or cost will be realized in a given year. Assets-Lives,buildings,utilities and transportation systems, cultural, social. . . Benefit-Any increase in utility or well-being to an individual, group or society associated with an action or choice. Bounded from below by price. It is synonymous with value in economic theory. Benefits and costs are complementary-a cost is a negative benefit, since costs decrease well-being and benefits increase well-being. Benefit/Cost Analysis - A systematic quantitative method of assessing the desirability of government projects or policies when it is important to take a long view of future effects and abroad view of possible side-effects. Benefit/cost analysis is recommended as the technique to use in a formal economic analysis of government programs or projects. (From OMB A-94) Consequences-Damages (full or partial), injuries, and losses of life,property, environment, and business that can be quantified by some unit of measure, often in economic or financial terms. Cost-Any reduction in utility or well-being to an individual, group or society associated with an action or choice. Generally it is not the same as price,which bounds cost from above. Cost Effective-The least cost alternative means for achieving the same stream of benefits or a given objective. Cost-effectiveness analysis is less comprehensive than benefit/cost analysis, but can be appropriate when the benefits from competing alternatives are the same or where a policy decision has been made that the benefits must be provided. It can be used to compare programs with identical costs but differing benefits. FEMA guidance has defined cost-effective as the benefits equal to or exceeding the costs. (From OMB A-94) Damage-Damage refers to physical destruction measured by physical indicators such as the number of deaths and injuries or the number of buildings destroyed. Disaster- The impact of a natural event upon a vulnerable community resulting in disruption, damage, and casualties that cannot be relieved by the unaided capacity of locally- mobilized resources. Disaster Management-The efficient use of resources to coordinate the processes of relief, recovery, and reconstruction. 22-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 22:Glossary Disaster Response-Activities occurring in the aftermath of a disaster which assist disaster victims and which rehabilitate or reconstruct damaged infrastructure. Discount Rate-Discount rate is the interest rate used in calculating the present value of expected yearly benefits and costs. Net present value represents the discounted value of future benefits and costs. Discounting reflects the time value of money and the view that benefits and costs are worth more when they are experienced sooner. OMB determines the discount rate for analysis of federally funded projects. Empirical-Relying on experience or observation, capable of being verified or disproved by observation or experiment. Exposure- The number,types, qualities, and monetary values of various types of property or infrastructure and life that may be subject to an undesirable or injurious hazard event. GIS- Geographic Information System. A computerized mapping system and tool that enables the visual display of geography to various scales linked with information, often from databases. For the purposes of hazard mitigation,the system allows planners to take information about a specific area,to overlay a hazard to see areas that might be impacted, and to develop actions to minimize the impacts. Hazard-An event or physical condition that has the potential to cause fatalities, injuries, property damage, infrastructure damage, agricultural loss, damage to the environment, interruption of business, or other types of harm or loss. Hazard Mapping-The process of establishing geographically where certain phenomena are likely to pose a threat to human settlements. Hazard Potential-Possible adverse consequences. Hazard Potential Classification- A system that categorizes dams according to the degree of adverse incremental consequences of a failure or mis-operation of a dam. The hazard potential classification does not reflect in any way on the current condition of the dam (e.g., safety, structural integrity, flood routing capacity.) Impacts- The impacts of a disaster include market-based and non market-based effects. Market-based impacts include destruction of property and a reduction in income and sales. Non-market effects include environmental consequences and psychological effects suffered by persons involved in a disaster. Incremental Consequences- Under the same conditions(e.g. flood, earthquake, or other event),the difference in impacts that would occur due to failure or mis-operation of the dam over those that would have occurred without failure or mis-operation of the dam and appurtenances. 22-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 22:Glossary Loss-Any reduction in value, or well-being to individuals, groups or society. A loss is a cost. Losses avoided are benefits. Direct Losses-Losses linked directly to a hazard event including all damages and employment losses due directly to the closure of damaged facilities. Indirect Losses -All losses other than direct losses. Indirect losses include economic losses due to dislocations in undamaged factories or commercial ventures,banking, and insurance as well as non financial losses such as loss of historical resources,pain, and suffering. Maximum Foreseeable Loss - An estimate of losses assuming the worst combination damage and disruption to a business. This estimate allows consideration of the worst possible consequences. Mitigation-All actions taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects. Mitigation activities contrast with short-term risk-reducing actions such as preparedness,response and recovery measures and risk spreading measures such as insurance. Multiplier- The ratio between the direct effect on output or employment and the full effect including the effects of second order rounds or spending. (From OMB A-94) Natural Hazard- The probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging natural phenomenon within a specific period of time. Some of these include tropical cyclones, hurricanes, drought, earthquakes, floods, landslides,tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. Net Present Value- The discounted monetized value of expected net benefits (i.e., benefits minus costs). This is the standard criterion for deciding whether a government program can be justified on economic principles. Net present value is compute by assigning monetary values to benefits and costs, discounting future benefits and costs using an appropriate discount rate, and subtracting the sum total of discounted costs from the sum total of discounted benefits. (From OMB A-94) Opportunity Cost- The value of alternatives foregone to achieve the mitigation activity. It can be thought of as the value of the good or service in its best alternative use. Present Value-The value of a stream of benefits or costs when discounted back to the present time. Probable-Likely to occur; reasonably expected;realistic. Probability and Frequency- A measure of how often an event is likely to occur. Frequency can be expressed as the average time between occurrences or exceedances (non- exceedances) of an event or the percent chance or probability of the event occurring or being exceeded(not exceeded)in a given year or a longer time period. 