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residential or resort developments whose residents would arguably use such access to selected <br /> <br /> public resources or facilities could such a dedication be considered remotely reasonable. <br /> 1. Unconstitutional Land Development Regulations as Takings: the <br /> Constitutional Standards <br /> Judges and commentators have long suggested that conditions, exactions and dedications attached to <br /> land development permits must bear some proportionate relation to the land development upon which <br /> they are levied. See, e.g., Heyman and Gilhool, "The Constitutionality ofImposing Increased <br /> Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions" 73 Yale L.J. 1119 <br /> (1964). As the following analysis makes clear, such land development conditions (impact, mitigation <br /> and "in-lieu" fees and other exactions, and land dedication requirements) are development driven. It is <br /> the contemplated land development project that generates the need for the public facility or other <br /> infrastructure improvement which justifies the dedication or exaction. It follows that it is always <br /> inappropriate to levy or charge such exactions and dedications on the rezoning process. Zoning <br /> generates no such needs. It also follows that the fee collected or the interest in land acquired by <br /> government must be spent or used -and soon -for the public facility or improvement for which it was <br /> collected. Failure to spend or use the fee or land renders the basis for charging it invalid. So does <br /> failure to use or spend it reasonably quickly , or to spend it for a general or different purpose (i.e., a road <br /> fee for school purposes). However most litigation over land development conditions arises because of <br /> questions about the relationship of the condition on a land development permit to problems or needs <br /> generated by the contemplated development. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in two <br /> landmark cases: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of <br /> Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), both of which struck down government land dedication conditions upon <br /> the issuance of land development permits (coastal zone and building permits, respectively) as <br /> unconstitutional takings of private property by regulation. <br /> In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court struck down a Coastal Commission <br /> <br /> requirement that a landowner dedicate an easement across the back portion of his lot and parallel to the <br /> <br /> public beach as a condition for permission to rebuild a beach house. The Commission said that the <br /> <br /> problem it sought to address was the blocking of views from the beach road to the beach by the <br /> expanded house, thus making it difficult for the public to see that there was public beach below. As the <br /> Court said: <br /> It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches <br /> be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created <br /> by the new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" <br /> to using the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused <br /> by construction of the Nollans' new house...The lack of nexus between the condition and the <br /> original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it <br /> was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid <br /> governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer linuts <br /> of "legitimate state interests" in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them. 483 <br /> U.S. 836-839 (emphasis added). <br /> 11 <br /> <br />