Loading...
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.
Home
My WebLink
About
Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan: 18. Risk Assessment
CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY COUNTY OF HAWAII 920 ULULANI STREET HILO,HAWAII 96720 r f 18. Risk Assessment Chapter 18:Risk Assessment CHAPTER 18 - RISK ASSESSMENT In assessing vulnerability to various hazards,there are four categories of concern: • Emergency response capabilities. What are the components of an effective emergency response system for all hazards and how adequate and resilient are these facilities'? • Lifeline facilities. What are the critical lifelines to provide for our basic needs and do we need to relocate or fortify any of these facilities to withstand hazard risks? • Recovery capabilities. What facilities arc necessary to facilitate recovery after a disaster and how adequate are these facilities'? • Special at risk populations or areas. What special populations or areas require particular attention during emergencies for evacuation or to contain potential secondary hazards? This chapter inventories the facilities, populations, or areas in each of the above categories, and assesses their risk to hazards. 18.1 Emergency Response Facilities and Capabilities The County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan is the basis for the County's emergency response programs to promptly implement a fully coordinated response and measured appli- cation of resources when disaster threatens or occurs.12 Although fully functional, the plan needs review and updating since it is over ten years from the last revision. 18.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is the command center during a civil emergency. In a major emergency, numerous agencies must carry out the many different functions needed in an emergency swiftly and well. Many of these functions are interdependent; one agency cannot do its job well without information from another-agency. The EOC activates at different levels depending on the emergency. For minor emergencies, activation would not go beyond the Civil Defense staff working with the Fire and Police de- partments, and operational decision making may transition to an incident command center at the scene as the emergency situation becomes clearer. For advance readiness for what may become a full emergency(e.g., issuance of a"watch"), limited activation of other agencies for the EOC is necessary to coordinate and support more complex field operations. A full disaster requires mobilization of the entire organization shown in Figure 18-1 to carry out and coordinate warning, evacuation,police, fire, rescue and ambulance services, mass care, damage assessment, debris clearance, health, medical and sanitation services, public works, radiological protection and any other service required to protect public health and safety. 82 County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan, 1989. 18-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment COUNTY OF HAWAII DISASTER RESPONSE ORGANIZATION MAYOR STATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR CIVIL DEFENSE STATE CIVIL.DEFENSE ........I HAWAII CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY ........ AMERICAN RED CROSS POLICE FLRE-RESCUE PU3LIC[7;ORKS HEALTH AND MASS CARE LrtnrMS &ENGINEERING MEDICAL PUBLIC WELFARE POLICE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF DIST.HEALTH BRANCH( HS) DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTL EN-F DEPARTh4ENr PUBLIC WGRSS OFFICE(DOH) WATER SUPPLY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS COOPERATING AGENCIES COUNTY DEPARTMENTS STATE DISTRICT AND AND AGENCIES BRANCH OFFICES Hawaii Electric Light Co. EBS Station Verimn AmatewRadio Club Dept of Civil Service Dept o£Accountmg&Gen Services Gas Co_ StiuguPlantawm Assoc_ Dept of Finance Dept of Agmuhme Civil AirPaanl Medical Groups Planing Department Dept of Sus_&Ecoa Deuv. SoylGut Scouts Civic&Service Groups Dept of Liquor Control Dept of Cam.&Coo Affaus Religious Grw4is Coast Guard Reserve Dept of Parks and Recreation Dept of Conti Charitable Organizations Coast GuardAmiliny Dept ofReseawh& Dept ofDefmse Too Bus Companies Salvation Army Development Dept of Education Frataoal Groups News Media Corporation Counsel Dept of Hawn Hama Lands Business&Professional Radio&Television Mass Transit Dept of Labor&Indus.ReL Associations Broadcasting Stations Office of Aging Dept of Land&Natival Res_ Labor Unions Trade Associations Other County Agencies Dept of Taxation YMCA-YWCA-YBA Hotel Resorts (As needed) Dept of Transportation Civic and Service Groups VisitorindosnyB) University of Hawaii Nursing Associations Private Schools Office of Coo Protection Other Figure 18-1. Emergency Response Organization Source:County of Hawaii Emergency Operations Plan The County's EOC is located in the Civil Defense office which is part of the Hawaii Public Safety Complex on Kapiolani Street in Hilo. The facility is designed to have self-sufficient enclosed live-in capacity for 75 persons for two weeks and is equipped with the following: • Communications radio and telephone links to the rest of the County and the State; • Warning systems controls; • Meeting area capacity of 50 persons to accommodate the team; • Information such as maps, contact information, departmental plans and SOPS; • 24-hour personal accommodations (e.g.,restrooms, shower, food preparation area); • Standby water and power(i.e., 2 emergency generators and associated fuel storage); • Designed for radiation protection factor(PF) of at least 100. The EOC is not in the tsunami evacuation zone, flood hazard zone, or high-risk lava hazard zone(Lava Hazard Zone 1 or 2). 18-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Should the EOC become inoperable for any reason, there is a mobile command post that is ready as the alternate EOC. There is also a backup facility in Kona at the Department of Pub- lic Works' baseyard. 18.1.2 Emergency Shelters Shelters are a place of refuge for residents and visitors in anticipation of a hazard event and after the event as necessary. These shelters are primarily public facilities consisting of schools, parks, community centers and office buildings that have capacity to accommodate large numbers of people and are assumed to be basically structurally sound to withstand hurricanes (many of these facilities have not been evaluated for structural adequacy). This section evaluates adequacy in terms of location/capacity, structural integrity, and staffing. 18.1.2.1 Location and Capacity The current Civil Defense shelter inventory island wide is listed and illustrated in Chapter 17. Shelter needs depend on the hazard. For tsunamis, shelters are needed only for residents and visitors in the tsunami evacuation zone. Similarly, for lava flow hazards, shelters are needed only for residents in the lava inundation area. In contrast, shelter needs for hurricanes are widespread. For planning purposes, therefore, meeting the needs for hurricane shelter will ensure adequate shelter needs for all other hazards. A Hurricane Emergency Sheltering Plan developed by the State Civil Defense in 1998 utilized behavioral analyses studies to determine the amount of shelter space government must be capable of providing for evacuees in public facilities."' Information obtained from the Oahu behavioral analyses provided information about likely evacuation rates, i.e., the percentage of the population that will evacuate in response to advisories from local officials, and the evacuation destinations-- i.e., the percentages of evacuees who would seek shelter in public facilities, as compared to homes of relatives and friends, hotels and other destinations. Based on the data collected, the State's sheltering plan utilized the following averages to determine public sheltering needs: • Average percentage of people leaving their homes for another location: • Weak Storm-60 percent Strong Storm-90 percent • Average percentage of those leaving their homes who will go to public shelters: • All Storms-35 percent Applying these guidelines to determine the resident shelter needs for strong storms in Hawaii County, the greatest deficiencies are in North Kona, followed by South Hilo, Puna, and South Kohala (see Table 18-1). The total shortfall based on the stated assumptions is 9,100 spaces. The only districts which have excess capacity arc North Hilo and Hamakua. 83 State of Hawaii,Department of Defense,State Civil Defense Division,Hurricane Emergency Sheltering Plan,December 1998. 18-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Table 18-1. Resident Shelter Needs b y District District Est.Population" Shelter S aces Needs86 Deficient s7 N.Kohala 6,038 1,590 1,902 312 S.Kohala 13,131 2,920 4,136 1,216 N.Kona 28,543 5,275 8,991 3,716 S.Kona 8,589 2,225 2,706 481 Ka'u 5,827 1,175 1,836 661 Puna 31,335 8,435 9,871 1,436 S.Hilo 47,386 13,100 14,927 1,827 N.Hilo 1,720 640 542 -98 Hamakua 6,108 2,375 1,924 -451 Totals 148,677 37,735 46,835 9,100 It should be noted that these figures are for the resident population only and do not address our visitor needs. Hotels need to be prepared to self-shelter their guests. As an incentive, liability coverage for private shelters, as outlined in Hawaii Revised Statutes section 128-19, is available to those facilities that create suitable guest shelter space. A coordinated program needs to be in place to assist hotel and resort managers to identify hurricane-resistant space and to train staff. For cruise ship passengers, the County needs to coordinate with various hotels or identify public shelter spaces to accommodate these passengers. 84 Hawaii County Data Book 2000 85 Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency 86 Calculated from[Population]x[People Leaving Their Homes(.90)]x[People Leaving Home That Will Go to Shelters(.35)]. 87 Calculated from[Needs]-[Shelter Space]. 18-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Kohala High&IntAerKohala Elernerdary H 1TH-�1 1.F �Honokae High&Intermediate Waimea State Offices&Courthouse Waimea Element ry$interinediate I SOUTH KOHA Population=1 184 NORTH 1111 Population=1720 i Hilo IntermediateHilo High 1 SOUTH HILO M& Waiakea High Kealakehe ElementaryKealakehe High Pop44ation=4741 ilva Elementary Kealakehe hirermediat NORTH KONA 7CC Kahakai Elemer/POpulanon=34024 Keaau MiddleKeaau High **Holualoa Elementary Mountain View Elementary Konawaena High * Keonepoko Elementary 1 Pahoa High&Imermedia ahoa. entary �e Honaunau Elementary PUNA Population=42591 Hookena Elementary 11 SOUTH KONA Population=11414 _ I KAU I` Population=7050 y.Kau High and Pahala Elementary ' A Legend * Emergency Shelters G — Major Road 0 4 8 116 24 32 Miles Figure 18-2. Nfap of shelter locations on Hawaii island 18.1.2.2 Structural Evaluation Ideally, all shelters should be hurricane-resistant in that the roof, walls, and windows will withstand hurricane forces. Although these shelters do not meet all of the guidelines established for evaluating hurricane-resistant facilities, they are the best that are available at the moment. No facility can be completely "hurricane-proof' and facility managers will be instructed to take precautions which will minimize the potential danger to shelter occupants. Known deficiencies will be addressed as part of an overall mitigation program to identify cost-effective retrofit projects that will improve the safety and capacity of the available shelters. A number of the shelters/centers are situated within lava hazard zone 2, including the Hawai- ian Ocean View Estates Community Center in the Ka'u District, the Keonopoko Elementary School complex in Puna, the Pahoa High and Intermediate School complex in Puna, the Pahoa Neighborhood Center in Puna and the Ho'okena Elementary School in South Kona. The Hawaii Volcanoes National Park Visitor Center, designated as a center, is situated in lava hazard zone 3. 18-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.2.3 Staffing Future updates to this plan should evaluate staffing needs as the number of shelters increase. 18.1.3 Police Stations The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Police Depart- ment during disaster response and recovery phases as follows: Evacuation • Direct and control traffic flow into and out of restricted disaster areas, and ensure open trafficways for all emergency and lifesaving services;protect life and property. • Assist in disseminating warning information. • Direct evacuation of the public from threatened areas. • Provide for security of vacated homes and facilities. • Establish and man roadblocks and barricades as required; deny entry into restricted areas. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Provide the department's operations control and emergency communications and activate emergency procedures. • Transmit vital information and requests for assistance from field units to the Civil De- fense EOC by timely spot and situation reports; keep field units currently informed. • Maintain interagency communication, coordination and support to facilitate operations as established by CD procedures. • Assist with conducting radiological monitoring and reporting as required. • Post-disaster • Survey, assess and report estimated disaster-related damages, losses and relief needs to the Civil Defense EOC on a continuing basis, especially during the initial stages. • Perform other tasks related to the situation as may be directed by appropriate authority. At a hurricane or tsunami watch, all off-duty and volunteer officers report to their respective main station. There are eight main district police stations around the island along with four substations and ten mini police stations (see Figure 18-4). Central dispatch facilities are located in the Hilo station. There are approximately 350 officers assigned to the various stations with an island-wide average of approximately 2.5 officers per 1,000 residents. None of the main stations are located in the tsunami evacuation zone. Two of the substations are unavoidably located in the lava hazard zone 2 (Pahoa,Hawaiian Ocean View). 18-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment H sq�y. H H H P P P ro v 1 H ❑ County Base Yard LHU Hospital Q Police District Station Q Police Substation • Asset located in Volcanic Major Roads Hazard Zone 2 Figure 18-3. Map of Police Stations,DPW Baseyards,and Hospitals 18.1.4 Fire and EMS Stations The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Fire Department during disaster response and recovery phases as follows: • Fire-fighting,rescue, emergency medical • Direct and control fire hazard reduction, fire fighting, search and rescue operations to save life and property and to maintain or restore lifeline services and facilities. • Operate the department's Communication Control Center to facilitate the direction and control of all Fire-Rescue forces and operations "round the clock" shifts. • Provide ambulance and emergency medical services. • Assist in damage control. 18-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment • Evacuation • Assist in disseminating warning information and evacuating public. • Coordinate use of vehicles from other agencies for ambulatory and evacuation needs. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Transmit vital information and requests to the Civil Defense EOC by timely spot and situation reports;keep field units informed. • Assist in dispatching health and medical personnel to areas where their services are re- quired. • Request on-scene augmentation as soon as the need is anticipated. • Initiate and maintain interagency communication, coordination and cooperation to facilitate operations. • Conduct radiological monitoring and reporting as required. • Post-disaster • Survey, assess and report to the Civil Defense EOC estimated disaster-related damage, losses and relief needs. • Perform other tasks as may be required by the situation or directed by appropriate authority. There are fourteen regular fire stations around the island along with eighteen volunteer fire stations and two federal fire stations (see Figure 18-4). Centralized dispatch facilities are located in the Central Fire Station in Hilo. There are approximately 281 fire fighters assigned to the county fire stations around the island augmented by approximately 309 volunteer fire fighters. EMS (emergency medical service), rescue, and hazard materials teams are located at the following stations: 18-8 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment F F F' F F -.. F F F F F F F F + Fire Station F + EMS Hazmat Rescue Asset located within Tsunami Evacuation Zone � Rescue&EMS • Asset located within Volcanic Hazard Zone 2 • Asset within FIRM 100 Year or 500 Year Flood Zone 0 Fire Volunteer Station Figure 18-4. Map of Fire Stations • EMS-- all County fire stations (as distinguished from volunteer and federal stations) have EMS capability, except Waiakea and Laupahoehoe; • Ocean and/or helicopter rescue--Waiakea, South Kohala(helicopter only), Kailua; • Hazardous materials response team-- Kaumana. A response team is needed for West Ha- waii. None of the fire stations are located within the flood or tsunami evacuation zones. Two sta- tions are unavoidably located in lava flow hazard zone 2: Pahoa, Hawaiian Ocean View(vol- unteer). 18-9 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mit gal on Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment A study conducted in 1993 evaluated the seismic risks of fire stations." This study evaluated the structural conditions and non-structural hazards that could disrupt operational emergency services. Typical non-structural hazards include: garage doors that may bind if the support- ing structure experiences significant permanent racking and may consequently prevent fire fighting and rescue equipment from responding to an emergency; poorly anchored propane tanks that may roll over, rupture supply lines, cause uncontrolled releases of propane, and start fires; and unsecured batteries for emergency power generation which can fall, rupture, and cause a loss of power supply for emergency communication equipment. In addition, the desktop and console communications equipment and computers housed in the communications bunker at Hilo Central Fire Station must be secured to prevent falling. Since this equipment functions as the central dispatch and command center, damage to this equipment would jeopardize emergency response throughout the County. The study evaluated the structural conditions of four fire stations in more detail. Structural improvements were found to be necessary for each of these stations. Similar detailed structural evaluations need to be performed for the other stations. Overall, because of the high seismic risk in this County, and the age of the majority of the fire stations, the study rated the emergency preparedness of these essential facilities as poor. Hardening these essential facilities and mitigating non-structural hazards should be a high priority. 