22-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 22:Glossary Process Mitigation-Indirect mitigation activities that lead to policies,practices and projects that reduce risk. They include efforts to assess hazards,vulnerability and risk; conduct planning to identify projects,policies and practices and set priorities; educate decision- makers and build constituencies and political will; and to facilitate the selection, design, funding and construction of projects. Project Mitigation -Project mitigation includes measures to avoid or reduce damage resulting from hazard events. They include projects to elevate, acquire and/or relocate buildings, lifelines and structures threatened by floods, strengthen buildings to resist earthquake or wind forces, and to improve drainage and land conditions. Rehabilitation-Action undertaken in the weeks or months following a disaster to restore basic services which enable life in the region to return to normality. However, it should be recognized that normality also gave rise to a disaster. Therefore,the term can be equated with vulnerability, and there is thus a need to advance from the status quo towards post-disaster improvements. Relief-Attention to immediate and basic needs of disaster survivors. These needs include food, clothing, shelter, and medical or emotional care. In the case of fast-impact disasters such as floods, earthquakes or cyclones,this process is directed at saving lives and alleviating further suffering. Risk-Potential losses associated with a hazard, defined in terms of expected probability and frequency, exposure, and consequences. Risk is therefore the product of specific risk and elements at risk;the convolution of the probability hazard,vulnerability(or fragility), and asset exposure. Risk Assessment-A process or method for evaluating risk associated with a specific hazard and defined in terms of probability and frequency of occurrence,magnitude and severity, exposure, and consequences. Shadow Prices -If a market in a good is not perfectly competitive,then market prices will not reflect the opportunity costs of that good. The price of the good, as corrected to equal its opportunity cost, is termed its shadow price. Vulnerability-The susceptibility to physical injury,harm, damage, or economic loss. 22-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f LJ 23. Plan Review Crosswalk -4L MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK INSTRUCTIONS FOR USING THE PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK FOR REVIEW OF LOCAL MITIGATION PLANS Attached is a Plan Review Crosswalk based on the Local Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning Guidance,published by FEMA in July,2008. This Plan Review Crosswalk is consistent with the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act(Stafford Act),as amended by Section 322 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000(P.L.106-390),the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968,as amended by the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004(P.L.108-264) and 44 Code of Federal Regulations(CFR)Part 201—Mitigation Planning,inclusive of all amendments through October 31,2007. SCORING SYSTEM N—Needs Improvement: The plan does not meet the minimum for the requirement. Reviewer's comments must be provided. S—Satisfactory: The plan meets the minimum for the requirement. Reviewer's comments are encouraged,but not required. Each requirement includes separate elements.All elements of a requirement must be rated"Satisfactory'in order for the requirement to be fulfilled and receive a summary score of"Satisfactory." A"Needs Improvement"score on elements shaded in gray(recommended but not required)will not preclude the plan from passing. When reviewing single jurisdiction plans,reviewers may want to put an N/A in the boxes for multi-jurisdictional plan requirements.When reviewing multi- jurisdictional plans,however,all elements apply. States that have additional requirements can add them in the appropriate sections of the Local Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning Guidance or create a new section and modify this Plan Review Crosswalk to record the score for those requirements. Optional matrices for assisting in the review of sections on profiling hazards,assessing vulnerability,and identifying and analyzing mitigation actions are found at the end of the Plan Review Crosswalk. The example below illustrates how to fill in the Plan Review Crosswalk.: Assessing Vulnerability: Overview Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(ii): [The risk assessment shall include a]description of the jurisdiction's vulnerability to the hazards described in paragraph(c)(2)(i)of this section. This description shall include an overall summary of each hazard and its impact on the community. Location in the Plan(section or SCORE Element annex and page#) Reviewer's Comments N S A. Does the new or updated plan include an Section II,pp.4-10 The plan describes the types of assets that are located within geographically defined overall summary description of the hazard areas as well as those that would be affected by winter storms. jurisdiction's vulnerability to each hazard? B. Does the new or updated plan address Section II,pp.10- The plan does not address the impact of two of the five hazards addressed in the plan. the impact of each hazard on the 20 Required Revisions: jurisdiction? Include a description of the impact of floods and earthquakes on the assets. Recommended Revisions: This information can be presented in terms of dollar value or percentages of damage. SUMMARY SCORE J U L Y i , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M ) A- 1 LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK Local Mitigation Plan Review and Approval Status Jurisdiction: County of Hawaii Title of Plan: Date of Plan: County of Hawaii Mult-Hazard Miti ation Plan Aril 2010 Local Point of Contact:Quince T.Mento Address: Title:Administrator Agency:Count of Hawaii Civil Defense Agency Phone Number: 808 935-0031 E-Mail:gmento@co.hawaii.hi.us State Reviewer:Dawn Johnson Title: Date: FEMA Reviewer: Title: Date: Diane Earl Plan Reviewer July 19,2010 Date Received in FEMA Region Insert# Plan Not Approved X Plan Approved Date Approved dFIRM Adopted Participating Risk Mitigation NFIP Status in Ian? Assessment Action Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N N NIA CRS Jurisdiction: Class 1. Y Y Y Y Y Y 2. 3. [ATTACH PAGE(S)WITH ADDITIONAL JURISDICTIONS Notes: Y=Participating N=Not Participating N/A=Not Mapped J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) 2 LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW SUMMARY The plan cannot be approved if the plan has not been formally adopted. Each SCORING SYSTEM requirement includes separate elements.All elements of the requirement must be Please check one of the following for each requirement. rated"Satisfactory"in order for the requirement to be fulfilled and receive a score of "Satisfactory."Elements of each requirement are listed on the following pages of the N-Needs Improvement: The plan does not meet the minimum for the Plan Review Crosswalk. A"Needs Improvement"score on elements shaded in gray requirement.Reviewer's comments must be provided. (recommended but not required)will not preclude the plan from passing. Reviewer's comments must be provided for requirements receiving a"Needs Improvement" S-Satisfactory: The plan meets the minimum for the requirement. score. Reviewer's comments are encouraged,but not required. Prerequisite(s)(Check Applicable Box) NOT MET MET Mitigation Strategy N S 1. Adoption by the Local Governing Body: X 13.Local Hazard Mitigation Goals:§201.6(c)(3)(i) §201.6(c)(5) OR 14.Identification and Analysis of Mitigation Actions: §201.6(c)(3)(ii) 2. Multi-Jurisdictional Plan Adoption:§201.6(c)(5) NIA 15. Identification and Analysis of Mitigation AND Actions: NFIP Compliance.§201.6(c)(3)(ii) 3. Multi-Jurisdictional Planning Participation:§201.6(a)(3) NIA 16. Implementation of Mitigation Actions: X §201.6(c)(3)(iii) 17. Multi-Jurisdictional Mitigation Actions: NIA Planning Process N S §201.6(c)(3)(iv) 4. Documentation of the Planning Process:§201.6(b) and§201.6(c)(1) Plan Maintenance Process N S 18. Monitoring,Evaluating,and Updating the Plan: Risk Assessment N S §201.6(c)(4)(ii) 19. Incorporation into Existing Planning 5. Identifying Hazards:§201.6(c)(2)(i) X Mechanisms:§201.6(c)(4)(ii) 6. Profiling Hazards:§201.6(c)(2)(i) 20.Continued Public Involvement:§201.6(c)(4)(iii) X 7. Assessing Vulnerability: Overview:§201.6(c)(2)(ii) X 8.Assessing Vulnerability: Addressing Repetitive Additional State Requirements` t* S Loss Properties.