COM 0212.129 1996-1998 - Laserfiche WebLink

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as it approaches the end of its operating life in the year 2000. Second, the estimated construction costs of a new production reactor, the MAPLE-X10, have escalated from $23 million in 1989 to an extraordinary $100 million by 1994. Nordion has refused to help cover the cost over-runs for the MAPLE-X10. Moreover, in 1993, MDS/Nordion launched a lawsuit to have the 1991 contract rescinded, and to have AECL return the $165 million purchase price of Nordion, along with $300 million in damages. This dispute remains unsettled. In addition to the $100 million MAPLE-X10, a second reactor will be needed once the NRU reactor is shut down. AECL is also considering construction of the IRF (Irradiation Research Facility) reactor at an estimated cost of $500 million. Investment of public funds in any new radioisotope production reactors is ill- advised, because AECL and Nordion will soon be facing new competition for the sale of their most profitable radioisotope (Molybdenum-99) from radioisotope producers in the US and Europe. AECL's Decommissioning Liability For four years, AECL has defied the Auditor General of Canada by not financially accounting for its decommissioning costs. Decommissioning activities include dismantling radioactive structures such as old reactors; cleaning up radioactively contaminated sites; managing the associated radioactive wastes; disposing of radioactively wntaminated equipment; and returning sites to "green field" condition. According to AECL's current practice for the financing of decommissioning activities, the company will simply send the bill to the taxpayers each year for expenses as they are incurred. This is not an acceptable procedure for proper financial planning or accounting. AECL has made a preliminary and partial estimate of decommissioning costs at about $300 million. However, the Auditor General's office has estimated federal decommissioning costs at $850 million, including AECL's portion. AECL should fully account for those decommissioning liabilities and should create a fund to cover those costs. This study's calculation of total funding to AECL (Table 1) does not include any amount for decommissioning liability. Federal Heavy Water Investments Heavy water, needed for CANDU reactors, is difficult, expensive, and dangerous to manufacture. Considering the grossly inflated historic expectations for CANDU sales at home and abroad, it is perhaps not surprising that heavy water manufacture represents the single greatest financial and technological fiasco experienced by the Canadian nuclear industry. Two heavy water plants in Nova Scotia, and one in Quebec, as well as most of the Bruce Heavy Water Plant in Ontario have been built and then shut down in the absence of any market for the heavy water. In 1981, the Canadian parliament forgave AECL heavy water plant loans and interest 4