18.1.5 Department of Public Works Baseyards The County Department of Public Works carries out an important role during and after emer- gencies. The County Emergency Operations Plan describes the responsibilities of the Depart- ment of Public Works as follows: • Lifeline infrastructure repair and debris clearance • Direct and control overall public works and engineering operations to maximize the sav- ing of life and property and maintenance or restoration of lifeline services and facilities. • Direct and control emergency debris clearance, hazard removal and repair of vital facili- ties. • Isolate damaged sewer mains, disinfect raw sewage spills, restore service on priority ba- sis and decontaminate polluted areas in coordination with the District Health Office. • Assist in providing emergency transportation, emergency power and illumination. • Assist in search and rescue operations in conjunction with debris clearance and other public works functions. • Construct emergency fallout shelters, or improve existing shelters, in accordance with plans for expedient public shelter construction during a period of national emergency. • Evacuation • Provide assistance to the Police Department in establishing roadblocks or other traffic and crowd controls. 88 Wiss,Janney,Elstner Associates,Inc.,June 1993. Potential Seismic Hazards and Emergency Response Pre- paredness of Essential Fire Stations and Hospitals i the County of Hawaii. Prepared for the State of Hawaii Office of Civil Defense and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board. 18-10 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment • Assist with warning and evacuation of department personnel and the public. • Monitoring, communication, coordination • Provide the required liaison in the Civil Defense EOC with appropriate "round-the- clock" shifts. • Assist in damage control. Transmit vital information and requests to the Civil Defense EOC by timely spot and sit- uation reports;keep field teams informed. • Initiate and maintain interagency communication, coordination and cooperation with all Public Works engineering centers,base yards and work teams to facilitate operations. • Conduct radiological and other hazardous material monitoring and response as required ensuring the safety of the work crews. • Post-disaster • Prepare mass burial sites in coordination with the District Health Officer. • Assess disaster-related damage and operational requirements; report estimates to Hawaii Civil Defense EOC. • Assume other responsibilities as may be required by the situation or directed by compe- tent authority. The Department of Public Works has eight base yards which serve as their operational, storage and maintenance centers (see Figure 18-3). These base yards are situated in Kurtistown, Hilo, Honokaa, Waimea, Hawi, Honalo, Captain Cook and Waiohinu. None of these base yards are situated in areas highly susceptible to natural hazards. 18.1.6 Hospitals There are five hospitals on the island with emergency medical and intensive care facilities (see Figure 18-3). Because of the expansiveness of this island, it is important and fortunate that the State hospital system is able to subsidize the hospitals in the outlying rural districts. A 1993 study evaluated the seismic risk of hospitals.89 The study found that non-structural hazards at all the hospitals were severe. Typical non-structural hazards include: poorly se- cured emergency power generators; unsecured hot water heaters, boilers, and piping that jeopardize sterilization, kitchen, and laundry services; and unsecured laboratory equipment, medical supply cabinets, pharmaceuticals, toxic chemicals, patient records, x-ray equipment, hung ceilings, corridor lighting, sprinkler lines, and propane tanks. The study conducted a detailed structural evaluation only of the Kona Hospital. Similar evaluations should be done of all hospitals. The findings of the Kona Hospital indicate the level of concern and urgency to ensure that these essential facilities are able to remain functional after a major earthquake. 89 Wiss,Janney,Elstner Associates,Tnc.,June 1993. Potential Seismic Hazards and Emergency Response Pre- paredness of Essential Fire Stations and Hospitals in the County of Hawaii. Prepared for the State of Hawaii Office of Civil Defense and the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Board. 18-11 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment For the Kona Hospital, the study found that the Kona Hospital has several structural features reminiscent of the Olive View Hospital in California that contributed to its severe damage and partial collapse in the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake. These features of the Kona Hospital include: discontinuous shear wall along the west side which creates a partial soft story effect; irregular layout of shear walls at the ground floor which may lead to significant torsional response of the building; and the lack of adequate shear reinforcing bars in the columns where they are restrained by the concrete slab-on-grade that may lead to brittle failure of these columns. A structural engineer conducted a post-Kiholo Bay assessment to evaluate the safety of the facility and assured hospital personnel that the building was operable. This was followed by a more detailed review of seismic adequacy, preformed by the Hawaii Health Systems Corporation. 18.1.7 Hawaii County All Hazard Assessment of Critical Facilities This project consisted of conducting an all-hazard rapid visual screening (RVS) of approximately 70 to 80 critical facilities in the County of Hawaii,including: • emergency operations center • 10 fire stations • 13 ambulance facilities • 10 police stations • 6 hospitals and clinics • Hilo and Kona airport facilities The project engineering team lead by the University of Hawaii conducted an all-hazard rapid visual screening of critical facility buildings in the County of Hawaii. FEMA 154 procedures were followed for the seismic evaluation, while similar procedures developed by Martin & Chock, Inc., for SCD were used for hurricane evaluation. A HAZUS MH risk assessment model has been used to evaluate the expected losses for each building due to earthquake, hurricane and flooding, using features determined from examination of the original construction plans and the site visits. Complete vulnerability rankings lists of all facilities studied are included in Table 18-2 through Table 18-4. Two facility groups that ranked worst based on the site observations and HAZUS analysis were designated for more detailed Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) evaluation and development of recommended mitigation procedures. This detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit a PDM grant applications for the most needed retrofit project, and prioritize the most vulnerable critical facility buildings for future retrofits. The vulnerability of a building can be measured by economic loss or by loss of functionality related to the extent of damage. Both of these risk measures for earthquake and hurricane hazards were analyzed at an equivalent level of probability, so that an "apples to apples" comparison of effects for each building was possible. Both of these risk measures were analyzed for earthquake and hurricane hazards at an equivalent level of probability (750- to 1000 year RP). 18-12 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Total aggregated losses for each event are given below: • Hurricane Event Total Losses—Essential Facilities $48,000,000 • Hurricane Event Total Losses—General Building Stock $7,138,000,000 • Earthquake Scenario Total Losses—Essential Facilities $117,000,000 • Earthquake Scenario Total Losses -General Building Stock $4,243,000,000 From the results of these analyses a short list of the critical facilities with the highest economic losses or greatest loss of functionality (most severely damaged) was created for review by county officials. This list is included below: Group Kaiwalani Fine Station,Honokaa Fie Station,North Kohata Fire Retrofits ptimatily consist of installing a Station,and the Central Fie Station Dispatch Office complete load path for hurricane wind uplift Group B Kona Civic Center Fire Station,Kona Civic Center Police Station, Work primarily consist of seisnric Keaau Fire Station,Keaau Police Station,and Laupaliochoe Police retrofits of masonry and concrete, Station(LPS) except LPS Goup C Kohata Hospital Scisuric and Hunicanc retrofits Group D Kau Hospital Hurricane and some Seisnric retrofits From the short list of highest expected loss facilities, Group B plus the Central Fire Station Dispatch Office and Kau Hospital were selected by HCDA for detailed Benefit Cost Analysis. Ka'u Hospital in Pahala, Hawaii, provides long-term care and acute care, obstetrics, emergency room, ambulance, and outpatient services. It is an essential facility for the southern Hawaii County districts of Puna, Kau, and South Kona. It is located in the Kau District of the County of Hawaii, the region of highest seismic hazard in the state, highest concentration of volcanic gas emissions, and is subject to hurricanes and windstorms since Hawaii is a hurricane and windborne debris hazard region. Built in 1968, its as-built condition predates modern requirements for seismic bracing of nonstructural elements and protection against windborne debris impacting windows. A common gas produced during the nearby Hawaiian eruptions just to the east that is potentially harmful to human health is sulfur dioxide. Exposure to gases can endanger those with heart and respiratory ailments. The Kau Hospital Hurricane and Seismic Retrofit project was developed as a result of the Hawaii County All-Hazards Assessment of Critical Facilities investigation that was conducted in 2008-2009. After a preliminary engineering design and cost estimate, a Benefit-Cost Analysis was performed to evaluate the mitigation project because the analysis indicated high vulnerability to seismic and hurricane hazards.. This same detailed evaluation provided the information necessary to submit the full PDM grant application to FEMA. Type of mitigation activity proposed: Non-structural Retrofitting of Existing Buildings and Facilities: Modifications to the non- structural elements of an existing isolated hospital facility to reduce or eliminate the risk of future damage, protect patients, and ensure continuity of operations. Non-structural retrofits include bracing of building ceilings to prevent earthquake damage, protection against windborne debris breaching of the enclosure, and protection of ventilation systems, 18-13 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment enhancement of the ventilation system to include better indoor air quality, and the abatement of hazardous material. This is a multi-hazard retrofit in which the State of Hawaii's contribution is the retrofit of the ventilation system to mitigate against harmful volcanic gas emissions and abatement of some indoor hazardous material. The Federal share contribution is for seismic bracing of the ceiling grid in essential facility areas, removal of an incinerator stack that is a potential seismic falling hazard, and mitigation against hurricane and windstorms through protection against windborne debris impacts on windows and rooftop mechanical systems and anchorage of nearby ancillary structures on site that would otherwise be large debris sources. Matching funds will come from two sources, both expenditures of the Hawaii Health System Corporation: 1) Final design and construction documents for the retrofits prepared by a structural engineer, and 2) a Capital Improvement Project for Kau Hospital to provided enhanced supply air handling system to mitigate against Volcanic Gas (VOG), ceiling asbestos abatement, and the replacement of vulnerable jalousie louver windows for improved hurricane resistance and better control of the interior air environment. In past VOG episodes, patients have needed to be relocated to other hospitals because of lack of sufficient air pre- conditioning to eliminate sulfur dioxide and other VOG particulates. According to Hawaii Volcano Observatory 2008 estimates, Kilauea Volcano emits 2,300 tons of sulfur dioxide per day. The project was determined by the FEMA BCA tool to have over $4 million in benefits over 25 years accrued from building loss protection, contents loss prevention, and functionality protection to enable continuity of operations during hurricane and earthquake disasters. The Benefit Cost Ratio is expected to be 6.67. Thus, the combination of the proposed FEMA PDM retrofits with the state's already planned air handling and enclosure retrofits will mitigate against hurricanes, earthquakes, and volcanic gas hazards. 18-14 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-2. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic earthquake event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Earthquake Probabilistic Senario(750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario(1000 year return Vulnerability List period) period) atetl atetl5 $toss %Loss -1 FEMA Budding n st% $Loss %Loss Building eufld ing Na me escrlptton Es%r- Score vel st.$LOSS J-Rank L k nk TVPe k k T ute CareFacility/Hilo Medical Cente C-FaClllty 39.7%$33,431,818 and a37 VPD 33 C2M eMC 8.3% $7,020,915 ant a45 56 CECBM VBUR Building 1 and 2/Kona Community HOSpit CareFacility 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 13 CIL MC 26.4% $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Hale HO'ola Hamakua CareFacility 40.8% $7,481,502 3 32 D 0.9 EMIL LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL Hawaii Public SafeNR,ildwg A EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 D 05 C2L LC 6.3% $688,116 1S S1 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety Bnlldln g B EmergencyCtr, 46.39/6 $5,001,817 5 26 D 1 C2L LC 6.39/6 $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFaci lily 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D 4N/A W2 MC 20.2% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kohala Hospital CareFacility 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 D DJ RM11L PC 21.2% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Psychiatric Facility/Kona Community Ho CareFacility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C2L MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Extended Care Facility/Hilo Medical Ce CareFacility 39.9% $3,021,799 9 36 D O.7 EMIL PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL VAOUtpatient Clinic/Hilo Medical Cent CareFacility 49.5% $2,887,890 10 22 D 1.9 RM2L LS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Special Services Building/Kona Communl CareFacility 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21L MC 26.4% $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Kona Police Statfon(Kealakehe Police St Po11ce5tat1on 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 CIL MC 14.59% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Central FireStation FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C21- PC 6.39% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Hale HOOla/Hilo Medical Center C-Fac111ty 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM11L LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL M-tenance Building/Hilo Med-1 Cent CareFacility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 ❑ 1.7 RM2L PC 8.1% $393,177 2S 46 48 MECBL METAL Maintenance Office/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 50.3% $1,735,545 16 201 DI 03 I W2 PCI 2.9%1 $99,795 461 621 39 WMUH2 BUR Keaau Fire Station-d Poli ce Stati on P01i-S-ion 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 EMIL PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Kea..Fire Station-d POl i ce Stati on FireStation 76.556 $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 EMIL PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL La-dry BUi ldi ng/H i 10 M edi ca l Center Care Facility 49.59% $1,349,815 19 23 D OJ RM21- LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Kaumana Fire Station FireStation 66.3% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM11- PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL Ko na Cl vi c Center PO l i ce Sta ti o n Po l i-Station 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM11L PC 26.7% $368,258 28 2S 25 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center C-Fac111ty 40.7% $1,110,051 22 33 D 1.7 RM11L LS 35.4% $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua Police Station Police5tation 59.7%1 $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 CIL PC 35.5% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D O7 CIL PC 31.6% $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Central Fire Station Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 01 2 61 S3 LS 15.1%1 $375,567 271 381 53 SP BM METAL Kau Police Station(Naalehu Police Stati Po1ice5tat1on 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 EMIL LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Hospital CareFacility 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C2L PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Kawailani FireStation FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D 1J RM1L PC 4.2% $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Hawaiian OCean View Estates Fire Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Waimea Fire Station FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM2L LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 14 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSFI METAL Waimea Police5tation(Kamuela Police St Po11ce5tation 34.7%1 $622,439 32 42 D 1.7 RM1L LC 28.6% $512,443 20 24 24 MECBL BUR Keauh0u-Kona FireStation FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM1L LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 341 31 D1 2.61 53 PC 4.8%1 $29,510 581 SS 57 SPMBS METAL Kau Fire Station(Pahala Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 3S 9 D 1,7 RM11L LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus BUllding(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna tani Fi FireStation 22.9% $424,027 37 51 D 1.2 EMIL LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Naalehu EMS CareFacility 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 14 Wl PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSFI METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 EMIL LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 C2L MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Radiation Oncology/Kona Community HOSp CareFacility 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 1979% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH11 METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 S7 ❑ 4.2 RM11L HC 19.4% $327,845 31 34 34 MECBL METAL Pahoa Flre Station FireStation 32.7%j $2S9,41SI 43 4411 D1 1.4 Wl LS1 8.1%j $64,151 501 481 43 WSFI METAL Pahoa Police Station P011Ce5tati0n 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 W1 PC 14.6% $55,572 53 39 33 WSFI METAL Waiakea Fire Station Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kawailani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D 2.6 53 MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSFI METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 Wl PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSFI METAL Infusion Center/Kona Community HOSpita Care Facility 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 43 w LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 8 WSFI METAL Hawal is n Pa ra d l s e P a r k Fire Sta ti on Fire Station 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 w PC 4.7% $13,897 63 S7 4S WSFI METAL Kau P011ce Station Generator Building IN Po11-Station 73.3% $151,733 SO 10 D 2.2 RM11L LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBL METAL North Kohala Police Station(Kapaau Poli Po11ce5tation 132% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 EMIL LS 212% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Waiakea Fire Station Fire Station 84% $142,615 52 631 D 1 4.2 RM11i HCI 2.6% $43,780 351 63 64 MECBL METAL La upa hoehoe P,1,ce St,ti on(N-h Hi I,P Po11ce5tat1on 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 WI PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSFI METAL Kea..Fire Station Vehicle Sh ed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 53 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau Police Station Vehicle Shed P011Ce5-1- 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSFI METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSFI METAL Naalehu Fire Station Vehi Cle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSFI METAL Kona Police Station Generator Building( Po11ce5tat1on 31.S% $54,837 S8 45 D 2.2 EMIL LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Central Fire Station Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 50 D 1.7 EMIL LS 6.8% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Acres Volunteer Fire Station a n FireStation 1 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl LS 20.7%11 $57,180 52 31 26 WSFI METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61j 59 D 6.3 Wl LS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSFI METAL taupah-!,-Volunteer Flre Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 S4 D 3.9 Wl PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSFI METAL La upahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 ❑ 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSFI METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station Vehlcl e 5 Police5tation 15.5% $24,020 64 S8 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSFI METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 6S 65 D 4.3 Wl LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSFI METAL North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus BUil FireStation 3.2% $5,522 66 65 D 1.4 WE L5 47.1% $51,316 48 11 9 WSFI METAL 18-15 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-3. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic earthquake event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Earthquake Probabilistic Senario(750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario(1000 year return Vulnerability List period) period) atetl atetl5 $toss %Loss Soll FEMA euilding n st% $toss %Loss Building eufld ing Na me escrlptton Es%rLr, Score vel st.$LOSS Uses Ra nk Kona Civic Center Fire Sttion FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 as 24 Rank1 TyPD 0.7 Ty C1L Le PC 31.6% $381,596 Ra 26 Ra 18 17 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus Brij ldjng(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Waiakea Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 844% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.8% $29,510 58 55 57 SPMRS METAL Kona Civic Center Police Station Police5tation 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 17 RM1L PC 267% $368,258 28 25 25 MECBL METAL Kawailani Fjre Station FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D 12 RM1L PC 4.2% $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Station a rd Police Station Po1ice5tat1on 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 02 RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Station a rd Police Station FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 07 RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Hawajian Ocean Vjew Estates Fire Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kau Fire Station(Pahala Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 D 1.7 RM1L LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Police5tation Generator RUilding(N Police5tation 73.3% $151,733 50 10 D 2.2 RM1L ITS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECRL METAL Kau Police Station(Naalehu Police Stati Police5tation 73.3% $986,266 26 10 ❑ 22 RM1L ITS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECRL METAL Pahoa Police Station Po11-5tat1on 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 Wl PC 14.6% $55,572 53 39 33 WSFI METAL Ka u ma na Fire Station FireStation 66.3% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM1L PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL Central FireStation FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -O.S C2L PC 6.3% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Hamakua PoIlceStation PoIlceStation 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 ❑ -0.7 C1L PC 35.S% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Hawajian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 Wl PC 4.7% $13,897 63 57 45 WSFI METAL Hawajian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 Wl PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSFI METAL Keaau Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau Police Station Vehicle5hed Police5tation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSFI METAL Maintenance Office/Hilo Medical Center Ca reFa,;l i ty 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D 0.5 W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Kohala Hospital C-Fa„Illy 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 ❑ 07 RM1L PC 21.2% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL VACUtpatient Clinic/Hilo M edl,al Cent C-Fa„Ilty 49.S% $2,887,890 10 22 D 1.9 RM2L ITS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Laundry Building/Hilo Medical Center C-Facility 49.5%1 $1,349,815 19 23 D 0.7 RM2L LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 511 MECBL BUR Hale HOOla/Hilo Medical Center C-Facility 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 17 RM1L ITS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Kawai lani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 251 DI 2 61 53 MCI 3.5%1 $14,672 62 60 48 WSFI METAL Hawa ii Public Safety BUi Id,ng B EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 5 26 D 1 C2L LC 6.3% $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety BrildingA EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 D D3 C2L LC 6.3% $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center C-Facility 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSFI METAL Buildingland2/Kona Community H,,pit C-F-Lity 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 13 C1L MC 26.4% $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Psychiatric Facility/Kona Community Ho C-Fa,jlity 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C21F MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Special Services euilding/Kona Communl C-Facility 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C2L MC 264% $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Hale Ho'ola Hamakua C-Facility 40.8%1 $7,481,502 3 32 D DA RM1L ITS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 151 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center C-F-Illy 40.79/6 $1,110,051 22 33 D 12 RM1L LS 35.49/6 $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation Hdir.pter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,7091 4SI 34 DI 2.61 S31 ITS 4.8%1 $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Central Flre Station Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 ITS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Extended Care Facj li[y/Hilo Medical Ce C-Facdjty 39.9% $3,021,799 9 36 D O.7 RM1L PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL Acute Care Facility/Hilo Medical Cente C-Facdjty 39.7%$33,431,818 1 37 D 33 C2M MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBM BUR Maintenance Building/Hilo Medical Cent C-Facility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 12 RM2L PC 8.1% $393,177 25 46 48 MECBL METAL Keauhou-Kona FireStation FireStation 37.656 $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM1L LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Waimea FireStation FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D DA RM21- LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBLI SPM Naalehu EMS C-F-lily 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 1.4 Wl PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSFI METAL Waimea PoIlceStation(Kamuela Police St PoIlceStation 34.7% $622,439 321 42 ❑ 12 RM11L LC 28.6% $512,443 20 241 24 MECBL BUR Kona PoIlce Station(Kealakehe Police St PoIlceStation 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 ❑ 2.2 C1L MC 14.5%1 $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Pahoa Fire Station FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 D 1.4 Wl LS 8.1% $64,151 50 48 43 WSFI METAL Kona Police Station Generator RUilding( Police5tation 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM1L LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR North Hawaii Community Hospital C-Facility 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 20.2% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Infusion Cen ter/Kona Community H-ILL, C-F-Iily 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 43 Wl LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 8 WSFI METAL Naalehu Fire Station Vehicle5hed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSFI METAL Radiation Oncology/Kona Community HOSp Car,F,,lllty 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL Central Flre Station Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 50 D 1.7 RM1L ITS 6.9% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna Lani Fi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 ❑ 12 RM1L ITS 162% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Waikoloa FireStation Fire Station 224% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 RM1L ITS 162% $269,018 35 36 37 MECRL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cent, Emergency Ctr 22.09/6 $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 C2L MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Laupahoehoe Volunteer Fjre Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 54 D 3.9 Wl PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSFI METAL La upahoehoe Police Station(North Hilo P Police5tation 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 Wl PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSFI METAL Hawaiian Acres Volunteer Flre Station a n FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl ITS 20.7% $57,180 52 31 26 WSFI METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 57 D 4.2 RM1L HC 19.4% $327,845 31 34 34 MECBLI METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station VehlcleS Po1ice5tat1on 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSFI METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61 59 ❑ 63 Wl ITS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSFI METAL Honokaa Fire Station FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSFI METAL North Kohala Police Station(Kapaau Poll Police5tation 13.2% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM1L LS 21.2% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Kau Hospital Ca reFa,)lty 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 1 .S C2L PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 63 D 4.2 RM1L HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Laupahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 ❑ 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSFI METAL North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus BUi, FireStation 3.2% $5,522 66 65 D 1.4 Wl LS 47.1% $81,316 48 11 9 WSFI METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 Wl IS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSFI I METAL 18-16 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-4. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by dollar loss from a probabilistic hurricane event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Earthquake Probabilistic Senario(750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario(1000 year return Vulnerability List period) period) atetl atetl5 $Loss %Loss -1 FEMA Budding n st% $LOSS %Loss 9ullding eufld ing Na me escrlptton Es%r- Score vel st.$LOSS J-Rank Building land 2/Kona COmmunitV HOSpit CareFacllirV 45.6%512,336,068 Rant Ran29 TvPeB 13 TV CIL Le MC 26.4% $7,149,901 Rant Ra 26 27 CECBL TSPM Fscute Care Facility/Hilo Medical Cente CareFacility 39.7%533,431,818 1 37 D 33 C2M MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBM BUR Hale HO'ola Hamakua CareFacility 40.8% $7,481,502 3 32 D 0.9 RM11L LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFacility 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 202% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kau Hospital CareFacility 12.39% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C21- PC 33.19/6 $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Psychiatric Facility/Kona Community HO CareFacility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3J C21L MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Special Services Building/Kona COmmuni CareFacility 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21L MC 26.4% $1,619,632 7 28 27 CECBL METAL Kohala Hospital CareFacility 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 D 0.7 RM11L PC 21.2% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Kona Police Station(Kealakehe Police St Po11ce5tat1on 33.9% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 CIL MC 14.5% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center CareFacility 40.7% $1,110,051 22 33 D 1.7 RM1L LS 35.4% $965,139 10 16 14 MECBL METAL Extended Care Facility/Hilo Medical Ce CareFacility 39.8% $3,021,799 9 36 ❑ 0.7 RM1L PC 112% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL VAOUtpatient Clinic/Hilo M edical Cent CareFacility 49.59% $2,887,890 10 22 D 19 RM21- LS 13.9% $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Naalehu EMS CareFacility 36.09% $397,626 38 41 D 1.4 Wl PC 69.2% $763,653 13 4 4 WSFI METAL Hawaiian Cc-View Estates Flre Station FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 ] 12 SPMBS METAL Hawaii Public Safety BUildingA EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,049,757 4 26 ❑ 03 C2L LC 6.3% $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety BUildwgB EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 S 261 DI 11 C2L LCI 6.3% $681,583 161 S11 54 MECBL BUR Hamakua Police Station Po11ce5tat1on 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 CIL PC 35.S% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Waimea FireStation FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM21- LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM La upahoehoe Police Station(NOrth Hilo P Po11ce5tation 19.1% $131,983 53 54 D 1.4 W1 PC 83.9% $578,948 19 1 1 WSFI METAL Waimea Police Station(Kamuela Police St Po1ice5tat1on 34J9% $622,439 32 42 D 13 RM11- LC 28.69% $512,443 20 24 24 MECBL BUR Keauhou-Kona Fire Station FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 ❑ 1.2 RM11L LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL La upahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 D 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSFI METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSF11 METAL Kau Police Station(Naalehu Police Stati Po11ce5tation 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 RM11L LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Maintenance Building/Hilo Medical Cent CareFacility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 1.7 RM2L PC 8.1% $393,177 25 461 48 MECBL METAL Kona Civi c Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D 0.7 CIL PC 31.6% $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Central Fire Station Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Kona Civi c Center Police Station Po11ce5tat1on 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM11L PC 26.7% $368,258 28 25 25 MECBL METAL Hale HOOla/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 48.S% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM1L LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Station Apparatus Bull ding(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2-361 $273,710 421 57 D 4.2 RM11L HC 194% $327,845 31 34 341 MECBL METAL Infusion Center/Kona Community Hospita CareFacility 272% $187,975 48 47 B 43 W1 LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 8 WSFI METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna lani Fi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 D 12 RM1L LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Radiation Oncology/Kona Community HOSp CareFacility 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 S2 D 1.8 RM11L LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center CareFacility 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSFI METAL North Kohala Police Station(Kapaau Pali Po11ce5tation 13.2% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM11L LS 21.2% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Kau ma na FireStation FireStation 66.356 $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM1L PC 13.9% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 WI LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSFI METAL Central FireStation FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C21- PC 6.39% $215,300 401 531 57 CECBLI BUR Laundry Building/Hilo M edical Center CareFacility 49.59% $1,349,815 19 23 D 03 RM21- LC 7.99% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Naalehu Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 481 D1 4.41 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSFI METAL Kau Fire Station(Pahala Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 ❑ 1.7 RM11L LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL La upahoehoe Volunteer Flre Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 S4 D 3.9 Wl PC 76.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSFI METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station VehicleS Po11ce5tation 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSFI METAL Maintenance Office/Hilo Medical Center Care Facility 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D as W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Civil Defense Emerg...VOperatlOns Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 53 D 4.6 CIL MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus BUil FireStation 3.2% $5,522 661 65 D 1.4 W1 LS 47.1% $81,316 48 11 9 WSFI METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.S% $30,922 61 S9 D 63 W11 LAI 39.9%1 $79,794 49 131 11 WSF11 METAL Pahoa Fire Station FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 D 1.4 Wl LS 8.1% $64,151 50 48 43 WSFI METAL Kau Police Station Generator RUilding(N Police5tation 73.3% $151,733 SO 101 DI 22 RM1L LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBL METAL Hawaiian A,-Volunteer Fire Station a n FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl LS 207% $57,180 52 31 26 WSFI METAL Pahoa Police Station Po1ice5tat1on 66.7% $253,180 44 12 D 4.4 Wi PC 14.69/6 $55,572 53 39 33 WSFI METAL Kawailani FireStation FireStation 76.5% $845,036 28 5 D iJ RM1L PC 4.29/6 $45,950 54 59 60 MECBL METAL Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 63 D 4.2 RM11L HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Stationand Police Station PollceStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 S D 0.7 RM11L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire S tationand Police Station FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 5 D 0.7 RM11L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Waiakea Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.S%l $29,510 581 SSI 57 SPMBS METAL Waiakea Fire Station Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 ❑ 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kona Police Station Generator Building( Po11ce5tation 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM1L LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D&7R PC 4J% $16,349 61 57 45 WSFI METAL Kawailani Flre Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSFI METAL Hawa iian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 ❑ PC 4.7% $13,897 63 S7 45 WSFI METAL Central Fire Station Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 59 SO D LS 6.9% $13,045 64 50 52 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Station Vehicle Shed Fire Station 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau Police Station Vehicl a Shed Police5tation 53.2% $128,379 54 18 D LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSFI METAL 18-17 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-5. Hawaii critical facility vulnerability ranking,sorted by loss of use from a probabilistic hurricane event Hawaii County Essential Facilities Earthquake Probabilistic Senario(750 year return Hurricane Probabilistic Senario(1000 year return Vulnerability List period) period) atetl atetl5 $toss %Loss -1 FEMA euilding n st.