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<br /> Ash=ord & Wriston 12/17/2003 10:28 PAGE 014/014 Fax Server <br /> Under the third standard, proportionality, aresort development o)y say, three hundred units may <br /> well generate a need for beach access across the land so developed because of the population <br /> increase, but whether such an access world need to be public, as opposed to "residents only" is <br /> faz less certain <br /> Z. The Constltutlooal Standard Applied <br /> Following Nollan, many courts have smock down land development conditions for lack of nexus <br /> and/orproperLonality. Por ega*_+!pte, in Art picule(L Group v, Cl?ckattias Cotmty, 912 P.241227 <br /> (Ore. App. 1996), an Oregon peals court stnrck down a road dedication requirement fox a 19- <br /> lot subdivision even though the county had demonstrated that the county needed the road: "W e <br /> do not imply that a development cannot have impacts drat could warrant improvtmetrt conditions <br /> that are system wide is scope. Hawever...the detenninaiive factor must be the relationship <br /> between the impacts ojthe development and the approval ojthe conditions, and not the extent of <br /> the public's need <br /> jor road or other improvements that happen to exist at the rime the parNeular <br /> development is approved." {at 1236) <br /> In /~mncn Oil Co. v Villaee of SchaumburE, 661 N.E.2d 380 (I1L App. Ct. 1995), the court <br /> smock down a road widening dedication, holding that We taking of 20'/0 of Amoco's lend for <br /> roadway widening purposes on the basis of a .4% increase in traffic caused by the proposed <br /> riwvelnpmen; "dn~.a not 00!rS.~Mnd tvi+~ t~ slte3t IIn;innR ofrC~ttgl! propordonaL+ty." 661 <br /> N.E2d at 391. <br /> Vther examples: Schultz v. Cit~f Grants rase. 884 P.id 56v (vre.App. i 9v4j, saiking down a <br /> road dedication; ~i+ot>erty Grouo Inc v Plannin¢ & Zonin¢ Com'n of the Town of Tolland 628 <br /> A.2d 1277 {Conn. 1993) atn7cing down road widening dedication; Lexineton-Faverie Urban <br /> Count~Gov't v. Schneider. 849 S. W. Zd 557 txy. Ct. App. 1992), striking down bridge <br /> dedication requirement; Cobb v. Snohomish Countv, 829P.2d 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), <br /> striking down a road improvement fee; Dellinger v. City of Charlotte, 44i S.fi.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. <br /> App. i994j striking down a road dedication requirement; Castle Homes tic Dey. v City of Brier. <br /> 882 P.2d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) striking down a pex-lol road impact fee. <br /> There are literally dozens of additional post-Nollan/Dolan cases striking down various impact <br /> fees and exactions for parks, schools, sowers, wator and housing where govemmcnt fails to meet <br /> the nexis and proportionality standards imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the <br /> foregoing analysis, which draws only upon toadlaccess cases, should be sufficient to demonstrate <br /> the inadequate basis of the Draft General Plan in exacting free access to the beach ,let alone <br /> parking, as a condition for coastal resort development approval. There is no connection or nexus <br /> between such a coasts] resort development and either public parking or beach access. Such a <br /> r~°.S.^.rt ,ixiPl~rnnPnf ,rove nni rin~r~ the It~ f^.r 9t:Ch r~lriYnap a~n„1 a..m:e$ ?~Cr°-.n~~~r, ~:~~n :f :t <br /> did, the requirement would sorely tack proportionality. The requirement is unconstitutional on <br /> its Face. <br /> 13 <br /> <br />