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1/28/24,3:08 PM Save Sunset Beach Coalition v.City and County of Honolulu,78 P.3d 1 -Haw:Supreme Court 2003-Google Scholar
<br /> We believe that if the legislature had intended absolute protection from golf course uses for A and B rated agricultural lands,it would have done so unequivocally
<br /> by prohibiting the issuance of permits for golf courses under the special permit provisions...or by employing clearly prohibitory language...Because the
<br /> amendment...merely reiterated the provisions of§205-4.5,which provided authority for special permits for golf course uses on A and B rated lands,§205-2
<br /> cannot be construed as an outright prohibition on such permits.
<br /> Id.at 338-39,790 P.2d at 910.
<br /> In light of the foregoing,the word"important"can only be viewed in its common and usual sense.As noted earlier,"the words of the constitution are presumed to be used in
<br /> their natural sense...'unless the context furnishes some ground to control,qualify or enlarge them."'State ex rel.Amami ,56 Haw.at 577,545 P.2d at 1182(citation and
<br /> internal brackets omitted)(emphasis added).The common and ordinary meaning of the word"important,"rather than its technical,shorthand use in the ALISH system,would
<br /> be consistent with the meaning of the term in light of the foregoing.
<br /> Vil.
<br /> Plaintiffs'fifth argument on appeal is that a country district can not be established on state agricultural lands unless,pursuant to ROH§21-5.30,four guidelines used to identify
<br /> lands for country designation were met.As stated earlier,ROH§21-5.30(c)enumerates four guidelines for identifying potential country district lands.See supra note 5.
<br /> Plaintiffs argue that the guidelines are mandatory,and because not all four guidelines were met,the Lihi Lani lands could not be rezoned as a country district.
<br /> 15 *15 We conclude that"use"or consideration of the four guidelines expressed in ROH§21-5.30(c)are mandatory,but that the ultimate designation decision arising out of that
<br /> mandatory consideration must,of necessity,involve the exercise of discretion.The use of the terms"shall"and"identify"appear to indicate that the guidelines must be utilized
<br /> in the consideration of specific lands for rezoning as a country district.Such consideration,however,involves the application of"guidelines."The plain and ordinary meaning of
<br /> the term"guideline"is"an indication or outline of future policy or conduct(as of a government)."Webster's Third New Int'I Dictionary 1009(1961).See also Grievance Adm'r v.
<br /> Underwood,462 Mich.188,194,612 N.W.2d 116(2000)("The plain meaning of guideline'is'an indication or outline of policy or conduct."'(Citations omitted.)); Tutein v
<br /> Dale,43 F.Supp.2d 113,121 n.14(D.Mass.1999)(defining"guideline'as'any guide or indication of future action"'(citation omitted)).Hence,"guidelines[,]"as defined in
<br /> ROH§21-5.30,denote individual factors that are not mandatory in themselves,but instead provide direction or guidance with respect to the ultimate decision to rezone.Any
<br /> rezoning to country,then must,pursuant to ROH§21-5.30,include consideration of the guidelines.But because guidelines presuppose the exercise of discretion,the failure to
<br /> satisfy all of them cannot be said to preclude identification of land as"country."
<br /> Therefore,the City Council must apply all the guidelines,but it is not restricted in approving a rezoning application that does not satisfy all four of them.In the instant case,the
<br /> Department of Land Utilization determined that the Lihi Lani project satisfied two of the four guidelines,namely that the land being zoned to"Country"was not predominantly
<br /> classified as prime,unique,or other lands of agricultural importance,and the existing public facility capacities would preclude intense development on the land.Accordingly,
<br /> the court did not err in making finding number 61 to the effect that all four guidelines need not be satisfied.26
<br /> Vlll.