§201.6(c)(2)(11) 9. Assessing Vulnerability: Identifying Structures, Insert State Requirement Infrastructure,and Critical Facilities: 201.6 c 2 ii B X § O( )()O Insert State Requirement 10. Assessing Vulnerability: Estimating Potential Losses: §201.6(c)(2)(ii)(B) X Insert State Requirement 11. Assessing Vulnerability: Analyzing Development X Trends:§201.6(c)(2)(ii)(C) 12. Multi-Jurisdictional Risk Assessment:§201.6(c)(2)(iii) NIA LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN APPROVAL STATUS PLAN NOT APPROVED EEI 'States that have additional requirements can add them in the appropriate sections of the Local Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning Guidance or create a new section and See Reviewer's Comments modify this Plan Review Crosswalk to record the score for those requirements. PLAN APPROVED J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) See`Summary of Significant Plan Revisions 3 Subsequent to FEMA July 23,2010 Crosswalk." LOCAL MITIGATION P PREREQUISITE(S) 1. Adoption by the Local Governing Body Requirement§201.6(c)(5): [The local hazard mitigation plan shall include]documentation that the plan has been formally adopted by the governing body of the jurisdiction requesting approval of the plan(e.g.,City Council,County Commissioner, Tribal Council). Location in the SCORE Plan(section or NOT Element annex and page# Reviewer's Comments MET MET A. Has the local governing body adopted new See August 16,2010 The updated plan must be adopted by the County of Hawaii. or updated plan? Approval Required Revision: Adoption by the County of Hawaii. X B. Is supporting documentation,such as a See August 16,2010 Required:County Resolution documentation. resolution,included? Approval Required Revision:Documentation of adoption of the April 20 X IO plan by the County of Hawaii. SUMMARY SCORE 2. Multi-Jurisdictional Plan Adoption Requirement§201.6(c)(5): For multi jurisdictional plans,each jurisdiction requesting approval of the plan must document that it has been forma ly adopted. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or NOT Element annex and a e#) Reviewer's Comments MET MET A.Does the new or updated plan indicate the N/A specific jurisdictions re resented in the Ian? B. For each jurisdiction,has the local governing N/A body adopted the new or updated Ian? C.Is supporting documentation,such as a resolution, N/A included for each participating jurisdiction? SUMMARYSCORE 3. Multi-Jurisdictional Planning Participation Requirement§201.6(a)(3): Multi jurisdictional plans(e.g.,watershed plans)may be accepted,as appropriate,as long as each jurisdiction has participa ed in the process...Statewide plans will not be accepted as multi jurisdictional plans. SCORE Location in the Plan(section NOT Element or annex and page# Reviewer's Comments MET MET A. Does the updated plan document how the planning team NIA reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update process? B. Does the new or updated plan describe how each N/A J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) 4 jurisdiction participated in the plan's development? C. Does the updated plan identify all participating jurisdictions,including new,continuing,and the jurisdictions that no longer participate in the Ian? SLIMMARYSCORE N/A PLANNING PROCESS: §201.6(75): An open public involvernen1 process is essenlial to the developmeru of an ejjeclive plan. 4.Documentation of the Planning Process Requirement§201.6(b): In order to develop a more comprehensive approach to reducing the effects of natural disasters,the planning process shall include: (1) An opportunity for the public to comment on the plan during the drafting stage and prior to plan approval; (2) An opportunity for neighboring communities,local and regional agencies involved in hazard mitigation activities,and agencies that have the authority to regulate development,as well as businesses,academia and other private and non-profit interests to be involved in the planning process;and (3) Review and incorporation,if appropriate,of existing plans,studies,reports,and technical information. Requirement§201.6(c)(1): [The plan shall document]the planning process used to develop the plan,including how it was prepared,who was involved in the process,and how the public was involved. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the plan provide a narrative description of the Chapter 2 Element satisfied in Chapter 2 X process followed to prepare the new or updated plan? B. Does the updated plan document how the planning Chapter 1 Element discussed in Chapter 1,Appendix A.This Appendix team reviewed and analyzed each element of this Appendix A discusses the overall reorganization of the 2010 Plan.It addresses section of the plan and whether this section was revised the updates and revisions in the updated 2010 plan. as part of the update process? Referenced Although it contains a good description of this element;there is a sentence is portion missing in the 4n,section which states,"Each hazard- completed. specific chapter discusses previous/current mitigation efforts and future mitigation plan activities,so that specific recommendations are focused on each hazard.These recommendations are then---- --" that is where it ends.They need to finish the sentence. X Recommended Revision: • Complete the above referenced sentence. • Provide a more detailed statement of how the planning team reviewed each element of the plan. J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) A-5 �ATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK 4.Documentation of the Planning Process Requirement§201.6(b): In order to develop a more comprehensive approach to reducing the effects of natural disasters,the planning process shall include: (1) An opportunity for the public to comment on the plan during the drafting stage and prior to plan approval; (2) An opportunity for neighboring communities,local and regional agencies involved in hazard mitigation activities,and agencies that have the authority to regulate development,as well as businesses,academia and other private and non-profit interests to be involved in the planning process;and (3) Review and incorporation,if appropriate,of existing plans,studies,reports,and technical information. Requirement§201.6(c)(1): [The plan shall document]the planning process used to develop the plan,including how it was prepared,who was involved in the process,and how the public was involved. Location in the SCORE C. Does the new or updated plan indicate who was Chapter 2, Element satisfied in Chapter 2 involved in the current planning process? (For section 2.1.1 example,who led the development at the staff level and were there any external contributors such as contractors?Who participated on the plan committee, provided information,reviewed drafts,etc.? D. Does the new or updated plan indicate how the public Chapter 2, Element addressed in Ch 2 Mitigation Planning. was involved? (Was the public provided an opportunity Section 2.1.2 to comment an the plan during the drafting stage and There is a lot of discussion about various public venues;however, prior to the plan approval?) the only substantial documentation I could find is a Survey.The narrative and/or the Survey do not show figures as to how many people responded to the survey.As far as I could tell by looking at the graphical sampling of the results is that one question received the most responses and the total who answered that question was 1,111 respondents.That is LESS than 1%of the island's residents (175,784). There is a good analysis of the survey;response may be low based on the population,however,the data collected yields useable information for Mitigation Actions. Recommend Revision: X • P.2-3 states there is a draft available for review on the State website.The link is broken;upload the approved plan on the State website. • Hawaii County Resident Survey:Could use more information on the number of people who filled out the surveys.The number of respondents varies widely with each question. E. Does the new or updated plan discuss the Chapter 2 narrative discusses agencies,academia and various opportunity for neighboring communities,agencies, interested parties,but does not discuss businesses or X businesses,academia,nonprofits,and other interested nonprofits(e.g.the Pacific Tsunami Museum).It does state that parties to be involved in the planning process? the American Red Cross was involved. J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) A-6 �ATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK 4.Documentation of the Planning Process Requirement§201.6(b): In order to develop a more comprehensive approach to reducing the effects of natural disasters,the planning process shall include: (1) An opportunity for the public to comment on the plan during the drafting stage and prior to plan approval; (2) An opportunity for neighboring communities,local and regional agencies involved in hazard mitigation activities,and agencies that have the authority to regulate development,as well as businesses,academia and other private and non-profit interests to be involved in the planning process;and (3) Review and incorporation,if appropriate,of existing plans,studies,reports,and technical information. Requirement§201.6(c)(1): [The plan shall document]the planning process used to develop the plan,including how it was prepared,who was involved in the process,and how the public was involved. Location in the SCORE Recommended Revision: • Include any representation from the private sector such as the hotel industry or other businesses that have been involved with the planning process. • Recommend briefing the Chamber of Commerce,health care and retail sectors. F. Does the planning process describe the review and Several plans and studies have been reviewed and portions incorporation,if appropriate,of existing plans,studies, incorporated into this plan.Specifically—Hawaii State Drought reports,and technical information? Plan,County of Hawaii General Plan,Hurricane Flood X Insurance Study,Structural Assessment of Buildings for Hurricane Shelter Classifications and ASCE 7-10. SLIMMARYSCORE RISK ASSESSMENT: y201.6(c)(2): The plan shall include a risk assessment that provides the factual basis for activities proposed in the strategy to reduce losses from identified hazards. Local risk assessments must provide sufficient information to enable the.jurisdiction to identify and prioritize appropriate mitigation actions to reduce losses from identified hazards. 5.Identifying Hazards Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(i): [The risk assessment shall include a]description of the type...of all natural hazards that can affect the jurisdiction. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1,Appendix,pgs.Al-1 through A1-5 provides a good how the planning team reviewed and description of the review and updates. analyzed this section of the plan and X whether this section was revised as part of the update process? B. Does the new or updated plan Chapter 4,Section 4.1 Each Hazard is described and discussed in depth in separate include a description of the types of Chapter 5,Section 5.1 chapters. all natural hazards that affect the J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) X 7 jurisdiction? Chapter 6,Section 6.1 Chapter 7,Section 7.1 Chapter 8,Section 8.1 Chapter 9,Section 9.1 Chapter 10,Section 10.1 Chapter 11,Section 11.1 Chapter 12,Section 12.1 Chapter 13,Section 13.1 Chapter 14,Section 14.1 Chapter 15,Section 15.1 Chapter 16,Section 16.1 Chapter 17 SLIMMARYSCORE 6.Profiling Hazards X Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(i): [The risk assessment shall include a]description of the...location and extent of all natural hazards that can affect the jurisdiction. The plan shall include information on previous occurrences of hazard events and on the probability of future hazard events. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page# Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1—Appendix A meets this requirement. how the planning team reviewed and analyzed each element in this section of the plan and whether any was revised as part of the update process? B. Does the risk assessment identify the Chapter 4,Section 4.1 Well described in each hazard's chapter. location(i.e.,geographic area Chapter 5,Section 5.3.2 affected)of each natural hazard Chapter 6,Section 6.1.1,Section 6.4 Recommended Revision: addressed in the new or updated Chapter 7,Section 7.1,Section Landslides:Figure 6-3 is hard to read.Include an 11/17 plan? 7.3.1.1,Section 7.3.1.2 sized map. Chapter 8,Section 8.1.1,Section Dam Failure:There are 13 dams included in the list for the 8.3.1 Island of Hawaii;however,Figure 11-1 shows just 11. Chapter 9,Section 9.3.2 Include the additional two dams. Chapter 10,Section 10.1.2,Section Coastal Erosion:Location could be discusses more 10.3.1 substantially in narrative. Chapter 11,Section 11.1 X Chapter 12,Section 12.2 Chapter 13,Section 13.1 Chapter 14,Section 14.3.1 Chapter 15,Section 15.3 J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) A-8 C. Does the risk assessment identify the Chapter 4,Section 4.4 Magnitude or severity is described for Hurricane,Landslides and extent(i.e.,magnitude or severity)of Chapter 5,Section 5.3.2 Rock Falls,Earthquakes,Lava and Vag,Tsunami,Floods,High each hazard addressed in the new or Chapter 6,Section 6.3 Surf,Drought. updated plan? Chapter 7,Section 7.3.1 Recommended Revision: Chapter 8,Section 8.3.1 Ch.11 Dams-Briefly described in narrative.Mapping done Chapter 9,Section 9.3.2 by Pacific Disaster Center could be added to further Chapter 10,Section 10.3.1 illustrate actual scenarios of dam failures in Hawaii County. Chapter 11,Section 11.2 Ch.13 Coastal Erosion is not a major risk so extent is not Chapter 12,Section 12.2 addressed.Suggest inclusion of cliff erosion that has Chapter 13,Section 13.2 impacted structures in the past. X Chapter 14,Section 14.2 Ch.15 Wildfires-briefly discussed.Expand to include a Chapter 15,Section 15.2 detailed narrative or map. D.Does the plan provide information on Chapter 4,Section 4.2 Previous occurrences for all hazards are discussed,some in more previous occurrences of each Chapter 5,Section 5.2 detail than others.If there have been no occurrences of a specific hazard addressed in the new or Chapter 6,Section 6.2 hazard since 2007,i.e.,high winds,hurricanes and wildfires,make updated plan? Chapter 7,Section 7.2 a statement to that effect in each of the appropriate chapters. Chapter 8,Section 8.2 Recommended Revision: Chapter 9,Section 9.2 Landslides:List the year the occurrence(s)occurred in Chapter 10,Section 10.2 Figure 6-6 Chapter 11,Section 11.2 Lava:State if there has been no occurrence(s)since 2005 Chapter 12,Section 12.2 Tsunami:The information is from 1975.If there are more Chapter 13,Section 13.2 recent occurrence(s),include this information. Chapter 14,Section 14.2 Flooding:Update Figure 10-3 X Chapter 15,Section 15.2 Dam Failure:Delete information related to Kauai's dam failures or provide a statement of how this information is Current Drought conditions are relative to the County of Hawaii. discussed. Drought:include more recent occurrence if applicable. E. Does the plan include the probability Chapter 4,Section 4.3 Probability of future events is discussed for High Wind Storms, of future events(i.e.,chance of Chapter 5,Section 5.3 Hurricane,Landslides and Rock Falls,Earthquakes,Lava and occurrence)for each hazard Chapter 6,Section 6.3 Vog,Tsunami,Floods,Dam Failures,High Surf,Coastal Erosion, addressed in the new or updated Chapter 7,Section 7.3 Drought,Wildfires. plan? Chapter 8,Section 8.3 Recommended Revisions: Chapter 9,Section 9.3 Dam Failure:The HMP discusses it in terms of Hawaii State; Chapter 10,Section 10.3 provide a narrative or discussion specifically for the County Chapter 11,Section 11.3 of Hawaii. Chapter 12,Section 12.3 Coastal Erosion:discusses probability of future events in a Chapter 13,Section 13.3 general way;provide a narrative or discussion specifically X Chapter 14,Section 14.3 for the County of Hawaii. Chapter 15,Section 15.3 Drought&Wildfire probabilities should include more detail. SUMMARYSCORE J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) X A-9 7.Assessing Vulnerability: Overview Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(ii): [The risk assessment shall include a]description of the jurisdiction's vulnerability to the hazards described in paragraph(c)(2)(i) of this section. This description shall include an overall summary of each hazard and its impact on the community. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1—Appendix A meets this requirement. how the planning team reviewed and analyzed each element in this section of the plan and whether any was revised as part of the update process? B. Does the new or updated plan Executive Summary The summary descriptions of vulnerability to each hazard are quite include an overall summary Chapter 18,Sections 18.1,18.2 varied in the detail;a few chapters indicate specific vulnerability to description of the jurisdiction's Chapter 18,Section 18.3.3 the hazard discussed;others have indications of vulnerability vulnerability to each hazard? scattered throughout the text.The plan would be much more"user friendly"if there were a consistent statement of vulnerability within each chapter. Recommended Revision: • Provide a statement/discussion/narrative for each hazard within the specific chapter that clearly states the County of Hawaii's vulnerability to the hazard. • Coastal Erosion and Wildfire should have additional X information that states vulnerability to these hazards. • Include a discussion of historical/cultural areas in the vulnerability statements. C.Does the new or updated plan Chapter 4,Section 4.4 Hazard impact is not included for all hazards. address the impact of each hazard Chapter 5,Section 5.4 on the jurisdiction? Chapter 6,Section 6.5 Required Revision: Chapter 7,Section 7.4 The information for the impact of dam failures on pg.11-7 is Chapter 8,Section 8.4 generic to the State of Hawaii.There must be a discussion Chapter 9,Section 9.4 of the impact of dam failure specific for the County of Chapter 10,Section 10.3.1 Hawaii.This could be inferred from the provided information; however,the requirement is for the jurisdiction of this plan. Chapter 11,Section 11.4 X Chapter 12,Section 12.4 Wildfire information is inadequate.Again,most of it is for the Chapter 13,Section 13.4 State of Hawaii and not specific to the County of Hawaii. Chapter 14,Section 14.4 Chapter 15,Section 15.4 • See revised section 11.5.2.2 and new Figure 11-9. J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) A- 10 • See revised Chapter 15 which has Hawaii County specific information and mitigation actions further developed by the Hawaii Wildfire Management Or anization. SUMMARYSCORE X B. Assessing Vulnerability: Addressing Repetitive Loss Properties Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(ii): [The risk assessment]must also address National Flood Insurance Program(NFIP)insured structures that have been repetitively damaged floods. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the Ch.10 Floods satisfies this element,well done. planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update rocess? B.Does the new or updated plan describe Chapter 10,Section 10.3.1.2 Ch.10 Floods satisfies this element. X vulnerability in terms of the types and See 10.3.1.1 NFIP Flood Insurance Profile for Hawaii County. numbers of repetitive loss properties X located in the identified hazard areas? Note:This requirement becomes effective for all local plans approved after October 1,2008. SUMMARYSCORE 9. Assessing Vulnerability: Identifying Structures X Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(ii)(A): The plan should describe vulnerability in terms of the types and numbers of existing and future buildings,infrastructure,and critical facilities located in the identified hazard area.... Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1—Appendix A meets this requirement. planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update rocess? B. Does the new or updated plan describe Chapter 5,Section 5.5.1.1 This element is addressed in Ch 5,Ch 7,Ch 8,and Ch 18. X vulnerability in terms of the types and Chapter 7,Section 7.4 numbers of existing buildings,infrastructure, Chapter 7,Section 7.5.1 Note: A"Needs Improvement"score on this requirement will X and critical facilities located in the identified Chapter 8,Section 8.4 not preclude the plan from passing. hazard areas? Chapter 18,Sections 18.1.7,18.1.8,18.3.3 J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) 11 LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CF C. Does the new or updated plan describe Chapter 3,Section 3.3.1 This element is discussed in Ch 3 and Ch 17. vulnerability in terms of the types and Chapter 17,Section 17.3 Note: A"Needs Improvement"score on this requirement will numbers of future buildings,infrastructure, Chapter 17,Section 17.4 not preclude the plan from passing. X and critical facilities located in the identified hazard areas? SUMMARY SCORE X 10.Assessing Vulnerability: Estimating Potential Losses Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(ii)(8): [The plan should describe vulnerability in terms of an]estimate of the potential dollar losses to vulnerable structures identified in paragraph(c)(2)(ii)(A)of this section and a description of the methodology used to prepare the estimate.... Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1—Appendix A meets this requirement. planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section X was revised as part of the update process? B. Does the new or updated plan estimate Chapter 7,Section 7.4 This element is discussed in Ch 7,Section 7.4;Ch 8,Section 8.4; potential dollar losses to vulnerable Chapter 8,Section 8.4 Ch 18,Sections 18.1.7,18.1.8(University of Hawaii)and 18.3.3 structures? Chapter 18,Sections X 18.1.7,18.1.8,18.3.3 Note: A"Needs Improvement"score on this requirement will not preclude the plan from passing. C.Does the new or updated plan describe the Chapter 5,Section 5.4 This element is satisfied in Ch 5,section 5.4;Ch 8,Section 8.4; methodology used to prepare the estimate? Chapter 8,Section 8.4 and Ch 18,Sections 18.1.7,18.1.8,and 18.3.3 Chapter 18,Sections X 18.1.7,18.1.8,18.33 Note: A"Needs Improvement"score on this requirement will not preclude the plan from passing. SUMMARYSCORE X J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) 12 CRC 11.Assessing Vulnerability:Analyzing Development Trends Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(ii)(C): (The plan should describe vulnerability in terms oq providing a general description of land uses and development trends within the community so that mitigation options can be considered in future land use decisions. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and pa e# Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the See updated Chapter 3, There is no documentation as to how the planning team reviewed, planning team reviewed and analyzed this Section 3.4 analysis for this analyzed and/or revised each element in this section. section of the plan and whether this section statement. Required revision: was revised as part of the update process? Provide a statement which describes how the planning team X reviewed the vulnerability of any development trends to the identified hazards.Recommend reviewing FEMA How-To-Guide 42(FEMA 386-2) B. Does the new or updated plan describe land Chapter 3,Sections 3.1, This element is satisfied in Chapter 3 and Chapter 18. uses and development trends? 