% $toss %Loss 9ullding eufld ing Na me escrlptton Es%r- Score vel st.$LOSS U-Rank La upahoehoe Police Sta tion(NOrth Hi 1,P PollceStatlon 19.1% $131,983 as 53 Ran54 TyPD 1.4 Ty Wl Le PC 83.9% $578,948 Ra 19 aaak1 1 TWSFl METAL Laupahoehoe Fire Station FireStation 4.4% $24,441 63 64 D 4.3 Wl LS 76.0% $419,540 22 2 2 WSF1 METAL Laupahoehoe Volunteer Fire Station FireStation 19.1% $29,696 62 S4 D 3.9 Wl PC ]6.0% $117,996 44 2 2 WSF1 METAL Naalehu EMS C-Facility 36.0% $397,626 38 41 D 14 Wl PC 692% $763,653 13 4 4 WSF1 METAL Naalehu Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 25.6% $79,581 57 48 D 4.4 Wl MS 69.2% $214,777 42 4 4 WSFl METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station Vehi,I,S Police5tation 15.5% $24,020 64 58 D 6.8 Wl LS 68.2% $105,884 45 6 6 WSF1 METAL Honokaa FireStation FireStation 14.6% $96,004 56 60 D 3.9 Wl PC 61.8% $404,933 23 9 7 WSF1 METAL nfusion Cen ter/Kona Community Hospita CareFacillty 27.2% $187,975 48 47 B 4.3 Wl LS 47.3% $326,312 32 10 a WSF1 METAL North Kohala FireStation FireStation 3.2% $15,463 65 65 D 4.3 Wl LS 47.1% $227,684 39 11 9 WSF1 METAL North Kohala Fire Station Apparatus BUil FireStation 32% $5,522 66 65 D 14 Wl LS 47.1% $51,316 48 11 9 WSF1 METAL Kailua-Kona Fire Station Boat Shed FireStation 15.5% $30,922 61 59 ❑ 63 Wl LS 39.9% $79,794 49 13 11 WSFl METAL Hawaiian Ocean View Estates FireStation FireStation 74.3% $820,617 29 8 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $702,336 14 7 12 SPMBS METAL Kau Fire St.-nApparatus BUilding(Pah FireStation 85.6% $442,888 36 2 D 2.6 S3 MC 63.6% $329,220 30 7 12 SPMBS METAL Hamakua Pollee Station Police5tation 59.7% $1,091,199 23 15 D -0.7 C1L PC 35.5% $649,604 17 14 14 MECBL METAL Hale HO'ola Hamakua CareFacillty 40.8% $7,481,502 3 32 D DO RM1L LS 35.5% $6,509,984 3 15 14 MECBL METAL Hamakua Health Center CareFacillty 40.7% $1,110,051 22 331 D 1.71 RM1L LS 35.4% $965,139 10 161 14 MECBL METAL Kona Civic Center Fire Station FireStation 88.8% $1,072,827 24 1 D 0.7 C1L PC 31.6% $381,596 26 18 17 MECBL METAL Kau Hospital C-Facility 12.3% $916,638 27 62 D 0.5 C21- PC 33.1% $2,467,836 5 17 18 CECBL SPM Keauhou-Kona Fire Station FireStation 37.6% $557,473 33 39 D 1.2 RM1L LS 29.8% $442,418 21 22 19 MECBL METAL Kau Polce Station(Naalehu Police Stati Po1ice5tat1on 73.3% $986,266 26 10 D 2.2 RM1L LS 29.9% $402,492 24 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau Fire Sta tion(Pahala Fire Station) FireStation 73.6% $482,659 35 9 ❑ 1.7 RM1L LS 29.9% $196,086 43 19 20 MECBL METAL Kau PoIlce Station Generator BUllding(N Police5tation 73.3% $151,733 50 10 D 2.2 RM1L LS 29.9% $61,922 51 19 20 MECBLI METAL Waimea Fire Station FireStation 37.0% $739,413 30 40 D 0.9 RM21L LC 29.2% $583,917 18 23 23 MECBL SPM Waimea Police Station(Kamuela Police St Po11ce5tation 34,7%1 $622,439 321 42 D1 1.7 RM11L LCI 28,6%1 $512,443 201 24 24 MECBL BUR Kona Civic Center Po1ice5tation Po11ce5tation 81.3% $1,121,271 21 4 D 1.7 RM1L PC 26.7% $368,258 28 251 25 MECBL METAL Hawai ian ACres Volunteer Fire Station a n FireStation 16.8% $46,430 60 56 D 6.8 Wl LS 20.7% $57,180 52 31 26 WSFl METAL Buildingland2/Kona Community HOSpit C-Facility 45.6%$12,336,068 2 29 B 13 C1L MC 26.4% $7,149,901 1 26 27 CECBL SPM Psychiatric Facility/Kona COmmdnl ty HO C-Facility 43.0% $3,056,799 8 30 B 3.7 C21L MC 26.4% $1,878,673 6 26 27 CECBL SPM Special Services Building/Kona COmmuni CareFacillty 43.0% $2,638,938 11 31 B 4.2 C21L MC 26.4% $1,619,632 ] 28 2] CECBL METAL Dialysis Center/Hilo Medical Center CareFacillty 46.1% $699,924 31 28 D 1.4 Wl PC 17.0% $258,696 36 35 30 WSP1 METAL North Kohala Police Station(Kapaau Poli Po11ce5tation 132% $150,807 51 61 D 1.2 RM11L LS 212% $241,427 37 29 31 MECBL SPM Kohala Hospital CareFacillty 49.7% $3,671,684 7 21 D 0.7 RM1L PC 212% $1,562,278 8 30 31 MECBL METAL Pahoa Police Station Po11ce5tation 66.7% $253,180 44 12 DI 4.41 Wl PC 14.6-/61 $55,572 53 39 33 WSFl METAL Kailua-Kona FireStation FireStation 16.2% $273,710 42 57 D 4.2 RM11L HC 19.4% $327,845 31 341 34 MECBL METAL Radiation oncology/Kona Community HOSp CareFacillty 24.5% $338,137 41 49 B 6.8 Wl MS 19.7% $271,248 34 33 35 WMUH1 METAL North Hawaii Community Hospital CareFacillty 28.8% $4,372,256 6 46 D #N/A W2 MC 20.2% $3,060,570 4 32 36 WMUH1 METAL Kohala Coast Fire Station(Mauna La ni Pi FireStation 22.8% $424,027 37 51 D 1.2 RM11L LS 16.2% $302,645 33 36 37 MECBL METAL Waikoloa FireStation FireStation 22.4% $371,499 39 52 D 1.8 RM1L LS 16.2% $269,018 35 36 37 MECBL METAL Kona Police Station(Kealakehe Police St Po11ce5tation 33.8% $2,507,770 12 43 D 2.2 C1L MC 14.5% $1,078,515 9 40 39 MECBL METAL Maintenance Office/W,Medical Center Ca reFaci l i ty 50.3% $1,735,545 16 20 D 03 W2 PC 2.9% $99,795 46 62 39 WMUH2 BUR Kaumana Fire Station FireStation 66.39% $1,121,511 20 13 D 1.4 RM11- PC 13.99% $235,421 38 41 41 MECBL METAL VA tpOti en[Clinic/H I I o M ed i ca l Cen t Care Facillty 49.5% $2,887,890 10 22 ❑1 10 RM21L LS 13.9%1 $808,876 12 42 41 MECBL METAL Pahoa Flre Station FireStation 32.7% $259,415 43 44 ❑ 1.4 Wl LS 8.1% $64,1S11 50 481 43 WSF1 METAL Extended Care Facility/Hilo Medical Ce CareFacillty 39.8% $3,021,799 9 36 D 0.7 RM11L PC 11.2% $852,665 11 43 44 MECBL METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station Vehi FireStation 56.1% $193,613 47 16 D 3.9 Wl PC 4.7% $16,349 61 57 45 WSF1 METAL Hawaiian Paradise Park Fire Station FireStation 56.1% $164,571 49 16 D 4.4 Wl PC 4.7% $13,897 63 57 45 WSFl METAL Kona Police Station Generator Building( Po11ce5tat1on 31.8% $54,837 58 45 D 2.2 RM11- LS 10.0% $17,200 60 44 47 MECBL BUR Maintenance Building/Hilo Medical Cent C-Facility 37.8% $1,825,403 15 38 D 1.7 RM2L PC 8.1% $393,177 25 46 48 MECBL METAL Hale HOOla/Hilo Medical Center CareFacillty 48.5% $2,176,209 14 24 D 1.7 RM1L LS 8.1% $365,093 29 46 48 MECBL METAL Kawailani Fire Station Apparatus Shed FireStation 48.3% $199,783 46 25 D 2.6 S3 MC 3.5% $14,672 62 60 48 WSF1 METAL Laundry Building/Hilo Medical Center CareFacillty 49.5% $1,349,815 19 23 DI 071 RM2L LC 7.9% $214,895 41 49 51 MECBL BUR Central Fire Station Dispatch Office FireStation 24.0% $46,454 S9 SO D 17 RM1L LS 6.8% $13,045 641 SO 52 MECBL METAL Central FireStation Warehouse FireStation 40.0% $993,191 25 34 D 2.6 S3 LS 15.1% $375,567 27 38 53 SPMBM METAL Hawaii Public Safety BUildingA EmergencyCtr 46.39/6 $5,049,757 4 26 D 03 C2L LC 6.39/6 $688,116 15 51 54 MECBL BUR Hawaii Public Safety BUildingB EmergencyCtr 46.3% $5,001,817 S 26 D 1 C2L LC 6.3% $681,583 16 51 54 MECBL BUR Acute Care Facility/Hilo Medical Cente CareFacillty 39.7%$33,431,818 1 37 D 33 C2MI MC 8.3% $7,020,915 2 45 56 CECBMI BUR Central FireStation FireStation 64.5% $2,203,166 13 14 D -0.5 C21L PC 6.3% $215,300 40 53 57 CECBL BUR Waiakea FireStation Boat Shed FireStation 84.4% $524,281 34 3 D 2.6 S3 PC 4.8% $29,510 58 SS 57 SPMBS METAL Waiakea Fire Station Helicopter Hanger FireStation 40.0% $220,709 45 34 ❑ 2.6 S3 LS 4.8% $26,231 59 55 57 SPMBS METAL Kawailani FireStation Fire Station 76.5% $845,0361 28 51 DI 1.7 RM1L PCI 4.2%1 $45,950 541 59 60 MECBL METAL Civil Defense Emergency Operations Cente EmergencyCtr 22.0% $364,060 40 T5D 4.6 C2L MC 5.5% $91,236 47 54 61 CECBL BUR Keaau Fire Station Vehicle Shed FireStation 53.2% $128,379 54 2.6 S3 LS 3.3% $8,010 65 61 62 SPMBS METAL Keaau Police Station Vehicle Shed Police5tation 53.2% $128,379 54 2.6 S3 LS 1.4% $3,343 66 66 63 WSF1 METAL Waiakea FireStation FireStation 8.4% $142,615 52 4.2 RM1L HC 2.6% $43,780 55 63 64 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Stationand Police Station Police5tation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 0.] RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL Keaau Fire Stationand Police Station FireStation 76.5% $1,531,627 17 0.7 RM1L PC 1.8% $36,141 56 64 65 MECBL METAL is-is Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.8 University of Hawaii Study As part of the State of Hawaii hazard mitigation plan the vulnerability of all buildings within the University of Hawaii system were assessed. Average annual losses were computed for hurricane, earthquake, and flood hazards on each campus. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 18-5 and Figure 18-6. More detailed site specific modeling was conducted to rank each building on each campus in terms of the expected losses and loss of functionality due to probabilistic earthquake, hurricane, and flood scenarios. For simplicity, the buildings of both the UH Hilo and Hawaii CC campuses were included in one rank list, this list is shown in Table 18-6. CUH Man❑a Honolulu CC Leeward CC KapiolaniCC,$398,539,4% ■H❑naluiucc $352,869 $202,502 Windward CC oLeewar❑CC 5% 3% $144,233 Kauai CC 2% $139,564 OKapl❑lanl CC 2% mWlnd—d CC - Maui CC NKWal Cc $219,670 ■Maul CC 3% netherF-11Ne5 Wd Genera'F-IrNes ■UHHiimHavaii CC Other Facilities and General Facilities $994.084 14% UH Manoa $3,545,826 51% HUH Hilo/Hawaii CC $1,075,816 16% Annual Losses All Hazards, All Buildings Figure 18-5. University of Hawaii AAL losses per campus UH Hilo&Hawaii Community College-Annual Losses $50,000;5% 169,378 16% •Hurricane •Earthquake Flood Figure 18-6. Annual losses per hazard for UH Hilo and Hawaii CC 18-19 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-6. Vulnerability r nking of UH Hilo and Hawaii CC facilities UH Hilo&Hawaii CC-Building Vulnerability List Total Number of Campus Buildings- 132 00-year Hurricane Event Vulnerability Loss o Loss of Modeled $Loss Risk Functi Modeled $Loss Risk Functionality Building Buildin $Loss Percentile (NUm. Iding$Loss Percentile (Num.of Days) UHH-LEARNING RESOURCES CENTER $ 8,376,291 >95% 82 $ 3,374,601 >95% 28 UHH-UCB $ 7,765,196 >95% 190 $ 2,759,306 >95% 28 UHH-WENTWORTH HALL $ 7,041,499 >95% >90 $ 975,155 90-95% 44 UHH-THEATER $ 6,559,633 >95% >90 $ 900,880 90-95% 28 UHH-LIFE SCIENCE COMPLEX $ 6,194,326 >95% >90 $ 1,024,260 90-95% 57 UHH-BUS ED/COMPUTER CTR $ 5,476,613 >95% >90 $ 794,824 85-90% 44 o UHH-HALE KAUANOE-DORM II $ 4,992,235 90-95% >90 $ 1,330,454 90-95% 31 o UHH-CAMPUS CENTER BUILDING $ 4,948,361 90-95% >90 $ 1,758,364 >95% 28 v UHH-BUSINESS OFFICE $ 4,554,295 90-95% >90 $ 1,244,384 90-95% 57 0 UHH-KANAKA'OLE HALL(EKH) $ 4,339,733 90-95% 82 $ 2,023,685 >95% 31 z UHH-HALE KEHAU DORMITORY $ 3,754,989 90-95% 41 $ 611,100 80-85% 80 m HAW CC-CAFETERIA $ 3,496,075 90-95% >90 $ 736,298 85-90% 57 BANK OF HAWAII BLDG DOWNTOWN HILO $ 3,276,531 90-95% >90 $ 679,581 80-85% 49 UHH-HALE KANILEHUA DORMITORY $ 2,181,045 85-90% >90 $ 1,398,069 90-95% 131 Kukahauula Institute of Astronomy $ 1,811,419 80-85% 22 $ 3,342,365 >95% 47 UHHilo Musuem and Astronomy Building $ 1,699,836 80-85% 22 $ 4,577,015 >95% 100 Panaewa-Covered Equine Arena $ 191,714 1501/ 21 $ 933,623 90-95% 280 UHH-STUDENT SERVICES $ 3,244,905 85-90% >90 $ 472,289 70-75% 28 UHH-MARINE SCIENCE BUILDING $ 3,031,175 85-900A >90 $ 661,690 80-85% 57 >, HAW CC-TRADE&INDUS/LABS $ 1,481,454 80-850A >90 $ 591,631 80-85% 100 HAW CC-TRADE&INDUS/LABS $ 1,481,454 80-85% >90 $ 591,631 80-85% 100 c HAW CC-CARPENTRY SHOP B $ 1,411,915 80-85% >90 $ 548,605 75-80% 100 HAW CC-Agricultural Mechanics&Biology Lab $ 1,074,382 70-75% >90 $ 429,064 70-75% 100 3 HAW CC-Learning Center&IT Support $ 1,074,382 70-75% >90 $ 429,064 70-75% 100 c HAW CC-Auxilary Services Shops $ 1,002,664 70-75% >90 $ 389,589 60-701/ 100 HAW CC-Administration&Student Services $ 821,766 70-75% >90 $ 181,186 50-60% 31 UHH-HALE IKENA,B $ 386,633 50-60% >90 $ 606,652 80-851/ 322 m HAW CC-CAS,ART LABS $ 217,403 1501/ 57 $ 236,740 50-60% 211 = Fish Hatchery Greenhouse $ 490,991 50-60% 39 $ 697,833 85-90% 129 Pearl Hatchery Greenhouse $ 490,991 50-60% 39 $ 697,833 85-901/ 129 HAW CC-OCET&Financial Aid $ 75,389 150% 22 $ 247,113 50-60% 239 Based on the results of this analysis a more specific assessment of the highest ranked buildings can be conducted to determine the benefit/cost ratio of any potential retrofits. 18.1.9 Warning Sirens and Evacuation System Sudden-onset hazards such as earthquakes and local tsunamis occur with little or no warning. For most other hazards, an effective warning system requires a reliable forecasting system. The County relies on the following sources for forecasting of the various hazards: • Tsunami-- The Federal Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC), based on Oahu, provides capable warning for distant tsunamis. Figure 18-7 illustrates the warning procedure. The system has never missed warning of a damaging tsunami since its beginning in 1947, but has caused a number of unneeded evacuations. 18-20 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment POSSIBLE TSUNAMI -•450mph y 0-0 TIDE GAUGE �0 }D 7Mf7f� GROUND WAVE SEISMOGRAPH 5m" EARTHOVAKE � CHECK S REPORTS DES IS REPORTS OUT MAG?77 6 PTWC IN W/ETA WATCH 3 5mm. NO ■ ESS IGNORE lnl 7 DECISION YES CIVIL EVAC- ? TSUNAMI? DEFENSE UATION NO 3hr CANCEL SIRENS WATCH Tsunami Warning System Flow Chart HOW DOES THE TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM WORK? When a significant earthqualae(1)occurs in the Pacific,it is detected(2)at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center(PTWC)in Ewa Beach,Oahu. Five geophysicists man the Center around the clock. If the magnitude I'3)is greater than 7,the epicenter is located. If the epicenter is in an area lilzely to cause a tsunami,a tsunami warning{a is sent to nearby coasts and a tsunami watch is set for areas with a travel time more than three hours away. Messages are sent to tide observers for a report on the first wave,(S)and telemetered water level gages are checlaed. In addition,the earthquahe's moment is calculated. The geophysicists(S)quickly review the earthquake and sea level data and historical information to decide if a warning is needed for areas currently under a watch condition. If hazardous waves are predicted(7),the warning is sent to emergency officials across the Pacific at least three hours ahead of the first wave (the speed of the waves has been pre-calculated for all areas). People can then be cleared from all coastal areas(S)that might be hit by the waves. I Red numbers correspond to numbers on the Tsunami Warning 5ystem Flow Chart Figure 18-7. Pacific Tsunami Warning System • Flooding(rainfall, high waves) and Hurricanes--National Weather Service Forecast Office (NWS) • Lava flow--Hawaiian Volcano Observatory,U.S. Geological Survey The warnings from the PTWC and NWS are issued as a "watch" and/or a "warning" to the County Civil Defense Agency. The Civil Defense activates the sirens to alert people to seek further information from the ra- dio or TV. The Civil Defense transmits warnings to the public through the Emergency Alert System, which consists of simultaneous broadcasts over all radio and television stations. An 18-21 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment effective public education program ensures a calm, organized, and efficient response to the warnings. The County currently has 68 sirens and 12 simulators in operation around the island. Simula- tors provide a signal to manned stations where personnel are utilized to disperse the warning, these are shown in Figure 18-9. Sirens have an effective average range of one-half mile. Sirens are critical for populated coastal areas for tsunami warnings. Figure 18-8 shows the deficiencies in the coverage of coastal areas. I • p • • ,t:' • t. - Civil Defense Sirens with 1/2 Mile Buffer Figure 18-8. Civil Defense Warning Sirens and Evacuation Routes 18-22 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Hawaii Hilo• Honokohau §�Old Kona Airport 1�Pahoehoe 1•Kahaluu Ka oho • Ahalagui Pohoiki §6 Napoopoo Opihikau Honaunau Keahou Apua Halape Kaaha . AL A oil Milolii Punaluu Honuapo 0; -Cellular Runup Detector • Satellite Runup Detector �-Sea Level Gauge Figure 18-9. Site locations for Cellular Run-up Detectors(CRD's),Satellite Run-up Detectors(SRD's),and Pacific Tsunami Warning Center sea level gauges Police, fire and other emergency vehicles equipped with siren and PA equipment will sound and broadcast warnings in areas to be evacuated,particularly in affected areas not covered by the CD sirens or in radio reception "dead spots". The Civil Air Patrol, County, military and private helicopters provide warnings to isolated areas. 18.1.10 Critical Lifeline Infrastructure Facilities A community's infrastructure provides services, utilities and linkages which allow society to function. The term"lifelines" is commonly used for this infrastructure and can be defined as systems or networks which provide for the circulation of people, goods, services and information,upon which health, safety, comfort and economic activity depends. Lifelines are the means whereby a community supports its day to day activities and include mechanisms used to respond to emergencies. During and after hazard events, the Big Island's 'lifelines' are vulnerable to disruption and/or damage. These systems are often large, complex and interdependent. Failure of one system (or part of it) causes repercussions in other systems and therefore increases a community's vulnerability further. For example, the vulnerability of the Port of Hilo, a transportation component, could affect the entire island's energy and transportation system since all propane, diesel, gasoline, and fuel oil for the island is supplied through this one location with no alternate. When stored fuel is used up, 18-23 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 1s:Risk Assessment transportation would falter first; eventually, the electrical supply for the island would be reduced to geothermal (about 20% of the usual total) and hydro power (less than 5%). Most water and sewage systems would halt as would most communication systems. This section will assess the vulnerability for the following lifelines: • Transportation systems -- harbors, airports, roads and bridges, buses, automobile rental agencies • Energy systems--electrical/fuel, gas • Communication systems -- telecommunication networks, cell phone sites, radio transmitters • Water systems-- County water system • Wastewater systems --County sewerage system 18.1.10.1 Transportation 18.1.10.1.1 Harbors Hawaii island has two deep-draft harbors with port facilities that enable large ships to dock and unload: Hilo Port and Kawaihae Port (see Figure 18-10). For island communities, the resilience of port facilities is crucial to efficient post-disaster recovery since this is the entry point for bulk supplies and heavy equipment. 