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1/28/24,3:08 PM Save Sunset Beach Coalition v.City and County of Honolulu,78 P.3d 1 -Haw:Supreme Court 2003-Google Scholar
<br /> Richardson v.City&County of Honolulu,76 Hawai'i 46,66,868 P.2d 1193,1213.1994),(emphasis added;internal quotation marks omitted).Consequently,while the City's
<br /> contention that its zoning authority is"concurrent"is somewhat true,any zoning ordinance enacted by the City may not actually conflict with the provisions in HRS chapter 205.
<br /> Otherwise,the City is not authorized to so zone,and HRS§50-15 requires that we invalidate the ordinance.See Richardson,76 Hawai'i at 66,868 P.2d at 1213.
<br /> X.
<br /> The dual state and county land use designation approach is analogous to the requirement that property owners comply with both the county development plans and zoning
<br /> ordinances.In GATRI v Blane,88 Hawai'i 108,962 P.2d 367(1998),this court addressed the consistency required between development plans and county-enacted zoning
<br /> ordinances,both of which have the force and effect of law.Id.at 109,962 P.2d at 368.In GATRI,a general partnership(GATRI),desired to build a snack baron a parcel of
<br /> land which was zoned for B-R Resort Commercial(allowing for construction of the snack shop),although the development plan called for single family(SF)use(not allowing
<br /> for construction of the snack shop).Id.at 109,962 P.2d at 368.
<br /> When the developer submitted a SMA permit application to the Maui County Planning Commission,the permit was denied,because,although the county zoning designation
<br /> was proper,the snack shop was inconsistent with the county general plan.Id.at 109-10,962 R2d at 368-69.On appeal to the circuit court,GATRI argued that the decision of
<br /> the Director of the Commission was erroneous because a development which is consistent with the governing zoning ordinance is per se consistent with the development
<br /> plan,and thus,GATRI was entitled to the expanded list of uses permitted under the zoning ordinance,rather than the more restricted uses permitted under the development
<br /> plan.Id.at 110,962 P.2d at 369.
<br /> 18 The circuit court issued a judgment in favor of GATRI,which the Director appealed.'18 Id.at 110,962 P.2d at 369.In reviewing the appeal,this court determined that,because
<br /> the development plan had the force and effect of law,"the development must be consistent with both the[development]plan and the zoning."Id.at 115,962 P.2d at 374.
<br /> Because GATRI was subject to both the development plan as well as the zoning ordinance,GATRI was entitled only to the more restricted uses allowed by the development
<br /> plan.See id.
<br /> In HawaiTs land use system the legislature's statutory districts constitute more of a general scheme,and,presumably,by delegating authority to zone to the counties,the
<br /> legislature intended that specific zoning be enacted at the county level.We believe that the"consistency doctrine"enunciated in Gatri is somewhat instructive in the instant
<br /> case.Because the uses allowed in country zoning,are prohibited from conflicting with the uses allowed in a State agriculture district,only a more restricted use as between the
<br /> two is authorized.By adopting a dual land use designation approach,the legislature envisioned that the counties would enact zoning ordinances that were somewhat different
<br /> from,but not inconsistent with,the statutes.
<br /> XI.
<br /> While the counties are empowered to enact zoning ordinances,HRS chapter 205 clearly limits the permissible uses allowed within an agricultural district.HRS§205-4.5(b)
<br /> states that"[u]ses not expressly permitted in subsection(a)shall be prohibited,except the uses permitted as provided in sections 205-6 and 205-8[.]"(Emphasis added.)Thus,
<br /> any use permitted by a country designation not expressly permitted in HRS§205-4.5(a)or by virtue of HRS§§205-6 or 205-8(2001)[15]conflicts with the statutory regime.
<br /> HRS§205-6 provides that:
<br /> The county planning commission may permit certain unusual and reasonable uses within agricultural and rural districts other than those for which the district is
<br /> classified.Any person who desires to use the person's land within an agricultural or rural district other than for an agricultural or rural use,as the case may be,
<br /> may petition the planning commission of the county within which the person's land is located for permission to use the person's land in the manner desired.
<br /> (Emphasis added.)However,we observe that the"reasonable and unusual"exception permitted by HRS§205-6 cannot be utilized to circumvent the essential purpose of the
<br /> agricultural district.In Curtis,90 Hawai'i at 397,978 P.2d at 835,this court held that the"essential purpose[of HRS§205-6]...is to provide landowners relief in exceptional
<br /> situations where the use desired would not change the essential characterof the district nor be inconsistent therewith."Id.(emphasis added)(citing Neighborhood Board No.
<br /> 24(Waianae Coast)v.State Land Use Comm'n,64 Haw.265,639 P.2d 1097(1982)).Accordingly,while a landowner may request a permit for a use allowed by the country
<br /> designation but prohibited in an agricultural district,such a permit is appropriate only in an"exceptional situation"that does not contravene the general purpose of an
<br /> agricultural district.We have also concluded that an ordinance authorizing a zoning use more restrictive than that permitted under the statutory district,would not conflict with
<br /> such a regime and thus is permissible.See discussion supra.
<br /> XII.
<br /> Plaintiffs argue that a permitted use under the City's county district exceeds the state agricultural district because it allows the use of a"dwelling,detached,one-family[,]"and
<br /> requires no special permit for such use.HRS§205-4.5(a)(4)limits dwelling use to"[f]arm dwellings,employee housing,farm buildings,or activity or uses related to farming
<br /> and animal husbandry[.]"
<br /> 19 But in the instant case it is not evident that the development would conflict with the most restrictive use as between country zoning and the agricultural district.As noted*19
<br /> above,Obayashi contends that its development will fit within the permitted uses of an agricultural district.01 Moreover,Obayashi does not indicate it seeks a special permit for
<br /> "reasonable and unusual"uses under HRS§205-6.As previously indicated,the City takes the position that issues as to the residential nature of the development"will be
<br /> presented only at the time actual uses are proposed"and"permits are sought."Also,the City generally maintains that at the time of permitting or enforcement only the most
<br /> restrictive uses would be authorized.
<br /> Under the ripeness doctrine,a court should"reserve judgment upon a law pending concrete executive action to carry its policies into effect[.]"Bremner v.City&County of
<br /> Honolulu,96 Hawai'i 134,144,28 P.3d 350,360(8pp.2001),,reconsideration denied,(July 5,2001),certiorari denied,(Aug.13,2001).On somewhat analogous grounds,this
<br /> court has explained the principles of the ripeness doctrine in relation to administrative decisions,as follows:
<br /> The need to avoid premature adjudication supports a definition of"dispute"that requires more than a"difference of opinion"as to policy.The rationale underlying
<br /> the ripeness doctrine and the traditional reluctance of courts to apply injunctive and declaratory remedies to administrative determinations is"to prevent courts,
<br /> through avoidance of premature adjudication,from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies,and also to protect the agencies
<br /> from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effect felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."
<br /> Grace Bus.Dev Corp.v.Kamikawa,92 Hawai'i 608,612,994 P.2d 540,544(2000)(quoting Abbott Labs.v.Gardner,387 U.S.136,148,87 S.Ct.1507,18 L.Ed.2d 681
<br /> (1967));see also League of Women Voters of Hawaii v Doi,57 Haw.213,214,552 P.2d 1392,1393(1976).(explaining,in relation to a request for a declaratory judgment,that
<br /> this court was reluctant to"decide important questions regarding'the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a
<br /> concrete case[.]"'(Citation omitted.)).Thus,"[p]rudential rules of judicial self-governance founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of courts in a
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