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First, developers cannot argue that there is a taking where only a portion of a person's land restricts development. In Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 2002 U.S. Ll?XIS 3028 (2002) the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a categorical taking does not occur if only a portion of land is downzoned. The courts have also uniformly rejected the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a taking. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131; Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498-99; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 397 (1926) (75% diminution in value caused by zoning law); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 at footnote 8 (1992) ("It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95%a loss will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full."); see also William C. Haas & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979) (value reduced from $2,000,000 to $100,000); Concrete Pipe and Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993). Second, placing land in "open" or "conservation" does not leave landowners with no economically beneficial use of the land and does not prohibit all future uses of the property. Uses are still allowed by the underlying zone and the precise uses can only be definitively determined after application for SMA permits etc. For example, Pacific Star's land at Keopuka is currently using 30 acres of the land for agricultural uses and macadamia nut orchards. Another 30 acres could be used for agricultural purposes. None of these uses would be adversely affected in any way by the proposed redesignation. Third, none of the landowners in question have significant investment-backed expectations. Investments to date have been minor. As the I°Iawai i Supreme Court held in County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance, 653 P.2d 766 (1982): "When a property owner has actually proceeded toward development pursuant to existing zoning, the initial inquiry is whether a developer's actions constituting irrevocable commitments were reasonably made or were speculative business risks not rising to the level of vested property right. Thus, the Developers may not establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development." The I~awai'i Supreme Court long ago emphasized that rights do not vest until the last discretionary permit such as the SMA permit has been issued. County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance, 653 P.2d 766 (1982). Finally, the county's reasons for designating conservation and open areas serve legitimate public interests. It is beyond question that government may downzone property to protect environmental interests. The City and County of ;Honolulu did it, for example, at Queens Beach. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized government's right to "protect the public interest in health, the environment and the fiscal integrity of the area." Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480, U.S. 470, 488 (138`7}. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that government may act in accord with background principles of property. One of the basic principles of property law, as articulated by the I-Iawai'i Supreme Court, is the public trust doctrine, which serves to protect the state's natural resources. As the I~awai i Supreme Court has recognized, "There can be no