Laserfiche WebLink
Under the third standard, proportionality, aresort development of, say, three hundred units may <br /> well generate a need for beach access across the land so developed because of the population <br /> increase, but whether such an access would need to be public, as opposed to "residents only" is <br /> Far less certain. <br /> 2. The Constitutional Standard Applied <br /> Following Nollan, many courts have struck down land development conditions for lack of nexus <br /> and/or proportionality. For example, in Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227 <br /> (Ore. App. 1996), an Oregon appeals court struck down a road dedication requirement fora 19- <br /> lot subdivision even though the county had demonstrated that the county needed the road: "We <br /> do not imply that a development cannot have impacts that could warrant improvement conditions <br /> that are system wide in scope. However...the determinative factor must be the relationship <br /> between the impacts of the development and the approval of the conditions, and not the extent of <br /> the public's need for road or other improvements that happen to exist at the time the particular <br /> development is approved." (at 1236) <br /> In Amoco Oil Co. v Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), the court <br /> struck down a road widening dedication, holding that the taking of 20% of Amoco's land for <br /> roadway widening purposes on the basis of a .4% increase in traffic caused by the proposed <br /> development "does not correspond with the slightest notions of rough proportionality." 661 <br /> N.E.2d at 391. <br /> Other examples: Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569 (Ore.App. 1994), striking down a <br /> road dedication; Property Group, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Com'n of the Town of Tolland, 628 <br /> A.2d 1277 (Conn. 1993) striking down road widening dedication; Lexington-Fayette Urban <br /> County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W. 2d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), striking down bridge <br /> dedication requirement; Cobb v. Snohomish County, 829 P.2d 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), <br /> striking down a road improvement fee; Dellinger v. City of Charlotte, 441 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. <br /> App. 1994) striking down a road dedication requirement; Castle Homes & Dev. v City of Brier, <br /> 882 P.2d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) striking down aper-lot road impact fee. <br /> There are literally dozens of additional post-Nollan/Dolan cases striking down various impact <br /> fees and exactions for parks, schools, sewers, water and housing where government fails to meet <br /> <br /> the nexis and proportionality standards imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the <br /> foregoing analysis, which draws only upon road/access cases, should be sufficient to demonstrate <br /> <br /> the inadequate basis of the Draft General Plan in exacting free access to the beach ,let alone <br /> <br /> parking, as a condition for coastal resort development approval. There is no connection or nexus <br /> <br /> between such a coastal resort development and either public parking or beach access. Such a <br /> <br /> resort development does not drive the need for such parking and access. Moreover, even if it <br /> did, the requirement would sorely lack proportionality. The requirement is unconstitutional on <br /> its face. <br /> 13 <br /> <br />