18-24 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 'l 1 [l Harbor © Airport Asset within Tsunami Evacuation &100 or 500 Year Flood Zone Major Roads Figure 18-10. Harbors and Airports The Hilo and Kawaihae Ports compare as follows: Table 18-7. Hilo and Kawaihae Port Facilities Hilo Kawaihae Wharf length 2700 1600 Cargo embarked(tons annually) 1,500,000 1,000,000 Storage(1000 sf) 122 23 -sheds -open 680 427 Passengers 3000(in a day) 200 if needed(no terminal) Fuel handling all types very limited Relative vulnerability -tsunami more less -hurricane less more Earthquake/Liquefaction more more 18-25 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment While the basic cargo capability of both ports is redundant, Kawaihae does not handle passengers nor large amounts of fuel. Some basic fuel manifolds were installed at Kawaihae several years ago but capped off for future use.90 One gasoline supplier(Union/Costco) does use one intake to supply their service station. Most of the fuel tanks at the harbor are supplied by trucks from Hilo, and have a capacity of 814,000 gallons which is about a 60 days' supply for the current users. Both ports are subject to tsunami and hurricane surge. However, it is very unlikely that both ports would be severely damaged by the same event, but probable that both could receive some damage, one more than the other. The harbor master does not know of any specific hardening methods nor of any such plans by the State DOT. Passenger ships can simply be diverted from this island while any in port upon a tsunami warning will put to sea and can then proceed to an undamaged port. In case of a tsunami or hurricane threat, any passengers unable to board in time for sailing will be kept on their busses and sent to shelters specified by Civil Defense. For information on the Port of Kawaihae, and the damage it suffered during the Oct. 2006, Kiholo Bay Earthquake, see Section 7.2.1.1. 18.1.10.1.2 Airports and Landing Strips Hawaii Island has four public airports-- two primary commercial airports with the ability to receive large carriers (Hilo and Kona International Airports) and two smaller airports (Waimea-Kohala and Upolu Airports). Upolu Airport is not heavily used for passenger or cargo. None of the airports are located in a tsunami evacuation zone, flood zone, or high-hazard lava flow zone. The terminals are not considered satisfactory for hurricane sheltering. They would depend on tout- busses to move people to Civil Defense-specified shelters. The Hilo terminal and related functions can run for 47 hours at full capacity (78 at 50%) from the fuel with the emergency generator. The FAA tower,which is separate, can operate at full capacity for at least three days around the clock, and possibly for 12 days. In an emergency, the basic control functions of the tower can be handled by portable radio equipment from any location in the airport area. In addition to the main 10,000 ft. runway, Hilo has a second runway 5600 ft long which easily handles inter island airliners. The Kona airport has similar backup capabilities, except for having just one runway of 11,000 ft and handles more passengers (1.3 million vs. 800 thousand enplaned for Hilo). The Waimea-Kohala airport has minimal passenger capability but with a 5600 ft runway can handle interisland aircraft if needed. There are numerous military and civil heliports around the island. The National Guard has six large (12 passenger) helicopters at Hilo, which the Governor can make available for emergency use and can fly to Oahu nonstop. The County has two smaller ones, and the tour industry has over 20; none can go as far as Oahu without refueling. 90 Ian Birnie,Harbor master,personal communications,September 2003. 18-26 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment The Army has an airport at Pohakuloa training area, with a runway 3600 ft long. It is of little value for supply or evacuation due to the remote location and short runway combined with the elevation of 6000 ft. Airline fuel is loaded only in Honolulu. Fuel for smaller aircraft and helicopters could become a problem when tank trucks are emptied if the storage tanks are unable to refill them. There are about eight small (ranch and crop duster) airstrips around the island. Civil Defense has a map of them, as they are no longer shown on aviation maps. 18.1.10.1.3 Roads and Bridges The major arterial highway system circles the island with a mix of State and County jurisdic- tion (see Figure 18-11). However, during emergency evacuations, the County police control all State highways or County roads, assisted by the Department of Public Work's pre-planned barricade system. Barricade locations are shown in the tsunami evacuation maps. If a bridge or crossing on a State highway is damaged or threatened, the County will respond during the emergency to determine whether to close and to designate alternate bypass routes. During the recovery phase, the State and County cooperate in clearing and restoring roads around the is- land. 18-27 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Pik Source: CeIISUS BUI-CaU PDC(Pacific Disaster Center) County of Hawaii • Bridges Accuracy: Roads USGS Quad Major Roads Figure 18-11. Roads and Bridges Roads and bridges may be (and have been) affected completely by stream flooding,tsunamis, earthquakes, and landslides. The 7.2 magnitude Halape earthquake in 1975 not only damaged roads in the Volcano area but caused landslides that affected the highway at Laupahoehoe and Honomu.91 The heavy rain and flooding in November 2001 completely blocked a major road in Hilo and the only highway through Ka'u. The tsunami of 1946 ruined the railroad bridges at Wailuku River and Kolekole stream(the railroad right-of-way is now highway 19). Several bridges on this coast are now being reinforced against earthquake damage which may also make them more resistant to tsunami or hurricane storm surge. Ali'i Drive in Kailua is susceptible to these hazards but there are alternate routes. Figure 18-11 identifies the bridges on the major roads. Future updates to this plan will identify road segments and bridges that are within the VE zone (at risk to tsunami and hurricane surge), the bridges that have been or are programmed for reinforcement, and the highway segments that have experienced past closure from landslides with no alternate routes. Key repairs were made after the 2001 flood to bridges that have required repetitive repairs. 91 USGS 18-28 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment The 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake had a relatively minor impact on the roads and bridges in Hawaii County. Although rock and soil slides in cuts above roadways were numerous, damage to road embankments and pavements was less prevalent, with a few exceptions (Figure 18-12). The most dramatic of these was the collapse of half of the roadway at Mile 35 on Highway 19 near Pa`auilo,resulting in the closure of one lane of traffic (Figure 18-13). This was caused by failure of a 20-foot high embankment and rock wing wall on the approach to a concrete girder bridge. The cast-in-situ concrete girder bridge is supported on rock wall abutments. The bridge suffered no damage but the adjacent embankment failed. The wing wall consisted of mortared rock and was approximately 14 inches thick. Because of the lack of redundancy in the highway system on the Island of Hawaii, road closures due to rockfalls, landslides or embankment slope instability can have a significant effect on emergency response and economic recovery efforts. For a number of hours after the earthquakes, the area of North Kohala, including the town of Hawi, was cut off from the rest of the island because of road closures on Highways 250 and 270, the only access roads to this region. Fortunately, the rockfalls and landslides caused by these earthquakes could be cleared relatively easily, and all roadways on the Island of Hawaii were open to at least one-lane traffic within two days of the earthquakes. 18-29 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment ���i. .ice •.-� Figure 18-12. Road damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake 1 r Figure 18-13. Bridge embankment Damage resulting from 2006 Kiholo Bay Earthquake Tn many districts a scarcity of access roads creates a problem should lava flows, storms or earthquakes, sever these roads. For example, Highways 11 and 190 are the primary roads in Kona and they are sub-parallel to the coast and vulnerable to the lava hazard. Only a second- ary road provides access to the ocean in South Kona where the lava flow hazard is highest. This and other more minor roads may be essential in the evacuation of people to the ocean. Future updates to this plan will identify critical road segments that require hardening or an emergency bypass. 18-30 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.11 Energy Systems 18.1.11.1 Electrical/Feel The Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc. (HELCO) operates the electrical system on this is- land. The electrical system consists of power generating plants, substations, and transmission lines (see Figure 18-14). HELCO power plants are located at Keahole,North Kona, Waimea, South Kohala, Waiakea Peninsula and Kanoclehua, South Hilo, and Keaau, Puna. Generating plants rely on petroleum to produce 75% of the power, with the balance generated from renewable sources such as geothermal, hydroelectric, and wind. Should the supply of petroleum become a problem, HELCO has fuel storage to generate power from oil for an average 30 days, per a PUC requirement. The fuel tanks are at the Hilo base and located out of flood,tsunami, and lava hazard zones. All major transmission lines are overhead. 18-31 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment ® Electric Substations Figure 18-14. Electrical Substations One generation station (Waiakea) is in a tsunami/hurricane flood zone. This is not a signifi- cant problem since its capacity is only 15 MW and adequate generation is available in safer locations. The major risk(in addition to fuel supply) is damage to transmission lines by hurri- cane winds, possible earthquake shaking or lava flow. Two transmission lines to the Kona side run along the Saddle Road and are in or near lava flow zone 2, from Mauna Loa. HELCO has a modem remote switching system, as well as a remote sensing and control dispatch system, to work around limited damage areas or resolve and restore service, but lacks generation capacity on the Kona side. If that side of the island is isolated, only 25% of normal usage can be supplied.92 92 Personal communication with Jay Ignacio,HELCO. 18-32 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.11.2 Gas Propane gas is widely used on the Island of Hawaii. Public Utilities Commision regulates 67 miles of gas mains and service lines on the Big Island. These lines serve approximately 1,600 customers and are located mainly in Hilo. In addition, approximately 9,300 customers throughout the county are provided gas service by tank or cylinder. The Public Utilities Commission does not regulate this type of service. Major liquid propane gas substations on the island of Hawaii are located in Hilo, Kailua-Kona, Waimea, and Ka'u. 18.1.12 Communication Systems The basic communication system for the island is the Verizon(formerly Hawaiian Telephone Co.) wire, standard and optical cable connections. The County has an extensive radio repeater and microwave-linked system which serves the police and fire department mobile units via VHF frequencies (see Figure 18-15). VHF frequencies are limited to line-of-sight contact. Hawaiian Electric has a private radio, microwave, and leased phone line system which has some interconnection with the County system. The television cable company (Time-Warner) provides video service around the island which includes high speed data service supplying Internet service for homes and offices. 18-33 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment I.A A 50 1 / :y Microwave Only As set located in volcanic y Hazard Zone 2 Asset within FIRM 100 or Repeater Only 500Year Flood Zone Asset located within Volcanic Repeater & Microwave 41 HazardZone 1 Figure 1S-15. Communication Systems. Two primary cellular phone networks serve the island: AT&T and Verizon. Coverage is nec- essarily concentrated in populated areas and some highways. It is important to note that the cellular network depends on the land line phone system for interconnections and cannot func- tion without working telephone service. Interisland phone service is now provided exclusively by underwater optical fiber cable. The State has a digital microwave link. There is no interisland satellite service. Figure 18-16 shows the cables in place as of 1996. While cables have broken from hurricane surge (Hurricane Iwa, at Makaha, Oahu), it appears that there is ample redundancy in the present cable array. Telephone (including cell phones), emergency services radios, and interisland communica- tions are vulnerable not only to long-term power failure (Verizon says most exchanges will 18-34 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment last only a day on their battery power but diesel service will last 72 hours 93) but especially to hurricane, earthquake, and in a few locations, tsunami, lava flow, and landslide damage. In Hurricane Iwa, five undersea cables near the Oahu coast were broken. In Hurricane Iniki, all communications were lost until one portable radio channel was put in use. Even when radio amateurs were able to set up temporary antennas and communicate, lack of telephone connection remained a major problem of having communications with all vital locations. The Civil Defense EOC includes radio systems for amateur and Civil Air Patrol use, as well as police and fire. It has backup propane generators and tanks for at least four days of service, but may be extended to two weeks. For new telecommunication towers, the Planning Department requires the submittal of "Building plans for the tower, certified by a licensed structural engineer, verifying that the tower, together with the initial antennas and other equipment proposed to be installed thereon,will have a hard survivability for sustained winds of one hundred miles per hour.-94 Communication Networks, January 1996 Kauai \ \ \\ �♦O'ahu \ ` \ C ♦\ ------ ♦[ � r 1 Maui GTE fiber optic ------ --r GTE microwave r i Distance Education �\ % Skybridge ------ \ t HITS State digital microwave k I-net fiber ------ Figure 18-16. Communications Network. Source:Juvik,S.&J.Juvik,Attas of Hawaii,University of Hawaii Press,1998,p.274 93 Personal communication with Duane Miyashiro,Manager,Verizon. 94 Hawaii County Code section 25-2-74. 18-35 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.13 Water Systems Domestic water systems on this island include the County water system, private water systems (e.g., Waikoloa), and individual water catchments. Besides domestic uses, water is essential for fire fighting. Since the County water system serves a majority of the island's population and would be relied upon by non-County users during emergencies, the resilience of the County's system is the focus of disaster mitigation. The County water system consists of source, storage, and transmission facilities (transmission lines and booster pump stations). The GIS inventory of the water system facilities is in progress. The Department of Water Supply facilities are generally at small direct risk from most haz- ards other than possible leaks after an earthquake. The primary problem would be electrical supply for the pumps. More than half of the water supply is pumped, with a few small systems gravity fed(i.e.,Waimea, Honomu). None of the pump stations have backup diesels. The Department estimates that, with typical water use, their tank storage would last only a day or two.9' Water can always be trucked to areas without a functioning system. Water hauling trucks are available from the following sources: • Fire Department: ten tankers of 750 to 3500 gallon capacity, totaling 13,850 gallons, located around the island; • National Guard: four 500 gallon tankers at Hilo; • Private water haulers: There are 29 PUC-licensed trucks hauling water; most are based in Puna or Hilo. Their-capacity ranges from 2500 to 7500 gallons, with an average of---4000 gallons. Their total capacity is 1,206,000 gallons.96 Thus, the totals are 43 tank trucks and 1,221,850 gallons. Most Department of Water Supply reservoirs would normally be depleted within two days if no electricity is available for pump- ing, though there are a few gravity-fed sources such as Waimea and Honomu that could be utilized to fill tankers. However, the trucks would be dispersed by Civil Defense to serve household locations in the damaged areas rather than being used to try to refill tanks or reser- voirs, if any were available. 95 Personal communication with Glenn Al una,Engineer,Department of Water Supply. 96 Hawaii County Civil Defense,data tables. 18-36 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.1.14 Wastewater Systems On this island, the predominant method of wastewater disposal is onsite individual wastewater systems (i.e., cesspools or septic systems). The County sewerage system serves approximately 30% of the resident population. The priority area to sewer is the coastal areas to prevent cesspool seepage to the nearshore coastal waters. The County presently operates six sewerage systems: Hilo, Papaikou, Kulaimano, Kapehu, Kailua-Kona, and Keauhou (see Figure 18-17). During tsunamis, hurricanes, or earthquakes, disaster mitigation focuses on preventing leakage from the sewerage system. During the recovery phase, the operation of the system is not critical since portable toilets and facilities with onsite disposal are available. 18-37 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment akuea Hmstd.R Homesteatl Kaup Kulaimano System 3 w `- N mina R Kute� gno Nom Kulaimano Section in Detail a n � MR µ� WiP ` W:P 12 8 e eek Pepe ekro St. _ W .Source: _ y County of Hawaii Accuracy: N Parcel Layer Legend 'a ServicePointST ^••••FormST Parcels o ManholeST GrawtyST • OischargePointST OuttaIIST —LateralST —TreatmentST Figure 18-17. County Wastewater System. 18-38 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment The 1946 tsunami filled Hilo Bay with sewage which took weeks to flush out. Hilo's waste- water treatment plant has been relocated out of the tsunami zone. All other County treatment plants are outside the VE flood zone. However, 16 out of the 18 sewage pump stations appear to be in hazard zones. it would take careful mapping and site visits to determine with certain- ty whether such stations are at risk. All treatment plants and pump stations are designed to withstand earthquakes. All treatment plants and pump stations have standby diesel or propane generators in case of electrical failure. 18.1.15 Recovery Facilities and Capabilities Recovery involves all activities needed to provide emergency services and resumption of at least temporary normal services such as water, electricity, food distribution, and basic trans- portation. As with other aspects, these responsibilities fall under the umbrella of the County Civil Defense and are carried out by County departments,private agencies, and businesses. 