3.2,3.3 X Chapter 18,Section 18.3 Note: A"Needs Improvement"score on this requirement will not preclude the plan from passing. SUMMARYSCORE X 12.Multi-Jurisdictional Risk Assessment Requirement§201.6(c)(2)(iii): For multi jurisdictional plans,the risk assessment must assess each jurisdiction's risks where they vary from the risks facing the entire planning area. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and a e# Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the N/A planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update process? B.Does the new or updated plan include a risk N/A assessment for each participating jurisdiction as needed to reflect unique or varied risks? SUMMARYSCORE N/A J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) 13 L MITH MITIGATION STRATEGY: §201.6(e)(3): The plan shall include a mitigation strategy that provides the jrnisdiction's hlueprintfijr reducing the potential losses identified ht the risk assessment,based on existing authorities,policies,programs and resources,and its ahility to expand on and improve these existing tools. 13.Local Hazard Mitigation Goals Requirement§201.6(c)(3)(i): [The hazard mitigation strategy shall include a]description of mitigation goals to reduce or avoid long-term vulnerabilities to the identified hazards. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and a e# Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1—Appendix A satisfies this requirement. planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update rocess? B.Does the new or updated plan include a Chapter 19,Section 19.1 Hazard Mitigation Goals are listed in Ch 19,Section 19.1 X description of mitigation goals to reduce or avoid long-term vulnerabilities to the identified hazards? SUMMARYSCORE X 14.Identification and Analysis of Mitigation Actions X Requirement§201.6(c)(3)(ii): [The mitigation strategy shall include a]section that identifies and analyzes a comprehensive range of specific mitigation actions and projects being considered to reduce the effects of each hazard,with particular emphasis on new and existing buildings and infrastructure. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and a e# Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1—Appendix A satisfies this requirement. planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update rocess? B.Does the new or updated plan identify and Chapter 4,Section 4.5.2 Ch.19 section 19.1 lists Mitigation Goals and Objectives X analyze a comprehensive range of specific Chapter 5,Section 5.5.2 Section 19.2 discusses Mitigation Actions by category(i.e., mitigation actions and projects for each Chapter 6,Section 6.5.2 prevention,property protection,public education and hazard? Chapter 7,Section 7.5.2 awareness,etc. Chapter 8,Section 8.5.2 In Sections 19.2.10-19.2.7 specific hazards(Hurricanes and Chapter 9,Section 9.5.2 Wind Storm,Earthquakes,Tsunamis,Rainfall Flooding and Chapter 10,Section 10.4.2 High Waves,Lava Flows,Droughts and Wildfires and Chapter 11,Section 11.5.3 Landslides and Sea Cliff Erosion)are discussed. Chapter 12,Section 12.5 X Chapter 13,Section 13.5 Ch.17-is dedicated totally to shelters. Chapter 14,Section 14.5.2 J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) A- 14 Chapter 15,Section 15.5.1 Chapter 16,Section Chapter 17,Section 17.5 Chapter 19,Section 19.2 and 19.4 C.Do the identified actions and projects Chapter 5,Section 5.5.2 This element is satisfied in Ch 5(Tropical Cyclone), address reducing the effects of hazards on Chapter 9,Section 9.5.2 Section 5.5.2;Ch 9(Tsunami),Section 9.5.2,and Ch 17 new buildings and infrastructure? Chapter 17,Section 17.5 (Shelters),Section 17.5. X Chapter 19,Section 19.4 Chapter 19,Section 19.5 D. Do the identified actions and projects Chapter 5,Section 5.5.2 This element is satisfied in Ch 5(Tropical Cyclone), address reducing the effects of hazards on Chapter 17,Section 17.5 Section 5.5.2 and Ch 17(Shelters),Section 17.5. X existing buildings and infrastructure? Chapter 19,Section 19.4 19.5 Mitigation Actions also satisfies this element.Nicely Chapter 19,Section 19.5 done. SUMMARYSCORE 15.Identification and Analysis of Mitigation Actions: National Flood Insurance Program(NFIP)Compliance X Requirement:§201.6(c)(3)(ii): [The mitigation strategy]must also address the jurisdiction's participation in the National Flood Insurance Program(NFIP),and continued compliance with NFIP requirements,as appropriate. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and a e#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1—Appendix A satisfies this requirement. planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update process? B. Does the new or updated plan describe Chapter 10,Section 10.4.1.1 This element is satisfied in Ch 10,Section 10.4.1.1 X the jurisdiction(s)participation in the Note:This requirement becomes effective for all local NFIP? mitigation plans approved after October 1,2008. X Recommended Revision: • Explicitly state that the County of Hawaii is a NFIP participant. C.Does the mitigation strategy identify, Chapter 10,Section 10.3.1 This element is satisfied in Ch 10,Section 10.3.1 and analyze and prioritize actions related to Section 10.4.1.1 Section 10.4.1.1 continued compliance with the NFIP? Note:This requirement becomes effective for all local mitigation plans approved after October 1,2008. SUMMARYSCORE J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) X 15 16.Implementation of Mitigation Actions Requirement:§201.6(c)(3)(iii): [The mitigation strategy section shall include]an action plan describing how the actions identified in section(c)(3)(4)will be prioritized,implemented,and administered by the local jurisdiction. Prioritization shall include a special emphasis on the extent to which benefits are maximized according to a cost benefit review of the proposed projects and their associated costs. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and a e#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the Chapter 1 Appendix A Chapter 1—Appendix A satisfies this requirement. planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update rocess? B.Does the new or updated mitigation strategy Chapter 19,Section 19.4 Ch 19,Section 19.4 addresses mitigation strategies X include how the actions are prioritized?(For and how the actions were prioritized.The STAPLE-E X example,is there a discussion of the process process was used. and criteria used? C.Does the new or updated mitigation strategy Chapter 19,Section 19.5 Ch 19,Section 19.5 Implementation Actions satisfies address how the actions will be implemented this element. and administered,including the responsible department,existing and potential resources and the timeframe to complete each action? D.Does the new or updated prioritization Chapter 18,Sections 18.1.7,18.3.3 Ch 18,Sections 18.1.7 and 18.3.3 and Ch 19, process include an emphasis on the use of a Chapter 19,Section 19.4 Section 19.4 satisfy this element. X cost-benefit review to maximize benefits? E.Does the updated plan identify the Executive Summary xiv to xviiii The mitigation strategy,actions and implementation completed,deleted or deferred mitigation Chapter 4,Section 4.5.1 plan in Chapter 19 are excellent.I do not find any actions as a benchmark for progress,and if Chapter 5,Section 5.5.1 reference to the review of the 2007 plan mitigation activities are unchanged(i.e.,deferred),does Chapter 6,Section 6.5.1 actions or comments as required in this element. the updated plan describe why no changes Chapter 7,Section 7.5.1 occurred? Chapter 8,Section 8.5.1 Required Revision: Chapter 9,Section 9.5.1 Provide a table/narrative/discussion of Chapter 10,Section 10.4.1 completed,deleted or deferred mitigation X Chapter 11,Section 11.5.2 actions as an indication of progress. Chapter 14,Section 14.5.1 . If the activities are unchanged,provide a statement as to why. See new Section 19.5 Discussion of Past Implementation Actions,and editorially revised Section 19.6 Present Implementation Actions. SLIMMARYSCORE X J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) 16 17.Multi-Jurisdictional Mitigation Actions Requirement§201.6(c)(3)(iv): For multi jurisdictional plans,there must be identifiable action items specific to the jurisdiction requesting FEMA approval or credit of the plan. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page# Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether this section was revised as part of the update process? B.Does the new or updated plan include identifiable action items for each jurisdiction requesting FEMA approval of the Ian? C. Does the updated plan identify the completed,deleted or deferred mitigation actions as a benchmark for progress, and if activities are unchanged(i.e.,deferred),does the updated plan describe why no changes occurred? SUMMARY SCORE PLAN MAINTENANCE PROCESS N/A 18. Monitoring,Evaluating,and Updating the Plan Requirement§201.6(c)(4)(i):[The plan maintenance process shall include a]section describing the method and schedule of monitoring,evaluating,and updating the mitigation plan within a five-year cycle. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and a e#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the planning team Chapter 1 Appendix Chapter 1—Appendix A satisfies this requirement. reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether A this section was revised as part of the update process? B. Does the new or updated plan describe the method and Chapter 20 The HMP Committee will meet on a semi-annual basis. schedule for monitoring the plan,including the responsible The HMP Committee will include members from each X department? county agency or department. C.Does the new or updated plan describe the method and Chapter 20 The semi-annual reports will enable the Planning schedule for evaluating the plan,including how,when and by committee to participate in an annual workshop which X X whom(i.e.the responsible department)? I will serve as an evaluation tool measuring the progress. D.Does the new or updated plan describe the method and Chapter 20 Annual briefing will be conducted with semi-annual X schedule for updating the plan within the five-year cycle? reports. SUMMARYSCORE J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) X 17 19. Incorporation into Existing Planning Mechanisms Requirement§201.6(c)(4)(ii):[The plan shall include a]process by which local governments incorporate the requirements of the mitigation plan into other planning mechanisms such as comprehensive or capital improvement plans,when appropriate. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page#) Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether X this section was revised as part of the update process? B. Does the new or updated plan identify other local planning The table in Chapter 20,pg 20-2 satisfies this mechanisms available for incorporating the mitigation requirement. requirements of the mitigation Ian? C.Does the new or updated plan include a process by which As above.Nicely described. the local government will incorporate the mitigation strategy Process for monitoring projects in described on pg 20- X and other information contained in the plan(e.g.,risk 1. assessment)into other planning mechanisms,when appropriate? D. Does the updated plan explain how the local government As above. X incorporated the mitigation strategy and other information X contained in the plan(e.g.,risk assessment)into other planning mechanisms,when appropriate? SUMMARYSCORE X J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) 18 20. Continued Public Involvement Requirement§201.6(c)(4)(iii): [The plan maintenance process shall include a]discussion on how the community will continue public participation in the plan maintenance process. Location in the SCORE Plan(section or N S Element annex and page# Reviewer's Comments A. Does the updated plan document how the planning team See revised Chapter There is no information as to how the planning team reviewed and analyzed this section of the plan and whether 20 for completion of reviewed this section of the plan.Pg.Al-5.#20,states this section was revised as part of the update process? the revision. that the Plan Maintenance chapter is presently being revised.Has this been completed? Required Revision: X • Provide a discussion that describes how this section of the plan was reviewed and analyzed for updating to the 2010 plan. B.Does the new or updated plan explain how continued Chapter 20 The Plan Update Procedures on pg.20-3 reference public public participation will be obtained?(For example,will awareness community-based workshops and symposia.It there be public notices,an on-going mitigation plan is unclear if these are intended as education or public committee,or annual review meetings with stakeholders?) participation in the planning process. Required Revision: X • Provide information regarding how the public/community will be continually involved with the plan update process. SUMMARYSCORE X J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) 19 -4L MITIGATION PLAN R MATRIX A:PROFILING HAZARDS This matrix can assist FEMA and the State in scoring each hazard. Local jurisdictions may find the matrix useful to ensure that their plan addresses each natural hazard that can affect the jurisdiction. Completing the matrix is not required. Note: First,check which hazards are identified in requirement§201.6(c)(2)(i). Then,place a checkmark in either the N or S box for each applicable hazard. An"N"for any element of any identified hazard will result in a"Needs Improvement"score for this requirement. List the hazard and its related shortcoming in the comments section of the Plan Review Crosswalk. Hazard Type Hazards Identified C. Previous D. Probability of Per Requirement A. Location B. Extent Occurrences Future Events 201.6 c 2 i Yes N S N s N s N S T Avalanche C/i b ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ occk 1) o xes \ Coastal Erosion ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® Change th t he bpX o4b/e 1. Coastal Storm ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® \- to.. a defa4/t and Dam Failure ® E] ® E] ® El ® E] E] Checked"Va 14e Drought ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® Earthquake ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Expansive Soils ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Levee Failure ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Flood ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Hailstorm ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Hurricane ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Land Subsidence ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Landslide ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ❑ Severe Winter Storm ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Tornado ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Tsunami ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Volcano ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Wildfire ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Windstorm ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Other Shelters ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Other Volcanic Gas ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ Other HAZMAT ® ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Legend: §201.6(c)(2)(i)profiling Hazards A. Does the risk assessment identify the location(i.e.,geographic area affected)of each hazard addressed in the new or updated plan? B. Does the risk assessment identify the extent(i.e.,magnitude or severity)of each hazard addressed in the new or updated plan? C. Does the plan provide information on previous occurrences of each natural hazard addressed in the new or updated plan? D. Does the plan include the probability of future events(i.e.,chance