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1/28/24,3:08 PM Save Sunset Beach Coalition v.City and County of Honolulu,78 P.3d 1 -Haw:Supreme Court 2003-Google Scholar
<br /> democratic society,considerations flowing from our coequal and coexistent system of government,dictate that we accord those charged with drafting and administering our
<br /> laws a reasonable opportunity to craft and enforce them in a manner that produces a lawful result."Bremner,96 Hawai'i at 144,28 P.3d at 360(internal citations,brackets and
<br /> quotation marks omitted)(citing Life of the Land,63 Haw.166,172,623 P.2d 431,438(1981)).
<br /> In this case,Obayashi claims it will comply with HRS chapter 205.The City represents that it will enforce the appropriate statutes and ordinances and allow only the most
<br /> restrictive use of the land in the event of a conflict.Under these circumstances,we affirm the court's grant of summary judgment on Count VI but on the ground that Count VI is
<br /> not ripe for decision.1371 See Enos v Pacific Transfer&Warehouse,Inc.,79 Hawai'i 452,459,903 P.2d 1273,1280(1995),reconsideration denied(Oct.16,1995)(noting that
<br /> "it is well-settled that'[a]n appellate court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any ground in the record which supports affirmance"')(Quoting Strouss v Simmons,66
<br /> Haw.32,40,657 P.2d 1004,1010(1982)(citations omitted)).This should not,however,bar Plaintiffs from raising this issue again as may be appropriate.See,e.g., The Skull
<br /> Valley Band of Goshute Indians v Leavitt,215 F.Sul2p.2d 1232,1252(D.Utah 2002).(noting that a determination of ripeness is final,"absent a change in factual circumstances
<br /> 20 relating to the ripeness issue")(citing Solar v Merit Sys.Protection Bd.,*20 600 F.Supn.535,536(S.D.Fla.1984).);Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Assocs.,Ltd.v.Nola n,755
<br /> A.2d 7 ,813(R.I 2000)(noting that a"change in material circumstances"prevented application of res judicata to a previously made ripeness decision).
<br /> XIII.
<br /> Plaintiffs'remaining issue on appeal concerns the court's protective order of a memorandum prepared by Obayashi's attorneys,and transmitted to an expert witness who listed
<br /> it as a reference in a publicly issued EIS.t381 We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.See,e.g.,Hac v.University
<br /> of Hawaii,102 Hawaii 92,100-01,73 R3d 46,54-55(2003)(citations omitted)."An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason
<br /> or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant."Id.(citations omitted).
<br /> A.
<br /> As a preliminary matter,it is necessary to distinguish between the attorney-client and the work-product privileges.The attorney-client privilege is codified in the Hawai'i Rules
<br /> of Evidence(HRE)Rule 503,which provides that a client"has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
<br /> made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client[.]"HIRE Rule 503(b);see also DiCenzo v Izawa 68 Haw.528 535 723 P.2d 171
<br /> 175 1986)(noting that prior to codification,the"common-law attorney-client privilege[has been]long recognized by the courts of Hawaii").The underlying principle of this
<br /> privilege is to"encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
<br /> administration of justice[.]"State v Wong,97 Hawai'i 512,518,40 P.3d 914,920(2002).(quoting United States v Zolin 491 U.S.554,562,109 S.Ct.2619,105 L.Ed.2d 469
<br /> .(1989));see also DiCenzo 68 Haw.at 535,723 P.2d at 175(explaining that"lawyers can act effectively only if they are fully advised of the facts by the parties they represent
<br /> and disclosure will be promoted if the client knows that what he tells his lawyer cannot be extorted from the lawyer"(internal quotation marks,brackets,and ellipses omitted)).
<br /> On the other hand,the work-product privilege has its foundation in HRCP Rule 26,01 which states that parties"may obtain discovery regarding any matter,not privileged,"
<br /> (emphasis added),and indicates that"discovery of documents and tangible things...prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial"shall be disclosed only upon a showing of
<br /> "substantial need of the materials"and"undue hardship"in obtaining the materials in another fashion.HRCP Rule 26(b)(3).Further,"[i]n ordering discovery of such materials
<br /> when the required showing has been made,the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,conclusions,opinions,or legal theories of an attorney or other
<br /> representative of a party concerning the litigation."HRCP Rule 26(b)(3).
<br /> Although Obayashi repeatedly states that the memorandum contains"legal analysis,legal impressions and legal conclusions"there is no indication that it was prepared in
<br /> anticipation of litigation.We must conclude then that the work-product privilege is inapplicable.I401
<br /> B.
<br /> To come within the attorney-client privilege,the communication must be a"confidential communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
<br /> 21 services"between appropriate*21 parties as stated in HIRE Rule 503(b).Accordingly,a communication occurring in the following manner is privileged:
<br /> (1)where legal advice of any kind is sought(2)from a professional legal adviser in his[or her]capacity as such,(3)the communication relating to that purpose,
<br /> (4)made in confidence(5)by the client,(6)are at his[or her]instance permanently protected(7)from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,(8)except the
<br /> protection be waived.
<br /> Sapp v Wong 62 Haw.34 38 609 P.2d 137 140(1980)(quoting 8 Wigmore,Evidence,§2292(McNaughton rev.1961)).However,as in Sapp,a reviewing court may
<br /> determine that under the circumstances of the case that there was an invocation of the privilege.See Sapp 62 Haw.at 39 609 P.2d at 141 ("We,however,go farther than
<br /> deciding that the proper determinations were not made.Under the circumstances of this case,...[the comments]fall within the ambit of the privilege[.]").Here,it was apparent
<br /> that the memorandum was prepared on behalf of a representative of Obayashi in an effort to ensure that the proposed development met all applicable laws and Obayashi's
<br /> needs.As such,the allegations sufficiently met the requirement that the memorandum was a confidential communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of a
<br /> legal service for Obayashi between Obayashi's representative and a lawyer.HIRE Rule 503(b).As such,we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion to determine that
<br /> the memorandum was privileged.
<br /> XIV.
<br /> Plaintiffs assert that the disclosure of the memorandum to an expert witness and the subsequent citation to the memorandum in a public document waived any privilege.HIRE
<br /> Rule 511 governs the waiver of privilege through a"voluntary"disclosure,and states:
<br /> A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if,while holder of the privilege,the person or the person's predecessor
<br /> voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter.This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is a privileged
<br /> communication.
<br /> HIRE Rule 511(emphasis added).The commentary to this rule explains that"[a]ny intentional disclosure by the holder of the privilege defeats[the purpose of the privilege]and
<br /> eliminates the necessity for the privilege in that instance."Thus,a waiver analysis would focus on whether the disclosure was voluntary.Cf.Territo v.Cabrinha,24 Haw.621,
<br /> . ................................................................
<br /> 626(1919)(expressing that"[i]n all cases where a personal privilege exists for a witness to testify or not,if such witness does testify without objection he will be deemed to
<br /> have done so voluntarily"(citation omitted));Takamori v Kanai,11 Haw.1,2(1897),(holding that the act of"voluntarily"putting defendant's counsel on the witness stand
<br /> waived the claim of privileged communication).
<br /> https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3834089830730945441&q=regulates+permissible+land+uses&hl=en&as_sdt=4,12 7/11
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