18.1.16 Debris Management Removal and disposal of debris will clearly be a major problem. The island of KauaTs experience after the hurricanes showed what an extensive problem debris was, and how important its removal, storage, and disposal- temporarily or long term- is to recovery.97 Hawaii County's problem is intensified compared to the 1946 and 1960 tsunami debris clearance due to the closure of all sugar plantations. Machinery and experienced manpower from the plantations was a major factor in clean-up after those disasters.98 Hawaii County does not have a public curbside solid waste collection system. Instead, resi- dents dispose their solid waste at transfer stations located at 21 existing sites, and businesses hire private contractors who collect and dispose the waste at the landfills. The County trans- ports the solid waste from the transfer stations to two landfills: in Hilo and Puuanahulu (see Figure 18-18). Based on the existing reliance on residents to transport their solid waste to designated sites, the County's Disaster Debris Action Manual99 emphasizes the need to educate the public and businesses on post-disaster solid waste disposal practices (particularly the need to separate recyclables) and pre-arranged contracts with private contractors for emergency debris clearance and collection. None of the landfill or transfer station sites are within the flood or tsunami inundation zone. 97 For the State report on the problems and recommendations on this task,after Hurricane'Iniki,see Hawaii Disaster Debris Management Plan,prepared by IT Corporation(prime contractor)for State of Hawaii Department of Health and Civil Defense Agency,June 2000. 98 Personal and newspaper accounts at the Pacific Tsunami Museum describe the contributions of the planta- tions and the unions to recovery after tsunamis. 99 Harding ESE,County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual,prepared for the County of Hawaii, December 18,2001. 18-39 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment T '> T T T T � T ; T T T T T T T T 0 LANDFILL TRANSFER STATION TDSR TRANSFER STATION Figure 18-18. Landfills,Transfer Stations,and TDSRs. Because of the limited remaining capacity at the Hilo Landfill, a major disaster will likely overwhelm the capacity. The Hilo Landfill has an estimated remaining capacity of 400,000 cubic yards. The Puuanahulu Landfill has a remaining capacity of 14,000,000 cubic yards. The estimated generation of hurricane debris from a Category 4 storm is about 1,600,000 cu- bic yards for the South Hilo district, and about 1,800,000 cubic yards for the combined Kona and Kohala districts. The strategy, therefore, is to minimize the amount to be landfilled and thereby minimize the hauling costs from Hilo to Puuanahulu. A tentative list of priorities for debris clearing,which Civil Defense will determine according to the situation,is as follows: 1. Life Safety 2. Communications 3. Essential roadways; access 18-40 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 4. Water 5. Electricity 6. Fuel (for emergency generators; emergency and recovery vehicles) 7. Airports 8. Barge docks (including fuel manifolds). The Disaster Debris Action Manual addressed the following: • Debris Estimation. The Action Manual used spreadsheet models to estimate the quantities and composition of disaster debris generated by a hurricane, flood event, or tsunami. It did not estimate debris generation for earthquakes. A HAZUS run of the 04/02/1868 Ka'u Earthquake on the current day building inventory of Hawaii County produced debris generation of 1.27 tons. The hurricane table considers both with and without heavy rains - a factor overlooked in the hurricane studies done for Kaua'i and Oahu. • Temporary Debris Storage and Reduction (TDSR) Sites. Since the existing transfer stations will not be sufficient to handle disaster debris, TDSR sites are pre-identified areas to temporarily dispose debris. The Action Manual identified seven of the transfer stations that are large (10 acres or more) and/or have significant contiguous areas that are available for expanding to TDSR sites: Kalapana, Keaau, Waiohinu, Keei, Kailua, Waimea, and Hilo. Hilo site is in the quarry area adjacent to the landfill. The Puuanahulu Landfill has an area set aside in the landfill plan for TDSR use. A typical material processing flow for a TDSR site is shown in Figure 18-19. 18-41 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment DNSITE r--->OFrUTE Compostebles Air Curtain Indnemuw Grieenwasle Public Midable I Plc[-up of ; Herdwrwds Gtind Boilers �r Segregate r—� Metals and j -_ Markel Applonces On of QR Densty Island Mboad Aggregate Debris Mi'n'd Crush Read Base btaterias Clean Shred Landfill 'Gave Wood Nows Resoun:e Reuse — —A_* Rcusahles dmr - 'ge -- O[xn�gah-d Boxes Rausabtxt Prows for 491 S Household Trenspon Rncyc.ah:os Racyclalws - Plastic Sheeting Residues and Dis:ards Ldntlnl: Bulky Wastes i Density - Woody C8D Density _ ' Bdiers- Figure 18-19. Typical Material Process Concept for TDSR Site. Source: Harding ESE,County of Hawaii Disaster Debris Action Manual,December 18,2001. 18-42 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter-IS:Risk Assessment A typical site plan is shown in Figure 18-20. ---------------------- -e. pro'essoa Rr:j_&O O.D- -1 5 Acm Wandy Ddw;s Scrap'hood 0.7 Acre Storage 0 7.4cre C&D ..... ........... Oebris G",r.Elebri, 0.4 Ac- Metal G'."' 0.5 Arre W451V Debris 0.8 Acre ................ 0.r A- A. --------- d 4 Az.. To Mar.,(els or Landfill Gafa Hcuse,'Offica Allow for quzjing 3pacc Access Road Site 1-unctions Key 1. Green Waste Data 2 Mixed C&D Program Area 6.6 Acres 3 Reusaues&Recyclable& 209E Circulation 1.3 4 Bulky Wastes Buffer 0.7 Public and Disposer Access Roads .......... ► Petirnaler Road 1.4 Perimeter Service Road ToU TDSR 10.0 Arm♦ Figure 18-20. TDSR Conceptual Site Plan. Source: Hat-ding ESE,County of Hawaii Disaster Debt-is Action Manual,December 18,2001. 18-43 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment There is a problem, however, in that some of these areas are private property and use agreements have not yet been negotiated. 44 CFR 10.8 (c) Statutory exclusions. The following actions are statutorily excluded from NEPA and the preparation of environmental impact statements and environmental assessments by section 316 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act(Stafford Act), as amended, 42 U.S.C- 5159,- 1. Action taken or assistance provided under sections 402,403,407, or 502 of the Stafford Act; and 2. Action taken or assistance provided under section 406 of the Stafford Act that has the effect of restoring facilities as they existed before a major disaster or emergency Actions falling within the bounds of these Statutory Exclusions are exempt from NEPA, including all NEPA review and documentation. These actions must, however, still comply with all applicable environmental laws and Executive Orders. For section 402, General Federal Assistance For section 403, Essential Assistance For section 406, Repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of a facility damaged or destroyed. These 406 funded activities must take place on the same site as the damaged facility, and conform substantially to the pre-existing condition. Also, the proposed facility must conform substantially to the pre-existing footprint and location on the site of the pre- existing damaged facility. Alternate or improved projects not meeting the above criteria do not fall within the STATEX,and require NEPA review For section 407, Debris removal For section 502,Federal emergency assistance • Response Protocols. The Action Manual specified best management practices for various types of wastes (e.g., green waste, metal, mixed debris, woody C&C debris, asphalt roofing, putrescible wastes). Although cleanup of private property is the responsibility of the owners, curbside pickup for a specified time period may be eligible for FEMA funding. Civil Defense would instruct residents and businesses to separate disaster debris and set these materials out at curbside during debris collection sweeps for a green waste collection sweep, metals debris collection sweep, and mixed debris collection sweep (mixed debris, woody C&C, roofing, gypsum, plastic sheeting, aggregate and rubble, household furnishings and belongings). Residents and businesses shall be instructed to not set out the following materials: household rubbish (take to transfer stations); hazardous waste (hold for organized collection events or handled by private contractors under contract to the business); putrescible waste (take to transfer stations); dead animals (special instructions). For public roadways and facilities, green waste cleared from roadways and public facilities should be kept separate from other debris for collection and removal to designated temporary storage sites. Mobile chippers should be used to chip the tree limbs, brush and leaves at the time of collection and the chips transported to and stored at designated temporary storage sites. County parks may be suitable for temporary storage sites. Tree 18-44 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment trunks and stumps should be transported to TDSR sites for processing through a tub grinder or, if of millable timber quality, for possible reuse. Building debris and personal property debris encountered on public property should be diverted to TDSR sites for processing and land filling. Debris consisting of utility poles and lines, and utility devices should be handled by the utility companies. • Inventory of Contractors and Equipment. The Action Manual compiled an initial inventory of equipment in public ownership and list of potential contractors and their equipment. The contractors' equipment, however, is not listed in the Action Manual, nor is the availability of the Hawai'i National Guard or the Army. The Guard will certainly be called upon for personnel to aid in debris removal. It is planned that much of the clearance will be done under the Department of Public Works. • Contract Management. The Action Manual provides references for model contracts (time and materials, lump sum, or unit price contracts); • Public Education Programs. Hazard mitigation public education programs should include proper handling of disaster debris. The Action Manual provides references for examples of public communication materials. A debris hotline should also be established during the Increased Readiness,Response, and Recovery Phases. Update and follow-up action requirements include: • Update debris estimation with earthquake estimates, using modeling such as HAZUS provided the modeling has been validated against historic events and local conditions, and refine the estimates provided with any updated methodology; • Annual civil defense training should include the response actions specified in the Action Manual (section 5.0 entitled Action Steps for Response to a Disaster Event); • Develop a TDSR site in Puna; coordinate agreements with private owners for TDSRs on private land; determine applicability of environmental assessments for emergency, temporary uses such as TDSRs; • Maintain the resource inventory (e.g., contact list of contractors and equipment) to keep it updated; • Update the information specified in the Action Manual, such as estimates of remaining capacity of disposal facilities; availability and capacities of biomass burners; lists of equipment in public ownership; changes in land uses and access of potential TDSR sites and surrounding lands; • Periodically review boilerplate contracts for debris management services. 18.1.17 Economic Assets The following types of economic assets facilitate post-disaster recovery: • Survival and building supplies. Retail outlets that sell food, bottled water, blankets, clothes, matches, toilet paper, building materials, fuel, pumps, and other basic items will be a resource to the community; 18-45 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment • Financial institutions. To purchase needed supplies, residents and businesses may need access to cash or arrange loans; • Businesses. Returning to normal operations as quickly as possible will avert massive unemployment. Mitigation measures include educating and providing assistance as necessary for businesses to obtain business interruption insurance to minimize post- disaster business failures. Future updates to this plan will include GIS inventories of these assets. 18.2 Special at Risk Populations and Areas 18.2.1 At Risk Populations Certain segments of the population require special attention for hazard education efforts to build their readiness capability or during a hazard event for evacuation assistance. These population segments include: • Young and elderly--require special hazard education and evacuation assistance; • Non-English speakers--require special hazard education; • Persons with disabilities-- require special hazard education and evacuation assistance for the sensory,mental, and physically impaired; • Lower income-- requires special hazard education to implement readiness measures and may require assistance during recovery phase. • Visitor--lack knowledge of hazards and warning systems loo The concentrations of these special populations are as follows: • Relatively high percentage of youngsters (<18 years old) • Puna District-- several communities (e.g., Ainaloa, Fern Acres, Nanawale Estates, Orchidland Estates,Hawaiian Beaches) • Pahala and Naalehu in the Ka'u District; • Waikoloa and Waimea in the South Kohala District. 100 Preparing the tourism sector(and other transient populations).for disaster in Hawai'i County,Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited(NZ)&the University of Hawaii Manoa, February 2004 18-46 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment • Relatively high percentage of elderly(60+years old) • South and North Hilo Districts-- several communities (e.g., Honomu, Papaikou, Paukaa, Wainaku,Laupahoehoe); • Pahoa in the Puna District; • Honokaa in the Hamakua District; • Keauhou in the North Kona District; • Pahala in the Ka'u District. • Places with more than 1,000 disabled persons(excluding employment disabilities): • Hilo in the South Hilo District; • Kailua and Holualoa in the North Kona District; • Hawaiian Paradise Park, Hawaiian Beaches, and Volcano in the Puna District; • Waimea in the North Kohala District. • Highest percentage of public assistance as an indicator of lower income: • Puna District; • Ka'u District. • Highest numbers of persons who do not speak English well or not at all: • Hilo and Pepeekeo in South Hilo District • Keaau,Hawaiian Paradise Park,Pahoa in Puna District Kailua and Holualoa in North Kona District • Waimea and Waikoloa Village in South Kohala District • Captain Cook in South Kona District 18.2.2 Buildings,Residences and Remote Off-Grid Settlement Areas The location of residential areas is important for evacuation and shelter planning. The value of buildings at risk indicates whether special measures are warranted to reduce vulnerability. As of December 2009, there were approximately 132,555 lots in this County of which 59,249 were zoned for residential use. Table 18-8 summarizes the number of residential lots and total building values entirely or partially located within the tsunami evacuation zone, special flood hazard zone, or lava hazard zone 1 or 2. 18-47 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment Table 18-8. Vulnerabilit•Analysis of Residential Areas1"' Islandwide Special Flood Tsunami Lava Hazard Hazard Zone Evacuation Zone 1 or 2 Zone Total Lots 132,555 6,300 33,124 Residential Lots 59,249 1,618 2,668 5,752 %Total Lots 44.7% 1.2% 2.0% 4.3% Total Building $22,997M $1,321M $1,391M $1,448M Value of Residential Lots 18.2.3 Hotels and Resorts Hotels and resorts pose special concerns for the safety of visitors, with most of the major facilities located in the tsunami evacuation zone. Since public shelters do not have capacity to accommodate all visitors, the hotels and resorts would be relied upon for in-place sheltering. Future planning will strive to have each major hotel and resort has an emergency plan approved by Civil Defense to ensure a trained staff and appropriate shelter capabilities. An updated database of hotels and resorts would track the status of emergency plans and contact information to communicate as necessary with the resort before, during, or after a disaster. 18.2.4 Schools,Day Care Centers, and Nursing Homes If evacuation is necessary during school hours, the location of all day care centers and schools from pre-schools to university, public and private, is critical to control traffic flow. For daycare centers, pre-schools and elementary schools, significant traffic will be incoming for parents to pick up their children, as well as outgoing. Nursing homes will require emergency response plans to ensure sheltering, evacuation, supply of emergency provisions, and back-up systems to sustain vital medical equipment. 18.2.5 Parks and Shopping Centers Parks and shopping centers are a concern since large numbers of people may be at these facilities and may not be aware of warnings. Future planning will ensure that managers of major shopping centers have emergency plans. Federal, State, and County park personnel participate in the EOC to ensure proper warnings and evacuation of these facilities, as necessary. Park buildings and shopping centers may also serve as shelters. Park grounds may serve as potential temporary storage areas for green waste or other debris. 101 Based on 2008 County Tax Appraiser data 18-48 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment 18.2.6 Hazardous Materials Sites Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) are potential secondary hazards if released into the environment by a hazard event, or if it is potentially explosive from the heat of a lava flow or wildfire. HAZMAT carriers may cause spills in accidents caused by flooding or earthquake. HAZMAT transported through pipelines may leak as a result of earthquakes. HAZMAT releases pose short- and long-term toxicological threats to humans and to terrestrial and aquatic plants and wildlife. Toxic materials affect people through one of three processes: inhalation,ingestion, or direct contact with skin. The State Department of Health requires the registration of storage sites for hazardous materials and notification to the Fire Department. The Department of Health maintains a database on these storage sites. Future updates to this plan will include a map produced from the County's GIS database. 