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AShlora wriscou aa,i„~~~~ - been shaped by the Stele's law of properly - i.e., whemer and to what degree the state's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land wnh respect to which the takings ciaimmtt alleges a dtmintrtion in (or elimination oil value. 505 U.S. at 1016, n.7. Several lower federal and state courts have dealt with the issue. 'Thus, bout Florida Rack Industries. Inc, v. Unital States. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and v 'es Harbor. htc. v. United States. 28 F.3d 117] (Fed. Cir.1994) discuss the denominator issue in the context of denials of section 404 (Clean Water Act) dredge and fill permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers. In Lovefadies. the court considered only 12.5 of plaintifFs 250 acres, hpldmv L imal~ly t ~aF H,E Cnmc ~_ff_rrr;Y~ly d,n+!~ tM nndL'9Pn^ Ell ~^nQP?ICEIly t`•..C.G~i'..l use and so was liable for the difference in vahte with (52.7 million) and without (512,500) the permit. To the same effect is Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). in which the court held the relevant parcel for regulatory takings analysis was 50.7 acres rather than 311 acres owned by the plaintiff landowner. Similarly is East Cabe Mav Associates v. State. 693 A.2d 114 {N.7. Super. Ct. App. Div.1997) the cauri held that the denominator would not include adjacent pttrprxty subdivided and sold many years prior to dte enactment of dte present reguiadams dwying use. To the same effect, Animas Valley Sand and Gravel Inc. v. Board of County Cotnm'ra. 8 P.3d 522 (Col Ct. App. 2000), where We court accepted as the relevour parcel only landowne'o 33 awa+ Jcai~altxl in a river corridur'distrtc ; TatfierTlrur atYOT-._ - - - - ~ ~ - - - piaintin's adjoining Property as wail D. It h Possible That Varions landowners in the Csanty have changed positions based epos eaisting wnhrt:, pnttiag in infrastrnctare and subdividing tlleir land In tltelnvestment-backed expectations generated by eriatinE County land nse regalntions and therefore have vested rights to proceed wim construction of additional dwcitiags. The doctrine of vested rights is designed to protect property owners from a change in the law which would otherwise render a land developm~t project ar consntrction illegal, which was otherwise legal when cotmnenced. The landowner has a vested right to continue such a project if the landowner has expended money in reliance on the existing land use controls in effect at the time the project ar construction is commenced. Virtually any governmental action approving the cotnmenceatent of a project will do, except that in Hawaii if there is still a discretionary permit outstanding -such as a shoreline management permit -the landowner's right to proceed does not vest until that last discretionary permit is issued. Most courts having considered the matter agree that approval of a subdivision plat orplan vests such rights. See, ag., You gblood v. Board of 5uoervisora of yen Die¢o County, 586 P.2d 556 {California 1978). It may well be that many landowners have span money in reliance on their existing zoning classifications to install infiastructure necessary for the construction of dwelling units on their land. ~thtrs may have expended funds for the subdivision of their lands in similar reliance on existing zoning. These owners need only a building permit under existing zoning to conshuct houses on their infrastructured and subdivided land in order to construct additional dwelling units. i3nder Hawaii law, with no additional disctctionary permits (preliminary subdivision plat 9