<br /> Plaintiffs'sixth argument is that the City's country zoning designation conflicts with HRS chapter 205,because the uses allowed in a country district exceed those permitted
<br /> within the state agricultural district.In rebuttal,Obayashi contends that Plaintiffs are barred from arguing that the project fails to comply with HRS chapter 205 because they did
<br /> not object to the court's dismissal of counts II and III of Plaintiffs'complaint,which alleged,respectively,that(1)the proposed uses of the property do not qualify as a
<br /> permissible agricultural use under HRS chapter 205,and(2)that the property will not be used primarily for agricultural purposes.Obayashi argues,however,that country
<br /> zoning in this case is not inconsistent with HRS chapter 205,because chapter 205 permits"farm dwellings,"and the dwellings planned are"farm dwellings"within the definition
<br /> of HRS chapter 205.1271
<br /> The City agrees that Plaintiffs should be barred from arguing that County zoning conflicts with state agricultural zoning because Plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of the
<br /> counts related to this issue.In addition,the City maintains:(1)that it has"concurrent jurisdiction"with the State in agricultural districts;(2)it is empowered to enact any type of
<br /> 16 zoning as long as the zoning complies with the"long-range,comprehensive,general plan"requirement of HRS§46-411281(3)it has the authority,pursuant*16 to HRS§205-6
<br /> (2001),12e1 to"permit certain unusual and reasonable uses within agricultural and rural districts other than those for which the district is classified[;]"(4)it is charged with the
<br /> "administration of county zoning laws"and"the restriction[s]on use and the condition[s]relating to agricultural districts under section 205-4.5[,]"HRS§205-12(2001),and
<br /> thus it will resolve permissible uses in an agricultural district at the time of permitting;and(5)as to any incompatibilities between uses authorized in country zoning and in
<br /> agricultural districts,only uses authorized by HRS chapter 205 can occur even if a country designation would ordinarily permit greater uses.
<br /> Count VI of the Plaintiffs's complaint raised the specific question of whether the City could zone land as country in a state-designated agricultural district.0 That count
<br /> requested a declaratory judgment that the City could not rezone agricultural district lands as country,injunctive relief preventing Obayashi from beginning construction or
<br /> development in a country zone,and injunctive relief enjoining the City from approving any use that is not permitted in an agricultural district.In addressing this count,the court
<br /> found in finding number 64 that"Plaintiffs have not demonstrated nor is the evidence sufficient to show that the zoning change from Agriculture to Country was inconsistent
<br /> with or violated the provisions of Chapter 205,HRS."Plaintiffs did assign error to this finding on appeal.Thus,Plaintiffs are not precluded from arguing this issue.
<br /> lX.
<br /> Initially we note that it is fundamental that authority to zone is conferred by the legislature on the counties.See Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev.Co.V.City&County of Honolulu,70
<br /> Haw.480,483,777 P.2d 244,246(1989).("The counties of our state derive their zoning powers from HRS§46-4(a)(Supp.1988),referred to as the Zoning Enabling Act.").
<br /> 17 However,counties are authorized to zone only according to the dictates of HRS§46-4 subject to limitations within HRS chapter 205.1U See HRS§205-5(a)*17("Except as
<br /> herein provided,the powers granted to counties under section 46-4 shall govern the zoning within the districts,32 other than in conservation districts.")Because the provisions
<br /> in HRS chapter 205 are"law[s]of statewide concern,"see Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev.,70 Haw.at 489,777 P.2d at 249,,and HRS§46-4 does not relate to the City's"executive,
<br /> legislative[,]and administrative structure and organization[,]"id.at 489,777 P.2d at 250,the State's districting scheme prevails over the City's land use ordinance.Thus,any
<br /> conflict between the State provisions and the county zoning ordinances is resolved in favor of the State statutes,by virtue of the supremacy provisions in article VIII,section 6
<br /> of the Hawaii ConstitutionIM and HRS§50-15.1s41
<br /> Thus,if an ordinance truly conflicts with Hawai'i statutory law that is of statewide concern,then it is necessarily invalid because it violates article VIII,section 6 of
<br /> the Hawaii Constitution and HRS§§50-15—the state's supremacy provisions.A law of general application throughout the state[]is a law of statewide concern
<br /> within the meaning of article VIII,section 6[]of the Hawai'i...Constitution.Marsland[v.First Hawaiian Bank],70 Haw.[126,]133,764 P.2d[1228,]1232[(1988)].
<br /> https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3834089830730945441&q=regulates+permissible+land+uses&hl=en&as_sdt=4,12 5/11
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