18.3 Relationship of Land Use Growth Trends to Hazard Areas 18.3.1 Growth Trends The County of Hawaii encompasses the entire island of Hawaii which consists of 4,028.2 square miles, larger than all of the other Hawaiian Islands combined. While the largest in size, Hawaii County also enjoys the lowest population density in the state at approximately 37 persons per square mile which compares to a statewide average of approximately 189 persons per square mile.102 The census registered 148,677 residents in the year 2000, a 24 per cent increase over the 1990 resident population. The County General Plan revision anticipates that the resident population will continue to grow and projects annual growth rates ranging from 1.95 per cent to 2.1 percent till the year 2020. Projected estimates for 2020 indicate an island resident population of 217,718, or an increase of 46 per cent over the estimated 2000 population of 148,677.103 The low population density is reflected in the broad land use patterns established within the county. The State Land Use Law established four basic land use categories within the state in 1961. These categories arc described by the County General Plan revision as follows: "The Urban District is generally defined as lands in urban use with sufficient reserve to accommodate foreseeable growth. In the County of Hawaii this district is comprised of approximately 55,989 acres or two per cent of the island's total land area. Rural Districts are defined as lands primarily comprised of small farms mixed with low density residential lots that have a minimum lot size of one-half acre under the State Land Use Law. Of the four districts, this is the smallest, with approximately 1,005 acres of the island's total land area. The Agricultural District includes lands with a high capacity for intensive cultivation as well as those with low capacity. The minimum lot size in this district under the State Land Use Law is one acre. The Agricultural District has the second greatest land area with approximately 1,184,599 acres or slightly under 46 per cent of the total land area of the 102 County of Hawaii,Department of Research and Development,Data Book,2008. 103 County of Hawaii,Planning Department. General Plan,2005. 18-49 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment island. Conservation Districts are primarily those lands in the existing forest and water reserve zones. This district has the largest land area with approximately 1,339,770 acres or 52 per cent of the total land area of the island."104 The state land use district acreages are broken down by judicial district below. Table 18-9. State Land Use Districts Acreage(as of Jul•2007) District Agricultural Conservation Rural Urban Total Pima 175,064 138,538 140 6,431 320,173 South Hilo 71,858 168,462 18 12,622 252,960 North Hilo 53,644 120,073 78 582 174,377 Hamal ua 162,769 236,315 14 1,042 400,140 North Kohala 64,740 12,641 20 2,435 79,836 South Kohala 150,163 15,366 183 10,728 176,440 Not Kona 159,149 186,244 519 19,496 365,408 South Kona 110,796 35,041 33 815 146,685 Ka'u 232,855 427,090 - 1,838 661,783 Total 1,181,038 1,339,770 1,005 55,989 2,577,802 The existing land use pattern in the County has its origins in the historical agricultural based economy which was the predominant industry for most of the past 100 years. These patterns have been modified by the more recent emergence of the visitor industry which is now the predominant economic engine for the County. The Puna District, with a population of 31,335 in 2000, had the highest growth rate in the County for the ten year period from 1990-2000 at 50.8 per cent. The district is primarily rural and agricultural in nature with the major agricultural businesses being the growing of macadamia nuts, flowers, foliage, papaya, bananas, tropical fruits and vegetables. The high growth rate in the district can be attributed to the availability of relatively cheap land that was developed in the 1950's and 60's into thousands of non-conforming residential-sized lots that lack the basic infrastructure found in current subdivision standards. Nevertheless, construction of single-family dwellings within these non-conforming subdivisions has increased as the district serves as a bedroom community to the Hilo area. Many of these existing non-conforming parcels in the southeastern end of the Puna district are situated within lava hazard zones 1 and 2 which have the greatest risk of possible inundation. Flooding during heavy rains is also an ongoing concern within the district. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes to the established land use pattern over the next several years. The South Hilo district had a population of 47,386 in 2000 which represented approximately 32 per cent of the total population for Hawaii Island. The City of Hilo is the largest population center on the island with the main offices of the county government, branch offices of federal and state agencies located there. The island's major deep draft harbor and 104 County of Hawaii,Planning Department. General Plan,200.5. 18-50 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment international airport are also located in Hilo. In addition to industrial, commercial and social service activities, the University of Hawaii at Hilo and Hawaii Community College and affiliated research programs play an important role in Hilo's economy. The entire City of Hilo, south of the Wailuku River is situated within lava hazard zone 3. Low lying coastal areas are within the tsunami inundation zone and evacuation areas. Sections of the city are also subject to flooding during periods of heavy rain. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes to the established land use pattern over the next several years. The North Hilo and Hamakua Districts are two rural agricultural districts that are undergoing significant socio-economic changes. The two districts experienced the loss of their two remaining sugar operations during the 1990's which resulted in the loss of 1,200 jobs and approximately 43,500 acres of cane production. Eucalyptus trees have been planted on a portion of the former sugar acreage but much of the area remains unutilized. The 2000 population in the Hamakua District was 6,108 while the North Hilo population was 1,720. The majority of these residents reside in former plantation communities that are scattered along the Mamalahoa Highway. Many of the remaining residents are employed outside of the region either in resort related jobs in the neighboring South Kohala District or other jobs in South Hilo. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The North Kohala District is another rural agricultural district that was formerly reliant on the sugar industry. Ranching, macadamia nut production, and nursery production are the principal agricultural activities currently operating in the district. The 2000 population in North Kohala was 6,038 with many of them employed in resort related jobs in neighboring South Kohala. Although a major landowner in the North Kohala district, obtained rezoning of approximately 15 acres of land in 1993 for the development of a 200 to 240-unit lodge hotel at Mahukona, no activity towards the development of the lodge hotel has occurred to date. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The South Kohala District contains a diverse mix of agriculture in the Waimea region as well as one of the world's premiere resort destinations along the coast. With a population of 13, 131 in 2000, the South Kohala district had the second highest growth rate in the County during the period between 1990-2000 at 43.7 percent. The Waimea region contains the most extensive truck farming area in the County growing vegetables, fruits, flowers and foliage. Most of the lands in South Kohala, between the farms of Waimea and the resorts on the coast, are used for cattle ranching. Nevertheless, the visitor industry is the major economic force in the district. There are three major resort nodes that have been developed by Mauna Kea Properties, Mauna Lani Resort, and the Waikoloa Land Company. These resort nodes include hotels, condominiums, single family residential subdivisions, golf courses and commercial centers. The number of hotel rooms within these three resort nodes totals over 3,250. The district is also served by major transportation facilities which include Kawaihae Harbor, Waimea-Kohala airport and major highway systems linking the communities of Waimea, Waikoloa Village and Kawaihae. The Waimea community is experiencing growth pressures with proposals for expanded residential growth by the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands and Parker Ranch,the major land owner in the district. 18-51 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment The North Kona District, with a population of 28,543 in 2000, includes Kailua-Kona which is considered to be the center of government, commercial and industrial activities in West Hawaii. The primary employment generator in the district is tourism with visitor accommodations and facilities extending from the Keauhou-Kona Resort at the southern end of the district to the Hualalai Resort and Kona Village Resort at the northern end. These visitor accommodations include world class destination resorts with a full range of amenities as well as resort condominium units, timeshare units and stand alone hotels. Currently there are approximately 4,000 visitor accommodations in the North Kona district which accounts for over 45 per cent of the total on the island. The major agricultural activities within the district include coffee, macadamia nut, avocado and ranching. Major infrastructure facilities serving the district include the Honokohau Small Boat Harbor, Keahole Airport and the Kailua pier. North Kona is facing major growth pressures including additional resort, commercial, industrial and residential development throughout the district. The South Kona district is another rural agricultural district that had a population of 8,589 in 2000. The major economic activity in the district is agriculture with coffee, macadamia nut, avocado and ranching leading the way. Many South Kona residents are employed in the visitor industry in the adjacent North Kona District. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The Ka'u district is another rural agricultural district that is undergoing a socio-economic transition after closing of the Ka'u Sugar Company in 1996. The population in the district totaled 5,827 in 2000. The major economic activity in the district remains agriculture with macadamia nuts and ranching leading the way. Growth trends do not indicate any major changes for the region over the next several years. The County Planning Department is in the process of developing a GTS spatial growth model that would be a useful tool to evaluate growth trends in relation to hazard areas. 18.3.2 Land Use Tools The County General Plan, first adopted by ordinance on December 15, 1971 and most recently updated in 2005, provides the foundation for a comprehensive planning program for the County of Hawaii. This program, consisting of three interrelated parts, is depicted in Figure 18-8 and described in the County General Plan Revision as follows: The General Plan represents the first level and encompasses long-range goals,policies, standards, and courses of action for the entire County. The General Plan also provides the legal basis for all of the other elements of the County's planning structure. As such,the General Plan is the highest order, or 'umbrella' plan. It establishes the outer limits or boundaries within which the County must operate. The second level consists of short and middle range plans that further define the long-range goals and policies of the General Plan. These plans are related to specific regions or districts (Hilo, Kona, Kohala, Ka'u, etc.), functions (recreation, agriculture, drainage, highways, etc.), and specific areas within a region(Kailua Kona,Downtown Hilo,etc.). 18-52 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment The third level consists of specific mechanisms to implement the two higher levels of the planning hierarchy. These include the Zoning and Subdivision Codes and both the operating and capital improvement program budgets.105 GENERAL PLAN Functional Plan Community Ievelopment Plan Area Improvement Plan P aeeotiori Wild Hilo L10wntown Pere opm¢nT Plan Sewerog¢Jprainoge K-0ne Historic Sites K.hala piluo Vilingt besign Plan Etc. Etc_ € c. Land Use Development Operating Budget Capita!Improvements Program Codes �Clp) Zon-ng Subdivision Other Codes rated Regulotions Figure l S-21. County of Hawaii Land Use Planning System The Hazard Mitigation Plan is a functional plan that is part of the second level of the County's comprehensive planning program described above. As such, the hazard mitigation objectives, strategies and implementing actions need to be consistent with the broader goals, policies, standards and courses of action contained in the General Plan. Working within the framework of the comprehensive planning program, implementing mechanisms that will be utilized to address the mitigation objectives include the Zoning and Subdivision Codes, the Operating and Capital Improvement Program Budgets and other County ordinances. The County General Plan recognizes that certain areas susceptible to natural hazards may need to be kept open and not utilized for buildings, structures or other economic development purposes. These areas may be designated as Conservation or Open in the County General Plan, Land Use Pattern Allocation Guide Map. Within the County Zoning Code, the "Open" district applies to areas generally intended for open type uses although it does permit golf courses, with a use permit, some recreational facilities, and various public and utility-type facilities. There is currently no County zoning district that calls for land to be preserved in a largely natural state. As such the General Plan Revision is proposing a new policy to "Amend the Zoning Code to create a category for lands that should be kept in a largely natural state, but that may not be in the Conservation District, such as certain important view planes, buffer areas, and very steep slopes." 105 County of Hawaii,Planning Department. General Plan,200.5. 15-53 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter IS:Risk Assessment Existing mechanisms within the General Plan and Zoning Code allow the County to direct new development proposals away from known natural hazard locations. Areas that are already developed or have existing land use entitlements for future development present a significantly more difficult and complex challenge for achieving hazard mitigation objectives. Areas that are subjected to repetitive losses or have experienced total devastation may be targeted for public acquisition and relocation. Short of acquisition and relocation the County can utilize tools such as Cluster Plan Development or Planned Unit Development measures that encourage developers to restrict development on certain portions of their property due to flooding (or other natural hazard conditions) in exchange for allowing higher densities or other code deviations for the remainder of their property. 18.3.3 Loss Estimation and Hazard Ranking The relative severity of the various hazards can be measured by the estimated losses. Expected losses when expressed in dollars do not include loss of lives. The components of loss estimates usually include: structural loss (structure replacement value x percent damage), contents loss (content replacement value x percent damage), and functional loss (functional downtime costs+displacement time costs).106 One estimate developed for the State of Hawaii, which focused only on structural property loss, concluded that the most severe losses for the County of Hawaii are earthquake, hurricane, lava flow, flood, and tsunami in that order (see Table 18-10). Compared to the other counties, Hawaii County had the highest earthquake losses, second highest hurricane losses, and the only county with lava flow losses. Table 18-10. Relative Hazard Severity of Major Hazards Based on Average Annual Loss Estates Hazard AAL Hunicane $69 million Earthquake $65.1 million Lava Flow $24 million Flood $0.5 million Tsunami $0.25 million Source: Martin&Chock,Inc.,2009. Average Annualized Loss Estimates for Hazards in the County of Hawaii Updates to this plan have refined the loss estimates, using the HAZUS model. HAZUS involves two steps: analysis of the specific risk, then application of the analysis to the area. Extensive data bases are provided for these purposes. The programs can be used at three levels: a basic level with default inputs, a second level with more specific inputs, and a third, very expert and detailed level with most defaults replaced by local inputs where allowable. 106 FEMA,State and Location Mitigation Planning How-To Guide: Understanding Your Risks,chapter 4. 18-54 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment HAZUS was first developed for earthquakes and was made available to State Civil Defense as HAZUS 99. A more recent version called HAZUS-MH (for multi-hazard) has been provided which includes wind and flooding modules. Through a series of studies beginning in 2000, the State of Hawaii Civil Defense extensively revised the HAZUS-99 inventory information for Hawaii and Maui Counties to account for code adoption and enforcement policy histories of each county, Hawaii building construction types, the number and locations of specific building types, geospatial centroids of population centers, as well as Hawaii construction costs. Ground motion calculations in HAZUS-99 were significantly enhanced by State Civil Defense by using a Hawaii-specific ground motion attenuation model. Soil amplification effects were incorporated into HAZUS-99 using a NEHRP site class map for the island of Hawaii prepared by URS in 2004. The implementation and testing of each of these parameters was carried out under the technical supervision of the Hawaii State Earthquake Advisory Committee (HSEAC). In 2004-2005, further studies were conducted to quantify loss reductions and the mitigation effectiveness of seismic retrofit, code adoption and enforcement policies. A more recent study completed by Martin & Chock in 2009 incorporated a modern-day equivalent of Level 3 Hawaii and Maui County building inventories, and updated the hazard and modeling improvements completed by State Civil Defense into the latest HAZUS-MH platform. The study also used the observed impacts associated with the recent Hawaii Kiholo Bay earthquake disaster of 2006 to validate the model results produced by the enhanced HAZUS earthquake loss estimation tool. A summary of the loss estimation procedure for each hazard is as follows: • Flood - census tracts/blocks overlaid with flood maps, such as FIRM. But, note that the tsunami portion of such maps is based on all possible tsunamis and any one event will affect less property. The State is presently in the process of updating the FIRM's. By 2010, HAZUS will be available for this use and can include probability. • Hurricane - a HAZUS hurricane model has been developed, tested, and validated against Hurricane 'Iniki on Kauai. This model is available for use on Hawaii Island. • Lava flow - predictive data are now available from the Hawaii Volcano Observatory (HVO) which can be used with GIS layers to make probability estimates of losses. A more simple, "first cut"would use the published lava hazard zones. • Windstorms and high waves (except hurricanes) and landslides are not considered a significant enough loss risk to require a formal evaluation. The repetitive losses presently cataloged for these events can provide estimates of future losses. • Earthquake - as noted above, HAZUS is used for loss predictions and was originally developed for earthquakes. The default HAZUS data has been updated and enhanced based on data collected from the tax appraiser's database to more accurately reflect the building exposure in Hawaii County. • Landslides - there appears to be no methodology in place to predict the loss from such events as the massive coastal slide at Waipunalei ten years ago. 18-55 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Risk Assessment • Tsunamis - existing models and data can provide probable (usually