2007-07-23_George_Kahoohanohano_et_al_v._State_of_Hawaii_et_al_-_Opinion_of_the_court_by_Justice_Acoba

Home

Kaho'ohanohano v. State Page 7 of 46 I think the question before the [c]ourt is the question of standing.And I think earlier the [c]ourt in this proceeding the [c]ourt articulated its scope of inquiry to be whether or not[P]laintiffs do,in fact,have certain rights with regard to the sound actuarial condition of the [ERS]. I think as a result of the discussion,the[c]ourt has come to the realization that that determination is probably best left to another day. At this time,what the [c]ourt needs to adjudicate is whether the individual named[P]laintiffs have a sufficient interest in the outcome so as to justify their prosecution of the claims in this case. We will get into it a little bit with regard to [Honolulu County's] motion,but the mere fact that monies at this time,in this action,may not actually be paid to the [P]laintiffs doesn't end this court's inquiry because there are equitable relief that is also prayed for by the individual named[P]laintiffs. At this time,there were references by both the [S]tate and the [P]laintiffs to submissions contained in the--in connection with the motion for summary judgment,and I think this court at least would be more comfortable availing itself of that more complete record to adjudicate whether or not the individual named[P]laintiffs have a specific right or interest in the surplus accounts or excess earning accounts. So the court at this time concludes that the [P]laintiffs do have a sufficient interest in the outcome to justify this matter going forward on their behalf, so the [c]ourt will respectfully deny the [S]tate's motion to dismiss,certainly without prejudice to raising at the time of the motions for summary judgment any and all arguments raised at this proceeding. (Emphases added.) "[T]he [c]ourt [elected] under [Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)] Rule 52 not to make any specific findings of fact or conclusions of law." It stated that "[a] simple order denying the motion for good cause is --will be sufficient." The court further ruled: Turning to [Honolulu County's] motion,which is the motion regarding real party in interest. I think the [c]ourt's alluded to its inclination that simply because damages may not be paid to the individuals named,that is not dispositive of their ability to prosecute this case in their own names and as representatives of a larger class. So the [c]ourt is inclined to deny that motion and all joinders. (Emphasis added.) On March 17 and 18, 2003, the court held a hearing on the State's January 10, 2003 motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs' two separate October 1, 2002 motions for partial summary judgment. At the end of the hearing, the court granted the State's motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs and Trustees, and denied Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment. The court stated that it did not agree with the sovereign immunity argument and "[P] laintiffs could sue and bring this action if in fact Act 100 were unconstitutional." The court also dismissed the statute of limitations argument. The court instead found that there had been an "insufficient showing that the Constitutional Convention of 1950 intended to restrict the State's power and flexibility to enact future legislation as long as it did not diminish or impair the accrued benefits" and that "the phrase accrued benefits does not include the right of the members to an actuarially sound retirement system." Thus, the court concluded that Act 100 was constitutional as a matter of law. Specifically, the court determined that "it was incumbent upon this [c]ourt to construe the language of[a]rticle XVI, section 2 to determine whether in fact the [P]laintiffs have a right." According to the court, it "elect[ed] pursuant to [HRCP] Rule 52 not to make any specific findings of fact and conclusions of law but simply [to issue] an order disposing of the motion which would incorporate any good cause shown in the record to sustain the [c]ourt's ruling." In discussing the remaining claims, the court stated, "I still like my idea of a dismissal without prejudice that could be reinstated in the event of a remand. It's cleanest. It doesn't prejudice anyone. I hope to still be the judge here if the matter comes back down." On May 16, 2003, the court entered its written "Order Denying [the State's] Motion to Dismiss and [Honolulu County's] Motion to Dismiss the Individual Plaintiffs." The order states in relevant part: For good cause,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that[the State's]Motion to Dismiss filed June 28,2002,and all joinders therewith,are DENIED without prejudice. For good cause,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that[Honolulu County's]Motion to Dismiss the Individual Plaintiffs,filed December 31, 2002,and all joinders therewith,are DENIED without prejudice. The court's June 24, 2003 written judgment confirmed that the State's motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs http://www.state.hi.us/jud/opinions/sct/2007/26178.htm 8/12/2008