2007-07-23_George_Kahoohanohano_et_al_v._State_of_Hawaii_et_al_-_Opinion_of_the_court_by_Justice_Acoba

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Kaho'ohanohano v. State Page 8 of 46 and Trustees was granted, and that Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment based on article XVI, section 2, and for breach of contract, were denied. The judgment further specified, "[A]ll other claims in this action(including, without limitation, the claims in [P]laintiffs' Second Amended Complaint against [Honolulu County, Kauai County, Maui County, and Hawaii County])were dismissed without prejudice, sua sponte." On June 27, 2003, Honolulu County filed a motion to alter or amend the order granting the State's motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment, and the June 24, 2003 judgment in favor of the State on the basis that Honolulu County was entitled to a judgment in its favor. The other three counties joined in the motion. No order disposing of the motion was entered on the record within ninety days after the motion was filed. Thus, for purposes of HRAP 4(a)(3), the motion was deemed denied on September 25, 2003, ninety days after the filing of the June 27, 2003 motion. On October 24, 2003, Plaintiffs and Trustees filed notices of appeal from the June 24, 2003 final judgment. On November 6, 2003 and November 7, 2003, Hawaii County, Honolulu County, Maui County, and Kauai County [collectively, the Counties] filed cross-appeals from the June 24, 2003 final judgment in favor of the State and against Plaintiffs and Trustees, and from the denial of(1)Honolulu County's June 27, 2003 motion to alter or amend, and (2) Hawaii County's, Maui County's, and Kauai County's joinder to Honolulu County's June 27, 2003 motion to alter or amend. On November 7, 2003, the State filed a cross-appeal from the court's May 16, 2003 order denying the State's motion to dismiss. IV. Initially, the State argues on appeal that(1) Trustees "lack standing to bring their complaint in intervention"; (2) "Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this lawsuit"; (3)Plaintiffs' "action is not ripe for adjudication"; (4) Trustees' and Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief are moot; (5) "this lawsuit involves 'political questions' and is not justiciable"; (6) "Trustees' action against the State is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity"; and (7) "Trustees' action against the State is barred by the 2-year statute of limitations set forth in HRS § 661-5." We consider, first, the question of Plaintiffs' standing. V. As to the issue of standing, generally it has been declared by this court that "[s]tanding is concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit." Pele Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawaii 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "'[T]he crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf."' Mottl v. Miyahira 95 Hawaii 381, 389, 23 P.3d 716, 724 (2001) (quoting In re Matson Navigation Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 81 Hawaii 270, 275, 916 P.2d 680, 685 (1996)) (emphasis added). In determining whether a plaintiff has standing, the court "look[s] solely to whether [the plaintiff] is the proper plaintiff. . . , without regard to the merits of the allegations." Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 281, 768 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1989). In addition, in analyzing whether a party has standing, "[o]ur touchstone remains the needs of justice." Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 63 Haw. 166, 176, 623 P.2d 431, 441 (1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Hence, "while every challenge to governmental action has not been sanctioned, our basic position has been that standing requirements should not be barriers to justice." Id. at 173-74, 623 P.2d at 439. Thus, "[o]ne whose legitimate interest is in fact injured by illegal action of an agency or officer should have standing because justice requires that such a party should have a chance to show that the action that hurts his interest is illegal." Id. at 174 n.8, 623 P.2d at 439 n.8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice." Sierra Club v. Hawaii Tourism Auth., 100 Hawaii 242, 250-51, 59 P.3d 877, 885-86 (2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (other citations omitted)) (brackets omitted). Additionally, "[a]n organization . . . has standing to sue for injury to its own interests, separate from any injury to its members, inasmuch as standing may be established in http://www.state.hi.us/jud/opinions/sct/2007/26178.htm 8/12/2008