maximum expectable) inundation for a tsunami of any magnitude from any direction. Unfortunately, there is no valid prediction of the probability of such an event. (See tsunami section for discussion of this question). For estimation purposes, a "100 year" event is usually used, as in flood work. This actually means simply a 1% annual chance of occupancy. A worst case tsunami, based on earthquakes from each of the four common source areas, can then be run in a model and inundation overlaid on census block data for loss estimation. When available and in use, the HAZUS flood module can use this information as an input and provide estimations more automatically. Focusing only on property losses may not provide a reliable ranking of hazards. Future up- dates of this plan may attempt a broader analysis. For hazard ranking analysis purposes, the models such as HAZUS will focus on the anticipated maximum likely event rather than the worst case. 18-56 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A Preparing the tourism sector (and other transient populations' for a disaster in Hawai'i Introduction World wide,tourists flock to areas of natural beauty which are often also sites prone to natural hazards,such as coastal zones,river valleys,forests and mountains, RaWai'i County is no exception with its white and black sand beaches,and Volcano National Park,with its active lava flows enticing thousands of visitors to the Big Island each year. Managing the tourists that visit the Tsland in the event of a disaster is of paramount importance if risk to life and negative impacts on the tourism industry are to be minimised. Problems with managing tourists in a disaster There has been a considerable effort over the last few decades to increase awareness of the general populace about natural hazards in Hawaii. Tourists(and other transientpopulations)however,remain a difficult group to assess in terms of understanding their level of knowledge of hazards and possible actions they may take in the event of a disaster, This group is also difficult to target with hazard education program because of its transient nature and language differences. As an example, research on improving the effectiveness of warnings systems has frequently highlighted the difficulty of preparing transient populations to respond appropriately to warnings(Drabek 1994, 1996). Due to these reasons,tourists should be regarded as part of the`at-risk population' in a natural disaster. The expanding tourist industry in Hawaii means that the tourist population is increasingly exposed to disasters. Particular vulnerabilities result from; ■ unfamiliarity of surroundings ■ lack of knowledge of local hazards ■ language barriers ■ transient movement in remote areas ■ difficulty in educating Hazard education and warning systems Arange of education programs(e.g.brochures,articles,signs)are traditionally used for educating people about natural hazards generally with the aim of increasing individual,business and household preparedness. Warning systems are used to war people of imminent threat in the event of a disaster.Although these approaches may be acceptable for the general populace,they may not be ideal when putting in place measures to protect tourists,and the tourism economy. Education Hazard education can be considered from two perspectives: fmitute of Geclagical&Afuelear Sciences Limited(W)&the University of Hawaii—Manoa Prapaing he hansm sector(8 othertranstent populations)for a disaster in Hawaii County February 2004 Als-1 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A 1)education of tourists about hazards and how to respond during a disaster 2)education and capacity building of the tourism sector to manage and respond to a natural disaster. The former is discussed below,the latter later in this paper as the most effective form of education for the tourism sector. Effective education about hazards specifically alined at tourists is difficult to achieve due largely to the transient nature of tourists and language barriers. If tourists were able to gain a clear understanding of the potential hazards in Hawai'i,the warning systems,and how to respond to these,there would be less reliance on other parties (most likely tourism personnel)to assist. However,reaching tourists with this type of information is unlikely to be successful so other strategies,such as focussing on tourism firms and personnel,need to be considered.Discussing and showing tourists potential natural hazards is not generally favoured by the tourist industry;the exception is warnings about problems they are likely encounter such as sea urchins or property theft from their car_ The perception from tourism personnel has been that if tourists are told that an area is disaster prone it would deter people from visiting the area,and result in a downturn in business. In contrast,interviews held with visitors[(Drabek 1996)]have shown that there is an expectation for competent disaster preparedness from managers and governrnent,and that failure in an event of a disaster would be remembered as a negative experience that could cause the loss of future revenue and lives. From this we can deduce that it is better not to spend too much effort telling tourists about potential natural hazards,but to make sure that tourism firms and personnel are educated and trained how to respond in the event of a disaster, Warning systems Having tourists respond correctly to warning systems is crucial to minimize the loss of life_ Response to warning systems is not always that expected by those giving the warning-a problem likely to be exemplified when tourists are involved(given the unfamiliar surroundings they may find themselves in). A number of factors tell us why people would react in an unexpected manner to a warning,and these can be applied to the tourist population: • warning content and style • level of perceived personal risk • ability to confirm a warning message ■ receiver(e.g.tourist)characteristics Although the content and style of a warning system can be controlled,it is bard to understand and interpret how a receiver may react to the warning system. When dealing with tourists who are likely to be unfamiliar with local warning systems,it is even more difficult to predict their response actions. 2 Ins6'tute of Geological&Nuclear Sdenoes Limited(N4 8 the tlraversity of Hawaii—Manoa Fmpanny die tourism sector(&Aer transient pop ufatiom)for a disaster in Hawaii County February 2004 Alg-2 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A Developing a fail safe warning process is complex due to the diversity and number of sources and the difficulty in reaching diverse groups. The range of sources creates potential problems in the design and implementation of warning systems. Another issue identified is the potential adverse impact of false alarms on the tourism sector and resultant impact on the effectiveness of future warning response.Again, training tourism personnel on how to respond to warnings and keep tourists safe has been identified as an effective way of improving warning response effectiveness. Education programs and warning systems appear to be the two most common approaches aimed directly at tourists to educate them about natural hazards and warn of impending danger. The effectiveness of these approaches however can be questioned as there is more likely to be more success in directly approaching tourism Ems and working with tourism personnel on how to keep tourists safe in the event of a disaster. Who is responsible for the tourist? Expecting tourists to take the time to find out about hazards while they are on vacation is unrealistic. A 2001 Washington State Tsunami Survey confirmed this when results showed that tsunami hazard maps in survey communities had been seen by 62%of residents but only 19%of visitors. Of those surveyed,28%of residents and 46%of visitors were unaware of the tsunami warning system(Johnston et al 2002) Because of this,education and warning systems(discussed above)are unlikely to be the primary means to ensure tourists are kept safe in a disaster. Such findings reinforce the need for Civil Defense to work closely with tourism firms and personnel before a disaster occurs in order to ensure they understand the hazards in their area and how best to respond in the event of a disaster. Roles and responsibilities of tourism personnel need to be identified and expectations clarified- Understanding the tourism sector Given that most tourism ventures are privately owned firms,there is a need to establish relationships with these business owners and convey the importance of emergency planning for their staff(tourism personnel)and clients(tourists). Tierney (200 1)discusses how private firms are"less than enthusiastic about emergency preparedness"so bringing this idea to fruition will not be easy. Research has shown that a number of factors can influence a private firm's disaster preparedness such as size and age of the business;whether there is national head office for multiple local offices;and type of business. Except for the size of the business(where it has been shown that the larger the organisation the better prepared they are),other factors remain inconclusive and contradictory in terms of their influence on a firm's emergency preparedness and willingness to participate in emergency planning. Gamble(2000),found that the impacts of and the recovery from Hurricane Floyd were greatest to small tourism facilities. This may indicate that smaller firms do not 3 Institute of Geological&NuclearSaences Limited(N71&the Ut7hRisW ofHawdi—Manoa Prepaing the tourism sector(&other transient populations)for a disasterin Hawaii Colezty February 2004 A18-3 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A have the time and resources to commit to preparedness,which will make it difficult to engage them in any training program. Important lessons for the tourism sector in Hawai'i can be drawn from the experience of the two hurricanes that struck Hawaii in recent years:tourist resources can recover quickly from disasters if their base appeal is not significantly compromised, when the island infrastructure is again functioning and an strong program is needed to publicize the recovery to agencies and potential tourists who may have an image of the island being devastated_ .Hawai'i of course is very reliant upon its natural environment to entice tourists and if this remains sustained in the event of a disaster then tourists will continue to come to Hawai'i. However,it is important to emphasize the restoration of the infrastructure that supports tourists(from hotel beds and food to accessible transport routes)as well as the resident population. A significant event similar to that on Kauai (Iwa;Iniki), affecting this island,could impact severely on such infrastructure and restrict the number of tourists to the Island. The importance of tourism personnel training Engaging and educating tourism firms(particularly small firms)and training tourism personnel are critical factors to reduce loss of life to tourists in the event of a disaster. Drabek carried out two studies that highlighted this issue. Drabek's 1994 study looked at 185 tourist companies and their level of evacuation preparedness,and in 1996 Drabek studied 800 transients including 520 tourists who had experienced evacuation during a disaster. The most significant lessons learned by tourism personnel that had been involved in a natural disaster were: • Plan appropriate protective actions • Resist threat denial • Debunk the panic myth(a myth that the public panics when wamed of disaster) • Have one person in charge • Jmprove employee and customer communication • Plan to provide customer sheltering • Anticipate the needs of special populations • Provide records protection • Recognise family priorities • Structure media relationships(This is a major issue as there have been cases of exaggeration and misinformation presented from the media. This can have adverse impacts on current and future tourism business) Key findings of the 1996 study of tourists who experienced evacuation in a disaster found: • that policies and procedures to evacuate tourists were adhoc • tourists in disasters were frequently critical of whom they perceived to be responsible(e.g,hotel owners) 4 lnsh'tute of Geological&Nuclea'Sdences Limited(N4&the University of Hawaii-Mama Preparing the tourism sector(&othertmansient popufations)for a dsasterin Hawaii County Felwuary2004 Alg-4 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A ■ investment and public/private interagency partnerships in emergency management are essential In a 2002 a`Survey of Residents Sentiments on Tourism in Hawaii'(DBEDT)was earned out that highlighted a number of key issues that could assist with future tourism planning and management. Although not focussed on tourism personnel,the results from a number of the questions can be used to assist with understanding how to manage tourism in Hawaii County: o Many residents of Hawai'i were more likely to favor tourism growth than oppose it,with support for main growth areas to be Hilo and East Hawaii,especially Volcano. This could be indicative of future growth areas for tourism and acceptance of tourism by residents. • Do not assume that`visitor industry jobs'are`hotel jobs'as only 45%of those surveyed agreed they were,therefore highlighting that a number of other sectors (unidentified)involved tourism personnel. • There has been increasing support for government to improve infrastructure in tourist areas. This finding may indicate support for future emergency management program such as shelters and escape routes. Improving the resilience of the tourism sector To ensure that the tourism sector remains resilient in the event of disaster,Hawai'i Civil Defense needs to maintain their dialog with tourism firms and personnel and assistthem to integrate emergency preparedness into their core activities. A training needs analysis could be carried out to assess tourism personnel's understanding of hazard risk,emergency planning issues,levels of personnel training, barriers to implementing mitigation and ways to overcome negative impacts of false alarms. A training needs analysis will help with developing appropriate personnel training for emergency management functions.This analysis should: 1. Determine what groups will be involved 2. Specify everyone's roles 3, Define decisiort-making procedures 4. Ensure effective co-ordination among the organizations involved 5. Define communication procedures 6. Ensure resources are sufficient and available Although there is a financial cost associated with training,benefits will be that tourism personnel are better prepared and able to respond more effectively in the 5 Insb'tute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences limited(NZ)&the U4wisity of Hawaii—Mama Preparing the tourism sector(&other transient populations)for a disaster in Hawaii County February 2004 Als-5 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A event of a natural hazard. This could prevent loss of life and reduce business losses at both a local and State level. A training needs analysis could also: • create a checklist for onsite analysis of operating conditions of tourism environments for tourism firms to"self-check"their procedures • identify,in conjunction with tourism personnel,ongoing training programs that will suit their needs and schedules • considerpublic education programs that are specifically targeted at the tourist(e.g, different languages,short simple messages)Public education effectiveness can be increased by repeating the same message in varying formats such as brochures, signs,and in a variety of languages and locations. • form agreements with tourism firms or tourist body as to who is responsible for tourists in a disaster(tools to encourage tourism firms to undertake emergency planning can be via the use of non-regulatory methods(e.g.education/workshops) and/or regulatory mandates set by the State). Conclusion Targeting tourists as a means to teach them about hazards in Hawai'i may prove futile,with the exception of short,simple,repetitive messages(such as tsunami signs at the beach)_ Organizational buy-in from tourism firms and training of tourism personnel are two key issues that need addressing. To reduce risk to the tourism sector,Civil Defense needs to work closely with this group to: • encourage tourism firms(especially small firms)to put preparedness measures in place prior to an event occurring,and • train tourism personnel how to respond during a disaster with the aim of keeping tourists safe • have media relations in place to avoid negative portrayal of hazard events(i.e. instead work with these media so that`success'stories are portrayed). 6 lnsbkute of Geological&NuclexSaences Limited(N4&the University of Hawaii—Manoa Preparing the tourism sector(&other irament popubtions)for a dsasterh Hawaii County February 2004 A18-6 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapter 18:Appendix A References and reading list Ballantyne,M.,Paton,D.,Johnston,D.,Kozach,M.,and Daly,M.,2000. Information on volcanic and earthquake hazards: The impact on awareness and preparation. Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited Science Report#2000/2. Wellington, New Zealand. Drabek,T.E. 1994, Disaster Evacuation and the Tourist Industry.Boulder,BO:University of Colorado,Institute of Behavioral Science,Program on Environment and Behaviour. USA. Drabek,T.E. 1996. Disaster Evacuation Behavior:Tourists and other Transients.Boulder, BO:University of Colorado,institute of Behavioral Science,Program on Environment and Behaviour.USA. Gamble,D.W.2000.Field evaluation of Hurricane damage to water resources,tourism infrastructure,and emergency response of San Salvador,Bahamas. Boulder Natural Hazards Center,Quick Response Report#124. USA. Gerrard,J.1994. Report on the 23,December Kaikouraflood,Jim Gerard,MPRangiora. Parliament House,Wellington,New Zealand. Handmer,J.2000.Are flood warnings futile? Risk communications in emergencies. The Australasian Journal of Disasters and Tranrna Studies 2002-2. Australia. Hawaii Department of Business,Economic Development and Tourism and the Hawaii Tourism Authority. 2003. `2002 Survey of Resident Sentiments on Tourism in Hawaii'. Market Trends Pacific Inc.,John M. Knox&Associates Inc. Hawaii,USA_ "Hurricane Iwa,Hawaii,November 23,1982",National Research Council, 1983 Johnston,D.2002-Results of the August-September 2001 Washington State Tsunami Survey_ Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited. Science Report#2002/17. Wellington,New Zealand, Krausse,G.2000. `There's a big vvind coming':a profile of survival and the culture of response after Hurricane Mitch on Isla Guanaja,Honduras. Boulder Natural Hazards Center,Quick Response Report#123.USA. National disaster Survey Report,Hunicane Iniki NOAAINWS,April 1993 Ward,R.,Paton,D.,Johnston,D,and Becker,J.,2003.Whakapapa Ski Field,lahar warning system,Ruapehu:A review of training issues. Institute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences Limited. Science Report#2003/7_Wellington.New Zealand, Tierney,K.J,Lindell,M.K.,and Perry R.W. 2001_ Facing the Unexpected=Disaster Preparedness and Response m the United States_ USA. 7 Insi'tute of Geological&Nuclear Sciences limited(NZ)&the University of Nawad-Ntanoa Preparing the tourism sector(8,other transie4populagons)for a drsasterin Hawah County February 2004 A18-7 Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan