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or shoreline management permit, for example) the rights of these landowners have vested as a matter of law to proceed with the construction of these units and any subsequent change of the law such as that now contemplated by the County Council in Draft General Plan should not legally prevent such construction. See, for authority, County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance Company, 653 P.2d 766 (Hawaii 1982) and Life of the Land v. City Council, 606 P.2d 866 (Hawaii 1980). Indeed, if such landowners have had any official assurances from the County with respect to the preparation of their land for development (and subdivision approval clearly constitutes such assurance) the County is also equitably estopped from preventing the construction of additional units on such infrastructured and/or subdivided land. E. Section 1983 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act subjects any person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory, subjects any person in the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to liability to the party injured. 42 USC s. 1983. Such actions can be brought in either state or federal court, and under Monell v. New York Citv Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) local governments are "persons" which are subject to such suits for liability under Section 1983 for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief "...where...the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." (at 690). The U.S. Supreme Court has further held in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) that local government has "no immunity from damage liability flowing from their constitutional violations." Moreover, individual government officials have only qualified immunity for such rights deprivation actions, primarily when acting in their legislative orjudicial capacities. There is no such immunity when acting in an administrative capacity. In further court decisions, deprivation of property rights through unconstitutional land use controls has been clearly held to be such a deprivation covered by Section 1983. Therefore, if the County should pass the Draft General Plan and its application is found to unconstitutionally take private property under any of the grounds discussed above in preceding sections of this analysis: (1) the County has no immunity to a suit for damages under Section 1983 For the taking of property without compensation and (2) administratively enforcing such an invalid ordinance can subject individuals who enforce it to claims for damages as well. F. Public Access and Parking Requirements for Coastal Resort Development The Draft General Plan also appears to require landowners to dedicate public access-ways across private land as a condition to approving all coastal development uses of land. Essentially, the Draft General Plan at page 318: "Coastal resort developments shall provide public access to and parking for beach and shoreline areas." The public access-way dedication requirements imposed on coastal resource developments are clearly and unequivocally unconstitutional under the rules set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard. Such required dedications bear no relationship to any problem caused by a proposed subdivision (no nexus, in other words, rational or otherwise). Only if a landowner proposes large 10