COM 0042.062 2004-2006 - Laserfiche WebLink

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AShfOY'd & MPiStan 12/1'7/LVVJ lU;OG rrvi: vac.iviz residential or resort developments whose residents would arguably use such access to selector public resources or facilities could such a dedication be considered remotely reasonable. 1. Unconstitationai Land Development Regniatlons as Takings: the Constitutional Standards Judges and commentators have long suggested that conditions, exactions and dedications attached to Iand development permits must bear some proportiaaate relation to the land development upon which they are levied. See, e.g., Heyman and Gilhool, "The Constitutionality ofImposing hrtereased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions" 73 Yale L.J. t i t9 {1964). As the following analysis makes clear, such land development conditions (impact, mitigation and "in-Heu^ fees anfl other exactions, and land dedication regtutemeats) are deveiopmart driven. It is the contemplated land devetopmart project that generates the need for the public facility or other infrastructure improvement which justifies ~e dedication or exaction It follows that it is always inappropriate to levy or charge such exactions and dedications on the rezoning process. Zoning generaiw rro such needs. Ii also follows that the fee collected or the interest in land acquued by goveimnexrt must be spent or used -and soon -for the public facility or itnpmvematt for which it was collected. Failrtre to spend err use iix fear or land renders the basis for charging it invaiia. $o does failm~e to use ar spend it reasonably quictcly , or to spend it for a general or different purpose (i.e., a road fee for school purposes). However most Sitigation over land dxrvdoprneot conditions arises because of questions about the relationship of the condition oa a land development pemut to problems or needs generated by the contemplated development. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in two landmark t:ases:I~.41lan v. Ati[omia Coan~ Com+_++ission. 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tieard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994), both of which etruek down government land dedication conditions upon the it:saance of land development permits (coastal zone and building permits, respectively) as unconstitutional takings of private property by regulation. In Pollan v. California Coasts( Commission, the Suprarre Court struck down a Coastal Commission requirement that a landowner dedicate an easement across the back portion of his lot and parallel to the public beach as a condition for pennrssion to rebtdld a beach IIotrse. Tire Commission saki ttud the problem it sought W address was the blocling of views from the beach road to the beach by the expanded house, thus malting it difl5cult for the public to ate that these was pubfic beach below. tls the Court said: It is quitennpossiblc to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to wall: across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand how it towers any "psyctnlogicai barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to remody any additianai congestion on them caused ly construction ofthe Nollans' new house...The lack ofnezus between the condition and the original ptnpose vfthe buikting nxC'ictiaa converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining ofan easement to serve some valid gavernmentai purpose, but without payment of compensation. W/wtever may be the Darer limits of "Iegitimate state interests " in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them. 483 U.S. 836-834 (emphasis added). it