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2005-03-11 Letter to Constance Kiriu from Lincoln Ashida re Appointing Authority of the County Clerk
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2005-03-11 Letter to Constance Kiriu from Lincoln Ashida re Appointing Authority of the County Clerk
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(MW) <br /> Honorable Constance Kiriu <br /> March 11, 2005 <br /> Page 4 <br /> In the case of the Corporation Counsel, the Charter makes clear that <br /> removal may only occur with the consent of both the Mayor and the Council. The <br /> Corporation Counsel is the only executive branch appointee who requires <br /> Council approval for his removal, and this requirement is specifically provided for <br /> in the Charter. <br /> Council Approval is Not Necessary for the Removal of the Deputy County <br /> Clerk and Legislative Auditor <br /> It is our considered opinion that as the appointing authority, the County <br /> Clerk may remove both the Deputy County Clerk and Legislative Auditor without <br /> Council approval or consent. <br /> The Charter contains provisions for various County officers, wherein the <br /> method of removal specifically provides for Council or other board approval. <br /> Examples of this are the removal provision for the Corporation Counsel by the <br /> Council, and the removal provision of the deputy chief of police by the Police <br /> Commission.3 <br /> Had Council approval been required for the removal of the Deputy County <br /> Clerk and the Legislative Auditor, the Charter would have said so. <br /> The aforementioned position is supported by the authority found in Rine v. <br /> City of Sherrill, 152 Misc.2d 19, 574 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1991). In that case, a police <br /> officer in New York sought declaratory relief, alleging that he was improperly <br /> removed by the city manager. The police officer claimed that since the city's <br /> charter gave the police commission the authority to appoint him, he could only be <br /> removed by that commission. The charter was silent on any removal provision. <br /> In finding for the city and against the police officer, the Supreme Court of <br /> Oneida County, New York, found it was proper for the city manager to remove <br /> the police officer. The Court stated as follows: <br /> The Court concurs in the City's position. While the Charter could have <br /> expressly provided in Section 191 that the Commission also have the <br /> authority to remove policemen, that Section was silent as to removal <br /> authority. The removal authority is granted in Section 41(2) to the City <br /> Manager "except as herein provided"; there are no contrary exceptions <br /> provided in the Charter. A Court may not read into a statute (here a <br /> Charter) words not used by the legislature which would defeat the purpose <br /> of the statute. In determining the legislative intent in the construction of a <br /> statute, such intent is to be ascertained from the words and language <br /> used, and the statutory language should be construed according to the <br /> 3 Section 7-2.3 of the Charter provides in pertinent part that"The deputy(police chief)shall be <br /> appointed by the chief of police with the confirmation of the police commission and may be <br /> removed by the chief of police with the approval of the commission,without cause being stated." <br />
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