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MR. MATSUKAWA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Michael Matsukawa. I’m an attorney from Kona, representing Ms. Ford. <br /> <br />MS. FORD: You’re off, Mike, you have to start over (the microphone was off). <br /> <br />MR. MATSUKAWA: I’m sorry. My name is Michael Matsukawa. I’m an attorney in Kona and I represent Ms. Ford this morning. I just had a few points to provide to the Board for its consideration. The first is a procedural thing. Lawyers like procedure, but that’s what we’re here to do, make sure things are working properly. First of all, under your own rules—excuse me, under the Code, Section 2-86 as to filing a petition, the petitioner needs to file a memorandum of authorities that discuss each point being raised. It’s not enough to just file a petition. And the reason for that I think is pretty clear. The last time I was before this Board, I had the opportunity to discuss the Carrigan case that went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. And the question was what is the character of a elected official’s vote? What character does the law give it? And so Justice Scalia in the Carrigan case described a vote of an elected official as a commitment of his or her share of the legislative body’s power to pass or defeat a particular proposal. A memorandum would have also set forth the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s view on this issue. This is the case of Eddie Tangen versus the State of Hawai‘i Ethics Commission. The Court was looking at a very similar provision, ethics provision, at the state level that we have at the county level. And the question was—I think Mr. Adams was asking here what section of 2-84, and in the absence of a memo, it’s hard for us to fathom which subsection. I presume it’s number 1, no officer shall take official action directly affecting a business or undertaking in which the officer has a substantial financial interest. And in the Tangen case the court went on to say that the state legislature, the voters of the state, when they enacted Article 14 of the State Constitution, didn’t intend to prohibit an elected official from voting on anything simply because there may be a perceived or in fact an actual conflict. And the court emphasized the word directly--that this was an intent to segregate the kinds of situations where an elected official perhaps ought not to cast that vote which represents the expression of the electorate. And so they advised caution, that directly eliminates something that’s remote, speculative, or indirect. So without getting into the substance of the bills in question, my understanding is Bill 113, which was Margaret Wille’s bill, has an exemption for GMO papayas. Ms. Ford’s bill had a proposed amendment to also exempt papayas, GMO papayas, from the legislation. Her bill is in committee. Ms. Wille’s bill is up for a vote next week. So we get to the timing of this petition. This subject has been known for awhile. It seems as though the petitioner is trying to cancel Ms. Ford’s vote, to be honest. They could have brought this petition earlier, but they waited for the eve of this November 19 committee vote—I mean council vote—that’s coming up. But the point of law I think is, is this a direct conflict, in the sense of the Code. And the Code says directly affecting a business or undertaking in which the officer has a substantial financial interest. It’s the burden of the petitioner to make that showing, that in fact the petition is couched in terms of stopping competition. But we don’t know. There’s an exemption for papayas. So are we certain that there will