of occurrence)for each hazard addressed in the plan? JULY 1 , 2008 (WIDFIRM) A-20 TIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK MATRIX B:ASSESSING VULNERABILITY This matrix can assist FEMA and the State in scoring each hazard. Local jurisdictions may find the matrix useful to ensure that the new or updated plan addresses each requirement. Completing the matrix is not required. Note: First,check which hazards are identified in requirement§201.6(c)(2)(i). Then,place a checkmark in either the N or S box for each applicable hazard. An "N"for any element of any identified hazard will result in a"Needs Improvement"score for this requirement. List the hazard and its related shor.q no in the comments section of the Plan Review Crosswalk. Note: Receiving an N in the shaded columns will not preclude the plan from passing. r—,/ r� r,ehee Hazards A.Overall A.Types and Number B.T s and e cA- Identified Per Summary B. Hazard of Existing Structures Number of Future char rhehe boxan bre A. Loss Estimate B. Methodolo y to.,c o'e fa tl Hazard Type Requirement Description of Impact in Hazard Area Structures in Hazard hee�ed�rV a%e §201.6(c)(2)(1) Vulnerability Estimate Area Estimate w \ Yes N S N S N S N S I N S N S Avalanche ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ — ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Coastal Erasion ® v ❑ ® ❑ ® m ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Coastal Storm ® 2 ❑ E ❑ ® a ❑ S ❑ ❑ a ❑ S ❑ S Dam Failure E O' ❑ E ❑ E - ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ a ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Drought ® 2 ❑ ® ❑ ® c ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ L ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Earthquake ® - ❑ E ❑ S a ❑ E ❑ ❑ E ❑ S ❑ S Expansive Soils ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ W ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Levee Failure ® 3 ❑ ® ❑ ® ? ❑ ® ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Flood ® s ❑ ® ❑ ® ❑ E ❑ ❑ _ ❑ S ❑ S Hailstorm ❑ 5 ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ _ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Hurricane S ❑ S ❑ S > ❑ E ❑ ❑ ❑ E ❑ S Land Subsidence ❑ a ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ �' ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ a, ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Landslide E _ ❑ E ❑ E ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ c ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Severe Winter Storm E ❑ E ❑ E ❑ E ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Tornado ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ G ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Tsunami E ❑ E ❑ E ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ a ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Volcano E ❑ E ❑ E _ ❑ E ❑ ❑ ❑ E ❑ E Wildfire S ❑ E ❑ S ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ _ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Windstorm S ❑ E ❑ S ❑ E ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Other Shelters E ❑ E ❑ E ❑ E ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ other Volcanic Gas ® ❑ S ❑ E ❑ S ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Other HAZMAT S ❑ E ❑ S ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Legend: §201.6(c)(2)(ii)Assessing Vulnerability:Overview A. Does the new or updated plan include an overall summary description of the jurisdiction's B. Does the new or updated plan describe vulnerability in terms of the types and numbers of vulnerability to each hazard? future buildings,infrastructure,and critical facilities located in the identified hazard areas? B. Does the new or updated plan address the impact of each hazard on the jurisdiction? §201.6(c)(2)(ii)(B)Assessing Vulnerability:Estimating Potential Lasses §201.6(c)(2)(ii)(A)Assessing Vulnerability: Identifying Structures A. Does the new or updated plan estimate potential dollar losses to vulnerable structures? A. Does the new or updated plan describe vulnerability in terms of the types and numbers of B. Does the new or updated plan describe the methodology used to prepare the estimate? existing buildings,infrastructure,and critical facilities located in the identified hazard areas? J U L Y 1 , 2 0 0 8 (W I D F I R M) A-21 LOCAL MITIGATION PLAN REVIEW CROSSWALK MATRIX C:IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF MITIGATION ACTIONS This matrix can assist FEMA and the State in scoring each hazard. Local jurisdictions may find the matrix useful to ensure consideration of a range of actions for each hazard. Completing the matrix is not required. Note: First,check which hazards are identified in requirement§201.6(c)(2)(i). Then,place a checkmark in either the Nor S box for each applicable hazard. An "N"for any identified hazard will result in a"Needs Improvement"score for this requirement. List the hazard and its related shortcoming in the comments section of the Plan Review Crosswalk. Hazards Identified A. Comprehensive Per Requirement Range of Actions To Hazard Type 201.6 c 2 i and Pro'ects �l heck Yes N S (� ch rck,c box QS, Avalanche ❑ ❑ ❑ �_ an the de bo,anb 1. Coastal Erosion ® ❑ ® �"the kea.,V d Coastal Storm ® ❑ ® Ckety„ dl4e Dam Failure ® ❑ Drought ® ❑ Earthquake ® ❑ Expansive Soils ❑ ❑ ❑ Levee Failure ® ❑ Flood ® ❑ Hailstorm ❑ ❑ ❑ Hurricane ® ❑ Land Subsidence ❑ ❑ ❑ Landslide ® ❑ Severe Winter Storm ® ❑ Tornado ❑ ❑ ❑ Tsunami ® ❑ Volcano ® ❑ Wildfire ® ❑ Windstorm ® ❑ Other Shelters ® ❑ other Volcanic Gas— ® ❑ Other HAZMAT ® ❑ Legend: §201.6(c)(3)(ii)Identification and Analysis of Mitigation Actions A. Does the new or updated plan identify and analyze a comprehensive range of specific mitigation actions and projects for each hazard? JULY 1 , 2008 (WIDFIRM) A-22 Chapter 23:Plan Review Crosswalk Summary of Significant Plan Revisions Subsequent to FEMA July 23, 2010 Crosswalk Section/Chapter Revision Executive Summary . Description of Section 406(2)of the Stafford Act clarified • Change to Plan Update and Maintenance chapter is described 1. Introduction . Appendix A: Overall reorganization and reformatting of the 2010 plan recommendation in Chapter 19 • Changes to the new Plan Maintenance chapter described 2. Mitigation Planning Minor editorial corrections 3. Land Use and . Section on Economy-Agriculture discussion Development . Section of Analysis of Development Trends impacting hazard mitigation planning is added 5. Tropical Cyclones . Reference added to Figure 5-2 • Future Plans—Hawaii Residential Safe Room discussion is updated for new mitigation project 11. Dam Failure . Figure numbers are corrected • Section on PDC Dam Failure Inundation Map Project and Future Plans are updated relating to hazard mitigation measures 14. Droughts . Discussion of current drought conditions is added to the Section on Significant Historic Events Table 14-2 • Future Plans Projects are updated 15. Wildfires • Discussion of recent wildfires is added to Significant Historic Events • A new section on Community Wildfire Protection Plans is added • Section on Mitigation Strategies is updated and completed as of 2010,and establishes priorities 17. Shelters Future Mitigation Plans are updated for anew 2010 project follow- up for the Hawaii Residential Safe Room 19. Mitigation Strategy . Section 19.5 discusses the status of past implementation actions listed in the 2005 plan. • Section 19.6 is editorially revised to indicate actions that are similar or continuations of the 2005 plan actions 20. Plan Update Procedures The revised approach to Chapter 20 is explained.Elaborated information is given by other anticipated work in the next 1 to 4 years(in addition to the specific maintenance checklist). 21. References Updated list 23. Plan Review Crosswalk The responses to the July 23,2010 FEMA Crosswalk Review is given, along with this summary of significant changes to the Final Plan. Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan