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that is necessary is that they achieve "substantial equality of population among the various <br /> districts." Id. at 579. <br /> "Substantial equality of population" has come to mean that a legislative plan will not be <br /> thrown out for inequality of population if its overall range is less than ten percent. <br /> The ten - percent standard was first articulated in a dissenting opinion written by Justice <br /> Brennan in the cases of Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. <br /> 755, in 1973. In later cases, the Court majority has endorsed and followed the rule Justice <br /> Brennan's dissent accused them of establishing. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); <br /> Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 -43 (1983); <br /> Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993). <br /> 2. Unless Necessary to Achieve Some "Rational State Policy" <br /> The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims had anticipated that some deviations from <br /> population equality in legislative plans might be justified if they were "based on legitimate <br /> considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy ...." 377 U.S. 533, 579 <br /> (1964). So far, the only "rational state policy" that has served to justify an overall range of more <br /> than ten percent in a legislative plan has been respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions. <br /> And that has happened in only three cases: Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Brown v. <br /> Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); and Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993). <br /> In Mahan v. Howell, the Supreme Court upheld a legislative redistricting plan enacted by <br /> the Virginia General Assembly that had an overall range among House districts of about 16 <br /> percent. The Court took note of the General Assembly's constitutional authority to enact <br /> legislation dealing with particular political subdivisions, and found that this legislative function <br /> was a significant and a substantial aspect of the Assembly's powers and practices, and thus <br /> justified an attempt to preserve political subdivision boundaries in drawing House districts. <br /> Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983), upholding a legislative plan with an overall <br /> range of 89 percent, was decided by the Supreme Court on the same day that it decided Karcher <br /> v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), where it threw out a congressional plan with an overall range of <br /> less than one percent. Reconciling these two cases is not easy. Nevertheless, I shall try. <br /> First, as I have noted, the constitutional standard for legislative plans is different from the <br /> standard for congressional plans. <br /> Second, it is important to understand that in Brown v. Thomson the Court was faced with <br /> a reapportionment plan rather than with a redistricting plan. The members of the Wyoming <br /> House of Representatives were being reapportioned among Wyoming's counties, rather than <br /> having new districts created for them. Because the boundaries of the districts were not being <br /> changed, the opportunities for partisan mischief were far reduced. <br /> Third, Wyoming put forward a "rational state policy" to justify an overall range of more <br /> than ten percent, and the Court endorsed it. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell concluded that <br /> Wyoming's constitutional policy— followed since statehood —of using counties as representative <br /> districts and insuring that each county had at least one representative, was supported by <br /> substantial and legitimate state concerns, and had been applied in a manner free from any taint of <br /> arbitrariness or discrimination. He also found that the population deviations were no greater than <br /> necessary to preserve counties as representative districts, and that there was no evidence of a <br /> built -in bias tending to favor particular interests or geographical areas. 462 U.S. at 843 -46. <br />